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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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SEA POWER AND CURRENT U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
30 November 1960

by

Major George Fielding Eliot, USA (Ret.)

It is always a challenging and a pleasurable experience to stand on this platform and speak to this audience. I find it most particularly so today, conscious of the honor done me in asking me to speak to such an audience, very largely a naval audience, in this year of Polaris, only two weeks after the USS George Washington stood out from Charleston Harbor to establish, deep under the icy surface of the northern seas, the response of the American people to the Soviet threat of nuclear assault with ballistic missiles. On the dock amidst the last-minute preparations, Rear Admiral K.M. McManes, who commands the Charleston Naval District, said in a reporter's hearing, "You see that young skipper on her bridge? When he says, 'Cast off, all back 3/4, left standard rudder,' he will be writing the first words in a new chapter of the long history of warfare." That was a sailor's interpretation of the meaning of Polaris. I hope this audience, in which sailors predominate, will forgive me for amplifying that interpretation with another thought.

This one comes from a politician, and it is concerned not so particularly with Polaris itself as with what Polaris ought to mean and may come to mean. One of the more experienced, and certainly more vocal members of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, is Congressman Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania. Last January during the hearings on the Defense Appropriation Bill, after

listening to a fairly optimistic and minutely detailed presentation on the state of the national defense from Secretary Gates, Mr. Flood delivered himself as follows: "You know," he said, "you are missing just one point in this business. A great nation's ability to affect the course of events in this world is dependent upon two things, not just one. There must indeed be a reality of power in a great nation. You say we have that and I believe you, but the mere reality of power in your inventories, your arsenals, and your navy yards, will not do. There must be a public image of that reality of power in the minds of the people of this country and the peoples of the world, and there is no such image. There must (went on the Congressman) be two factors in our control of world events, in our own national security—the reality of our power, and the fact that there must be a public image of the existence of that reality. Merely doing the first will not be enough; you cannot win that way." That goes along pretty well with something that Colonel George A. Lincoln at West Point has said, "Power, until it is actually used, is what people think it is." The Soviets have established their image of power. They have taken great care to do so. Sputnik—who hasn't heard of Sputnik in the farthest corners of the world? Every peasant tapping a rubber tree in Indonesia has heard of Sputnik and of the first rocket to go around the other side of the moon. The Soviets take great pains with these public presentations. But to create a true public image of the reality of power is more complicated. It is much more difficult to explain, even to a sophisticated audience, exactly what would happen to the Soviet Union if they launched a nuclear attack against the United States, then it is to point to Sputnik or Lunik and say, "See, there is the evidence of the supremacy of Soviet power over these Americans."

Two years ago, when I had the honor to stand on this platform to speak on American national strategy, I closed my remarks with a reference to George

Washington's recommendation that our military posture should always "appear truly respectable in the eyes of our friends, and formidable to those who might otherwise become our enemies." General Washington was speaking of an image of power and the need for it. National power exists only to serve the national purposes, to help achieve the national aims. Two years ago when I spoke here that purpose and those aims had just been defined in the terms of that day by the then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. He had stated his conception of our military needs in terms of a capability for deterring nuclear aggression by the certainty of retaliation, and of containing non-nuclear aggression by a capability for a swift and effective reaction tailored to the circumstances of the case. He went on to say that it was his belief that time was on our side, that "internal pressures are bound to alter the character of Communist regimes, particularly if these regimes are denied the glamor and prestige of great external successes." Thus to deny external successes to international Communism was, in Mr. Dulles' view, the principal mission of our military forces. In principle that may still be sound enough. But for a practical application it lacks something. What it appears to lack is the development of Congressman Flood's visible image of power, visible to our own people, the people of allied states, and to the ever-watchful enemy.

An image of power is not readily evolved from negative ingredients. Polaris, rising like the bright star for which it is named above the dark horizon of the future, has to some extent supplied that lack, at least for the moment. Polaris not only represents power, but power in motion, which is the kind of military power the United States can best use for its national and international purposes. The impression abroad produced by Polaris and its deployment has on the whole been favorable among our allies. The *London Observer* remarks that the so-called missile gap is closing before it had really started to open.

Paradoxically, however, Polaris, together with our other deterrent weaponry, also establishes what we might call a condition of nuclear stability. The men in the Kremlin will not dare launch a nuclear surprise attack on the West while we possess a nuclear striking force which is immune to a surprise knockout, and therefore the threat of doing so loses much of its credibility. But since the Soviets with their closed society have the ability to conceal the location of their missile sites, they possess a nuclear striking force likewise relatively immune to surprise destruction or counterattack. While this is so, neither will we dare to launch a pre-emptive attack against them as has sometimes been urged, or be able to destroy their ability to get at us with nuclear weapons. Thus any threat on our part of nuclear retaliation for a nonnuclear Soviet aggression, loses much of its credibility. In a condition of nuclear stability based on the mutual possession of invulnerable striking power, nuclear deterrence becomes a two-way street. We need something more active and convincing than nuclear stability and mutual deterrence to give life and dynamism to our policies, to establish a convincing image of power which shall, in turn, establish that confidence which is the cement of defensive alliances. We need something more, and it lies ready to our hands—the gift of our geography which gives us almost unlimited access to the oceanic spaces of the world, and the heritage of our national experience in the use of the sea in war. The kind of war that we are fighting today, and must continue to fight while the Communist purpose of world domination endures, is not just a military war; it is a war in which the enemy uses every aspect and factor of his national power in a coordinated effort, of which the objective is the eventual destruction of our way of life while he is still capable of destroying it. It is a war in which there is an increasing degree of convertibility between political and economic warfare and shooting warfare, or the threat of it in various degrees. The Communists know only too well how to combine every

means for the achievement of their ends. They do not take military risks where the odds are all against them. They temper such risks to the offerings of opportunity. We must apply that lesson to our own necessities. We must learn to combine political purpose with military advantage where we have it, and where we have it is at sea. If we can anywhere establish a believable, convincing and continuous image of unchallengable national power, the sea is where we can do it, and that is quite a lot of anywhere. The guiding concept behind such a procedure, such a policy and strategy, must be freedom of action based on the principle of mobility.

More than 2,000 years ago Xenophon, the Greek military strategist and writer, who led the Ten Thousand in their march to the sea, wrote that the art of war is at bottom the art of keeping one's freedom of action. Marshal Foch, quoting this remark of Xenophon, observed that at the end of an operation—or still more of a series of operations—what is the result save that the victor is free to do to, and exact from, the vanquished what he will, while the vanquished is immobilized and ruled and must yield to the victor whatever is demanded of him? The one has maintained freedom of action, the other has lost it, and this is the difference between victor and vanquished in the mind of Marshal Foch. This differs very little in principle from Admiral Mahan's idea of the purpose of naval operations—to maintain the free use of the sea for one's own purposes and to be able to deny it to the enemy.

