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A Political and Economic Appraisal of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia

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A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF GREECE,
TURKEY AND YUGOSLAVIA

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
21 October 1960

by

Professor A.N. Dragnich

My topic concerns the area of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. A look at the relief map here shows us something of the existence of interesting configurations of mountains and water. I am sure that all of you have some ideas about the strategic importance of these countries. The geographic areas which they occupy have always been of great importance to any nation, or combination of nations, seeking control in the eastern Mediterranean. With the coming of atomic weapons, however, to be delivered via air, there was a tendency among some strategists to minimize the importance of geography, or, more precisely, to say that control over such areas as the Dardanelles or the Ljubljana gap was of minor importance, because they could be neutralized so easily with atomic weapons. More recently, however, with the realization that what we face is the prospect of limited "brush fire" wars, the strategic importance of this area has again been emphasized.

I shall not dwell upon the importance of these countries because I am sure that this is quite obvious. However, I should like to point out at the outset to a certain incongruity in considering these countries together. Greece and Turkey are on our side; Yugoslavia is not—at least not in my opinion. I shall have more to say about that later.

HISTORY OF PAST RIVALRY AND CONFLICT

I should think that it would also be useful to point out, at the outset, that there is a long history of past rivalry and conflict where these countries are concerned. First of all, there was the long Turkish occupation of Greece and what was then Serbia, stretching out over several centuries. For hundreds of years, in the games of the good guys and the bad guys in Greece and Serbia, the bad guy was invariably the Turk. During the 19th Century, there was the long struggle of Greece and Serbia for independence from Turkey. Gradually, painfully and after much bloodshed, a precarious independence was won. In this century, the Balkan War of 1912, a carefully calculated effort on the part of the Balkan powers, including Greece and Serbia, to drive the Turks from Europe, succeeded in its major aims. Hostility between these powers was further increased by virtue of the fact that Turkey fought on the side of the Central Powers in World War I. Between the two World Wars, relations between Greece and Yugoslavia were cordial and even friendly. The same thing could be said about relations between Turkey and Yugoslavia. But relations between Greece and Turkey continued tense. They even fought each other in 1921-22, and there have been other indications of tensions since that time. Since World War II, relations between these countries have fluctuated.

In the immediate post-World War II period, Yugoslavia was a loyal ally of the Soviet Union, and deeply involved in helping the Communist rebellion in Greece. Not only did the Yugoslavs help the Communist rebels, they also provided camps for kidnaped Greek children, most of whom found their way to Czechoslovakia, Poland and other eastern European countries. Very few of these children ever found their way back to Greece.

Since Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, Yugoslavia's relations with Greece and Turkey

have gradually improved although, understandably, there is aloofness, if not distrust, between Yugoslavia and her two neighbors. Relations between Greece and Turkey have also fluctuated. There has been a slow movement toward cordiality, although it has been interrupted periodically by such disagreements as the one over the future of Cyprus.

SOME THINGS IN COMMON

Despite the differences between these countries, they have some things in common, which I think it would be well to note. First of all, they are all underdeveloped countries economically, and they have been striving to develop their economies, although by different means. Because they are undeveloped economically, however, they are not as interdependent as they might be. Each has very little of what the other needs, and each sells many of the same commodities, for example, tobacco and wines. Secondly, there has been political instability, unless you consider the forcefully imposed Communist regime in Yugoslavia stable. The people's yearning for freedom and democracy in all three countries has received setbacks, although less so in Greece than in the other two. Thirdly, all three have had some experience with Communism, as a reality or as an imminent threat, with the Greeks and the Turks able to ward it off, although the threat is not completely removed.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION

Now let us turn to a brief examination of the political and economic situation in these countries.

