Naval War College Review

Volume 13
Number 5 *June*

Article 2

1960

Historical and Cultural Background of the USSR

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Recommended Citation

Fainsod, M. (1960) "Historical and Cultural Background of the USSR," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 13 : No. 5 , Article 2.
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PRINTER'S CORRECTIONS

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Vol. XII No. 10 June 1960

Page 27, line 33, change "Rusians" to "Russians"

Page 31, line 13, change "or" to "of"

Page 40, line 32, change "seperate" to "separate"

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Issued Monthly
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF THE USSR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 30 September 1959 by
Professor Merle Fainsod

My subject, "The Historical and Cultural Background of the USSR" is so huge that it is necessary, I think, to carve it up into some sort of manageable piece, and what I would like to do is to focus on the historical roots and the historical background of the Bolshevik Revolution.

I understand that yesterday you had a lecture on "Communism in Theory and Practice," and I am going to assume that this is part of the background on which we can draw, but in order to understand the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, while it is important to have this Marxist heritage in mind, we cannot stop with the ideas of Marx. We have to understand the special nature of the Russian revolutionary movement and the conditions which produced it. One must understand that Russian Marxism in its Bolshevik form was not merely an importation and an adaptation of the ideas of Marx in Russia, that it was not merely a response to the introduction of western industrialism into Russia, but that it was also deeply influenced in its formative stages by the traditions of the Russian revolutionary movement of which it was a part.

As you know, what differentiated the Bolshevik party from the mass labor and socialist parties of western Europe was the concept of the party as a conspiratorial organization, a select band of professional revolutionaries who were bound together by iron discipline and who were activists to the core. Now, that conception was a product of specific conditions in Tsarist Russia, and to understand it we have to dip into Russian history. Let me begin by noting certain factors in Russian development that are important for an understanding of the Russian revolutionary movement.

First, Russia's backwardness in joining the march of what we call western civilization. It is worth remembering that Russia was

conquered by the Mongols, the Tatars, in the 13th century, and that the Mongol-Tatar conquests lasted for about two and one-half centuries until 1480. While Russia lay prostrate under the yoke of the Asian conquerors, the peoples of Western Europe were in the process of creating a new civilization and going through their Renaissance, transforming the medieval structure of society into what we call modern civilization.

Now, the two and one-half centuries of the Mongol yoke left certain scars on Russia — scars that are still visible. Some of them, I think, are worth noting. First, it left as a heritage an intense and stubborn hatred of foreign rule. To expel the foreign invaders from the Russian homeland became something of a holy mission. Second, it affected the character of the Russian government — the evolution of Tsardom — the peculiar character of Russian autocracy.

The formula of the Mongols and the Tatars during their years of dominance had been to keep the Russians divided, to exhaust them by endless tribute paying, but the formula broke down out of the confusion of many Russian principalities. There emerged the princes of Moscow, shrewd, cold-blooded, hard-headed. They became the agents, the tribute collectors of the Khans, and in the process they also learned much from their conquerors, especially about the character of autocratic rule. Then, with the help of the Russian Orthodox Church, they revolted and began to gather up what they called Russia's patrimony — that is, the lands that had formerly been Russian, and these they welded together into their own autocracy. They had their time of troubles at the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th centuries. Sometimes this is called Russia's War of the Roses — civil war — but the wars ended in a thorough destruction of Russia's princely class, the boyars, and the Tsar grew in power as his political competitors, the boyars, were weakened. Under Peter the Great at the beginning of the 18th century, the state became essentially a hierarchy of castes, each with its appointed duties and responsibilities. The serf owed duty to the squire. The squire, too, was in his way a serf owing duty to the Tsar. He was privileged but he was also duty-bound, and the church, too, was subordinated to the state, and at the top of this structure stood the

Tsar, the all-powerful autocrat, the successor of the Khans. In part as a result of this desperate struggle to free Russia from the foreign yoke, to secure unity, to consolidate power within the state, the Russians lost what few elements they had of really democratic political life. A very limited form of local self-government persisted in the form of the village community, the "mir" so-called, with its communal lands, its strip farming, its provisions for periodic redistribution by the community of lands of the "mir." It is easy, I think, to exaggerate the importance of the "mir." The real struggle to impose constitutional limits on the authority of the Tsar was the product of the 19th and the early 20th centuries. That struggle miscarried. Despite some concessions, Russian Tsardom adhered to its traditional ideology of autocracy and the tradition of the Tatar Khans lived on wrapped in a Russian guise.