Now we see the landlocked and relatively immobile Communist states denied freedom of action on their frontiers short of unacceptable risks. We see them chafing about Communist encirclement, and yet confronted all around their peripheries with very serious risks indeed if they start major aggression across those frontiers. How then shall they continue to expand? Writing in the *Naval Institute Proceedings*

earlier this year, Dr. Maurice Hellner—a civilian analyst in the Office of Naval Intelligence—lists immediate Soviet purposes as being these four: first, the breaking out of the imperialist encirclement, by which today they really mean overleaping, not breaking through, as they did, for instance, in Egypt; second, fragmenting our alliances through exploiting divergent aims and interests of the allies outside the immediate area of the alliance; third, capturing revolutionary movements around the world and converting them into Communist movements; and fourth, creating by this ubiguitous activity an image of overwhelming Soviet power. To every one of these purposes sea power properly and vigorously used by us offers an effective answer. There can be no new beachheads, no opening of new flanks in noncontiguous territory by the Soviets unless they can have free use of the sea and of the air lanes and spaces above the sea. Egypt is a good example of that—that was their first experiment in a major overleaping of the imperialist encirclement, the shipment of arms to Egypt in 1955. And I imagine there must have been among the advisors of those who took that decision some who said, "You will never get away with it. The Americans and British will never allow you to send arms to Egypt in shiploads. They will stop the ships." Others said, "No, they won't; they won't quite get their courage up to do that, and besides they are too legal-minded." The latter were quite correct. As a matter of fact, the question of whether the Soviet ships should be stopped, whether the ports of Egypt should be blockaded, arose at a fairly high level in this country, and Mr. Dulles, whose mind was very keen and active in some areas, but was still confined by legal concepts, said, "No, we can't do that, it would be an act of war; blockade is an act of war," which is a pure lawyer's definition because no war would have resulted. However, we had trouble instead.

Consider now the other Soviet purposes. There can be no free-wheeling interference in other people's

affairs in noncontiguous territory, as is now projected for Algeria for one example, without the use of the sea. There can be no capture of revolutions abroad without seaborne logistic support, including, of course, technicians or "volunteers," to give the Communists a continuing hold on the course of affairs, which enables them to convert this revolution to their model and purpose. This we are seeing in Cuba today. There can be no image of overwhelming Soviet power if Soviet purposes are continually being frustrated by the denial of free access to those parts of the world in which the Soviets claim to have interests or seek to go. Of course, this concept gets back to the idea of the will behind it. Perhaps we need a new definition of the old idea of freedom of the seas, of which so much has been heard. Perhaps we need a new definition of contraband. Historically, there has been upon the great sea powers an unspoken obligation to maintain the peace and security of the sea as a great international highway simply because they had the means to do it in the interest of all who used the sea. Under that concept both British and American warships at one time or another have interfered with the slave trade; both British and American naval vessels have interfered with what the British called gun-running in the Persian Gulf, and what we used to call filibustering in the Caribbean—again on the high seas in international waters.

It may be thought that it is hard to produce these new definitions—to adapt them to our new requirements, but that hasn't always been hard for us to do. We have proved in the past our adaptability to the demands of self-preservation. No one could have talked more loudly about neutral rights than we did during the Napoleonic wars. We came to blows with Britain, partly on that subject, in 1812. And yet, during the Civil War, when it became necessary for the Federal Government to establish a blockade of the southern coast, "neutral rights" became very quickly indeed to be what the senior Union naval officer present on any

particular occasion said they were. Despite the bitter complaints which were constantly being addressed to our government, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Welles, used to protect his people, to the great annoyance of Secretary of State Seward. This state of affairs pretty well continued right down to the end of the war. The attitude of the Royal Navy is very interesting in this regard. British shipping interests were feeling the bite of the blockade in the last year or two pretty severely, when it was becoming much more efficient. The American and West Indies Squadron of the Royal Navy had been somewhat reinforced, presumably to keep an eye on these proceedings. But not much seemed to be done by the British Navy. One British admiral in Washington on an official visit remarked at a convivial moment, "I can't quite see interfering with you chaps doing a blockade when the very life of Britain may one day come to rest on being allowed to maintain an effective blockade. No, my dear fellow, we wouldn't think of such a thing. We would much prefer to be able to remind you of this on some other occasion when we need to make a tight blockade despite your interests." And this came about in World War I. Again we had a great clamor about neutral rights—especially the Scandinavian countries and Holland were being progressively restricted in their imports and the definitions of contraband were extending day by day, and our complaints about it were couched in fairly strong language.

Then came along April 1917 and we got into the war, whereupon we sent some navy and economic experts over to discuss blockade matters with the British. They took a good look at the list of contraband and at the regulations and one of our men leaned back and looked at the British in astonishment and said, "You people call this a blockade? Let's get down to business here and we will give you some of our ideas about a blockade." It is reliably reported that three months later you couldn't buy so much as a bobby pin in Amsterdam. So we do change our ideas on these

subjects, even on sacred subjects like the freedom of the seas, and maybe we are going to have to rethink that one again.

It may seem somewhat of a jump from the Atlantic blockade to Hungary, but during the Hungarian revolt when the sympathies of the American people were so strongly with the rebels who were fighting so bravely, a question was repeatedly asked in Congress and elsewhere, Why don't we help them? The answer was, in the heart of central Europe, nuclear weapons aside, the military advantage is unquestionably with the Russians. The military risks of U.S. interference are just too great. The Russians recognized that. They seemed to be fairly sure that we would not assume those risks. Why should we not assume and act accordingly in areas of the world where the military advantages unquestionably are with us, which is almost everywhere on salt water beyond the reach of Soviet coastal forces—why should we not assume that the Russians are out of their bailiwick and act accordingly? Take Africa, for example.

In a recent article in the *Revue Militaire Generale*, General J.M. Nemo of the French Army observes: "Africa is surrounded by seas. She has always been reached from the sea. It is still by sea that she receives and exports most of her merchandise. If ships should cease to stop at her harbors, Africa would suffocate economically, modern air transportation notwithstanding. What aviation does is to speed goods from harbor to user. The combination of ship and plane, of harbor and airfield, are the wherewithal of Africa's economy and of Africa's strategy." Stop and think a minute, gentlemen. In a contest involving Africa under these circumstances, and considering the geographical factors of access to the sea, in such a contest should we accept even the possibility that the Soviets could beat us? Not if we make it a contest, and that is where the image of power comes in, for the will to use power in a free society must be

generated by public and political confidence that power can be used successfully, especially when the use of power may in a particular instance have to be initiated by our side. The application of power by one member of an alliance, and particularly its initial application, needs an even wider area of confidence and hence an image of power more convincing to a wider variety of opinion. Today, largely because of Soviet threats embellishing the image of Soviet power that the Kremlin seeks to create, there is a nervous and jittery reaction to the mere suggestion of the use of force among some of our allies. Even the comparatively tough-minded British seemed, judging from their press, to be a little upset the other day when we ordered a naval task force into the Western Caribbean in response to the request of the governments of Guatemala and Nicaragua for protection against any threat from Cuba. One British paper remarked that they supposed it was necessary, but why did we have to make such a display? Why did we have to send an aircraft carrier? Couldn't we do it with a less provocative sort of approach—maybe a couple of destroyers or something? I am sure the Royal Navy didn't go along with this idea, but that is the kind of thing that is said when anybody talks about using force, and especially us. We are supposed to be trigger happy; they worry about it.

