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# NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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REVIEW

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A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF GREECE,  
TURKEY AND YUGOSLAVIA

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
21 October 1960

by

Professor A.N. Dragnich

My topic concerns the area of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. A look at the relief map here shows us something of the existence of interesting configurations of mountains and water. I am sure that all of you have some ideas about the strategic importance of these countries. The geographic areas which they occupy have always been of great importance to any nation, or combination of nations, seeking control in the eastern Mediterranean. With the coming of atomic weapons, however, to be delivered via air, there was a tendency among some strategists to minimize the importance of geography, or, more precisely, to say that control over such areas as the Dardanelles or the Ljubljana gap was of minor importance, because they could be neutralized so easily with atomic weapons. More recently, however, with the realization that what we face is the prospect of limited "brush fire" wars, the strategic importance of this area has again been emphasized.

I shall not dwell upon the importance of these countries because I am sure that this is quite obvious. However, I should like to point out at the outset to a certain incongruity in considering these countries together. Greece and Turkey are on our side; Yugoslavia is not—at least not in my opinion. I shall have more to say about that later.

## HISTORY OF PAST RIVALRY AND CONFLICT

I should think that it would also be useful to point out, at the outset, that there is a long history of past rivalry and conflict where these countries are concerned. First of all, there was the long Turkish occupation of Greece and what was then Serbia, stretching out over several centuries. For hundreds of years, in the games of the good guys and the bad guys in Greece and Serbia, the bad guy was invariably the Turk. During the 19th Century, there was the long struggle of Greece and Serbia for independence from Turkey. Gradually, painfully and after much bloodshed, a precarious independence was won. In this century, the Balkan War of 1912, a carefully calculated effort on the part of the Balkan powers, including Greece and Serbia, to drive the Turks from Europe, succeeded in its major aims. Hostility between these powers was further increased by virtue of the fact that Turkey fought on the side of the Central Powers in World War I. Between the two World Wars, relations between Greece and Yugoslavia were cordial and even friendly. The same thing could be said about relations between Turkey and Yugoslavia. But relations between Greece and Turkey continued tense. They even fought each other in 1921-22, and there have been other indications of tensions since that time. Since World War II, relations between these countries have fluctuated.

In the immediate post-World War II period, Yugoslavia was a loyal ally of the Soviet Union, and deeply involved in helping the Communist rebellion in Greece. Not only did the Yugoslavs help the Communist rebels, they also provided camps for kidnaped Greek children, most of whom found their way to Czechoslovakia, Poland and other eastern European countries. Very few of these children ever found their way back to Greece.

Since Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, Yugoslavia's relations with Greece and Turkey

have gradually improved although, understandably, there is aloofness, if not distrust, between Yugoslavia and her two neighbors. Relations between Greece and Turkey have also fluctuated. There has been a slow movement toward cordiality, although it has been interrupted periodically by such disagreements as the one over the future of Cyprus.

### SOME THINGS IN COMMON

Despite the differences between these countries, they have some things in common, which I think it would be well to note. First of all, they are all underdeveloped countries economically, and they have been striving to develop their economies, although by different means. Because they are undeveloped economically, however, they are not as interdependent as they might be. Each has very little of what the other needs, and each sells many of the same commodities, for example, tobacco and wines. Secondly, there has been political instability, unless you consider the forcefully imposed Communist regime in Yugoslavia stable. The people's yearning for freedom and democracy in all three countries has received setbacks, although less so in Greece than in the other two. Thirdly, all three have had some experience with Communism, as a reality or as an imminent threat, with the Greeks and the Turks able to ward it off, although the threat is not completely removed.

### POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION

Now let us turn to a brief examination of the political and economic situation in these countries.

#### *Greece*

The political situation in Greece today can best be described by the term "an uneasy stability." Greece is a constitutional monarchy governed by a parliamentary system. The party in power is the National

Radical Union, a conservative group which has 170 seats out of 300 in the National Assembly, a comfortable majority. However, the Communists exercise far more power than their numbers would indicate. At the end of World War II, Greece was in the throes of a Communist rebellion. Thanks in large part to American aid, the Communist bid for power was stopped. Today the number of Communists in Greece is estimated at between 50,000 and 75,000 controlled by some 1,500 hard-core underground agents. Yet they support a left-wing organization which constitutes the opposition in the parliament, the so-called United Democratic Left, which has seventy deputies in the National Assembly, a sizeable group. The interesting thing about that particular bloc is that their vote has jumped from ten per cent in 1952 to twenty-four per cent in 1958, i.e., more than doubled in a period of six years. We do not know what it would be today if an election were held, but in all likelihood, if we read the signs correctly, the chances are they would even improve on that twenty-four per cent.

The United Democratic Left voters, by and large, are not Communists or even fellow travelers. Most are non-Communists or even anti-Communists, who are using elections as a way of expressing their resentment against stagnation at home and frustration over such questions as Cyprus. Many Greeks believe that American intervention brought about the appointment of Karamanlis as Premier precisely because we thought he was less aggressive on the Cyprus question. And this makes many Greeks feel that we intervened in the Greek situation to their disadvantage. The question of Cyprus has been settled, in a way, but the Greeks point out that no more than twenty per cent of the population of Cyprus is Turkish, yet there are to be Greek and Turkish troops on the island; there is to be a Turkish vice-president with a veto power; and the Turkish Cypriotes are to have thirty per cent of the representatives in the legislature and in the civil service, all of which makes the Greeks feel that the Turks are getting an undue advantage in Cyprus.



The political situation in Greece has been aggravated somewhat by a nationalist trend, whose leader seems to be General Grivas, the hero of Cyprus. Ironically, the Communists have become "nationalists" in Greece. They support General Grivas in the hope of overthrowing the present government, particularly since Grivas opposes monarchy and advocates constitutional changes, and any basic change would constitute a significant change in Greece. As elsewhere, the Communists are seeking to get the greatest amount of mileage out of the existing discontent.

On the other hand, the leadership of the country seems weak. The older parties seem to have declined. The conservative and liberal forces seem unable to produce a dynamic united leadership. No great political personality has emerged, such as Adenauer in Germany or De Gaulle in France. In sum, therefore, the Greek political situation resembles an uneasy equilibrium.

The Greeks do a lot of talking about politics. It has been said that the Egyptians invented civilization, the Lebonese (Phoenicians) moved it westward and the Greeks civilized it, and they have been talking about it ever since. But talk alone will not solve pressing political and economic problems. As a matter of fact, the Communists make much use of this Greek proclivity to talk, in the coffee houses and at the watering places. The Communist agents will come to a coffee house, and if the Russian ambassador had talked to the Foreign Minister, these agents will say to the people at the coffee house, "Well, do you know that the Soviet ambassador offered our Foreign Minister a loan today, but he turned it down?" (No loan may have been offered at all, but this is one of the Communist tactics.) Or at the watering places, where ladies come to get water and to talk, they will say, "You know, it's terrible what has happened to our

tobacco market. Do you know the reason for this? You know, Germany used to be a big market for tobacco, but the Americans have taken it over and so now we are without a tobacco market." These are but two examples of how Communist agents exploit this great facility to converse.

