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Current U.S. Military Strategy

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CURRENT U. S. MILITARY STRATEGY

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Mr. Hanson Baldwin

My topic, "Current U. S. Military Strategy," is such a tremendous one that I am going to wander this morning.

It has been said, I think, that in the world's two oldest professions — the art of war and the art of love, the amateurs claim greater proficiency than the professionals. It is with some trepidation, therefore, that I, as an amateur strategist, stand before you to discuss this subject, and it might puzzle you a little bit, as it did me, as to why the Naval War College has asked me to talk about strategy. I would like to think, parenthetically perhaps, that I once proved to Admiral Ingersoll's satisfaction that I was perhaps a better strategist than he was, at least as far as forecasting the future of baseball teams is concerned. He still owes me a dinner from the occasion when the Yankees won the pennant quite some time ago! Seriously, I think the reason why I stand here at your invitation might be that my military philosophy accords with that of this school. I believe in the indivisibility of military force. I do not believe in a one-weapon or a one-idea or a one-service philosophy. I believe in a flexible, strategic concept.

Now, gentlemen, I am convinced that we are facing a period of tremendous crises. This, of course, is often said. But there is today little doubt that major problems in both international and domestic affairs will come to a peak in the foreseeable future, which may determine the entire future of our nation. At some time between now and 1965 or 1970 we may actually cross a great watershed of history which may determine whether our nation is to remain great or to go downhill. The crisis is political, military, economic and moral; this historical watershed confronts us.

Now, before examining our difficult defense problem I would like to review with you for a few moments the state of the world

and the current military trends in this time of troubles of the past few years. I don't think that we can discuss strategy in proper context unless we see what the trends have been and unless we examine, at least with a once-over-quickly, the elements of this crisis of which I have spoken.

When we talk about the world situation I always remind myself not to become too lengthy. I deal with it every day and perhaps I become too immersed in detail, so I remember the story of Jock, the Scotchman, who went out with his girl one night and said, "I'm a mon of few words, do ye or don't ye?" She said, "Well, customarily I don't, but your eloquence has convinced me." I won't promise to be quite as brief as Jock, but I will certainly remember his eloquence.

In looking at the world situation, let us compare first the position of the United States with that of Soviet Russia and its communist allies in this world conflict that has been continuing since World War II. I don't need to stress to this audience the reasons for this conflict — they are political, they are economic, they are ideological, they are military and moral, and there are human differences — vast human differences between our concepts in this country, in the United States, and the concepts, for instance, in Asia, Communist China and Soviet Russia. Life is of little worth in those countries and life does mean something here. Now, while we must always keep our eye on this main stream of conflict it would be a profound mistake to lose sight of the fact that this conflict has been exasperated, has been muddied, has been made far more complex and difficult by a whole stream of converging conflicts. Some of these are local and regional, such as the conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis in the Middle East, and Pakistan and India about Kashmir. There are a whole host of other factors — the technological revolution of our time which has foreshortened the map of the world and brought us all so much closer together and has thereby created crises by itself; the industrial expansion of our times, and, of course, the population explosion through which the world is passing. The latter, in the long-range point of view,

may be one of the most important factors with which you will have to deal in the future. So much for the causes of conflict.

In military strength, suffice to say, in my opinion, the United States still is superior to Soviet Russia in overall military strength, chiefly due to our superior nuclear delivery capability and our superior sea power. That nuclear delivery capability, that superiority in nuclear delivery capability, has been reduced obviously within the last few years, but for the moment, at least, and I think for the foreseeable future as long as we make no major mistakes we can still retain it. The sea power superiority is of tremendous importance. If you look at the map of the world it is the only way by which we can keep in touch with our allies and they with us. We have great weaknesses in some aspects of military strength, in the ability to wage conventional war or limited wars, and in various other ways. You are all familiar with those weaknesses. I am not going to dwell on them this morning.

We still hold an advantage — a military advantage. This is the point I want to leave with you. We still hold an advantage as of today, but given the technological revolution in warfare which has destroyed our insular security; given the great industrial and technological advances of Russia, that advantage is no longer overwhelming and we no longer can be sure that we will retain it unless we give our undivided attention to it.