Now, the Mongol yoke left another persisting impress — the feeling that since Russia was backward, since it had fallen behind Western Europe, it was necessary to catch up, to learn from Western Europe. It was necessary not only to catch up, but to surpass the achievements of Europe. You have been listening to Khrushchev on this theme — it is an old theme. "Catch up and surpass," the Russians say.

Sometimes, as with Peter the Great, away back in the early part of the 18th century, the idea was confined only to borrowing techniques of industry and technical organization. Sometimes, as with an important intellectual school of the 19th century, Westernizers so-called, it also extended to borrowing political ideas, forms of political organization, the ideas of Marx among other things. But whatever form it takes, one catches in the centuries of Russian history, a sense of inferiority before the West, an inferiority which is deep-seated and which even produced, by way of reaction, a kind of over-compensated Slavophilism with its pride in things indigenously Russian. And some of Khrushchev's pronouncements on this last visit, I think, illustrate this kind of drive, but behind this drive lies long centuries of inferiority, of the mood of self-deprecation.

Let me just read to you poems of the 19th and 20th centuries which give you some of this feeling. Here is a poem called "Fatherland":

> How ugly nature is here truly
> Fields whose meek flatness gives offense
> Bare legs taking big bellied wenches on their way
> Poor peasant shod with base that's rotting
> Roads that facilitate delay
> Wretched views from manor houses of landscaping, bizarre
> Filth, vileness, stench, cockroaches swarming, the knout supreme on every hand,
> And that is what our countless boobies keep calling sacred fatherland.

Here is another one — a very famous poem by Alexander Blok called "The Scythians," written just after the revolution, written to the West:

> You are the millions, we are multitude
> And multitude and multitude,
> Come, fight! Yea, we are Scythians,
> Yea, Asians, a squint-eyed, greedy brood.
> For you — the centuries, for us — one hour.
> Like slaves, obeying and abhorred,
> We were the shield between the breeds
> Of Europe and the raging Mongol horde.
> For centuries your eyes were toward the East.
> Our pearls you hoarded in your chests,
> And mockingly you bode the day
> When you could aim your cannon at our breasts.
> Yea, Russia is a Sphinx, Exulting, grieving,
> And sweating blood, she cannot sate
> Her eyes that gaze and gaze and gaze
> At you with stone-lipped love for you, and hate.

Well, I could expand this theme. Here for example, is a speech by Stalin at the end of the twenties, and in this speech, which was

written to make the case for industrialization, borrowing techniques again from the West, Stalin said:

> "The history of old Russia is the history of defeats due to backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol-Khans; she was beaten by the Swedish feudal barons; she was beaten by the Polish Lithuanian squires; she was beaten by the Anglo-French capitalists; she was beaten by the Japanese barons — all beat her for her backwardness, for military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for governmental backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness. Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? We are 50 to 100 years behind the advanced countries. We must cover this distance in 10 years; either we do this or they will crush us."

Now, if you want to understand some of the dynamism behind this drive to attain supremacy, you must see it, I think, against this long tableau of backwardness and of the struggle to overcome it. Well, these factors which I have stressed — the hatred of foreign rule, the peculiar shape of Russian autocracy with its very limited opportunities for experience in self-government, this sense of inferiority and backwardness before the West — all of this is important for an understanding of Russia, or an understanding of the peculiar shape of the Russian revolutionary movement.

Now, I would like to turn to an analysis of the development of the Russian revolutionary movement, and the first point that I should like to make about it is that the movement is, above all, revolution from above; that its leadership comes from the intellectual classes — what the Russians call the intelligentsiya. We sometimes refer to them as the intelligentsia. Lenin, himself, as you know, was a member of the minor nobility. Many of those who surrounded him came from the same social milieu, and these leaders started out as the rankest amateurs of revolution, but as we will see, out of the fire of their experience they emerge as professionals, expert practitioners of the revolutionary art. There *is* one important exception to this generalization that I have just made, and that is that there is also

a tradition in Russia of a popular peasant uprising under peasant leadership. You find it exemplified in the uprising led by Stenka Razin in the 17th century, by Pugachev in the 18th century, and so on. But these risings are like the French peasant risings, the Jacquerie; that is, rather formless, anarchic, without real direction. Indeed in Russia, insofar as they have a philosophy, it is still a belief in the messianic mission of the Tsar, who according to the peasants is being misled by his advisers, and who, if you could only get to him, since he is a good man, would liberate the common people from the exploitations to which they are being subjected by the nobility and bureaucracy. And you have some interesting continuations of this tradition in current Soviet practice. That is, you allow criticism, you see, of the lower ranks — the top is immune, at least while it is still alive — and you seek to divert it from the top, and you seek to preserve the notion that the top is a kind of dispenser of mercy.

