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CURRENT U. S. MILITARY STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
3 December 1959 by
Mr. Hanson Baldwin

My topic, "Current U. S. Military Strategy," is such a tremendous one that I am going to wander this morning.

It has been said, I think, that in the world's two oldest professions — the art of war and the art of love, the amateurs claim greater proficiency than the professionals. It is with some trepidation, therefore, that I, as an amateur strategist, stand before you to discuss this subject, and it might puzzle you a little bit, as it did me, as to why the Naval War College has asked me to talk about strategy. I would like to think, parenthetically perhaps, that I once proved to Admiral Ingersoll's satisfaction that I was perhaps a better strategist than he was, at least as far as forecasting the future of baseball teams is concerned. He still owes me a dinner from the occasion when the Yankees won the pennant quite some time ago! Seriously, I think the reason why I stand here at your invitation might be that my military philosophy accords with that of this school. I believe in the indivisibility of military force. I do not believe in a one-weapon or a one-idea or a one-service philosophy. I believe in a flexible, strategic concept.

Now, gentlemen, I am convinced that we are facing a period of tremendous crises. This, of course, is often said. But there is today little doubt that major problems in both international and domestic affairs will come to a peak in the foreseeable future, which may determine the entire future of our nation. At some time between now and 1965 or 1970 we may actually cross a great watershed of history which may determine whether our nation is to remain great or to go downhill. The crisis is political, military, economic and moral; this historical watershed confronts us.

Now, before examining our difficult defense problem I would like to review with you for a few moments the state of the world

and the current military trends in this time of troubles of the past few years. I don't think that we can discuss strategy in proper context unless we see what the trends have been and unless we examine, at least with a once-over-quickly, the elements of this crisis of which I have spoken.

When we talk about the world situation I always remind myself not to become too lengthy. I deal with it every day and perhaps I become too immersed in detail, so I remember the story of Jock, the Scotchman, who went out with his girl one night and said, "I'm a mon of few words, do ye or don't ye?" She said, "Well, customarily I don't, but your eloquence has convinced me." I won't promise to be quite as brief as Jock, but I will certainly remember his eloquence.

In looking at the world situation, let us compare first the position of the United States with that of Soviet Russia and its communist allies in this world conflict that has been continuing since World War II. I don't need to stress to this audience the reasons for this conflict — they are political, they are economic, they are ideological, they are military and moral, and there are human differences — vast human differences between our concepts in this country, in the United States, and the concepts, for instance, in Asia, Communist China and Soviet Russia. Life is of little worth in those countries and life does mean something here. Now, while we must always keep our eye on this main stream of conflict it would be a profound mistake to lose sight of the fact that this conflict has been exasperated, has been muddied, has been made far more complex and difficult by a whole stream of converging conflicts. Some of these are local and regional, such as the conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis in the Middle East, and Pakistan and India about Kashmir. There are a whole host of other factors — the technological revolution of our time which has foreshortened the map of the world and brought us all so much closer together and has thereby created crises by itself; the industrial expansion of our times, and, of course, the population explosion through which the world is passing. The latter, in the long-range point of view,

may be one of the most important factors with which you will have to deal in the future. So much for the causes of conflict.

In military strength, suffice to say, in my opinion, the United States still is superior to Soviet Russia in overall military strength, chiefly due to our superior nuclear delivery capability and our superior sea power. That nuclear delivery capability, that superiority in nuclear delivery capability, has been reduced obviously within the last few years, but for the moment, at least, and I think for the foreseeable future as long as we make no major mistakes we can still retain it. The sea power superiority is of tremendous importance. If you look at the map of the world it is the only way by which we can keep in touch with our allies and they with us. We have great weaknesses in some aspects of military strength, in the ability to wage conventional war or limited wars, and in various other ways. You are all familiar with those weaknesses. I am not going to dwell on them this morning.

We still hold an advantage — a military advantage. This is the point I want to leave with you. We still hold an advantage as of today, but given the technological revolution in warfare which has destroyed our insular security; given the great industrial and technological advances of Russia, that advantage is no longer overwhelming and we no longer can be sure that we will retain it unless we give our undivided attention to it.

In the political struggle for the world, in the cold war which becomes hot in some parts of the world, we can rightly claim that we have made great gains in western Europe at least. If you recall western Europe right after World War II, France and Italy were threatened with communism and even some of the smaller countries of Europe were so threatened. England was in a very serious economic condition and the entire continent was unstable. Today there is a well-defined Iron Curtain in Europe, a border beyond which in my opinion, the Russians dare not trespass without the risk of major war. The countries of western Europe on the whole have won their way back, with our help, to tremendous economic prosperity and to political stability. Most recent, of course, is France

under de Gaulle where a real renaissance has occurred, a renaissance that is moral as well as political and economic. With it has come political difficulties. De Gaulle is a man who has a mind of his own and cannot be easily influenced or led by his allies and this always creates problems, but nevertheless he has restored France to the ranks of greatness. If he can solve the Algerian problem he will have completed, I think, that renaissance.

But the happy picture in Europe is not equally happy elsewhere in the world. Our gains in Europe have certainly been offset by our losses in Asia. We no longer speak in any case of the liberation of the satellites as we did at the start of the Eisenhower administration. These captive nations are now solidly enchained.

The Middle East is still unstable and in turmoil. Africa is in flux, even Latin America, as we look at our own back door, offers very, very major problems. Berlin and Germany are still divided. The Berlin problems are by no means resolved. When we look at the Far East we see Korea and Indo-China still cut in two — no settlement to the Formosa Strait problem. All over the world one sees the emergence of nationalism, in some cases nationalism penetrated by communism, and all over the world, excepting Europe, there are unsettled frontiers — fluid boundaries, areas where this conflict for the world could erupt into hot war at any time.

I stress the unsettled nature of all of the world's political problems. We are talking about disarmament, but we have not solved the causes for armament which are political in nature.

There's a brighter side to this brief survey of our world today and this is that Russia has her own problems. Russia is in the throes of change. There are classes developing in this so-called classless society. Titoism — the heresy of nationalism communism — as opposed to the international brand dominated by Moscow, has reared its head in Hungary, and in Poland. Today, I think, Poland is facing another crisis. I recommend to your attention, if you haven't seen them (and this is not just an advertisement for the circulation of the New York Times) the articles that are now being carried in the Times about Poland by Mr. Rosenthal, our correspon-

dent, who was recently expelled from that country because the communist government said that he delved too deeply into their society. There is no doubt that Poland is facing another crisis today, just as Hungary faced one some years ago.

In addition to these problems which Russia faces, the problem of securing the power of the dictator is still one of the Kremlin's headaches. Mr. Khrushchev is unquestionably the number one man, but he is not another Stalin. His enemies are still alive. He could make a mistake and he could, in my opinion, still be overthrown. In addition to these problems there are obvious Communist-Chinese/Russian friction points — in central Asia along the Manchurian frontier, in southeast Asia and now over India. It is significant, I think, that for the first time Russia did not side clearly with Communist China about the Indian border disputes but took a neutral position. In balance, when we look at the world today, the global power of the United States in relation to the global power of Soviet Russia and of communism, has certainly been reduced within the recent ten years.

Now, look for a moment at the domestic aspects of this crisis that I said we faced — the national situation. We face a presidential election next year. This present administration is in a sense a lame duck administration, with two more national budgets to prepare — the one for this year which will come out shortly, and the one for the following year. This administration has adopted a so-called level budget concept as far as national defense is concerned. Roughly a budget of forty-one billion dollars annually or thereabouts — a hold-the-line-budget. On the other hand, we are faced, as you well know, with a period of inflation; every year costs have increased. You have to pay more for the same thing. We are also faced at the moment with something that wasn't true a few years ago — an outflow of gold from the United States, an unbalance of payments partially due to our very extensive foreign aid, partially due to the fact that we have a great many troops abroad upon whom some three billion dollars annually is estimated as being expended in foreign countries, and partially due to the fact that we are tending to price ourselves out of the world markets. An outflow of gold —

inflation — and at the same time the tremendous expense of new weapon systems due to the technological revolution in war.

I was down at Lackland Air Force Base where the Air Force trains its basic recruits at San Antonio, Texas, not so long ago, and here at the gateway to the Air Force, only four out of some twelve hundred buildings are modern and permanent structures. It is one of the oldest and shabbiest bases I have seen. The commander has asked time and time again for about one-fourth the price of a B-58 bomber to start the rehabilitation of that base. All he wants is about three to five million dollars. He hasn't yet been able to get it. One quarter the price of an expendable bomber! One bomber — figure for yourself — 12 to 20 million dollars. The tremendous expense of new weapon systems, the technological revolution in war have provided added problems to this fiscal problem we face.

At the same time I think we see the country getting into a social and economic deadlock, an impasse between the laboring unions and the manufacturers. A steel strike has resulted, and despite the President's insistence that it be settled, there is as yet no indication that collective bargaining will yield results. Collective bargaining has either broken down or it has been accomplished at the expense of the common good and has resulted in an endless round of wage-price increases, and more inflation.