Greece

The political situation in Greece today can best be described by the term "an uneasy stability." Greece is a constitutional monarchy governed by a parliamentary system. The party in power is the National

Radical Union, a conservative group which has 170 seats out of 300 in the National Assembly, a comfortable majority. However, the Communists exercise far more power than their numbers would indicate. At the end of World War II, Greece was in the throes of a Communist rebellion. Thanks in large part to American aid, the Communist bid for power was stopped. Today the number of Communists in Greece is estimated at between 50,000 and 75,000 controlled by some 1,500 hard-core underground agents. Yet they support a left-wing organization which constitutes the opposition in the parliament, the so-called United Democratic Left, which has seventy deputies in the National Assembly, a sizeable group. The interesting thing about that particular bloc is that their vote has jumped from ten per cent in 1952 to twenty-four per cent in 1958, i.e., more than doubled in a period of six years. We do not know what it would be today if an election were held, but in all likelihood, if we read the signs correctly, the chances are they would even improve on that twenty-four per cent.

The United Democratic Left voters, by and large, are not Communists or even fellow travelers. Most are non-Communists or even anti-Communists, who are using elections as a way of expressing their resentment against stagnation at home and frustration over such questions as Cyprus. Many Greeks believe that American intervention brought about the appointment of Karamanlis as Premier precisely because we thought he was less aggressive on the Cyprus question. And this makes many Greeks feel that we intervened in the Greek situation to their disadvantage. The question of Cyprus has been settled, in a way, but the Greeks point out that no more than twenty per cent of the population of Cyprus is Turkish, yet there are to be Greek and Turkish troops on the island; there is to be a Turkish vice-president with a veto power; and the Turkish Cypriotes are to have thirty per cent of the representatives in the legislature and in the civil service, all of which makes the Greeks feel that the Turks are getting an undue advantage in Cyprus.

The political situation in Greece has been aggravated somewhat by a nationalist trend, whose leader seems to be General Grivas, the hero of Cyprus. Ironically, the Communists have become "nationalists" in Greece. They support General Grivas in the hope of overthrowing the present government, particularly since Grivas opposes monarchy and advocates constitutional changes, and any basic change would constitute a significant change in Greece. As elsewhere, the Communists are seeking to get the greatest amount of mileage out of the existing discontent.

On the other hand, the leadership of the country seems weak. The older parties seem to have declined. The conservative and liberal forces seem unable to produce a dynamic united leadership. No great political personality has emerged, such as Adenauer in Germany or De Gaulle in France. In sum, therefore, the Greek political situation resembles an uneasy equilibrium.

The Greeks do a lot of talking about politics. It has been said that the Egyptians invented civilization, the Lebonese (Phoenicians) moved it westward and the Greeks civilized it, and they have been talking about it ever since. But talk alone will not solve pressing political and economic problems. As a matter of fact, the Communists make much use of this Greek proclivity to talk, in the coffee houses and at the watering places. The Communist agents will come to a coffee house, and if the Russian ambassador had talked to the Foreign Minister, these agents will say to the people at the coffee house, "Well, do you know that the Soviet ambassador offered our Foreign Minister a loan today, but he turned it down?" (No loan may have been offered at all, but this is one of the Communist tactics.) Or at the watering places, where ladies come to get water and to talk, they will say, "You know, it's terrible what has happened to our

tobacco market. Do you know the reason for this? You know, Germany used to be a big market for tobacco, but the Americans have taken it over and so now we are without a tobacco market." These are but two examples of how Communist agents exploit this great facility to converse.

Let us now turn briefly to the economic situation in Greece. The Greek economy is beset with a number of problems. There have been steady improvements since 1950 in agriculture, industry, health, education, and public utilities. Yet progress has been uneven, and many problems remain unsolved. The biggest problem is how to shift labor surplus from land to industry. Agriculture, including forestry and fishing, is the mainstay of the Greek economy. About half of the country's labor force is employed—often underemployed—in agricultural work, and nearly eighty-five per cent of the country's exports consist of unprocessed and processed farm products.

