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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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CONTENTS

THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM	1
<i>Professor Edward Younger</i>	
COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS	21
<i>Professor Warren B. Walsh</i>	
RECOMMENDED READING	41



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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW

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THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
2 November 1960

by

Professor Edward Younger

Gentlemen: I have the opportunity this morning to initiate the study on the uncommitted nations. I would like to assure you, as I move into this subject, that there are a great many things about the uncommitted nations I do not know, and I approach this series of lectures with a great deal of humility; don't be surprised if, in many cases, questions are thrown back to you for answers when they're too hot for me to handle. That's an old trick one picks up after many years of teaching.

At this point I wish to stress, now that I have had the pleasure of listening to so many fine lectures, of going to the seminars, of hearing you participate, and of getting my words in too, that I am learning just about as much as you are. If this continues on through the year, I shall have to begin to pay tuition to the War College, because I am actually building up another doctoral specialization. So far, my stay at the War College has been a very exciting experience, one of the two or three most exciting ones I have ever had in my adult years. I know that you too are enjoying it as much as I.

When the topic, neutralism, was assigned to me for a lecture, I was gratified to see in the title the word "dynamics"—"The Dynamics of Neutralism." Actually the roots of neutralism go deep in history; these roots have spread rapidly, not only in depth but also horizontally; and today the foliage is running like a kudzu vine. The number of neutralist nations daily

increases, and the number of people within nations accepting the ideals and illusions of neutralism hourly multiplies. So there is no doubt of its dynamism.

Neutralism is a twin of neutrality. The terms are often used interchangeably; still there are fundamental differences. Neutrality assumes a state of war. It is a condition of being on neither side, of keeping out of shooting wars. It has a strictly legal status as well as a diplomatic or political function. Neutralism on the other hand embraces policy, attitude, and sentiment. It is an ideal but at the same time a realistic political device. Neutralism today demands of the neutralist nation dissociation from the Cold War and efforts to mitigate the harshness of the struggle, while at the same time gaining the greatest national advantage possible from the struggle.

Both concepts are older than the words themselves. Let us look very hurriedly at their historical roots. Neutrality was the term most frequently used until the past decade, although neutralism has also been used some in the past. Three or four centuries before Christ, the Mauryan Kingdoms of India were practicing a kind of neutrality with other nations, and wherever existed political organizations approximating national states in ancient times, the concept of neutralism was evolving. In early Greece, neutrality arose to mitigate the conflicts between Hellenic city-states, and no doubt an incipient neutralism existed in the minds of some of the people. With the rise of Rome and the advent of Pax Romana, the concept of neutrality yielded to one world or world empire. During the Middle Ages it stayed dormant under the cover of feudalism, and Christianity was the unifying influence. With the rise of modern national states and the waning of the Middle Ages, however, neutrality re-emerged, and by the time Columbus discovered America in the late 15th century, it had become very well known among political leaders.

Within the next two or three centuries, during the period of discovery, exploration and colonization in the New World, neutrality began to approach the status of law. At the same time neutralism emerged as a term indicating indifference primarily to religious controversies that were then shaking Europe. But it was in the 19th and early 20th centuries that neutrality made real headway, and it was primarily because of the United States, the world's greatest neutral in modern history, that it developed so rapidly and strongly. The 19th century, remember, was a century of great relative peace; international law and neutrality, vigorously supported by the United States as a part of international law, made more progress than in any other century in history.

The type of neutrality advanced by the United States during the 150 years from about 1790 to 1940 came to include also the present concept of neutralism. At one time or another, it was expressed and operated as an ideal, a sentiment, a policy, a means of political action and finally as law. It was first of all a political device employed to assure American independence and to increase American trade. Wise American leaders at the end of the Revolution beheld a weak, tottering republic requiring peace and time in order to grow strong. If the young Nation committed herself to any of the warring European nations, she might become an international puppet, on the losing side in a war with her independence snuffed out. Better to remain neutral, gain time, grow strong and hence stay independent. Moreover, neutrality would promote economic growth. Trade had been a vital element in the lifeblood of the American colonies. With independence and peace, the young republic found herself cut off from world trade by European colonial monopolies. Only a policy of neutrality in future wars would assure American participation in the rich trade of all belligerents. So, in the 19th century, the United States took the lead in crystallizing the laws of neutrality, in stressing neutral duties and also

neutral obligations. Neutrality was strong underpinning for the central policy of isolationism; it got enshrouded also in the glowing American nationalism of the century; and thus neutrality became an ideal, a sentiment, merging into neutralism.

On the eve of the First World War, Woodrow Wilson declared that the people of the United States would be neutral not only in deed but also in thought, carrying the idea of impartiality to a very great extreme. In time, the United States was drawn into the war mainly because her neutral rights were violated by the Central Powers, especially by Germany. President Wilson was determined that international law—the laws of neutrality—would not be sacrificed, and in trying to maintain these laws he almost inevitably, but unintentionally, led the nation into the war. After the war, the obsessive isolationism which gripped the nation until the outbreak of the Second World War was a harbinger of present-day neutralism in other countries; it can be compared in many respects to the kind of sentimental, intellectual neutralism existing among the intelligentsia and some of the masses of France, West Germany, Britain, Japan, and most of the other neutralist nations today. Associated with this neutralism is a distrust of the United States, a distrust of the wisdom of her leaders, a fear of her blunders and a fear of world conflagration. This attitude is similar to the distrust and fear Americans held for the "broils of Europe" a century and a half following her independence.

The word neutralism was used in the debates on the eve of the First World War in Italy; it was involved in the question of whether or not the Italians would be drawn into the war. Again, immediately following the Second World War, the concept of neutralism began to be discussed elaborately in certain French newspapers. Although time this morning will not permit a discussion of neutralism among our Western European allies, I shall briefly comment on French neutralism

a little later. Before getting into specific nations, however, let me first analyze at random the complex of factors, forces, and conditions making it so popular around the world today.

Much of it is instinctive; much arises from sheer fear of atomic destruction. No individual wishes to jump into a fight between neighbors or friends unless it is crystal clear that his own interests are at stake and he stands to gain more by taking sides than by staying out. Masses of people, national leaders and national states similarly react. Americans, I have already suggested, almost instinctively perceived in the 19th century that it was wise to keep out of European alignments, to take advantage of the rivalries and wars of major powers and to grow strong. Today the enormous destructive potential of atomic war has whetted this instinct for non-alignment. The fear of total destruction in an atomic war is a powerful influence operating on the popular mind in Western Europe, England and Japan.

In Asia and Africa, neutralism springs up especially from glowing nationalism, from emotions charged by struggles for independence, from yesterday's colonialism and imperialism. It is a fierce expression of independence, and it is fostered in varying degrees by the recency of revolution, serious internal domestic troubles, and realistic national interest. Political leaders of the new nations, seeking to modernize, to maintain political stability, and to establish unity, feel that they cannot afford to take sides, especially with the once colonial West. Direct commitments might mean rejection at home by the nationalist movement. On the other hand, anti-Western, anti-colonial epithets are valuable in maintaining control at home and in establishing national unity. The colonial past still colors internal politics, and consequently non-alignment and neutralism are devices used to curry political favor, to bolster morale, and to sharpen moral fervor for the cause of national unity and achievement.