You get this incredible concept that is coming up now in NATO, about NATO's nuclear rearmament with fifteen fingers on the trigger instead of one. This is a deterrent? All this because our power image is not yet sharply defined—is not yet widely credible and accepted. Polaris—just as hardware which can be seen on the television screens—helps. It has caught the imagination of many, but actions by our government which display confidence in our power, Polaris included, will help more. I don't expect to see any great and sudden revolution in policy; things don't come that way. The policy evolves, but consider the development of the Polaris weapon—you have got these

1200-mile missiles up there in the northern seas. You have to have them there if they are to have any deterrent effect, within reach of significant Soviet targets. It is not difficult to take a globe and a pair of dividers and figure where the patrol stations have to be. We can't just send these submariners up there and leave them to their own devices. We have got to be prepared to take care of them, to support them in case of need. Making the Second Fleet into an operational force is probably one recognition of that need—the increase in operational attack carriers from 14 to 16 another move in that direction. Generally, we are widening the scope of our immediate naval interests and we are confronted by new obligations. The Soviets are not going to like having Polaris submarines deployed in waters in which their missiles can strike Soviet targets. They are going to try to revive their antisubmarine capability, which has not had the highest priority in the Soviet Navy heretofore. They are going to find out that ASW without carriers is a short-legged business. They are surely going to start thinking in terms of extending the radius of action of their shore-based aircraft by at least establishing the capability of getting advanced bases. I do not need to say more to indicate one area in which there will be a sharp rise in strategic and tactical competition in sea warfare capabilities. And there will be others.

The other day the Chief of Naval Operations for the first time publicly indicated interest in an Indian Ocean task force to fill the vast vacuum of Western power westward of Singapore along the southern face of Asia. A South Atlantic squadron has also been mentioned especially since the Congo trouble attracted our attention to the explosion possibilities among the emerging independent states of Africa. Certainly as the image of what Polaris, and sea-based power generally, means to our security becomes more clearly defined in the public and congressional minds, we shall have to have a very large-scale expansion of our

own antisubmarine warfare capabilities. So we return to our basic need, the reality of power of the kinds and quantities that our needs demand, plus a visible and credible image of that reality. Few forms of power, taken as a whole, are more visible, are more credible, to the average observer in countries bordered by the sea, than naval power. We return also to our basic concept of strategy, that is, the use of power—freedom of action, which involves limiting the freedom of the action of the enemy as an essential corollary. On our main defensive land front in Europe, we are accustomed to speak of the ground forces as the shield, and our nuclear striking power as the terrible swift sword. But on the active sea front all over the world, nuclear power, though wielded largely from mobile bases, is the shield covering the use of the sword of amphibious mobility. The situations are reversed. Here is an image and a concept which promises to serve our needs in this dangerous decade of the 1960's upon which we are entering, which may indeed, as Vice Admiral John T. Hayward suggested to Congress earlier this year, take the premium clear out of this surprise attack business, and strip credibility from the rival image of power which Mr. Khrushchev and his friends are seeking so assiduously to create. In this image and concept, gentlemen, sea power, if we will but seize upon it and use it, may serve the needs of our current strategy; our current security, and that of the Free World of which we are champion and whose shores are largely washed by the oceans upon which the image of our power must constantly be displayed. In so doing we may be laying the foundations of a future as hopeful as that of the one hundred years during which British sea power secured the peace of mankind. The Pax Britannica we all remember with gratitude as the era of the one hundred years after Waterloo during which science, education, the general welfare of mankind, made the greatest advances in five centuries. If we are going to have a similar period of peace and security for the ideals and hopes of free men and women everywhere, it is going to be,

gentlemen, a Pax Americana, and it will be based on our ability to control the seas for our own purposes and to deny them to any enemy. Thank you, gentlemen.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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Upon graduation from college, Major Eliot served with the Australian Imperial Force in the Dardanelles, the Western Front and France. He then served in the U.S. Army for eight years (1922-1930) in the Military Intelligence Reserve, attaining the rank of Major.

After contributing to fiction magazines for several years, he began writing extensively on military and international affairs. He has since become widely known as an author, journalist, radio and television commentator and lecturer. He was military correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune from 1939-1946, and was then a correspondent and columnist for the *New York Post Syndicate* from 1947-1949. Since 1950, he has been affiliated with the *General Features Syndicate*. He was a military analyst for the Columbia Broadcasting System from 1939-1947 and since 1950 has been associated with the Mutual Broadcasting System as a commentator.

Publications:

The Ramparts We Watch; Bombs Bursting in Air; Hour of Triumph; The Strength We Need; Hate, Hope and High Explosives—A Report on the Middle East; If Russia Strikes; Caleb Pettengill, USN (novel) and *Victory Without War*, 1958-1961.

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
23 September 1960

by

Professor Inis L. Claude, Jr.

One of the most notable features of present-day international relations is the proliferation and flourishing of regional associations, which we may loosely define as more or less formally constituted and elaborately organized mechanisms created and maintained by a self-selected group of states which have, or feel that they have, a particular basis for intimacy of interrelationship. The adjective "regional" automatically suggests a geographical relationship. While it is true that there is hardly a regional grouping in which the factor of the spatial location of member states has no constituent role, it is equally true that today's regional pattern is by no means dictated by the facts of geography. Some groupings, indeed, are geographical monstrosities. The essential characteristic of a regional association is that its composition is determined by the application of some criterion of selectivity which is believed to be relevant to the task at hand. It is inherently, and by deliberate contrivance, a nonuniversal international agency.

As I have suggested, the international woods are increasingly full of regional associations. They are growing not only in numbers, but in variety as well. Many of the most striking and significant innovations in the field of international organization have recently been associated with, and are attributable to, the regionalization movement. One has only to mention NATO, SEATO, OAS, the Council of Europe,

the European Common Market, and the Warsaw Pact—and this by no means exhausts the list—to demonstrate the multiplication and the diversification of regional associations in our time.