Secondly, Greece needs to find better export markets for her agricultural products. Most of the western countries have erected tariff barriers which seriously limit Greek exports of agricultural products to the west.

Thirdly, Greece needs development funds and credits. As you know, she has received some help from the United States during the past decade but it is not enough. More recently, she has been getting credits from Germany, as well as advice and technical assistance, and there have been some good results, although there are Greeks who remember something of the pre-1939 period when German economic connections also meant rather strong German control. Consequently, there is some fear in Greece that German capital will also bring about economic control.

Many economists assert that Greece's main troubles stem from an organic poverty which can be overcome only through the cooperative spirit of its few immensely rich citizens, many of whom keep their wealth abroad, particularly the shipping interests, thus denying its use to the Greek economy. These economists also insist that about 400 families still control all the key positions in the Greek economy and a scandalously high proportion of the national income. Moreover, some critics of the present government assert that appropriate use is not being made of the money that is available to the government. Money is being used, they say, to beautify Athens and to make it a great tourist center, with the result that other areas are not getting their fair share of either the tax dollar or the tourist dollar. In any case, the Communists have been very active, telling the Greek farmer that Communist countries would be very glad to buy his products. And to some extent they have succeeded, in that they have prodded the government into seeking more trade with the Communist bloc.

Turkey

I must say that the Turks were very helpful in building up some interest for this lecture by bringing to trial the former leaders this past week. Today, as you are aware, Turkey is a dictatorship, but dedicated to the return of power to civilian authorities at an early date. And people who know something about Turkey seem to feel that they actually mean it—that they will restore power to civilian authorities at a reasonably early date. But while we cannot be too certain of the future, let us review briefly Turkey's recent past which led up to the present dictatorship.

In the first half of this century, Turkey underwent a sizeable revolution, politically, economically and otherwise, particularly under Kemal Ataturk. There were three rather distinct stages of development in this century. The first stage, characterized by the

Young Turk movement and experimentation with constitutionalism and political parties, finally ended in 1923 with the abolition of the monarchy. The second stage saw the establishment of a republic and the inauguration of the Ataturk reforms. This period was characterized by one-party rule, which came to an end about 1945. The third stage, beginning with 1946, saw the reform of the political structure, to permit the open functioning of opposition political parties, which was a big step forward toward democratization in Turkey.

The constitution which existed prior to 1946 was drafted in 1924 and was designed to meet the special conditions of transition from the old monarchy to a republican regime, and the inauguration of the Ataturk reforms. The political struggle which began in 1946 had two immediate goals:

1. to neutralize the ideology and the means which favored the establishment and maintenance of one-party rule.
2. to assure the free existence of opposition parties, and to devise an impartial electoral mechanism to allow the people to express their political preferences freely.

It is of interest that the ruling party, the Republican party, put through reforms in the press law, the police law, the association law and the electoral law. To be sure, there was pressure on the Republicans to do this, but it still remains a fact that they did it, and it is largely as a result of these reforms that the opposition party was able to come into power (the Democratic party). These reforms gave all opposition elements an opportunity to organize, which they did, with the largest opposition segment being organized around the Democratic party. In the elections of 1950, the Democrats won a clear-cut

majority, and the government was turned over to them in an orderly, typically democratic fashion.

Many believed that the Democratic victory in 1950 was a milestone in that it would insure the right of several political parties to exist. Although the Democrats had little trouble in getting re-elected in 1954, they sensed themselves slipping by 1957, and held hurried elections in that year, which they won with great difficulty.

Within the last two years, the Democrats showed less and less respect for the opposition. Progressively, they sought to impair the opposition's right to criticize and to oppose. In the spring of this year, they made the lot of the Republicans unbearable by seeking to set up special committees to investigate their activities. This situation culminated in a series of student demonstrations and some bloodshed. It was at this point that the Army took over, partly because the Democrats, in their effort to stay in power, had dragged a segment of the army into politics. So the army went all the way, so as not to become anyone's political pawn.