By pursuing neutralist policies, political leaders of the new nations (often of weak, tottering governments) can gain prestige for themselves not only at home but also abroad. They can take advantage of their strategic political position in the bi-polar world today and gain political and economic concessions for their country. They would be less than intelligent if they did not realize that they are courted both by the Free World and the Communist Bloc. The flattering attention paid to these leaders by Khrushchev at the recent United Nations meeting illustrates the prestige advantage to be gained both by the neutralist governments and the major power able and willing to capitalize on neutralism. Photographs of Khrushchev and Sukarno, of Khrushchev and Nasser, of Khrushchev and Nkrumah are no doubt appearing today in peasant mud huts and shanties throughout Indonesia, Egypt and Ghana.

By building fences abroad, let me repeat, these neutralist leaders were not only building up their prestige at home; they were also increasing their stature among the other neutralist nations and, in effect, creating something of a Third Force—a vague, magnetic attraction for rising nations by which they can use their "floating votes" to gain concessions, influence world affairs, and increase their prospect of importance. The Third Force can also help prevent war, neutralist spokesmen maintain, and give the newly developing countries time to grow strong. Through the Third Force and by other means of diplomacy the neutralist nation, whether weak or strong, can achieve a position of power, not through military strength which she usually does not have, but from her peculiar strategic political position geared to the nature and drift of power politics in the world today. This, of course, is a clear example of the *real politik* aspect of neutralism.

The neutralist leaders believe that they can use this peculiar strategic political position between the

Free World and the Communist Bloc, let me say again, to gain economic assistance, to modernize their countries, and to meet the demands of the Revolution of Rising Expectations sweeping the underdeveloped parts of the world. In Asia, Africa and Latin America the aspiration to modernize is obsessive and impelling. Unless we can do it at once, they declare, we will certainly go Communist. They are perhaps correct, for Communism has taken deepest root in those countries with a large peasant population, whose first efforts to industrialize failed or were too slow—Russia and China. So the neutralist leader who seeks economic assistance from both the United States and Russia is not necessarily playing off one side against the other for sinister reasons. More than likely he sincerely believes that he must modernize his country at once in order to stave off revolution at home, achieve decent national objectives and stay in power. He is therefore willing to accept help from all comers. The plain fact that a neutralist nation can get help from both sides is a powerful dynamo behind the spread and adoption of neutralism today. After all, the committed nation receives help from only one side.

Leaders in the underdeveloped countries, moreover, do not want to spend money for alliances and military preparedness—money desperately required for economic development. They do not want to join power blocs for fear they will be drawn into war. Not only do they wish to avoid war themselves; they do not want war to break out between the two great power centers. In either case their efforts to industrialize would be paralyzed or postponed, they fear. Better to remain neutral, they argue, and devote their efforts along with other neutralist nations to maintaining peace.

Populations at random in the various nations are further conditioned for neutralism by prejudices built in by history, by fundamental racial, ethnic, and cultural differences, and by what they read. Unfortunately, in tone the resultant neutralism is

often anti-Western, anti-American, and seemingly if not always in fact pro-Russian. Some speaker has declared recently that Asians and Africans have a pathological distrust of the white man. While this statement is exaggerated, there is some truth in it. Unfortunately, too, distrust of the Western white man seems at most times to be greater than distrust of the Russian or Communist white man. This distrust springs in part from the colonial past, but also in part from the enormous propaganda effort of the Communist Camp, which led by Russia has successfully identified itself with Asian and African nationalism.

But lying at the base of such distrust and sometimes towering above all other factors is bitter, incipient racial prejudice on the part of both white and non-white. While the Western democratic white man struggles haltingly to rid himself of racialism, the Communist propagandist fills the non-white with race hatred, and among non-white populations the demand for racial equality is growing faster than white enlightenment can seemingly develop new patterns of conduct. The aspirations of the underdeveloped people in Asia, Africa and Latin America cannot be satisfied by purely economic and political means. Their eyes are now fixed on the goal of equality in terms of respect, regardless of color, creed, or nationality. Although the Communist Bloc have their own race prejudices and problems, through totalitarian methods they keep them effectively concealed from the uncommitted peoples. And they are also convincing the uncommitted, underdeveloped non-white people that they are free from racial prejudice. It is hard to exaggerate the importance of racialism in assessing the causes for the rapid spread of neutralism; and its importance for the Free World is magnified by its increasing pro-Communist bias.

In addition, in Asia especially, neutralism as a sentimentality or an ideal stems from fundamental but not unbridgeable philosophical and cultural

differences. Although all human beings have aspirations, characteristics, and drives in common, once they are engulfed by great cultures, certain basic differences in outlook and approach on life emerge. Old and in many cases moribund Asian civilizations have been flushed up and re-invigorated in modern times by the fertilization of Western liberal democratic thought stressing the dignity of the individual, humanitarianism, and progress. Still, many Asians argue that the Western approach to life based on empirical research, differentiation, and specialization, leads to a rigid inflexible society, governed by exclusive principles and intolerant of other peoples and ideas. On the other hand, they hold, Asian societies with greater experience in synthesizing conflicting ideas and cultures are eternally seeking and finding greater harmony and tolerance. The irony of all this is that in reality the Asians have a much greater practical bent than they realize, and while today the pragmatic, quick approach to modernization along Western lines is winning easy acceptance among them, the West is setting the pace in the quest for synthesis, harmony, and world values.

Finally, a favorable climate for neutralism has been created by the wide reading of works on Marxism. Even in the United States where reading Marx caught on slowly, his writings began to influence thinking early in the 20th century and helped to generate an economic interpretation of history. In Africa, and especially in the Middle East and Asia, almost two generations of the rising élites, those who led the independence movements and those who in large measure still control affairs today, grew up on a reading diet of Marxism. To these molders of public opinion, it seemed that Marx's interpretation of capitalism and imperialism accurately described the situation in their land, and his emphasis upon revolution promised freedom from colonialism. The reading of Marx therefore, which distilled dislike for capitalism, distrust of the West, and softness for Communism, today keeps

alive a craving for neutralism, again with a bias for the Communist nations.