Let us now turn briefly to the economic situation in Greece. The Greek economy is beset with a number of problems. There have been steady improvements since 1950 in agriculture, industry, health, education, and public utilities. Yet progress has been uneven, and many problems remain unsolved. The biggest problem is how to shift labor surplus from land to industry. Agriculture, including forestry and fishing, is the mainstay of the Greek economy. About half of the country's labor force is employed—often underemployed—in agricultural work, and nearly eighty-five per cent of the country's exports consist of unprocessed and processed farm products.

Secondly, Greece needs to find better export markets for her agricultural products. Most of the western countries have erected tariff barriers which seriously limit Greek exports of agricultural products to the west.

Thirdly, Greece needs development funds and credits. As you know, she has received some help from the United States during the past decade but it is not enough. More recently, she has been getting credits from Germany, as well as advice and technical assistance, and there have been some good results, although there are Greeks who remember something of the pre-1939 period when German economic connections also meant rather strong German control. Consequently, there is some fear in Greece that German capital will also bring about economic control.

Many economists assert that Greece's main troubles stem from an organic poverty which can be overcome only through the cooperative spirit of its few immensely rich citizens, many of whom keep their wealth abroad, particularly the shipping interests, thus denying its use to the Greek economy. These economists also insist that about 400 families still control all the key positions in the Greek economy and a scandalously high proportion of the national income. Moreover, some critics of the present government assert that appropriate use is not being made of the money that is available to the government. Money is being used, they say, to beautify Athens and to make it a great tourist center, with the result that other areas are not getting their fair share of either the tax dollar or the tourist dollar. In any case, the Communists have been very active, telling the Greek farmer that Communist countries would be very glad to buy his products. And to some extent they have succeeded, in that they have prodded the government into seeking more trade with the Communist bloc.

### *Turkey*

I must say that the Turks were very helpful in building up some interest for this lecture by bringing to trial the former leaders this past week. Today, as you are aware, Turkey is a dictatorship, but dedicated to the return of power to civilian authorities at an early date. And people who know something about Turkey seem to feel that they actually mean it—that they will restore power to civilian authorities at a reasonably early date. But while we cannot be too certain of the future, let us review briefly Turkey's recent past which led up to the present dictatorship.

In the first half of this century, Turkey underwent a sizeable revolution, politically, economically and otherwise, particularly under Kemal Ataturk. There were three rather distinct stages of development in this century. The first stage, characterized by the

Young Turk movement and experimentation with constitutionalism and political parties, finally ended in 1923 with the abolition of the monarchy. The second stage saw the establishment of a republic and the inauguration of the Ataturk reforms. This period was characterized by one-party rule, which came to an end about 1945. The third stage, beginning with 1946, saw the reform of the political structure, to permit the open functioning of opposition political parties, which was a big step forward toward democratization in Turkey.

The constitution which existed prior to 1946 was drafted in 1924 and was designed to meet the special conditions of transition from the old monarchy to a republican regime, and the inauguration of the Ataturk reforms. The political struggle which began in 1946 had two immediate goals:

1. to neutralize the ideology and the means which favored the establishment and maintenance of one-party rule.
2. to assure the free existence of opposition parties, and to devise an impartial electoral mechanism to allow the people to express their political preferences freely.

It is of interest that the ruling party, the Republican party, put through reforms in the press law, the police law, the association law and the electoral law. To be sure, there was pressure on the Republicans to do this, but it still remains a fact that they did it, and it is largely as a result of these reforms that the opposition party was able to come into power (the Democratic party). These reforms gave all opposition elements an opportunity to organize, which they did, with the largest opposition segment being organized around the Democratic party. In the elections of 1950, the Democrats won a clear-cut

majority, and the government was turned over to them in an orderly, typically democratic fashion.

Many believed that the Democratic victory in 1950 was a milestone in that it would insure the right of several political parties to exist. Although the Democrats had little trouble in getting re-elected in 1954, they sensed themselves slipping by 1957, and held hurried elections in that year, which they won with great difficulty.

Within the last two years, the Democrats showed less and less respect for the opposition. Progressively, they sought to impair the opposition's right to criticize and to oppose. In the spring of this year, they made the lot of the Republicans unbearable by seeking to set up special committees to investigate their activities. This situation culminated in a series of student demonstrations and some bloodshed. It was at this point that the Army took over, partly because the Democrats, in their effort to stay in power, had dragged a segment of the army into politics. So the army went all the way, so as not to become anyone's political pawn.

It may seem ironical to note that the Democratic party, at its convention in 1949, when it was seeking power, had asserted in effect that a violation of the ballot would entitle the individual to act in self-defense, i.e., the right to rebel. I say "ironical" because this is exactly what happened.

After the coup last spring, the army banned all political activity for the time being, dissolved the National Assembly and arrested the members of the previous cabinet, together with most of the Democratic deputies and a number of civil servants, and in its place (in place of the old regime) the army group set up a cabinet, composed of about one-third generals and the remainder of non-party civilians of some repute. They immediately abolished censorship; journalists and

students were released from prison, and a committee was set up under the Rector of the University of Istanbul, a rather eminent man, to prepare a new constitution. Free elections have been promised in the near future. There was even talk of elections this fall, but subsequently it was decided that the elections should be postponed until spring.

One thing might be noted here before I proceed, and that is that despite the disagreements between the Republicans and Democrats, they are both staunchly anti-Communist, and neither is being used as a Communist front of any type.

Communism does not have much strength in Turkey, although it does have a certain amount of indirect influence and I would like to say a word about this. As is typical of situations where Communists operate, they operate in a variety of guises, a variety of organizations in addition to the party. In the various guises in which they have operated in Turkey, they have still had rather tough sledding, with the Communist party being formally abolished in 1958. Because they have generally been viewed as agents of Moscow, the Communists have had few followers. Because of this and because of the proximity of the Soviet Union to Turkey geographically, there have been those in Turkey who would depict any criticism of internal affairs as unpatriotic. In the opinion of some people in Turkey, ignorance is the best means of assuring social peace. Consequently, discussion of socio-economic problems has been limited largely to academic circles. Hence the fear of Communism becomes an impediment to a healthy democratic debate on some basic problems which the country faces.

At the same time, the Communists and their followers were the first to introduce into Turkey a clear, simple and emotionally appealing explanation of the existing social and economic difficulties, and this has made some impression. Of course, they always

put forth these clear, simple and emotionally appealing explanations with some short-cut solutions which also look attractive on paper. In the absence of other views, the Communists were able to create the impression that only they knew the answer to economic and social problems. I think this has given them much more of a standing than they would otherwise have.

