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Command Decisions

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particular value to all military officers are the answers to questions such as: How does a staff officer write and how does he speak? What are the qualities of a good staff officer? Also provided are guides for preparing staff studies, estimates, plans and orders, and finally an appendix with eighteen complete formats and a glossary of selected military terms. The book is complete and the authors, three military members of the faculty of the Armed Forces Staff College, have dealt objectively and thoroughly with their material. An invaluable addition to a professional library.

Greenfield, Kent Roberts, ed. *Command Decisions*. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1959. 482 p.

This volume was prepared by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, to satisfy the needs of the Army's Command and General Staff School. It is a complete and interesting examination of the twenty most crucial and controversial decisions of World War II. It is not a comprehensive history of the war; it reflects only the highlights. Sixteen authors contributed the twenty articles which comprise the book. Each of these authors presents an unbiased, factual and well-documented account of his particular subject. The writings contain little interpretation and no opinion except that brought out by the factual account. Some of the articles (or chapters) have been published elsewhere, e.g., "Japan's Decision for War," by Louis Morton appeared in the *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 1954, and "The Anvil Decision: Crossroads of Strategy," by Maurice Matloff appeared in the same publication in July 1958. Hanson Baldwin has written a perceptive introduction to this book. In it he quotes Voltaire as saying that history can only be well written in a free country. The book bears out the authenticity of this statement, as each article is painstakingly and comprehensively documented. Only in free countries could historians have access to such a volume of information and the freedom to write the unbiased facts. *Command Decisions* is recommended

as worthwhile and fascinating reading for anyone interested in military history.

Mau, Hermann and Krausnick, Helmut. *German History, 1933-45*. London, Oswald Wolff (Publishers) Ltd., 1959. 157 p.

In less than 150 pages the authors have given one of the best recent accounts of the Nazi period in Germany. The book contains little that is really new, but it carries a special interest as being the work of contemporary German historians. They write with feeling, yet with such detachment that the reader never is made aware of their nationality until he reaches a chapter called "The Enemy Strikes Back," and finds that the enemy is the United States. However faithful the translation may be to the original, the English style is excellent, and it makes for easy as well as profitable reading. The chapters are clear and succinct to the point that each paragraph is full of significance. The authors seek neither to excuse Hitler nor to absolve the German people of all responsibility by putting all blame upon him. "Rarely had a people followed the banners of a revolution more willingly," they write, and the critical point in their acquiescence was the collapse of the German monarchy in 1918. Catapulted to power in times of economic crisis, "Nazism surrounded itself with an atmosphere of anti-rational fervour, the unique climate of a 'movement,' the stimulant of a dynamism without goal or purpose." More and more, Nazism is shown to be not a struggle for an idea, but a struggle for power. In foreign policy, the authors point out, the public repeatedly gave personal credit to Hitler for what really had resulted from long effort on the part of his predecessors; and then his early triumphs in adopting a belligerent attitude toward the West secured him in his further risks. "Many a doubt in Germany as to the honesty of Nazi ends and means was silenced by the feeble attitude . . . of the outside world." The strict Neutrality Acts of the United States encouraged both this attitude and Hitler's aggressiveness. Demand for unconditional surrender, the authors believe, did significantly