Another factor of crisis is that we have produced a government of over-centralized controls — the age of bureaucracy, of big government — of Parkinson's law (with which you are all familiar, I think) that the less actual work you do in government, the more people you need to do it — the age of the No man — the age of people who can say *no* to nearly every project, but who have no direct responsibility to the public. (For instance, the President has a scientific advisor who is a man of tremendous influence not only upon military development, but upon nearly any type of scientific development in the country. Legally he has no responsibility whatsoever, either to the Congress or to the public, yet actually he has tremendous power). This is the age of over-centralized control. And

finally it's an age of civilianization of our military forces, the social concepts and the mores of our time tending to dominate military goals. Samuel P. Huntington in his classic, *"The Soldier and the State,"* noted that "the military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces — a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security, and a social imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function." This is what has been happening, in my opinion, in America.

But this civilianization of the armed forces is only part and parcel of a social cycle that is changing fundamentally the American dream. We have substituted security instead of opportunity. Our youth pays tribute to eroding ideas — the idea that the end justifies the means, that it is all right if you can get away with it. You see this moral decay in the TV quiz scandals; you see it in the lack of morals of the body politic around you. There is dry rot in the nation. I refer you to Dr. James D. Conant, president emeritus of Harvard, who in a speech which was little noticed — a recent speech — said that he thought there was a threat as severe as any in the nation's history confronting the United States, but few Americans seemed to be aware of it. I quote: "Our existence and our freedom are both in danger, yet as I have traveled around the country, with few exceptions, I have sensed no awareness of our peril. For the most part I have encountered little but complacency compounded in a curious way with despair." Or to quote George Kennan, whom all of you know. He said: "If you ask me as a historian whether a country in a state this country is in today with no highly developed sense of national purpose, with the overwhelming accent of life on personal comfort and amusement, with a dearth of public services and a surfeit of privately-sold gadgetry, with a chaotic transportation system, with its great Metropolitan areas being gradually disintegrated by the head-long switch to motor transportation, with an educational system where quality has been extensively sacrificed to quantity, and with insufficient social discipline even to keep its major industries functioning with-

out grievous interruptions — if you ask me whether such a country has over the long run a good chance of competing with a purposeful, serious and disciplined society such as that of the Soviet Union, I must say that the answer is *no*."

Now, what does all this add up to? I certainly do not want to cry *havoc* about my country, but I am convinced, as I said at the start of this talk, that we are facing a period of extreme crisis and a watershed of history. The trends of the recent past are clear. We have a carefully and closely defined, a rigidly limited, budget. The limited budget and the current division of the budget, faced with the irreconcilable factors of inflation, rising costs, the outflow of gold, have meant that something has had to give, and what has given is military manpower and the size of the operating forces, and flexibility. Our commitments have remained the same or have increased; our capability of meeting them has been reduced. We have tended more and more toward an inflexible concept, and toward a static rather than a dynamic policy — toward a materialistic society contented with itself, rather than a young, idealistic, eager nation. Militarily we have tended to deify the machine rather than man who in my opinion is the whole heart and soul of the battle.

Now so much for the trends of our time, where we stand in the world struggle, the background factors which shape our current national policy and strategic concepts. I feel sometimes like Satchel Paige, the ancient ballplayer, who kept pitching the older he got. You remember he finally left the minor leagues at the age of 52 and went out to Hollywood to carve a career for himself, and his final aphorism about how he stayed young appeals to me when I look at the world around me. He said, "Never look behind you, something might be gaining on you!"

Before we examine our current strategic concepts we have, of course, to know what our national policy, our foreign policy, is, because at least, in theory, our national policy, our foreign policy, should determine the strategic concepts the we develop to support that policy. I am going to speak in general terms now, first in the

interest of simplification and the interest of time, and second to clarify.

Globally the United States is a "have" nation; we have essentially a static — a defensive policy to hold what we've got; sometimes I don't think we even have that. When I read the paper this morning and saw that the President had suggested that perhaps Panama should have some symbol of sovereignty over the Canal Zone I felt that we lacked determination to hold what we've got. But we are essentially a "have" nation; in a political sense we are on the defensive; we are still wed to the policy of containment — not roll-back. This administration came into office with the idea, as you know, of possible liberation of the captive nations. That has been abandoned as a goal. The real test was Hungary and we did not move; our aims are defensive, containment.

The second great policy that has dominated our post-war years has been a policy of filling the vacuums of power left by World War II — the political, the economic, the military vacuums around the world with the help of the American dollar, with political alliances, and, where needed, with the help of American armed forces. On the whole, particularly in western Europe, we have done this, I think, quite well. We have tried to prevent those vacuums from being dominated by Soviet Russia and filled by them. We have had some conspicuous failures; most conspicuous of all was the communization of China, but we have also had some successes. That was the second major policy. And thirdly, we have hitched our political policies, our foreign policies, to the goal of collective security, of international cooperation. We are convinced that we cannot live alone in this new world of foreshortened frontiers and we have built up organizations like NATO and SEATO. We are no longer, at least in political policy, an isolated nation.

Now, these national policies — these three I have mentioned, should shape and form the strategic concepts that are needed to support them. Now, let's take a look at our current strategy. Our current strategy is still fundamentally devoted to the concept that we will plan to utilize nuclear weapons in any war against Soviet

Russia — the utilization of nuclear weapons is to be taken for granted at least for planning purposes. We still stick, though with some modifications, to the massive retaliation doctrine enunciated by the late John Foster Dulles, when he said we would choose a place and time of our own choosing to retaliate as we wish against any aggressor. Of course, he meant nuclear retaliation.

There has been some walk-back on that policy. The National Security Council has lent at least lip-service to the idea that we must also provide a deterrent against conventional war — limited war — and has urged some strengthening of limited war forces. But essentially and basically the massive retaliation policy still dominates our strategic concept. Now, this has been coupled in recent concepts with the doctrine, not of preventive war but of *preemptive war*. In other words, if we are certain that Russia is preparing an attack — a nuclear attack upon the United States — if we are certain from our intelligence, or other sources, that missiles are about to be fired, or planes are being assembled on air bases for such an attack, we will try to strike first at their missile bases and air bases, in order to prevent the attack from being launched, or at least to blunt the enemy's attack.

Another factor of major importance to our military concepts is the dominance, due in large part to the two preceding factors — the massive retaliation doctrine and the preemptive doctrine, — the dominance of the Air Force in the national defense picture. The existing budget allocation for the next budget, for the next fiscal year, is roughly the same that it has been in the past five years since the new look of the Eisenhower administration was adopted — about 46-48% for the Air Force, 26-28% for the Navy and Marines, 22-24% for the Army.

But these strategic concepts which we have adopted have been shaped and hammered and forged by the factors that I mentioned in the first part of my talk — the emphasis upon a level budget, inflation, the flight of gold, and all these other internal factors which contribute to crises. There is a growing and clear-cut ambivalence, in my opinion, between our political goals and

our military methods of achieving those goals. For instance, we have, in our emphasis upon massive retaliation and preemptive attack, and upon this fixed allocation of the budget between the services, tended to produce inflexibility, because everything is keyed to this one concept of massive nuclear attack which certainly produces an over-killed capability. With the planes that we have in this country, the number of planes and weapons that can deliver nuclear weapons against an enemy, we can devastate Russia many times over. The preemptive attack doctrine has tended to create a desire, a need for unlimited forces and infinite goals — unattainable goals. Quite obviously, if your main target is going to be the enemy's missile bases and the enemy's air bases, the more of those the Russians acquire, the more missiles and the more planes we will have to have if that is going to be our main target. It is a geometric progression. There is no end in sight — the objective keeps going up, and up, and up. And this has also resulted — all these factors combined — the limited budget, the division of the budget, the emphasis upon massive retaliation — in a very clear-cut reduction of our limited war capability and at the same time a trend toward a Fortress America concept. There is no doubt that we have spent billions, — I think the last figure that Congress produced was about 32 billion dollars — on purely defensive measures for the North American continent since about 1950. Included in this, of course, is the Air Defense Command and the various radar warning lines, DEW lines, the Navy's share of the offshore barriers, and so on. Now we are spending billions more on B MEWS stations against ballistic missiles, and although we haven't yet spent the billions there are many advocates who urge that we provide still more billions on the Nike-Zeus and the anti-ballistic defense system, and scores of billions on civilian defense.

Thus our current political and military policies present to my mind curious contradictions. Politically we stand for collective security — militarily we are trending toward a Fortress America. I would hasten to add, and I want to make this quite clear, that this has not occurred as yet completely. This is not all black and

not all white. We are still overseas in strength; we still have a capability for fighting limited wars. The Tactical Air Command, which I visited yesterday with its composite air strike force, capable of getting overseas in a hurry; the Strategic Army Corps of the army; the amphibious forces of the marines, etc. — all have a capability for meeting these brushfire wars. But the current trend is clear. We are trending more and more toward a Fortress America concept. Not long ago in the Pentagon I heard a very well-informed and high-ranking officer predict that if the present trend continued, we would be out of Europe by 1965, and another officer who shared with me a great deal of concern over the state of the country, said that he was afraid we would make decisions or fail to make them between now and the end of this administration which might determine whether the country would remain great.

Well, now having reviewed our present position, what should we do about it? Let's try to play Secretary of Defense or President of the United States, or even God, and see what kind of strategic concept, what kind of military organization we need. I know you gentlemen are studying here to assume high command and staff positions in which you may be able to influence the course of the country's future, and I am sure this school with its flexibility of ideas and its stimulus of thought is never going to produce the somewhat limited type of staff officer described in that classic definition produced long ago in the Infantry Journal. I quote: "The typical staff officer is a man past middle life, spare, wrinkled, intelligent, cold, passive, non-committal, with eyes like a codfish, polite in contact, but at the same time unresponsive, cool, calm, and as damnably composed as a concrete post or a plaster of Paris cast; a human petrifaction, with a heart of feldspar and without charm of the friendly germ; minus bowels, passions or a sense of humor. Happily, they never reproduce and all of them finally go to hell."