In the political struggle for the world, in the cold war which becomes hot in some parts of the world, we can rightly claim that we have made great gains in western Europe at least. If you recall western Europe right after World War II, France and Italy were threatened with communism and even some of the smaller countries of Europe were so threatened. England was in a very serious economic condition and the entire continent was unstable. Today there is a well-defined Iron Curtain in Europe, a border beyond which in my opinion, the Russians dare not trespass without the risk of major war. The countries of western Europe on the whole have won their way back, with our help, to tremendous economic prosperity and to political stability. Most recent, of course, is France

under de Gaulle where a real renaissance has occurred, a renaissance that is moral as well as political and economic. With it has come political difficulties. De Gaulle is a man who has a mind of his own and cannot be easily influenced or led by his allies and this always creates problems, but nevertheless he has restored France to the ranks of greatness. If he can solve the Algerian problem he will have completed, I think, that renaissance.

But the happy picture in Europe is not equally happy elsewhere in the world. Our gains in Europe have certainly been offset by our losses in Asia. We no longer speak in any case of the liberation of the satellites as we did at the start of the Eisenhower administration. These captive nations are now solidly enchained.

The Middle East is still unstable and in turmoil. Africa is in flux, even Latin America, as we look at our own back door, offers very, very major problems. Berlin and Germany are still divided. The Berlin problems are by no means resolved. When we look at the Far East we see Korea and Indo-China still cut in two — no settlement to the Formosa Strait problem. All over the world one sees the emergence of nationalism, in some cases nationalism penetrated by communism, and all over the world, excepting Europe, there are unsettled frontiers — fluid boundaries, areas where this conflict for the world could erupt into hot war at any time.

I stress the unsettled nature of all of the world's political problems. We are talking about disarmament, but we have not solved the causes for armament which are political in nature.

There's a brighter side to this brief survey of our world today and this is that Russia has her own problems. Russia is in the throes of change. There are classes developing in this so-called classless society. Titoism — the heresy of nationalism communism — as opposed to the international brand dominated by Moscow, has reared its head in Hungary, and in Poland. Today, I think, Poland is facing another crisis. I recommend to your attention, if you haven't seen them (and this is not just an advertisement for the circulation of the New York Times) the articles that are now being carried in the Times about Poland by Mr. Rosenthal, our correspon-

dent, who was recently expelled from that country because the communist government said that he delved too deeply into their society. There is no doubt that Poland is facing another crisis today, just as Hungary faced one some years ago.

In addition to these problems which Russia faces, the problem of securing the power of the dictator is still one of the Kremlin's headaches. Mr. Khrushchev is unquestionably the number one man, but he is not another Stalin. His enemies are still alive. He could make a mistake and he could, in my opinion, still be overthrown. In addition to these problems there are obvious Communist-Chinese/Russian friction points — in central Asia along the Manchurian frontier, in southeast Asia and now over India. It is significant, I think, that for the first time Russia did not side clearly with Communist China about the Indian border disputes but took a neutral position. In balance, when we look at the world today, the global power of the United States in relation to the global power of Soviet Russia and of communism, has certainly been reduced within the recent ten years.

Now, look for a moment at the domestic aspects of this crisis that I said we faced — the national situation. We face a presidential election next year. This present administration is in a sense a lame duck administration, with two more national budgets to prepare — the one for this year which will come out shortly, and the one for the following year. This administration has adopted a so-called level budget concept as far as national defense is concerned. Roughly a budget of forty-one billion dollars annually or thereabouts — a hold-the-line-budget. On the other hand, we are faced, as you well know, with a period of inflation; every year costs have increased. You have to pay more for the same thing. We are also faced at the moment with something that wasn't true a few years ago — an outflow of gold from the United States, an unbalance of payments partially due to our very extensive foreign aid, partially due to the fact that we have a great many troops abroad upon whom some three billion dollars annually is estimated as being expended in foreign countries, and partially due to the fact that we are tending to price ourselves out of the world markets. An outflow of gold —

inflation — and at the same time the tremendous expense of new weapon systems due to the technological revolution in war.

