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PRINTER'S CORRECTIONS

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Page 27, line 33, change "Rusians" to "Russians"

Page 31, line 13, change "or" to "of"

Page 40, line 32, change "seperate" to "separate"

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF THE USSR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 30 September 1959 by
Professor Merle Fainsod

My subject, "The Historical and Cultural Background of the USSR" is so huge that it is necessary, I think, to carve it up into some sort of manageable piece, and what I would like to do is to focus on the historical roots and the historical background of the Bolshevik Revolution.

I understand that yesterday you had a lecture on "Communism in Theory and Practice," and I am going to assume that this is part of the background on which we can draw, but in order to understand the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, while it is important to have this Marxist heritage in mind, we cannot stop with the ideas of Marx. We have to understand the special nature of the Russian revolutionary movement and the conditions which produced it. One must understand that Russian Marxism in its Bolshevik form was not merely an importation and an adaptation of the ideas of Marx in Russia, that it was not merely a response to the introduction of western industrialism into Russia, but that it was also deeply influenced in its formative stages by the traditions of the Russian revolutionary movement of which it was a part.

As you know, what differentiated the Bolshevik party from the mass labor and socialist parties of western Europe was the concept of the party as a conspiratorial organization, a select band of professional revolutionaries who were bound together by iron discipline and who were activists to the core. Now, that conception was a product of specific conditions in Tsarist Russia, and to understand it we have to dip into Russian history. Let me begin by noting certain factors in Russian development that are important for an understanding of the Russian revolutionary movement.

First, Russia's backwardness in joining the march of what we call western civilization. It is worth remembering that Russia was

conquered by the Mongols, the Tatars, in the 13th century, and that the Mongol-Tatar conquests lasted for about two and one-half centuries until 1480. While Russia lay prostrate under the yoke of the Asian conquerors, the peoples of Western Europe were in the process of creating a new civilization and going through their Renaissance, transforming the medieval structure of society into what we call modern civilization.

Now, the two and one-half centuries of the Mongol yoke left certain scars on Russia — scars that are still visible. Some of them, I think, are worth noting. First, it left as a heritage an intense and stubborn hatred of foreign rule. To expel the foreign invaders from the Russian homeland became something of a holy mission. Second, it affected the character of the Russian government — the evolution of Tsardom — the peculiar character of Russian autocracy.

The formula of the Mongols and the Tatars during their years of dominance had been to keep the Russians divided, to exhaust them by endless tribute paying, but the formula broke down out of the confusion of many Russian principalities. There emerged the princes of Moscow, shrewd, cold-blooded, hard-headed. They became the agents, the tribute collectors of the Khans, and in the process they also learned much from their conquerors, especially about the character of autocratic rule. Then, with the help of the Russian Orthodox Church, they revolted and began to gather up what they called Russia's patrimony — that is, the lands that had formerly been Russian, and these they welded together into their own autocracy. They had their time of troubles at the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th centuries. Sometimes this is called Russia's War of the Roses — civil war — but the wars ended in a thorough destruction of Russia's princely class, the boyars, and the Tsar grew in power as his political competitors, the boyars, were weakened. Under Peter the Great at the beginning of the 18th century, the state became essentially a hierarchy of castes, each with its appointed duties and responsibilities. The serf owed duty to the squire. The squire, too, was in his way a serf owing duty to the Tsar. He was privileged but he was also duty-bound, and the church, too, was subordinated to the state, and at the top of this structure stood the

Tsar, the all-powerful autocrat, the successor of the Khans. In part as a result of this desperate struggle to free Russia from the foreign yoke, to secure unity, to consolidate power within the state, the Russians lost what few elements they had of really democratic political life. A very limited form of local self-government persisted in the form of the village community, the "mir" so-called, with its communal lands, its strip farming, its provisions for periodic redistribution by the community of lands of the "mir." It is easy, I think, to exaggerate the importance of the "mir." The real struggle to impose constitutional limits on the authority of the Tsar was the product of the 19th and the early 20th centuries. That struggle miscarried. Despite some concessions, Russian Tsardom adhered to its traditional ideology of autocracy and the tradition of the Tatar Khans lived on wrapped in a Russian guise.

Now, the Mongol yoke left another persisting impress — the feeling that since Russia was backward, since it had fallen behind Western Europe, it was necessary to catch up, to learn from Western Europe. It was necessary not only to catch up, but to surpass the achievements of Europe. You have been listening to Khrushchev on this theme — it is an old theme. "Catch up and surpass," the Russians say.

Sometimes, as with Peter the Great, away back in the early part of the 18th century, the idea was confined only to borrowing techniques of industry and technical organization. Sometimes, as with an important intellectual school of the 19th century, Westernizers so-called, it also extended to borrowing political ideas, forms of political organization, the ideas of Marx among other things. But whatever form it takes, one catches in the centuries of Russian history, a sense of inferiority before the West, an inferiority which is deep-seated and which even produced, by way of reaction, a kind of over-compensated Slavophilism with its pride in things indigenously Russian. And some of Khrushchev's pronouncements on this last visit, I think, illustrate this kind of drive, but behind this drive lies long centuries of inferiority, of the mood of self-deprecation.

Let me just read to you poems of the 19th and 20th centuries which give you some of this feeling. Here is a poem called "Fatherland":

How ugly nature is here truly
Fields whose meek flatness gives offense
Bare legs taking big bellied wenchies on their way
Poor peasant shod with base that's rotting
Roads that facilitate delay
Wretched views from manor houses of landscaping,
bizarre
Filth, vileness, stench, cockroaches swarming, the
knout supreme on every hand,
And that is what our countless boobies keep calling
sacred fatherland.

Here is another one — a very famous poem by Alexander Blok called "The Scythians," written just after the revolution, written to the West:

You are the millions, we are multitude
And multitude and multitude,
Come, fight! Yea, we are Scythians,
Yea, Asians, a squint-eyed, greedy brood.
For you — the centuries, for us — one hour.
Like slaves, obeying and abhorred,
We were the shield between the breeds
Of Europe and the raging Mongol horde.
For centuries your eyes were toward the East.
Our pearls you hoarded in your chests,
And mockingly you bode the day
When you could aim your cannon at our breasts.
Yea, Russia is a Sphinx, Exulting, grieving,
And sweating blood, she cannot sate
Her eyes that gaze and gaze and gaze
At you with stone-lipped love for you, and hate.

Well, I could expand this theme. Here for example, is a speech by Stalin at the end of the twenties, and in this speech, which was

written to make the case for industrialization, borrowing techniques again from the West, Stalin said:

“The history of old Russia is the history of defeats due to backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol-Khans; she was beaten by the Swedish feudal barons; she was beaten by the Polish Lithuanian squires; she was beaten by the Anglo-French capitalists; she was beaten by the Japanese barons — all beat her for her backwardness, for military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for governmental backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness. Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? We are 50 to 100 years behind the advanced countries. We must cover this distance in 10 years; either we do this or they will crush us.”

Now, if you want to understand some of the dynamism behind this drive to attain supremacy, you must see it, I think, against this long tableau of backwardness and of the struggle to overcome it. Well, these factors which I have stressed — the hatred of foreign rule, the peculiar shape of Russian autocracy with its very limited opportunities for experience in self-government, this sense of inferiority and backwardness before the West — all of this is important for an understanding of Russia, or an understanding of the peculiar shape of the Russian revolutionary movement.

Now, I would like to turn to an analysis of the development of the Russian revolutionary movement, and the first point that I should like to make about it is that the movement is, above all, revolution from above; that its leadership comes from the intellectual classes — what the Russians call the intelligentsiya. We sometimes refer to them as the intelligentsia. Lenin, himself, as you know, was a member of the minor nobility. Many of those who surrounded him came from the same social milieu, and these leaders started out as the rankest amateurs of revolution, but as we will see, out of the fire of their experience they emerge as professionals, expert practitioners of the revolutionary art. There *is* one important exception to this generalization that I have just made, and that is that there is also

a tradition in Russia of a popular peasant uprising under peasant leadership. You find it exemplified in the uprising led by Stenka Razin in the 17th century, by Pugachev in the 18th century, and so on. But these risings are like the French peasant risings, the Jacquerie; that is, rather formless, anarchic, without real direction. Indeed in Russia, insofar as they have a philosophy, it is still a belief in the messianic mission of the Tsar, who according to the peasants is being misled by his advisers, and who, if you could only get to him, since he is a good man, would liberate the common people from the exploitations to which they are being subjected by the nobility and bureaucracy. And you have some interesting continuations of this tradition in current Soviet practice. That is, you allow criticism, you see, of the lower ranks — the top is immune, at least while it is still alive — and you seek to divert it from the top, and you seek to preserve the notion that the top is a kind of dispenser of mercy.

