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PRINTER'S CORRECTION

to

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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Page 42 - Line 17, change "underlaying" to "underlying"

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.**

COMMUNISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
29 September 1959 by
Professor A. N. Dragnich

You may be in for a difficult morning. I do not know who dreams up these lecture topics, but this one on the "Theory and Practice of Communism" is a pretty good description of a semester course which I give at Vanderbilt, and to try to cram it within an hour, or within fifty minutes, is going to be some task. I suppose if I were really wise I would select some phase of it and talk about that and forget about the rest, but I am foolish enough to attempt to adhere to the scope of the lecture as outlined.

Some of you heard Professor Ader talk about conflicting political and economic systems. Part of his discussion dealt with an examination of Marxism. I know that some of you in the audience (this is a somewhat different audience) did not hear those remarks, and so while I might prefer to go on from where he left off and talk about some things that I am particularly interested in, I must, for the first few minutes, talk about theory, at least for the benefit of those people who were not at that particular discussion.

All socialists, including Marxian socialists, accept the general idea that somehow the basic goods and services of a society ought to be collectively owned and collectively controlled for the benefit of all instead of a few. This is not a new idea; it is an idea that you can trace back to the Old Testament, and you can trace it up through history.

What then makes Marxian socialism new or different? In his lecture, Professor Ader made some rather significant distinctions between communism and socialism, and I in no way disagree with those distinctions. I think they are distinctions that are significant, but what makes Marxism somehow different from other forms of socialist thought is that, in a sense, it is the outgrowth of two converging factors or movements in man's history. These

are modern science and the industrial revolution. Now, I do not want to blame science for Marxism, but Marxism came along at a time when great strides had been made in science, a time when to call something scientific was really to call it accurate. Modern science gave Marx an opportunity to say, in effect, "Let's get rid of this fuzzy thinking — let's put society under the microscope and let's see what makes it tick." This, in combination with the growth of modern industrial power, which contributed to great changes in the social and political order, gave the Marxists an opportunity to attempt to develop from these factors a law of social development. The Marxists, therefore, like to refer to their doctrine as "scientific socialism."

Before I talk about Marxism in more detail, I should like to make some distinctions in the use of the two terms — socialism and communism. Let me just talk about the distinctions in the last hundred years or so. After 1848, i.e., the time of the publishing of the Communist Manifesto, communism came to mean revolutionary action toward the overthrow of the capitalist order and the establishment of a communist society. Socialism, on the other hand, meant the achievement of a similar society, but by constitutional means, by persuasion and the ballot box, rather than by force. After 1872, however, and down to 1917, the two terms were practically synonymous, or to be more accurate, the term communism was virtually dropped. Within twenty-five years of the publishing of the Communist Manifesto, therefore, its authors were calling themselves, not communists, but social democrats or socialists. With the coming of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, however, the old distinctions were revived, and even accentuated.

The way the Russians use these terms is also of some interest. When referring to the doctrine, to the ideology that supposedly guides their system, they very often use the word *socialism*. They also use the term *Marxism*, but most frequently they talk of *Marxism-Leninism*, and sometimes of *communism*. They also tend to use the words *socialism* and *communism* to designate certain stages in their development. They tend to use the term *socialism* to

describe that particular stage in which they now happen to be — a transition stage, a stage in which they have socialized industry and other economic aspects of the country. This stage supposedly leads to the ultimate type of society which they are seeking, which is communism.

Now let me turn to a brief resume' of Marxian ideology, or Marxism as a theory. Note what I said earlier, that Marx thought that he and Engels had discovered the laws of social development. Note that I say *laws* of social development. They thought that they had discovered the laws of social development and then proceeded to expound them and to explain them.

The way I approach this discussion is to say that you can talk of Marxism as being essentially three things: It is, first of all, an interpretation of capitalism. It is more than that, of course, for an interpretation of capitalism requires an interpretation of what preceded it, etc. But if you look at Marxian writings, the bulk of them — I do not know whether you want to say 70% or 90% — but certainly the bulk of Marxian writings deals with an interpretation of capitalism and with an interpretation of social development generally. Secondly, Marxism is the stage — the positive stage — of transition, the stage in which all political power is seized and property is socialized. It is also the stage in which they lay low the exploiters. Thirdly, Marxism is the ultimate stage of social development — the ideal society in which everyone is supposed to contribute according to his ability, and in turn, will be rewarded according to his needs.

Now let me go back over those three aspects rather quickly. As Professor Ader indicated, the basic concept in dialectical materialism is that society moves through certain stages. One type of society will create within itself certain contradictions — will, in effect, create the seeds of its own destruction — and out of this will come a synthesis, or a new society which supposedly combines the best of the old and the new.

This dialectic process keeps moving. You might ask, what is the power there? What is the driving force in the dialectic pro-

cess? Well, it is matter; it is the mode of economic production. The way that man goes about satisfying his economic needs — his needs for food, shelter, clothing — determines the kind of relations he is going to have with his fellow men. Since everyone is out to satisfy his desires, his wants, his needs, conflict results, and ultimately society tends to split up into those who have more and those who have less. Out of this conflict of interests you get social classes.

Now, this conflict of interests, this setting up of social classes, determines how society is going to be organized, politically, socially and otherwise. In every instance the class which is the strongest, which is dominant or which is perhaps sometimes in league with another class, gets hold of the political machinery, and perhaps even the religious machinery of society, and proceeds to govern in its own interest. So you see, the state becomes the instrument of the dominant class in any particular society.

Now, when new productive forces evolve, the existing social institutions usually will not permit of their proper utilization, because the one class which is dominant is too selfish and not far-sighted. By following a selfish and short-sighted philosophy, it brings on a conflict. Class alignments tend to change, social struggles are intensified and ultimately revolution is the result. And, of course, following that you get a new type of society which itself will ultimately produce an inner opposition which will lead to its downfall.

When Marx and Engels applied this general theory, this so-called social law, to the development of capitalism, they discovered that with invention, with the industrial revolution, with the rise of the trading merchant class, the shackles of the old feudal order stood in the way. Thereupon the bourgeois class, which was coming into dominance, overthrew the feudal order and the shackles which held it in check. But like the feudalism and other societies prior to it, capitalist society brings forth its own inner opposition, the proletariat, the class of propertyless wage earners which it needs to operate the machinery of capitalist production. It does not, how-

ever, give that class all of the benefits that society could give it. In other words, capitalist society stands in the way of the proper utilization of all of the things that can produce abundance. Since the bourgeois class will not allow this abundance to be spread to the proletariat, the position of the proletariat gets worse — the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. One of the results of this state of affairs is that the poor people cannot buy the goods that are available. The consequences of this “overproduction” are unemployment, economic depressions, class struggle and, ultimately, revolution. But, according to the Marxists, the class struggle has been simplified under capitalism. Instead of many classes, as you had in Roman times or under feudalism, you have essentially two classes — the capitalist or bourgeois class, and the propertyless wage earners, the proletariat. When the latter discover what is happening to them, when they become enlightened, they will revolt.

The Russian Marxists, notably Lenin, altered this theory, in part so as to have it fit Russian society. You see, what this theory presupposes is that the revolution against capitalism will come at a time when capitalism is full-blown, is developed and is ready to fall off the tree, so to speak, as any overripe fruit might do. But Russia was a long way from being capitalistically developed. As a matter of fact, capitalism was just gaining a hold in Russia. According to Marxian theory, therefore, the proletarian revolution in Russia might not come for decades, or perhaps a century or more. I do not think that I am being unfair to Lenin when I say that he wanted to see the revolution come to Russia in his lifetime, and he did not mind modifying Marxian theory a bit, by contending, among other things, that the proletarian revolution did not have to wait until Russian society had gone through the evils of the capitalist stage. Social developments could be telescoped a little. Earlier Lenin had adhered pretty much to the traditional Marxian notion, but subsequently began changing, particularly when he realized that perhaps there was even the possibility of harnessing the peasantry to help the proletariat.

In other words, Lenin believed that they would march hand in hand with history, but they would just push history a little faster

than it normally would go. To do that pushing, Lenin devised the concept of the professional revolutionary. The proletariat would be led by a group of dedicated, hard-boiled revolutionaries who were disciplined and who would shed their blood, if need be, to bring about the new society. While Marx rarely talked of a political party, Lenin made it his chief business for nearly twenty years to build the kind of party that he thought would be needed to overthrow Russian-bourgeois society. Lenin added to Marxian theory the proposition that imperialism was the last stage of capitalism. He maintained that eventually various capitalist states would get into trouble with each other because they would not find sufficient markets at home. In their search for overseas markets, as well as for sources of raw materials, they would run into conflict with each other, and there would be war. Therefore, in Lenin's view, capitalistic imperialism was the cause of war. So much for the Marxian interpretation of the social laws that govern the development of society.

I am not going to say much about the two other aspects of Marxian theory. The one, the positive program, simply involves a seizure of power, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is supposed to be temporary, and the task of building the new economic and social order. In other words, once you have this analysis — once the proletariat has conducted the revolution — there are two tasks: one, to seize power politically and to hold on to it; and second, to socialize capital and to lay low the exploiters.

The other, and final aspect of Marxian theory, has to do with what most of us would regard as Utopia, the so-called classless and stateless society. Some of you may be asking yourselves, in view of the Marxian laws of social development, why the dialectic process stops once the classless-stateless society is established. The Marxians have an answer for that. You see, this revolution — the proletarian revolution — does away with the thing which is responsible for the class structure — the private ownership of property. When property comes into the possession of society as a whole, you see, the thing which has divided people into classes

is no more. When everyone is in the same class, by definition, there is a classless society. Earlier, you will note, I said that according to Marxian theory the state is the instrument of the dominant class. Now, if there are no classes, then there is no need for a state. Well, of course, nothing in Soviet practice or any other communist practice has given us any reason to believe that this kind of thing will occur.

