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Robert O. Coulthard
U.S. Navy

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DISARMAMENT—THE WORLD'S ENIGMA

Research paper written by LCDR R.O. Coulthard, USN

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INTRODUCTION

"He shall judge between many peoples, and shall decide for strong nations afar off; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nations shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more; but they shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig tree, and none shall make them afraid . . ."

Holy Bible, *Micah 4*.

Although man is a fairly large and powerful creature, compared to most animals, he is armed rather weakly for his size. We lack not only horns and claws, but do not even possess the large canine teeth of our cousin the ape. Man has developed many weapons since he first learned to throw stones or hit with a stick. The purpose of the weapons, regardless of their refinement, has remained the same—to kill, wound, or otherwise subdue an enemy in order to force our will upon him. Weapons enable us to strike our opponent at a greater distance than if we depended only on our hands and teeth; and by storing energy which is released all at once when the weapon strikes, we are able to inflict more damage than by biting or kicking. If man had not developed weapons with which to defend himself from other animals and to assist him in procuring food, he probably would not have survived in this competitive world.

The entire written history of the world, and probably also the un written history, is a record of war and conflict. Even a cursory examination of the Old Testament of the *Holy Bible* will disclose that it too is a history of war—tribe against tribe, nation against nation, Philistines against Israelites, King David a military leader, etc. The sages of the time

expected Christ to be a leader of armies and free the Jews from the yoke of Rome.

Like war, disarmament is not a new concept. Its history runs concurrently with that of warfare. From the earliest days it has always been customary to disarm the conquered after his defeat in order to eliminate future threats. Somewhere in the dim past the theory was propounded that weapons caused wars and hence war could be eliminated by eliminating the weapons. Attempts to disarm have consistently failed—as evidenced by the wars which have followed. However, this fact does not deter governments from trying again and again to stabilize world conditions through the vehicle of disarming. Since the end of World War II, negotiations of some sort have been in progress almost continuously.

During the past few months the general public has been subjected to a constant barrage of words from the press, radio and television concerning the current negotiations; but like the author of this paper, is probably very vague on the history of previous proposals for limitation of armaments and disarmament. The primary purpose of this study is to fill in this gap in the author's knowledge by examining historically and chronologically some of the major attempts in this field from the earliest history to the current negotiations. It is felt that an understanding of previous failures is essential to an understanding of the current proposals; and an understanding of disarmament in general is essential for the military leaders of the United States. A treaty on arms limitation, even a partial limitation such as banning the tests of nuclear weapons, may seriously affect the future capabilities of our armed forces. The outlawing of nuclear weapons would cause drastic changes in our current military planning and procurement.

DISARMAMENT—THE WORLD'S ENIGMA

CHAPTER I

DISARMAMENT EFFORTS PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I

"Right without might is weakness. Might without right is tyranny."

Blaise Pascal, *circa* 1655.

Ancient and Early Attempts.

A brief review of world history reveals that disarmament proposals are not just the "problem child" of this century. Proposals for disarming can be traced as far back in history as 546 B.C. when in China a confederation of Yellow River states laid the foundation for a league which kept the peace in that area for a hundred years. This league subdued an aggressive Yangtze state, incorporated it into the league, and made a general treaty of disarmament. (40:1)

International peace has probably been regarded as the ideal world situation since the beginning of history. The fundamental principle of all organized religious movements since ancient times has been universal brotherhood. Unity of mankind and humanitarianism were the means of reaching this utopia. Micah and Isaiah, two of the Israelite prophets, formulated texts which are still the favorites of peace movements—"They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks..." (22:710) During the rule of the Roman Empire, however, the Christian leaders had to condone military service and it became common practice for priests to accompany the armies. The great work of the medieval Church was its attack on the problem of war and its attempt to organize peace from a different approach. An example of this is pointed out by Mr. Beales in his book, *The History of Peace:*

> By the Truce of God, proclaimed in 989 at the Council of Charroux and extended in 1027, fighting among the feudal nobles was prohibited from sunset every Wednesday till dawn on the following Monday, and on certain festivals. Fantastic as it sounds to modern ears, the prohibition was tolerably well respected for close on two centuries, and it serves as an index of the influence exerted by the Papacy. (4:18)