Moreover, some of the regional institutions are of extraordinary importance, not only as contributions to the development of international organization, but also as instruments of the foreign policy of states and influences upon the foreign policy of states. Certainly, some of the Western European organizations represent vitally important experiments in the relationships of their member states. In recent weeks, the OAS has loomed particularly large in the international affairs of the Western Hemisphere. And anyone cognizant of the strategic problems of the Cold War must surely be aware of the profound significance of NATO.

Perhaps the most striking evidence of the rising importance of regional associations in the period since the Second World War is to be found in the *de facto* emancipation of those agencies from the restrictive and directive control of the United Nations which was contemplated in 1945, when the Charter of that organization was devised. It is true that a preference for the regional principle was vigorously expressed by leading figures in the anti-Axis coalition during World War II, and that the San Francisco Charter conceded a great deal to the demands of those who favored emphasis upon that principle. Indeed, as we shall see later, the Charter contained, in Article 51, a major loophole designed to permit states to form combinations for defensive purposes. To this degree, it left the way open for independent action by regional groupings, and even expressed a considerable reliance upon collective defensive arrangements divorced from the United Nations in critical situations. Nevertheless, the general tendency of the San Francisco Conference was to make the United Nations the focal point of primary reliance in international affairs, and to insist that regional associations

should be subordinated to the authority of the global institution. A place was recognized, rather grudgingly and conditionally, for regional agencies, but it was expected and intended that the responsibility and the competence of the world body to preside over the international scene should not be compromised by the autonomous activities of regional agencies. Senator Vandenberg, a prominent advocate of the regionalist viewpoint, spoke of the "over-all supervision" and the "dominant supremacy of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security," in discussing the relationships between the United Nations and regional groupings. The official American commentary on the San Francisco Conference, submitted to the President by the Secretary of State, contained the following passage:

> It was recognized that the Security Council must have a general authority over regional security machinery in order to prevent such arrangements from developing independently and thus possibly pursuing different ends. In other words, this provision (Article 53) was intended to coordinate the functions of a regional grouping with those of a general organization, and at the same time establish the final authority of the latter.

The provisions for insuring the primacy of the United Nations over regional associations remain formally in effect, and the constitutional documents of most of the latter agencies contain words respectful of this superiority-inferiority relationship. However, I suggest that a realistic analysis must point to the conclusion that this relationship is fictitious. Regional associations have assumed the autonomy which the authors of the Charter sought to deny them. Restrictive clauses, purporting to subordinate their activities to the overarching authority of the United Nations, are likely to be ingeniously evaded, or

studiously ignored, or conveniently forgotten, rather than crassly violated. Note, for example, our success just a few weeks ago in frustrating the Soviet Union's efforts to have the Security Council assert its competence to give or deny legitimacy to the decision of the OAS to invoke nonmilitary sanctions against the Dominican Republic. There were several technical quibbles which clouded the issue, but the United States made its position clear when its spokesman denounced the Soviet move as "a bald effort to seek a veto over the operation of the inter-American system." That is precisely what Article 53 seems to have been intended to do—to make regional enforcement action dependent upon authorization by the Security Council—but we have effectively repealed the rule without erasing the words which state the rule. The notion that OAS or NATO, or the Warsaw Pact organization—is under the control or supervision of the United Nations falls into the category of legal mythology. For whatever reasons, regional associations have gained an importance in world affairs which was not contemplated by the predominantly globally-oriented institutional designers of 1945.

The variety of regional associations now extant is sufficient to justify, if not necessitate, a venture in classification. Neat categories are difficult to formulate for this collection of entities: we have big ones and small ones, compact ones and diffuse ones, modest ones and pretentious ones, active ones and dormant ones, et cetera. We Americans have a standing temptation to divide them into good and bad regional associations, honorable ones and disreputable ones, depending upon whether the United States is a member, or is sympathetically related to them. This is convenient, but probably not very scholarly! Our typology can legitimately distinguish between multi-purpose regional bodies—such as the OAS—and those which are meaningfully concerned only with a single functional objective; the latter category may be subdivided to separate the economic and social agencies

from those which have a predominantly political and military—or security—orientation. Thus, the OEEC is a regional economic body, and NATO is unmistakably a security arrangement. We may want to differentiate between regional associations which reflect a tendency and an aspiration to move in a federative direction—here I refer to the European Coal and Steel Community and its sister institutions created by the well-known European Six—and regional associations which follow the more traditional lines of international organization, confining themselves and seeming destined to confine themselves to promoting collaboration and coordination among the member states.

I should be the first to admit that these classificatory suggestions provide only the crudest of Procrustean beds, but the lack of categorical definitiveness does not really concern me. The essential point is that regional associations pose and confront different kind of problems; they serve different purposes; they exhibit different sets of characteristics; hence, they cannot be analyzed or evaluated in the same terms. We must be wary of excessive generalization in dealing with these quite disparate entities.

I should like now to turn to the group of regional associations with which the United States has been most actively concerned—those which have primary relevance to the problem of security—which are ultimately military in their implications. Here, I think it worthwhile to dwell at some length upon the distinctions between what I would call (1) the "collective security" type; (2) the "alliance" type; and (3) the "guarantee" type of arrangement.

Let us look first at "collective security." This concept, first elaborated in the aftermath of World War I, implies a legal and organizational arrangement, supported by requisite political conditions, in which all the members of a group are committed and expected to rally to the defense of any one of their number

which may be attacked by any other of their number. This is a deterrent scheme, internally oriented; that is to say, it is expected to embrace, within a single system of order, the potential aggressor, the potential victim, and the potential defenders of the collective peace, and it purports to deter aggression within the system by offering the assurance and the threat of collective resistance to any member which goes on the warpath. This collective action may involve sanctions of whatever variety may be deemed or found necessary—diplomatic, economic, or military. The theory of collective security represents the repudiation of the theory of balance of power, in that it looks to the attainment of stability not by the development of an equilibrium between defined groups set in competition with each other, but by the maintenance of a flexible disequilibrium—a situation in which any state within the system may be discouraged from aggression by the prospect that all or virtually all of the other states will join in mobilizing an overwhelming preponderance of power, cooperatively and collectively assembled, to frustrate its ambitions.

It is evident that collective security is essentially a global scheme. It was originally conceived in the conviction that the competitive divisiveness which marked the balance of power system was a flaw fatal to the prospects of a stable and peaceful order. It promised to substitute for the "we against them" situation an alternative arrangement in which "all of us will stand against any of us who kicks over the traces." The League of Nations represented a faltering and imperfect—and, ultimately, unsuccessful—attempt to translate the theory of collective security into an operative scheme. Regionalism was widely believed to be incompatible with, and antithetical to, collective security. Regionalists, past and present, have effectively criticized the collective security notion on the ground that it is neither probable nor desirable that a given state should undertake—or honor, if it does undertake—an obligation so indeterminate as that of

fighting anywhere, at any time, against any aggressor, on behalf of any aggressee, in combination with any other defenders of the general system.