With this rather brief and cursory survey of Marxian doctrine, I should like next to turn briefly to a critique of Marxian theory, to suggest several ways in which, I think, Marxian theory went wrong or why it went wrong, and then I want to talk a little about communist practice, notably communist practice in the Soviet Union. Perhaps I ought to add that I am not entirely original here, that some of the things I shall say you may have read or heard before. In any case, I have listed six different ways in which the Marxian theorists have erred.

First of all, their assumption or contention that the materialist forces are the primary forces in society is not really sound. I think all of us would agree that materialistic forces are of some consequence, but society certainly is much more complex than that. We have many studies which demonstrate, to my satisfaction and to the satisfaction of many others, that the materialistic forces are not the primary ones. There are others.

Secondly, I think Marx erred in attributing the consequences of the industrial revolution to capitalism alone. What he saw of capitalism, what he saw of the industrial revolution, was really the first stages of capitalist development. Hence, he tended to attribute to capitalism alone the evils of that period. But our subsequent view of industrialization in other parts of the world, particularly state-controlled and state-engineered industrialization such as that in the Soviet Union, provides us with a more accurate picture. We have discovered that the industrial revolution, whether it is engineered by private enterprise or by the state, tends to create social classes (and this is true of the Soviet Union). The classes lower down in the scale are the classes which get less of what there

is to get. In other words, they are exploited. Therefore, it would seem that the exploitation of workers is not the result of capitalism or of socialism, but of the early stages of the industrial revolution.

Thirdly, it seems to me that Marx erred in not foreseeing that when the industrial revolution had run its course the lot of the worker would improve. Of course, this may be rather familiar to you. It seems worth noting, however, that the use of free speech and the availability of a free press permitted the discussion of many of the conditions which, I think all of us would agree, were atrocious in the early stages of industrialization. This discussion permitted not only the bringing of the facts to the people, but it also served to arouse a certain social conscience which resulted in a considerable modification of these conditions. Moreover, in addition to free speech and free press, the workers were able to organize into unions and thus push their program and to get many of their demands. And finally, the right of workers to participate in the choosing of members to legislative bodies enabled them to exercise an influence through the democratic process of law making.

I think all of you are fully aware that these things considerably modified the nature of the social order under capitalism. I should like to add parenthetically that perhaps, and I say only perhaps, the absence of free speech and free press in the Soviet Union, the absence of effective labor unions and the absence of a really meaningful democratic process — the very absence of these things in the Soviet Union may prevent the Soviet Union from going beyond this initial stage of industrial development, where you have one dominant class, call it the red bourgeoisie if you will, and the remainder of the people who are exploited.

Fourthly, I think that Marx, Engels, Lenin and others, erred considerably in underestimating the strength and flexibility of capitalism. Capitalism has turned out to be much more flexible, much more resilient and much stronger than Marx and Engels or any of the other Marxian writers attempted to point out. One reason for this has been the tremendous growth of a middle class. The rich did not get richer and the poor get poorer. As a matter of

actual fact, you had a kind of a levelling, with the income tax serving to limit the accumulation of wealth while at the same time a growing amount of sharing was taking place through legislation and through union activity. One other thing, I think, ought to be added: modern day capitalism, at least in this country, has demonstrated a tremendous ability to adjust to considerable public regulation.

Another point where Marx erred, I think, is in his underestimating the strength of nationalism. You are familiar with the Marxist slogan, "workers of the world unite." The Marxists insisted that loyalties to country would be superseded by loyalties to the working class, but this has turned out to be almost completely the reverse. Actually national loyalties have turned out to be much stronger than class loyalties, and there is no evidence of a reversal in this respect.

Finally, I think Marx and his cohorts also erred in their assumption that the workers would act rationally in certain given circumstances. As a matter of fact, most studies in the fields of sociology and psychology, particularly social psychology, tend to demonstrate that generally people are moved to action rather slowly, that people seldom act and when they do act they do not act particularly rationally. Many of the studies of political behavior in voting, for example, are quite clear on this point. They show that the reasons people give for voting as they do are something less than rational.

Having made these observations by way of a critique of Marxian theory, let me now turn to Soviet practice for a moment. You are going to hear Professor Brzezinski from Harvard tomorrow, who will be talking about the Soviet political system. I have talked with him about his lecture, so I shall attempt not to talk about the things that he plans to cover.

The basic critique of Marxian practice, it seems to me, is that this system, which was going to set men free and which was going to provide a greater measure of social justice, has failed. In

actual practice, the result has been three things: political dictatorship, economic dictatorship, and finally, the most far-flung tyranny known to man.

Now, let me go back to those three points. The political dictatorship was envisioned by the theory, but it was going to be something transitory, something temporary. Moreover, it was going to be a dictatorship of the majority proletariat against the minority capitalists. As it has turned out, of course, it is not a dictatorship by the proletariat, but a dictatorship by the few over the proletariat and over everyone else. In a communist political system, the party, or more precisely, the party leadership is everything.

In Mr. Khrushchev's TV speech he talked about how people are elected to the Supreme Soviet. He wanted to give an indication that this was a democratic system, that it paid some attention to the people. Well, I ask you, even if it were true that the people could elect freely to the Supreme Soviet, what kind of a legislature would you have, or how much could such a legislature do? As a matter of actual record, the Supreme Soviet meets for about five days once or twice in any one calendar year. Very often a session meets for two or three days, most of which time is consumed in a few speeches.

Permit me to digress here for a moment to tell you about one of my experiences. One of the things that I wanted to do when I was serving in our embassy in Yugoslavia in 1947-50 was to see what a communist legislature was like. Consequently, one evening at a cocktail party I asked the deputy chief of protocol if I could get a card to sit in the galleries of the parliament, and he said, "Why, yes, but I think the session wound up tonight." The next day I checked back and discovered that the session had begun only two days earlier and it was all over with. Thereafter I watched carefully for the announcement of the next session. This time I made my request promptly and got a card to attend that particular session of the Yugoslav parliament. It was almost a direct copy of the Supreme Soviet. I sat through every minute of that parliamentary session, which sounds ridiculous if you should be thinking

about Congress or the British Parliament. That Yugoslav Parliament met for about two and a half days. It met for an hour or two in the morning and then an hour or two in the afternoon. More than half the time was consumed by a couple of speeches. Nobody proposed anything from the floor that was not proposed by the government. No one objected to anything. No one voted against anything. No one spoke against any proposal or introduced any new ones. Yet in those short sessions they managed to pass seven or eight laws, one of which was the nationalization of the drugstores. I was interested in timing the passage of these measures, and do you know how long it took them to nationalize the drugstores? Five minutes! Some of the other bills took even less time.

The point I want to make is that in communist countries the party is everything. The governmental structure is there simply as an administrative apparatus to carry out party decisions.

I should also like to refer briefly to Soviet elections. Not only is there only one candidate for each office to be filled (and these are carefully selected by the party), but in addition a person does not need to mark his ballot to vote. While they do have booths for people to go into, the tendency of the post-World War II years has been to discourage people from going into the booths. Since all you have to do to vote for the list is to deposit your ballot in the box, the only thing you could do in the booth, anyway, would be to invalidate your ballot. The Soviets discouraged this, largely through demonstration; that is, certain of the party boys would appear and they would take the ballot and proclaim that they were openly "casting a ballot for Joseph Stalin and the whole list." Such open demonstrations tended to intimidate other people; they were convinced that it was wiser not to take the trouble of going into the booth.

There is another point I want to make in connection with the Soviet political dictatorship. It has to do with the Bill of Rights. I am sure that you have heard it said, and perhaps you have even said it that "the Soviet system is democratic in theory. Theirs is a democratic constitution. The trouble is that they don't adhere

to it in practice." Why, even one of our national magazines, which is noted for its hindsight, at one time said: "There is nothing wrong with the Soviet constitution. In theory they have a Bill of Rights much like ours." This is utter nonsense, and I want to nail that down if I don't do anything else this morning. Let me read you from the Soviet constitution, Article 125:

"In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law: freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings, freedom of street processions and demonstrations . . ."

Does that give you any right, in theory, to advocate anything but socialism, or their system the way they interpret it? It most certainly does not. This is not democratic even in theory. It says you have freedom of speech, press, assembly and street demonstrations, provided these things are used in conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system. When the next person tells you that this constitution is democratic on its face, I hope you will refer him to Article 125. Also, you will find a similar sort of thing in Article 126, which lists the communist party as the only real force in the Soviet system. In short, you do not have political democracy under this system, nor do you have basic civil rights. Incidentally, the so-called Bill of Rights is not just a Bill of Rights. It is also a Bill of Duties, and there are some rather significant duties, too.

I should now like to refer briefly to what I have called economic dictatorship. Again this is a dictatorship by the few. It is true that the one Marxian idea which has been realized in the Soviet Union, and this is about the only one which has been realized, is that private enterprise has been taken over by society as a whole. In other words, they have nationalized capital; they have nationalized industry and other phases of the economy. But in the process they have not brought about any equality of reward. There are tremendous differences in income, and these differences are greater

than the differences we find here in the United States. The gap between the low-paid worker and those at the top is tremendous, much greater than the gap in the United States. Not only that, but the group at the top, which I referred to as the new bourgeoisie, the new master class, lives rather well. A trip to the Soviet Union gives one a pretty vivid impression that there are people in the Soviet Union who live relatively well, while the vast masses live in poverty. You do not see much in between. One cannot help but be struck by the contrast between a small number of people who live relatively well and the remainder whose standard is low.