Early writers on world peace either did not mention the idea of disarmament or touched on it only in passing. About the time of the Third Crusade, Gerohus of Regensberg advanced what is probably the first definite plan for abolishing war. For simplicity and logic it would be difficult to surpass. The Pope was to merely forbid war and require all differences between princes to be referred to Rome for decision. Those who rejected the Pope's award would be excommunicated and deposed. The weakness of the plan was, of course, the basic assumption of universal Christianity—a condition which the world has never achieved and probably never will. (4:19)

With the advent of the era of individual sovereign states in the sixteenth century, and nationalism replacing internationalism, all hope for universality disappeared. Nationalism obviously was not compatible with universality and a new approach to establishing peace had to be found. One method was through limitation and several devices have been tried: disarmament, collective security, judicial agencies—all more or less political measures.

Pre-Hague Efforts.

The first official proposal in modern times for the limitation of national armaments came in 1766 at

the end of the Seven Years War between Austria and Prussia. Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian Chancellor, proposed to Frederick the Great a reduction of the troops of both countries. The basis of the agreement was to be a demobilization of three-fourths of the soldiers which each country had under arms at the time of the Peace of Hubertsburg. Kaunitz's suggestion was rejected by Prussia and a renewal of the proposal by Emperor Joseph II three years later was also turned down. (47:5)

Nothing really definite is known of Napoleon's plans but he may have had the idea of organizing all of Europe into one "Super State" and thereby establish a more or less permanent peace. The Napoleonic Wars destroyed the balance of power arrangements (systems of collective security) which had been the foundation of international peace and order since the end of the middle ages and threatened to replace them with a universal empire. This arrangement (like Hitler's at a later date) might have assured peace and orderliness for a time but it also was a serious threat to freedom. Today the world is faced with a parallel dilemma in the form of International Communism.

The next important disarmament proposal came after the Congress of Vienna in 1816 when Czar Alexander I of Russia wrote his well-known letter to Lord Castlereagh of England and proposed the simultaneous reduction of armed forces of every kind, stating that "It is necessary that disarmament be effected with the same agreement and striking loyalty that has decided the safety of Europe and which alone can today ensure its happiness." (47:7) In his reply Lord Castlereagh pointed out the difficulties involved in such an arrangement—"It is nevertheless impossible not to perceive the complications which this question presents in the establishment of a scale of forces for so many Powers, who are in such varying circumstances with regard to their relative means, their frontier, their position and their ability to arm themselves

again." (47:7) Metternich's reaction to this proposal was that because of "the difficulty always of obtaining any true data from Russia. . . to take the initiative here, uncertain of reciprocity of confidence, would be impossible." Czarist Russia at this time was the only country in Europe which was still keeping her army on a war footing. (36:vii) The only concrete result of the Czar's initiative in this matter was the convention of February 10, 1817 whereby the Powers which were maintaining troops in occupied France, agreed that each should reduce their forces by twenty per cent.

While these overtures were being made among the European powers, the United States made its first proposal for arms limitation. The Great Lakes had been the theatre of bloody battles during the War of 1812 and the situation was ripe for a naval armaments race in those waters. When the war came to an end both belligerents had large naval forces on the Lakes and the British were building, or planning to build, sufficient ships to guarantee their supremacy. With this situation in mind President Monroe instructed the United States' Ambassador in London to propose mutual disarmament on the Great Lakes to Lord Castlereagh. The suggestion was favorably received and negotiations were transferred to Washington, where in 1817, the Rush-Bagot executive agreement for mutual disarmament on the Great Lakes resulted. This agreement on disarmament is one of the few in recorded history which on the whole has been faithfully observed. The principle of demilitarization was eventually extended to the land and resulted in an undefended frontier stretching for more than three thousand miles. In 1893 the United States' government refused to exhibit a warship at the Chicago World's Fair for fear of violating the agreement. (1:156) Probably the first time warships appeared on these lakes since the signing of the agreement was during the second World War when the U.S. Navy stationed a small aircraft carrier in those waters for the purpose of conducting carrier

landing training. Over-all this agreement has given to the world an excellent object lesson in mutual disarmament.

Hague Conferences.