I was down at Lackland Air Force Base where the Air Force trains its basic recruits at San Antonio, Texas, not so long ago, and here at the gateway to the Air Force, only four out of some twelve hundred buildings are modern and permanent structures. It is one of the oldest and shabbiest bases I have seen. The commander has asked time and time again for about one-fourth the price of a B-58 bomber to start the rehabilitation of that base. All he wants is about three to five million dollars. He hasn't yet been able to get it. One quarter the price of an expendable bomber! One bomber — figure for yourself — 12 to 20 million dollars. The tremendous expense of new weapon systems, the technological revolution in war have provided added problems to this fiscal problem we face.

At the same time I think we see the country getting into a social and economic deadlock, an impasse between the laboring unions and the manufacturers. A steel strike has resulted, and despite the President's insistence that it be settled, there is as yet no indication that collective bargaining will yield results. Collective bargaining has either broken down or it has been accomplished at the expense of the common good and has resulted in an endless round of wage-price increases, and more inflation.

Another factor of crisis is that we have produced a government of over-centralized controls — the age of bureaucracy, of big government — of Parkinson's law (with which you are all familiar, I think) that the less actual work you do in government, the more people you need to do it — the age of the No man — the age of people who can say *no* to nearly every project, but who have no direct responsibility to the public. (For instance, the President has a scientific advisor who is a man of tremendous influence not only upon military development, but upon nearly any type of scientific development in the country. Legally he has no responsibility whatsoever, either to the Congress or to the public, yet actually he has tremendous power). This is the age of over-centralized control. And

finally it's an age of civilianization of our military forces, the social concepts and the mores of our time tending to dominate military goals. Samuel P. Huntington in his classic, *"The Soldier and the State,"* noted that "the military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces — a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security, and a social imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function." This is what has been happening, in my opinion, in America.

But this civilianization of the armed forces is only part and parcel of a social cycle that is changing fundamentally the American dream. We have substituted security instead of opportunity. Our youth pays tribute to eroding ideas — the idea that the end justifies the means, that it is all right if you can get away with it. You see this moral decay in the TV quiz scandals; you see it in the lack of morals of the body politic around you. There is dry rot in the nation. I refer you to Dr. James D. Conant, president emeritus of Harvard, who in a speech which was little noticed — a recent speech — said that he thought there was a threat as severe as any in the nation's history confronting the United States, but few Americans seemed to be aware of it. I quote: "Our existence and our freedom are both in danger, yet as I have traveled around the country, with few exceptions, I have sensed no awareness of our peril. For the most part I have encountered little but complacency compounded in a curious way with despair." Or to quote George Kennan, whom all of you know. He said: "If you ask me as a historian whether a country in a state this country is in today with no highly developed sense of national purpose, with the overwhelming accent of life on personal comfort and amusement, with a dearth of public services and a surfeit of privately-sold gadgetry, with a chaotic transportation system, with its great Metropolitan areas being gradually disintegrated by the head-long switch to motor transportation, with an educational system where quality has been extensively sacrificed to quantity, and with insufficient social discipline even to keep its major industries functioning with-

out grievous interruptions — if you ask me whether such a country has over the long run a good chance of competing with a purposeful, serious and disciplined society such as that of the Soviet Union, I must say that the answer is *no*."

Now, what does all this add up to? I certainly do not want to cry *havoc* about my country, but I am convinced, as I said at the start of this talk, that we are facing a period of extreme crisis and a watershed of history. The trends of the recent past are clear. We have a carefully and closely defined, a rigidly limited, budget. The limited budget and the current division of the budget, faced with the irreconcilable factors of inflation, rising costs, the outflow of gold, have meant that something has had to give, and what has given is military manpower and the size of the operating forces, and flexibility. Our commitments have remained the same or have increased; our capability of meeting them has been reduced. We have tended more and more toward an inflexible concept, and toward a static rather than a dynamic policy — toward a materialistic society contented with itself, rather than a young, idealistic, eager nation. Militarily we have tended to deify the machine rather than man who in my opinion is the whole heart and soul of the battle.

Now so much for the trends of our time, where we stand in the world struggle, the background factors which shape our current national policy and strategic concepts. I feel sometimes like Satchel Paige, the ancient ballplayer, who kept pitching the older he got. You remember he finally left the minor leagues at the age of 52 and went out to Hollywood to carve a career for himself, and his final aphorism about how he stayed young appeals to me when I look at the world around me. He said, "Never look behind you, something might be gaining on you!"