Some of you have probably read, or maybe are now reading, the book by Milovan Djilas entitled, *The New Class*. Certainly there is ample evidence in every communist society to support what Djilas says about the status of the new privileged class. It is fairly obvious that the rewards to the few at the top are really all out of proportion to the rewards that others in communist society get.

Thirdly, I said that the result has been the most far-flung tyranny known to man. In this respect I am not going to confine my remarks to Russia. To some extent, I shall be drawing on my experiences in Yugoslavia, but we could be talking about any communist country. What I want to consider, in the few remaining minutes, is the question of the methods by which this tyranny is imposed and maintained.

One of the primary techniques, which I am sure is familiar to all of you, is what I have chosen to call force and fear. They simply liquidate people out of hand, at least the most dangerous ones. The less dangerous ones are perhaps imprisoned or sent to labor camps. And for those who are not sufficiently dangerous to be physically liquidated or sent to prison, there is the secret police, which keeps a fairly active surveillance of them, to say nothing of intimidation. Periodically, these people are invited to come in for questioning, released, invited again, etc. Under such circumstances, a person never knows when the invitation might carry with it a provision for a much more permanent stay.

In addition to the secret police, you also have what I have termed the secret police auxiliary, or the vast network of informers who are found in offices and in various places of work, in school-rooms — in virtually every segment of society.

The element of force and fear can pretty well cow the population so that it will not dare do anything, mainly because nearly everyone knows what happens to people in such circumstances. But the communists do not rely on force and fear alone. They also seek to mobilize public opinion. They make sure that they own and control the public opinion media. In other words, there are no privately-owned newspapers, no privately-owned radio stations, no privately-produced programs, no privately-owned movie houses, no privately-produced movies, no privately-owned theaters or plays. All of these are controlled by the government for the purposes of party propaganda.

For those people whom they cannot reach by these media, they go out and create new media. Let me cite one example concerning university professors who tended to be aloof at one period. When asked to write articles for communist newspapers or other party publications, some of the professors tried to beg off. A man might say: "Well, I don't know anything about politics, I'm not politically informed." The party's answer was to set up a newspaper for university professors. Now, how can you refuse to write for a paper that is specifically set up for you and your group? Look at the effort the state has made setting up a newspaper just for you. But if you then say you are awfully busy and have a lot of things to do, the party is generous even to the point of providing you with the theme, or perhaps even the finished article. How much easier could it be?

They did the same thing with authors. The Russians created the Literary Gazette, and the Yugoslavs followed the example by setting up the Literary News. Here, you see, they say to many authors (or would-be authors): "Well, many of you fellows complained about the previous regime before the war. You didn't have the right of free speech or press, but look how much better things

are for you now. Don't you owe it to society to say so? Here we have even set up a newspaper especially for you, giving you the printing presses, paper, ink and everything that goes with it, including," they might add, "the text of what you want to say."

In addition to this type of propaganda effort, the communists utilize face-to-face agitation, where they employ millions of people (perhaps two million people in the Soviet Union). All of these activities are under guidance from the agitation and propaganda section of the party's central committee.

In addition to force and fear and the monopolization and mobilization of public opinion, the communist regimes make use of a third technique, the so-called mass organizations. Whereas the technique of force and fear is used to destroy opposition and to instill fear, and whereas the mobilization of public opinion is carried out so as to make sure that the party's message is brought to the people in a variety of contexts, the mass organizations are utilized to harness the people to perform concrete and specific tasks which the party desires. Among the mass organizations are the local councils, the so-called trade unions, the youth organizations, the organizations of writers and artists, war veterans associations, sports groups, railway workers associations and a whole host of others.

In addition to the concrete work that these organizations are supposed to perform, the communists also hope that they can be used to create among the people a sense of popular participation. Some people probably do get carried away and think that they are really involved in doing something useful. Others probably hate themselves for doing things that they really would prefer not doing, particularly when they know that they are thereby strengthening a system which they do not like.

Moreover, the communists make sure that in the schools, along with science and math, the students are exposed to a certain amount of political indoctrination. Their one true science, the science of Marxism-Leninism, is not neglected in any school.

Finally, there is a constant attack on competing influences. There is an attack on religion, varying from the physical destruction of churches to the disparagement of religion generally. The consequences are fairly obvious. If you are a young man and you want to get ahead, you will seek to avoid an entry in your dossier to the effect that you are a church-goer. Then there are the attacks on the home and home influences. And you have heard about the attempt to exclude outside influences, whether it be the Voice of America, or books, newspapers, movies, or sheets of music.

I am aware that this hasty survey of the methods by which tyranny is imposed and maintained leaves a good deal to be desired. I wish there were more time so that I could give you a more detailed picture of communist tyranny, what it is and what it does, and particularly what it does to people.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Alex N. Dragnich

Present Position

Nimitz Chair of Political Science, Naval War College

Schools

U. Washington, 1938 B.A.

U. California, 1939

Ph.D. (Political Science) 1945

Career Highlights

1942-44 Senior propaganda analyst & political analyst, U. S. Department of Justice.

1944-45 Research analyst, OSS

1945-47 Asst. Professor, International Relations, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio

1947-50 Cultural Attache and Public Affairs Officer, American Embassy, Belgrade, Yugoslavia

1950-52 Associate Professor, Political Science, Vanderbilt U. Nashville, Tennessee

1952-59 Professor Political Science, Vanderbilt University

Miscellaneous

Author of *Tito's Promised Land*; chapter in Yugoslavia, edited by R. J. Kerner (University of California, 1949) and in *The Fate of East Central Europe*, edited by Stephen Kertesz (University of Notre Dame Press, 1956). Also contributor of articles to scholarly magazines.

Professional Affiliations: APSA; Southern Political Science Association; Western Political Science Association.

In "American Men of Science," Part II, Page 175.

FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 12 October 1959 by
Professor C. L. Rossiter

When we are dead and buried, and our children and grandchildren as well, historians will look back to the decade upon which we are about to enter and will describe it, I am certain, as an age of impending crisis. What now comes through only darkly to us will then be transparently clear to them: that the American people in the 1960's faced a situation no less ominous, and at the same time no less hopeful, than that of the 1760's or 1850's or 1920's or 1930's — each of these a decade in which we drifted, angrily or amiably, into dangers we refused to recognize until we had been cast among them.

If I may anticipate history and the historians by talking about our situation in the present tense, we are fast being caught up in a whole series of appalling crises — a crisis in technology, a crisis in education, a crisis in foreign policy, a crisis in race relations, a crisis in culture, a crisis in morals. And the total crisis compounded of all these crises, any one of which may soon be big and nasty enough to tax all our purposes and ingenuity for the next quarter-century, looms even bigger and nastier because we have thus far refused to trust the evidence of our eyes and label it for what it is.

We have refused to do this because, in a word, we are Americans, because there is little or nothing in the ideas by which we live that teaches us either to recognize the warning signals of a genuine crisis or, if we do recognize them, to move against it with solutions that mobilize the energies and talents of the whole nation of preventive action — and for the long haul. In the crises of the past we relied on war, luck, or opportunism to provide a workable solution, but war is no longer tolerable, our luck is no longer running, and opportunism is far too feeble a pattern of action in the fact

of the social and physical forces that Darwin, Einstein, Ford, Freud, and Marx have let loose all around us.

No small part of the crisis of our time arises out of the bland assumption that we already have the tools at hand to deal with it; and that assumption, it seems clear, is a result of ideas for which we are so grateful to our ancestors that we cannot bear to examine them for signs of wear and tear. The fact is that this mounting crisis is, as much as any social crisis can ever be, a crisis of ideas. I do not mean to say that we have been led into our present discontents by wrong ideas, or even by the wrong application of right ideas. I must leave it to others to explain more fully why we are where we are, limiting myself to the observation that, all things considered, we deserve to be there. I do say that certain delusions, I would say self-delusions, in the pattern of our working ideas are contributing more than their share to the deteriorating state of the nation by making it much more difficult to recognize, to analyze, and to attack the problems that increasingly beset us.

I would like to deal in this speech with the most important single aspect of the mounting crisis in American ideas: the crisis in our ways of thinking about politics — a word I use in the broad Aristotelian sense — in what I, following the lead of other men, have called the American Political Tradition. And my thesis is simply that many of the ideas by which we have lived freely and wrought successfully in this realm of politics are, to be blunt about it, obsolescent; that they are irrelevant to the problems of the kind of world in which we live and certainly are going to live; and that we must rethink them boldly if we are to leave to our children an America even half as free and pleasant as the one we inherited from our fathers.

In order to argue this thesis properly, I must first describe the American tradition in words that most of my readers will understand and accept; and that, I know from experience, is no easy thing to do. It is far more pleasant and less controversial to cherish the American tradition than it is to describe it. No Ameri-

can yet has made an authoritative statement of its essentials, and no American is ever likely to. We have no Marx, no Teacher identified and venerated as the First Source; we have no Engels or Lenin or Stalin to restate and, if necessary to recreate the lessons of the Teacher. One of the delights of the tradition is pluralism, which means that each of its children is encouraged to make his own interpretation of its principles; and it is, after all, the product of centuries of trial and error and prescriptive growth rather than of a few years of imperious dogmatizing. The implacable hostility of the American political tradition to either monism or dogmatism must always frustrate even the most well-meaning, self-effacing efforts to describe it in words that most Americans will accept as conclusive. The best I can hope to do is to state what I like to think have been our commonly accepted beliefs about politics, and to leave it to my readers to restate them as they see fit.

Let me group the ideas that make up our tradition under four main headings: the nature of man, the pattern of society, the structure and purpose of government, the place of man in society and under government. The results will be, as best I can state them, the essentials of our common tradition.