Up to this point I have analyzed those causes that encourage the growth of neutralism at random among various nations and peoples of the world. Now let us turn to some specific regions and national states, where additional factors are operating to give neutralism its present dynamism. In South and South-east Asia, neutralism among countries like India, Indonesia, and Burma, has been encouraged by their proximity to their two powerful neighbors, Russia and Red China. This is best exemplified by the most influential neutralist leader in the world today, Nehru of India. From education a product of the West, and firmly committed to democracy and free institutions, still he fears that alignment would bring the Cold War to India at once; and sooner or later, armed invasion from the Red Chinese or Russians, or both. India of course is not strong enough militarily to resist attack from either of these powers; and, engaged in a desperate struggle to modernize, she is unwilling to commit her natural resources to elaborate military preparedness. Moreover, like the other newly developing nations in the region, India is pressed hard at home by a closely-knit, dangerous Communist Party. Nehru, consequently, while pursuing from time to time a vigorous anti-Communist line at home, cautiously avoids a foreign policy of alignment which might aggravate Moscow or Peiping to the point of their directly intervening in behalf of the Indian Communist Party.

At international conferences, at the several foreign capitals, Nehru and his fellow neutralist leaders try to commit the major powers, especially those nearest at hand, to policies which assure their own security. In all probability Nehru, for example, managed to get Chou En-lai invited to the 1955 Bandung Conference in order to commit Red China, in clear view of Afro-Asian nations, to a policy of peace and

negotiations. No doubt Nehru had in mind the highly complicated and disputed border between India and Red China. For similar reasons he probably persists in seeking the admission of Red China to the United Nations. With Russia or Red China under the full glare of world public opinion, Nehru can attune India's strategic political position to the most favorable balance of forces at the moment and use it to protect his borders, enhance India's prestige in the world, especially in South Asia where he wishes India to be dominant, and continue to receive economic aid from both sides. And finally in the case of Nehru, world peace is also a consuming ideal inherited from the national Indian conscience conditioned by history and the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi. Neutralism in a divided world is a status corresponding most nearly to the deep-seated Indian tradition of tolerance for peoples and creeds and of non-violence for achieving political goals.

South Asian attitudes toward Russia, Red China, and the West of course differ considerably. China is closer and more to be feared. In recent years, in Tibet and along the Indian border, she has exploded the myth of Asian nationalism that Asians will not attack Asians. As in the United States, wishful thinking prevails in South Asia that Sino-Russian discords may reach such degree that Russia serves as a balance against China. In any event, Russia is farther away. Geographically a part of Asia and containing Asian peoples, Russia appeals to Asian nationalists. Through her supple propaganda, she has convinced South Asians that her record on colonialism and imperialism in Asia is clean. Because of her brilliant economic and technical progress, she elicits great admiration in this poverty-ridden part of the world, especially among those who have been habitually readers of Karl Marx. So, for Russia, there is an underlying sympathy which crops out seemingly as pro-Russian, anti-Western neutralism.

In the Middle East the results are basically the same although some of the reasons are different. There Arab nationalism is perhaps more emotional and irrational than nationalism elsewhere in the world. There too the Russians have a more appealing record than the Western powers on colonialism and imperialism. In the post-World War II years, moreover, it was the Western powers who sought to build up a defense zone which ran counter to burning Arab aspirations to control Middle Eastern affairs without any interference whatever from outside sources. The Western build-up of a security system which led to the Baghdad Pact was an important reason for the adoption by Nasser of an anti-Western brand of neutralism. But even more important is the presence of Israel established by the West and liberally supported by funds from the United States. Israel provides the rallying cry for Arab nationalism. Opposition to Israel is the only issue on which the Arab nations can agree. No Arab leader feels that he can stay in power if he pursues a policy of alignment with a Western nation like the United States which helped establish and still supports Israel. On the other hand, Nasser and his fellow Arab neutralists have been unwilling to embrace Communism. Like Nehru they have conducted anti-Communist campaigns at home, sought economic aid from both the Free World and the Communist Bloc, and pursued other foreign policies which appear to Americans as pro-Russian. Paced by Nasser, the Arab nations have also demanded and received arms from both sides. Finally neutralism, with a pro-Communist bias, fits Nasser's schemes to carve out a dominant position for Egypt among the emerging people of Africa. It enables him to capitalize on Sino-Russian efforts to drive Western influence from Africa while asserting leadership over the bloc of neutralist African nations now flirting with Communist Russia and China—mainly Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the Lumumba forces of the Congo.

Nearly all of the new African nations have aspirations common to the neutralist. Some have

publicly proclaimed neutralist positions and some are pursuing neutralist policies without proclaiming them. Only a few have been willing to admit openly to alignment with either the Free World or the Communist Bloc. All of them are seeking quick modernization and are tempted by economic and technical aid, no matter what the source. And of course they are united in their demands for absolute racial equality, political independence, and the end of colonialism. These demands, too, are powerful factors operating against alignment with the West. Still it is doubtful that Nasser or any other neutralist leader can mold a majority of African nations into a hard part of an organized neutralist Third Force because of the conflicting interests of these new nations as well as the conflicting ambitions of their leaders. Nor does it seem likely that the present efforts at rapprochement between Nasser's Egypt and the United States will be entirely successful in the light of conflicting aims and policies of the two countries in Africa and of the American relationship with Israel.

In Japan *chūritsu*, meaning neutralism, expresses a sentiment extremely popular among nearly all classes and connotes something intrinsically good and desirable. Even more popular is the term *dokuritsu* meaning independence. In Japan as in many of the newly developing nations, independence and neutralism are closely associated in the popular mind. Curiously, *dokuritsu* has become more popular as a slogan since the 1951 Japanese-American Defense Pact ended American occupation and restored Japan to an independent position. But as a popular concept in Japan, independence means reducing the ties with the United States and achieving a state of neutralism eventually. For the present, however, most of the Japanese are reconciled to maintaining alignment with the United States as a practical, advantageous arrangement. The United States, while giving Japan a market for her goods and providing her with a defense system at low cost, also is a powerful friend, capable of speaking in her

behalf with strength and prestige at a time in history when Japan feels isolated in the world and not fully accepted by her sister Asian nations.

Japanese neutralism can best be analyzed by dividing it into three types. The first, pseudo-neutralism, is the deceptive brand advocated by the extreme left—the Communists, numerous adherents from the Socialist Party, and many from the teachers and labor unions. This vociferous group is using neutralism as a rallying cry in order to bring Japan under eventual Communist control. Their agitation last spring was very effective in channeling student discontent into mass riots against the Defense Pact and the visit of President Eisenhower. The second type is sentimental, nostalgic, illusory. It includes the great middle group of Japanese, easily the majority, who cling to General MacArthur's statement of 1950 that the normal position of Japan should be the Switzerland of Asia. This large group illusively dreams of an opulent Japan, at peace and trading with all nations, her neutrality guaranteed by the community of nations. The third type is espoused by the extreme right which demands that Japan re-arm at once, pursue a course midway between the Free World and the Communists, and stand ready to exert military power to achieve her objectives.