Despite this doctrinal tension between collective security and regionalism, we do find some evidences of the imprint of collective security on contemporary regional associations. In one of its aspects, the OAS is a collective-security-like organization. I refer to the fact that, under the Rio Pact of 1947 and the Bogota Charter of 1948, all members of this hemispheric body are pledged to consider an attack upon any of them by any state, including explicitly another American state, as an assault upon them all, capable of triggering the mechanism of collective consultation and possible collective action. Thus, insofar as the OAS is directed toward the cooperative squelching of aggression from within its own ranks, this body represents a translation into regional terms of the normally universalistic doctrine of collective security. It may well be that the United States conceives the OAS primarily as an instrument of hemispheric solidarity against possible intrusions of outside powers, but, in practice, a very large part of the political business of the organization has concerned problems of relationship among its member states, not between them and extra-continental powers.

With this exception, contemporary regional security groupings tend not to be internally oriented in the manner of a collective security system, but externally oriented in the manner of an alliance system. NATO, to cite the most significant example, is clearly not a design for collective action by its members to protect each of them against aggression launched by any of its fellow-members. It is, rather, a combination of states which, fearing attack from the outside—and from a particular source on the outside about the identity of which there is no confusion or disagreement—have joined together to cope with that external threat. Nobody joins NATO to find safety

against the United States, a member of NATO; it offers none. Indeed, I should say that a state's joining NATO indicates that it feels threatened by the Soviet Union and does not feel threatened by the United States. NATO is not a means of gaining security against American attack, but a symbol of its members' conviction that no such security is needed. In this sense, NATO, an alliance, is a much more moralistic scheme than a hypothetical collective security system. Collective security assumes that any state may be tempted to commit aggression, and, consequently, that every state must be enveloped in a system which threatens to confront it with overwhelming collective force if it should yield to that temptation. The theory of collective security is no respecter of states—it acknowledges no line between peace-loving and potentially warlike states. NATO, on the other hand, expresses a belief on the part of its lesser members that one of the Great Powers is predatory, and must be guarded against, while the other can be counted upon to use its strength for beneficent purposes, and can be relied upon for protection. This would seem to indicate that, within the present-day operation of the balance of power system at least, states do not conduct their policy exclusively upon the basis of calculations of relative power—who has how much power—but rely heavily upon their estimations of the interests, purposes, and moral scruples of the holders of power—who seems likely to try to do what with his power.

I would submit that NATO is an alliance, precisely and particularly in the sense in which an alliance is different from, even antithetical to, a collective security arrangement. It is a security arrangement directed against aggression from outside, contrasting sharply with collective security, a security arrangement directed against intramural aggression. Collective security commits all to act for each against any, while NATO, a selective security system, unites a selected group of states in mutual protection against

an external power which is specific, even though it is not formally specified in the text of the treaty. Yet, ironically enough, NATO has been, frequently and at the very highest levels, described as a collective security arrangement.

Why, we may ask, is NATO so commonly and persistently mislabeled in this manner? How can it be that an alliance is called a collective security arrangement, when Woodrow Wilson and his cohorts worked so hard to replace the alliance system with the collective security system which they regarded as basically different and infinitely preferable? Is it fair to Wilson, who was sent to his grave by the fight over collective security, to add the further indignity of spinning him in his grave by allowing alliances to appropriate the label of the scheme which was to supplant them?

The answer is rather complicated. In the first place, much of the misuse of the term, collective security, is doubtless innocent and entirely natural. Less charitably, we could call it ignorant. Collective security does not sound like a technical term with a specialized meaning, and it is understandably not obvious to the uninitiated—persons unfamiliar with a generation of literature in the international organization field—that collective security is not a fit term for any scheme whereby two or more states undertake to act collectively against threats to their security—that is, even for an alliance. More defensively, perhaps, I might say that this usage expresses the impatience of men of affairs with the semantic quibbling and terminological hair-splitting of the men of scholarship. Why should the academics be permitted to capture a perfectly good expression like collective security and regiment its use, depriving others of a convenient synonym for "collective defense arrangement" or "mutual security association"? By whose fiat can collective security be deprived of its apparently natural synonymity with those latter expressions?

I should respond at this point that I do not really think it matters what an alliance is called—except that I do believe it inadvisable to call two different things by the same name. This practice has an unfortunate tendency to conceal differences which ought to be held in awareness, and taken into account, in the interest of accurate analysis and appraisal. Herein lies the secret of my unhappiness about the corruption of the terminology of alliance and collective security.

I must now contradict myself. It does matter what an alliance is called. Objectively, perhaps it does not, but subjectively it matters greatly. Subjective reactions to words are often highly important among the objective facts with which both statesmen and politicians—and I leave you to make the distinction there—must deal. "What's in a name?" is, in the realm of politics, a rhetorical question, begging the answer, "A great deal."

Here, we approach another part of the explanation for the phenomenon under consideration. In terms of contemporary ideology, American and international, collective security sounds better than alliance; it peals a more acceptable tone. Domestically, the word, alliance, has a long history of disrepute. Wilson drew from a long American tradition when he spoke disapprovingly of the alliance system, and I believe that he was being very shrewd when he strove desperately, albeit unsuccessfully, to convince the American public that the League system which he asked them to join was fundamentally different from the alliance system which they had always shunned. International-relations realists, who condemn Wilson for his disparagement of the balance-of-power cum-alliances system, should be reminded that he was functioning as a domestic-politics realist when he refrained from trying to sell the American people a permanently entangling-alliance scheme. For my part, I have an unconfirmed and perhaps unconfirmable hunch—which may

or may not mean a wrong one—that Wilson's insistence on the fundamental differentiation between the new collective security system and the old alliance system was motivated largely by tactical considerations. My notion is that he might have been willing to consider an old-fashioned alliance with the World War I associates in the postwar period, but he felt that the American Senate and public would accept only an arrangement which was, or could be plausibly represented as being, markedly and drastically different from such an alliance. In the event, they accepted neither, but I cannot find it within myself to assert that Wilson was wrong, or unrealistic, in his apparent conviction that they were more amenable to being sold a new-fangled scheme called collective security than the old-fashioned and traditionally maligned thing called alliance.

Alliance is still a word of very dubious repute in the United States. We are becoming braver. This eight-letter word, along with various four-letter words, is now being given greater and less abashed public currency. But the urge for a euphemism persists, and collective security fills the bill. We have alliances now, but in truth we have no doctrine of alliance to legitimize it and bestow ideological respectability upon it. In terms of the American tradition, "a good alliance" may sound self-contradictory; collective security is used to mean just that. Its use enables us to make entangling alliances without confessing, even to ourselves, that we have repudiated the wise counsel of the Founding Fathers against entering into entangling alliances.