Our view of man, the raw stuff of politics, has always been pleasantly clouded. We have never been able to laugh off entirely the Augustinian warning that all men are miserable sinners; we have always been tempted by the Pelagian dream that all men can be made perfect. We cling even today to a mixed view of man's nature and capacities; yet, except for the deep suspicion we entertain of man in power, the mixture is made up largely of the ingredients of hope. If the American tradition is not perfectibilist, it is certainly meliorist. It makes more of man's benevolence than of his wickedness, more of his educability than of his perversity, more of his urge to be free than his need to submit, more of his sense of justice than of his capacity for injustice; and it plainly lacks any secular counterpart to the doctrine of Original Sin. If we have been entertained but not impressed by the old line of revivalists, we have been excited but not convinced by the new breed of psychol-

ogists. The man of the American political tradition is a *rational* man, one who, when given half a chance, will make political decisions calmly and thoughtfully with the aid of Aristotelian reason — reason tempered by experience.

One thing we are sure about man — and I mean real man, not man in the abstract: He is a precious child of God and is thus, in a visible as well as mystical sense, the equal or potential equal of all other men. Whatever postures of superiority we may adopt toward one another in real life, we adopt them in defiance of one of the essentials of our tradition, which translates the pious hope that all men are created equal into a practical insistence upon equality of political voice, equality of opportunity, equality before the law, equality of consideration, and equality in constitutional rights. Ours has been a harsh kind of equality — prompting Americans to say “I’m as good as you” rather than “You’re as good as me” — but it is equality with precious few reservations. The weight of our tradition of equality has made it hard for us to think in terms of class, order, hierarchy, aristocracy, *expertise*. The common man is still the only man with an unchallenged place in the American dream.

Our thoughts about society have been few and casual, as befits a people that has made a fetish of individualism. In the American political tradition there is little room for the community, even less for the natural and voluntary groups that, in the opinion of many sociologists, give it an essentially cellular rather than atomistic structure. We have been lectured at repeatedly by social thinkers from Madison to Riesman about the vital role of groups in society and thus in politics, yet we still find it hard to admit that the American community is anything more than a loose aggregate of individuals.

The tradition makes even less room for the concept of class — and no room at all for the class struggle. The best of all classes in our classless society is, of course, the middle class. Indeed, it is the only class that really counts politically or culturally, and the performance of any institution is to be judged in terms of how

well it serves to expand or strengthen or reward this class. We resolve the obvious contradiction between our tradition of classlessness and our preference for the middle class by defining the latter in such a way as to encompass most of the American people. The aristocracy, which is to be envied rather than trusted, is an accidental, unstable by-product of the social process; the proletariat, which is a dirty word, does not exist. Whatever "classes" or "levels" or "strata" we may display in our society, the natural relationship among them is one of harmonious interdependence.

And whatever the structure of the society, it is and should be marked by constant change. We turn instinctively to words like "mobility," "flexibility," "fluidity," and "dynamism" to describe American society at any point of time, and to words like "progress," "expansion," "growth," and "advance" to describe its course from point to point. "Everyone on the move; everything on the way up" — this is the picture of society we carry in our minds.

The American political tradition has a formula for government compounded of three elements: populism, constitutionalism, and skepticism. By populism I mean the heavy emphasis we place on the central role of the people in the twin processes of electing and directing those officials who make the policies by which we live. The basis of government is the freely given consent of the people; the object of government is to secure their liberties and advance their interests. The wisest of political oracles ever devised is a clear majority of the American people.

The structure of our government is based upon a double-barrelled assumption: that such a majority may well be too easy rather than too hard to muster, and that it cannot always be counted on to be wise and benevolent. More than that, all men however good and rational they may be, are uniquely susceptible to the temptations of power. Therefore, whether it be to cool off the whimsical majority or frustrate the headstrong official, the pattern of government must be made thoroughly constitutional. The spirit of constitutionalism pervades the American tradition, and is made visible in a Constitution that is both the instrument and symbol

of our national purpose. Through this charter and those of all our other political communities the total authority of the people is divided, dispersed, restrained, and on occasion even fragmented. The great services of arrangements such as federalism, the separation of powers, the party system, checks and balances, staggered elections, and representation are that they force men to think, talk, and bargain before they act, and that they institutionalize the procedures through which public policy is made, administered, and enforced. The rule of the majority must prevail, but it must prove itself persistent and undoubted on all occasions and extraordinary on extraordinary occasions, and it must recognize that there are some things it cannot do by right of might. In the American political tradition majority rule is both means and menace.

Finally, we still cling to the skeptical attitude of most of our ancestors toward political power. We assume that it can do great evil, but we are not at all sure it can do great good. Government serves several important purposes for the men who have consented to its authority, but the most numerous and important of their purposes are achieved through other devices, the most effective of which is the free play of each man's ambition and talents. And even in its proper areas of operation it cannot be entirely, much less consistently successful. The inherent inefficiency of government and the inherent tenacity of the social fabric combine to frustrate the aspirations of those men who imagine they can do great things, even or especially great and good things, with political authority.

The American political tradition has a simple, even simple-minded answer to the eternal question of man's place in society and under government, and the answer, in one word, is "individualism." Believing as we must that the rights of man are sacred and unalienable, insisting as we do that social progress results from the efforts of self-reliant men rather than from the directions of government, denying as we always have that a community can be anything more or greater than the men who make it up, we have become almost doctrinaire in our emphasis upon the primacy of

the individual in our political calculations. Whether competitive, cooperative, or downright abrasive, individualism is the natural condition of all men and the reliable goad of most progress.

I could go on indefinitely describing the essentials of the American political tradition, especially since such ideas as constitutionalism and individualism can be framed in a dozen different and equally valid ways. I ought to say something about certain American principles that are not primarily political yet help form the larger context in which this tradition has been shaped — our confidence in a just God, our happy view of history, our expectation of inevitable progress, our insistence that a higher morality governs the strivings of men. I ought to call attention to the “American temper,” to the unique cast of mind — optimistic, pragmatic, idealistic, moralizing — that flavors all our thoughts about politics. I ought also to rummage through other fields — education, for we must take note of our profound faith in the instruments of learning; religion, for we must not overlook the importance of the doctrine of the separation of church and state; law, for in our attitude toward it we find that same yearning for precision and predictability that inspires the spirit of constitutionalism; and science, for from it we draw a spirit and a method that we wish we could apply more consistently in the area of politics. But I trust that I have said enough to reveal at least the solid substance, if not every delicate detail, of our common political tradition.

And I trust, too, that I have said enough to indicate its provenance. If I may sum up several centuries of intellectual history in a few inadequate words, the American political tradition is a natural fruit of three famous stocks, the Christian heritage of justice and virtue, the English pattern of law and liberty, and science, for from it we draw a spirit and a method that we wish we could apply more consistently in the area of politics. These stocks were crossed in England to produce a new and more productive stock, and it was then carried to America, there to grow in fertile grandeur in a physical and social environment unique in the history of man, an environment conspicuous for its bigness, richness, diversity, good fortune, and immunity from the diseases of the en-

vironment from which the stock had been brought. The fruit is characteristically American, but it is also undeniably Western. It is, indeed, simply the most highly developed variety of the dominant faith of the North Atlantic community — Liberalism — which means that, viewed in a larger perspective, the crisis of the political tradition in America is simply one aspect of the crisis of Liberalism all over the West. The nature of the greater crisis, of which ours is one of the least recognized but most advanced phases, is most clearly understood as a steadily widening, now almost intolerable gap between ideal and reality, between the noble hopes and promises of the Liberal dream and the sorry wreckage of the world it helped all unwittingly to make.

It is not easy for us to admit that some of the most cherished principles of our tradition are in a state of disrepair and even decay, and to look with a clear eye at the widening gap between ideal and reality in our own national existence. For one thing, it *is* a tradition, a heritage from a glorious past, and to men who have full reason to take pride in their ancestry such an admission seems to border upon subversion. For another, it has served us well for almost two centuries, and one could argue persuasively that our most precious single possession as Americans has been this tradition of hope and liberty. And for a third, what kind of men could live, or would want to live, in a society in which the reach of the ideal did not exceed the grasp of reality by a healthy margin? One of the great functions of a tradition is to inspire the men who cherish it, and I do not see how it could perform this function at all if it did not depart from reality in the direction of the ideal. This is equally true of a less glorious but no less essential function, that of comforting its adherents, which it accomplishes principally by helping them to rationalize their interests — whether vested or merely hoped for.

But a great tradition must do something more if it is to deserve acceptance and veneration. It must guide as well as inspire; it must explain as well as explain away. Our ideals are first of all ideas, and as such they must be operative, or be cast on the scrapheap of

oblivion. The gap between principles of our tradition and the facts of our condition must be wide enough to encourage us, but not so wide as to paralyze us; wide enough to give us a bad conscience, but not so wide as to leave us with no conscience at all. How far the ideal should depart from reality in the well-ordered society is one of those questions that make a mockery of the pretensions of political science to be a science. It cannot be answered exactly, and I for one am glad. All we can say for certain is that there is a fairly long patch on the road from reality to ideal, which begins well beyond the cynicism of those men who deal only in facts and ends well short of the fecklessness of those who deal only in dreams, and, further, that a tradition functions properly as a tradition only within its limits.

It is my contention that our own tradition has come dangerously close to the outer boundary of the stretch within which we can expect it to operate effectively. In part, this situation arises out of the fact that amid these blessed surroundings we always did make too much of the promises of Liberalism, in part out of the fact that the reality of American life has changed more rapidly and radically than we have hitherto been willing to recognize. However, we may care to explain this situation, the nasty truth is that our political tradition is in serious danger of becoming, in the worst (or Marxist) sense of the word, an *ideology* — a collection of rank illusions that serves no purpose higher than to rock all of us together contentedly, the disinherited as well as the established, in the same cradle — a tolerable situation except that cradle may come down with one great crash. And we are in serious danger of attempting to solve the great problems of our time with the aid of ideas that may lead us to make the wrong decisions or, as is more likely, deaden our will to make any decisions at all.

