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The Theory and Principles of War

E. M. Flanagan Jr.
U.S. Army

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TO
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Page 13 line 6 - Change "World War II" to "World War I"

Page 13 line 9 - Change "Siberia" to "Serbia"

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THE THEORY AND PRINCIPLES OF WAR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
to the Junior Reserve Officers' Course
8 May 1961

by

Colonel Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., U.S. Army

When I realized the full scope of the topic I was assigned to discuss this morning, I must admit that I felt baffled and perplexed, for the subject is a very weighty one. Learned writers have worn out many quills and typewriter ribbons seeking its philosophy, its wellsprings, and its fiber.

But to get to the heart of the matter, I'll just read you the scope of this lecture. It is: "The nature and theory of war, consideration of the inter-relationship of the military and the nonmilitary factors in the development of strategic concepts, a brief review of classic concepts of strategy, and the contribution they have made to modern strategic concepts." I think you can understand my initial feeling of trepidation after contemplating that scope. For a discussion of the nature and theory of war is fraught with many complexities and difficulties because one can weave into it such academic disciplines as philosophy, science, technology, sociology, morality, geography, history, economics, and politics, not to mention the various other arts and sciences which go to make up just the military side of war itself.

You must wonder why you should have this as a kickoff lecture for your two-week course here at the Naval War College. First of all, one of the reasons is to get you off the decks of your former DD's and CVA's

and to think on a different plane, on the national and the international level. Another reason is that because we are unmistakably at war today, a discussion of war is a very timely subject. A third reason is that wars have been in all our backgrounds ever since we were teen-agers. A fourth is that, while your vocations are not in a military line, you must have strong avocations in that field, else you would not be here today. Therefore, it seems appropriate to talk about war.

The most important point to be made here is that you are a blend of the civilian and the military, which in this day and age is a mix of transcendent importance for the conduct of warfare. I hope to prove this point unequivocally before the end of this 50 minutes. I might add, perhaps impertinently, that while war may be too important to be left to the generals, so, too, today's peace—cold war—neither war nor peace—is too important to exclude the generals and the admirals. So much for why you should listen.

Before I get into the main subject, I would like to make a few other general comments. First, I am going to mention authors and books from which I got some of my material; I think you might do well to remember some of these books and at least to flip through them while you are here. Second, I am going to cover a very broad field, and I am not going to offer you any solutions, generally speaking. I am only going to point out the problems. This is in keeping with Admiral Colestock's rejoinder to forget your civilian pursuits and to think in a different context while you are here at the course. Third, I certainly encourage you in any free moment that you have, and I know they are relatively few and far between, to go to our libraries and browse around. At Sims Library there is a special shelf of books which has been set aside especially for you. A few of the books I used in preparing this lecture are included. One of the most

valuable items in the library is the *War College Review*. This is a monthly publication which contains the more important lectures given here at the War College and some of the outstanding term papers and theses written by the students, both in the Command and Staff and Naval Warfare Courses.

When you get back to your homes, you might do well to read up on some of the fields which may be opened up to you here at the Naval War College. In this connection, your local drugstores and paperback bookstores have many important and worthwhile books in very inexpensive editions. Among them are: *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* by Henry A. Kissinger; *What We Must Know About Communism* by Harry A. and Bonaro W. Overstreet; *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* by Walt W. Rostow; *American Diplomacy* by George F. Kennan; *Democracy in America* by Alexis de Tocqueville; *The Public Philosophy* by Walter Lippmann; *Arms and Men* by Walter Millis; *The American Presidency* by Clinton L. Rossiter; and *A Documentary History of the United States* by Richard D. Heffner, all extremely fine books for your libraries. These books cover a broad field too, and, using them as a basis, you can expand outward, continually increasing your breadth of vision and scope of intelligence. Another book, not in paperback, but which is a formidable study of the United States, is *The United States in the World Arena* by Walt W. Rostow. This is a classic, I feel, in the broad study of United States foreign policy. So much for my introductory remarks.

Here are the broad topics which I am going to discuss in the main part of my lecture. They are, first, the history of war; second, the various types of war; third, some of the causes of war; fourth, the nature of war itself; fifth, some of the principles of war; and finally, the formulation of a national strategy.

In order to simplify a discussion of the vast history of warfare, I should like to classify wars into three categories: primitive, historic, and modern. The divisions between these classifications are based upon man's various inventions in the fields of weapons and communications. The primitive gave way to the historic when (a) the horse was introduced to the battlefield and (b) when the peoples of the various nations fighting the wars had learned to write. The historic gave way to the modern when gunpowder and printing were invented and introduced to the conduct of war. To give you a finite date, the Hyksos of Palestine used the horse and chariot when they conquered the Egyptians in 1750 B.C. This date would mark the transition from primitive to the historic.

Another way of classifying wars, and which I will develop in more detail, is by breaking the history of war into three periods: the ancient, the medieval, and the modern. Ancient warfare lasted to about 500 A.D.; the medieval phase lasted from 500 to 1500 A.D.; the modern period has been from 1500 A.D. to the present. I will discuss these three periods in historical sequence.