Very much the same analysis applies to the international scene. To assert, in a United Nations meeting, for instance, that we have formed an alliance is to make the damaging confession that we are a reactionary force, bent on turning the calendar back to the bad old days of uninhibited power politics and undercutting recent attempts to institute a more orderly system of world affairs.

All this suggests that collective security is as acceptable a concept, domestically and internationally, as alliance is unacceptable. This is true, in the ideological sense. Considering that collective security has but the sparsest of claims to operating success in the past, and but the barest of prospects for operative significance in the future, its ideological success is rather remarkable. The truth is that nobody really wants to participate in a full-fledged security system. We dare not rely on such a system. We are not willing to accept the obligations which would be incumbent upon us in such a system. We cannot allow the Soviet Union to gain the opportunities which such a system would confer upon it. I might cite in evidence of these statements some of the policy situations which have arisen in the various post-World War II crises. In the Korean crisis of 1950, the United States went into action with the blessing of the United Nations, but our leaders were very careful to assure the public that we entered the fray on the basis of our own judgment of our own interests, not on the basis of an obligation imposed on us by a vote of the Security Council. Evidently we were not prepared to accept the collective security proposition that American response or lack of response to Communist aggression should be determined by a collective rather than a national policy decision. In the Hungarian crisis of 1956, the United States was very glad to have a collective condemnation of Soviet malfeasance, but we carefully avoided any initiative which would have put us in the position of being ordered by the United Nations to engage in action directly against the Soviet Union. We regarded the decision to fight against the Soviet Union as too grave to allow it to be made for us by an international organization. In the simultaneous Suez crisis, we indicated clearly that we were as hesitant to engage in collective security action with the Soviet Union as against it. President Eisenhower brushed aside as "unthinkable" the Soviet suggestion that the two great powers join their forces to clear up the Middle Eastern

situation. He was right. It was unthinkable, for our interest demanded that Soviet forces be kept out of that critical area, not that they be invited in under the covering of a collective security enterprise.

The point of all this is that we reject collective security in fact, and for reasons which seem utterly sound. We are not alone in this. The rejection of collective security is one point on which the nations are virtually unanimous. Yet, curiously enough, the ideological attraction of the slogan of collective security is sufficiently powerful to induce statesmen to believe that it is politically advantageous or even necessary to cover alliances with the euphemistic label of "collective security arrangements." I suggest that the description of NATO and other regional defensive groupings in which the United States participates as collective security associations is in large part a domestic and international public relations gesture.

Having said this, let me concede that in one important respect NATO does borrow from the doctrinal tradition of collective security. The idea of collective security is closely connected with the notion of international organization. Wilson did not simply preach the doctrine of collective security in the abstract. He pushed the concrete project of a League of Nations. His criticisms of the balance of power system boiled down to the assertion that it was fatally disorganized. It amounted, he alleged, to competitive chaos. His therapeutic prescription was organizational in nature. He called for a systematic institutionalization of the conduct of international relations. Thus, there is good historical reason for the association of the concepts of collective security and international organization.

In the light of this background, the "O" at the end of "NATO" assumes significance. It is our fashion today to include an "O"—for organization—in the

abbreviated titles of regional security associations. In some cases, it stands for something real—in NATO, for instance. In others—SEATO, for instance—the meaningfulness of its referent is much more questionable. But the "O" must be there. SEAT won't do; it must be SEATO. I think there are two reasons for this, aside from the facilitation of pronunciation. First, we have a throwback to the point concerning ideological attractiveness: an alliance is a "bad thing" but an international organization is a "good thing." True, in the contemporary ideological mood, an international organization may be regarded as an expression of naiveté, but it is unlikely to be denounced as evidence of nastiness. N-A-T-O has a more reputable sound than N-A-T. Second, I think that we have here a genuine recognition of the need—the objective need—for institutional mechanisms to translate formal commitments into effective reality. Mere pieces of paper are no longer highly regarded as instruments of American foreign policy. We have become acutely aware that treaties of alliance have real significance for us only if they serve as constitutional foundations for the erection of institutional superstructures. Wilson conceived of international organization to replace the alliance system, to make alliances unnecessary. What we have done is to use international organization to implement the alliance system, to make alliances working entities in time of uneasy peace rather than mere formal assertions of intent to work together in the event of actual war. Wilson envisaged international organization in lieu of alliances. We have adopted international organization in support of alliances. Thus, NATO is an alliance plus, rather than a mere old-fashioned alliance. We judge, with unchallengeable correctness, that the prospect for the North Atlantic alliance's doing what we hope it can do in the troubled and dangerous situation of our time is enhanced by the existence of an operative mechanism designed to promote the implementation and the implementability of the commitments stated in the Treaty. In this sense—the sense that our regional security

associations reflect the adoption of the international organization motif—I think it is fair to say that the collective security tradition has left its imprint on our security arrangements.

Nevertheless, this is far from saying that NATO is properly described as a collective security arrangement. Fundamentally, it is a new kind of alliance—a souped-up alliance, if you please. I do not say this in criticism. If we can emancipate ourselves from the notion that alliance is reprehensible and collective security is respectable, and consider the matter on its merits, I think we may conclude that this variety of alliance is infinitely preferable in today's setting to any version of collective security which we could conceivably have. We have adopted NATO precisely because it is different from collective security—because it offers the hope of benefits which we doubt that a collective security system could confer, and seems not to have the deficiencies which would characterize any collective security system that we can presently imagine. I suggest that if we were clear about ourselves and honest with ourselves, we would simply say that we have rejected the prescription of collective security and opted instead for a modernized alliance system. And I see no reason why we should say this apologetically. There is nothing sacred about the doctrine of collective security.