Well, now to come back to the emerging revolutionary role of the intelligentsia. It begins to emerge in an important fashion in the reign of Catherine the Great toward the end of the 18th century, as the winds of doctrine from Western Europe began to circulate in the court and in the circles around the court. Earlier, of course, it is true that Peter the Great, in the words of Pushkin, had cut a window through into Europe, but Peter's interests were thoroughly practical. He was not interested in borrowing ideas; he was interested in borrowing techniques. With Catherine the window was opened to ideas, philosophy, French liberal thought, English thought, Voltaire, Montesquieu, the Encyclopedists, Adam Smith. These began to be read in Russia and they became the intellectual possession of a small class of intellectuals in Russia. But the Popular rising (the peasant rising of Pugachev) and rumors of the excesses of the French Revolution frightened Catherine, and an abrupt stop was put to the journalistic activity which was inspired by western ideas. A rigid censorship was imposed on all periodicals, books, and other publications. Catherine the Great even put under the censorship, under the ban, her own book, *The Nakaz,* the instruction book, the book she had written under the influence of Montesquieu and which embodied her ideas of how she proposed to reform and govern

Russia. And so the intellectual ferment which began in the early part of Catherine's reign was forced into the underground where it largely remained through the reign of her successor, Alexander the First.

The next important episode in the history of the Russian revolutionary movement is known as the Decembrist movement, because of the military insurrection which took place under the leadership of a group of progressive army officers in Petrograd during Dcember 1825 at the time of the death of the emperor, Alexander I, and the accession of Nicholas I. Now the members of this Decembrist movement were mostly army officers of liberal inclination who had gotten out into Europe at the time of the Napoleonic war and had familiarized themselves there with French ideas and who hoped to see Russia reform after western constitutional models. What these people wanted to do was to abolish serfdom, to adopt a constitution, to extend education, reform justice, to establish institutions of local self-government, to guarantee individual rights and freedom of conscience — by our standards not very revolutionary ideas. But by the standards of Russia at the time these, of course, challenged the very foundations of Tsardom. And these ideas were disseminated secretly in small societies organized for the study of political and social questions — these societies, patronized by these army officers, and some of the members of the intelligentsia who gathered around. These people had no popular followers, and indeed, the insurrection which they sponsored, which was intended to capitalize on the confusion of the change of reign, proved abortive. The leaders were either executed or banished to Siberia, and Nicholas I, who succeeded to the throne, dedicated himself to the task of eradicating any trace of liberalism in the Russian empire. The press censorship was made more rigid, iron discipline was established in the army and in the bureaucracy, and the intellectual classes, at least those of them with independent ideas, were virtually forced out of political life. And this helped, as we shall see, to produce one of the tragedies of the Russian liberal intellegentsia — it was deprived of the opportunity of acquiring practical political experience, it was virtually forced into a life of irresponsibility — a

life of loose word spinning, endless discussions in conspiratorial secrecy of the fate of Russia, without the opportunity really to cut their teeth in practice and do something about it, and to acquire a sense of what the problems and difficulties were.

During the reign of Nicholas I, from 1825 to 1854, the loyalties of the intellectuals, insofar as they were permitted, began to divide among two rival camps — the camp of the Slavophils, so-called, and the camp of the Westernizers. The experience of the Napoleonic war — the Russian victory in that war — strengthened the national consciousness, and poets, novelists, and authors now began to express their pride in Russia — express the feeling that it was the West that was decadent — that the Slavs were the people with a future. Some of them did this, and searching for unique features of their own strength, the more reactionary among them found it in autocracy, in the church and in the peasant land commune of the mir. It was against the background of this Slavophilism, this resurgent pride, that Nicholas I and the Minister of Education, Count Uvarov, developed his famous trinity of orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationalism. "Our task," he said, "consists in establishing such an education for the nation as will unify in itself the spirit of orthodoxy, of autocracy, and of nationalism."