Well, now to come back to the emerging revolutionary role of the intelligentsia. It begins to emerge in an important fashion in the reign of Catherine the Great toward the end of the 18th century, as the winds of doctrine from Western Europe began to circulate in the court and in the circles around the court. Earlier, of course, it is true that Peter the Great, in the words of Pushkin, had cut a window through into Europe, but Peter's interests were thoroughly practical. He was not interested in borrowing ideas; he was interested in borrowing techniques. With Catherine the window was opened to ideas, philosophy, French liberal thought, English thought, Voltaire, Montesquieu, the Encyclopedists, Adam Smith. These began to be read in Russia and they became the intellectual possession of a small class of intellectuals in Russia. But the Popular rising (the peasant rising of Pugachev) and rumors of the excesses of the French Revolution frightened Catherine, and an abrupt stop was put to the journalistic activity which was inspired by western ideas. A rigid censorship was imposed on all periodicals, books, and other publications. Catherine the Great even put under the censorship, under the ban, her own book, *The Nakaz*, the instruction book, the book she had written under the influence of Montesquieu and which embodied her ideas of how she proposed to reform and govern

Russia. And so the intellectual ferment which began in the early part of Catherine's reign was forced into the underground where it largely remained through the reign of her successor, Alexander the First.

The next important episode in the history of the Russian revolutionary movement is known as the Decembrist movement, because of the military insurrection which took place under the leadership of a group of progressive army officers in Petrograd during December 1825 at the time of the death of the emperor, Alexander I, and the accession of Nicholas I. Now the members of this Decembrist movement were mostly army officers of liberal inclination who had gotten out into Europe at the time of the Napoleonic war and had familiarized themselves there with French ideas and who hoped to see Russia reform after western constitutional models. What these people wanted to do was to abolish serfdom, to adopt a constitution, to extend education, reform justice, to establish institutions of local self-government, to guarantee individual rights and freedom of conscience — by our standards not very revolutionary ideas. But by the standards of Russia at the time these, of course, challenged the very foundations of Tsardom. And these ideas were disseminated secretly in small societies organized for the study of political and social questions — these societies, patronized by these army officers, and some of the members of the intelligentsia who gathered around. These people had no popular followers, and indeed, the insurrection which they sponsored, which was intended to capitalize on the confusion of the change of reign, proved abortive. The leaders were either executed or banished to Siberia, and Nicholas I, who succeeded to the throne, dedicated himself to the task of eradicating any trace of liberalism in the Russian empire. The press censorship was made more rigid, iron discipline was established in the army and in the bureaucracy, and the intellectual classes, at least those of them with independent ideas, were virtually forced out of political life. And this helped, as we shall see, to produce one of the tragedies of the Russian liberal intelligentsia — it was deprived of the opportunity of acquiring practical political experience, it was virtually forced into a life of irresponsibility — a

life of loose word spinning, endless discussions in conspiratorial secrecy of the fate of Russia, without the opportunity really to cut their teeth in practice and do something about it, and to acquire a sense of what the problems and difficulties were.

During the reign of Nicholas I, from 1825 to 1854, the loyalties of the intellectuals, insofar as they were permitted, began to divide among two rival camps — the camp of the Slavophiles, so-called, and the camp of the Westernizers. The experience of the Napoleonic war — the Russian victory in that war — strengthened the national consciousness, and poets, novelists, and authors now began to express their pride in Russia — express the feeling that it was the West that was decadent — that the Slavs were the people with a future. Some of them did this, and searching for unique features of their own strength, the more reactionary among them found it in autocracy, in the church and in the peasant land commune of the mir. It was against the background of this Slavophilism, this resurgent pride, that Nicholas I and the Minister of Education, Count Uvarov, developed his famous trinity of orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationalism. "Our task," he said, "consists in establishing such an education for the nation as will unify in itself the spirit of orthodoxy, of autocracy, and of nationalism."

This nationalistic or Slavophil trend naturally impressed itself in the public consciousness because of the favor with which it was regarded by the autocrat, but there was also a strong undercurrent of protest against this trend which was prevalent in the circles of the intelligentsia. One Belinsky, who became the leader of the protesting group of Westernizers, continued throughout this period to condemn the backwardness of Russia. He violently attacked what he called the nationality of birchbark sandals and peasant smocks, and he said as the objective of his group, "I love the freedom of thought and I hate all that limited it." The great Russian writer, Gogol, who started off as a critic of Russian society, had a kind of mystical phase and he identified himself with the status quo. Belinsky wrote a famous denunciatory letter to him in which he proclaimed this. He said, "Russia sees her salvation not in mysticism, nor in asceticism, nor pietism, but in the successes of civilization,

enlightenment and humanity. What she needs is not sermons — she has repeated them too often — but the awakening in the people of a sense of their human dignity, lost for so many centuries amid the dirt and refuse. She needs rights and laws conforming not to the preachings of the church, but with common sense and justice and their strictest possible observance.”

Well, there was this confrontation then of Slavophiles and Westernizers, and there were some among the intellectuals who tried to achieve a synthesis between Slavophilism and the Westernizers. Such a one, for example, was Alexander Herzen who is largely responsible for introducing Socialism into Russian thought. But Herzen despised the political forms of Western Europe — the whole apparatus of parliaments and representation — and on the other hand, he greatly admired the Russian village mir (he idealized it), with its principles of cooperative fellowship and its plain folk who composed it. Joining his likes and his dislikes together, Herzen called on Russia to throw off serfdom, throw off the nobility, the bureaucracy and the Byzantine church and to base her future on the peasants' partnership of the mir under the Tsar.

Well, this dream may seem fantastic, but it became important in Russia because the system of agrarian socialism and free federation which Herzen wove together became the stable ideas of the Narodniki — Populists of the 1870's — and of the Socialist Revolutionaries later, and you may remember that in the last free election in Russia in 1918, the elections for the constituent assembly, it was these Socialist Revolutionaries — the SRs — who carried the majority of the country.

Meanwhile, during the period of the reign of Nicholas I, a certain ferment of critical ideas continued, but it was an underground ferment confined to small circles, not permitted public ventilation or expression. It was still predominately the ferment of conversation, but there was already one important exception. That was Michael Bakunin who was particularly important for our purposes because of his influence on the Bolsheviks. Bakunin's importance consists in the fact that he was the first of the intellectuals in his generation to burst the bonds of conversation and to

take on the career of a professional revolutionary. From 1848 on — he was a huge giant of a man — we see this Russian giant with enormous vitality rushing, roaring, swearing all over Europe, devising conspiracies against the established governments — Russia, Austria, the German and Italian rulers — laying fire wherever there was something to burn. His ideas were confused, his objectives were far from clear; he was, if anything, an anarchist, but what he loved above all was action — revolution. Herzen said of him that he had a way of mistaking the second month of gestation for the ninth, that he enjoyed all of the preliminary bustle of the Polish revolt in the sixties as though he was getting ready a Christmas tree. A Frenchman who worked with him in Paris said that he was a treasure on the first day of a revolution, but it was a good idea to shoot him on the second. The judgment of Nicholas I is also to the point. Nicholas I said, “He is a brave fellow, but we must keep him locked up.”

Now, what makes Bakunin important? It was not his romantic madness, but the fact that he developed in thorough-going form, the theory and practice of a conspiratorial band of professional revolutionaries who would be able to seize and hold power almost regardless of the attitudes of the mass of the people, the leverage, you see, of the organized minority.

Bakunin was a great admirer of the Jesuits, and taking his cue from what he admired only, what he conceived to be their organizational vitality, he attributed their power and vitality to the complete effacement of the personal will in the perfection of the collective organization. And he sought to construct an organization that was strictly selected, that was bound to absolute obedience toward the superiors in the organization, that was severed from all connections outside the organization, that knew no moral obligations outside the good of the organization.