In 1960, the Japanese drive toward neutralism, triggered off by the U-2 incident, made enormous strides. To destroy the Defense Pact with the United States, drive out the Americans, and push Japan into a neutralist position is the immediate Sino-Russian objective. The U-2 incident crystallized neutralist and anti-American sentiment in Japan, and was the signal for a stepped-up, vituperative propaganda campaign from Moscow and Peiping against the Defense Pact. The resulting mass riots and the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit was a cheaply won victory for the Communists in East Asia. Conversely, it was a stunning blow to Premier Kishi, to orderly

government in Japan, to the Defense Pact, and to Japanese and American prestige. And although the present pro-American government is almost certain to win the November elections, still the Communists have tested their weapons—mass demonstrations, student riots and strikes—and found them effective. There is no good reason to expect that they will not use them again and again as Japan continues to slip slowly but unmistakably toward neutralism.

Growing South American neutralism today is nourished by most of the factors already analyzed but especially by intense nationalism and the passion to modernize and raise living standards. Its anti-American tone is a product of Communist propaganda, of past relations with the United States, of envy and jealousy of United States achievements and power, of fear of United States future intervention, of disappointment from alleged recent neglect by the United States, and finally from an underlying anti-United States cultural nationalism. Only the last item here named needs further comment.

Latin American cultural nationalism draws sharp distinctions between culture in the United States and that to the south. In the United States, it is alleged, culture is materialistic, coarse, and inferior; in Latin America, idealistic, refined, and superior. Perhaps a majority of the literary figures in Latin America hold this view, and most of the poems and novels produced there in the 20th century emphasize these themes and draw these distinctions. Latin American literature unfortunately is rarely translated and read in the United States; hence, Americans are only now becoming aware of this deeply imbedded source of anti-Americanism. Similarly Latin American knowledge of culture in the United States is too shallow to recognize the myth of this interpretation. The two cultures of course are products of Western civilization and are much more nearly alike than different. For deeper understanding and greater appreciation,

they require more study and knowledge from both sides, a goal easy to achieve and exciting in the achieving. The extent of the adoption of neutralism as official policies by Latin American nations will be vitally influenced by the Castro Revolution in Cuba. If it succeeds, many other leaders captured by the Castro ground swell will follow his example. Significantly, Castro has diligently courted the neutralist nations as well as the Communists.

Growing neutralism in Western Europe also rests on many of the factors already analyzed. This morning I wish to comment on only one additional characteristic, peculiar especially to France. Neutralism sprouted up in France immediately following the end of the Second World War. Advocated by left-wing elements, and by some moderates with close attachments to the United States, it received a volley of discussion in certain French newspapers. Fundamentally, it was based on the fear from these groups that alignment with victorious America, apparently moving rapidly to the right, might hamper social reform at home. The advent of the McCarthy Era gave this view deeper rooting. On the right simultaneously extreme nationalists, called Gaullists, feared that the United States, allegedly tampering with the colonial empires of Europe, would expedite the independence movement among people under French colonial control. As time went on, these two elements have tended to fuse, creating a fertile soil for the continued growth of neutralism. Similar factors, I wish to suggest, may also be operating in Britain and West Germany.

In conclusion let me repeat that neutralism is indeed a dynamic movement. Although somewhat dampened in South Asia, it is increasing in Africa, Latin America, and Japan; it is near the surface elsewhere, even among our allies in Europe. Although a neutralist bloc closely organized and firmly committed to common goals does not at the moment seem likely, still the neutralist nations may very well exert decisive

influence on issues of vital importance to the United States such as disarmament, the admission of Red China to the United Nations, the future of Dag Hammarskjold and Patrice Lumumba, and of the future location and re-organization of the United Nations. More directly, a neutralist group may be able from time to time to prevent a dangerous impasse between the Big Two, to keep negotiations going until agreement is reached.

On the other hand we discern that Communists under the cloak of neutralism steal into positions of power and seize control of governments. We cannot fail to see too that the Communist Bloc, exploiting with finesse the obvious advantages which history and geography have put in their hands, have more effectively come to terms with neutralism than we have done. Wherever possible they have identified themselves with it, and are ever seeking to direct it against the United States.

As Americans, we are understandably concerned at the apparent anti-American, pro-Communist tone of much of today's neutralism. This anti-American tone does exist, no doubt, and this morning I have sought to explain why. Still, I believe we are inclined to misunderstand the origin and to exaggerate the extent of this tone. Most neutralist nations pursue policies designed to achieve their own national goals; Nehru is primarily for India, not for or against the United States or Russia. In pursuing their own national interests, their policies from time to time will in fact run counter to the wishes of the major powers. This we expect and concede; our leaders no longer hold that it is "immoral" to be neutral.

To face up to the problems of neutralism, both our people and our leaders must diligently keep taking stock of ourselves and our institutions in order to eradicate so far as possible the causes underlying the rising tone of anti-Americanism. Americans live in a goldfish bowl today, we must realize. Can anyone

doubt that race riots, reckless talk about foreign cultures, or offensive personal conduct abroad are at once heard and seen around the world? Can we afford to forget that the Communist propaganda machines are relentlessly grinding away to keep foreign peoples from forgetting our own faults?

Our diplomacy moreover must be made persuasive in terms of the specific aims and aspirations of the neutralist nations whenever possible, and at all times in terms of the attention, courtesy, and respect we pay the leaders of the neutralist nations. By this I do not mean that we should sacrifice our basic interests and national goals in misguided, truckling efforts to curry the favor of say, Nehru, Nkrumah, or Nasser. Our long-range objectives must be steadfastly pursued with all the means at our disposal despite neutralist opposition. But realism demands that our policies and approaches should be made with a clear understanding of the sources of neutralist international conduct—not with fear nor necessarily with acceptance. Whether we like it or not, neutralist nations are here in the world in numbers and force. With deeper understanding, with more flexible policies, with greater diligence, with fuller cooperation from our people and with firmness, our leaders can cope successfully with the problems of growing neutralism, although we cannot expect the neutralist nations to pursue policies *always* favorable to us.

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Publications: A Selected List

John A. Kasson: Politics and Diplomacy from Lincoln to McKinley. Torch Press, 450 p. 1955. (Phi Beta Kappa Prize, University of Virginia.)

Inside the Confederate Government: Diary of R.G.H. Kean. Oxford University Press, 244 p. 1957. (Book of the Month Selection, Civil War Book Club.)

"Woodrow Wilson: The Making of a Leader," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, LXIV, October 1956. (A Wilson Centennial Lecture.)

"Indians and Americans: On a Better Understanding," *Allahabad University Magazine*, India, XXXV, January-March 1958. (A lecture given before both Indian and American audiences.)

"American Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy in the Nineteenth Century," *United States in World Affairs*, Madras, India, 1958. (The first in a series of lectures given before South Indian audiences.)

COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
15 November 1960

by

Professor Warren B. Walsh

Broadly speaking, printed and oral information on Communist strategy and tactics falls into four categories. First are the pronouncements of the chief makers and implementers of Communist strategy and tactics—Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Frunze, Shaposhnikov, Stalin, Bukharin, Khrushchev and Mao. The second category comprises elaborations on and derivations from the prime pronouncements, that is, the works of lower echelon Communists. Third are the argumentations within the Communist leadership such as those that once took place between Kautsky and Lenin, or like those now in progress between Moscow and Peking. Finally, there are summaries, analyses, and descriptions by non-Communists.