Economically, Turkey's problems are similar to those of Greece, except that Turkey is less developed. The basic economic problem is the reliance on agriculture, with all of its inadequacies, the most important of which is that it is largely dry-land grain farming, to say nothing of the exhaustion of the soil, erosion, and the goats which eat everything in sight and contribute to the erosion. About forty-five per cent of the national income comes from farming, with agricultural products making up about eighty per cent of Turkey's exports. Aggravating the agricultural problem is the annual population increase, which runs around three per cent, which is a sizeable population increase.

Some progress has been made, thanks in large part to the aid which Turkey has received since World War II. National production has almost doubled since 1950, but distribution has been bad and inflation even worse. Wages have stayed low. At the same time, the various social and economic changes whetted the people's appetite for a higher and higher standard of living. But the rush to industrialize has left many unsolved problems.

The Turks had vast plans for development in all directions. A road bridge over the Bosphorus, a shipyard, and a steel industry were going to be built. They were going to make advances in television, tourism, city planning, electrification, irrigation, afforestation, water systems, etc. But the government set no priorities, despite the fact that they could not possibly meet the costs for all these projects at

the same time. There is a shortage of capital in Turkey because of the low level of income and a low rate of savings. There is inadequate technical know-how, and foreign exchange shortages. In short, there has been an unwillingness to look at economic problems realistically.

The Turks have been stubborn, and disinclined to listen to economic advice. As long as credits and aid were flowing from abroad, the unrest caused by rapid and erratic economic development gave little reason for concern. But when aid decreased, the economic boom dwindled and the effects of ill-planned development were quickly felt. Today, there seems to be a determined attempt to abandon the economic nonsense of the previous regime. The economic posts in the present cabinet are in the hands of civilians. An economic planning board has been set up to draw up a long-term investment plan for Turkey. The board has the advice of distinguished foreign economists, and is working in close contact with the United Nations experts who for many years have been poring over Turkey's economic problems.

### *Yugoslavia*

Politically, Yugoslavia is in the grip of a Communist dictatorship, which was established toward the end of World War II. In some circles today it is fashionable to say that Tito and his comrades established themselves in power by their own efforts, whereas Communism was imposed on the other Eastern European countries by the Soviet Union. This is really false. True, there was a Communist-led guerrilla movement in Yugoslavia, whose main effort was devoted to the seizure of political power there, and only secondarily to conducting guerrilla activities against the occupation authorities. But without outside help, it is doubtful if they would have been successful. Outside help came, first from the West, which was won over by Churchill to the principle that whoever was killing Nazis was deserving of help.



We abandoned a real patriot in the person of General Mikhailovitch, who was the first to raise the resistance banner in any European country, but who found that his country could ill afford the shooting of hostages, in a ratio of ten to one and 100 to one for every German soldier and officer killed by the guerrillas. In limiting his activities, he did nothing worse than underground movements in Western Europe which were constantly told to lie low, by no less a person than Mr. Churchill himself, and to husband their resources until the day of the invasion. But this principle did not seem to apply to Yugoslavia, particularly after Tito convinced Churchill that Mikhailovitch's inactivity was tantamount to collaboration with the Nazis.

Western aid to Tito and his partisans was crucial to their survival, but it is doubtful if it would have been enough for victory if it had not been for Soviet help. Let me remind you that by official Yugoslav admissions, when Soviet troops reached the Yugoslav frontier in September 1944, it was a whole month before they could make contact with the Tito forces. Tito's forces were, in the main, in the mountainous regions of Yugoslavia. The regions where the Russians came, eastern Serbia, were regions that were even at that time very friendly to Mikhailovitch, regions in which Tito's movement had not been able to penetrate. Once the Russians arrived, Tito ordered forced marches by his troops from the mountainous areas, and ultimately they did get to the Danube south of Belgrade to make connections with the Soviet forces then under the command of General Tolbukhin. It was this Soviet army that finally drove the Germans out of Belgrade in the latter part of October 1944, and turned the capital of the country over to Tito.

Once established in Belgrade, Tito moved rapidly to consolidate his regime. He had told Churchill earlier, in a conference in Italy, that he had no

intention of seeking to establish a Communist regime, but this did not stop him from riding roughshod over every one who would stand in the way of establishing such a regime. I know that it's fashionable in some circles today, in trying to distinguish Tito's regime from other Communist regimes, to say that this regime not only came into power without outside help, whereas in other eastern European countries it was imposed by the Russians, but also that it was less brutal—that it wasn't as brutal as the regime of the Bulgarians or the Hungarians. Well, I can tell you that Tito's regime exceeded the others in brutality. They had an earlier start for one thing. In proportion to the population of each of these eastern European countries, the Tito Communists killed more people than any of the other East European regimes, although in some circles today it is fashionable to forget that. Countless thousands were wiped out in the most ruthless fashion, often without even a Communist-type trial, as meaningless as that may be. A reign of terror instilled fear everywhere. A secret police, on the Soviet model, moved about freely, governed by no law except its own. Death, torture, imprisonment, fear and intimidation finally brought an unwilling populace to heel. Sullen and resentful, the people saw what had happened to all opponents of the regime, real or imagined. For a time, they believed that the West would not tolerate this state of affairs—that we would do something. But after a while they realized that they would have to make peace with the inevitable. This was even more so after Tito was expelled from the Cominform and after we extended aid to his regime on a gradually increasing scale.

In the past few years, force and violence have not been so much in evidence in Yugoslavia, and if some of you have been there you probably have wondered where all the force and violence is. The techniques of force and fear have been perfected so that their outward manifestation was not so necessary as in the past. But the control is there. There is absolutely

no evidence that the Communists have lost their determination to hold onto power. There is absolutely no evidence that they are willing to share power with anyone, least of all with anyone who believes in freedom.

Once in power, the Yugoslav Communists lost no time in seeking to remake Yugoslavia in the Soviet image, politically, economically and in every other way. Industrial enterprises, large and small, were seized without benefit of compensation. A Soviet-type five-year plan was inaugurated. A drive to collectivize agriculture was launched. In short, the Yugoslav Communists were determined to push through their first five-year plan even if it set the country back fifty years.

The results of their initial economic policies were soon in evidence—serious dislocations, waste, shortages and a rapidly declining standard of living. At the height of their chaotic economic mess, they had the good fortune to be kicked out of the Cominform, and we came to their rescue and bailed them out. Today the story is still told about the peasant who was visited by a foreigner who saw three photographs on his wall—a photograph of Tito, a photograph of King Peter, and a photograph of President Eisenhower. The visitor commented on this congruity and the peasant said, "These are my icons, my holy pictures. This is where I do my worshiping." The foreigner, intrigued by this, said, "Well, I am intrigued, how do you do this?" "Well," he said, "I go over here to Marshal Tito's picture and say, 'Our Father which art in heaven'; then I go over to the picture of King Peter and say, 'Thy kingdom come'; then I go over to the picture of President Eisenhower and say, 'Give us this day our daily bread.'"