In the hands of Bakunin's disciple, Nechayev, his ideas mis-carried and produced a great scandal in Russia when Nechayev arranged to murder one of the student members of his group who was suspected of the intention of turning informer. Nevertheless, the scheme in its essentials as I described it became a living part

of the activist revolutionary tradition in Russia, and it was a tradition on which the Bolsheviks were to draw. If you are interested in following this through in novel form, for example, perhaps some of you have read it, Dostoevsky's novel, *The Possessed*. It is also available, I think, under a different title in the Penguin series. It is called, *The Devils*. This is a novel about the Bakuninist and the Nechayev groups, the conspiratorial five, and it will give you the pattern. What is important, I think, for our purpose is that the essentials of this scheme of organization — not the ideals but the scheme — were taken over later by Lenin and became a part of the organizational philosophy of Bolshevism. And it is perhaps also worth remarking that Marx did not have these organizational ideas and that he was a great enemy of Bakunin. Indeed, the First International eventually floundered on the great feud between Bakunin and Marx.

Well, now to continue this analysis of the development of the Russian revolutionary movement into the reign of Alexander II — 1854 - 1881. You remember that Alexander II came to power after the disastrous defeats of the Crimean War, and he came in promising radical reform and the result was to produce a great intellectual awakening among the intelligentsia. The six newspapers of the day of Nicholas I multiplied to sixty-six; the nineteen monthlies increased to one hundred fifty. Dostoevsky again has given us an unforgettable picture of the intellectual excitement of the salons in his novel, *The Possessed*. He says of this period: "They talked, they talked, they talked of the abolition of the censorship, and of the phonetic spelling and of the substitution of Latin characters for the Russian alphabet, of splitting Russia into nationalities united in a free federation, of the abolition of the army and the navy, of the restoration of Poland as far as the Dnieper, of the peasant reforms, and of the manifestoes, of the abolition of the hereditary principles, the family of children, of creeds, of women's rights, and so on. They talked." But the first flush of enthusiasm died down when the conditions of the act of emancipation of the serfs in 1861 became known. When it appeared that even though the serfs were being freed, they were being condemned to what amounted to poverty as a result of the small size of the land allotments and the high price and high

interest rates charged for the purchase of the lands. A strong current of disillusionment set in among the intelligentsia and it is in this phase of the development of the Russian revolutionary movement that the insurrectionist and terrorist elements began to come to the fore. Great hopes were placed in the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. The secret organizations, the intellectuals called Land and Liberty, planned a peasant rising for the summer of 1863. Nothing came of it. A number of the leaders were executed; an attempt was made to assassinate the Tsar in April 1866. That also was a failure. The societies that had helped plan the assassination were discovered, many of their members sent to Siberia. But the plan which failed in 1866 was eventually successful in 1881, but Russian revolutionaries during this period were by no means united on conspiracy and insurrection and terror. There was also an important group gathered around Peter Lavrov, who preached the virtues of education and propaganda. Lavrov said, "No revolution is possible until you go through a long period of preparation and education of the people." He argued that what the intelligentsia had to do was to stop talking with each other, and go out into the villages to teach the peasants, to help to awaken them out of their darkness. The result was something which assumed the proportions of a crusade — the famous movement of going to the people. In these years, 1872, 1873, and 1874, students, teachers, lawyers, doctors, officers, under the influence of Lavrov's teachings, joined in and swarmed over the countryside to begin to try to establish contacts with the people. The countryside, in a sense, was covered with crusaders and evangelists, and what happened is depicted in unforgettable fashion in another novel (I hope some of you have read it) called *Virgin Soil*. It is devoted to this episode.

Well, what happens is what might be expected, but what was for the people concerned, tragic. Rural Russia — illiterate, dark, could make nothing of these missionaries. The gulf which divided what the Russians called "people" from "persons" was too deep. Most of the intelligentsia did not know how to talk to the people when they reached them. The peasant did not understand what they were driving at. Many of the social missionaries were delivered

over to the police and in other cases the peasants under the influence of the church regarded the missionaries as representatives of anti-Christ. The experience of the intelligentsia was sobering and disillusioning. Some of the soft ones committed suicide; others for the first time were brought up against realities. They began to recognize that vague idealism was not enough, that the task of educating the peasant was more than a week end in the country, that patient organization was required, and all life had to be lived together. A few — too few — digested the lesson, and they settled down in the countryside to undertake the long, disagreeable tasks of overcoming suspicion and proving their usefulness to the peasant. Many — too many — flocked back to the towns and the cities, there to agonize their sick consciences in conversation and, when the pressures became too great, to break out with heroic acts of terrorism which brought the police down on town and country alike. As one of the organizers who stayed behind in the countryside said, "As soon as we have started something going, bang! — the intellectuals have killed somebody, the police are on us. Why don't they give us a chance to educate and organize?"

Well, the tragic history of the Narodniki movement during the late seventies and early eighties is one of increasing dedication to terror. The triumph of the extremists found expression in the organization in 1879 of the *Narodnaya Volya*, the People's Will group, perhaps the first tightly organized Russian revolutionary party. Their triumph was not complete at the organizing meeting in June 1879. Some adherents of the old policy of agitation and permeation were still represented, among them one Plekhanov, who became a Marxist later and became the teacher of Lenin, but the immediate influence of those who advocated agitation rather than terror was negligible and their role in this period was completely overshadowed in the wave of terror which the Narodniki, or the People's Will group, unleashed.

Like all of its predecessors, the People's Will group was primarily concerned with the liberation of the peasantry. Russia was still an overwhelmingly rural country, and they felt that you needed constitutional reforms in order to achieve liberation. Indeed,

as the famous letter of their Executive Committee to Alexander III on his accession to the throne makes clear, their aim was a constituent assembly composed overwhelmingly of peasant representatives who, it was expected, would put a program of agrarian socialism into effect. But they were denied constitutional channels of expression and so they turned to terror instead, hoping through a series of key assassinations to organize and intimidate the government into concessions, to arouse the people, and to seize power in the cities. From the fall of 1879 to the spring of 1881, the terrorists waged a relentless duel with the government; one after another important official was killed. Finally, in March 1881, the People's Will group accomplished its chief aim, the assassination of the Tsar himself, Alexander II. But instead of ushering in a constituent assembly, the revolutionists only succeeded in intensifying the repression. The peasants were deaf to the revolutionary signal; after a short-lived panic in court circles, the reaction consolidated its hold. The People's Will groups were broken to pieces by the authorities; revolution was reduced, in the words of one boasting official, "to a cottage industry." So the Narodniki, the People's Will group, dwindled in effectiveness, although many of their ideas were later to be picked up by the Socialist Revolutionaries in the Twentieth Century.

During the next stage of the development of the Russian revolutionary movement in the 1890's, the Marxists began to come to the fore. The history of their growth and their developing influence is a large subject I shall not have time to treat this morning. You can find it developed in my book or many other places. Perhaps it is enough to note that one branch of the Marxists, the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, were able to draw on the organizing traditions of this revolutionary movement that I have sketched, this minority scheme by which you use your conspiratorial leverage to seize power. They were able to take power in November 1917. They were a small party, a minority party, but they were disciplined. They were activists; they were sure of their goals; the opposition was divided and scattered; they were blessed with unusually skillful leadership and the experience of 1917 tested this elite conception of a select band of professional revolutionaries and the conception survived the test.

Now, I am not one of those who believe that the triumph of the Bolsheviks was in any sense inevitable, but I would, I think, stress that Bolshevism as a movement was an indigenous, authoritarian response to the environment of Tsarist absolutism which nurtured it. The Tzars, in a sense, manufactured their own executioners. They manufactured them because they had never learned the wisdom of the Burkean adage that if you would preserve, it is necessary to reform. They were unwilling to share power with those members of the intelligentsia who were pressing for reform.

This estrangement between the Tsar and the intelligentsia turned out to be a tragedy for both sides. The autocracy was unable, unwilling, to harness the reforming zeal of the intelligentsia to state purposes, and the intelligentsia, in turn, were denied an opportunity to acquire experience in the arts of responsible government. They were condemned to pursue their dream of justice in conspiratorial violence, and they were driven to become more authoritarian in their organization and more maximalist in their demands. Deprived of the chance to share in power, deprived of the sobering discipline of facing up to real problems, the more restless and energetic spirits among the intelligentsia placed themselves at the head of all of the forces of discontent in Russian society. They ended up by releasing a Pandora's box of unintended consequences, which represented over a time a tragic betrayal of the dream of freedom on which their revolt was nourished.