First, what principles should dominate our strategic concepts in the years ahead? Number one, to me, is that any valid military policy must support a finite and attainable political goal. The aim of any rational conflict is not, and never can be, uncon-

ditional surrender or total destruction. Unlimited political goals, such as the destruction of an ideology, lead to unlimited military aims, to infinite expenditures and to disaster. The operational words of any military policy must be *finite* and *attainable*. And, second, the pace of the technological revolution demands top priority and generous funding for research and development in all weapons fields. Not for production, necessarily; this is where I differ with the Army. I do not think we would be wise to fund Nike-Zeus for production today, but I think we would be very unwise if we did not fund Nike-Zeus to the maximum extent of our capability for research and development. A break-through in technology could conceivably alter the entire structure of our defense.

Third, is a negativism; a Fortress America strategic concept cannot possibly support the nation's political and economic policies in the years ahead. There was a time, obviously, when isolationism as a political-military policy was viable, but it is not a viable policy today and cannot be tomorrow. Missiles and jet planes have altered the time/space factor and nuclear weapons have postulated a threat to our existence as a nation. I don't need to stress to this audience that a defense based upon our own shores is impossible. It sacrifices the advantage of bases overseas, outposts and warning lines. Moreover, and more important, withdrawal into our frontiers would imply political, psychological and economic defeat — a slow withering away; our allies would slough away. Nothing could be so well calculated to insure the domination of the world by communism. Our entire post-war security concept has been, and must be built, upon collective security.

Now, fourth, a corollary to this proposition is self-evident. Any military policy we adopt should have as one of its primary purposes the security of the home base. In other words, we must attempt in the future as we have done in the past, to keep war away from our own shores, to fight it on the broad seas, in space or in the air, or in other continents.

Fifth, invulnerability to surprise attack is a key requirement to the successful nuclear deterrent of the future; and sixth, flexi-

bility and rapid reaction to an entire spectrum of challenges is essential if we would be able to make the punishment fit the crime and if we would be able to meet a limited enemy aggression with limited means.

Now, in the implementation of these principles, the characteristics of the forces required can be grouped, it seems to me, for the sake of convenience, under two general heads. They are not necessarily exclusive: the requirements of nuclear deterrence and the requirements of limited war. The requirements of deterrence can, I think, be logically considered only if we consider attack against the United States by a rational ruler, or by a rational act — you cannot provide defense against irrational rulers — there is no way of convincing an irrational ruler that a deterrent is viable, that I know of. But if you could provide a nuclear retaliatory force that would insure the destruction of two to three hundred Soviet cities, that would knock out every Soviet city, say above 50,000 population, a force that was invulnerable to enemy surprise attack, regardless of what the enemy did, then I would think you would have produced a deterrent which would be convincing to any rational ruler. But he would have to know that that force existed, was ready, and that the national will to use it was there.

Now invulnerability can be provided by a number of means — by purely defensive means if you could actually provide a sort of a death ray which would knock aircraft or missiles out of the skies, if you can imagine such a thing. It can be provided by mobility, and it can be provided by hiding the particular launching vehicles so that they cannot be found. It seems to me very clear that within the state of the art today the sea-launched Polaris missile best fits the definition of our needs for an invulnerable deterrent. It is both mobile and it can be hidden; no one can predict ahead of time where it will be found. It has certain disadvantages — communications problems, for instance — but I believe that these can be licked, and if you can establish a nuclear deterrent force with the capability of knocking out every one of the enemy cities of any size, regardless of what he does first, I think that the deterrent is viable — the deterrent exists. In some future time, within

the state of the art, it is quite conceivable that a nuclear-powered aircraft, constantly orbiting the earth, carrying ballistic missiles to be fired against enemy targets, may be the answer in some measure, or the supplement, at least, to the Polaris submarine. And getting even more Buck Rogers, in some future time a variable orbit satellite capable of missile launching, might also take over this role.

Now, if you agree that the requirements of deterrence can be met by an invulnerable mobile force, what then do we need for conventional forces? What do we need for limited wars? Let me stress here that it seems to me that the threat that we face in the future is the threat of creeping communism, of a limited attack, of a continuation of the kind of thing that we have faced since World War II. There have been some 22 or 23 incidents since World War II in which military forces have been employed. Many of them have been at the instigation of communism.

Now, with the oceanic rimlands of the Eurasian continent — all of that vast continent of Eurasia with its rimlands threatened by the heartland enemy, and with the surrounding seas and skies as the only avenue of attack and line of communications to the other continents, it is clear that mobile sea power must play a major role as a deterrent to limited, as well as to unlimited, attack. Only by sea can collective security be preserved. Without sea power Korea could have been overrun, western Europe absorbed little by little, southeast Asia attacked. Sea power, of course, today means air power above the seas, as well as ships upon and beneath the surface. It must control the lines of supply to our allies — must be capable of transporting land power to nearly any point around the periphery of Eurasia and must be able to support land power within range of sea power's weapons.

In addition to this requirement which is fundamental as a deterrent for limited war there is need, in my opinion, for three types of land power in the threatened rimlands, with the necessary air support to make land power effective. First, is the need for indigenous forces in the rimland nations or in Africa to maintain

internal security and prevent a communist coup and to pull the trigger to start the fighting in case of external invasion. In a large nation such as France and England, such forces are assured. Our difficulty with foreign military aid has occurred chiefly in the smaller, more backward nations. Here, I think, we have made two mistakes. We have attempted in some countries to create armies too much after our own image, not taking into consideration adequately the terrain or the social character of the country, the nature of the peoples, etc., and we have allowed political and psychological considerations to be overemphasized at the expense of military effectiveness. Some of the smaller armies have become much too big, for instance in Iraq. Some time ago we provided 8" howitzers and a number of tanks for Iraq, a nation which was not capable of either utilizing those weapons or employing or maintaining them. In many cases these smaller armies have been over-organized and over-equipped with no clear purpose save national prestige in view. What a country like Iran or Iraq needs, standing alone, is a small force to resist external aggression. Iran could not possibly hope to halt that aggression. Her defense is clearly dependent upon collective security. But what she must have is a trigger force that will fire the shot heard around the world and that will invoke sanctions, will call her allies to her aid. That force should be capable of delay, of harassment, of intelligence collection. Indigenous forces should be carefully organized and trained for demolitions, for guerrilla warfare, and for stay-behind activities. Yet our training emphasis in many of our MAGs has been upon formal warfare rather than upon the only kind of war small nations can fight today against major aggressors — unconventional war, harassment and delay, guerrilla war. This is the first kind of land power I think we need.

The second is a kind that you see in Germany today — the kind of land power formally organized and equipped — fairly sizeable forces such as those found in western Germany and Korea, to hold certain key gateways and to stabilize the political situation in those countries. There is no doubt that Europe should furnish the bulk of her own defense and I think that this is likely to occur

as western Germany arms. Even so, American land power is going to be required if only in a static sentinel role for some time to come, not only to bolster the still-weak armies of the west, but as a pragmatic on-the-scene pledge of collective security. If all our forces are withdrawn from foreign commitments and the United States pins its deterrent entirely upon atomic retaliation, we can scarcely expect our allies to remain steadfast, for if some minor aggression occurs, and we have no answer to it except atomic ruin for ourselves as well as the enemy, the deterrent is not credible either to our allies or to the enemy. Soldiers on the scene are the best evidence of American determination to fight for freedom. Now this second role is obviously one which the army is best equipped to fill and which it has filled extremely well. There is a third kind of land power needed — a mobile force ready for action around the rimland of Eurasia or elsewhere in the world. Such a force need not be large. I think it has become somewhat too large in the Army's Strategic Army Corps. Its costs would be prohibitive if it was large and its rapid transportation impossible, if it was numbered in hundreds of thousands. But it should be highly trained for all kinds of limited conflict. It should be better equipped than any enemy it may face. It must be heavily supported by sea, by air power, and above all it must have a rapid reaction time. Such a fire brigade instantly in action against a small brush-fire might well extinguish the blaze before it became a conflagration. The Marines and our amphibious forces, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific, have this capability. In addition, the Army has established in its Strategic Army Corps an airborne reaction which supplements, as it did in Lebanon, the seaborne reaction of the Marines. Some of you may not know, if you haven't been in the Mediterranean recently, that the Marines have augmented their reaction ability, and that in the Sixth Fleet, by helicopter transportation. They now have permanently with them one LSD with some helicopters aboard which would enable them to land at least a company by helicopter over the beach instead of using the old conventional way of landing by amphibious craft.

My criticism of our mobile deterrent capability is that there is some slight overlap between the Marines and the Strategic Army Corps, and my feeling is strong as I have said before publicly, that the Army would do better to concentrate on rapid reaction time rather than upon mass — upon getting one well-armed battle group to the scene within hours rather than in getting, say, a division to the scene within weeks.

These three types of land power are required then as a deterrent to limited wars.

Well, you may say then, what are the requirements of organization?