Let me now turn to examine those principles of our tradition which, in my opinion, have drifted farthest away from reality or, to be more exact, have lagged farthest behind the onward rush of the American people into new ways of living. Before I do this I want to make clear my own admiration, and indeed veneration, for the American tradition. I am certainly one of those who look

upon it as our most precious possession. If we were ever to reshape it in such a way as to deny the primacy of liberty, the dignity of the person, the importance of morality, or the necessity of constitutionalism, I would say that we had ceased to be good Americans or even good men. With neither the essence of the American tradition, liberty and justice, nor with the aspiration, liberty and justice for all, can we have any serious argument. My argument is with some of the principles and assumptions — let us call them secondary or instrumental — through which its great ends have hitherto been pursued. Without further resort to that great American tradition, the filibuster, I go straight to the point by calling for the amendment or even abandonment of at least five ideals.

In the first place, I do not see how we can continue to delude ourselves much longer with the Liberal view of man's nature and destiny. This gentle, well-meaning, confident view has now had a full two centuries to prove itself in the test of events, and the result of the test is the sad truth that man is not one bit more admirable and his destiny a good deal less alluring than they appeared even to such doubting well-wishers as John Adams and Abraham Lincoln. We were led by our commitment to Liberalism to expect a steady improvement in the behavior of men in both their personal and political capacities; but the naked reality of our age, as it has been an only ill-concealed reality of all history, is that even the most favored men are driven by urges and fears that can be diverted but never tamed by learning or security or morality or appeals to reason. Our natures are a battleground over which sociability and selfishness, decency and depravity, love and hate, reason and unreason struggle without rest. Our destiny is to find no genuine release from pain, fear, and doubt this side of the grave. This is a lesson taught by history, especially current history, just as it is taught by our theologians and psychologists; and it is high time we made it an open part of our political tradition.

We must not rush shamefacedly to embrace the savage, cynical view of human nature. I doubt that any of us would care

to live in a society where Hobbes had slain Locks and chopped him into little pieces. But we are going to be pushed into such a view against our better instincts, among which I list the saving instinct of love, if we do not settle down fairly soon in a moderate position that mixes hope and caution in a more sober-minded view than we have hitherto had the courage to adopt. We have been told repeatedly by Reinhold Niebuhr of "the limits of all human striving, the fragmentariness of all human wisdom, the precariousness of all human configurations of power, and the mixture of good and evil in all virtue;" and yet we would still rather listen to the high priest of "the cult of reassurance," Norman Vincent Peale. If we go on listening, if we choose reassurance over reality, we are letting ourselves in for a bout of disillusionment in which the only certain winner would be the forces of autocracy. What we must fear and forestall is a failure of faith, for that will shortly be followed by a "failure of nerve" — and that will be for us, as it was for the Greeks, the end of the free society.

I do not expect any sharp improvement in our affairs to result from widespread adoption of a sober view of man's nature and capacities, but I do think we will be in a far better spiritual and intellectual position to deal with a world of pain and sorrow and frustration. A new recognition of the irrationality of political man might well give us a saner, more active politics at home. A new rejection of what Niebuhr calls "the regnant modern theory of potentially innocent men and nations" — that is, Americans and America — might well lead us to a sharper, more successful policy abroad.

This is not an easy exercise that I am counseling, for many Americans will read it as an invitation to men to stop loving one another. To them I would give one reminder and pose one question: The essence of life is charity, and charity has a far greater role to play in the sober than in the innocent view of man. And does anyone seriously think that Dr. Niebuhr loves men any less warmly than does Dr. Peale?

I confess that I am not half so certain about what we might do to readjust our commitment to equality; for though it needs

readjustment, it also needs reaffirmation. This is one instance in which the intolerable gap between ideal and reality might be most effectively closed by bringing the latter into closer conformity with the former. Equality is not much less central than liberty to our tradition, and we challenge our whole meaning as a people in history when we challenge this splendid principle. It might be less dangerous, and certainly would be more ennobling, if we were to apply a little more force and a lot more reason to reducing the glaring inequalities in some areas of American life, principally by persuading men to treat their neighbors like men. We are not likely to persuade them at all successfully if we water down our belief in equality.

At the same time, there is no longer any point in blinking the fact that one of the essential characteristics of an advanced industrial civilization is an almost hierarchical pattern of inequalities in status, power, knowledge, skill, security, compensation, and even privilege. We have the fascinating example of the Soviet Union before our eyes, and there is nothing in our own example that would lead us to think that we are exempt over the long run from the pressures that have forced a new pattern of stratification on Russian society in such a short time. There is another fact about the industrial society, however, that serves as a powerful countervailing force in behalf of equality as an operative ideal: the insatiable need for skilled, responsible, creative men and women, which can be filled only if the entire society serves as a pool of talent.

Our commitment to populism is a close corollary of our commitment to equality, and it is not surprising that here, too, we stumble across a principle in visible need of modification. An uncritical faith in the wisdom of the people, whether maintained for coldly political or warmly spiritual reasons, can lead a complex society into trouble even in the most happy times; in times like ours it can lead us to disaster. For what we fail to recognize is that the obverse of too glad a devotion to the dual principles of equality and populism is a neglect of the compelling problem of leadership.

Is it not as clear as such things can be that the future of our civilization — politically, economically, culturally, and even spiritually — depends upon its capacity to generate and support skilled and prudent leaders at every level and in every corner of American society? And is it not equally clear that one of the necessary ingredients of this capacity is a much more central place in the American tradition for the concept of leadership that really leads and, as a corollary, an *expertise* that is really expert?

We have already suffered badly from the lack of such a concept in our kit of operative ideals. We can shrug off the phenomenon of the Congressman from Ohio or California who is forever polling his constituency in defiance of the Burkean principle of representation. He, unlike Burke, has no other constituency to which he can flee in defeat and have a second chance at victory. But what can we say of the experts in Brooklyn or Chicago who make no conscious effort to introduce and maintain natural leaders in public housing projects? It is these experts we should blame for the blight that soon begins to eat away at many projects, or the climate of ideas in which, like the rest of us, they must work up their plans? The point that I am trying to make is that in our present climate it would have been a most unusual thing for them to have given purposeful consideration to constructing a pattern of leadership within the project itself. This, it seems to me, is much too large a price to pay for the jolly feeling that, whatever else we may be, we are staunch democrats.

The climate of social and political purpose must, I suggest, be changed. Our tradition must make a larger place for leadership, and we must turn our attention more openly to the problem of how to strengthen the position of our leaders in all areas of life without cutting them loose from their final responsibility to the American people. Can we have it both ways — leadership *and* democracy? I think we can, as we have certainly proved consistently through the operation of that amazing instrument of democratic leadership, the American Presidency.

It will be objected — I would be troubled if it were not — that I am advocating the forced injection of the principle of elitism

into the American political tradition. To this I can answer only that "elitism," like "privilege" or "force" or "bureaucracy" or "vested interest" — is simply a dirty word with which men can cut off discussion but not the existence of various inevitable and, to be sure, unpleasant arrangements and institutions of organized society, and especially of the modern industrial society. I can answer, further, that there are elites and elites, and that ours, which I am certainly willing to call by some other name, is no less different in nature and method from the elites of the totalitarian or authoritarian states than, say, the Congress of the United States is from the Supreme Soviet, the University of Michigan from the University of Moscow, or the *New York Times* from *Pravda*. Our instruments of leadership are a reflection of our whole society, and if it is "democratic," they will be, too.

One important means of having both stronger leadership and stronger democracy is, as I have suggested, a reaffirmation and readjustment of the splendid principle of equality. Let us reaffirm equality in constitutional rights, equality before the law and equality of consideration. Let us reaffirm equality of political voice, even if we do recognize that the chorus of all our voices is not so well-trained and finely-tuned as our tradition would have it. Most important, let us put equality of opportunity back in first place among all our operative ideals, but this time let us mean it and not, like the American disciples of Herbert Spencer, use it as an ideological smokescreen for rank inequalities of power and possession and privilege. A full application of this concept to our affairs, especially to our system of education, would do more than any other single factor to counter-balance any lowering of esteem for democracy that might result from a new emphasis upon the importance of leadership. What could be more healthy for the spiritual state of American democracy than a widespread assumption that our leaders have earned their places, and what could bring more support to such an assumption than a genuine attempt to throw open the gates of opportunity to the children of the oppressed and disinherited?

Here, then, are two further amendments that I would suggest solemnly for the American political tradition: a new emphasis upon the role of leadership in the free society, at the expense of an admirable but naive faith in the vigilance and wisdom of the people; a renewed emphasis on equality of opportunity, at the expense of nothing by prejudices and fears and vested interests of which we should be ashamed.