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- 1936- Staff Member, Presidents' Committee on Administration Management.
- 1940- Consultant, Temporary National Economic Commission and visiting lecturer at Yale University.
- 1941-42 Price Executive, Consumers Durable Goods, Office of Price Administration.
- 1942-43 Director, Retail Trade and Services Division.
- 1943- Commissioned in Specialists Reserve, U. S. Army.
- 1944-45 Deputy Director, Civil Affairs Training School, Harvard University.
- 1946-49 Chairman, Department of Government, Harvard University.
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Miscellaneous:

Authored *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule; American People and Their Government* (with A. J. Lien); *International Socialism and the World War; Government and the American Economy* (with A. L. Gordon); *How Russia is Ruled*; and articles to *Public Administration Review; American Economic Review; Yale Law Journal*.

PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

A lecture delivered
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This morning we are looking at this question of European integration and what some of the problems, accomplishments and prospects are, and then I propose to look at it from three general viewpoints — the military, the political, and the economic. In each area there have been certain accomplishments and activities towards cooperation and integration. When I have finished all this, if it seems very simple to you, then I have not done the job properly, and you do not have a true picture of the situation. If it seems very complicated, just remember I am only touching on the major organizations, and I have not even mentioned scores of them which should be included.

Sometimes they may say of Europe, as has often been said of the British Empire, that it was put together in a fit of absent-mindedness. But this is not really the case, because there has been a lot of effort, a lot of work — tremendous programs — of trying to overcome the obstacles to get this thing going, since World War II.

But there is a tradition of unity in Europe. There is the legacy of the Roman Empire which has lingered on. There is the tradition of the unity of Christendom under the medieval church — the continuation of the concept of empire, particularly with the re-establishment under Charlemagne in 800 A.D.

The Europe of the Six, which we will talk about in a moment, follows very closely the area comprised in Charlemagne's empire. And then look over here at this map — the only exception is southern Italy and Switzerland. So there is a tradition of unity, as well as a tradition of rivalry in Europe. In medieval times scholars would move from one city to another without interruption, and there were no close ties to the idea of nationalism. As the areas broke up into the feudal states, and then later formed into

larger ones, the people still dreamed of continuing the empire — getting it together again. In 1305, for instance, when Pierre Dubois developed his project for the recovery of the Holy Land, he wanted to bring together a union of the princes of Europe with a council and a court for the purpose of rescuing the Holy Land from the infidel.

About 1600 you had Henry IV of France and his celebrated Grand Design. This surely is the first mention of a Europe of the Fifteen. His scheme envisaged fifteen European states with a council consisting of four commissioners from each of the Great Powers and three from each of the lesser powers; six regional councils, and an international army and navy. These were largely for the preservation of peace. Later you had, after the Congress of Vienna, the Holy Alliance, the Quadruple Alliance, and later on what came to be known as the Concert of Europe.

The League of Nations, after World War I, was pretty largely a European-dominated organization after the United States stepped out. By 1911 there were already some forty-five public international unions which were very largely European, brought together for various technical purposes. The situations though, in the period before World War I, had some features which seem attractive in the days since. A. J. P. Taylor wrote of this period:

“The Congress of Berlin made a watershed in the history of Europe. It had been preceded by thirty years of conflict and upheaval; it was followed by thirty-four years of peace. No European frontier was changed until 1913; not a shot was fired in Europe until 1912, except in two trivial wars that miscarried . . . coal and steel offered prosperity to all Europe and remade European civilization. Though protective tariffs remained everywhere except in Great Britain (even there the differences were very slight — about 5.7 per cent in Great Britain, 8.2 per cent in France, and 8.4 per cent in Germany; the only true protectionist countries were the United States, 18.5 per cent, and Russia with 35 per cent) international trade

otherwise was free. There was no governmental interference, no danger of debts being repudiated. The gold standard was universal. Passports disappeared except in Russia and Turkey. If a man in London decided at 9 o'clock in the morning to go to Rome or Vienna, he could leave at 10 a.m. without either passport or traveler's cheques, merely with a purse of sovereigns in his pocket."

Then with World War I this thing broke apart in a way, and yet on the allied side at least there was considerable machinery for the purpose of allied cooperation — a whole series of financial and economic councils, the Maritime Transport Council and Executive, the Wheat Executive and various commodity executives combining their efforts for purchasing and supplying materials, and so on.

Since World War II there has been a rekindling of a European movement which had its difficulties, though remained alive, in the inter-war period. Churchill set the keynote in his speech at the University of Zurich in 1946, when he called for a kind of United States of Europe.

I

The first aspect of this for us to look at, I think, might be the military — the efforts toward military cooperation and integration. A forerunner of this was the treaty signed at Dunkirk in 1947 between France and Britain. It was a fifty-year treaty of alliance and mutual assistance. The next year they expanded upon this in the Brussels Treaty. This was a treaty between the same two powers, France and Britain, adding the Benelux countries, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Again they set it up for a fifty-year period. They called it a treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration, and collective self-defense. It went beyond purely military matters. Perhaps they felt that they had to put in social, economic and cultural collaboration, as well as self-defense, because there was not a whole lot they could do for self-defense at that point in 1948. But they did set up a Western Union Defense Organization calling for collective self-defense under Article 51

of the U. N. Charter. This may have been almost unprecedented in an international organization — that is, to set up an alliance with going machinery in peacetime. It has been difficult enough in war time to have combined staffs, and so on.

First, there was a Consultative Council made up of the foreign ministers and a permanent commission which was made up of the foreign ambassadors from London and a special British representative. London was the seat of the Secretariat, comprising a permanent staff, and a security committee to safeguard classified information. There was a defense committee made up of the defense ministers, a permanent military committee made up of an officer from each state except Luxembourg (represented by Belgium), a Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee, and a Military Supply Board Executive, and a Finance and Economic Committee. Finally, an Administrative and Planning Committee included the commanders in chief on land, air and sea. This developed into a combined military headquarters sometimes referred to as the Uniforce. That was the one under Field Marshal Montgomery with headquarters at Fontainebleau, and you will remember that for land, sea, and air, the Uni-terre, Uni-mere and the Uni-air were set up.

The Brussels Powers agreed to the pooling of equipment and resources, subject to outside commitments. At the time it was really a pooling of scarcities. Yet they were determined to fight with what they had. A statement issued in May 1948 by the military committee to the defense ministers stated, "In the event of an attack by Russia, however soon it may come, the Five Powers are determined to fight as far east in Germany as possible. If Russia overruns the countries of Western Europe, irreparable harm will be done before they are liberated, owing to the Russian policy of deportation and pillage. Their preparations are, therefore, aimed at holding the Russians on the best position in Germany covering the territory of the Five Powers in such a way that sufficient time for American military power to intervene decisively can be assured."

Meanwhile, in April 1948, the National Security Council in Washington had been discussing ways in which the United States might indicate a willingness to enter into a collective arrangement,

and then the stage was set in the Vandenburg resolution of 1948, and conversations then began along those lines. Representatives from the United States and Canada met with the Western Union Organizations at their various meetings in London, and General Lyman L. Lemnitzer who is now Chief of Staff of the Army, headed the American delegation. The mission was under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it had officers who would meet with each of the bodies in London — thirteen Army officers, three Air Force and one Navy at the time.

This grew into the negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In spite of Russian displeasure they proceeded with this — the Brussels powers, plus the United States and Canada, then adding Norway, Denmark, Portugal and then Iceland.

The North Atlantic Treaty came into force on the 24th of August, 1949, after being signed in April. Delegates met in September to set up an organization which paralleled rather closely the organizations that you found in the Brussels Treaty Organization of Western Union — the council of foreign ministers, committees of finance ministers, and so on. Coming into the various military organizations was the military committee, made up of Chiefs of Staff; a Standing Group, made up of representatives of Britain, United States and France, a sort of executive committee, then a Standing Group representative in Paris. Then the military commands (which had not been anticipated at first) were set up and you had SACEUR and SACLANT, and so on.

The things which were responsible more than anything else, I suppose, for hastening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a going concern, were the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia in 1948, when the Communists took over, and the Berlin blockade. These things made it appear necessary to get some kind of an organization established.

Now, as far as the military headquarters are concerned, that was a little bit later. That came pretty largely as the result of two events — the explosion of the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in December, 1949, and the Communist attack in Korea in June,

1950. In August that year the French made inquiry of the United States if the latter was prepared to commit ground forces for the defense of Europe, and whether allied forces ought to be integrated under a single supreme command; the United States gave an affirmative answer on both counts. In September, 1950, the North Atlantic Council approved plans establishing the Supreme Headquarters, and in December asked General Eisenhower to take command.