First, gentlemen, I would emphasize civilian control of policy. That does not necessarily mean, in my mind, civilian administration — something that we have come to. I believe in strategy by a committee. I do not believe in the formulation of strategy by one mind. In any case, in our form of government, strategy will be formulated by committee because even if you have a single Chief of Staff in the Pentagon he is not going to be the final determiner of strategy. Nowadays decisions are far too vast to be made in the Pentagon. They must be made at the President's level — the National Security Council, the Bureau of the Budget, etc. We must provide for centralized direction, for quick reaction time, and for decentralized and flexible operations and administration, and this latter we have failed to do. This big bureaucratic government, the tremendous numbers of assistants to assistants — civilian and otherwise — that have been built up in the Pentagon and outside of the Pentagon and in other branches of government, have tended to interfere, to confuse, to slow down. I don't believe, at least as of today, in the creation of purely functional forces except in certain narrow areas perhaps. A functional force would seem to me to create a requirement, to generate a requirement for more costs — for duplication. What is a destroyer? Is it a limited war force? Is it a radar picket ship for air defense? Is it an anti-submarine weapon? It is all of these and a good bit more. Obviously, if you are going to pick this destroyer and say, "You will perform only an anti-subma-

rine function; you will be only an air defense weapon; you will be only a limited war force," you either sacrifice some of your other functions, or you build "X" number of destroyers — as many destroyers as there are functions — so that each one of those functions can have a destroyer.

I do not believe in a single Chief of Staff. I feel that the best interests of the country are to be filled by compromise, by hammering out on the top level the differences of viewpoints and ideologies between the services. I believe very strongly that the National Security Council must be strengthened in its role and it must place higher importance upon psychological warfare — upon the influence on this great world conflict through which we are passing, of political and psychological factors. There is no notice whatsoever shown at any level in Washington except way down the line in the Pentagon of the importance of Soviet space achievements upon United States prestige. Certainly the importance of the psychological factor has not been reflected at the top level.

And I believe that the final requirement for this new kind of force, for this strategic concept which I have been enunciating, is a frank recognition that man is, must be, and will remain the king of battle. Perhaps some of you read Mr. Khrushchev's speech yesterday in Hungary. He boasted about his rockets and he boasted about his military strength, but he ended by saying, above all, "We have the will to win." This is the key, in my opinion, to any strategic concept. Modernize this ultimate weapon, man, select him more carefully, give him tough, hard training, give him wonderful leadership — the sooner we can end the draft the better from my point of view. I believe in an all-volunteer force. Certainly, I believe in the need for thorough study — a restudy of the procurement of military personnel.

And finally, gentlemen, in summary and conclusion, to recapitulate, first, strategy like diplomacy, is the art of the possible — it must be flexible. The drift toward frozen concepts, inflexible centralized control, one immutable answer to a whole spectrum of challenges, must be halted. And second, a flexible strategy must be

the product of many minds, not one. A single service, a single Chief of Staff, would inevitably tend toward a single military party line. Third, a finite nuclear deterrent must support a finite political goal. Fourth, our limited war capability must be strengthened. Fifth, the rigid adherence to a level defense budget, and the present distribution of the budget among the armed services must both be abandoned if the foregoing requirements are to be met. Sixth, man as a leader, a fighter, and not merely a pusher of buttons, man with a rifle in his hand and the will to win in his heart, is still the primary determinant of battle. And finally, gentlemen, only in the widest of horizons can we find even a relative security tomorrow. A Fortress America is forever gone — gone with Tyre and Sidon, as obsolete as the Maginot Line. We must look unto the seas for our strength, the windswept surfaces, the uncharted depths, the skies above. Unless we use the wide waters as a base for deterrent, highway for commerce, medium for attack, bastion for defense and supply line to victory, the years to come will witness the slow end of the American dream.[1]

[1]The concluding portion of this talk and various other paragraphs in it were quoted, or paraphrazed from an article by the author, written for the Marine Corps Gazette, scheduled for publication in March 1960.

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COMMUNISM IN CHINA

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
2 October 1959 by
Professor David Nelson Rowe

The topic for today, "Communism in China," I have chosen to treat not historically but analytically. In other words, rather than attempting to summarize the whole history of the development of Chinese Communism, I will try to bring out only some of the main features of its development, to understand which it is necessary for us to get down to basic fundamentals and often to think in genetic terms.

First, I want to talk about the basic character of Chinese Communism. Here you will understand that I will make use of the material that has been published over the past 25 years, a period during which our understanding and knowledge of Chinese Communism have advanced greatly. I think it is saying a very great deal, even though it sounds as though we were speaking in minimum terms, to say that we have begun really to learn something about Chinese Communism.

Now, to start out on the basic character of Chinese Communism, I will make a flat statement here which I hope you will take in the way that I make it, namely, that it is not something I am going to leave dangling in the air, but that I will try to show the truth of it as we go on. That statement is that Chinese Communism is an orthodox development of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. Here are some relevant quotations from leading Chinese Communists on this subject.

In 1949, in a book entitled *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and formerly Chairman of the so-called Chinese People's Republic, spoke as follows: "The Chinese found the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism which holds good everywhere, and the face of China was changed." To bring this more up to date, and radically

shift the emphasis, in January 1957, then Premier Chou En-lai spoke as follows: "All of us Communists consider it a matter of pride for us to be as true to Marxism-Leninism as was Stalin himself." This takes Stalin's so-called Marxism as the standard.

Now, some people may say that these are matters of lip service. I do not believe this is true. It seems to me that the more we examine the real nature and content of Chinese Communism the more we find that Chinese Communists are sincerely devoted to Marxism as interpreted, and changed, by Lenin and Stalin. There have been some interpretations of these doctrines by Mao Tse-tung, but most of these so-called interpretations are not essentially new; they do not really depart from the main core and the main trend of orthodox Marxism as revised by Russian interpreters, namely, Lenin and Stalin.

Much has been made of the supposed Chinese, and particularly so-called Maoist modifications of orthodox Marxism, but these are at best highly dubious. At worst, those who call attention to the so-called Maoist modifications are making propagandistic efforts to establish the ideological "autonomy" of Chinese Communism in relation to the USSR.

Why should there be a propaganda of ideological autonomy of the Chinese Communists vis-à-vis the Soviet Union?

I believe this is because of the vain hope of many people who wishfully think that it may be possible at some time to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union — between Communist China and Soviet Russia. I do not believe this process of wedge-driving has the slightest chance of success in the future which we can consider from a responsible policy-making point of view.

Actually, the Chinese Communist do not wish to be autonomous in regard to the Soviet Union; and, to bring it down to earth, they cannot possibly afford to be autonomous from the Soviet Union. They cannot trade even any partial dependence upon the West for a reduction in their dependence upon the Soviet Union.

Now, I will develop these matters later in this lecture. We can make up our minds as we go along in this discussion just how

much real autonomy there is in the relations of China to the Soviet Union and how much is likely to be developed in the future.

The important modifications of Marxism did not begin in Communist China. Those modifications of Marxism which were important in the Chinese Communist revolution were initiated by Lenin and Stalin. This is why it is so important to note that Mao Tse-tung and all the chief Communist theorizers in China keep constantly advocating not merely primitive Marxism, but primitive Marxism as amended by Lenin and Stalin.

Here is how some of the features of primitive Marxism were modified by Lenin and Stalin, such modifications having a primary importance to the history of the Chinese Communist revolution.

Lenin, for instance, spoke of the place of the peasantry in the Communist revolution as over against Marx's emphasis upon the proletariat, that is, the urban laboring class. Mao Tse-tung did not originate the notion that the peasantry should form an important component element in the Communist revolution; that was Lenin's contribution, as early as 1905.

Lenin also advocated substituting a conspiratorial revolution carried on by professional revolutionaries, usually middle class intellectuals, in place of the orthodox Marxist revolution conceived as strict class warfare between the working industrial proletariat and the bourgeoisie or the property-owning classes.

The conspiratorial elitism of Lenin also has had an important part in the Chinese Communist revolution. This idea was taken over by Mao Tse-tung as part of a normal Communist ideological inheritance.

Marx's idea, for instance, that the emancipation of the working class, that is, the urban proletariat, is to be the task of the working class itself, was long heralded by Lenin, but was effectively abandoned by the Russian revolutionaries of 1917, headed by Lenin. The Russian revolution itself was far from being a mere matter of an urban industrial proletariat revolting against a bourgeoisie of property owners. In fact, the entire Russian socio-economic environment — an environment of agrarian feudalism, for example, some-

thing which has not existed in China for 2,000 years — would have made it impossible to succeed in a revolution on that kind of basis. So here was the modification along that line. This is not by any means an invention of Mao Tse-tung; in Communist China it is nothing but a take-over from Russian Communism. Similarly, Stalin's great emphasis on the force of arms in a successful revolutionary struggle was originated long before the takeover of this idea by the Communist Party in China.

Later in the lecture I will call further attention to how the Chinese Communists made use of these and other ideas of orthodox Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. But first I want to discuss the chief *tactics* of the Chinese Communists in gaining power in China, because here we may secure further insights into the nature of Chinese Communism and how it has developed in China.

A primary tactic of the Chinese Communists in gaining power was to establish the leadership of a military and intellectual elite over the proletariat and the Communist Party. This military and intellectual elite was distinctively middle-class in its social origins. It was not a peasant-derived elite. None of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in the early days had ever lived on a farm as adults or cultivated the soil themselves. Neither were any of these leaders people who had worked in factories — the proletariat of the classic Marxist definition. They were primarily middle-class intellectuals. This was in accordance with the Chinese tradition under which for thousands of years the educated small minority of the country was the center of political activity. Accordingly, all those who aimed at power tried to become members of the educated minority.