Before we examine our current strategic concepts we have, of course, to know what our national policy, our foreign policy, is, because at least, in theory, our national policy, our foreign policy, should determine the strategic concepts the we develop to support that policy. I am going to speak in general terms now, first in the

interest of simplification and the interest of time, and second to clarify.

Globally the United States is a "have" nation; we have essentially a static — a defensive policy to hold what we've got; sometimes I don't think we even have that. When I read the paper this morning and saw that the President had suggested that perhaps Panama should have some symbol of sovereignty over the Canal Zone I felt that we lacked determination to hold what we've got. But we are essentially a "have" nation; in a political sense we are on the defensive; we are still wed to the policy of containment — not roll-back. This administration came into office with the idea, as you know, of possible liberation of the captive nations. That has been abandoned as a goal. The real test was Hungary and we did not move; our aims are defensive, containment.

The second great policy that has dominated our post-war years has been a policy of filling the vacuums of power left by World War II — the political, the economic, the military vacuums around the world with the help of the American dollar, with political alliances, and, where needed, with the help of American armed forces. On the whole, particularly in western Europe, we have done this, I think, quite well. We have tried to prevent those vacuums from being dominated by Soviet Russia and filled by them. We have had some conspicuous failures; most conspicuous of all was the communization of China, but we have also had some successes. That was the second major policy. And thirdly, we have hitched our political policies, our foreign policies, to the goal of collective security, of international cooperation. We are convinced that we cannot live alone in this new world of foreshortened frontiers and we have built up organizations like NATO and SEATO. We are no longer, at least in political policy, an isolated nation.

Now, these national policies — these three I have mentioned, should shape and form the strategic concepts that are needed to support them. Now, let's take a look at our current strategy. Our current strategy is still fundamentally devoted to the concept that we will plan to utilize nuclear weapons in any war against Soviet

Russia — the utilization of nuclear weapons is to be taken for granted at least for planning purposes. We still stick, though with some modifications, to the massive retaliation doctrine enunciated by the late John Foster Dulles, when he said we would choose a place and time of our own choosing to retaliate as we wish against any aggressor. Of course, he meant nuclear retaliation.

There has been some walk-back on that policy. The National Security Council has lent at least lip-service to the idea that we must also provide a deterrent against conventional war — limited war — and has urged some strengthening of limited war forces. But essentially and basically the massive retaliation policy still dominates our strategic concept. Now, this has been coupled in recent concepts with the doctrine, not of preventive war but of *preemptive war*. In other words, if we are certain that Russia is preparing an attack — a nuclear attack upon the United States — if we are certain from our intelligence, or other sources, that missiles are about to be fired, or planes are being assembled on air bases for such an attack, we will try to strike first at their missile bases and air bases, in order to prevent the attack from being launched, or at least to blunt the enemy's attack.

Another factor of major importance to our military concepts is the dominance, due in large part to the two preceding factors — the massive retaliation doctrine and the preemptive doctrine, — the dominance of the Air Force in the national defense picture. The existing budget allocation for the next budget, for the next fiscal year, is roughly the same that it has been in the past five years since the new look of the Eisenhower administration was adopted — about 46-48% for the Air Force, 26-28% for the Navy and Marines, 22-24% for the Army.

But these strategic concepts which we have adopted have been shaped and hammered and forged by the factors that I mentioned in the first part of my talk — the emphasis upon a level budget, inflation, the flight of gold, and all these other internal factors which contribute to crises. There is a growing and clear-cut ambivalence, in my opinion, between our political goals and