In November, 1949, the American delegation to the Military Committee of the Five Powers — that was this western union which had been there previously — became known as the Joint American Military Advisory Group (JMAG), and it was to coordinate military assistance, operating directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It then became the coordinating agency in Europe for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, which followed up closely on the North Atlantic Treaty.

In February 1951 the MAG groups began arriving in Europe, and they were assigned administratively to JMAG. That was a different situation from what you found anywhere else in the world. It was put on a regional basis. Here was a further step toward European military integration. When the United States EUCOM was organized in August of 1952, the military assistance elements of JMAG became the military assistance division of that new headquarters.

In October, 1948, General Marshall, then the Secretary of State, had looked at the situation, and said that the Western European nations were "completely out of their skins, and sitting on their nerves." He said that any kind of an immediate shipment, even rifles, would have an electrifying effect. Already the Brussels powers had begun an inventory of their armaments requirements, and the more they took inventory, the worse the situation appeared, so they were anxious to enter into this mutual defense assistance program with the United States. They already had taken steps to pool their resources in the program which they called "infrastructure," a program for construction of airfields, pipe lines, communications facilities, and other logistic installations which they would

share, and they programmed this according to "slices." The first was one begun by Western Union and finished by it. The second was begun by Western Union and completed under NATO. Then you had the later slices in the three-year and four-year plans under NATO, the total for the program being about 2.8 billion dollars.

Now, we come to another phase which we may speak of as a second phase of Western European Union. We have spoken about the Brussels Treaty and its organization under this Western Union, and then the taking over of its military functions, in effect, by NATO, with the United States and Canada and other European states participating. Now, we have another phase in which this Brussels Treaty is resurrected. By about 1950, with demands for more man power in Korea, and anxiety about setting up new command systems and so on, the question was more and more being raised: What about German contributions to the NATO defense in Western Europe? To the United States the logical thing seemed to be to have Germany come into NATO on the same basis as everyone else. This ran into some opposition in Europe. France was still reluctant to see a new German army raised. The British were not very enthusiastic about it either. Then the French came up with a suggestion for a European army, and this was a thing which was discussed, as a matter of fact, in the Strasbourg Assembly, got approval there, Churchill gave his support, and then Rene Pleven of France developed it into a detailed plan, the Pleven Plan, or the plan for a European Defense Community, the EDC.

The plan was to bring the German elements into the European army in which would be integrated at brigade levels, the equivalent of the twelve divisions which they were going to contribute. In this way the Germans would be contributing their share, and yet would not have a national army as a unit under their own command which might pose a threat to the security of other European countries. The British refused to participate in such a fully integrated organization. The others went ahead (the six powers) and signed the treaty on May 27, 1952. Then the French began to drag their feet on ratification. Other things came up — the war in Indo-China — they were worried about the British

refusal to participate and the lack of their commitments on the continent — the question of the Saar — so that it finally became evident that the French were simply not going to go through with it. Secretary Dulles tried to put on pressure. He said that the United States would be forced to make an “agonizing reappraisal” of its policies if the French did not ratify. He said, “There is no alternative to EDC,” so the French promptly turned it down in August 1954. Immediately Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden went out to search for an alternative. He found it in the Brussels Treaty. Again there would be national units, but the treaty would be revised to bring in Germany and Italy, — these six, and in this Britain would participate, and it would contain provisions for the control of German armament. The protocols provided for a new assembly which had not been in the old organization, the Assembly of Western European Union which would be a parliamentary body chosen from the member parliaments. They set up limits for armed forces which might be maintained on the continent under SACEUR. This was at a time when most people were worrying about the limits below which they ought not to fall instead of the upper limits, but they were concerned with the upper limits, too, and they had protocols governing the control, and the inspection of arms, prohibiting German manufacture of guided missiles, warships, strategic bombers, and so on, and setting up the machinery to enforce this.

Thus now we have the new Western European Union as a coordinating agency within NATO. Actually this new organization also had some other activities — cultural, social, economic, but again I think it is clearer if we look at it principally as an effort at military integration.

The next step we may speak of is that of political integration. This is the most difficult of all, but at least we see a beginning. On December 1947 a number of prominent leaders in Europe met together and formed an International Committee for the Movements for European Unity, and then sponsored a “Congress of Europe” which met at The Hague in May 1948. They had some 713 delegates there from 15 countries, and observers from 10 other countries (these observers were refugees from countries which could not

really participate). The honorary president was Sir Winston Churchill. There they adopted a message to Europeans: "We desire a united Europe throughout whose area the free movement of persons, ideas and goods is restored." It called for a charter of human rights and a court of justice — and a European Assembly. They decided that this should be open to all democratic European nations.

The negotiations went on during September 1948. The Belgian and French governments presented the Hague proposals to the permanent council of the Brussels Treaty powers, then proposed the establishment of a parliamentary assembly. They had some disappointment when the British showed a distinct lack of enthusiasm for giving it very much real authority. They did finally accept the idea, however, and that was the main thing here — a parliamentary assembly, a European assembly, but they did it with reluctance and did not grant too much power. This British attitude was shared actually by some of the others, but finally a group of fifteen states came together and joined the Council of Europe, with its councils of ministers and with its consultative assembly. This consultative assembly is the big European parliament which meets at Strasbourg in France, in the House of Europe.

The British apparently were reluctant to go too far into participation in the European federation for fear it might weaken their ties with the Commonwealth. British institutions were not as much dislocated by the war as the others had been, and they were more ready to go ahead with things as they had been. The British seem to have sort of a natural reluctance to go along with too much machinery in formal organizations; they prefer more of a pragmatic approach. They do not believe too much in written constitutions and in detailing all the rules. Further, there was the question of party politics and the position taken in the various parties.

The statute of the Council of Europe was accepted on May 5, 1949, the day that the Berlin blockade was lifted. At Strasbourg they accepted in the preamble to their statute: "Reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom,

political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy . . .”

Membership then, turns out to be the same as that of the European NATO powers, plus Austria, Ireland and Sweden, and less Portugal, so that it really is an organization of European democracies. Members of the parliament — and representation is weighed according to size so that what used to be the Great Powers, the larger powers, each have eighteen members, and the others have from three to seven except that Turkey has ten — are chosen by the national parliaments, not by the government ministers. In most cases they are elected by the parliaments — some of them are selected in other ways, but the parliament in all cases sets the rules for their choice. They had hoped to have this develop into what they called a political authority with limited functions but real power. The real power has not been forthcoming, but the Assembly has been able to do much in the way of discussion and co-operation in this general direction. One thing they did was to adopt a European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This spelled out more precisely what they had said in the statute about the conditions for membership. This provided some means for legal redress in attempting to guarantee respect for the right to life, the right to fair trial, freedom of thought, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. They set up a European commission on human rights where appeals could be made and where, after enough states have accepted, even private individuals could petition a complaint that certain of these basic rights were not being respected, and further provide for a European Court of Human Rights to which appeals might be taken after this has been accepted as a compulsory jurisdiction by eight states.

In 1952 they added another protocol to guarantee the right of property, the right of parents to have children educated to their own belief. This gave some difficulties. For instance, suppose the parents were vegetarians or nudists, or whatever; all these things were going to be guaranteed. They finally got a statement upon which they could agree, upon general principles. Then, they added a guarantee of free election for parliaments. This stated that the

parliaments should be subject to popular election at stated intervals. Right away some European states then become ineligible for membership in the Council of Europe. All the Communist-oriented states, of course, are ineligible.

One further effort was made towards political integration among the Six. That was at the time of the EDC, the European Defense Community, the one which failed of ratification. Paralleling that, they had set up what they called the European Political Community in which they had hoped to set up regular machinery, almost a limited federation in a way, in which institutions would be available for all their various cooperative activities, but when EDC died, this died with it.

III

Probably the most spectacular advances on the road toward European integration have been in the field of economic integration since the war. It is so common for us to think of Europe in terms of individual countries that we tend to overlook the real position of Europe in world economic production.

Here I have attempted to make a comparison so that we could get the general relative standing. (See Table 1). All the Western European countries (and in this I am putting together all European countries which are not behind the Iron Curtain) are considered together to compare them with the United States, with the Soviet Union, the Eastern satellites and China. Often we think about the big population of India and so on; we do not always think of the big population of Europe — not even including Russia, not even including the satellites — it is 344 million.

The gross national product of 397 billion U. S. dollars is far greater than that of the Soviet Union or any of these other areas outside the United States.