Lynn Montross in *War through the Ages* subdivides the first part of the ancient wars into general categories. First were the wars of the Asiatics fighting on the great plains prior to the ascendancy of the Greeks. Then came the "gymnastic warfare" of the Greeks. By this he means, for example, the Battle of Marathon in 480 B.C. The Greeks were opposed at the Battle of Marathon by a superior force of Persians who were equipped with missiles, light cavalry, heavier arms, and a greater number of men. Miltiades, leader of the Greeks, inferior in strength and equipment, had to use tactics and ingenuity to beat the Persians. Miltiades backed his flanks on two parallel streams, put his rear up a slope, and made his flanks stronger than his center. The Persians succeeded in driving in the Greek center, but at a

given signal, the flank units swung inward and attacked the Persians in their flanks. The extremely athletic and physically fit Greeks were able to surround the Persians, limit their maneuver space and defeat them decisively. This was the first illustration in war of the tactical double envelopment. It also illustrates the "gymnastic warfare" of the Greeks.

Along about this same time occurred the Battle of Salamis, the first great naval battle in history. Again the Greeks were faced by a superior Persian force, this time at sea, and again the Greeks had to resort to clever tactics and a ruse to win. The Greeks enticed the Persians into rather limited waters, limited the Persian maneuverability and defeated them piecemeal. The Persians lost 200 ships to 30 by the Greeks. These battles were in the ancient period. These are the glorious days of Philip; of Alexander, the first great military genius; of Hannibal; of the Romans in the days of the Roman legions; and of Caesar who was a great leader, but incidentally no great shakes as a strategist. He got himself out of many tough situations by sheer luck which, I suppose, one could also call flashes of brilliance. As I proceed with this discussion, I would like you to try to relate some of the principles I may mention, some of the tactics and techniques employed, to modern-day warfare.

The next phase in the over-all history of warfare is the medieval period. This has been called the Dark Ages of War. But because it developed the mounted ironclad knight, it also introduced the cavalry cycle of warfare. During this period wars were very limited. The cavalry became ascendant and, in the Battle of Hastings in 1066, the mobility and the flexibility of the cavalry proved its worth. The infantry at this time was very ill-armed. The medieval period is also the time of the great Crusades, when propaganda was used effectively for the first time to arouse whole

nations to go out and do battle against the infidels. It was also the period of Genghis Khan, the sadistic, all-conquering Mongol military genius. He was the first man to use subversion, spies, and psychological warfare on a large scale to conquer and keep whole peoples subdued and subservient.

In the 13th century, and still in the medieval period, we come to the era of fortified castles and the counterweapon, seige artillery. Also, along about this time the British developed the longbow, and it proved its efficiency in the Battle of Crecy in 1346 where it permitted the British to defeat the French. At Poitiers in 1356, the longbow-equipped English again defeated the French. This time, however, light cavalry also played a major role in the victory. In the 14th century, gunpowder was introduced to battle, and for the first time it reduced a siege to a relatively short period. In 1453 Constantinople fell after only 55 days of attack. The days of the invulnerable fortified strong points were thus numbered.

After the medieval period came the modern era of warfare. It is subdivided into four phases: the religious wars, the 18th century limited wars, the revolutionary and civil wars, and the world wars.

The Religious Wars were fought from 1500 to 1648. The terminal date for this period was the end of the bloody Thirty Years' War. During the religious wars, Gustavus Adolphus sallied forth from Sweden with some revolutionary new and highly efficacious ideas on how to run an army. For example, he kept the supplies with his army, proved that he could win with a relatively small army if it was well trained, well supplied and disciplined.

Next in the modern era are the 18th century limited wars. This was the period of armed diplomacy. It lasted from 1648 to 1793, the beginning of the French Revolution. This is the heyday of Frederick

the Great Wars were limited during this epoch because, by this time, Europe had gotten thoroughly sick of warfare. Armies had become permanent parts of their nations' environment, economy, and strength and, very importantly, were loyal to their sovereigns. At about this time, uniforms were introduced by Louis XIV. Armies, after the model and example of Gustavus Adolphus, were well-supplied and disciplined. After 1700 the musket and the bayonet became the principal arms of the infantrymen. Armies were relatively small, and wars (I think this is an important point) were fought for limited objectives because governments did not want to overthrow other governments; they merely wanted to obtain concessions. Therefore, there was a limitation on political objectives for which wars were waged.

This was also the period of Clive of India, when he carved out great empires for the British; of colonial wars in America; of Montcalm versus Wolfe at Quebec; and of the supremely sanitary and militarily competent Lord Amherst, who literally cleaned up the armies and converted them into smooth, well-trained fighting machines.

Next is the Revolutionary and Civil War phase, ushered in by the French Revolution in 1793 and closed out by the start of World War I. During this period, the strategy and tactics of warfare underwent a revolution. The wide and credible authority of governments now made it possible for them to raise and equip mass conscripted armies, to regiment civil populations, and to levy and collect high taxes. Thus totality was introduced to warfare during this period. On the conduct of warfare itself, Napoleon introduced great mobility not only on the battlefield, but also between battles. Thus, by unencumbering his troops from heavy personal loads, he was able to move great distances rapidly, a capability which permitted him strategic surprise on more than one occasion. He also found that light mobile artillery on the battlefield was a great killer. He introduced and used it efficiently.