Public and governmental concern about powerful new weapons, missile gaps, deterrent gaps, and the tremendous cost of an adequate military establishment is not a singular achievement of this generation. In 1898 the Czar of Russia was apparently confronted with the same problems as we are currently facing. On 24 August of that year, the Russian foreign minister delivered to the representatives of other nations at St. Petersburg a circular proposing a disarmament conference. It was apparently the Czar's intention to put an end to the ever-increasing armaments; as he pointed out:

> . . . the maintenance of universal peace, and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations represents, in the present condition of affairs all over the world, the ideal toward which the efforts of all governments should be directed. . . The ever-increasing financial burdens strike at the root of public prosperity. (5:319)

Since the scope of this proposal was narrow and it did not indicate the manner of execution, it received a rather cool reception from the other Powers. As a result, a second letter was circulated in December enlarging upon the original plan and suggesting the following agenda items for a conference:

1. An agreement for a definite term not to increase the present strength of armies and navies.

2. An agreement as above not to increase the military budget.

3. A study of ways and means for future reduction of armed forces and military budgets.

4. A ban on the use of new weapons, new explosives, and new powder more powerful than that currently in use.

5. A ban on employing weapons from balloons.

6. Outlaw the use of submarines and agree not to construct naval vessels equipped with rams. (47:14)

The Czar's proposals resulted in the calling of the First Hague Conference (1899). In view of our present dilemma on the same general subject, the discussions, proposals, and counter-proposals by the gentlemen attending that conference make extremely interesting reading. Twenty-six nations, including the United States, were represented at the conference and although no agreement was reached on the reduction of armaments, the conduct of war was regulated and the principle of voluntary arbitration was accepted. A Court of International Justice was established at The Hague.

A second Hague Conference was proposed by President Roosevelt in 1904 but arrangements were delayed due to the Russo-Japanese War and the conference was not called until 1906, once again by the Czar, and finally met in 1907. The Czar's invitation did not include the subject of disarmament on the agenda and although the British and other delegates attempted to include a discussion of arms limitation, they failed due to the opposition of Germany. The Second Hague Conference accomplished very little of importance. The rules of warfare were revised and reaffirmed and the

principle of arbitration was also reaffirmed. (40:5) Professor Bailey in his book on our diplomatic history had this to say about the 1907 conference:

> Roosevelt confessed that he was too much disturbed by the Japanese situation to give proper attention to the Second Hague Conference. . . On the whole the results were even more disappointing than those of the First Hague Conference. Of the fourteen conventions drawn up, twelve had to do with the regulation of war rather than its prevention. . . . The American delegates and the United States Senate attached to the convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes the customary reservation designed to protect traditional policies. (1:573)

Prelude to World War.

Between the Hague Conferences and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 there were several more sporadic attempts at disarmament and arms limitation. Most notable were the Anglo-German negotiations in which three successive proposals were made. The first of these was 'The Exchange of Information' proposal made in an address before the House of Commons by Sir Edward Grey in 1911:

> I have always held that frank exchange of information between the two Governments, through their naval attaches, would guard against surprise. It would convince each nation and the world that neither was trying to steal a march upon the other, and it would have a pacific effect. It may be that within the limits of the German Naval Law some retardation of naval expenditure may be effected. It may be that agreement would make it certain that there would be no addition to the present program in Germany. (47:35)

To this proposal the Germans were apparently in complete agreement, stating that the German naval construction program had always been completely open and above board for the whole world to see.

The second and third proposals were both made by Mr. Winston Churchill, the Minister of the Navy. In 1912 he proposed a sixteen to ten proportion between the British/German capital ships. Admiral von Tirpitz is reported to have stated that he would have no objections to such an arrangement with the reservation that cruisers, torpedo boats, gun boats, and submarines were not to be included. In 1913, speaking before the House of Commons, Mr. Churchill proposed a one-year holiday on construction of warships by Great Britain and Germany stating that: "It imposes no check upon the development of true naval efficiency. It is so simple that it could lead to no misunderstanding. The finances of every country would obtain relief. No navy would sustain the slightest injury." (47:38) His proposal, however, did not receive favorable public support in England and the Germans never did reply.

Thus ends the period before the first great holocaust, World War I, which gave birth to several more new weapons of destruction—the tank, combat airplane, and poison gas. The efforts to decrease military expenditures, reduce the number of men under arms, reduce naval tonnage, and in general to halt competition in armaments had failed. The obstacles to an international agreement encountered in this phase of world history were a forecast of things to come.