The steel production is a very significant item, of course, and here the European powers have 106 million tons. Compare that with the Russians and the Americans. Frequently we are told that if the Russian production continues at its present rate of growth, in so many years it will surpass that of the United States. If that

happens, don't worry too much, because you can then take those same graphs and project them for the Western Europeans and find that they are going to be just as far ahead of the Russians as they are us when that time comes. Their production has had a phenomenal increase since World War II, because they practically started from scratch; thus it looks good.

Motor vehicle production — there the United States has 7,200,000, the European countries 3,700,000. The Red Chinese come out with 8,000. And incidentally, while we are talking about the Red Chinese, note that the gross national product of 40 billion dollars has to be divided among 630 million Chinese. That does not go very far.

And the coal here is 584 million tons and the kilowatt hours of electricity in billions is 428 for the Western European powers. This is just a general survey of the whole thing taken together.

TABLE 1
COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC PRODUCTION

	USA	Western Europe	USSR	Eastern Satellites	Red China
POPULATION (millions)	171	344	204	96	630
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (billions of dollars)	440	397	175	70	40
STEEL PRODUCTION (millions of short tons)	117	106	60	18	6
MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION (thousands)	7,216	3,718	496	138	8
COAL OUTPUT (millions of short tons)	512	584	409	254	145
ELECTRICITY (billions of kilowatt hours)	716	428	210	86	19

In an organizational way the beginning of economic integration in this postwar period was in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation — the OEEC — which grew out of the

Marshall Plan. It was set up as the counterpart of the ECA in Europe.

In his address at Harvard in June 1947, General George C. Marshall, then Secretary of State, invited the European countries, you remember, to get together in a program of economic recovery with assistance from the United States. In part this is what he said:

“It is already evident that before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to . . . help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. . . The initiative, I think must come from Europe . . . The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, European nations.”

While the British and French lost no time at all, Bevin of Britain almost flew over to Paris without any aircraft, in order to get together on what kind of a program they might figure out. They held some bilateral conversations. The French then advised the Russians to do the same, and then the three got together — the British, the French and the Russians. Molotov arrived in Paris with the greatest retinue of all, some fifty-two assistants and statisticians; they looked at the plan, and found it wanting. They said that this was devised for American imperialism. The Poles and the Czechs were very anxious to participate. They were ready to sign until they got the word from Moscow to hold back. By July 12 — this all had happened within a month — fourteen countries joined in Paris in a conference, and there they set up the Committee for European Economic Cooperation to draw up a detailed program. The next year they signed a convention to establish the Organization for European Economic Cooperation on a permanent basis to supersede the temporary committee.

The United States and Canada became associate members since they were participating, of course, in the Marshall Plan. This was the organization for the coordination of the Marshall Plan in Europe. It was strictly an intergovernmental organization. At the ministerial level it was a diplomatic conference type of organization without any pretensions to federalism. The British, the Scandinavians, and the others could participate fully.

Here you see the difference in approaches to organizational machinery. The Brussels Treaty originally had outlined obligations, but had not at first set up any machinery. The statute of the Council of Europe in the Strasbourg Assembly had set up machinery without any commitments. Now here, you have the OEEC which set up obligations, and did set up certain machinery for the purpose of coordination. The governing body was the council, as frequently found in such international organizations, with a single representative for each member — it might be the ministers, or it might be some lower representative — and they set up an executive committee of seven members who were elected annually. Then they added a whole series of technical boards to coordinate activities in certain industries. The whole idea was to have the efforts of Europe coordinated so that they could help each other, and then have the United States make up the difference so that there would not be a question of a whole series of bilateral arrangements with the United States and unnecessary duplication of effort.

Further encouragement along these lines came from the United States Congress in the legislation supporting the Marshall Plan. Section 102A of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 included this paragraph:

“Mindful of the advantages which the United States has enjoyed through the existence of a large domestic market with no internal trade barriers, and believing that similar advantages can accrue to the countries of Europe, it is declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to encourage these countries through a joint organization to exert sustained common efforts which will speedily achieve that

economic cooperation in Europe which is essential for lasting peace and prosperity.”

An amendment to the ECA in April, 1949, added this statement: “It is further declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to encourage the unification of Europe.” That is not just a statement of the Secretary of State, or the President; that is included in an Act of Congress declaring it to be the policy of the United States to encourage the unification of Europe. Within the OECC a number of specialized agencies were set up, the most important of which perhaps was the European Payments Union, a clearing house for exchange in international currencies with provisions for automatic credit when one currency would be short in terms or another (this recently has been replaced by the European Monetary Agreement); the European Productive Agency, to study ways and effects of adjusting to automation, to rationalizing their industries, coordinate research, and the European Nuclear Energy Agency formed in 1957, which coordinates certain activities in the way of joint efforts in atomic energy.

It was OEEC, too, that sponsored initial negotiations for a European free trade area, and then that project was further debated in the Strasbourg Assembly, as I shall mention again in a moment.

That which has gone furthest in the direction of integration has been in the countries of the Six, first of all in the European Coal and Steel Community. The countries here — largely within Charlemagne’s old empire — started out with the Schuman Plan, which was to establish a common market in the coal and steel industries. This was discussed in the Assembly of the Council of Europe, and in various committees, and finally Robert Schuman, then Foreign Minister of France, made this statement in May, 1950:

“A united Europe will not be achieved all at once, nor in a single framework. It will be formed by concrete measures which first of all create a solidarity in fact. The uniting of the European nations requires that the age-old opposition between France and Germany be overcome. The action to be taken must first of all concern France and Germany.

“To that end the French Government proposes that immediate action be concentrated on one limited but decisive point. The French Government proposes that the entire Franco-German production of coal and steel be placed under joint High Authority, within an organization open to the participation of other European nations.”

This, then, was looked upon in a way as really a first step toward federation by going right to the heart of a fundamental problem — the relationship between France and Germany right in the heart of Europe. If they could be brought together on such fundamental industries as coal and steel, then the prospect might be bright for other types of coordination, and the prospects might be bright, too, for peace and cooperation in central Europe. In the process of negotiations four other states came in — Italy and the Benelux countries, joining with France and Germany, making the Six. It took nearly a year to negotiate the treaty, and another year to get ratifications, but it was completed in July 1952. After a five-year transition period, it went into full operation from 1957. The British stayed out, but they did sign a special agreement of association which recognized certain matters of trade between the two areas.

The agreement established a common market in coal and steel, abolished tariffs and trade restrictions in those products, forbade discriminatory practices, forbade subsidies or state assistance, guaranteed equal access of all consumers, provided for maintenance of lowest possible prices, and promoted expansion of production and foreign trade. It has concerned some 574 mines and 434 iron and steel concerns altogether.

The High Authority is the executive agency. This is set up as a matter of individuals, and that is a far-reaching step, I think, in international organization. Often we set up an organization on the basis of representation of other organizations, so that the representatives must always make a plea for whatever they represent — for this service or that department or this nation, but here the High Authority is made up of nine members chosen for individual

competence; they are not supposed to be national representatives. They serve for a six-year term, one-third being chosen every two years. Eight are appointed by the governments in agreement and the ninth is chosen by the other eight. The first president was Jean Monnet. He was really the one who planned the Schuman Plan. He resigned in 1955, when he thought it was well underway, in order to head another organization to move further for European unity.

In addition to the High Authority there is a common Assembly made up of representatives from the national parliaments concerned. This assembly has certain supervisory powers over the High Authority. If backed by a two-thirds vote, it could adopt a vote censure in which case the High Authority is forced to resign. Here you see a very significant step in international organization in that the High Authority can issue a rule which binds individual companies within the various nations without going through the governments, and they have access to funds of their own because they can assess fees on the companies, and they can assess fines on them; of course, they must resort to the police powers of the individual states, but each state recognizes the High Authority and the European Coal and Steel Community as a legal person within that state, with authority under the law. In addition to this they have a Consultative Committee. This is a committee of fifty-one members drawn equally from members of the consuming group, from workers, and from the producers, and the High Authority must consult them on certain issues and may consult them on any issue. A special council of ministers (we go back to the council business again) attempts to harmonize the policies of the Coal and Steel Community with policies of the respective governments. Finally there is the Court of Justice to which these companies or states or council may take appeals. The court may, in effect, make a ruling of the High Authority unconstitutional if it has gone beyond its legal competence.