After Napoleon's downfall there was a 99-year period prior to World War I. During this period there were massed armies, but there were no prolonged wars except the Civil War in America. Europe was stable because there was a balance of power among the great nations. Our own Civil War was probably the first industrial one. It was a war in which the South fought to the last gasp; it was a war of annihilation. It was called industrial because, for one thing, each infantryman got a good rifle with a range of 600 yards, a factor which made the infantryman quite deadly on defense. There were no more volleys at commands, no more massed infantry in close formation, and relatively few cavalry charges. It was industrial also because the railroads were put to efficient use to move the troops strategically and to supply them logistically. Later on in this period Von Moltke introduced a command and staff system. This was necessary because troops were now widely scattered and dispersed. Therefore, command had to be decentralized, and the smaller unit commanders had to have the power of decision. These principles Von Moltke recognized in his command system. He also established staffs for commanders who now had more and more functions to perform and needed assistants to plan and supervise the execution of plans.

The next major period is that of the World Wars. World War I introduced a period of fantastic casualties and trench warfare where, at one point, 2 million men opposed 2 other million men across pulverized stretches of no man's land. World War II, of course, emphasized the machine on and above the battlefield and on, above, and below the seas. Strength came from machines and from industry which could turu them out at prodigious rates. It was our first truly global war. So much for the history of warfare.

The next major topic is the types of warfare through the ages. First of all, they might be described as either limited or absolute. A limited war

might be one in which one nation wanted to gain reparation for a real or imagined injury to it. This would be a limited war for a limited objective. But absolute war, on the other hand, is one in which one nation demands unconditional surrender from the other. Of course, World War II is a perfect example of an absolute type of war. Clausewitz had something to say on this particular subject. He said that there was a tendency of all wars, however limited their original aim, to become absolute if the belligerents are equal. This is certainly food for thought in today's international environment.

There is another way of classifying wars: international, imperial and civil. An international war is a war between states in the same community. Perhaps the Hundred Years' War and some of the European continental wars are examples of international wars. The imperial wars are between different kinds of states. Perhaps the conquests of Genghis Khan might be classed under imperial wars. Civil wars are waged between units within one country. From 1480 until World War II there were some 278 of these three types of wars: 135 were international, 65 were imperial, and 78 were civil. There is a great variety in the magnitude of wars: One might involve two very small countries fighting over a small chunk of real estate on their borders and lasting only a few months, to another involving millions of troops from many nations fighting doggedly for years. The Thirty Years' War, the Seven Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars, and World Wars I and II, are in this latter category. In modern times wars lasted about four years, but as these wars have decreased in length, they have increased in severity. They have been continuous wars fought day and night through all seasons. This is a relatively recent development from the time, say, of the Thirty Years' War, which was broken up by the various seasons of the years and daylight and darkness.

Wars can be discussed from a number of other points of view. For example, from the standpoint of intentional violence, one might discuss crimes and police actions; from the standpoint of solving conflicts, then you introduce negotiations, mediations, arbitrations, and the like; and from the viewpoint of intergroup relationships, you then can talk about alliances, ententes, understandings, etc.

Quincy Wright wrote a monumental work called *A Study of War*. He goes into the philosophy of war in great detail. This might logically lead next into a discussion of my next main topic: causes of war. One might say that war is a last resort for the settlement of disputes between organized groups, but most people have different ideas on what causes war. In every history book there is a different set of causes for any given conflict. There have been many learned philosophical discussions on the subject. Is man just naturally belligerent and is this what causes war? Perhaps so. Thus the field is broadened and diverse, and I can only hope to summarize the various causes of war.

One grouping of the causes of war might be the quest for land, wealth, power, and security. For example, the Japanese in World War II, with their Greater Southeast Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and the Germans, with their Lebensraum, might have been looking for land. The ancients fought many wars simply for wealth, not for land, and they did it with hired armies. They fought to determine which king would collect taxes and who would plunder whom. Certainly Genghis Khan was an example of this type of warrior. During the Middle Ages wars were also fought for wealth as opposed to land-grabbing. In the power category of causes of war, we have the example of the European wars in which nations fought for power and influence. Leaders also found that wars united their own people at home and strengthened their governments if they were successful in wars abroad. Napoleon,

Hitler, and Mussolini capitalized on this facet of war for power. They found that the more effective they were in warfare—the more effective they were in their conquests—the greater was their power at home; the more united were their people. Certainly this is one of the reasons for the rantings of Castro against the United States: he needs some scapegoat to cover up what's going on internally.

A fourth cause of war is security. Some might say that the fear of war is a cause of war. I would like to emulate one of our professors from last year who used to quote Thucydides to cover almost any circumstance. Thucydides said: "In arriving at this decision and resolving to go to war, the Lacedaemonians were influenced, not so much by the speeches of their allies, as by the fear of the Athenians and their increased power." Thus fear of war can be considered to be a cause of war. For example, a country might fear attack from her neighbor. Therefore, she might keep on a wartime footing huge armies and navies for her defense, but then, at a propitious moment when her fear got the better of her, decide to strike the first blow, or to strike a weaker nation.