our military methods of achieving those goals. For instance, we have, in our emphasis upon massive retaliation and preemptive attack, and upon this fixed allocation of the budget between the services, tended to produce inflexibility, because everything is keyed to this one concept of massive nuclear attack which certainly produces an over-killed capability. With the planes that we have in this country, the number of planes and weapons that can deliver nuclear weapons against an enemy, we can devastate Russia many times over. The preemptive attack doctrine has tended to create a desire, a need for unlimited forces and infinite goals — unattainable goals. Quite obviously, if your main target is going to be the enemy's missile bases and the enemy's air bases, the more of those the Russians acquire, the more missiles and the more planes we will have to have if that is going to be our main target. It is a geometric progression. There is no end in sight — the objective keeps going up, and up, and up. And this has also resulted — all these factors combined — the limited budget, the division of the budget, the emphasis upon massive retaliation — in a very clear-cut reduction of our limited war capability and at the same time a trend toward a Fortress America concept. There is no doubt that we have spent billions, — I think the last figure that Congress produced was about 32 billion dollars — on purely defensive measures for the North American continent since about 1950. Included in this, of course, is the Air Defense Command and the various radar warning lines, DEW lines, the Navy's share of the offshore barriers, and so on. Now we are spending billions more on B MEWS stations against ballistic missiles, and although we haven't yet spent the billions there are many advocates who urge that we provide still more billions on the Nike-Zeus and the anti-ballistic defense system, and scores of billions on civilian defense.

Thus our current political and military policies present to my mind curious contradictions. Politically we stand for collective security — militarily we are trending toward a Fortress America. I would hasten to add, and I want to make this quite clear, that this has not occurred as yet completely. This is not all black and

not all white. We are still overseas in strength; we still have a capability for fighting limited wars. The Tactical Air Command, which I visited yesterday with its composite air strike force, capable of getting overseas in a hurry; the Strategic Army Corps of the army; the amphibious forces of the marines, etc. — all have a capability for meeting these brushfire wars. But the current trend is clear. We are trending more and more toward a Fortress America concept. Not long ago in the Pentagon I heard a very well-informed and high-ranking officer predict that if the present trend continued, we would be out of Europe by 1965, and another officer who shared with me a great deal of concern over the state of the country, said that he was afraid we would make decisions or fail to make them between now and the end of this administration which might determine whether the country would remain great.

Well, now having reviewed our present position, what should we do about it? Let's try to play Secretary of Defense or President of the United States, or even God, and see what kind of strategic concept, what kind of military organization we need. I know you gentlemen are studying here to assume high command and staff positions in which you may be able to influence the course of the country's future, and I am sure this school with its flexibility of ideas and its stimulus of thought is never going to produce the somewhat limited type of staff officer described in that classic definition produced long ago in the Infantry Journal. I quote: "The typical staff officer is a man past middle life, spare, wrinkled, intelligent, cold, passive, non-committal, with eyes like a codfish, polite in contact, but at the same time unresponsive, cool, calm, and as damnably composed as a concrete post or a plaster of Paris cast; a human petrifaction, with a heart of feldspar and without charm of the friendly germ; minus bowels, passions or a sense of humor. Happily, they never reproduce and all of them finally go to hell."

First, what principles should dominate our strategic concepts in the years ahead? Number one, to me, is that any valid military policy must support a finite and attainable political goal. The aim of any rational conflict is not, and never can be, uncon-

ditional surrender or total destruction. Unlimited political goals, such as the destruction of an ideology, lead to unlimited military aims, to infinite expenditures and to disaster. The operational words of any military policy must be *finite* and *attainable*. And, second, the pace of the technological revolution demands top priority and generous funding for research and development in all weapons fields. Not for production, necessarily; this is where I differ with the Army. I do not think we would be wise to fund Nike-Zeus for production today, but I think we would be very unwise if we did not fund Nike-Zeus to the maximum extent of our capability for research and development. A break-through in technology could conceivably alter the entire structure of our defense.

Third, is a negativism; a Fortress America strategic concept cannot possibly support the nation's political and economic policies in the years ahead. There was a time, obviously, when isolationism as a political-military policy was viable, but it is not a viable policy today and cannot be tomorrow. Missiles and jet planes have altered the time/space factor and nuclear weapons have postulated a threat to our existence as a nation. I don't need to stress to this audience that a defense based upon our own shores is impossible. It sacrifices the advantage of bases overseas, outposts and warning lines. Moreover, and more important, withdrawal into our frontiers would imply political, psychological and economic defeat — a slow withering away; our allies would slough away. Nothing could be so well calculated to insure the domination of the world by communism. Our entire post-war security concept has been, and must be built, upon collective security.