It is this ability to see things with a bit of humor that enables these people to continue under this kind of a regime. Of course, the Communists have no

desire for anything but a Communist type economy. In agriculture they have had to abandon collectivization for the time being, or it may be more appropriate to say that they have really postponed it. They have not deviated from their fundamental goal—i.e., a completely collectivized economy.

To be sure, Yugoslavia, like Greece and Turkey, has suffered from too many people on too little land. There was a need to develop the country industrially, but Communist methods have resulted in huge material and human costs. Thanks to Western aid, primarily American, some solid improvements have been made. Even the standard of living has been improved some, although it is doubtful if it is up to prewar standards, especially if we take into account the fact that inflation has cut purchasing power and real wages.

Perhaps the biggest economic hurdle facing the regime is the lack of interest on the part of the people in a collectivized economy. This is especially true of the peasants, who believe, rightly or wrongly, that the government can never again drive them into collective farms. But there are government measures which even today control the peasants' economic activities pretty effectively, nonetheless.

Well, after this brief political and economic survey, let me sum up a few points that are really not within the scope of this lecture, but which have to do with the United States' stake in these countries.

## UNITED STATES' STAKE IN THESE COUNTRIES

### *Greece and Turkey*

First of all, and very importantly, the attitude of Greece and Turkey is good. They want to be associated with the Free World. Greece had her taste of Communist methods in the civil war. There are people walking around in Greece with their tongues cut off as

souvenirs of that brutal Communist effort to seize Greece. Turkey at one time flirted with the Soviets. In 1920, Mustafa Kemal declared his readiness to fight foreign imperialism, and sought to conclude a military and political alliance with the Soviet Union, and after a while he learned what this meant. Agreements were signed and aid given, which helped the Turks in their victory against Greece in 1920-21. But the Turkish-Soviet friendship deteriorated rather rapidly, especially after 1935, primarily for two reasons; (1) the Turks, particularly because of their geographic proximity, could not see any real friendship in the Soviet attempt to set up a strong Communist party in Turkey; (2) when the Soviets demanded modification of the Montreux Convention governing the Straits, the Turks were quite sure that this bode nothing but evil and the treaty of friendship was denounced in 1945.

As I have said, Greece and Turkey are on our side. They are members of NATO. At a time when some NATO members are cutting back on their commitment or threatening to cut back, we do not have this from Greece and Turkey. There is some indication that the Turks are even willing to increase their commitment. The outlook for free institutions in Greece and Turkey is far from dim. Problems there are, but there are things to be optimistic about. The basic attitude of these countries is one of a desire to be free and to be associated with the Free World.

Greece and Turkey are also members of the Balkan Pact, which we sought to foster and of which Yugoslavia is also a member. But in terms of preserving freedom, the Balkan Pact, in my opinion, is something less than a paper tiger. Now a word or two about Yugoslavia.

*Yugoslavia*

I think you had some biographical data circulated about me which indicates that I was in the American Embassy in Belgrade at the time of the break with the Russians. We did talk about this, we did make recommendations in the Embassy, and initially, I think, the basic decision which was reached by Washington, i.e., to try to keep Tito afloat, was sound. This was the first break in the Communist Bloc. It could be hoped that other breaks might come—that this might be one way of licking the Communist menace short of war—that perhaps here was the first blow, the first division within the Communist camp. Moreover, there were some practical reasons, too, why we should take a benevolent attitude toward Tito at that time. The Greek civil war was still on, the Trieste situation was still chaotic, western Europe was very weak militarily. The general feeling was that any subtraction from the Soviet Bloc was useful. But, I think, as time went on there was less and less reason to give aid to Tito. We did exactly the opposite, we increased our aid, even going to the point of giving military aid. I do not think there was any real justification for military aid, although I was out of the Embassy and out of the Foreign Service when that decision was reached. This merely gave the Yugoslavs an opportunity to build up a modern army, an army which I felt would not be used on our side, and conceivably could be used to our detriment. And after a time, I think, there was even a question as to the advisability of economic aid. Ultimately, we did cut out military aid, largely after Tito refused to abide by the agreements concerning inspection. When I was in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1952 (and I don't want to mention any names), I felt that the head of our military mission had been sold a bill of goods. He felt that militarily the Yugoslavs were a potential on our side. Of course, some of his colleagues were not so sure. I remember a young naval officer who said, "I have traveled a thousand kilometers over this country and

have not been able to see one damn thing yet that I was supposed to see." So there were people, as early as that date, who saw that Tito had no desire really to be cooperative, and ultimately when we could not stand it any more, Tito finally said, "Well, I don't need any more military aid." And so it was cut off. Politically, psychologically and morally, it seems to me, the Yugoslav Communists are on the other side, not ours. To be sure, they may want to stay neutral, or try to stay neutral, if possible, try not to get involved. But I would like to reiterate that politically, psychologically and morally, they believe that Communism is the way of the future, that that is the way the world is traveling and not towards freedom. In 1957 Tito asserted rhetorically (you can find this in the January 1957 issue of *Foreign Affairs*), "Why is every move on the part of the Soviet leaders looked upon even now with suspicion?" If that is not an indication of where Tito stands politically, psychologically and morally, I don't know what is. Moreover, we have had a demonstration recently at the General Assembly in New York where Tito, despite his neutralist front, was found on the Soviet side on several questions. Mind you, he did not merely just abstain, he was on their side. First, on the question of the admission of Red China to the United Nations. Secondly, on the resolution to discuss the enslavement of Tibet. Thirdly, on the resolution to discuss Hungary and Soviet actions there. In every one of those three incidents Tito was on the side of the Soviet Union and not ours. By continuing to help Tito's regime I think we helped to perpetuate the idea that Communism can be good or that there can be a type of Communism that is not bad. In this way, wittingly or unwittingly, we give the Communist idea a certain respectability, and I do not believe that this is in our national interest.

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### Publications:

- Tito's Promised Land*
- Yugoslavia*
- Fate of East Central Europe*



## THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ISLAM

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
7 November 1960

by

Professor E. Salem

Though one day before the election one is tempted to talk American politics, let us try to concentrate on an entirely different subject. My subject requires me to talk about Islam in fifty minutes. This is a hard task.