The biggest step of all was when these Six attempted to go further in setting up the European Economic Community. This was on the basis of their earlier success. A suggestion from the Benelux countries that they ought to see if they could not adopt

a common market in all products led to further negotiations among the foreign ministers. At Messina in Italy in June 1955 they set up a committee to negotiate on the matter and this resulted in the treaties signed at Rome in March, 1957. The common market went into effect then with the first stage on January 1 this year. It is to go through a transition period of twelve to fifteen years.

The European Economic Community has organizational machinery comparable to that of the Coal and Steel Community with a Commission as the executive agency; a Council of Ministers an Assembly, and a Court of Justice. The objective is that, at the end of the twelve to fifteen year period, the tariffs among each other will go to zero. The common tariff against the outside is to reach a level somewhat lower than those of Italy and France, and somewhat higher than those of Germany and the Benelux countries at the moment. It is a customs union, or a tariff union; in fact, it is a full economic union, and in this the African territories are associated with them.

EURATOM was set up at the same time — that is the European Atomic Energy Community. It consists of the same members, with machinery quite similar. It has its own commission and council of ministers, but shares the same assembly and Court of Justice.

With establishment of the European Economic Community, the question immediately arose about the relationship between this group and the others in the OEEC. The OEEC and the Assembly of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg attempted to discuss this matter in looking to the formation of a European free trade area. The British were very much interested in this.

Now you will notice a distinction between a customs union and free trade area. The customs union which these Six formed means that they have abolished tariffs among themselves or they will when the transition is finished, but they keep a common tariff against the outside world. A free trade area as they were using it meant free trade among the members of the group, that is, no tariffs among themselves, but each state would remain free to

regulate its own tariffs as against the outside world. Right away this raises difficulties. The British are in a situation of imperial preferences where tariffs are lower with respect to Canada, Australia, and so on, than are others. That means goods from Canada and Australia and New Zealand may come into Great Britain at a lower duty than they would to other countries, and compete then in the free trade area with Danish butter, for example, and that just was not very satisfactory to the Danes. It especially was not satisfactory to the French. Soon a split of opinion developed, the French on the one hand for this organic structure, the British again for the pragmatic approach to the free trade area, and the two came to loggerheads. A long period of negotiations finally broke up in December of last year — in about the stormiest session of the council of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation as had yet been held. It fell through, and that was the end for the moment of the European free trade area, as such, including all the countries of OEEC.

The atmosphere cleared somewhat when the French a short while later announced that they were going to go along with their commitments to OEEC which they had not been following so far. They were going to liberalize trade by raising quotas for outside goods by 90 per cent as they had intended, and they were adopting, with other states, the convertibility of their currency, and this did away with the European Payments Union. So these negotiations failed. Apparently one reason was that the British had miscalculated on the real strength of the drive toward unity among the Six powers and the cooperation which had developed between France and Germany. The British tactics were not all together sound either. They were in a difficult position with respect to the Commonwealth and imperial preferences. They made the statement a number of times that if they must choose between Europe and the Commonwealth they would have to choose the Commonwealth. But still there was a problem, particularly where the other countries were concerned. If they were going to be shut out of this big free trading area, what were they going to do? Consequently, the British began to search for an alternative, and this turned out to be a

free trade association among the so-called Outer Seven; the states of Scandinavia, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal and Britain had been left out of the common market. They signed a treaty in Stockholm in July of last year to launch their project. They aimed at a 20 per cent reduction of their tariffs by next July, paralleling the Common Market's objectives. The trade of these seven with the Common Market countries comes out this way — the British have 14 per cent of their trade which is not so important as some of the others; Denmark 36 per cent; Norway 31 per cent; Sweden 39 per cent; Austria 52 per cent and Switzerland 57 per cent. So it is a matter of serious concern for arrangements to be made regulating the trade between the states of the Common Market and the states of the Outer Seven.

IV

Now, let us see what we have so far, and try to summarize this organization which we have gone over. (See Table 2). — The *military*: Western European Union and NATO; the *political*: the Council of Europe with its Assembly at Strasbourg; and the *economic*: the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the European Coal and Steel Community; the European Economic Community; EURATOM, and the Free Trade Association.

TABLE 2
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

- I. MILITARY**
 - A. WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (London)**
 - B. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (Paris)**

- II. POLITICAL**
 - THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Strasbourg)**

- III. ECONOMIC**
 - A. ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION (Paris)**
 - B. EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY (Luxembourg)**
 - C. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (Brussels)**
 - D. EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (Brussels)**
 - E. EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (London)**

We can summarize these in another way according to membership and that is what is shown in Table 3. The Europe of the Six — the Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community and EURATOM. The Europe of the Seven — Western European Union. The Outer Seven — the Free Trade Association. The thirteen — NATO. The Fifteen — Council of Europe. The Eighteen — the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

TABLE 3
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

THE SIX	THE SEVEN	THE OUTER SEVEN	THE THIRTEEN	THE FIFTEEN	THE EIGHTEEN
ECSC	WEU	EFTA	NATO	CE	OEEC
EEC					
EURATOM					
Belgium	Belgium		Belgium	Belgium	Belgium
France	France		France	France	France
Germany	Germany		Germany	Germany	Germany
Italy	Italy		Italy	Italy	Italy
Luxembourg	Luxembourg		Luxembourg	Luxembourg	Luxembourg
Netherlands	Netherlands		Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands
	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	United Kingdom
		Austria		Austria	Austria
		Denmark	Denmark	Denmark	Denmark
		Norway	Norway	Norway	Norway
		Portugal	Portugal		Portugal
		Sweden		Sweden	Sweden
		Switzerland			Switzerland
			Greece	Greece	Greece
			Iceland	Iceland	Iceland
			Turkey	Turkey	Turkey
				Ireland	Ireland
					Spain
6	6+1	7-6+6	(6+7)-3+3	13-1+3	15+(2)+1

Also you can look at the various institutions which you have now. You have the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg; you have the Assembly of Western European Union which is made up of the same members from the countries concerned, and you have the Common Assembly of the European Community. When they set up these new organizations of the Six, they decided instead of having to set up an assembly for each of them to have only one — the European Parliament or the European Parliamentary Assembly.

The European Parliament is the parliament for the Six which serves the Coal and Steel Community, the Economic Community and the EURATOM. Under the leadership of Schuman of France as president of this assembly, they are taking steps now for direct election of its members in the various countries. Its size has been doubled; otherwise it is the same. It also meets at Strasbourg usually, though sometimes at other cities of the member states.

Now, let us consider briefly what the prospects and problems seem to be in this area as we look ahead. In an economic way, there has been some criticism that now what is happening rather than European integration is European disintegration, and that is the way it looked particularly to the British and Swiss, so long as they felt they were being frozen out of the Common Market. They have accused the French, Germans and Italians of discrimination. The answer of the French is that they are not discriminating at all, because this is an open organization, and not exclusive. Anyone may join who is willing to pay the price, but what the British want are the advantages without any of the disadvantages they tell them.

In the military situation there is the problem of a European deterrent — what ought to be done in building up nuclear forces — what ought to be done in coordinating the naval forces, the land forces, and so on. There is some talk now about what the French General Pierre Gaillois has said regarding a nuclear deterrent. Of course, they could not wipe out the Soviet Union; they cannot achieve parity. But all they need, they say, is just give us

enough and we shall develop enough so that we can just wipe out one Soviet city, and then we can say, if you attack us, we are going to wipe the city out. In fact, this may lead to sort of an adoption plan; as in this country we adopted cities for European recovery, there may be a movement now in which there will be an adoption the other way around — the Swedes adopt Leningrad, for instance, the French adopt Moscow, and so on, so that if they attack a country, they lose a city. That may be a deterrent. It is the same theory that the Swiss have used. It is so costly that it is not worthwhile for any big power to come through the mountain passes, and they think they ought to continue along that line. Well, that is a question. What should be the relationship of NATO, the Western European Union, with the military and civil institutions? At the Strasbourg Assembly military questions are not discussed. The Swedes and the Swiss will not participate in military discussions.

There is a question of rationalization — of trying to bring these various institutions together. I have mentioned that we have already seen a bringing together of institutions of the communities of the Six. There is a movement now to merge the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. It may be done. One more development last summer was the doing away of passports among the countries of the Six and Switzerland, so that they are getting back to where they were before World War I. That is real progress.