Perhaps this would be a good time to relieve the suspense. If you can conceive my metaphorical man as a tripod rather than a bipod, I will say that we can now drop the other—the third—shoe. For, some time back, I suggested that we differentiate between three types of regional security groupings: the collective security type, the alliance type—both of which I have discussed—and, finally, the guarantee type. I mean the latter category to include arrangements which, actually if not formally, involve less mutuality, or greater one-sidedness, than is customarily and reasonably associated with the concept of alliance. In a

guarantee situation, there is a guarantor—a state which does not so much participate in a scheme of reciprocal support as provide unilateral protection to lesser partners. Admittedly, no hard and fast line can be drawn between these two types of arrangement, and reasonable men may differ in their interpretations of a given relationship. In the present case of the United States, it is clear that we are the strongest partner in all the regional groupings in which we are involved, and are therefore somewhat in the position of a guarantor in every case. On the other hand, we doubtless hope or expect to receive security benefits from each of these groupings, and in this sense we have the status of ally in every case. Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that some of our so-called alliances are more genuinely alliances than others; the others, while not formally differentiated, are functionally much closer to the guarantee type of arrangement. It is a question of degree. NATO, I suggest, falls toward the alliance end of the scale, while SEATO, in my view, ought to be plotted near the guarantee end. Surely, it makes little sense to describe our relationships with Britain and with Thailand in the identical terminology of alliance. There is a difference of degree of mutuality in such a pair of cases significant enough to justify characterizing the relationships as different in kind. My main point is this: some regional associations are more accurately understood as formalizations of a great power's intent to reserve a given area against the intrusions of the competing great power than as alliances in the literal sense. They are declarations defining a sphere of influence. They are "No Trespassing" signs affixed to zones of critical importance. Concretely, I am inclined to argue that SEATO is not an alliance so much as it is a declaration that the United States, seconded by Britain and France, intends to react protectively on behalf of its Asian members if Communist aggression should be launched against them. Both NATO and SEATO are line-drawing operations in this sense; but NATO is additionally a

collective defense mobilizing agency, while SEATO, has, I think, very little of this additional feature. Much of NATO's meaning derives from its mechanism for collaborative planning and military preparation. SEATO's meaning, if I am not mistaken, is largely exhausted by the fact that it puts the United States on record as informing the Soviet Union that we will not acquiesce in its conquest of the designated area. I believe that the same is true of the OAS, insofar as it is a regional security association. This is a way of saying that, functionally, we could have accomplished very nearly the same thing in these cases by issuing unilateral reiterations and revisions of the Monroe Doctrine. This is not to say that we should necessarily have gone about it that way. The form of multilateral alliance has at least two special advantages. First, it pays a respect to the national sensitivities of the protected states which is wholly desirable. It makes for better relationships with them by sparing them the humiliation of the overt recognition of their dependence upon the United States. Second, it has the merit of introducing some degree of reciprocity into the relationship by providing a channel whereby they submit a certain quid for our quo. Their contributions to the security enterprise may be largely passive and permissive—in the form of bases, for instance—but these may nonetheless be significant. We would do well to recognize, however, that in the final analysis there is a fundamental difference between those regional associations which undertake the multilateral mobilization of resources for security and those which do little more than symbolize the intent of the United States to bar Soviet or other Communist expansion. If NATO is really more than an alliance, SEATO may perhaps be described as less than an alliance. If NATO is an alliance masquerading as a collective security arrangement, SEATO is a scheme of guarantee masquerading as an alliance.

Now, I should like to develop some observations regarding the situation which brought about the creation of regional security associations involving the United States, and the expectations which we may reasonably attach to such agencies. I shall focus primarily on NATO, which is unchallengeably the most significant of the lot.

Whatever one chooses to call NATO, one must surely concede that it is something new and unprecedented in the history of American relationships with other nations. The standard way of "explaining" NATO is to say that we attempted, in setting up the United Nations, to institute a system of collective security for the postwar era. That effort failed. When we had realistically to admit that the ideal hope of creating collective security within the framework of the world organization had faded, we turned to the establishment of NATO. The arrangement, in short, is a compensatory arrangement. Global collective security collapsed. NATO, whether viewed as a regional collective security scheme or, as I would view it, as a modernized alliance, undertakes to do what the United Nations was hopefully designed to do. The realists have picked up the pieces of the idealists' shattered dream.

It seems to me that this is a serious distortion of the facts concerning the United Nations and NATO. Admittedly, the founders of the United Nations indulged in a good deal of oratorical reference to the ideal of a global collective security system, and one can construe certain passages in the United Nations Charter as indicating that the world organization was intended and expected to save the world from war by confronting any and every potential aggressor with the massive resistance of the collected peace-loving states. However, I suggest that if you focus your attention for a bit on one word—VETO—you will discover that the creation of the United Nations represented no such intention or expectation.

Most commentators on the United Nations have suggested that the insertion of the great power veto in the provisions regarding the Security Council reflected a fondly held illusion that the Soviet Union and the United States would maintain their unity and march ahead in brotherly togetherness. This strikes me as both illogical and unhistorical. The veto was not put into the Charter in a fit of absent-mindedness or idealistic illusion. I find it difficult to imagine and impossible to discover supporting evidence for the proposition that the veto was so strenuously demanded by the great powers on the basis of a conviction that it was unnecessary, because they would be so united that they would never have significant occasion to use it. My logic tells me, and my reading of the record of the San Francisco negotiations tells me, that the veto was inserted in recognition of the probability that the great powers—notably, the United States and the Soviet Union—would disagree and thus find occasion to use it, not in confidence that the powers would always agree and thus leave it a dead letter. One does not fight for a veto power on the ground that nobody will want to veto anything.

The veto is analogous to a fuse in an electrical circuit. It is put there to blow out if and when the appropriate occasion arises. This assumes that there is a reasonable probability that such an occasion may arise. If one is confident that it will never be necessary or desirable to break the circuit, he would do better to stick a penny in the fuse box. The veto, like the fuse, is a deliberately weakened point in the line of action, designed to interrupt action in cases where such interruption is deemed prudent. The insertion of such a circuit-breaker anticipates and provides for such contingencies. It certainly does not reflect assurance that they will not arise.

What I am trying to say is this: the veto provision indicates that the founding fathers of the

United Nations recognized the danger of trouble among the great powers, and decided, quite deliberately and consciously, that it would be futile and dangerous for the Security Council to try to launch collective action against, or in the face of stubborn opposition by, one of the major states. To put it bluntly, their adoption of the veto rule was a way of saying that there should be a built-in obstacle to the United Nation's undertaking to initiate a collective security action against either of the two giants. This, I think, reflected not a smug assurance that such action would be unnecessary, but a realistic belief that it would be impossible to carry out successfully.

This adds up to the proposition that the notion of building a full-fledged collective security system, applicable to and hopefully effective in cases of aggression launched or supported by the major powers, was rejected at San Francisco. These are obviously the most critical cases for world peace and order. The United Nations was designed in the hope that collective action could be mobilized in cases of relatively minor importance. If the veto is interpreted as meaning what I think it was clearly intended to mean, we must conclude that the United Nations was not designed, or intended, or expected, to attempt the application of the collective security principle in the event of Soviet aggressiveness. What if the Soviet Union should go on the warpath? In that case, the writers of the Charter intimated, the various states will be on their own, to develop whatever response they think best with the blessing of Article 51. We do not think a global collective security system applicable to such a case can now be devised, and we fear that it would be both futile and dangerous to make the effort, or to foster the illusion that a collective security system capable of controlling great powers has been or can be erected.