A preponderance of these share a common characteristic. There are notable exceptions, but most of the millions of words uttered on this subject make Communist strategy and tactics seem more mysterious, more occult, and more difficult to understand than they really are. Here are three examples to enable you to form your own judgments. The first is a primary source; the second is a derivation; and the third is a non-Communist analysis.

Tactics, guiding itself by the directive of strategy and by the experience of the revolutionary movement . . . calculating at every given moment the state of forces inside the proletariat and its allies (greater or less cultivation, greater or

less degree of organization and class consciousness, presence of particular traditions, presence of particular forms of movement, forms of organization, basic and secondary) as well as in the camp of the adversary, profiting by discord and every kind of confusion in the camp of the adversary—marks out those concrete courses for winning the broad masses to the proletarian side and leading them to battle stations on the social front—which most surely pave the way for strategic success.

That, believe it or not, is an abridgement of a single sentence written by Stalin. The source is entitled, *Political Strategy and Tactics of Russian Communists*.

The second quotation is from a treatise entitled, *About the Principles of the Strategies and Tactics of Leninism*, by a lower echelon Communist theoretician.

The strategy and tactics of Leninism, firmly rejecting any kind of subjectivism, start from the growing necessities of the developing materialistic life of society, from the fundamental interests of the toiling masses; leans on the Marxist-Leninist theory as a science of the development of public life, of the ways of destroying capitalism, of the revolution of the oppressed and exploited masses, of the victory of socialism in the whole world, of the construction of a Communist society.

My third exhibit is another single-sentence quotation—this time from a non-Communist, American scholar.

This pliability in tactical modes of achieving the planned aim imparts a realistic

implementation to Soviet strategy; and it is essential to realize that their ethic opposes "adventuristic" moves not corresponding to the potentialities offered by their estimation of the relation of forces at least as strongly as it requires "advance" where the objective estimation permits.

Professional jargon like that always leaves me feeling as if I had come out exactly where I went in. It also reminds me of a conversation overheard in a railroad station in Portland, Maine back in the days when railroads would carry passengers in Maine. The scene was the ticket window, and the would-be traveler opened the conversation.

"I want to buy a round-trip ticket."

"Where to?"

"Why back here, ye durn fool."

Despite the voluminous evidence to the contrary, the problem doesn't seem to me to require such involved thought processes nor such complicated language. Maybe all this proves is not that the subject is simple but that I am. "If you can keep your head when all around you are losing theirs—it probably means that you haven't understood the problem."

Be that as it may, my general thesis is as follows: Communist strategy and tactics often become devious, richly varied, and highly complex in implementation, but both are basically simple in rationale and concept.

It is easy to grasp the rationale which underlies Communist strategy and tactics as soon as one realizes that present-day Communism has jettisoned most of its analytical and philosophical doctrines. All that

remains is a series of assertions. Because these are unproven by experience and unprovable by reason they must be taken on faith alone. To say it differently, a man must will himself to accept these assertions as being his basic truth.

Some of these assertions are not exclusive to the Communists, but only a Communist accepts them all. It is, in fact, the unquestioning acceptance of all these assertions which makes a man a Communist. The first assertion is that human society lives, moves, and has its being under the direction of suprahuman forces. Communists call these forces "historic necessity," or "the laws of social development."

A further word on this subject may clear away possible misunderstandings. Although Communists believe fully in "historic necessity," they do not believe that this operates automatically. If it did, they would need no strategy and no tactics—only patience. They believe that human actions affect events. They also believe that masses of men can be led to act in accordance with "historic necessity." The second and third assertions concern the leadership required to achieve this end.

The second assertion is that "historic necessity," or the so-called laws are discoverable through what Communists refer to as "the science of Marxism-Leninism." The third assertion is in two parts: (a) only those who have completely mastered this so-called science can truly understand or make use of "historic necessity," and (b) the only true masters of the "science of Marxism-Leninism" are the top Communist bosses at any given moment. If Khrushchey is a stronger boss than Mao, this proves that he is a better master of the "science of Marxism-Leninism" than Mao.

Such circular reasoning is characteristic. Go back a bit to the Communist claim that men will follow

"historic necessity" only if properly led. Now add that proper leadership can only come from the masters of their so-called science. It adds up to: Communism makes it possible for Communists to lead others. Now project a step. If men can be forced or persuaded to behave in accordance with what Communists claim is "historic necessity," then men's actions will inevitably cause a great revolution which will destroy the old social order and establish Communism. In other words, Communists believe that their revolution and their victory will come to pass only if they can coax or compel people to do what the Communists want done.

This is like saying that if I can force you, or persuade you, or fool you into jumping overboard you will inevitably get wet. I have to take prior and planned action in order to get you to do something which has an inevitable result. So do the Communists. They believe that their actions, and a strategy to guide their actions are a prerequisite to the so-called inevitable result. We shall return to this in a moment after finishing our look at the basic Communist assertions.

The fourth assertion is that conflict and struggle are the only roads to progress. They phrase it more vividly: in every situation there is that which is rising and that which is falling, that which is growing and that which is dying. (Khrushchev explained his ouster of Marshal Zhukov by saying that a growing cell must crowd out a dying cell.) Conflict between the two is inescapable. It is also, in the Communist view, good because it leads to progress. Therefore, conflict and struggle should be sought, welcomed and exploited—not avoided or reduced.

The fifth assertion is that the key conflict of today is the conflict between the "forces of revolution and change" and the "forces of reaction." We often think of Russo-American relations in terms of a power struggle between two giant nations. They think

of it as a proper, inescapable (under their leadership) and ultimately beneficial conflict between the old (us) and the new (themselves). This is a significant distinction.

The final assertion is that the Communists will triumph, or, as Khrushchev said last week in Moscow, "Communism will eventually be in force all over the earth." These six, basic assertions are part of the rationale underlying Communist strategy and tactics. The remaining parts are even simpler. You must have power in order either to persuade or compel people to do your will. One other, almost equally self-evident fact needs to be added. The Communists—out of necessity at first, later by deliberate and sustained choice—have been, are and will continue to be a minority. They do not aim at mass conversions. They aim at manipulating people, not at making people into Communist Party members.

Therefore, Communist strategy—stated in broad terms—aims at enabling a minority to seize and to retain power. It is just that simple, and it requires neither gobleydegook to explain nor genius to understand. The whole purpose of Communist strategy is to enable a minority to gain and to use power. We should, however, note that both words—minority and power—may refer to vastly different situations. A quick look at some of these variants reveals much about the scope and nature of Communist strategy.