This nationalistic or Slavophil trend naturally impressed itself in the public consciousness because of the favor with which it was regarded by the autocrat, but there was also a strong undercurrent of protest against this trend which was prevalent in the circles of the intelligentsia. One Belinsky, who became the leader of the protesting group of Westernizers, continued throughout this period to condemn the backwardness of Russia. He violently attacked what he called the nationality of birchbark sandals and peasant smocks, and he said as the objective of his group, "I love the freedom of thought and I hate all that limited it." The great Russian writer, Gogol, who started off as a critic of Russian society, had a kind of mystical phase and he identified himself with the status quo. Belinsky wrote a famous denunciatory letter to him in which he proclaimed this. He said, "Russia sees her salvation not in mysticism, nor in asceticism, nor pietism, but in the successes of civilization,

enlightenment and humanity. What she needs is not sermons — she has repeated them too often — but the awakening in the people of a sense of their human dignity, lost for so many centuries amid the dirt and refuse. She needs rights and laws conforming not to the preachings of the church, but with common sense and justice and their strictest possible observance."

Well, there was this confrontation then of Slavophils and Westernizers, and there were some among the intellectuals who tried to achieve a synthesis between Slavophilism and the Westernizers. Such a one, for example, was Alexander Herzen who is largely responsible for introducing Socialism into Russian thought. But Herzen despised the political forms of Western Europe — the whole apparatus of parliaments and representation — and on the other hand, he greatly admired the Russian village mir (he idealized it), with its principles of cooperative fellowship and its plain folk who composed it. Joining his likes and his dislikes together, Herzen called on Russia to throw off serfdom, throw off the nobility, the bureaucracy and the Byzantine church and to base her future on the peasants' partnership of the mir under the Tsar.

Well, this dream may seem fantastic, but it became important in Russia because the system of agrarian socialism and free federation which Herzen wove together became the stable ideas of the Narodniki — Populists of the 1870's — and of the Socialist Revolutionaries later, and you may remember that in the last free election in Russia in 1918, the elections for the constituent assembly, it was these Socialist Revolutionaries — the SRs — who carried the majority of the country.

Meanwhile, during the period of the reign of Nicholas I, a certain ferment of critical ideas continued, but it was an underground ferment confined to small circles, not permitted public ventilation or expression. It was still predominately the ferment of conversation, but there was already one important exception. That was Michael Bakunin who was particularly important for our purposes because of his influence on the Bolsheviks. Bakunin's importance consists in the fact that he was the first of the intellectuals in his generation to burst the bonds of conversation and to

take on the career of a professional revolutionary. From 1848 on — he was a huge giant of a man — we see this Russian giant with enormous vitality rushing, roaring, swearing all over Europe, devising conspiracies against the established governments — Russia, Austria, the German and Italian rulers — laying fire wherever there was something to burn. His ideas were confused, his objectives were far from clear; he was, if anything, an anarchist, but what he loved above all was action — revolution. Herzen said of him that he had a way of mistaking the second month of gestation for the ninth, that he enjoyed all of the preliminary bustle of the Polish revolt in the sixties as though he was getting ready a Christmas tree. A Frenchman who worked with him in Paris said that he was a treasure on the first day of a revolution, but it was a good idea to shoot him on the second. The judgment of Nicholas I is also to the point. Nicholas I said, "He is a brave fellow, but we must keep him locked up."

Now, what makes Bakunin important? It was not his romantic madness, but the fact that he developed in thorough-going form, the theory and practice of a conspiratorial band of professional revolutionaries who would be able to seize and hold power almost regardless of the attitudes of the mass of the people, the leverage, you see, of the organized minority.

Bakunin was a great admirer of the Jesuits, and taking his cue from what he admired only, what he conceived to be their organizational vitality, he attributed their power and vitality to the complete effacement of the personal will in the perfection of the collective organization. And he sought to construct an organization that was strictly selected, that was bound to absolute obedience toward the superiors in the organization, that was severed from all connections outside the organization, that knew no moral obligations outside the good of the organization.