Now, fourth, a corollary to this proposition is self-evident. Any military policy we adopt should have as one of its primary purposes the security of the home base. In other words, we must attempt in the future as we have done in the past, to keep war away from our own shores, to fight it on the broad seas, in space or in the air, or in other continents.

Fifth, invulnerability to surprise attack is a key requirement to the successful nuclear deterrent of the future; and sixth, flexi-

bility and rapid reaction to an entire spectrum of challenges is essential if we would be able to make the punishment fit the crime and if we would be able to meet a limited enemy aggression with limited means.

Now, in the implementation of these principles, the characteristics of the forces required can be grouped, it seems to me, for the sake of convenience, under two general heads. They are not necessarily exclusive: the requirements of nuclear deterrence and the requirements of limited war. The requirements of deterrence can, I think, be logically considered only if we consider attack against the United States by a rational ruler, or by a rational act — you cannot provide defense against irrational rulers — there is no way of convincing an irrational ruler that a deterrent is viable, that I know of. But if you could provide a nuclear retaliatory force that would insure the destruction of two to three hundred Soviet cities, that would knock out every Soviet city, say above 50,000 population, a force that was invulnerable to enemy surprise attack, regardless of what the enemy did, then I would think you would have produced a deterrent which would be convincing to any rational ruler. But he would have to know that that force existed, was ready, and that the national will to use it was there.

Now invulnerability can be provided by a number of means — by purely defensive means if you could actually provide a sort of a death ray which would knock aircraft or missiles out of the skies, if you can imagine such a thing. It can be provided by mobility, and it can be provided by hiding the particular launching vehicles so that they cannot be found. It seems to me very clear that within the state of the art today the sea-launched Polaris missile best fits the definition of our needs for an invulnerable deterrent. It is both mobile and it can be hidden; no one can predict ahead of time where it will be found. It has certain disadvantages — communications problems, for instance — but I believe that these can be licked, and if you can establish a nuclear deterrent force with the capability of knocking out every one of the enemy cities of any size, regardless of what he does first, I think that the deterrent is viable — the deterrent exists. In some future time, within

the state of the art, it is quite conceivable that a nuclear-powered aircraft, constantly orbiting the earth, carrying ballistic missiles to be fired against enemy targets, may be the answer in some measure, or the supplement, at least, to the Polaris submarine. And getting even more Buck Rogers, in some future time a variable orbit satellite capable of missile launching, might also take over this role.

Now, if you agree that the requirements of deterrence can be met by an invulnerable mobile force, what then do we need for conventional forces? What do we need for limited wars? Let me stress here that it seems to me that the threat that we face in the future is the threat of creeping communism, of a limited attack, of a continuation of the kind of thing that we have faced since World War II. There have been some 22 or 23 incidents since World War II in which military forces have been employed. Many of them have been at the instigation of communism.

Now, with the oceanic rimlands of the Eurasian continent — all of that vast continent of Eurasia with its rimlands threatened by the heartland enemy, and with the surrounding seas and skies as the only avenue of attack and line of communications to the other continents, it is clear that mobile sea power must play a major role as a deterrent to limited, as well as to unlimited, attack. Only by sea can collective security be preserved. Without sea power Korea could have been overrun, western Europe absorbed little by little, southeast Asia attacked. Sea power, of course, today means air power above the seas, as well as ships upon and beneath the surface. It must control the lines of supply to our allies — must be capable of transporting land power to nearly any point around the periphery of Eurasia and must be able to support land power within range of sea power's weapons.

In addition to this requirement which is fundamental as a deterrent for limited war there is need, in my opinion, for three types of land power in the threatened rimlands, with the necessary air support to make land power effective. First, is the need for indigenous forces in the rimland nations or in Africa to maintain