It is important in a discussion of this type also to differentiate between reasons and causes of war. Reasons are generally very lofty and idealistic; causes, on the other hand, are the realistic bases for which nations go to war. Take the War of 1812 for example. The reason publicized was the impressment of our seamen by the British, yet the real cause of the war was our desire to expand. Most wars have several causes. The United States entered World War I, for example, because of the invasion of Belgium, because of our economic and cultural ties with England and France, because we were afraid of a depression, because of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and because we thought the Germans were wrong. Parenthetically, I might say that I probably have mixed up causes and reasons; the point, however, is that there is normally more than one cause for a nation's going to war.

Quincy Wright analyzes six major wars, and in his analysis he gives a different set of causes of war. First, he considers the Moslem conquests, which, he says, were caused by the desire to spread religion. Thus, Islam carried on wars of conquest in the 7th century to spread their religion throughout the world.

Secondly, he analyzes the Crusades which, he feels, were caused by a religious zeal on the part of the Crusaders, and the populations which supported them, to avenge the indignities to the holy places by the infidels. He claims also that the Crusades resulted from the political ambition of the Popes to unify Christendom, by princes to gain territory and prestige, by the Italian towns to re-establish their trade routes, and by the ideology of the just war.

Thirdly, he analyzes the Hundred Years' War. He claims that insipient national enthusiasm drove the British to invade France. In the later stages Joan of Arc aroused the nationalism of the French and caused them to defeat and throw out the English, but he also avers that the political ambitions of the various leaders, the need to unite the countries at home to prevent rebellion and to add to the domain were also causes of the Hundred Years' War.

Fourthly, he considers the Thirty Years' War which started out as a religious war between the various camps in Europe: the Catholic camp on the one hand and the Protestant camp on the other. This war had its basis in an idealism. It started out as a religious war and ended as a war for territorial sovereignty with the rise of new leaders with disciplined armies in France, Sweden and Russia.

Fifthly, he analyzed the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Extravagance in France and heavy taxation finally caused the masses to revolt against the rulers. The rights of the common man became the religion of democratic nationalism. Napoleon fought

his wars for conquest, for international prestige, and for internal solidarity. Others, of course, fought to defend against Napoleon and to defend against the revolutionary idea of the rights of man which were spreading outward from France.

Finally, Quincy Wright considered World War II. This developed from nationalistic movements in the Balkans, and the allies fought to defend small nationalities such as Siberia and Belgium. The primary causes of this war were political. Austria desired to preserve itself in face of the Yugoslav propaganda, Russia fought to save its declining prestige, France hoped to recover Alsace-Lorraine, and the Germans and British fought for fear of unbalancing the power in Europe.

To sum up all of these causes and reasons for war which I have been mentioning, one might conclude that men and masses are moved to war (1) over enthusiasm for ideals; and (2) to escape from unsatisfactory conditions. This covers a lot of territory, but I feel that those two drives cause men and masses to wage or at least to accept war. Governments and organized factions start war (a) because a war is either necessary or convenient to enhance their foreign policy, to expand or maintain what they have, or to reorganize the community of nations; or (b) because incidents have occurred which the governments feel violated laws and impaired their rights. So much for the causes of war.

My next major topic is the nature of present-day wars. We have all heard a great deal of talk about cold, limited and general wars. There are various other gradations of warfare even today, and these are all points along a spectrum. The parts of this spectrum are differentiated by the scope of the political objectives at stake, by the dimensions of the conflict, and by the geographic arena. These are all limitations of one sort or another on warfare; you can think up many other kinds of limitations on war.

Starting at the left of the spectrum with cold war, it is clear that cold war may be peace one time and war another, depending upon the vantage point from which you are viewing the passing scene. Certainly, if you are a Laotian, the cold war today is fairly hot. Looking at it from an objective historian's viewpoint, peace has been interrupted some twenty times since World War II. Thus it is really a game of semantics to classify the period since World War II as real peace.

Looking at the spectrum in more detail—looking at the various ways of waging the cold war—one might progress from the left side of the spectrum at diplomacy, then move on to propaganda, subversion, show of force, blockade, guerrilla warfare, and limited non-nuclear warfare—all warfare methods in the cold war phase. Mr. Churchill once said that the cold war is all "mischief short of war."

Next I would like to discuss for a moment the so-called guerrilla or special warfare. Special warfare, as we know it in the Army, is made up of two components—unconventional warfare and psychological warfare. You may remember that the French Maquis were extremely effective during World War II as a type of guerrilla force. General Eisenhower credits them with giving him the equivalent of 15 divisions. Men and units like Castro and his 26 July Movement, Mahailovich and his Chetniks in Yugoslavia, the North Vietnamese in Indo-China, were all effective against superior conventional forces. The Indo-China War, for example, cost the French more than their Marshall Aid for four years. Their officer casualties per year were greater than the graduating classes of St. Cyr.