In these terms, the creation of NATO is not an effort to do something which the authors of the

United Nations promised but failed to do, but a move to attempt something which the latter acknowledged they could not do and abstained from trying to do. NATO does not reflect the breakdown of a United Nations assumption that there would be no trouble among the great powers. It reflects the realization of the United Nations assumption that if such trouble should arise, extra-United Nations arrangements would be required. The trouble has arisen; the extra-United Nations arrangements have been made. If NATO is not, as I have argued, an expression of the collective security doctrine, this is thoroughly compatible with the Charter, which repudiates the notion that a collective security system can be erected to cope with aggressive great powers. As I read the Charter, it says that if the Soviet Union becomes aggressive, you had better try something other than collective security. We have tried something other than collective security—namely, NATO. It might make sense to try to establish a collective security system to deal with difficulties of the sort which we face today, but the founders of the United Nations said, "No," and I suspect that they were right.

This is not to say that the regional security association is the ideal device for promoting the development of a stable world order and thus serving the most basic long-term interests of Americans and everybody else. Nor is it to say that the United Nations, not having been designed to do the job which NATO is designed to do, has nothing significant to do and no valuable potentialities to be realized. There is ample work to go around, and there is every reason to experiment with every type of international institution which shows the slightest promise of contributing something to the survival capacity of human civilization. Regional associations, like global organizations, pose peculiar problems and have their peculiar limitations. Yet, they also have possibilities and capabilities of a special order. The confrontation of the problems posed by regionalism and the

exploration of the possibilities afforded by regionalism are highly significant events in contemporary international relations and, I might add, in American foreign policy.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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Schools:

1938-42 Hendrix College, B.A. degree.
1946-49 Harvard University, M.A., Ph.D. degrees.

Career Highlights:

1942-46 Enlisted man, U.S. Army.
1949-51 Instructor in Government, Harvard University.
1951-56 Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University.
1956-57 Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware.
1957-60 Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan.
1960- Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan.

Miscellaneous:

Chase Prize, Harvard, 1949, for doctoral dissertation.
Faculty Fellowship, Fund for the Advancement of Education, 1951-52.
Research Grant, Rockefeller Foundation, 1958-59.
Visiting Research Scholarship, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1960-61.

Publications:

Books: *National Minorities: An International Problem*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955.

Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, New York: Random House, 1956, 1960.

Articles and Reviews published in *Harvard Studies on International Affairs*, *International Organization*, *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of International Law*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel,
(G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
(Attn: Station Library)
San Diego 36, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH
Naval District (Code 141)
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces,
Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 17
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U.S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
Norfolk 11, Virginia

BOOKS

Whiting, Allen S. *China Crosses the Yalu.* New York: MacMillan, 1960. 219 p.

Mr. Allen Whiting, in his interestingly prepared and well-documented book, has sought to determine why the Chinese Communists intervened in the Korean War. The initial purpose of his inquiry was to determine the extent to which Chinese Communist policies emerged from developments attending the Korean War. His research encompassed additional topics of interest which he has included in his work. These include the question of limited war and the constraints which conditioned the course of the war. The author has carefully scrutinized the Communist press for clues on strategy and tactics during 1950, has made a penetrating study of U.S. government materials and has drawn upon other available sources for his presentation of the facts and the conclusions he has derived from them.

Smith, Robert F. *The United States and Cuba.* New York: Bookman Associates, 1960. 256 p.

This book is a study of business and diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba during the years 1917-1960. The author places heavy emphasis on the business portion of such relations, and interprets every contact between the two countries in terms of sugar, tobacco, tariffs, banking and other industrial functions. The first four chapters, in fact, are a detailed recounting of all sugar agreements between the two countries, describing United States and Cuban moves, with dates, names and places. Fifty-four pages of profuse notes and bibliography are included. The thorough documentation and statistical approach make this book valuable for one who is interested in the commercial aspect of Cuban-United States relations.

Rossiter, Clinton. *Marxism: The View from America.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960. 338 p.

Clinton Rossiter has done a remarkably thorough job in presenting a clear picture of a difficult and complex political philosophy. He probes deeply behind the thinking men like Marx, Engels, Trotsky, Stalin, Khrushchev and many others, and brings forth not only the weaknesses of their views but the strengths as well. The book gives concise definitions of terms relative to Communist theory, as the important men in that field interpreted them, and continuing through with the same theme, discusses man, as Karl Marx and all the rest viewed him. These ideas are then contrasted with the American view of man. In logical sequence, the concepts of man are followed by an exploration of the classes as they exist in America. A comprehensive discussion of schools, churches and other institutions is presented through the eyes of Marx, followed by a severe lashing of capitalism in the traditional Marxist style. Comparisons of Marxist thinking and American views are made throughout, and provide the reader with a clear insight as to the inner workings of the political philosophies of both sides. Although the book requires a considerable amount of concentration, the fruits of the reader's efforts are rewarding.

Prittie, Terence C.F. *Germany Divided; The Legacy of the Nazi Era.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1960. 381 p.

Terence Prittie, who has been head of the German bureau of the *Manchester Guardian* for a number of years, addresses his efforts to a comprehensive review of postwar Germany in its struggle to regain its respectability and acceptance in world councils. With much personal knowledge, Prittie discusses such subjects as the East German refugees, rebirth of Nazi or extreme right political parties, current German attitudes on war crimes and criminals, current displays of anti-Semitism and the postwar status of cartels

such as those of Krupp and I.G. Farben. Much of the discussions are oriented toward their possible impact on the reunification of Germany, the division of which he describes as a legacy of the Nazi era. He states that the Allies have lost their opportunity to achieve the reunification of Germany on anything like acceptable grounds. Changes in Russian policies are bringing about a growing prosperity in East Germany and an increasing acceptance of integration within the satellite framework. Official East German feeling is that East Germany is now, and will remain, a separate and sovereign state.

Higgins, Trumbull. *Korea and the Fall of MacArthur.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. 229 p.

Sailor-statesmen who contemplate and debate limited war, its meaning, its complexities, its problems, and its inherent frustrations would do well to read and to mull over this rather short, carefully reasoned, sharply analytical study of General MacArthur's management of a limited war and his running debate with the Truman Administration over its conduct. *Korea and the Fall of MacArthur* is more than an historical record of the events leading up to General MacArthur's relief; rather it is a case study of limited war, built around our most famous one, which examines the peculiarities of waging war by the democracy of the United States. Included in this examination are the role of the JCS in politics; the role of the politicians in tactics and strategy; the role of the theatre commander in fighting a war; and the role of the public in deciding the objectives of war. The book is flavored throughout with a recountal of the constant interaction of politics and military strategy and tactics and how one influences and is inextricable from the other.

– NOTES –