Another element of the tradition that has probably outlived its usefulness is our skeptical attitude toward the uses of political power. All through American history men who really knew better have let their distrust of specific groups or parties in authority carry them into a position of doctrinaire anti-statism. Jefferson got us into this habit, and I am not sure that we can blame him. He shared most of the radical prejudices of his day, and no prejudice was more deeply ingrained in the minds of American, English, and French radicals than the assumption that government was inherently corrupt, oppressive, and malevolent. For centuries ordinary men had looked upon political authority as a tool of the rich, as a means for perpetuating privilege and legalizing inequality. When government intervened in the labor market, it was to keep hours up and wages down; when it intervened in commerce and finance, it was to grant favors and privileges to the few already on top of the heap. Active government was something associated with the likes of Alexander Hamilton, and agrarian democrats, who sought nothing more than a fair shake, and had every reason to fear it. Like most men, they went farther than necessary in generalizing from their fears and ended up as advocates of a theory of political authority that has served us both well and ill in the course of American history — well because it has doubtless saved us from a great deal of addle-pated legislation, ill because it has several times helped vested interests to block reforms desperately needed in the larger interest of a just society. Where Jefferson and Jackson left off, Sumner, Carnegie, Field, Sutherland, Hoover, and the American Liberty League picked up, and who can blame them for making the essence of Americanism a belief in the evil-doing but not good-

doing capacities of popular government, indeed of any kind of government?

All that, it seems to me, is now a thing of the past. If we should not put the credulous trust in the efficacy of merely political power displayed by socialists and other extreme reformers, we also should not despise the only weapon now available to us in many areas of American life. The time has surely come to free ourselves from the fears and slogans of the past and to recognize that prudent government under democratic control is necessary to solve the problems and improve the state of American democracy. We should not hope too much — I am quite willing to change that “solve” to “alleviate” — but we should also not expect too little. In a society of automation and atomic energy, a vacuum of power can be more dangerous than an overdose of it; in a world of crumbling empires and rising imperiums, power is the price of freedom and survival alike. With more than one tear in my own eyes, I pronounce the Jeffersonian theory of political power dead. And the cause: dangerous irrelevance.

While I am about it, I might as well be thoroughly impudent and call into question the sacred doctrine of individualism. This doctrine has, all things considered, served us well. Except in the distorted form of rugged individualism, in which it more often than not has provided a cover for some of the most anti-individualistic tendencies in American life, it has expressed one of the meaningful aspirations and realities of our great experiment in democracy. We should turn a deaf ear to those who propose that, since it is just about dead anyway, we should lay it firmly aside. I am certainly not making any such proposal. Individualism is not dead, neither as a fact nor as a faith. But it is in trouble, and a good part of the trouble is, as it were, of its own making. It has been much too appealing and useful a doctrine, and we have worked it so hard that we have turned it from a doctrine into a fetish. We no longer own and use American individualism; it owns and uses us.

The most fortunate result — and it is exactly here that I would suggest a major readjustment in our thinking — is the

blight it has cast upon the sense of community in the American political tradition. Our zealous participation in the rituals of the cult of individualism has left us almost insensitive to the immense debt every man owes to the groups of which he is always a member, from the family at one end of the spectrum to the United States of America at the other. We have forgotten the lesson of history — that we stand on the shoulders of uncounted generations. We have neglected a fundamental of our ethics — that every right of the individual bespeaks a duty and every privilege a responsibility. We have ignored the plainest fact of social science — that what keeps us from sliding all together into anarchy and thence into tyranny are the institutions of the community: families, neighborhoods, churches, schools, colleges, libraries, corporations, partnerships, unions, associations, cooperatives, courts, police, even or especially the agencies that make laws and collect taxes. Hardly one of these institutions has escaped damage in the rush of all good Americans to lay their offerings on the altar of individualism. This, it seems to me, is a situation we cannot tolerate much longer, for the future of this country — and of all the individuals in it, except perhaps our hermits and outlaws — calls for a strengthening of these institutions, especially those that are arms of the state.

It would not take too much intellectual effort on our part to undo most of the damage to most of our institutions with just a small twist here and there in the pattern of priorities within the American tradition. But it is going to take a healthy twist to convert our celebration of individualism and closely related skepticism of political power from a monkey-wrench to a cog in the machinery of public action. We could afford to celebrate individualism and deride government in an age when self-reliant individuals solved most problems of society in solving their own. But that age is dead, and a new age is here — one in which problems that are insoluble by private action fall more thickly upon us with each new census, each new invention, each new gratification of individual taste and ambition. Indeed, it is hard to think of a single major need we now feel — and soon will be feeling a hundred times more sharply — that can be filled, directly or indirectly, by private initia-

tive. The blight of the cities, the shortage of water and power and open space, the neglect of education, the crowding of the roads, the decay of the railroads, the ugliness of the sullied landscape, the pollution of the air we breathe — these are problems that have arisen to beset us not least because our minds have been geared neither to anticipate them nor, once they have been forced upon our consciousness, to move against them boldly with the only weapon equal to the task: community action in which government, be it federal or state or local or regional, plays the leading part. We will solve these problems or we will soon be passing our lives in secure little fortresses, our homes, surrounded by decayed jungles, our communities.

We will not even begin to solve them, I insist, until our minds are permeated by a heightened sense of the community, and the first step is surely to put individualism back where it belongs in the American tradition — as one cherished value among several rather than a compulsive value that devours all others. Again I would warn against giving up on individualism completely. The free individual is still the glorious ideal of the American tradition, and we abandon this ideal at peril of renouncing our claim to be a unique civilization. But if we continue to concentrate on it to the exclusion of all others, if we assume that we can honor it only by besmirching the community and its political agents, if we ask it to solve problems for which it has no solution, then we are condemning those who come after us to life either in a madhouse of anarchy or, when men have grown weary of anarchy, a prison house of tyranny. The free individual *within*, not against the community — is not this the twist we must make in our political thinking? Is not this the only spirit in which free men can ever hope to meet the mounting problems in what has been called “the public sector” of American life?

Let me now sum up my thoughts on the present state of the American political tradition, which I find to be a state of impending crisis: First, this tradition is one of our most precious possessions — because of its character, which reflects the noblest beliefs and

fondest hopes of the human race, and because of its services, which can be measured in the success of the American experiment in democracy. Second, one of the strengths of the tradition is the subtle way in which, over the years, it has partaken of reality and yet risen above it, in which it has been shaped by events and yet helped to shape them. It has been, I insist, a set of *operative* ideas, and we have prospered greatly because we have been able to maintain a tolerable gap between the aspirations of the tradition and the facts of existence. Third, the onward rush of the nation, has in the course of a few years, widened the gap to a point at which some parts of the tradition are now so divorced from reality that they are no longer operative, and we continue to use them at peril of giving way all at once, with one great sigh of frustration, to the problems that fall evermore thickly upon us. And finally, we will solve these problems, or at least keep pace with them, only if we restore our obsolescent ideas to working efficiency, if we meet the crisis of the American political tradition with bold and creative imagination.

I have suggested that we do this by taking a fresh approach to a full five of our old principles and assumptions. Out of the wreckage of the innocent view of man I propose that we salvage the view that mixes doubt and charity. From the swamp of our obsession with "the wisdom of the people" I propose that we emerge with an appreciation of the importance of genuine leadership, which in turn will give fresh vigor to the principle of equality of opportunity. A new sense of the community, a new respect for political power — these are further adjustments I would propose in our great tradition. In time, we may decide that other parts need overhauling. But I think I am proposing enough intellectual readjustment for one generation of Americans.

I propose them with confidence, and without any feeling of irreverence, for three good reasons. First, not a single one of them is really new at all. They have all been voiced by men of good will and high repute at memorable stages in the course of American history. My own peace with ideas I was not brought up to hold has

been concluded a great deal more easily, I confess, because I knew that they had been there all the time just below the surface of our alluring tradition. I take no small comfort in the thought that I am a disciple of John Adams in my view of man, of Hamilton in my respect for power, of all the founding fathers in my celebration of leadership, of all the men of the New England towns in my sense of community.

Second, not a single one of them can come as a surprise to Americans who have been engaged at all seriously in the rising debate over our present predicament. They all number adherents among men of good will and faith throughout America, and in a sense I am only proposing what cannot, in due course, fail of adoption by the people. My hope is that the process of adoption will be swifter than such processes usually are. The first step to that end is for the men who hold these ideas to stop feeling just a little bit un-American and to express them without apology.

They have every reason to do this because, third, not a single one of these ideas is inconsistent with what I have called the essence and aspiration of the American tradition. The essence is liberty and justice, the aspiration liberty and justice for all; and it is exactly because we glory in this aspiration that we must look for new ways to achieve it. We will not find them, I repeat, unless we make room in our tradition for such compelling ideas as leadership, power, and community. These are, to be sure, favorite words of all the tyrants of our time, just as they were favorite words of all the tyrants we cast off long ago. About them there lingers that faint aura of un-Americanism to which I have just called attention. But that is because we, in the throes of our obsessive affair with Liberalism, turned them out coldly to fend for themselves. Now they are coming home, whether we like it or not, for this is a world in which they are the realities of politics, democratic, autocratic and totalitarian alike. Free men, too, will use power, celebrate leadership, and cherish the community — or surrender abjectly to the worst of all threats to liberty: ignorance, violence, insecurity, and disorder.

If we can match this transit toward realism in our political ideas with a transit toward sobriety in our spiritual mood, we will, I think, be as well armed intellectually to meet the challenge of our time as any generation over the whole sweep of American history. I am well aware of the gravity of the course I am proposing, which involves nothing less, — and I pray nothing more — than a shift from the warm-hearted Liberalism of the sanguine Jefferson to the tough-minded Liberalism of the melancholy Lincoln, from innocence to apprehension, from enthusiasm to skepticism, from glad optimism to grim determination in our whole approach to the heaven-ordained task of preserving and improving American democracy. The course is grave — and I am praying — because history teaches us that a shift toward skepticism in the way a whole nation thinks can gather momentum and carry it to destruction. If we move away from optimism in the direction I foresee, we may well end up on the far side of pessimism in a state of unmanageable despair. It will take a measure of spiritual stamina we have rarely demonstrated to stand firm over a long period in a posture of skeptical democracy and to keep from collapsing wearily into the waiting arms of despotism. Yet history also teaches us that the way a whole nation thinks will after all, determine the way it acts, and we, who must now act more purposefully than ever before in our history, are left with no real choice but to think soberly.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH
Professor Clinton L. Rossiter

Present Position: Professor, Department of Government, Cornell University.