The guerrilla war going on between the French and the Algerians is causing the French to tie up a 500,000-man army. Back in the colonial days one of the greatest guerrilla warfare leaders was Major Rogers, who led his Rangers all over New York and New

England harassing the French and Indians. These are examples of guerrilla warriors.

Psychological warfare, on the other hand, was waged by such men as Genghis Khan whose noisemakers terrified and immobilized the opposition; Hitler and his screaming dive bombers and siren-screeching tanks put terror into the minds of his enemies. One of the classic gimmicks of psychological warfare was the Trojan horse which the Greeks rolled up to the gates of Troy as a peace offering. This is psychological warfare.

In the Army today we have both of these components. There are three Special Forces or Groups which make up our special warfare units. The 10th Special Forces Group is in Germany, the 7th at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 77th in Okinawa. These Special Warfare Groups are made up of teams of 10 or 11 men each. The men on these teams are experts in communications, demolitions, first aid and weapons. The aid men are so expert, for example, that they can take out anything from a splinter to an appendix. The men are trained for the country to which they might go; they learn some of the language, the customs, the history, and the geography. But these men are not themselves guerrilla fighters. Rather, it is their mission to go into a target country there to organize indigenous guerrilla forces. One of these teams of 10-11 men can organize a 1500-man force. Psychological warfare units are various types of loudspeaker units which are used for short-range broadcasting across the front line. But there are also long-range radio broadcasting units which can broadcast deep into enemy territory. So much for special warfare. I would like to get back now to the spectrum.

Next is limited war. A war may be limited by weapons, by geography, or by political considerations. The American Revolution was limited to obtaining our independence, not to conquering Britain. The War of

1812 did not have as its objective the subjugation of England. The Spanish-American War was limited simply to freeing Cuba. Korea, of course, was a prime example of a limited war, where we couldn't bomb across the Yalu, where we didn't use atomic weapons, and where the area around the 38th parallel became sacrosanct. The most uniquely limited battles in the history of warfare probably were the actions around Quemoy and Matsu where the Chinese fired only every other day.

Next on the spectrum moving to the right is a limited atomic war. Consider the possibility. I am not saying it is possible; I am just mentioning such a war so that you'll think about it. Some people think we might have a limited atomic war. We certainly could get one started; there's no question about that. But how are you going to stop it and still keep it a limited atomic war? Perhaps if the war initially had a limited political objective, and that objective were achieved, then one side might be willing to negotiate a truce or a settlement. But it seems clear that, for the next few years at least, a limited atomic war implies that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are fighting one another. Is either one of these adversaries going to be willing to lose even a limited political objective? On the other hand, the two protagonists might see the folly of such a war, realize that no good would come of it, and negotiate a truce.

Next on the spectrum is the general non-atomic war, something like World War II. Does this seem like a possible type of war in this day and age? There's no question that in this type of war—general non-atomic—the two adversaries are very definitely the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., or we wouldn't be calling it a general war. Is either the United States or Russia going to lose such a war and quit before unleashing some, or all, of her nuclear weapons? Is this a possibility? A general war implies that national survival is at stake. Are we going to surrender that with an intact stockpile of nukes? A lot of people hark back to

World War II and say that that was really a limited war because the Germans, who had a gas capability, didn't use it. I suspect that if the Germans thought that they could have gained an advantage by using gas they would have done so. I don't think the parallel exists here between gas and atomic weapons.

Next is total war, and there can be little question about its definition. Again our national survival is at stake; the nation is completely mobilized far more so even than during World War II.

I have categorized these types of wars into cold, limited, and general, and you note that the cold war goes all the way from diplomacy up through limited non-atomic war. Limited war starts back here some place around the blockade and goes up to general non-atomic war, because actually a general non-atomic war is in reality a limited war. General war picks up general non-atomic and goes through total war. This may give you some idea of the spectrum of warfare. Of course, there are other types of wars—the preventive war and pre-emptive war—but certainly these two are morally repugnant to us. What would we do if we had unmistakable evidence that Russian bombers and missiles were in the countdown stage and there was no question about the fact that the buttons were going to be pushed? Worse still, what if we knew that they were on the way? What is the United States going to do in such a situation? As I said earlier, I have no solution. Now that we have analyzed the history of warfare, the various types, the various causes, and the nature of war, my next main topic is the principles of war.

Some people scoff at the principles of war and attempt to punch holes in their logic and applicability. But as I go through them and explain them rather briefly, I would like you to determine for yourselves whether they do or do not apply today. I must admit that I have taken these right out of the Army field manual, but I must also add that while the Army uses

one set of words and the Navy uses another set, they all mean the same thing. See for yourselves if they are pertinent, not only on the battlefield or on the sea, but to the nation in the development and execution of its national strategy. (For you memory gimmick experts, the initials of the principles form the acronym MOSSCOMES.)