It may seem ironical to note that the Democratic party, at its convention in 1949, when it was seeking power, had asserted in effect that a violation of the ballot would entitle the individual to act in self-defense, i.e., the right to rebel. I say "ironical" because this is exactly what happened.

After the coup last spring, the army banned all political activity for the time being, dissolved the National Assembly and arrested the members of the previous cabinet, together with most of the Democratic deputies and a number of civil servants, and in its place (in place of the old regime) the army group set up a cabinet, composed of about one-third generals and the remainder of non-party civilians of some repute. They immediately abolished censorship; journalists and

students were released from prison, and a committee was set up under the Rector of the University of Istanbul, a rather eminent man, to prepare a new constitution. Free elections have been promised in the near future. There was even talk of elections this fall, but subsequently it was decided that the elections should be postponed until spring.

One thing might be noted here before I proceed, and that is that despite the disagreements between the Republicans and Democrats, they are both staunchly anti-Communist, and neither is being used as a Communist front of any type.

Communism does not have much strength in Turkey, although it does have a certain amount of indirect influence and I would like to say a word about this. As is typical of situations where Communists operate, they operate in a variety of guises, a variety of organizations in addition to the party. In the various guises in which they have operated in Turkey, they have still had rather tough sledding, with the Communist party being formally abolished in 1958. Because they have generally been viewed as agents of Moscow, the Communists have had few followers. Because of this and because of the proximity of the Soviet Union to Turkey geographically, there have been those in Turkey who would depict any criticism of internal affairs as unpatriotic. In the opinion of some people in Turkey, ignorance is the best means of assuring social peace. Consequently, discussion of socio-economic problems has been limited largely to academic circles. Hence the fear of Communism becomes an impediment to a healthy democratic debate on some basic problems which the country faces.

At the same time, the Communists and their followers were the first to introduce into Turkey a clear, simple and emotionally appealing explanation of the existing social and economic difficulties, and this has made some impression. Of course, they always

put forth these clear, simple and emotionally appealing explanations with some short-cut solutions which also look attractive on paper. In the absence of other views, the Communists were able to create the impression that only they knew the answer to economic and social problems. I think this has given them much more of a standing than they would otherwise have.

Economically, Turkey's problems are similar to those of Greece, except that Turkey is less developed. The basic economic problem is the reliance on agriculture, with all of its inadequacies, the most important of which is that it is largely dry-land grain farming, to say nothing of the exhaustion of the soil, erosion, and the goats which eat everything in sight and contribute to the erosion. About forty-five per cent of the national income comes from farming, with agricultural products making up about eighty per cent of Turkey's exports. Aggravating the agricultural problem is the annual population increase, which runs around three per cent, which is a sizeable population increase.

Some progress has been made, thanks in large part to the aid which Turkey has received since World War II. National production has almost doubled since 1950, but distribution has been bad and inflation even worse. Wages have stayed low. At the same time, the various social and economic changes whetted the people's appetite for a higher and higher standard of living. But the rush to industrialize has left many unsolved problems.

The Turks had vast plans for development in all directions. A road bridge over the Bosphorus, a shipyard, and a steel industry were going to be built. They were going to make advances in television, tourism, city planning, electrification, irrigation, afforestation, water systems, etc. But the government set no priorities, despite the fact that they could not possibly meet the costs for all these projects at

the same time. There is a shortage of capital in Turkey because of the low level of income and a low rate of savings. There is inadequate technical know-how, and foreign exchange shortages. In short, there has been an unwillingness to look at economic problems realistically.