Schools:

Cornell University, A.B. degree, 1939.

Princeton University, A.M. degree, 1941, and Ph.D., 1942.

Princeton University Proctor fellow, 1941-42.

Career Highlights:

1942-46 Lieutenant, U. S. Naval Reserve.

1947-49 Assistant Professor, Department of Government, Cornell University.

1949-54 Associate Professor, Department of Government, Cornell University.

1954-59 Professor, Department of Government, Cornell University.

Miscellaneous:

Authored *Seedtime of the Republic, Conservation in America, The American Presidency.*

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel,
(G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

Commandant ELEVENTH Naval
District (Code 154)
937 North Harbor Drive
San Diego, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH
Naval District (Code 141)
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces,
Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 17
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U. S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
U. S. Naval Base
Norfolk 11, Virginia

BOOKS

Doenitz, Karl. *Memoirs, Ten Years and Twenty Days*. Cleveland, World Pub. Co., 1959. 500 p.

A thorough and fascinating chronological account of the Battle of the Atlantic as waged and directed by an authority on submarine warfare. The author recounts the interplay between the personalities within the government, and discusses the problems with which he was faced in the execution of war against the two major sea powers. The student of antisubmarine warfare will find this book a "must" if he is to understand a former enemy's viewpoint of this phase of warfare, and further, fully to appreciate what the future holds in store with the use of the high underwater speed, truly submersible boat in attacks against United States shipping. Admiral Doenitz utilizes numerous quotations from the "War Diaries" of his commanding officers to enhance the reading and to factualize where necessary to describe better the changing tactical role of the submarine. There is an underlaying attempt to refute the Nuremberg verdict against him; in another section he goes to some length to question the actions of the U. S. Navy during America's "Neutrality Period" which preceded December 11, 1941.

Laqueur, Walter Z. *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*. New York, Praeger, 1959. 366 p.

The Soviet Union and the Middle East is a very thorough and extensively documented research study which traces the role of Soviet policy in the Middle East since the time the Bolsheviks first came to power through 1958. Additionally, it is a highly productive analysis of the internal political developments in the Soviet Union, and the *modus operandi* that finally resulted in the successful attainment of a long sought-after foreign policy goal. The comprehensive recital contained in the first half of the book concerning the ideological differences which for many years hampered Soviet efforts in the Middle East has more than historical value. In addition to a detailed

presentation of the turbulent internal policy conflicts which occurred during this period, and which under Stalin were resolved principally by purges, the author documents the difficulties that arose in the efforts to reconcile Communist ideological objectives with Pan-Islamism, Pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism (an insight which is necessary for an intelligible comprehension of the contemporary situation developed in the second part of the book). These differences of the Stalin era, however, finally resulted in the casting adrift of all indigenous Communist parties in that area shortly before World War II, and the temporary abandonment of the field to the West. At the same time, the author points out that the debacle for the West which followed on the heels of the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal in September, 1955, involved many politico-socio-economic factors, which could have been far more controlling than default by the West, or the ineptness and lack of a coherent policy by the Soviet Union.

A very important lesson is drawn from an analysis of Soviet successes in finally penetrating the Middle East. The Soviet political, social and economic system has attracted more sympathizers and imitators in the backward countries than in the more developed ones through its presentation of a blueprint for the rapid modernization of these backward societies, while, to those that have already reached a higher stage of development, it does not have as much to offer. This revealing recapitulation of Soviet techniques employed in achieving Communist penetration of the Middle East offers the reader a possible clarification of current developments in Cuba, South America, Africa and Southeast Asia, as well as forecasts of future political trends in these areas. It would appear that these political events in the Middle East indicate that the Soviet Union will be a much more formidable opponent for the United States in the Khrushchev era than it ever has been before.

Spanier, John W. *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959. 311 p.

President Truman, in April 1951, relieved General Douglas MacArthur of all his commands in the Far East for publicly opposing the policies of the United States Government. This, at a time when the country faced one of its gravest and most emotional constitutional crises. The issue involved civilian supremacy in the conduct of both military and governmental functions, since General MacArthur's actions and public statements, both in the military and political spheres, represented a threat and a challenge to the President's authority as commander-in-chief and chief diplomat to determine the nation's foreign policy. This book deals with that crisis and that issue. The author covers in detail the progress of the Korean War from the North Korean aggression of June 1950 to the end of the MacArthur hearings before a committee of Congress in July 1951. He traces the relations between the political aims of the war and military strategy, domestic politics and allied differences, and he analyzes the military, political and diplomatic factors which resulted in the controversy. Fundamentally, the aim of the author is to explore the question of whether the principle of civilian control over the military is compatible with the waging of limited war in today's world. The author presents evidence to show that the very functioning of our normal democratic processes, plus the American penchant for ideological crusades, exerts tremendous pressures to change a controlled conflict with limited aims into a total effort for complete victory. He suggests that history might easily repeat itself in case of another limited conflict. A very well written and interesting book.

Deriabin, Peter and Gibney, Frank. *The Secret World*. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1959. 334 p.

The Secret World is a biography of a former Soviet secret police official who, at 33, fled to the West. Written in the third

person by *Life* writer Frank Gibney, the book is also a synthesis of thoughts and observations on the life and times of Peter Deriabin, a Kremlin Guard officer until he fled in 1954. This volume contains no startling statements or philosophies, but is a very readable factual account of the everyday workings of the branches of the State Security. A central thought which threads throughout concerns an evaluation of the "changes" which have taken place since Khrushchev's rise to power. In the words of the author, ". . . the beast has changed his spots slightly, but he has not gone away. The advertised softening of the State Security has been only a prelude to its consolidation as an agent of the new dictator . . . the State Security remains the necessary tool of the dictator and the Party through which he rules." The appendices contain an example of the evolution of a formal case against a suspect, examples of incidents used for provocation in building up a case, a discussion of the 1958 revision of the USSR criminal code, and organization charts of the organs of the State Security of the USSR.

Greenspan, Morris. *The Modern Law of Land Warfare*. Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1959. 724 p.

By its title, this book sets the tone for its tremendously important contribution in that area of international law to which it is addressed. In this work, Greenspan has happily blended a most lucid presentation with a thoroughly researched and well-documented exposition of the laws of land warfare as they now exist. He writes not as a wishful thinker, but as a realist in the modern world. Personal opinions, when given, are clearly labeled. The author opens with an introduction as to the place of law in war. He then proceeds to trace international legal implications and principles throughout the course of war — from its commencement and its participants, through modern-day methods and instruments, to its termination. Greenspan also includes a short section on armed conflicts not of international character (civil war). Although the whole book

could well be of future monumental significance, Parts VI and VII which are concerned with the enforcement of the laws of war and neutrality are considered especially noteworthy and valuable. The easily readable style of writing employed (together with excellent indexing) and its rich documentation — including extensive footnoting, appendices containing full texts of documents, lists of cases and treaties, and a complete bibliography — make this book a valuable tool to both the elementary and the advanced student of international law.

Medina, Harold R. *The Anatomy of Freedom*, New York, Holt, 1959. 178 p.

The Anatomy of Freedom contains several speeches and addresses made by Judge Medina before various educational, patriotic and bar association groups the last few years before his so-called retirement on March 1, 1958. The book opens with a little background of some of the happenings during the Communist trial at which the author, Judge Harold R. Medina, sat for nine months as the newly appointed United States District judge. Various methods and attempts were used by the Reds in an effort to sabotage this trial of the eleven leading U. S. Communists. Threats against the judge's life were commonly used, as well as placards and signs with the messages: "How do you spell Medina? RAT" and "Medina will fall like Forrestal." The latter had the most telling effect because Medina had always had a fear of heights; but nothing, fortunately, came of it. The author shows clearly that the Communists are not a "sort of roughneck" as is commonly supposed by many, but a subtle, well-trained gang of enemy agents, intent on the overthrow of our form of government. Throughout the book the question keeps arising whether or not America's traditional methods of justice are capable of combating effectively the roadblocks placed by the Communists. Judge Medina's faith in, and sense of, freedom are constantly cropping up and are amply demonstrated in the narration of the Cramer treason case, in which an American-born citizen was accused

of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Medina won this case, but in so doing, had exposed himself to the ire and bitter criticism of many patriotic Americans. Even so, the judge contends, "The reality is that any lawyer worth his salt is devoting the greater part, if not the whole, of his time to the helping of people in dire distress of mind or body. He is not supposed to shun the cases which involve emotional disturbances and often have a disagreeable and nasty factual background . . . The true fact is that the dynamic forces in our lives are spiritual." The ringing theme of freedom predominates throughout this exceedingly interesting book. Judge Medina's straightforward approach to the pitfalls faced in everyday life is invigorating and thought-provoking.

Shepard, Francis P. *The Earth Beneath the Sea*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. 275 p.