It is a matter of historical record that the Communist minority may range from one or two men to a sizable group. It may mean a minority within a revolutionary movement or a minority of revolutionaries within a broader social group. Minority can apply to the Kadar regime, as opposed to the Hungarian people; to Communists within the Peasant Leagues of Brazil, or to the Leagues themselves as opposed to the remainder of Brazilian society. Minority also describes the Presidium of the CPSU in relation to its Central

Committee or to the whole Party or to the Soviet population. The minority might mean Lenin, bucking his closest associates and forcing them to accept the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; or it might mean Khrushchev in opposition to his colleagues on the Presidium in June, 1957. Minority might also, of course, refer to Harry Bridges and his henchmen in contrast to American union labor in general.

Power, as used in this context, has at least an equal range of applications. It varies in magnitude from one man's influence over a handful of revolutionary exiles to the formal, highly institutionalized domination of the USSR and its satellites by Khrushchev and his associates on the Presidium. It may refer, on a purely local level, to the domination of a plant union by its Communist business agent; or, on a national level, to the control of a coalition cabinet by its Communist members. The goal is the same no matter what type of minority or what power level is involved. The required strategy is one which will enable the Communist minority, whatever it is, to seize and to retain a monopoly of power. Moreover, the basic strategy is the same in all cases.

Such a strategy must be simultaneously broad and precise, rigid and flexible. It must be applicable at all levels of power, and in changing or even contrasting circumstances. It must be equally usable by the leader of an underground minority, which has power over itself alone; and by an open minority, such as the Soviet Presidium, which has formal authority over hundreds of millions.

Precision and rigidity have been achieved by always insisting upon an absolute centralization of power in the hands of a self-chosen, self-perpetuating elite which never loses sight of the ultimate objective. Breadth and flexibility are achieved by a willingness to use any and all means. Though Communists, like the rest of us, prefer big operations and big

gains to small operations and small gains, they are never too proud to work on a small scale until it is possible to expand. They do not, as my grandmother used to say, despise the day of small things. Their code of conduct, moreover, is totally lacking in what we think of as moral values. "Everything is moral," Lenin once said, which is necessary for the annihilation of the old . . . social order . . ."

The inability or unwillingness of many in the Free World to comprehend the sincerity and the implications of that statement is perhaps the greatest danger to freedom. People who understand intellectually that Communists are ruthless and deceitful often seem emotionally unable to grasp what their minds tell them. It is, indeed, hard for men of good will to believe that other men—men who outwardly resemble them in appearance, in ability, in many interests—can, by conviction be cheats, liars, betrayers, and murderers. It is precisely this emotional blindness which often enables the Communists to use our own virtues to destroy us.

The Communist's first strategic step in any situation is invariably the same; to introduce or to organize or to establish what they call the proletarian vanguard, that is, a CP. The CP, as a politically effective instrument, was created by Lenin, and he created it in his own image—disciplined, arrogant, single-minded, totally without scruples. It was also Lenin who gave the Party its distinctive dictatorial nature, not alone in relation to outsiders, but also within the Party itself.

The power structure of any CP can be accurately diagrammed as a series of concentric circles with the highest power concentration at the common center. Nomenclature may vary, but within every CP the common center is the big boss and his immediate associates—Khrushchev in the USSR, Mao in China, Tito in Yugoslavia, Togliatti in Italy, and so on. The first

circle is the Presidium of the Party's Central Committee; the second, that Committee itself; the third, lesser regional leaders; the fourth, local leaders; and finally—a long way from the true power center—the rank and file Party members.

While we are on the subject of organization, there is another aspect of it which is relevant to this morning's subject. In countries where CPs are legally in existence, but are not dominant—and this covers some 60-65 countries—the Party exists on three levels. It does so in the United States. The top level is openly acknowledged. It conducts meetings openly, campaigns in elections, publishes and distributes material under its own name, and its officials are publically identified. The second level is underground. Its meetings are unpublicized; if it campaigns in elections, it does so under cover; its publications do not identify their source; and its officials are not identified. (Ever since Lenin's time, CPs have simultaneously carried on legal, above-ground and illegal or underground activities.) The third level is completely clandestine. Its members are truly crypto-Communists—"sleepers," in the professional jargon—some of whom never reveal themselves. I am not sure that this group is ever really organized in any formal sense. Certainly they carry no Party cards, take no part in recognizable Party activities, and rarely, if ever, associate openly with Party members or fellow travelers. Some of them are expendable, and now and then one is expended, but mostly they are secret weapons, held in reserve for the favorable moment.

Returning more directly to strategy, it is possible for a minority to conquer a majority only by first splitting the majority into its component parts, and then by being quantitatively and qualitatively superior to each part in turn. This requires careful planning and much hard work, but it is not as difficult as might at first appear, especially to those who are not inhibited by scruples.

Majorities are rarely truly homogeneous. Usually they are more or less stable combinations of many, diverse elements temporarily held together by some common purpose or interest. Both centripetal and centrifugal forces are constantly at work in every majority—one set of forces tending to hold it together; the other, to disperse it. It is Communist strategy always to assist and exploit the latter. To do this, Communists must have allies and associates so the second strategic step is, in the words of a Party directive, "the attaining of the hegemony of the proletariat." Originally Communist strategists meant by this, getting control of the labor movement. Lenin, in a very revealing set of instructions to his Party, once said (in effect), "if we leave the workers alone and let them follow their own preferences, they will work out some form of co-operation with capital. We must not let this happen. We must capture control of the workers and lead them in the way we want them to go."

Communists still follow this directive, but one of the most significant developments in Communist strategy has been the broadening of this directive to include "the toiling peasants," as well as the toiling masses. Here is a prime case of making a virtue out of necessity. The revolution which Marx predicted for highly industrialized countries appeared in countries which were not highly industrialized—most importantly in Russia and, years later, in China. Lenin was forced to turn to the peasants for support, and did so, but always put his faith first in the city workers.

Mao, who began by thinking of the revolution in China as a movement of the industrial proletariat, quite early recognized and accepted the facts of Chinese life. Whereas he had once talked about depending primarily on the workers, he changed his mind in 1927. The revolution in China, he began to teach and to practice, must be a peasants' revolution, with the industrial proletariat ranking second. This is Mao's

major contribution to Communist strategic doctrine, and it is perhaps the most important development in that doctrine within the last generation. Its great importance lies in the simple fact that a peasant-based revolution is possible in Asia or Africa or Latin America—regions where the industrial proletariat is not sufficient to serve as a base.

There is also another aspect to this strategic development. Lenin taught that imperialism represented the final or dying stage of capitalism. According to Lenin's original version, ". . . the proletariat will be victorious first in those countries which are weak links in the imperialist chain." Today, this would be modified by placing the peasantry above the proletariat, but otherwise the strategic doctrine is the same. The reasoning goes like this. Imperialist nations are being sustained and their inevitable collapse is being delayed by reason of their exploitation of their colonial and quasi-colonial possessions. These colonial areas are the weakest links. By attacking through them, it is possible to strike down the imperialist powers. A recent Communist pronouncement on strategy stated this more formally, as follows.