The Turks have been stubborn, and disinclined to listen to economic advice. As long as credits and aid were flowing from abroad, the unrest caused by rapid and erratic economic development gave little reason for concern. But when aid decreased, the economic boom dwindled and the effects of ill-planned development were quickly felt. Today, there seems to be a determined attempt to abandon the economic nonsense of the previous regime. The economic posts in the present cabinet are in the hands of civilians. An economic planning board has been set up to draw up a long-term investment plan for Turkey. The board has the advice of distinguished foreign economists, and is working in close contact with the United Nations experts who for many years have been poring over Turkey's economic problems.

Yugoslavia

Politically, Yugoslavia is in the grip of a Communist dictatorship, which was established toward the end of World War II. In some circles today it is fashionable to say that Tito and his comrades established themselves in power by their own efforts, whereas Communism was imposed on the other Eastern European countries by the Soviet Union. This is really false. True, there was a Communist-led guerrilla movement in Yugoslavia, whose main effort was devoted to the seizure of political power there, and only secondarily to conducting guerrilla activities against the occupation authorities. But without outside help, it is doubtful if they would have been successful. Outside help came, first from the West, which was won over by Churchill to the principle that whoever was killing Nazis was deserving of help.

We abandoned a real patriot in the person of General Mikhailovitch, who was the first to raise the resistance banner in any European country, but who found that his country could ill afford the shooting of hostages, in a ratio of ten to one and 100 to one for every German soldier and officer killed by the guerrillas. In limiting his activities, he did nothing worse than underground movements in Western Europe which were constantly told to lie low, by no less a person than Mr. Churchill himself, and to husband their resources until the day of the invasion. But this principle did not seem to apply to Yugoslavia, particularly after Tito convinced Churchill that Mikhailovitch's inactivity was tantamount to collaboration with the Nazis.

Western aid to Tito and his partisans was crucial to their survival, but it is doubtful if it would have been enough for victory if it had not been for Soviet help. Let me remind you that by official Yugoslav admissions, when Soviet troops reached the Yugoslav frontier in September 1944, it was a whole month before they could make contact with the Tito forces. Tito's forces were, in the main, in the mountainous regions of Yugoslavia. The regions where the Russians came, eastern Serbia, were regions that were even at that time very friendly to Mikhailovitch, regions in which Tito's movement had not been able to penetrate. Once the Russians arrived, Tito ordered forced marches by his troops from the mountainous areas, and ultimately they did get to the Danube south of Belgrade to make connections with the Soviet forces then under the command of General Tolbukhin. It was this Soviet army that finally drove the Germans out of Belgrade in the latter part of October 1944, and turned the capital of the country over to Tito.

Once established in Belgrade, Tito moved rapidly to consolidate his regime. He had told Churchill earlier, in a conference in Italy, that he had no

intention of seeking to establish a Communist regime, but this did not stop him from riding roughshod over every one who would stand in the way of establishing such a regime. I know that it's fashionable in some circles today, in trying to distinguish Tito's regime from other Communist regimes, to say that this regime not only came into power without outside help, whereas in other eastern European countries it was imposed by the Russians, but also that it was less brutal—that it wasn't as brutal as the regime of the Bulgarians or the Hungarians. Well, I can tell you that Tito's regime exceeded the others in brutality. They had an earlier start for one thing. In proportion to the population of each of these eastern European countries, the Tito Communists killed more people than any of the other East European regimes, although in some circles today it is fashionable to forget that. Countless thousands were wiped out in the most ruthless fashion, often without even a Communist-type trial, as meaningless as that may be. A reign of terror instilled fear everywhere. A secret police, on the Soviet model, moved about freely, governed by no law except its own. Death, torture, imprisonment, fear and intimidation finally brought an unwilling populace to heel. Sullen and resentful, the people saw what had happened to all opponents of the regime, real or imagined. For a time, they believed that the West would not tolerate this state of affairs—that we would do something. But after a while they realized that they would have to make peace with the inevitable. This was even more so after Tito was expelled from the Cominform and after we extended aid to his regime on a gradually increasing scale.