When we realize that in traditional China not more than ten per cent of the population could be considered literate, not to say highly educated, we can see that Chinese politics has for many, many centuries been in the hands of a very small elite. This elite has never been agrarian in the sense of being professional farmers and who tilled the soil by their own hands. Many of them came from peasant families; but in order to become educated they had to become divorced from the countryside at an early age. This was

because Chinese education, difficult and formidable as it was, began in early childhood when the differentiation between the laborer and the scholar had to take place; it was not a matter of educating adults and securing leadership therefrom.

This concentrated small leadership that the Chinese Communist elite embodies is thus traditional in China; and there has been, indeed in modern times, no governmental system, whether it be Communist, Nationalist, revolutionary, or anything else, which has been based upon anything other than a small minority elite. The Communist elite worked up an alliance with the peasants and that is the second tactical feature.

This revolution was not a peasant revolution in a sense of being led by the peasantry. It was not a matter of violence coming up from the peasantry; it was a matter of a great deal of peasant discontent, which indeed is built into the Chinese countryside, has been built in for many generations, and probably will continue as built into the Chinese countryside even under the Chinese Communists, as I am going to develop a little bit later. So there was an alliance of this elite with the peasants.

Third: This Communist revolution so manned, so commanded, and so operated, was allied with non-Communists. This is the so-called "united front" tactic. This is not at all exclusively a Chinese matter and, in fact, the original pre-1927 united front tactics of the Chinese Communists were adopted at the behest of Stalin. And after 1927 their similar tactics were in strict coordination with a similar and simultaneous policy of the Soviet Union before, and during, World War II.

It was in the course of World War II that the united front policy, that is, of taking into an alliance with the Communists all elements which would cooperate with the Communists in any way, was greatly developed and put into effect in Communist China. This is the third general tactic of the Chinese Communist revolution.

The fourth general tactic is reliance upon armed revolution, with resulting initial emphasis upon highly developed irregular or

guerrilla warfare. This was the consistent means of war of the Chinese Communists until massive armed supply came from the USSR to the Chinese Communists and, combined with training by the Russians, gave the Chinese Communists their first formally organized and supplied field armies of a regular type after 1945.

The fifth general tactic was the division of the revolution into two stages, the first stage being a so-called "democratic" revolution, which would include all the bourgeios parties under the Chinese Communists, it was hoped; and this did develop in the course of time. The second stage was to be the so-called "socialist" (that is, Communist) revolution, which was to be final.

The two-stage revolution was more a propaganda device than a real thing, because the Chinese Communists, in fact, did actually control in both stages, so that the device was largely an effort on their part to bring other elements into camp.

Now, having considered here briefly the tactics and the basic features, I wish to turn again to the Communist elite, about which I have already spoken somewhat.

What is the real nature of the Chinese Communist elite?

Here I wish to repeat and magnify some of the previous remarks. This is a vitally important subject because of the controlling character of this elite, its utter and complete domination not only of the government, but of the whole country. It is important because Chinese Communism has been controlled by this elite. It is not a matter of Chinese Communism or some doctrine controlling this elite so that it would act on behalf of other groups.

First, the Chinese Communist Party was never a peasant party, as I have already indicated. It was a peripatetic group. They had to travel around the countryside. This cut them off from any particular part of the Chinese countryside; and it meant that no native local peasant leader could possibly maintain his leadership over discontented peasants in his area and utilize and exploit this as a basis for gaining control over the country at large.

Why did these people have to travel about so much?

It is because they were chased about. They were driven out of the cities where they first tried to work and were pursued from place to place. In 1936 they finally wound up in northwest China, where by December of that year their supporting armed forces were reduced to the last 20,000 or 30,000 total effectives. At this point the Chinese Communist elite and its remaining armed force were threatened with complete destruction by the armies of the National Government; and if it had not been for the intervention of the Japanese in North China in 1937 they doubtless would have been exterminated, and subsequent Chinese history would have been different.

These members of the Chinese Communist elite — not a peasant group, not a solid group identified with any particular part of the country — did not want at any time to be consistently or solely identified with any particular part of the population. They avoided identification with the proletariat because, certainly in the early stages of the revolution, the proletariat in China was powerless. They did not wish any firm identification, of course, with the landlords. Sometimes they sought it but most of the time not. They refused to be solidly tied to any one of the different elements of the peasantry. Their policy was to be flexible, and to have complete maneuverability from time to time between and among these different elements of the population.

In fact, the real interests of the Chinese peasantry, the single most numerous class of the population, were not the interests of the Chinese Communist elite. Why? Simply because the Chinese peasant was wholly dedicated to very, very un-Communist, un-Marxist ideas.

What was the Chinese peasant interested in? He was interested in owning land for himself.

For 2,000 years the Chinese peasant has had a tradition of private individual property rights in land. And what he has always wanted is more of the same. At times he feels he does not have a fair share, At those times he gets difficult and trouble arises; but he has never departed from his original devotion to the notion

of owning private property in land. This is utterly and completely incompatible with orthodox Marxism, or even with Marxism as modified by Lenin and Stalin, and the Communist elite of China could not, therefore, trust the peasant as a reliable agency for bringing about the Communist or so-called "socialist" revolution.

In 1928 the Chinese Communists were a great deal less experienced than they were to be in later years. In 1928, in South China, where they controlled a limited area, they tried to put into effect some of their orthodox Marxist ideas. They put in a decree for the nationalization of land. Lenin's ideas along this line had previously been rejected by the Russian peasantry. And the Chinese peasants objected so strongly to land nationalization that the Communists had to make a tactical retreat. They shifted then to taking into their hands all land owned by landlords, but this again was not what the peasants wanted.

The peasants would have been glad to help the Communists or any other group in killing the landlords, but, when they had the landlords safely buried underground, they wanted to take the land and own it themselves. So there was no use, as the Communists soon found out, in talking about the Communists taking the landlords' land and "nationalizing" that. No; this they had to retreat from, too.

Finally, in 1937 they shifted to reducing all rents. Well, this was fine from the point of view of the peasants — lowering all rents and taxes.

In 1942, they had gone so far as to announce that they were not attacking "the enlightened gentry (for 'gentry' you can read 'landlords') who supported democratic reforms." What did they mean by democratic reforms? They meant the reduction of rent and the limited redistribution of land. They said they would guarantee rent and interest rates on loans to peasants after they were reduced and brought down to a reasonable level.

In 1947, however, they veered again to the left on their land policy because by this time they were so close to getting power that they did not have to worry about the support of the peasantry.

As soon as they realized they didn't have to worry about peasant support, they embarked upon a policy which they have consistently followed ever since, namely, a policy of *deprivation* of the peasantry.

Now, the Chinese Communists do not practice the systematic deprivation of the peasantry just because they enjoy it. They do not practice it merely for purely doctrinal reasons, although they are Marxists. They practice the deprivation of the peasantry because 80 per cent of the people in China make their living directly from the land. This means that here, in peasant production of agricultural goods, lies the chief productivity of the country.

When we remember how absolutely rudimentary the industrial and technological development of China has been we can see that if the Chinese Communists want to go anywhere in economics they have to go from where they are — that is, they have to start saving from the sources of income that are available.

It is all very well to say that the peasant should be allowed to keep enough so that he can have a minimal standard of living; but this is incompatible with the Communist schedule for savings. The Chinese Communists are devoted to saving so as to bring on industrialization as rapidly as they can. They are going to get the money from where it is, and thus any industry they construct will be built upon the backs of the Chinese peasantry. Therefore, they search most assiduously for ways to extract more from the peasantry, painlessly if possible, but, if impossible, painfully. That is the basic capital accumulation problem in Communist China, and it was the basic capital accumulation problem of Japan in the early days of its modernization. When we study Japanese history after the restoration in the middle of the 19th century we find much the same thing was done there, namely, that modernization in Japan was constructed upon the backs of a long-suffering and highly-disciplined peasantry. But even there peasant deprivation was not pushed by any means as far as it is being pushed in China today.

Thus the Chinese Communists today are trying to discipline very rigidly a great mass of perhaps 500 million peasants who, unaccustomed to such rigid regimentation, are thoroughly opposed

to it, and see clearly where such totalitarianism is going to lead them. This has been the history of peasants in their relation to all strong governments in China over the last two thousand and more years. There is every reason to think that the Chinese peasants are today highly conscious of this basic problem, which every day the Communist government bears in upon them more clearly, more obviously, and more evidently than it has ever been borne in upon them in the past.

The question here for Communism was stated in its most clear-cut form by no one else than Lenin, years ago. In his emphasis upon the elitism of Communism, and the separation of the elite from the masses, Lenin showed his realization of the fact that the peasantry is an utterly undependable component of Communist revolution. Of course, Stalin found that out, too. He found that he had to liquidate eight million kulaks because they would not do what he wanted them to do. But Lenin had pointed out the problem long before. He said that the only question is *which* of the *urban classes* will *lead* the villages.

Now, for the Chinese Communists the working proletariat could not lead the villages, because the working proletariat to all intents and purposes hardly existed; China did not have much industry. And at the outset this proletariat was so small, weak, and scattered that Chiang-Kai-shek and the Nationalists, in the years after 1927, simply hounded out of existence their Communist organizations in the cities. The Communist organizations of the urban proletariat were far too vulnerable to police control. Therefore, no Communist urban proletariat could lead the villages in the truly Leninist sense; it had to be this disconnected group of Communist intellectuals, this elite, which in China applied the Leninist doctrine about the leading of the villages in the Communist revolution. If you wish to substitute a more realistic word, take out the word "lead" here and put in "dominate," "control," or "rule." That is what it really came down to.