In the hands of Bakunin's disciple, Nechayev, his ideas miscarried and produced a great scandal in Russia when Nechayev arranged to murder one of the student members of his group who was suspected of the intention of turning informer. Nevertheless, the scheme in its essentials as I described it became a living part

of the activist revolutionary tradition in Russia, and it was a tradition on which the Bolsheviks were to draw. If you are interested in following this through in novel form, for example, perhaps some of you have read it, Dostoevsky's novel, *The Possessed.* It is also available, I think, under a different title in the Penguin series. It is called, *The Devils.* This is a novel about the Bakuninist and the Nechayev groups, the conspiratorial five, and it will give you the pattern. What is important, I think, for our purpose is that the essentials of this scheme of organization — not the ideals but the scheme — were taken over later by Lenin and became a part of the organizational philosophy of Bolshevism. And it is perhaps also worth remarking that Marx did not have these organizational ideas and that he was a great enemy of Bakunin. Indeed, the First International eventually floundered on the great feud between Bakunin and Marx.

Well, now to continue this analysis of the development of the Russian revolutionary movement into the reign of Alexander II — 1854 - 1881. You remember that Alexander II came to power after the disastrous defeats of the Crimean War, and he came in promising radical reform and the result was to produce a great intellectual awakening among the intelligentsia. The six newspapers of the day of Nicholas I multiplied to sixty-six; the nineteen monthlies increased to one hundred fifty. Dostoevsky again has given us an unforgettable picture of the intellectual excitement of the salons in his novel, *The Possessed.* He says of this period: "They talked, they talked, they talked of the abolition of the censorship, and of the phonetic spelling and of the substitution of Latin characters for the Russian alphabet, of splitting Russia into nationalities united in a free federation, of the abolition of the army and the navy, of the restoration of Poland as far as the Dnieper, of the peasant reforms, and of the manifestoes, of the abolition of the hereditary principles, the family of children, of creeds, of women's rights, and so on. They talked." But the first flush of enthusiasm died down when the conditions of the act of emancipation of the serfs in 1861 became known. When it appeared that even though the serfs were being freed,they were being condemned to what amounted to poverty as a result of the small size of the land allotments and the high price and high

interest rates charged for the purchase of the lands. A strong current of disillusionment set in among the intelligentsia and it is in this phase of the development of the Russian revolutionary movement that the insurrectionist and terrorist elements began to come to the fore. Great hopes were placed in the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. The secret organizations, the intellectuals called Land and Liberty, planned a peasant rising for the summer of 1863. Nothing came of it. A number of the leaders were executed; an attempt was made to assassinate the Tsar in April 1866. That also was a failure. The societies that had helped plan the assassination were discovered, many of their members sent to Siberia. But the plan which failed in 1866 was eventually successful in 1881, but Russian revolutionaries during this period were by no means united on conspiracy and insurrection and terror. There was also an important group gathered around Peter Lavrov, who preached the virtues of education and propaganda. Lavrov said, "No revolution is possible until you go through a long period of preparation and education of the people." He argued that what the intelligentsia had to do was to stop talking with each other, and go out into the villages to teach the peasants, to help to awaken them out of their darkness. The result was something which assumed the proportions of a crusade — the famous movement of going to the people. In these years, 1872, 1873, and 1874, students, teachers, lawyers, doctors, officers, under the influence of Lavrov's teachings, joined in and swarmed over the countryside to begin to try to establish contacts with the people. The countryside, in a sense, was covered with crusaders and evangelists, and what happened is depicted in unforgettable fashion in another novel (I hope some of you have read it) called *Virgin Soil*. It is devoted to this episode.

Well, what happens is what might be expected, but what was for the people concerned, tragic. Rural Russia — illiterate, dark, could make nothing of these missionaries. The gulf which divided what the Russians called "people" from "persons" was too deep. Most of the intelligentsia did not know how to talk to the people when they reached them. The peasant did not understand what they were driving at. Many of the social missionaries were delivered

over to the police and in other cases the peasants under the influence of the church regarded the missionaries as representatives of anti-Christ. The experience of the intelligentsia was sobering and disillusioning. Some of the soft ones committed suicide; others for the first time were brought up against realities. They began to recognize that vague idealism was not enough, that the task of educating the peasant was more than a week end in the country, that patient organization was required, and all life had to be lived together. A few — too few — digested the lesson, and they settled down in the countryside to undertake the long, disagreeable tasks of overcoming suspicion and proving their usefulness to the peasant. Many — too many — flocked back to the towns and the cities, there to agonize their sick consciences in conversation and, when the pressures became too great, to break out with heroic acts of terrorism which brought the police down on town and country alike. As one of the organizers who stayed behind in the countryside said, "As soon as we have started something going, bang! — the intellectuals have killed somebody, the police are on us. Why don't they give us a chance to educate and organize?"