The first principle is the principle of *mass*. This means that a commander concentrates his forces at a given point, so that at that particular point, the point of decision, he has a greater combat superiority than does his enemy. He does not necessarily have a greater number of troops overall, but at the point of decision he has a greater preponderance of force. At the battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C., when the Thebans fought the Spartans, the Thebans overwhelmed a larger number of Spartans by massing at the point of decision.

The principle of *objective* means that a force has a specific and very definite objective which it must accomplish. It also has intermediate objectives which, if accomplished, will lead to the accomplishment of the final objective. All units in a force have objectives which, taken together, keep the battle organized and on the track and eventually lead to the force's victory.

The principle of *security* means that our forces have taken the measures necessary to prevent surprise, to avoid annoyance, to preserve freedom of action and to deny to the enemy information of our forces. Certainly the Japanese at Pearl Harbor meticulously followed this principle.

The principle of *surprise* is a corollary to this. The principle of surprise, of course, holds that if we do keep our plans from the enemy, if he has no idea of what our intentions are or of what we are going to do, we can achieve a greater victory than

without it. We may achieve a victory out of all proportion to the power employed. This may also be applicable on the national level in the cold war.

The principle of *command* means unity of command. It means that all the forces, regardless of service, which are put together to accomplish one common goal, are under the command of one single commander with requisite authority. Pearl Harbor is an example of the failure in organization for command.

The principle of the *offensive* means that only offensive action achieves decisive results. It permits the commander to exploit the initiative and impose his will on the enemy.

The principle of *maneuver* is the positioning of forces to place the enemy at a relative disadvantage. A commander takes advantage of weaknesses in the enemy to outmaneuver him. He takes advantage of the ability of his own forces to maneuver, to cut down his own casualties, and to inflict greater casualties and greater losses on the enemy. Maneuver alters the relative combat power of military forces.

The principle of *economy of force* is the corollary to the principle of mass. It means that at points other than the point of decision a commander has only the minimum essential means. To devote means to unnecessary secondary efforts, or to employ excessive means on required secondary efforts, is to violate the principles of both mass and objective. The mass must be in the critical area. On the national plane economy of force means that we have only the minimum force necessary to do the job. In translating this into more conventional every-day terms, how much overkill do we really need? How much SAC do we really need? How many Polaris submarines? How many Army divisions?

Simplicity, the final principle of war, is the keynote of military operations. It means that plans are kept as simple as possible because battle is extremely complex anyway, and the simpler the plans the easier it is to carry them out. Are these principles applicable also on the national and international level?

Hanson Baldwin has another set of principles which he says should dominate our strategic concept. His are first, military policy must support a finite and obtainable military goal. Second, the pace of the technological revolution demands top priority and generous funding for research and development in all weapons. (By this he means that the Army's Nike Zeus, for example, should be given top priority as far as Research and Development is concerned; but because it is so expensive it does not necessarily mean that it should get a great deal of money for production until the system is either proved or disproved.) Third, the fortress America concept cannot support the nation's political and economic policies in the years ahead. Fourth, and a corollary to that one, military strategy must have as one of its primary purposes, the security of the home base. Fifth, we must be invulnerable to surprise attack. (Polaris is a way that we can achieve this invulnerability to surprise attack. This is a key requirement to the successful nuclear deterrent of the future.) Sixth and last, flexibility and rapid reaction to an entire spectrum of challenges is essential. And I think he thereby eliminates our massive retaliation strategy as our only strategy. We must be able to cover the entire spectrum of war possibilities.

Now I would like to turn from the subject of war and discuss, finally, national strategy and its formulation. The Naval Warfare Course spends the better part of about 4-5 months on this particular subject; I would like to condense it down to the remaining time I have this morning. Naturally this is impossible, but I would like you to have just an inkling of what it is all about.

There are many definitions and a tremendous amount has been written on the subject of national strategy, military strategy, or strategy in general, but since we are all connected with the military, let me give you the JCS definition of strategy. The JCS dictionary says "Strategy is the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation, during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to national policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat." Note in that definition the emphasis on all parts of the national power—not simply military power. You can derive from this one observation that strategy is truly a complex affair.

How do our national planners go about developing a national strategy? In the next two weeks you are going to hear something about the Estimate of the Situation. Maybe a planner can develop a plan by making an estimate of the situation. He can determine the mission, the situation, the possible courses of action, and can analyze the opposing courses of action. Then he can compare his own courses of action as to advantages and disadvantages and then can test them for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Is it suitable? Will it do the job? Is it feasible? Can it do the job? And is it acceptable? Can we take the losses it might entail?