Lenin . . . showed that the struggle for national liberation [by the colonial or quasi-colonial peoples] is part of the revolutionary struggle . . . and that these oppressed nations, having thrown off the yokes of colonialism and feudalism, can, with the aid of nations where the proletariat has already been victorious, start on the road of socialist reform, avoiding the capitalist stage of development.

Communist strategists anticipate a threefold triumph from this strategy. First, the defeat of the colonial powers within the colonies. Second, a weakening of the colonial power at home. Third, by diverting the movement for national independence into a

Communist revolution, gaining these new nations for the Communist camp. You have only to look at Africa or Asia or Latin America to see this Communist strategy being successfully implemented.

The first strategic step, to review the enumeration, is the creation or promotion of a CP. The second step is for this CP to gain control of as many peasants and workers as possible. At the risk of dipping from strategy into tactics, let's look at that for a minute. Let's say that the immediate goal is to attain a dominant influence within a local union. First, the Communists establish a beachhead by getting several CP members into the local where they form a Party cell. The comrades do not try to gain control by preaching Communism in the shop or at the meetings. The chances are that Communism will not even be mentioned, and that the Party boys will not reveal their membership. They will, however, try to get themselves into key positions—secretary, treasurer, business agent; and they will use several devices—including lots of hard work—to bring this about. They'll accept the dirty jobs and the unpopular assignments. They will actively promote picnics and social affairs. They'll give advice and loan money. They will, in short, try to win the confidence of their fellow-members, and they will try to place their fellows under obligation. They will cater to the needs and wishes of their fellows, manipulate their aspirations, fears and grievances, and stir them up over concrete, local issues. Once securely ensconced, their tactics will change.

Meanwhile, the third strategic step will have been initiated. This is the creation of what Communists call a united front. Its main components initially—I'm leaving, now, the tactical procedures in a local union—will be peasants and workers, but, as soon as possible, special efforts will be made to lure into the coalition, artists and intellectuals, students and other young people, teachers, writers,

editors, and other community leaders, and representatives of various minority groups. Reformers, pacifists, and do-gooders in general are favored targets partly because they make good front men, and partly because it is one of the Communist's tactical aims to destroy all genuine reform efforts. One must be a revolutionary, not a reformer as Stalin used to say.

Such a coalition is entirely acceptable to Communists under one indispensable condition, namely, that the leading role in it be reserved for the Communists. So many groups, ranging from governments to small private organizations, have been suckered by the coalition device that it is worth a closer look. I prefer to let the Communists speak for themselves rather than to try to describe their position in my words. The following quotation is from a contemporary Communist directive.

Compromises are of two kinds. There are compromises that have to be made in the interest of the development of the revolutionary movement, and there are treacherous compromises whose effect is to hamper the victory of the proletariat. Communists cannot afford to give up compromises of the first kind.

. . . Compromises with strong opponents are necessary, if made to avoid destruction and to preserve forces for a future attack on the adversary, provided that such compromises will increase the strength of the revolutionary proletariat and weaken the forces of reaction . . .

While recognizing the admissibility of the principle of compromises, CPs cannot accept any ideological compromises. There can be no compromises which do not reserve to the Party freedom of action, freedom for

Communist propaganda and agitation, and the right [of the Party] to criticize and to fight against its temporary allies . . .

I hope you realize that what the Soviets have taught us to call peaceful co-existence is, in their minds, a compromise of the acceptable kind. As *Pravda* said in January, 1960.

Peaceful co-existence with countries of different social structures does not lessen the ideological struggle. Our Party will continue to conduct an irreconcilable struggle for Communist ideology.

Whether peaceful co-existence is an acceptable and effective form of compromise appears to be the issue between the SovComs and the ChiComs, the latter holding that it is not. The SovComs stated their position in a book review printed in *Pravda* last June.

Some persons mistakenly consider the course of the achievement of peaceful co-existence among countries having different political systems, [and] the struggle to halt the arms race and to strengthen peace and friendship among peoples, and the talks between the leaders of socialist and of capitalist countries as some kind of a deviation from the Marxist-Leninist position.

The use of such means of disseminating instructions is a standard Communist technique. This sentence said to trained Communists: "Khrushchev's policies—disarmament, summitry, the soft sell—are still valid despite criticism from Peking." It also said, "You will get back in line and promote these policies." Incidentally, Peking was recalcitrant in June, and the top-level discussions now in progress in Moscow suggest that their recalcitrance may still exist.

The fourth strategic step—to return once again to our major theme—calls for the further extension of Communist influence and control over as many persons as possible. This is done primarily through propaganda and agitation. Lenin drew a clear distinction between the two, and Communists continue to do so. "The propagandist," to use Lenin's own words, "operates chiefly by means of the printed word; the agitator operates with the living word." Lenin also made another distinction between propaganda and agitation. The propagandist, dealing with the question of unemployment, must present many ideas. He must explain how and why capitalism always produces crises, he must expound on the nature of the crisis, he must, in short, deal with abstractions and intellectual concepts. These have meaning and appeal only to a few. The agitator deals not with abstractions but with concrete and specific illustrations. Instead of talking abstractly about the inevitability of economic crises, he tells how the family in the next block was evicted for non-payment of rent, or he ostentatiously does a favor for someone known to the group. Here is an example:

A few years ago there was a mass meeting in a slum section of an English industrial city. Its purpose was to discuss the possibility of getting a public housing development. The MP for the district, a Conservative, addressed the meeting. So did his Labour Party opponent. Both talked in the generalities so dear to politicians. Then a member of the audience asked and was given permission to make some remarks. He began by saying: "Most of you know that I am a member of the CP. In case you don't, I tell you so now. But I am not here tonight because I am a Communist. I am here because I am one of your neighbors. I know at firsthand why we must have new housing." He then discussed the situation knowledgeably and with abundant local illustrations. His speech was not, in substance, a Party speech. He never mentioned Communism after his first statement, but his performance

was the essence of Communist agitation. The Britisher who told me the story unwittingly summed it up very neatly by saying, "Although I'm lifelong Tory, I couldn't help being impressed by the quality of that chap's mind and by the effectiveness of his leadership. He made our man look futile."

Gentlemen, I have slipped from discussing strategy into describing tactics. I make no apologies for this, but I do offer a confession. Even after years of association with war colleges, I am never quite clear as to where strategy leaves off and tactics begin. What are often called the "ebbs and flows" or the retreats" of Communist strategy usually appear to me to be tactical rather than strategic. Often the distinction seems to me to be no more than an arbitrary definition. Moreover, I think that the same rationale and the same basic concepts govern both Communist strategy and Communist tactics.