First of all, I would like to emphasize the fact that the world consists of diverse cultural groups, and that the world will continue to consist of diverse cultural groups for a long time to come. I am not therefore a believer in the bipolarization of the world, at least on a cultural level. Consequently, Islamic culture will continue to be important, irrespective of the political destiny of the Muslim World. Whether the Muslim World goes communist or democratic the probability is that it will remain in a special sense Islamic. Therefore it is important to examine Islam as a culture and to refer to the historical process that brought it about.

The modern history of the Near East starts with the march of Alexander the Great on Asia. He sought to "Westernize" the East. From Alexander's conquest of the East the process of Hellenization began. The Greek (Western) culture and the Asiatic cultures gave forth to a new culture of universal relevance. In the midst of this Hellenistic fusion Christianity developed as a universal religion concomitant with the universal Hellenistic culture. Christianity developed in this culture and assumed its forms. Its ideology and its doctrine (ex. concept of the trinity) were formulated

under the discipline of Greek philosophy and Eastern religiosity.

In a very important sense Islam may be considered an Arabian response to the cultural challenge of the Hellenistic world in the north. As the Hellenistic world had its order and ideology, so did the Arabs hope to formulate through Islam their own order and ideology. Muhammad of Arabia had an entirely different experience than that of Jesus, the citizen of the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire had order, law, peace, and organization, but was lacking in spiritual content. Christianity filled the spiritual vacuum. It had no need to venture into the political, economic and legal realms. The Arabian Peninsula, on the other hand, had no centralized government, no peace and very little order. The prophet of Islam had to deal with all these issues. Christianity was purely spiritual because Rome had offered everything else. Muhammad was called upon by necessity to furnish everything. He had to introduce or better "fashion" a new law, a new organization and a new state. Unlike Christianity Islam is not only a religion, but a community bound together by religious, legal, social, economic and political patterns, all conceived and ordered by the Islamic moral imperative. The Christian ethos is spiritual, teleological; that of Islam is spiritual and mundane at the same time. The difference between the founders reflects itself in the two religions. The Islamic community still exists as a community of sentiment, of brotherhood among all the Muslims; and the Islamic moral imperative remains the most unifying factor among the four hundred million Muslims in the world. Muhammad was more impressed with the image of Moses than with that of Jesus, and like Moses he established a warlike community dedicated to victory and to the conversion of the world into the true faith. Unlike Christianity which is the religion of the humble, Islam is the religion of the warrior and of the general. Muhammad organized the Islamic community and gave it a political structure and an

ideological content. It took the overarching ideology of Islam to unite the Arabs, but having unified them it sent them into the world as conquerors to realize in less than a century one of the greatest feats in human history. Under the banner of Islam the Arabs had established an empire that was at one time larger than the Roman Empire at its zenith. It extended from Morocco in the west to India in the east. Having reached the Atlantic, the Arab general rode his horse into the ocean exalting, "By Allah, if there is still further land to the west I shall conquer it for Allah and his prophet." The Muslims conquered Spain and all the major islands of the Mediterranean, plus the heel of Italy. Gradually Islam expanded into Africa and deeper into Asia until it reached Indonesia. Islam had finally settled on the major desert belt of the world, astride the two ancient continents. The character of this desert belt is largely nomadic. The thesis that Islam is designed to appeal to the nomadic rather than to the agriculturist mind is exceedingly important, but it is outside our topic.

The startling military victory of the Arabs confirmed the Islamic belief that Allah was destined to give victory to the Muslims, as the religion of al-haqq (the right) Islam must prevail. Islam is the last revelation of Allah to man. It is essentially the same revelation that was delivered to Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus. The Muslims believed that the followers of these revered prophets had corrupted the revelations. As a last resort Allah revealed the true religion to Muhammad clearly and decisively. The Quran is the sum total of these revelations. Islam therefore does not necessarily contradict the earlier revelations but corrects and completes them. The Quran was revealed to Muhammad through the angel Gabriel between the year 610 and 632 when the prophet died. The Old and the New Testaments were written by many authors. The former embodied the literature of the Jews, the latter consisted of epistles and letters written long after the death of Jesus. They were

corruptible. To the Muslims no such corruption was possible with respect to the Quran. As possessors of the true religion the Muslims became the chosen people of God precisely as the Jews once were. The victory of the early Muslims confirmed their belief in the superiority of Islam, and this belief is still strongly adhered to by the Muslims. Not only was the expansion military and geographical, but cultural as well. From the 8th to the 13th Centuries the Arabic culture was the world culture. The greatest books in medicine, mathematics, astronomy, geography, theology, etc., were written in Arabic. The Muslim scholars broadened through research and inquiry most of the known fields of knowledge. The Arabs received their intellectual ferment from the Greeks, the Syrians, the Persians and the Indians. The Arabic culture assimilated the diverse knowledge of the Near Eastern nations, elaborated on them and gave them an Islamic garb. In the 13th and the 14th Centuries Europe began to translate from Arabic into Latin. Arabic manuscripts on science, theology and philosophy were rendered into Latin by Jesuit scholars and by Jews, namely in Sicily and Spain. Since the Catholic Church erected an iron curtain between the Byzantine Empire and itself, Europe was virtually cut off from the classical Greek heritage. It was through the Muslims (the neutrals in the Christian conflict) that Gothic Europe and the Hellenic World had met. When Greek knowledge reached Europe it was already modified by Islam and carried an unmistakable Islamic flavor. Had it not been for the Arabic medium the European Renaissance would have most likely been delayed. Many important elements of Western culture derive their origin from this classical Arabic culture. In medicine, literature, philosophy, music and the sciences, the West owes a great deal to the Muslims. Algebra, chemistry and the zero are Arabic words. As naval men, you know, I believe, that the following naval words are of Arabic derivation—admiral, arsenal cable, sloop, average, corvette and tariff. The numerals you now use and which have

replaced the Roman numbers came to you through the Arabs. Imagine writing the present budget of the United States in Roman letters! Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologia* is greatly influenced by the writings of the Ibn Sina and of al-Ghazzali. Dante's *Divine Comedy* carries the unmistakable stamp of Arabic Sufism. Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* and Boccaccio's *Decameron* and other masterpieces of European literature were heavily influenced by Arabic writings.