Take the situation in Laos, for example. A planner knows what our mission is there. The United States wants to save Laos from being overrun by the communists. He knows what the situation is. The Pathet Lao have overrun approximately half of it. He has some broad courses of action. The United States can send in our own forces to beat back the Pathet Lao; the United States can increase military aid to Laos; or it can do nothing. There are various other possible lines of action within that spectrum, but for purposes of this broad and brief discussion, we'll limit

ourselves to those three. Now we must analyze the opposing courses of action. If we go in with our own forces, what will the North Vietnamese do? What will the Chinese do? Or what will the Russians do? If we step up military aid, what will the communists do? If we do nothing, will Laos go down the drain? Then we can compare our own courses of action. If we do go in there in force, is this really the place where we want to make the stand? Is this where we are going to draw the line on the ground and say, "You are not going to come across here. This is as far as you are going to go"? If we increase our military aid, is this going to accomplish our mission? Is the aid going to dwindle as it goes forward to where it is needed most—the front line troops? Where is it going to do the most good? Or, if we do nothing, what's going to happen then? Then we test the one course of action which we think is best for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. This might be one way of developing a strategy, but I would like to point out that Laos is only one small part of the overall national problem. A national strategy, however, is a continuing guide by which the country hopes to achieve its national interest and a world based on justice as we know it.

I would like to present another framework on which a national strategy might be hung. Military strategy, again according to the JCS dictionary, is "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force." National strategy, on the other hand, is an all-encompassing strategy and includes what we plan to do in all situations, including the military. You know that the U.S.S.R. certainly has a national goal for world order; their goal is the world-wide spread of communism. We, too, must have a national goal of world order, and a strategy by which we plan to implement it. What our goal purports to be is pretty hard to isolate. Do we wish to spread democracy throughout the world? Are we again seeking to make the world safe for

democracy? Can the jungle dwellers of New Guinea really handle democracy, one of the most sophisticated types of political philosophy ever evolved? If not, what? What is good for emerging nations? I don't know. This is another of the problems I told you I would mention. Thus, we must have, first of all, a goal. Next I will mention some of the other ingredients which go to make up a national strategy.

First of all, are our national interests. By this I mean "what should be." One might say that these are the enduring aspirations of a nation for its security and well-being as determined by its culture and by its principles. These are the national interests. I am also going to mention goals again—goals of world order and goals of national order. Some of the other ingredients are forces and trends which are at work in the world today. These include the population explosion, technological breakthroughs, emerging nationalisms, communism, the high standard of living in the United States, the abject poverty in other parts of the world, the alliance systems, the search for freedom, and perhaps the declining virility of the American people.

National objectives, concrete statements of the ends or conditions sought by national action, are another of the ingredients which go to make up a national strategy. Another is national power which "is the capability of a nation to adopt and implement national policies which will favorably influence trends and events toward achievement of national objectives selected to promote national interests. National power is the sum total of all our tangible and intangible sources of strength, including the political, military, socio-psychological, and economic elements." Another element is a national strategic concept which is a broad statement of our problems as a whole and a broad course of action to be followed. Still another is our national policies which link power to objectives—how to convert power in furtherance of our objectives.

Now I am going to try to put all these ingredients together to show how they go to make up a national strategy.

First of all, let's consider that the time period for our strategy is the next 10-15 years. If the United States were to follow an ideal course from now, directed through the next 10-15 years, and were operating in all areas at 100% efficiency, her path would follow a straight line headed directly at our national goal of world domestic order. This goal of world and domestic order is shaped by our national interests. From where do we derive our national interests? We get them from the Declaration of Independence; we get them from various comments, speeches, utterances of our leaders; out of various books written by learned, patriotic men. These things make up how the United States feels about problems and how we want life to be lived. Our national interests may be idealistic, but they cannot be selfish.

In reality, however, the course which the United States follows is not a straight line, following the 100% efficiency abscissa. Rather the path fluctuates up and down. What makes it fluctuate? The various forces and trends at work in the world cause it to fluctuate. Communism, for example, butts head-on against the path we want to take to achieve the national goal of world order we want. Advances in technology may assist us sometimes and may thwart us at others. (I suppose you might say that getting Gagarin into orbit before Mr. Shepard left the pad is technology working against us; this might be far-fetched, but it might be one example.) Other forces and trends, just a few among many, which vary our straight-line path are: emerging nationalism; the population explosion (working for us in some places and against us in others); mutual hostility of nations; underdeveloped economies; anti-militarism; materialism; isolationism; and affinity for disarmament.

To develop a national strategy the planner must next analyze all these forces and trends which are at work. He must determine which aid and which work against our national interests. Then he must determine how to increase the advantageous forces and trends and how to decrease the effects of the disadvantageous one. He determines objectives on country and regional bases.

To accomplish objectives we must apply power. We apply power against communism, for example. We determine what we can do to help the emerging nations. We apply power—it is not military necessarily; it is not economic power necessarily. It can be psychological. It can be the various parts of our power that go to make up the national power.

Then, in determining how we should apply power, we develop policies. We will apply so much power in a certain area. We will do it in such a way. Policy (which includes the quantity of power) plus objective equals our program for that one particular area. And these programs, taken as a whole, represent a national strategy, "a plan for the integrated development and employment of our national power over a period of time to achieve our national objectives." Naturally, the sum total of power expended must be costed and added up to see if the United States can afford it. It may be that tax increases, controls of various sorts may be necessary. And if these violate our national interests, within which the whole strategy is formulated, then the planners must go back and revise objectives and policies.

This is one way of formulating a national strategy. The national goal of world order and domestic order is shaped by our national interests. Forces and trends are analyzed and objectives developed. Power is allocated via our policies. We put policies and objectives together and we finally come up with a program.