In the past few years, force and violence have not been so much in evidence in Yugoslavia, and if some of you have been there you probably have wondered where all the force and violence is. The techniques of force and fear have been perfected so that their outward manifestation was not so necessary as in the past. But the control is there. There is absolutely

no evidence that the Communists have lost their determination to hold onto power. There is absolutely no evidence that they are willing to share power with anyone, least of all with anyone who believes in freedom.

Once in power, the Yugoslav Communists lost no time in seeking to remake Yugoslavia in the Soviet image, politically, economically and in every other way. Industrial enterprises, large and small, were seized without benefit of compensation. A Soviet-type five-year plan was inaugurated. A drive to collectivize agriculture was launched. In short, the Yugoslav Communists were determined to push through their first five-year plan even if it set the country back fifty years.

The results of their initial economic policies were soon in evidence—serious dislocations, waste, shortages and a rapidly declining standard of living. At the height of their chaotic economic mess, they had the good fortune to be kicked out of the Cominform, and we came to their rescue and bailed them out. Today the story is still told about the peasant who was visited by a foreigner who saw three photographs on his wall—a photograph of Tito, a photograph of King Peter, and a photograph of President Eisenhower. The visitor commented on this congruity and the peasant said, "These are my icons, my holy pictures. This is where I do my worshiping." The foreigner, intrigued by this, said, "Well, I am intrigued, how do you do this?" "Well," he said, "I go over here to Marshal Tito's picture and say, 'Our Father which art in heaven'; then I go over to the picture of King Peter and say, 'Thy kingdom come'; then I go over to the picture of President Eisenhower and say, 'Give us this day our daily bread.'"

It is this ability to see things with a bit of humor that enables these people to continue under this kind of a regime. Of course, the Communists have no

desire for anything but a Communist type economy. In agriculture they have had to abandon collectivization for the time being, or it may be more appropriate to say that they have really postponed it. They have not deviated from their fundamental goal—i.e., a completely collectivized economy.

To be sure, Yugoslavia, like Greece and Turkey, has suffered from too many people on too little land. There was a need to develop the country industrially, but Communist methods have resulted in huge material and human costs. Thanks to Western aid, primarily American, some solid improvements have been made. Even the standard of living has been improved some, although it is doubtful if it is up to prewar standards, especially if we take into account the fact that inflation has cut purchasing power and real wages.

Perhaps the biggest economic hurdle facing the regime is the lack of interest on the part of the people in a collectivized economy. This is especially true of the peasants, who believe, rightly or wrongly, that the government can never again drive them into collective farms. But there are government measures which even today control the peasants' economic activities pretty effectively, nonetheless.

Well, after this brief political and economic survey, let me sum up a few points that are really not within the scope of this lecture, but which have to do with the United States' stake in these countries.

UNITED STATES' STAKE IN THESE COUNTRIES

Greece and Turkey

First of all, and very importantly, the attitude of Greece and Turkey is good. They want to be associated with the Free World. Greece had her taste of Communist methods in the civil war. There are people walking around in Greece with their tongues cut off as

souvenirs of that brutal Communist effort to seize Greece. Turkey at one time flirted with the Soviets. In 1920, Mustafa Kemal declared his readiness to fight foreign imperialism, and sought to conclude a military and political alliance with the Soviet Union, and after a while he learned what this meant. Agreements were signed and aid given, which helped the Turks in their victory against Greece in 1920-21. But the Turkish-Soviet friendship deteriorated rather rapidly, especially after 1935, primarily for two reasons; (1) the Turks, particularly because of their geographic proximity, could not see any real friendship in the Soviet attempt to set up a strong Communist party in Turkey; (2) when the Soviets demanded modification of the Montreux Convention governing the Straits, the Turks were quite sure that this bode nothing but evil and the treaty of friendship was denounced in 1945.