Well, the tragic history of the Narodniki movement during the late seventies and early eighties is one of increasing dedication to terror. The triumph of the extremists found expression in the organization in 1879 of the *Narodnaya Volya*, the People's Will group, perhaps the first tightly organized Russian revolutionary party. Their triumph was not complete at the organizing meeting in June 1879. Some adherents of the old policy of agitation and permeation were still represented, among them one Plekhanov, who became a Marxist later and became the teacher of Lenin, but the immediate influence of those who advocated agitation rather than terror was negligible and their role in this period was completely overshadowed in the wave of terror which the Narodniki, or the People's Will group, unleashed.

Like all of its predecessors, the People's Will group was primarily concerned with the liberation of the peasantry. Russia was still an overwhelmingly rural country, and they felt that you needed constitutional reforms in order to achieve liberation. Indeed,

as the famous letter of their Executive Committee to Alexander III on his accession to the throne makes clear, their aim was a constituent assembly composed overwhelmingly of peasant representatives who, it was expected, would put a program of agrarian socialism into effect. But they were denied constitutional channels of expression and so they turned to terror instead, hoping through a series of key assassinations to organize and intimidate the government into concessions, to arouse the people, and to seize power in the cities. From the fall of 1879 to the spring of 1881, the terrorists waged a relentless duel with the government; one after another important official was killed. Finally, in March 1881, the People's Will group accomplished its chief aim, the assassination of the Tsar himself, Alexander II. But instead of ushering in a constituent assembly, the revolutionists only succeeded in intensifying the repression. The peasants were deaf to the revolutionary signal; after a short-lived panic in court circles, the reaction consolidated its hold. The People's Will groups were broken to pieces by the authorities; revolution was reduced, in the words of one boasting official, "to a cottage industry." So the Narodniki, the People's Will group, dwindled in effectiveness, although many of their ideas were later to be picked up by the Socialist Revolutionaries in the Twentieth Century.

During the next stage of the development of the Russian revolutionary movement in the 1890's, the Marxists began to come to the fore. The history of their growth and their developing influence is a large subject I shall not have time to treat this morning. You can find it developed in my book or many other places. Perhaps it is enough to note that one branch of the Marxists, the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, were able to draw on the organizing traditions of this revolutionary movement that I have sketched, this minority scheme by which you use your conspiratorial leverage to seize power. They were able to take power in November 1917. They were a small party, a minority party, but they were disciplined. They were activists; they were sure of their goals; the opposition was divided and scattered; they were blessed with unusually skillful leadership and the experience of 1917 tested this elite conception of a select band of professional revolutionaries and the conception survived the test.

Now, I am not one of those who believe that the triumph of the Bolsheviks was in any sense inevitable, but I would, I think, stress that Bolshevism as a movement was an indigenous, authoritarian response to the environment of Tsarist absolutism which nutured it. The Tzars, in a sense, manufactured their own executioners. They manufactured them because they had never learned the wisdom of the Burkean adage that if you would preserve, it is necessary to reform. They were unwilling to share power with those members of the intelligentsia who were pressing for reform.

This estrangement between the Tsar and the intelligentsia turned out to be a tragedy for both sides. The autocracy was unable, unwilling, to harness the reforming zeal of the intelligentsia to state purposes, and the intelligentsia, in turn, were denied an opportunity to acquire experience in the arts of responsible government. They were condemned to pursue their dream of justice in conspiratorial violence, and they were driven to become more authoritarian in their organization and more maximalist in their demands. Deprived of the chance to share in power, deprived of the sobering discipline of facing up to real problems, the more restless and energetic spirits among the intelligentsia placed themselves at the head of all of the forces of discontent in Russian society. They ended up by releasing a Pandora's box of unintended consequences, which represented over a time a tragic betrayal of the dream of freedom on which their revolt was nourished.

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1942-43 Director, Retail Trade and Services Division.

1943- Commissioned in Specialists Reserve, U. S. Army.

1944-45 Deputy Director, Civil Affairs Training School, Harvard University.

1946-49 Chairman, Department of Government, Harvard University.

1946-59 Professor Government, Harvard University.

Miscellaneous:

Authored *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule; American People and Their Government* (with A. J. Lien); *International Socialism and the World War; Government and the American Economy* (with A. L. Gordon); *How Russia is Ruled;* and articles to *Public Administration Review; American Economic Review; Yale Law Journal.*