Since World War II, we have had a strategy of filling vacuums and a strategy of collective security. Such a strategy has worked well and to our advantage in Europe—this side of the Iron Curtain. In Europe, we drew a line on the ground. It may not have been the line we wanted, but there is a clear-cut boundary between East and West. And there hasn't been too much communism oozing out from underneath the Iron Curtain since it has been established. True, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and others have been lost. But since then, we have maintained the status quo. But things are certainly not like that in Southeast Asia; there is no line on the ground. South Vietnam and Laos are in difficulty. It's clear that if they go, all of Southeast Asia is going to go. It may slide all the way to Australia. Clearly, we haven't drawn the line in Asia as we have in Europe.

But all has not been black since World War II. We have been successful in some places. I think we kept Italy and France from going communistic. The European continent is certainly stable. West Germany has recovered beyond all expectation and belief; we have helped England; we helped save Greece; we took a strong stand in Iran and forced the Russians to withdraw their forces shortly after World War II.

On the minus side of the ledger, we must admit to some disasters and losses. China is one; Korea has not been united, and South Korea is still in trouble; guerrilla warfare continues in Algeria; the Middle East is unstable; communism has moved into Cuba, and the whole of former Indo-China is up for grabs.

All I can hope to give you in such a hasty run-down is the overall framework of a national strategy. In your spare time, after you get home, you can read to fill in the various gaps. Many volumes have been written on various phases of this national strategic appraisal. For example, the threat we face is covered very well in *Protracted Conflict* by

Strausz-Hupé et al. The overall view, in one of the best books I can recommend to you, is covered in W.W. Rostow's monumental *The U.S. in the World Arena*. While you are here you might want to take a brief look at Lieutenant Dorsey's *A Concept of National Strategy*, which is in the September 1959 *Naval War College Review*. Another book which I think discusses the Korean War from a very refreshing viewpoint is *Korea and the Fall of MacArthur* by a man named Trumbull.

In summing up my remarks of the past 50 minutes, I must say, first of all, that it is extremely difficult to sum it up. I do hope that I made you think about our national strategy, and that I have planted a few desires to do a little outside reading on this subject. I hope that I have shown you the need for a purposeful, well-thought-out U.S. national strategy. I hope I have clearly indicated, above all, the close intermingling these days of the civilian and the military in the formulation of national strategy.

As long ago as 1513, Machiavelli said, "Success in war is determined by the political advantages gained, not victorious battles." Therefore, one might conclude that we lost World War II. I might also suggest that the principles I have mentioned are still valid.

Finally, I would like to quote a rather gloomy forecast by George Kennan. This is one man's opinion on whether or not we need a national strategy, whether or not we need a national purpose. He said, "If you ask me as a historian, whether a country in a state this country is in today, with no highly developed sense of national purpose, with the overwhelming accent of life on personal comfort and amusement, with a dearth of public services and a surfeit of privately sold gadgetry, with a chaotic transportation system, with its great Metropolitan areas being gradually disintegrated by the headlong switch to motor transportation, with an educational system where

quality has been extensively sacrificed to quantity, and with insufficient social discipline even to keep its major industries functioning without grievous interruptions—if you ask me whether such a country has, over the long run, a good chance of competing with a purposeful, serious, and disciplined society such as that of the Soviet Union, I must say the answer is No."

Have we as a nation really lost the fiber which made the old industrialists, entrepreneurs and frontiersmen resolute, brave, competitive, and ambitious? Are we so nationally satisfied that we merely want to be left alone to enjoy our standard of living and our material wealth? Have we lost the old American urge to expand and grow? Are we willing to concede and compromise our principles? Do we really need a national strategy?

At the beginning I told you that I was not going to offer any solutions. I hope at least that I have posed the problems.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Colonel Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., U.S. Army

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS: Master Parachutist

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND: USMA, January 1943
Basic Course, The Artillery
School, 1943, C&GSC 1946
Air Command and Staff School,
1949
Advanced Course, The Artillery
School, 1951
Armed Forces Staff College.
1955
Army War College, 1959
Boston University, 1960,
M.A. Political Science

DUTY ASSIGNMENTS:

NavWarCol	Staff	7/59-
Army War College	Student	8/58-6/59
Office CofS, USA	Asst SGS	6/56-7/58
Plans Office, Career Mgmt Div	Plans Off	6/55-6/56
AFSC	Student	1/55-6/55
674th Airborne FA Bn (Korea and Japan)	CO	6/53-11/54
TAS, Fort Sill	Asst Sec'y	6/52-4/53
" " "	Instructor, Air- borne	1/51-6/52
82nd Abn Div, Ft Bragg	Asst G1 & Asst G3	5/48-12/50
" " " " "	Staff Off, Div Arty	8/47-4/48
Air C&S School	Student	1/49-6/49
11th Airborne Div (Camp Mackall, N.C., New Guinea, Leyte Luzon, Okinawa, Japan)	Btry Off, Btry Cmdr Asst G3, Asst G1, Air Off	4/43-2/47
USMA	Cadet	7/39-1/43