The Earth Beneath the Sea is an up-to-date survey of marine geology for the general reader. The level of the book is well matched to the needs of the naval officer who wants to acquaint himself with this important subdivision of oceanography. The author is well qualified. He has worked in his field for over 35 years. Of these, the last seventeen were spent at the Scripps institution of Oceanography in La Jolla, California. The first few chapters show how waves and currents shape the sea floor and how the sea floor, in turn, originates and modifies waves and currents. The description of the interactions between the ocean and the bottom along the shores should be useful in amphibious problems. The explanations of the seismic origin and of the effects of tsunamis are interesting. More than half of the book is devoted to a description of the topography of the two thirds of the earth that is covered by salt water. Bottom topography is becoming increasingly important for naval operations, regardless of ocean depth. The book covers the whole spectrum from the beaches to the abyssal depths. Submarine canyons have now been surveyed in the continental shelves in many parts of the world. A few are undoubtedly

sunken river valleys; others are believed to be the result of underwater erosion, caused by deep ocean currents. Some of the continental slopes are among the most spectacular escarpments on earth and the floors of the deep ocean basins are far from monotonous. Recent echo sounding surveys have shown that midocean mountain systems are far more extensive than hitherto suspected, the mid-Atlantic ridge being a case in point, while isolated sea mounts of volcanic origin abound in the Pacific. Steep-sided trenches are often thousands of miles long. A number of charts and profiles demonstrate to the reader that the ocean floors exhibit at least as much contrast as the surfaces of the continents. Several chapters, mostly near the end of the book, cover the exploration of the rock structures underlying the ocean floors by direct coring and sophisticated geophysical techniques. The latter include acoustic probing, seismography and gravity surveys. The implications of the findings for the evolution of the ocean basins are discussed. A short bibliography references related books of a somewhat more technical nature. Some of the naval implications of much of the material in this fine book cannot be discussed in proper perspective in an unclassified review.

May, Henry F. *The End of American Innocence*. New York, Knopf, 1959. 412 p.

With enterprise and imagination the author of this sprightly volume searches for the origins of the cultural revolution which became manifest in America during the 1920's. His theme is that all the major elements of that revolution in thought, literature, manners and morals, often considered as growing out of the postwar reaction, actually were well at work before World War I. Concerned principally with the period 1912-1917, he divides his observations into four parts: "The Nineteenth Century Intact (1912)," "Older Insurgents and Invaders (1890-1917)," "The Innocent Rebellion (1912-1917)," and "The End of American Innocence (1914-1917)." Following in the tradition of *Goldman's Rendezvous with Destiny*, and serving

as a kind of prelude for such books as Allen's *Only Yesterday* and the Lynds' *Middletown*, the book is concerned mainly with the conflicts of ideas. Opening with the high optimism culminating in the triumph of progressivism and the election of Wilson in 1912, it ends with the tragedy of Wilson — "One of the few perfect tragedies of history, a story in which nobility of purpose combined with spiritual pride were cruelly punished by the gods." The earliest and most consistent supporters of the Allies and of American intervention in World War I, May points out, were neither the business interests nor those sensing a vital American interest in the balance of power or the preservation of the Atlantic barrier, but the defenders of nineteenth century tradition and the professional "custodians of culture." In the end they saw the complete disintegration of the old order, the set of ideas which had dominated the American mind so effectively from the mid-nineteenth century until after 1912. "The end of American innocence was a part of a great tragedy, but it was not, in itself, an unmitigated disaster. Those who look at it with dismay, or those who deny that it happened, do so because they expect true stories to have a completely happy ending. This is a kind of innocence American history must get over."

PERIODICALS

"Missile Plane." *Time*, November 23, 1959, p. 84.

A brief article on the Dyna-Soar which the Air Force hopes to have ready by 1968 or 1969.

Sington, Derrick, "Democracy's Chances in Asia." *Western World*. November 1959, p. 49-54.

Examines the questions: What can the West do to help the democratic idea which it has planted in Asia to prevail? And are there any chances that the authoritarian regimes in South-east Asia will evolve into Western-style democracies?

"Red China's Game in India: Grab First, Then Talk." *U. S. News & World Report*. November 23, 1959, p. 46-47.

The evidence is that China plans to hold on to what it has already seized along the Indian border.

Also, Joseph. "Some Thoughts on Co-Existence." *Encounter*. November 1959, p. 14-20.

Suggests that the West is the loser in the current scientific-industrial progress because we maintain a complacent, defensive attitude while the Soviet has a decidedly offensive posture, utilizing to the full scientific and technical advances.

Overstreet, Gene D. "The Communists and India." *Foreign Policy Bulletin*. November 1, 1959, p. 29-31.

The civil disobedience which resulted in the dissolution of the Communist Kerala government in India may have set an unfortunate precedent; the future of Indian Communism is examined.

Handler, David. "Central American Integration Progresses." *Foreign Commerce Weekly*. November 23, 1959. p. 20-21, 27.

Explains the Multilateral Treaty of Free Trade and Central American Economic Integration signed by the five countries on June 10, 1958, and discusses progress made to the present time.

Wyndham, Hon. E. H., Col., MC. "The Military Situation in Europe." *The Army Quarterly*. July 1959, p. 135-138.

This article discusses the Western Plan (put forward by Secretary of State Herter on 14 May 1959) for the reunification of Germany. It is of particular interest in that it provides a European's analysis of the Plan and an assessment of its prospect for success.

"Understanding Dr. Adenauer." *The Economist*. November 14, 1959. p. 601-602.

Differences between Britain and Germany may be viewed as two main grievances, as expressed by Bonn: Britain's aloof-

ness from the schemes of European integration, and the fear that British interest in negotiations with Russia might lead to a deal at Germany's expense.

Kennan, George F. "A Proposal for Western Survival." *The New Leader*. November 16, 1959, p. 10-15.

Mr. Kennan examines the results of our basing our security on nuclear weapons and suggests action for us to take if we are to turn the movement of world affairs in a hopeful direction.

"Bases 1: No Ramps for Greece. Bases 2: The Moroccan Prospect." *Foreign Report*. November 19, 1959, p. 3-6.

Outlines Greek attitudes toward U. S. IRBM bases in Greece and toward the recent Soviet peace offensive directed at Greece; the second report states that U. S. withdrawal from Moroccan bases is not immediately imminent.

"Defense Ring Around Russia — the Changes Coming Up." *U. S. News & World Report*. November 16, 1959, p. 54-55.

Traces the changes in the pattern of bases for U. S. planes and missiles guarding Europe.

Kennan, George F. "Russia, the Atom, and the West." *The Listener*. October 29, 1959. p. 711-713.

Mr. Kennan sets forth his reasons for believing that we should put aside the atom as a factor in national defense.

Colletta, Prof. Paola E. "Naval Mine Warfare." *Navy*. November 1959, p. 16-24.

A historical outline of the story of mine warfare from its inception through its high point in the Korean War and its status today.

Singer, S. E., Lt. Col., USAF "The Military Potential of the Moon." *Air University Quarterly Review*. Summer 1959, p. 31-53.

Discusses the possibilities and potentialities of the moon as a military base, how life might be sustained thereon, and

offers an interesting general analysis of the physical make-up of the moon.

Metcalfe, John E. "Effect of the Sahara — Libya Finds." *The Magazine of Wall Street*. November 21, 1959, p. 233-235, 262-263.

Treats the recent North African oil discoveries, their significance and strategic importance, and details foreign companies active in the development of these resources.

"Russia May Be Big Exporter by '65." *The Oil and Gas Journal*. November 16, 1959, p. 124-125.

There is a good chance that Russia will have a large exportable surplus of crude oil by 1965.

"Why Does Russia Want Negotiations?" *Western World*. November 1959, p. 29-39.

In this "debate of the month" Rep. Walter H. Judd of Minnesota answers, "In order to win the cold war," whereas Sir William Hayter, former British Ambassador to Moscow, believes that it is in order "to stabilize on existing lines."

Glennan, Dr. T. Keith. "Missiles and Space Technology." *Signal*. November 1959, p. 11-13, 35-36.

The Administrator of NASA tells what has been learned from the experiences in space developments over the past year and discusses the future thinking in the field.

"The Thrust to Conquer Space." *Business Week*. November 14, 1959, p. 116-125.

Details the progress and the problems to be solved in developing the F-1 single rocket engine with more than 1.5 million pounds of thrust, which could be ready in three years if funds are provided by Congress.

Cruver, Harry F., Col., USAF "The Air Force Reporting Problem." *Air University Quarterly Review*. Summer 1959, p. 80-98.

Analyzes the problem of organizing, communicating and utilizing information for decision making. Points out weaknesses and makes recommendations for correcting the outdated system of reporting in the Air Force — equally applicable to all military services.

"This is the Department of Defense." *Armed Forces Management*. November 1959.

Highly recommended as an extremely concise, up-to-date, clear and interesting overview of the entire defense establishment, compiling information that would otherwise have to be gleaned from dozens of sources.

Murphy, Robert. "The Shape of American Policy." *The Department of State Bulletin*. November 9, 1959, p. 659-662.

Historical experience has caused Russia's intense desire for national security, a desire exploited by Communism. The U. S. is attempting to create better understanding between the two countries by the exchange of persons program, work on an effective disarmament program, and negotiations on nuclear weapons tests and on safeguarding against surprise attack.

Harris, Richard C., Col., USAF "Overseamanship." *Air University Quarterly Review*. Summer 1959, p. 54-66.

Using the Air Force as an example, the author considers a positive program to prepare the officer and his dependents as American representatives abroad; stresses training and assignment.

Stevens, Francis B. "Why Ike Is Going Halfway Round the World." *U. S. News & World Report*. November 23, 1959, p. 55.

A look at the situation in the individual countries which President Eisenhower plans to visit clarifies the purposes of the presidential tour from December 3-22.

Phillips, Henry W. "The Evolution of a National Defense Weapon System." *Signal*. November 1959, p. 24-26.

Interesting illustrations highlight this article on the considerations of future defense systems.

Baar, James. "Navy Pushes Polaris Cruisers." *Missiles and Rockets*. November 16, 1959, p. 12-14.

Outlines U. S. Navy plan to supplement the Polaris submarine fleet and SAC, giving general advantages to be gained by such a weapons system and a comparison of costs with other Navy projects.