As I have said, Greece and Turkey are on our side. They are members of NATO. At a time when some NATO members are cutting back on their commitment or threatening to cut back, we do not have this from Greece and Turkey. There is some indication that the Turks are even willing to increase their commitment. The outlook for free institutions in Greece and Turkey is far from dim. Problems there are, but there are things to be optimistic about. The basic attitude of these countries is one of a desire to be free and to be associated with the Free World.

Greece and Turkey are also members of the Balkan Pact, which we sought to foster and of which Yugoslavia is also a member. But in terms of preserving freedom, the Balkan Pact, in my opinion, is something less than a paper tiger. Now a word or two about Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia

I think you had some biographical data circulated about me which indicates that I was in the American Embassy in Belgrade at the time of the break with the Russians. We did talk about this, we did make recommendations in the Embassy, and initially, I think, the basic decision which was reached by Washington, i.e., to try to keep Tito afloat, was sound. This was the first break in the Communist Bloc. It could be hoped that other breaks might come—that this might be one way of licking the Communist menace short of war—that perhaps here was the first blow, the first division within the Communist camp. Moreover, there were some practical reasons, too, why we should take a benevolent attitude toward Tito at that time. The Greek civil war was still on, the Trieste situation was still chaotic, western Europe was very weak militarily. The general feeling was that any subtraction from the Soviet Bloc was useful. But, I think, as time went on there was less and less reason to give aid to Tito. We did exactly the opposite, we increased our aid, even going to the point of giving military aid. I do not think there was any real justification for military aid, although I was out of the Embassy and out of the Foreign Service when that decision was reached. This merely gave the Yugoslavs an opportunity to build up a modern army, an army which I felt would not be used on our side, and conceivably could be used to our detriment. And after a time, I think, there was even a question as to the advisability of economic aid. Ultimately, we did cut out military aid, largely after Tito refused to abide by the agreements concerning inspection. When I was in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1952 (and I don't want to mention any names), I felt that the head of our military mission had been sold a bill of goods. He felt that militarily the Yugoslavs were a potential on our side. Of course, some of his colleagues were not so sure. I remember a young naval officer who said, "I have traveled a thousand kilometers over this country and

have not been able to see one damn thing yet that I was supposed to see." So there were people, as early as that date, who saw that Tito had no desire really to be cooperative, and ultimately when we could not stand it any more, Tito finally said, "Well, I don't need any more military aid." And so it was cut off. Politically, psychologically and morally, it seems to me, the Yugoslav Communists are on the other side, not ours. To be sure, they may want to stay neutral, or try to stay neutral, if possible, try not to get involved. But I would like to reiterate that politically, psychologically and morally, they believe that Communism is the way of the future, that that is the way the world is traveling and not towards freedom. In 1957 Tito asserted rhetorically (you can find this in the January 1957 issue of *Foreign Affairs*), "Why is every move on the part of the Soviet leaders looked upon even now with suspicion?" If that is not an indication of where Tito stands politically, psychologically and morally, I don't know what is. Moreover, we have had a demonstration recently at the General Assembly in New York where Tito, despite his neutralist front, was found on the Soviet side on several questions. Mind you, he did not merely just abstain, he was on their side. First, on the question of the admission of Red China to the United Nations. Secondly, on the resolution to discuss the enslavement of Tibet. Thirdly, on the resolution to discuss Hungary and Soviet actions there. In every one of those three incidents Tito was on the side of the Soviet Union and not ours. By continuing to help Tito's regime I think we helped to perpetuate the idea that Communism can be good or that there can be a type of Communism that is not bad. In this way, wittingly or unwittingly, we give the Communist idea a certain respectability, and I do not believe that this is in our national interest.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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- 1944-45 Research analyst, OSS
- 1945-47 Assistant Professor of International Relations, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio
- 1947-50 Cultural Attache and Public Affairs Officer, American Embassy, Belgrade, Yugoslavia
- 1950-52 Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University
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- 1959-60 Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy, Naval War College

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- Tito's Promised Land*
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