In fact, however, the non-proletarian Chinese Communist elite enjoyed at least one great advantage from the weakness of

the urban proletariat and the fact that they could not survive in the cities. They were driven out into the country; and they were kept there from 1937 to 1947 by the Japanese war and the civil war that followed it.

During this time this elite very skillfully and cleverly exploited the fact of their presence in the countryside, to confuse people into thinking that they were an agrarian group. They were not; they were not agrarian in origin; they were not agrarian in character. But they used the fact that they lived a life of wandering through the country to establish a false image of themselves. This was of immense propaganda value outside China. Inside China it did not mean too much. But in the West this propaganda had an immense value.

People in the United States began to think of the Chinese Communist elite as grass-roots agrarians. Nothing could have been more fantastically untrue. Nevertheless, this doctrine was assiduously cultivated and spread throughout the Free World by all pro-Communist propagandists, both inside and outside the Communist countries.

Now, since the take-over, the Chinese Communists have consistently exploited the peasantry.

Let us now look at some specific aspects of Chinese Communism in China today. We can best do this by examining functional areas in which Chinese Communist policies can speak for themselves. In saying that we are going to look at Chinese Communism inside China I do not wish to confuse the issue. All this may be treated as *internal* to China, But only for analytical purposes. It is not internal to China from the point of view of the Communist world revolution. From that point of view there is no such thing as Communism inside one country. Stalin used this phrase merely to describe a temporary device, a temporary necessity, leading eventually, he hoped, to world Communism.

Communism inside any country is an organic part of a world-wide reality — the Communist attempt at world revolution. We can look at Communism inside China as an internal thing. It is

difficult to do this because we can hardly separate the purely internal features of Chinese Communism from its inextricable ties outside the country. But for the sake of analysis, let's at least try. For convenience we may divide this analysis under two main headings.

Political

Politically, we will start at the top. At the top we have the Cult of the Leader (spelled with a capital "L"), the Leader who is omnipotent. Perhaps with the aid of the secret police, is he also nearly omniscient? In the light of abandonment of age-old religious superstitions, which has been going on apace for generations in China, this Leader takes on some of those rejected aspects of divinity. He is called by the Chinese their "Saving Star," or, if any of you understand Chinese, their *Chiu Hsing* (the Saving Star of China). He is the arbiter.

An ultimate arbiter is necessary in a country where the purge is so vitally important to stability. The purge has to supply from time to time, for theatrical and other reasons, the scapegoats to sacrifice for two purposes: (1) to keep your party and your politics purified, and (2) to see to it that the conduct of government is as accurate and efficient as possible. Somebody has to be alone in responsibility for decisions along this line; somebody has to be irreproachable and unchallengeable. Therefore, the leadership is a mystical thing. The Leader does not always have to be seen; his pronouncements take on tremendous importance. The Chinese Communists are trying to re-establish the age-old Chinese political tradition of absolute despotic power, something that, whereas it was a supposed attribute of the Chinese emperors, was never really held by very many of them.

This Leader is at the top of a party. This is the largest Communist Party in the world. It has approximately twelve million members. These Communists are scattered all over the country. They are not identical with the government but they control it. The reason for this is that it would be very inconvenient for the party to have to bear on its shoulders the burden of all the errors

of governing officials. But the party does control all government because party members hold all the critically important posts.

This party is *controlled.* It is controlled from the inside; it is controlled by many well-known and obvious devices. Among these are mutual spying, control committees, reprimand, expulsion, purges, criticism and self-criticism, and constant schooling of party members in the orthodox doctrines of Communism.

The many, many types of evils which are constantly being discovered by these processes of spying, criticism, and self-criticism include just about everything imaginable. This results in numerous campaigns for what is known as "party rectification."

Now, to go from the party directly to the government, the government is supposedly described by a constitution. This constitution demonstrates the truth which we sometimes lose sight of, which is that it is perfectly possible to have a constitution without having constitutional government. We Americans often tend, I think, to confuse the two.

This constitution, so-called, of Communist China *does not* establish a government which is subject to any kind of popular or legal control. The interests of the individuals in the country are all secondary to and inseparable from the interests of the state. Thus, there is no rule of law in our sense of the word. In fact, the constitution and the laws in Communist China are treated very much as they are in Communist Russia; that is, they can be amended out of existence by actions which are unconstitutional but which are perfectly possible because the elite decrees them.

One has always to stop and ask: "Why then do these Communist countries pay so much attention to laws and constitutions?" Not purely for formal and theatrical purposes, not at all, but because any going concern has to have in it certain elements of stability and continuity. No government can exist solely on a basis of the whims of an absolute ruler who may change his mind overnight about everything. This would lead only to the most intense disorder and chaos.

The Chinese Communists are trying to bring a communist-type order out of chaos, and therefore they cannot dispense with laws and constitutions. The constitutional dilemma of the Communist states is simply that they have to try to reconcile two utterly incompatible elements. One is an absolutist elite, and the other is a legal, statutory, stabilized situation. But I would make it as a general statement that none of us would recognize any state of law in Communist China. Certainly we would not recognize the so-called judicial processes, as they are in China, as resembling anything that we understand the term to mean.

The judicial process in China is at its best nothing but political pageantry, and at its worst is an absolutely and completely arbitrary process. Trials are conducted on a basis that you and I would find utterly incomprehensible. Actually, the trial is nothing but a forum; the judge is nothing but a presider; and the verdicts are always political. Most of the so-called "trials" are mere theatrical demonstrations, often with masses of people yelling and shouting about what is supposed to be happening. It is a commonplace that people are punished for crimes without being convicted of them by any judicial process whatever.

Now, this government is generally described as a government of democratic centralism — the Chinese term it the People's Democratic Dictatorship.

How can you have a democratic dictatorship?

It is called a democratic dictatorship because, first, it is a dictatorship as everybody knows, and, second, because the Communist elite professes to think, and tries to persuade the people to believe, that it is for the ultimate welfare of "the people." This is the sole extent of its being democratic.

In addition, of course, the word "democratic" has many values associated with it outside China. It is used in Communist states largely for its value in external propaganda, so that even the Communists' own internal description of their government is related to external things. This shows how absolutely impossible it is to separate internal from external factors so far as Chinese

Communism is concerned. In Communist China security becomes a central concern of the government. The people, in fact, are all incorporated into security committees. These committees exist in every factory, in every enterprise, in every school, in every street in the towns, and in every village in the country; everyone is a member of one or more of these security committees.

The security committees are characterized by what is known as collective responsibility; that is, the members of the committees are responsible for each other's actions. If any one member breaks the rules, all other members of the group are responsible for what he does, and may be punished for it. Therefore, they certainly have to go about to find who violated the rules, in order to expiate their own crimes, since the crime of any one person in a group is the crime of all.

One of the most grievous features of the security organizations is the organized denunciation of relatives. This is a highly formalized matter and it is usually a case of the young denouncing the old. This is because the young can be influenced more successfully along these lines. The older people cannot quite forget their old practices of family loyalty, which the Chinese Communists are doing their best to uproot.

All this security business and, in fact, the whole political and social order of China under the Communists is upheld by a system of penology that is characterized by concentration camps for the double purpose of punishment, and of organization and supply of masses of labor. All this is based upon and maintained by propaganda, and the propaganda is completely a state monopoly.

The state monopolizes all media and all channels of communication. It does not only monopolize them in a positive way; it also exerts an all-pervading censorship of all communications which by any chance can be exempt from the area of total state control. Propaganda is carried on also by vast organized movements. You have doubtless heard of a number of these.

The combination of police terror and propaganda is uniquely characteristic of totalitarian Communism, and China is no exception.

In general, this points up a chief feature of Communism as a political system. That is, that Communist politics is war, war to the death with the opposition. There should be no confusion here: the total destruction of the opposition (and *we* are that opposition) is the fixed objective of Communism. In this way, inside any Communist country, no opposition can be tolerated. The slightest sign of it brings to bear persuasion, but persuasion backed at every point by the ultimate sanction of physical terrorization. To those who are, or seem, unpersuaded, terror is indiscriminately applied. This is as true in Communist China as it is in the Soviet Union. We should keep this in mind, and never allow ourselves to be deluded by lying efforts to deceive us, no matter how thickly coated with an overlay of diplomatic practice. For example, if Mr. Khrushchev's trip to this country left him in any doubt that we understand that he is out to destroy us, then it did us much more harm than good.

Economic

Now, it is impossible to understand the internal nature of Chinese Communism as a system without some consideration of it in the economic field. I am not going to talk much about economic potentialities, or about developments in purely economic terms. But, it seems to me, I do have to mention some of those things for their political implications.

I have already mentioned the great political meaning — as far as the relations between the Chinese Communist elite and the peasantry are concerned — the great political impacts of China's poverty. I wonder whether you can quite realize or understand that poverty.

Chinese poverty is often talked about but it is hard to understand unless you have been there and have actually seen it. This poverty is a multiple thing. It is a poverty in resources. China is particularly poor in resources per capita. That is, what they do have has to suffice for a huge population. It is also a poor country from the point of view of average personal income. It is probably the poorest large country in the world; it is far behind India, for

example. It is one of the most poverty-stricken countries in the world from the point of view of capital production. It is backward not only in production, but in technology.