If you recall what was said about the various meanings of minority and power, you will realize that tactics range from the institutional and formal international level to a local and personal level. The variety is infinite, and a cataloguing would serve little purpose. Two months ago, the Central Committee of the CPSU devoted a special conference to this problem. One of the directives which came out of that session read as follows:

What is needed today is to avoid the cut-and-dried, to organize propaganda and agitation creatively, and to search persistently for the keys to the heart and mind of every person.

One of the questions invariably put to a lecturer on this subject is, "What can or must we do to meet the challenge you have described?" There is no quick easy answer, but I will presume to offer three clues.

First, the Communists are clear and steadfast about their purpose and their ultimate objective. We must clarify our own position, not just in terms of what we oppose, but also in terms of what we really want to achieve. Then we must be equally steadfast in pursuit of this objective.

Second, the Communists are imaginative and alert to operational opportunities at all levels, and in all fields. I recently selected at random from my private collection forty Communist publications and made a rough tabulation of the groups at whom they were aimed. The list includes Africans, artists, Asiatics, lawyers, miners, musicians, medical students, pacifists, poets, potential returnees or redefectors, students and other young groups, teachers, transport workers, union members, and women. The Communists operate politically, militarily, economically and culturally. We must be equally versatile and imaginative.

Third, the Communists rarely create the conditions they exploit, but they are alert to spot exploitable situations and vigorous in exploitation of them. Last week, for example, Khrushchev publicly pledged aid "to all colonial peoples fighting for their independence." They exploit national pride and national aspirations. They exploit traditional apprehension and rivalries. They exploit the universal human longing for peace and security. We must learn to make more effective use of such forces.

Finally, the Communists are fully aware that a state of war exists between them and us. "If war," said Shaposhnikov, "is the continuation of politics only by other means, then peace is the continuation of war only by other means." It suits their strategic and tactical purposes now to call the present situation "peaceful co-existence." Lenin was more accurate and more honest when, in forecasting this stage, he called it partial war. We must somehow bring ourselves to an

emotional as well as an intellectual understanding
of what Lenin meant.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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Present Position: Professor of Russian History and Chairman, Board of Russian Studies, Syracuse University; Chairman, Intelligence Projects Committee, Syracuse University Research Institute.

Schools:

Tufts College, B.A. degree, 1930.
Harvard University, M.A. degree, 1931.
Harvard University, Ph.D. degree, 1935.

Career Highlights:

1933-35 Assistant in History, Tufts College.
1935 Instructor to Professor of Russian History, Syracuse University.
1947 Associate Editor, *The Russian Review*.
1951-52 Director, Syracuse USAFIT Russian Program.
1952-55 Civilian Faculty, The National War College.
1952 Lecturer, The War College, Air University.
1953-55 Director, Political Affairs Division, The National War College.
1953-55 Lecturer, The Foreign Service Institute.
1955 Lecturer, The National War College.
1956-58 Lecturer, The Army War College.
1956-59 Lecturer, The NATO Defense College.
1958 Lecturer, The Canadian National Defense College.

Miscellaneous:

Commendation for Meritorious Civilian Service (with medal).

Selected, recent publications:

Russia and the Soviet Union, (U. of Michigan Press, 1958).

Readings in Russian History (3rd. ed., S.U. Press, 1959).

Some Notes on Mathematics and Mathematicians in the Soviet Union (1959).

Some Judgments on Soviet Science, *The Russian Review*, July 1960.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel,
(G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
(Attn: Station Library)
San Diego 36, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval
District (Code 141)
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces,
Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 17
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U.S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
U.S. Naval Base
Norfolk, Virginia

BOOKS

Ellis, Harry B. *Challenge in the Middle East: Communist Influence and American Policy*. New York: Ronald, 1960. 238 p.

Harry B. Ellis, an experienced newspaper correspondent, has worked in the Middle East from 1952 until the present. His book is a current report of Communist penetration of this area and his conclusions about American policy. The author contends that "the national interests of the United States and those of the Middle Eastern peoples are compatible, whereas the national interests of the Soviet Bloc and the nations of the Middle East are not," and explains that "Arab leaders, notably President Nasser, are far more deeply concerned about the dangers of Communist influence than is realized by many in the West."

Baar, James and William E. Howard. *Polaris!* New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960. 245 p.

The development of the most fabulous weapon system in the modern deterrent arsenal, the Polaris missile-armed nuclear submarine, is vividly and factually presented in this very entertaining book. The achievement of this near miraculous feat in the brief span of five years from conception to a fully operational system is dramatically recounted in minute detail. Although much publicity has been given to the Polaris program during the recent past, the authors have been most successful in compiling a very comprehensive and worth-while résumé of the actual operations of the Navy Special Projects Office, the unique organization responsible for the success of the project. The human element is effectively injected in the form of brief biographical sketches of the individuals through whose efforts success was obtained. A degree of excitement, normally found only in a novel, is ever present due to the never-ending race against time and the many setbacks and heartbreaks which

repeatedly threatened the program. *Polaris* is recommended not only as a complete chronological reference covering the development of the weapon system itself, but as an insight into the immensely complex problem of developing modern armaments, their expense, the interrelationship between the military and industry and the inner workings within the Department of Defense.

Hahn, Walter F. and John C. Neff, eds. *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1960. 455 p.

This book is a compilation of thirty-three essays, articles and lectures written or presented by a number of authorities in America today on the many problems relating to the gigantic power struggle in which the Free World and the Communist Bloc are engaged. It is divided into six parts commencing with the presentation of the situation which exists, and evolving through the nature of the Communist threat, the strategy and tactics of the Communist adversary, the problems of devising a military strategy to insure security, the difficulties of formulating an economic strategy to cope with the Soviet economic threat, and ending with a summary consisting of three chapters on what is to be done to meet the challenge by Dean Acheson, David Sarnoff and Frank R. Barnett. In addition to the above, contributors include such noteworthies as Arnold Wolfers, Walt Rostow, General Arthur G. Trudeau, Henry A. Kissinger, Hanson Baldwin, Albert Wohlstetter, Stefan T. Possony, Gerhart Niemeyer, John von Neumann and Robert Strausz-Hupé. The book cannot be said to be all-inclusive, but within the space available in one volume the editors have presented a very comprehensive account of the Free World's power struggle against Communism.

Spanier, John W. *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*. New York: Praeger, 1960. 234 p.

Professor Spanier reviews postwar events from the breakdown of the wartime coalition with the Soviet Union, through the beginning of the Cold War and the subsequent efforts of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to contain Communist expansion, right up to the Berlin crisis and the collapse of the Paris summit conference in May 1960. Within this reconstruction of the principal events of the period, he carefully depicts the general development of American foreign policy in Europe, Asia and the Middle East; the objectives sought by the United States; the political, military, economic and social policies it pursued in an attempt to achieve these objectives; and the inter-relationship of the policies and the impact of the actions in one area upon those in another. He has presented an excellent answer in depth to the question of how the balance sheet of achievement and failure stands today and of how well equipped America is to face the crucial challenges of the 1960's.