internal security and prevent a communist coup and to pull the trigger to start the fighting in case of external invasion. In a large nation such as France and England, such forces are assured. Our difficulty with foreign military aid has occurred chiefly in the smaller, more backward nations. Here, I think, we have made two mistakes. We have attempted in some countries to create armies too much after our own image, not taking into consideration adequately the terrain or the social character of the country, the nature of the peoples, etc., and we have allowed political and psychological considerations to be overemphasized at the expense of military effectiveness. Some of the smaller armies have become much too big, for instance in Iraq. Some time ago we provided 8" howitzers and a number of tanks for Iraq, a nation which was not capable of either utilizing those weapons or employing or maintaining them. In many cases these smaller armies have been over-organized and over-equipped with no clear purpose save national prestige in view. What a country like Iran or Iraq needs, standing alone, is a small force to resist external aggression. Iran could not possibly hope to halt that aggression. Her defense is clearly dependent upon collective security. But what she must have is a trigger force that will fire the shot heard around the world and that will invoke sanctions, will call her allies to her aid. That force should be capable of delay, of harassment, of intelligence collection. Indigenous forces should be carefully organized and trained for demolitions, for guerrilla warfare, and for stay-behind activities. Yet our training emphasis in many of our MAGs has been upon formal warfare rather than upon the only kind of war small nations can fight today against major aggressors — unconventional war, harassment and delay, guerrilla war. This is the first kind of land power I think we need.

The second is a kind that you see in Germany today — the kind of land power formally organized and equipped — fairly sizeable forces such as those found in western Germany and Korea, to hold certain key gateways and to stabilize the political situation in those countries. There is no doubt that Europe should furnish the bulk of her own defense and I think that this is likely to occur

as western Germany arms. Even so, American land power is going to be required if only in a static sentinel role for some time to come, not only to bolster the still-weak armies of the west, but as a pragmatic on-the-scene pledge of collective security. If all our forces are withdrawn from foreign commitments and the United States pins its deterrent entirely upon atomic retaliation, we can scarcely expect our allies to remain steadfast, for if some minor aggression occurs, and we have no answer to it except atomic ruin for ourselves as well as the enemy, the deterrent is not credible either to our allies or to the enemy. Soldiers on the scene are the best evidence of American determination to fight for freedom. Now this second role is obviously one which the army is best equipped to fill and which it has filled extremely well. There is a third kind of land power needed — a mobile force ready for action around the rimland of Eurasia or elsewhere in the world. Such a force need not be large. I think it has become somewhat too large in the Army's Strategic Army Corps. Its costs would be prohibitive if it was large and its rapid transportation impossible, if it was numbered in hundreds of thousands. But it should be highly trained for all kinds of limited conflict. It should be better equipped than any enemy it may face. It must be heavily supported by sea, by air power, and above all it must have a rapid reaction time. Such a fire brigade instantly in action against a small brush-fire might well extinguish the blaze before it became a conflagration. The Marines and our amphibious forces, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific, have this capability. In addition, the Army has established in its Strategic Army Corps an airborne reaction which supplements, as it did in Lebanon, the seaborne reaction of the Marines. Some of you may not know, if you haven't been in the Mediterranean recently, that the Marines have augmented their reaction ability, and that in the Sixth Fleet, by helicopter transportation. They now have permanently with them one LSD with some helicopters aboard which would enable them to land at least a company by helicopter over the beach instead of using the old conventional way of landing by amphibious craft.

My criticism of our mobile deterrent capability is that there is some slight overlap between the Marines and the Strategic Army Corps, and my feeling is strong as I have said before publicly, that the Army would do better to concentrate on rapid reaction time rather than upon mass — upon getting one well-armed battle group to the scene within hours rather than in getting, say, a division to the scene within weeks.

These three types of land power are required then as a deterrent to limited wars.

Well, you may say then, what are the requirements of organization?

First, gentlemen, I would emphasize civilian control of policy. That does not necessarily mean, in my mind, civilian administration — something that we have come to. I believe in strategy by a committee. I do not believe in the formulation of strategy by one mind. In any case, in our form of government, strategy will be formulated by committee because even if you have a single Chief of Staff in the Pentagon he is not going to be the final determiner of strategy. Nowadays decisions are far too vast to be made in the Pentagon. They must be made at the President's level — the National Security Council, the Bureau of the Budget, etc. We must provide for centralized direction, for quick reaction time, and for decentralized and flexible operations and administration, and this latter we have failed to do. This big bureaucratic government, the tremendous numbers of assistants to assistants — civilian and otherwise — that have been built up in the Pentagon and outside of the Pentagon and in other branches of government, have tended to interfere, to confuse, to slow down. I don't believe, at least as of today, in the creation of purely functional forces except in certain narrow areas perhaps. A functional force would seem to me to create a requirement, to generate a requirement for more costs — for duplication. What is a destroyer? Is it a limited war force? Is it a radar picket ship for air defense? Is it an anti-submarine weapon? It is all of these and a good bit more. Obviously, if you are going to pick this destroyer and say, "You will perform only an anti-subma-

rine function; you will be only an air defense weapon; you will be only a limited war force," you either sacrifice some of your other functions, or you build "X" number of destroyers — as many destroyers as there are functions — so that each one of those functions can have a destroyer.