Then there is the population, which has to be considered not only in its quantitative features but in its qualitative features as well. And here, for better or for worse, we must conclude that the Chinese population is for the most part qualitatively poor. This is not an adverse reflection upon the character of these people, their industriousness, their hard work, their frugality. These are all well-known Chinese characteristics. But it is true from a biological, physiological point of view.

The life span is short. The people are afflicted constantly with endemic diseases, which not only kill millions of people in epidemics, but also lower the health and productivity of hundreds of millions of people all the time, year by year. These include tuberculosis, malaria, internal parasites, and things of that kind, which almost anyone who ever goes to China finds rife in the countryside and all about him in the cities. These are not quick killers; they are afflictions which cut down the efficiency of the individual in a drastic way, so that many of the 600 million are only half alive most of the time. This is something which is hard for any of us to believe unless, as I say again, we have been there and have seen it with our own eyes.

What we have here is a vicious circle which seems almost unbreakable: mass ignorance and poor health mean low productivity; low productivity means low margins of economic income over the needs for subsistence. As a result, there are inadequate surpluses from which to extract those substantial sums of money which are needed for social improvement. But until you get social improvement you cannot begin to alter the basic environmental factors that hinder social improvement. This is a vicious circle, one of many constantly discovered in China. There is always present this baffling and puzzling problem: "Where do we begin, where do we start?"

The easiest place to start in China, as it was in Japan in the early days of its modernization, is by taking capital out of the

blood of the peasantry. This means mass deprivation, and this means solutions to such problems as agrarian production, which are dictated not on a purely economic basis, but by political and power demands that take the solution clear out of the field of economics. For example, the real meaning of the Commune system in Communist China today is political, not economic. It is aimed at the total breakup of the farm family and the destruction of the individualism and independence that are normal to it.

Now, in the brief space available I cannot even start to give you a general analysis of the economic problems of China, but I do want to try to give you an approach to thinking about these problems. Some economists will tell you it is perfectly possible for the gross income in a country like China to go up a certain per cent per year. But we must ask them how they estimate the net annual increase in the Chinese population. If they are honest they will tell you they cannot be certain about it. Nobody knows the answers. But the gross population problem is clearly visible: very high birth rates, and death rates which are almost equally high. But one of the first things necessary in order to increase production is to improve the health of the workers. This means that fewer people die; the death rate goes down; the population goes up. You are defeating yourself; aren't you? You are creating a fresh problem, namely somewhere between 12 and 18 million new people per year. They all have to eat. Where do the agricultural surpluses go then? What happens to savings?

Under orthodox, primitive Marxist doctrine, labor is the only source of wealth. Now, we are not dealing with orthodox primitive Marxism in any country today — we must remember this — certainly not in Communist Russia or in any satellite country. The Chinese Communists have long recovered from the notion that uninhibited increase of the population will add to the net income through adding more hands to work. You run out of space; you run out of land; you run out of the stuff to do with. At the same time, the Chinese Communists are trying to adhere to Marxist dogmas on population.

These are some of the great challenging dilemmas of China. No administration in China, no matter whether it aims at a complete development of democracy or at a complete totalitarianism — no administration in China in modern times can possibly face these problems and solve them, without introducing elements of total control into the environment. People say: "Well, that means then that the Chinese Communists are no worse, perhaps better, perhaps more rigidly efficient, than any other administration."

At this point we are forced to revert to a real and legitimate interest of our own. Our real interest is not in the character of Chinese government. For my part I would say, for example, that apart from our moral repugnance for it, we really are not very much concerned with the internal character of Russian Communist government. If the Russians want to suffer with it, let them have it. But we do have a legitimate concern with the attitude of specific countries toward us and their declared intentions toward us.

Here the Chinese Communists leave us in absolutely no doubt. Let us repeat again the statement of Chou En-lai: "All of us Communists consider it a matter of pride to be as true to Marxism-Leninism as was Stalin himself." We know that this ideology has as its central aim the takeover of the world by International Communism. This is orthodox Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.

Stalin is even more strongly and widely approved in China today than in the Soviet Union. This is seen in Chinese Communist anti-Titoism, and its support of the USSR's aggressive foreign policy in every aspect, as in the case of Hungary. This helps us answer the question as to what the aim of the regime in Communist China is toward us. The answer intimately affects, and indeed determines, the internal character and nature of Chinese Communism. It is that Communist China completely supports the Communist world revolution. We cannot understand so-called Chinese Communism unless we know that and understand it fully. This means that Communist China has declared herself to be our mortal enemy.

Now, in view of this, there are only two possible and obviously opposing attitudes which we could take. One is an attitude of opposition, that is, that we do our best to harm Communist China.

The other is that we try to wean it away from its support of Communist world revolution and make it more friendly to us. I submit (and I cannot, of course, enter into that exhaustively here) that the weaning-away tactic will never work in the case of Communist China. Therefore, in view of their openly declared destructive aims toward us, the only strategy we can adopt is to try to harm them as much as we possibly can. In the economic sphere this means, for instance, that we must not attempt in any way to help Chinese Communism by lifting any of its burdens off its back, by trading with it, or by supplying it with capital or loans.

The solution of the tremendous internal problems in Communist China is merely the first and vital concern of the Chinese Communists in their efforts to *promulgate World Communism in general.* Therefore, we must not help them; we must not trade with them; we must not lend them funds. All these things are being discussed nowadays; and it is said that we must recognize them and not keep them in isolation lest they are driven closer into the arms of the Soviet Union. In complete opposition to this idea, I will urge as strongly as I can that we should try to drive these two countries closer and closer into each other's arms. To change the figure of speech, we should do everything possible to put the Chinese Communists and their massive problems firmly upon the back of Russian Communism. This burden will continue to grow in size, to grow in intensity, and to distress the USSR for a long time to come if we have the will, the foresight, and the devotion, the dedication to this policy that I believe we should have.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Professor David N. Rowe

Present Position: Research Professor of Political Science and Director of Graduate Studies in International Relations, Yale University.

Schools:

Princeton University, A.B. degree.
University of Southern California, A.M. degree.
University of Chicago, Ph.D. degree.

Career Highlights:

1935-37 General Education Board Fellow in Humanities, Harvard University.

1938- Rockefeller Foundation Fellow, College of Chinese Studies, Peking.

1938-43 Lecturer, School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, also taught Chinese language and Social and Political Institutions of Eastern Asia.

1941-42 Special Assistant to Director, Branch of Research and Analysis, Office of Strategic Services, and Special Assistant to Ambassador, American Embassy at Chungking.

1943-51 Research Associate, Institute of International Studies, Department of Foreign Area Studies, Yale University.

1943-45 Member, War and Peace Studies Project, Council of foreign Relations.

1945-46 Director, Staff Officers School for Asiatic Studies, Yale University.

1947-48 Director, Undergraduate and Graduate Studies, Yale University.

1949-51 Director of Graduate Studies on East Asia, Yale University.

1954-56 Representative, The Asia Foundation in the Republic of China (Taiwan); Visiting Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University; Vice Chairman of Taiwan Committee at China Institute in America.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel,
(G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

Commandant ELEVENTH Naval
District (Code 154)
937 North Harbor Drive
San Diego, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH
Naval District (Code 141)
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces,
Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 17
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U. S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
U. S. Naval Base
Norfolk 11, Virginia

BOOKS

Busch, Noel F. *Thailand; An Introduction to Modern Siam.* Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand, 1959. 166 p.

Mr. Busch has very ably portrayed a picture of Thailand, past and present, leaving the reader with a distinct impression that he has gained an important insight into the makeup of modern Thailand. His approach has been to discuss those aspects of the country's geography, history, government, religion, arts and pastimes which he deems essential to a broad understanding of the way of life of the people that make up this free Southeast Asian kingdom. He has done this in colorful and informal fashion by intermixing personal impressions gained during his four-year stay in the country together with information gathered from a rather detailed research on his part of the various authoritative documents available on Thailand. The author points out vividly the impact that religion and freedom from foreign domination (except for the brief Japanese occupation in World War II) have had on the development of the culture and way of life of modern Thais. He pictures them as a philosophical, trusting, extremely polite and happily contented people, yet a race which over the centuries has guarded jealously its independence, fighting bravely to preserve it whenever it was threatened by outside forces. This has caused them to line up solidly with the free world in the current struggle against Communist domination. The purpose of Mr. Busch's undertaking is simply to provide in a small, informal and unpretentious book general information about Thailand for the casual reader. This work is the first volume in a new series. "The Asia Library," published in cooperation with the Asian Society, New York.

Committee for Economic Development. *The European Common Market and Its Meaning to the United States.* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1959. 152 p.

The European Common Market and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) are indicative of

the increasing trend toward political and economic unification of Western Europe. This exhaustive study attempts to determine the effect of these organizations, and the European Common Market in particular, on the foreign trade of the United States and other non-member countries, and proposes certain economic and commercial policies by which the United States can foster these tendencies without detriment to its own economy. Of particular interest is a statement by the European Committee for Economic and Social Progress of the problems confronting the European Economic Community.

Szulc, Tad. *Twilight of the Tyrants.* New York, Holt, 1959. 312 p.