I would like to emphasize, with respect to international relations, that no culture is an island, and that all great cultures are greatly interdependent. This has been particularly true of the ancient Near Eastern cultures, the Greek, the Arabic and the Western. After the Arab culture had attained its height, it began to decline. This is a natural historical process. Why does it happen? Many reasons are given, but none is really too convincing. Life is born, it flourishes and then declines. What is true of life is true of nations and cultures. When the Arabic culture declined, the Arabs did not completely wither from the scene of history. When a culture declines its energy is usually channeled into other directions. The Arabic culture inclined into the magic, mystery and authority of the traditional East. The humanistic, the scientific and the rational declined, and the Muslim Arabs dwelled on the narrower aspects of religion as Christian Europe did in the Dark Ages. Throughout the period of decline the spirit of Islam was preserved by the Sufi orders, the mystics of Islam. As a result of the vivid Muslim Western confrontation in the 19th Century, Islam began to rejuvenate. The 19th Century shook Islam from its lethargy. The Muslim World which for centuries had been victorious, even on European ground, was now on the defensive. Russia was the hunting ground of the Muslim Ottomans. To them the beardless infidels of Europe were inferior people whom they enslaved and employed in the army and the administration. The Muslim who was victorious in the

past, and who was confident of possessing the perfect religion, and therefore destined to rule in Allah's name, found himself rapidly collapsing. The first serious defeat the Turks suffered was in 1774 when they were defeated by the Russians. The famous treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji marks the beginning of the actual decline of the Ottoman Empire. Something fantastic had happened. Islam was on the defensive, and the infidels—the dirty infidels (as they were called by the Muslims)—through the manipulation of science and of new weapons, were on the march. The West was invading Islam, but it is against Islamic law for Muslims to fall under the rule of non-Muslims.

There is nothing in Christianity which says that a Christian should not be colonized by a Muslim, but there is a great deal in Islamic law that compels the Muslim if he is colonized by an outsider to either leave his "colonized" home and emigrate to the land of Islam, or to resist until Islam is victorious and a Muslim ruler is restored. After the Industrial Revolution, Europe began to expand rapidly, and the land of Islam itself became figuratively the "hunting ground" of Europe. In 1830 the French attacked Algeria; in 1881 they took Tunisia; in 1911 they took Morocco; in the same year Italy invaded Libya, the only patch left in North Africa. Egypt was under British administration since 1882. By the end of the 19th Century the periphery of the Arabian Peninsula, from Aden to Kuwait, became British protectorates. Faced with this humiliation Islam reacted by attempts to reform itself and to rejuvenate the Islamic spirit. Islam is searching for ways and means to restore its dignity and power as it is under legal and moral obligation to do.

The first attempt was to reform Islam. In the 19th Century a movement of modernization of Islam took place. This movement is still going on. The second response to the Western intrusion was to nurture a feeling of nationalism, and Arab nationalism is best viewed as an Islamic response to the Christian Western

intrusion. Arab nationalism is deeply Islamic and any attempt to picture it otherwise is based more on fiction than on living observation. Nationalism, therefore, is the modern response of Islam to the Western challenge. Nationalism need not be spiritual, and Islam does not make it necessary that it should be so. Therefore nationalism, as it exists today, is an Islamic reaction to restore the dignity and the power of the Muslim world. Unity of the Muslim world is almost impossible at this age, but political and administrative unity is not obligatory under Islamic law—dignity and power are. Therefore, the aim of the Muslim reaction would not be essentially to restore the unity of the Muslim world—that is important, but not the most important—but the first objective is to restore the dignity and power of the Muslim and to preserve his cultural ethos from the corrosion of Western and Eastern ideologies that now flood the world. In this context nationalism is a healthy thing and its ideology, though influenced by outside forces, remains basically Islamic. In the Arab world all ideology, be it socialistic, communistic, or western democratic, is justified on Islamic ground. The Quran, like the Bible, is flexible and subject to modernistic, progressive interpretations. There is nothing wrong with Islam that the Muslims cannot fix. The need, therefore, is for great Muslim scholars to perform this task and to persuade the Muslims of the validity of this new approach. The Muslims are attempting to restore the Islamic culture in a new form. In working for that goal they do not hesitate to borrow Western methods, techniques and attitudes. They will use every alien factor if it promises to rejuvenate the Islamic spirit and ethos.

It is possible for the Arabs to become Communist, but they will remain essentially Muslim-Arab Communists. If they become democratic they become essentially democratic Muslim Arabs. Whatever form they assume it must incorporate the Arab and the Islamic. There is no such thing as a world ideology that applies equally

everywhere. Each country, though it Westernizes, will most likely preserve its cultural distinctness. This is what is taking place in the Arab World today and I see no other alternative. It will be tragic if Arab ideology becomes completely Western or Eastern. An entirely alien ideology strips the Arab culture of its inner passion—its *élan vitale*. An ideology may be influenced by outside forces, but it must be grounded in the culture which it is supposed to serve. No effort should be spared, therefore, in encouraging the restoration of the Islamic culture in a new form. Grants to Islamic universities, to young Muslim scholars to work in Islamic fields, deserve to be encouraged.

To say that Islam is an obsolete religion is to confess ignorance of Islamic culture. Classical Islamic culture incorporated foreign ideas and attitudes and assimilated them into the Islamic scheme of things. It is quite possible that the new Islamic culture will do the same. Now the modern reaction of the Muslims to the West is serious and is therefore worthy of infinite soul-searching. In his relations with the West, the Muslim suffers from an unfortunate psychology. Muhammad in the Quran recognizes Jesus Christ as a prophet. His mother, Mary, is highly revered by the Muslims. There is ample room for Jesus and for Christianity in Islam, but there is no room at all in Christianity for Muhammad. The Prophet was annoyed with the Christians because they did not accept his prophecy. He craved for recognition, but recognition was not forthcoming, and the Quran reflects the psychological agony of Muhammad. The characteristic features implied in the psychology of the rejected still disturb the subterranean conscience of the Muslim. The Muslim wants to be recognized by the Christian as possessor of the true revelation. He is anxious to hear the Christian speak favorably of Islam, of its prophet, of its great culture. Instead of praise he heard vindictive language from the West. Muhammad had been portrayed as an



imposter, a liar, and up until the 18th and 19th Centuries Western scholars referred to the Prophet of Islam with highly unflattering words. Muhammad is utterly misunderstood in the Western culture. Working under this psychology a Muslim would like a communion of souls; he wants to be more understood and appreciated on his own grounds. It would be more worth while for the future President of the United States to speak sympathetically of the Islamic world and the Islamic culture than of the "Middle East" and the "Near East." These latter terms convey externality and reveal the shallow and selfish interests of the foreign powers in the defense, the oil, and the routes of the area. But Muslims like to be thought of in terms of Islam. The Muslim likes to be appreciated on his own cultural ground as a man who lives, dies, suffers and has something to contribute to the world. He would like to be looked at culturally rather than, incidentally, as a man who lives in an area that is of strategic value to the powers. How to appreciate the Muslim, how to commune with him on the deepest cultural level—this is the challenge to Western leadership.

In addition to this psychological element there is the question of imperialism. (Whether you like to tone it down and call it "colonialism" or "protection" or even "assistance" or not is your right.) Whatever you choose to call it, imperialism relegates the Muslim to an inferior political position and aggravates his agony. He is in a rage against the imperialist powers, namely the Christian Europeans—the filthy infidels. In his enmity to the West he is justified by religion as well as by political rationale.