I do not believe in a single Chief of Staff. I feel that the best interests of the country are to be filled by compromise, by hammering out on the top level the differences of viewpoints and ideologies between the services. I believe very strongly that the National Security Council must be strengthened in its role and it must place higher importance upon psychological warfare — upon the influence on this great world conflict through which we are passing, of political and psychological factors. There is no notice whatsoever shown at any level in Washington except way down the line in the Pentagon of the importance of Soviet space achievements upon United States prestige. Certainly the importance of the psychological factor has not been reflected at the top level.

And I believe that the final requirement for this new kind of force, for this strategic concept which I have been enunciating, is a frank recognition that man is, must be, and will remain the king of battle. Perhaps some of you read Mr. Khrushchev's speech yesterday in Hungary. He boasted about his rockets and he boasted about his military strength, but he ended by saying, above all, "We have the will to win." This is the key, in my opinion, to any strategic concept. Modernize this ultimate weapon, man, select him more carefully, give him tough, hard training, give him wonderful leadership — the sooner we can end the draft the better from my point of view. I believe in an all-volunteer force. Certainly, I believe in the need for thorough study — a restudy of the procurement of military personnel.

And finally, gentlemen, in summary and conclusion, to recapitulate, first, strategy like diplomacy, is the art of the possible — it must be flexible. The drift toward frozen concepts, inflexible centralized control, one immutable answer to a whole spectrum of challenges, must be halted. And second, a flexible strategy must be

the product of many minds, not one. A single service, a single Chief of Staff, would inevitably tend toward a single military party line. Third, a finite nuclear deterrent must support a finite political goal. Fourth, our limited war capability must be strengthened. Fifth, the rigid adherence to a level defense budget, and the present distribution of the budget among the armed services must both be abandoned if the foregoing requirements are to be met. Sixth, man as a leader, a fighter, and not merely a pusher of buttons, man with a rifle in his hand and the will to win in his heart, is still the primary determinant of battle. And finally, gentlemen, only in the widest of horizons can we find even a relative security tomorrow. A Fortress America is forever gone — gone with Tyre and Sidon, as obsolete as the Maginot Line. We must look unto the seas for our strength, the windswept surfaces, the uncharted depths, the skies above. Unless we use the wide waters as a base for deterrent, highway for commerce, medium for attack, bastion for defense and supply line to victory, the years to come will witness the slow end of the American dream.[1]

[1]The concluding portion of this talk and various other paragraphs in it were quoted, or paraphrazed from an article by the author, written for the Marine Corps Gazette, scheduled for publication in March 1960.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Mr. Hanson Baldwin

Present Position: Military editor, *New York Times.*

Schools:
Naval Academy, 1924.

Career Highlights:

1924-27 Service in U. S. Navy aboard battleships and a destroyer.

1927-29 Police reporter on *Baltimore Sun*, later general assignment reporter.

1929-59 With *New York Times* as military and naval correspondent, and military editor since 1942.

Miscellaneous:

Authored *Men and Ships of Steel* (with W. F. Palmer), 1935; *The Caissons Roll — A Military Survey of Europe*, 1938; *Admiral Death*, 1939; *What the Citizens Should Know About the Navy*, 1941; *United We Stand!* 1941; *Strategy for Victory*, 1942; *The Price of Power*, 1948; *Great Mistakes of the War*, 1950; *Sea Fights and Shipwrecks*, 1955.

Editor *We Saw it Happen* (with Shepard Stone), 1938.

Contributed articles to *New York Times Magazine, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Harpers, Atlantic Monthly.*

Awarded Pulitzer Prize in 1942.