Twilight of the Tyrants is basically an account of the rise and fall of five South American dictators, Getulio Vargas of Brazil, Juan Perón of Argentina, Manuel Odriá of Peru, G. Rojas Pinilla of Colombia and M. Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela. As South American correspondent for *The New York Times*, Tad Szulc has had an opportunity to obtain much of the information in his book first-hand. For the most part, Mr. Szulc does not judge the five principals, but is content to outline the dramatic events that characterized the careers of these men and to let the reader draw his own conclusions. His analysis of the political, economic and social conditions in each country shows an excellent insight into this transitional period of South American history. Mr. Szulc's style is both interesting and entertaining. He has written a lucid and vivid book; for those who wish to review the recent events in the countries concerned, it provides excellent background material.

Jessup, Philip C. and Taubenfeld, Howard J. *Controls for Outer Space.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1959. 379 p.

The authors see in the reach for outer space the need for regulation, agreements and accord in order to prevent misunderstandings which could quickly lead to a catastrophic mistake on the part of the United States or the Soviets. Another area which could lead to serious disagreement lies in the Ant-

arctic region, the scene of recent scientific study and explorations and claimed by more than a half-dozen countries.

Of particular note are the problems being created by man's movements into space. It is generally accepted that air space over nations is controlled by that state, but the question arises of how far into space. The use of free balloons carrying scientific instruments floating at heights of 20,000 to 30,000 feet brought strong protests from the Soviet and her satellites. It would seem that some limits in altitude must be established above which a state may not claim sovereignty. It is already clear that the use of outer space can include military activities which could be of great importance. Satellites with nuclear warheads might be maintained in distant orbits in advance of war until recalled for use against targets on earth. They might be used to jam attack-warning systems, provide weather data and make other observations in advance of military actions. At present, from the ground, it is not possible to distinguish between satellites or missiles with peaceful missions and those on military operations. Explosions of nuclear devices, at great altitudes, by the United States in 1958 disrupted radio contact with Japan for hours and radar was likewise blurred, both possible war uses. A nuclear burst on the moon might contaminate the area around it for years, foiling possible geologic and other scientific exploration.

The solution of space relations between the powers as well as settlement of the Antarctic claims should be solved now rather than be allowed to drift until some particular action leads to war. A proposal by the United States to cooperate in a system whereby outer-space missiles would be used exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes has been rejected by the Soviet. How to assure real separation of peaceful from military uses of atomic energy, and now, of outer space, is a key problem in a world bristling with antagonism, rivalries and fears, A pattern for international control must be developed, and the authors propose several.

Smelser, Marshall. *Congress Founds the Navy*, 1787-1798. Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1959. 229 p.

Congress Founds the Navy, 1787-1798, is an interesting, readable and remarkably documented record of a little-known era in U. S. Navy history. Naval historians have usually given slight attention to the political shaping of national naval policy, and political historians have generally presented only the final decisions in naval policy without much investigation of the policy-making process. These approaches to the study of American naval history have resulted in a good deal of apolitical narrative writing with emphasis on strategy, operations, technology, heroism, but with very little on what the nation expected of a navy and how the judgments on its mission were arrived at. The U. S. Navy was not founded by sailors but by politicians. The story of its founding is intimately connected with highly partisan politics. Decisons on naval strategic principles were reached by the same processes as decisions on tariffs, public lands, Indian problems, banking, the national debt or any other problem which engaged the public interest; the fountain of naval policy sprang from the Congress. The struggle between the Federalists and anti-Federalists over forming a navy was tied in with the need to ratify the Constitution, which in turn would give the power and resources required to form an effective navy. The opponents, of course, claimed that a navy would merely invite trouble from stronger nations. Throughout is an extremely interesting view of the national political scene and the gradual transition of American concern from internal (Indian) problems to a defensive coastal force to an offensive navy. Internationally the developments on the fringe of limited war with both France and England while each was at war with the other have a remarkably modern ring. Mr. Smelser's history contains much information which can be found in no other text. As an authoritative (almost 1000 footnotes in less than 200 pages of text) historical source, it is a near essential addition to a naval library.

Phillips, Ruby Hart. *Cuba, Island of Paradox.* New York, McDowell, Obolensky, 1959. 434 p.

R. Hart Phillips is well-qualified to author *Cuba, Island of Paradox,* as evidenced by the fact that she has been a resident of Cuba since 1920 and a staff correspondent of *The New York Times* in that country since 1937. The paradox to which Mrs. Phillips refers involves the never-ending fight waged by the Cuban people for the freedom which a succession of dictators continues to deny them. The details of this struggle, from Machado to Castro, cover the past 26 years, during which period eleven different governments have been in control. With each new government, the masses were promised that corruption would cease, that economic conditions would improve and that the incoming administration would not resort to brutal police methods to enforce their policies. These promises, of course, were never kept. The most interesting part of this work from the viewpoint of the War College reader can be found in the final chapter. Here the author supplies, in capsule form, her views on the effectiveness of Castro's reform program; on the success of the Communists in influencing the Castro government, the labor faction and the people; and on United States' policies toward Latin America in general and Cuba specifically. While the story is completely factual and uncensored, the long parade of miscellaneous and frequently minor characters who amble through the diary-like passages tend to detract from the principal theme, and the abundance of details is likely to become monotonous to the average reader.

Kulski, Wladyslaw W. *Peaceful Co-Existence.* Chicago, Regnery, 1959. 662 p.

With 27 years in the Polish diplomatic service, culminating in his position as Minister to London during 1940-1945, Mr. Kulski is extremely well-qualified to write about the intricacies of modern power politics. He describes in scholarly fashion the continuity of Soviet foreign policy since 1917. The entire discussion is thoroughly documented with 45 pages of footnote

references and thirteen pages of bibliography. This book is indispensable reading for an understanding of the cold war. It explains the flexible morality which permits a Communist sincerely to expound such absurdities as, "A national struggle directed against a capitalist state was to be supported by the Communists because it tended to weaken the imperialist chain. A similar movement against the socialist state, however, was to be looked upon as a crime against the revolution." It also lists the strategic mistakes which the Communists made after World War II in their treatment of newly independent, underdeveloped nations and how they have realized these mistakes and are starting a "new approach to underdeveloped countries which is not going to be amateurish."

PERIODICALS

Cooper, William G., Vice Adm., USN. "Antisubmarine Warfare." *Sperryscope.* Fourth Quarter, 1959, p. 2-6.

A general survey of the field of antisubmarine warfare by the Commander, Antisubmarine Defense Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

Harrington, Michael. "China-Soviet Conflict?" *The Commonweal.* January 8, 1960, p. 411-414.

There are differences between Russia and China, but they are similar societies opposed to the rest of the world, and China needs Russian aid and technique in her industrialization program. The author states that the Chinese-Russian unity has been fostered by the American China policy.

Lens, Sidney. "The Middle East's New 'Ism'." *The Christian Century.* January 13, 1960, p. 42-46.

An analysis of Nasserism, what it is doing for Egypt, how the people feel about it, and some of the problems it is facing.

Biorklund, E., Adm., Sweden. "Soviet's Methods of Expansion." *Air Power.* Autumn 1959, p. 17-24.

A summing up, giving a total view of Russian methods of

expansion — their principles and aims, methods employed to implement their objectives in various parts of the world, and the effects on the political-strategical picture.

Bines, William H. "A Call to Arms . . . for Peace." *Harvard Business Review.* January-February 1960. p. 97-105.

The military services are losing many of their most talented officers; this article gives the causes of this serious situation and suggests four ways "to produce quality leadership in a calling where peace is a profession."

Meek, George. "Russian Subs . . . Could Cripple U. S. from South." *Army-Navy-Air Force Register.* January 9, 1960, p. 12-13.

Explains the military importance of our Latin American neighbors, U. S. military aid to them being designed to aid in developing mobile units to counter submarine raider attacks on strategic bases, sea communications and coastal installations.

Burns, Arthur E. "The Cost of National Defense." *Human Events.* January 14, 1960, Article Section, p. 1-4.

A thoughtful discussion of the problems of defense expenditure, the difficulties of measuring the return or effectiveness of the military dollar; suggests that tax policy regard national security as a component of consumption and not as a charge against saving.

Bourguiba, Habib, Jr. "The Significance of Peace in Algeria." *Western World.* January 1960, p. 10-13.

The son of President Bourguiba and Tunisian ambassador to Paris explains the significance of a peace in Algeria both for North Africa and for the free world.

Loebelson, Robert M. "A Single Agency for ASW!" *Space/Aeronautics.* January 1960, p. 21.

RAdm L. B. Richardson, USN (Ret.), now senior vice president-engineering at General Dynamics believes that both industry and the Navy would benefit if ASW responsibilities and

authority were concentrated in a special-projects office instead of being scattered throughout the Navy.

Johnstone, William C., Jr. "Changing Attitudes in Southeast Asia." *SAIS Review.* Winter 1960, p. 3-10.

States that thinking people in Southeast Asia's ex-colonial countries have changed their attitudes toward "anti-colonialism," foreign policy, Communism and intra-regional relations.

"British Defence Policy." *The Political Quarterly.* January-March 1960.

A special number devoted to a consideration of Britain's strategic and political position in the world today, with an eye to discovering on what lines their defense policy should be molded.

Johnson, Max S., Maj. Gen., USA (Ret.) "With U. S. Eyes on Europe, Now the Pacific Is in Trouble." *U. S. News & World Report,* January 25, 1960, p. 65-67.

A firsthand report on the decline of U. S. defenses in the Pacific where danger from Red China increases.