Whether Algeria was backward, diseased or ignorant when France invaded it is immaterial. The material question is that this is an Islamic culture whose values were disturbed by an external, arrogant culture, and the Islamic response would be naturally one of negation—one of "you get out." This manifested

itself in nationalism—a natural and healthy manifestation. There is no need to criticize it; it is something to describe. Nationalism is naturally a negative reaction against the foreign powers—"get the foreigners out; let us reestablish our cultural identity." The question is not one of development and of material welfare; it is one of identity. This is the greatest issue. A Tunisian who is educated in France and knows little besides French culture returns to Tunisia and calls for the rejuvenation of the Arab Islamic culture because this is the only culture he can identify himself with. He is an alien to France as I am an alien to America, and he would like to identify himself with his own culture, with his own community. Nationalism may also be considered a movement of restoration of Muhammadan identity. What is going on in Africa? Every African nation would like to develop its own, even pagan, values because it likes to have its identity on authentic firm grounds, and not to be merely a reflection of a Western culture. It is a question of identity and to the Muslim the only identity he knows is an Islamic identity. Hence we have from now on to hear more and more about Islam, and the more the Muslims progress the more they will explore the Islamic element and recreate it in a modern garb. Islam is quite adept at that.

Western imperialism has intensified anti-Western feeling. It is most unfortunate that America, the land that had no association with imperialistic designs in the Islamic World, has allowed herself to be associated with the "hated imperialists." America has suffered by virtue of its association with Israel, and indirectly with France towards Algeria, and by failing to clearly associate itself with the emerging classes in the Muslim World. Thus the anti-Western feeling that characterized nationalism, has by association included America. The anti-Western feeling may turn out to be a phase in the development of nationalism. As nationalism gets more stable and attains its objectives and as Muslims become more confident and

secure, they will undoubtedly become less negative. This is the lesson of history. Meanwhile the Muslim World is trying to develop itself as fast as it can by a process called modernization, or more frankly, Westernization.

Westernization is now a process of universal relevance. Everyone is Westernizing. Communism (whether you like it or not) is one form of Westernization. So China is in a sense Westernizing. What is meant by Westernization? This means the use of the rational method, of industry, of techniques, of efficiency for mobilizing the forces of society towards progress—towards material, economic progress, for improving the economic lot of the masses. The concept of "progress" towards "bigger and better" things for everybody is something new in history. Progress in this sense is the spirit of our age. It is a contagious spirit. Whether it is the communizing influence, or the Western democratic influence, the objective is really the same—it is to explore as much as possible the social and economic forces of the society and to use them for human needs—for human material needs. You are doing that, and theoretically the Russians are doing the same. The Muslims are in the same boat. They are all Westernizing. It is extremely superficial to think that Westernization means that they are going to become Westerners. In a sense they are Westernizing to oppose the West. It is logical. No culture is more hated and more emulated than Western culture. You borrow the achievements of your enemy to strengthen yourself. The Muslim does not want, nor does he expect, to be an image of America. When President Eisenhower says that he would like to have the American ideals spread throughout the whole world, he is speaking of unrealizable goals. When Chairman Khrushchev speaks about Communism universalizing itself, he is committing the same error. Previously, Christianity and Islam failed to attain that goal. Their failure is the unlearned lesson. Every cultural group has its own image, has its own ideas, and the last thing it

wants to do is to be a reflection of you or of Russia. I hate to become a sheer reflection of my American wife. If this were to happen then adieu to my dignity, my identity and my roots. The question is ultimately one of roots. Every culture wants to revive its roots, and enhance its identity. Westernization is used as the means to that end. Westernization is being used in Turkey, but Turkey is more Islamic now than it was under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the twenties. Ataturk collaborated with Lenin to prevent the Western imperialists, the Greeks, the British and the French from dividing Turkey. He collaborated with the Communists to preserve the Turkish ethos. Now the Turks are collaborating with the West to safeguard the same goal. Saladin was great because he checked the march of the Crusaders in the world of Islam. As Saladin used the second Rome (Byzantium) against the Western invaders, so is Nasir now making a common cause with the third Rome (Russia) against the modern Western "crusaders." But as Saladin was no lover of the Byzantines, so Nasir is no great lover of Communism. Nasir, like Saladin, is interested in only one thing, the restoration of power and dignity to his Islamic community. In so doing he can better live with his conscience as a good Muslim.

The Islamic community must remain free and independent. It must nurture the Islamic virtues and live fully under the moral imperative of Islam, not only to secure happiness in this life, but to attain eternal salvation on Judgment Day. To the Muslim, then, his salvation has social and political requisites that can only be fulfilled in a strong, well-integrated community. This is a basic fact. This is why it is absolutely necessary for a Muslim country to be independent, for a Muslim to restore his cultural identity and his concept of dignity and power. All the slogans of Arab nationalism are Islamic; they cannot be otherwise. Therefore, a process of Westernization or of secularization, is really of no danger to Islam, but it is the only weapon left to Islam to pull itself

by its bootstraps as it were, and to restore its former identity and its old power. Islam as a culture was highly flexible. It all depends on the great interpreters of Islam. In the Quran Muhammad says, "You may marry one, two, three or four, but if you feel that you cannot do justice among them, marry only one." A modern interpreter says, "Muhammad knew that you cannot do justice except to one woman, and he was actually exhorting the Muslims to be monogamous." Thus one institution is reformed without departing from Islam. Muhammad said that the rich must help the poor. On the basis of this teaching the reformer is willing to introduce socialist or progressive taxation in Islam. There is ample ground in the Quran for intellectual freedom, and for humanistic adventures, if only the Muslim is ready for them. The cultural problem of the Muslim is primarily not one of religion, but of education, one of producing the right thinkers and the right scholars who can delve into Islam and modernize it. There are many superficial attempts now, but there will be deeper ones in the future, and Islam will be restored in a new form.

The emerging Islamic culture need not be isolationist. There is room in Islam for international cooperation, for international peace, for international law. In this respect Muhammad was a highly enlightened and foreseeing prophet. This is the reason why in reforming Islam the reformer returns directly to Muhammad rather than to those who imitated him later. Speaking as a Christian (I am a Greek Orthodox, a fossil group that has survived Islamic conquest) I feel it is the duty of Christianity to help Islam rejuvenate itself. It is good for Western culture to have other cultures in the world prosper and flourish on their own grounds. It would be good to encourage the idea of Islamism rather than Middle Easternism which really means nothing. In so doing one reaches more into the heart and soul of the Muslim peoples.

A lecture like this delivered extemporaneously and oratorically can have no summary, but I will be happy to answer any questions you may wish to raise.

## BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Elie A. Salem

Present Position: Assistant Professor of Middle East Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

### Schools:

1950 American University of Beirut, B.A. degree  
1951 University of Cincinnati, M.A. Political Science  
1953 The Johns Hopkins University, Ph.D. degree in  
Political Theory and Islamicism

### Career Highlights:

From 1954 to 1956, Mr. Salem taught public administration and general education at the American University of Beirut and also served as Secretary General of the Arab Public Administration Conference.

Since September 1956, Mr. Salem has been teaching at the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University in the capacity of Assistant Professor of Middle East Studies.

In 1959, Mr. Salem received a grant from the Social Science Research Council to do research in the Middle East on Arab political institutions. After spending eight months in the area Mr. Salem returned to his teaching post at the School of Advanced International Studies. At present he is writing a book on "Arab Politics and Ideology," which should be ready for publication in the summer of 1961. Mr. Salem has written a number of books on various subjects.

In addition, Mr. Salem has participated in numerous television and radio programs on the Middle East, and has lectured in academic, professional, social centers, including the University of Delaware, the Foreign Service Institute, the Naval War College, and the Army Intelligence School.

## RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel,  
(G14)  
Department of the Navy  
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Commanding Officer  
U.S. Naval Station  
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San Diego 36, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH  
Naval District (Code 141)  
Navy No. 128  
Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces,  
Marianas  
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 17  
Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

U.S. Naval Station Library  
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection  
Building C-9  
U.S. Naval Base  
Norfolk 11, Virginia



## BOOKS

Atkinson, James D. *The Edge of War*. Chicago: Regnery, 1960. 318 p.

Very adroitly and effectively Mr. Atkinson has recognized and analyzed Communist strategy in its deadliest form. Similarly, he has portrayed what he contends to be a failure on our part to view the East-West conflict in its proper perspective—i.e., no war and no peace. One of his basic points is that the American way plays the game fundamentally aboveboard and according to the rules, and the Soviets play to win, no matter how base or immoral the strategy employed.

In concluding, the author has tried to make the American people and their leaders understand the Communist challenge—and its meaning—and accept it; to make them understand and accept the challenge of unconventional warfare in the continuing no war, no peace atmosphere.

Seth, Ronald. *Two Fleets Surprised*. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960. 201 p.

*Two Fleets Surprised* is an accurate, highly readable account of the naval action between elements of the Italian and British navies at Cape Matapan, off the coast of southwest Greece. Written in detail, and with sufficient technical data to hold the interest of the professional man-of-war man, it presents the strategic and tactical aspects leading to and employed during the sea battle. Included in the description are eyewitness accounts of the surprise suffered by, and later actions of, the two Italian cruisers destroyed in a night action of three minutes' duration. The remarks concerning communications, sea-air coordination and tactics employed make this book well worth a careful reading.

Baruch, Bernard M. *The Public Years*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. 431 p.

In this second book of memoirs, Mr. Baruch relates his association with great and near-great persons and his involvement in national and international affairs. His comments on past events, while profiting from the vantage of hindsight, are penetrating and sound. This account portrays the keen insight and wisdom of Bernard Baruch in surveying the momentous years between Presidents Wilson and Truman, and reveals the sage advice which he provided to those in positions of authority relative to the social, economic and military affairs of this nation.

Hydeman, Lee M. and William H. Berman. *International Control of Nuclear Maritime Activities*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1960. 384 p.

*International Control of Nuclear Maritime Activities* is one of the first published works in a complex and acutely important new area of international law. It is extremely well written and easy to read and contains a wealth of information resulting from the comprehensive research efforts of the authors.

Payne, Donald G. *Red Duster, White Ensign*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1960. 260 p.

This account of the convoys to Malta during World War II is a series of narratives on various convoys and related military action from the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1942, illustrating the resilience of sea power in the face of apparently overwhelming opposition and difficulties. The role of carrier aircraft in protecting shipping from land-based air and the relative successes of remote control versus on-the-scene command of convoys and escorts is discussed in detail.

Courlander, Harold. *Shaping Our Times*. New York: Oceana, 1960. 242 p.

In a very clear and concise manner the author traces the United Nations from its inception to the present time, and demonstrates by use of abbreviated case histories how the various organs of the United Nations have functioned, both within and outside the context of the Charter. He indicates where the United Nations has succeeded and does not hesitate to point out its failures and shortcomings, showing by example how various forces in the world have tended to influence the position of specific nations and regional groups. This book is recommended to anyone who is interested in a short primer on the United Nations.

Ching-wen, Chow. *Ten Years of Storm*. New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, 1960. 323 p.

The author of *Ten Years of Storm* was a high official of the Chinese Communist Ministry of the Interior for eight years before he fled to Hong Kong in 1957. As Lin Yutang says in the foreword, "Here at last is a book by a Chinese who knows the true story of the Communist regime. The facts presented make the story believable, even though he is a Chinese talking about China." One of the important conclusions he draws from his long look at the Chinese Communist state is that the Westerners are foolish to pin their hopes on "Maoist" heresy. Peiping has a motive for every bit of information it gives the West. It may well be that the much-discussed Sino-Soviet dispute is a Communist gambit to enhance Khrushchev's stature as a peace-seeker. Mao will postpone any major quarrels with the socialist fatherland until the capitalist West is buried deep. On that point he is inflexible. He will not overly antagonize the helpful Soviets while China remains poor and underdeveloped, which will be considerably longer than some naive Westerners suppose. Chow discusses very freely and in detail, giving names, the series of fronts, movements,

struggles and liquidations by which the Communists achieved absolute sway. Though it is practically impossible for a Westerner to grasp the details and Chinese proper nouns, this book is convincing in its authenticity. The author concludes by discussing the weaknesses of the Communist regime and the hopes for China. There may yet be a great leap forward by those who have nothing to lose and their humanity to regain.

Ismay, Hastings L.I. *The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay*. New York: Viking, 1960. 488 p.

This autobiography covers the life of General Ismay from his initial service in India in 1902 until his retirement in 1957, the most emphasis being on the World War II period. It is a very clear description of the central direction of the war by one who was "in the middle of the web" as Churchill's Chief of Staff. General Ismay worked continually with the principal British and American leaders and attended the main wartime conferences at Moscow, Washington, Yalta, Cairo and Teheran. His reporting appears to be straightforward and factual, does not indulge in personalities and tells of his own involvement with modesty. Churchill's figure, as it should, permeates the narration of decisions and events. The writer includes portraits of the major Allied leaders but is somewhat noncommittal about the contributions of General de Gaulle, possibly reflecting Churchillian sentiments on the "cross of Lorraine" which the Prime Minister bore. In his reporting of the associations with the Russians, the reader may detect the influence of future events, for he appears to have foreseen the nature of the postwar East-West relations. This autobiography is very easy reading and is of interest to one desiring a brief account of the central direction of the war—the organization, the decisions and the personalities involved.

**- NOTES -**