A question that faces us now, too, is this: Should we look forward to an Atlantic community or simply to a European community? Former Secretary of State Acheson offered a plan in Bonn a few months ago suggesting that we now need an Atlantic community with an elected parliamentary assembly, and a council and so on, which would be open to other countries which are not in NATO — Sweden, Switzerland, and others. As many have said, these do not need to be separate things. What we ought to aim for is both — an Atlantic community and a European community. A strong, united Europe is a prerequisite to full Atlantic cooperation, for from the European point of view it will not appear to be so much an organization of American domination. As the report of the

so-called "Three Wise Men" of NATO stated in their report in 1957:

"The deepening and strengthening of this political cooperation does not imply the weakening of the ties of NATO members with other friendly countries or with other international associations, particularly the United Nations. Adherence to NATO is not exclusive or restrictive. Nor should the evolution of the Atlantic community through NATO prevent the formation of even closer relationships among some of its members; for instance, within groups of European countries. The moves toward Atlantic cooperation and European unity should be parallel and complementary, not competitive or conflicting."

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor James A. Huston

Present Position: The Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History
—on leave from position as Associate Professor of History, Purdue
University.

Schools:

Indiana University, 1939, A.B. degree; 1940, M.A. degree.

New York University Penfield Fellow, 1942.

St. John's College, Oxford, 1945.

New York University, 1947, Ph.D. degree.

Career Highlights:

1942-45 Major, AUS

1946-48 Instructor of History, Purdue University.

1948-53 Assistant Professor of History, Purdue University

1949- Consultant, Office of Chief of Military History.

1953-59 Associate Professor of History, Purdue University.

Miscellaneous:

Authored *Combat History of the 134th Infantry* (1948)

Biography of a Battalion (1950); numerous articles for
various publications.

Affiliated with History Assn.; Amer. Academy of Political and
Social Scientists; Society of International Law; Ameri-
can Military Institute; Miss. Valley Historical Assn.

Presently interested in American history, international relations
and contemporary international problems.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel,
(G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

Commandant ELEVENTH Naval
District (Code 154)
937 North Harbor Drive
San Diego, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH
Naval District (Code 141)
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces,
Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 17
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U. S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
U. S. Naval Base
Norfolk 11, Virginia

BOOKS

Ropp, Theodore, *War in the Modern World*. Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1959. 400 p.

This history of modern warfare traces the development of military technology from about 1400 through World War II, and correlates the political, economic and psychosocial factors with this military development. The author also presents, in nontechnical language, an appreciation of the works of the classical military writers — especially those of Clausewitz. The book includes an excellent general coverage of the relationship between air and ground operations and of the subject of command of the sea. These facets of modern war are discussed throughout the portions of the book dealing with events subsequent to the start of World War I, and thus serve to give the reader an excellent appreciation of the evolution of the various theories concerning these ever-present military matters. The author has employed an unusual footnoting method which provides a very valuable annotated bibliography of the major works on military history, and which would be extremely helpful to the researcher in this field.

Sheean, Vincent. *Nehru: The Years of Power*. New York, Random House, 1960, 306 p.

One does not have to read very far in Vincent Sheean's *Nehru: The Years of Power* to discover that the author is quite frankly biased on behalf of both Mr. Nehru and India. But in view of the one-sided press that India and Nehru's foreign policy have received in this country during the past decade, it is both refreshing and enlightening to view Nehru's and India's (they are both one, as Mr. Sheean points out) side of the picture as seen through the friendly eyes of the writer, a constant visitor to India for the past eleven years as well as a close personal friend of Nehru and of many other highly placed Indian government officials. To the interested reader the book gives an excellent overall picture of the many problems faced by the

new Republic of India and Mr. Nehru as chief of that republic during the past decade.

Siple, Paul A. *90° South*. New York, Putnam, 1959. 384 p.

This book is an interesting adventure account of the establishment and operation of the United States scientific station at the South Pole. The success of the mission was due to the combination of many years of planning and preparation plus the intense fortitude and devotion to duty of the Navy "Sea-bees" in the construction of the station in the face of almost impossible working conditions. The United States' contribution to the International Geophysical Year scientific program was enhanced greatly by this achievement, not to omit the prestige value of being the first country to establish itself on the polar cap. The author is an acknowledged expert on the subject of the Antarctic. Without his assistance as Scientific Leader the accomplishment of the mission would have been in doubt, and possibly the survival of the wintering-over party would itself have been jeopardized. He has described with understanding detail the day-to-day living under conditions of such extreme cold. He briefly covered the science program conducted by himself and the eight scientists, which comprised observations on weather, ionosphere, aurora and air glow, geomagnetism, seismology and glaciology. He also summarized the scientific objectives of the forty other IGY stations being maintained at Antarctica by eleven countries.

Munro, Leslie. *United Nations: Hope for a Divided World*. New York, Holt, 1960. 185 p.

Sir Leslie Munro, the author of *United Nations: Hope for a Divided World*, has had a distinguished career in the U. N. He was President of the Assembly in 1957 and 1958, as well as New Zealand's chief delegate to the United Nations. From his vantage point he has given his appraisal of the progress and accomplishments of the U. N. to date. As he indicates himself, this is not a book for scholars and international lawyers, but one designed to acquaint the general public with

the objects and powers of the United Nations and with some of the crises it has handled and survived. The author brings us behind the scene to acquaint us with some of the international personalities involved, and gives his impressions of the United Nations' role in the crises of Suez, Hungary and Israel. To clear up prevailing misconceptions as to what the U. N. is and what it is not, Munro argues that in a political sense the United Nations is only an instrument of its members for them to use or not, as the majority of them decide.

Joseph, Franz M., ed. *As Others See Us: The United States Through Foreign Eyes*. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1959. 360 p.

This is a book by twenty different persons from as many countries around the world. Some of the writers, like Dennis W. Brogan, have been in the United States a number of times and for extended periods, while others have been here for briefer visits. Some spoke English fluently, others virtually not at all. While each author's perspective, as he looks at the United States, is unique in certain respects, there are a number of common impressions. One of these is that the picture of the United States which the people of their respective countries have is not accurate. It may come as a surprise to some Americans that in many countries the people do not know much about us, or what they know is largely limited to clichés that have long lost whatever validity they may once have had.

Muhlen, Norbert. *The Incredible Krupps*. New York, Holt, 1959. 308 p.

For those interested in the history and evolution of the world's most unusual industrial dynasty, this detailed account of the Krupp family is considered acceptable diversionary reading. Written primarily as a biography of several generations of the Krupps, the book seeks to relate the family industry and fortunes to the changing political role and strength of Germany over the years. In addition, a great deal has been in-

cluded concerning the personalities of members of the family. It is a fair and unbiased account of an incredible family chronicle that one would not find even in fiction.

PERIODICALS

Nevski, N. A., Capt., Soviet Navy. "Soviet Amphibious Analysis." *Marine Corps Gazette*. February 1960, p. 22.

This extract from the chapter, "Fundamentals of Naval Science," in Capt. Nevski's book *The Navy*, describes what the Russians think of U. S. amphibious operations and how they are conducted.

"Soviet Feelers in Latin America." *Foreign Report*. February 25, 1960, p. 7-8.

Latin America's difficulties in marketing their exports at fair prices have offered Russia an opportunity for economic initiative in this region. Gives the channels through which the USSR has attempted to exert subversive pressure.

Beals, Carleton. "Cuba's Revolution: The First Year." *The Christian Century*. March 9, 1960, p. 284-286.

A picture of Cuba contrasting with that usually given in the U. S. press.

Bloch, Lionel. "Russia and the British Public." *The New Leader* March 7, 1960, p. 14-16.

Deplores the lack of a hard line and the spirit of compromise toward Russia that permeates the now prosperous British public and that has in turn been adopted by all the British political parties.

"Fortresses in Spain." *The Economist*. March 5, 1960, p. 876-878.

Examines the reasons behind Germany's desire for military bases in Spain and the dangers inherent in such a step.

"Oceanography." *Congressional Record*. February 18, 1960, p. 2680-2684.

Rep. Oliver of Maine speaks, stressing the importance of oceanography and highlighting Russian developments and action in this field.

Brode, Wallace R. "The Role of Science in Foreign Policy Planning." *The Department of State Bulletin*. February 22, 1960, p. 271-276.

Considers the solutions and problems created by scientific advance, appraisal of the science programs and participation of science in policy programming.

"Single Chief of the Military Would Imperil U. S. Defense." *Congressional Record*. February 17, 1960, p. A1310-A1311.

Includes two editorials discussing the dangers of one-man military control and the inherent deficiencies of the Supreme Staff system.