CHAPTER II

BETWEEN THE WARS—1918 to 1941

"The way to disarm is to disarm, and the time to begin is at once, not in the distant future."
Charles Evans Hughes, 1921.

During this relatively short period of world history (23 years) literally millions of words were written and thousands of speeches given on the subject of disarmament and arms limitation. A comprehensive bibliography of books and articles published during this period dealing with disarmament would itself fill a large-size book. There were four major conferences which attempted to solve this tangled problem: (1) The Washington Conference of 1921, (2) The Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1927, (3) The London Naval Conference of 1930, and (4) World Disarmament Conference of 1932. It is the purpose of this chapter to review briefly these conferences and the reasons for their failure.

In January 1918 President Wilson delivered his famous "Fourteen Point" address before Congress. The address was designed as a statement of war aims and as an instrument of propaganda for both domestic and foreign consumption. Thousands of leaflets listing these points were dropped from aircraft into Germany and Austria and ultimately proved to be instrumental in inducing the Germans to sue for peace. In October 1918 the Berlin government asked President Wilson to call a conference which would make peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points, and after a series of communications with both Germany and our Allies the Armistice was finally signed in November. It should be noted that the Allies were not generally enthusiastic about a peace based on the Fourteen Points, although

they had welcomed them as needed propaganda material, and it was only after a gentle hint of a separate peace between the United States and Germany that the Allies agreed to accept them as the basis for negotiations. The primary reason for their reluctance was probably due to the fact that a strict application of the Points would deprive them of the traditional spoils of war. They had already made secret agreements as to how the enemy's possessions would be carved up and divided. (1:650)

Point four of Wilson's address dealt directly with the reduction of armaments. Point fourteen suggested a world organization—"A general association of nations to secure mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike"—and eventually resulted in the formation of the League of Nations. (1:650) President Wilson, however, was unable to secure Senate approval of the Treaty of Versailles (of which the League Covenant was a part) and America never did become a member of the League. Wilson received credit as its founder, however, and a tablet at Geneva is so inscribed. The United States did not officially end the war until August 1921 when separate treaties were signed with Germany, Austria and Hungary. (1:682)

The Covenant of the League stated the following regarding arms limitations: "The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." (39:108) The influence of Wilson's fourth point is evident in this wording. The League of Nations, which began its official existence on February 10, 1920, created special machinery for disarmament at its eighth meeting. A permanent Armaments Commission was established under Article IX of the Covenant and its function was to advise the Council on matters concerning limitation of naval, air, and ground

forces. The commission, consisting of military representatives from each of the members, immediately organized and went to work; but its progress proved to be slow and rather ineffective, as did that of the League in general—hampered by the "built-in" brake, the requirement of unanimity. Under this rule, numbers did not count; one "no" voted down all "ayes." (39:108) A carry-over of this system in the form of the "veto" in the Security Council of the United Nations, where one "nyet" would outvote all "ayes," would prove to be the main stumbling block of our second attempt to organize the world for peace.

Washington 1921.

By 1921 the activities of the League had been unable to accomplish much in the way of international security in general and specifically in arms reduction. At this point, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan found themselves engaged in a tremendous naval building race. England and the United States were on friendly terms of course, but the Japanese, by their economic penetration of China and by taking over the former German islands in the North Pacific, had irritated and rankled the American government and general public. Even as early as 1920 there had been considerable discussion on both sides of the Pacific as to the possibility of a war between the United States and Japan. (1:687)

In August 1921 President Harding invited representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan to participate in a disarmament conference at Washington as "principles." Four minor Powers, Belgium, China, Portugal and the Netherlands, were invited to participate in the discussions affecting the Pacific area but were to have no active part in the disarmament program. (23:23) The aims of this conference were to bring about a limitation of armaments on the part of the principle Powers and to solve the Pacific

and Far East problems through joint efforts of all nine of the participants. It was really two conferences disguised as one.

On 12 November 1921 President Harding opened the conference with his official welcome to the delegates and concluded with the following words:

> I can speak officially only for the United States. Our hundred millions frankly want less of armament and none of war. Wholly free from guile, sure in our own minds that we harbor no unworthy designs, we accredit the world with the same good intent. So I welcome you, not alone in good will and high purpose, but with high faith. We are met for a service to mankind. . . I hope for that understanding which will emphasize the guaranties of peace, and for commitments to less burdens and a better order which will tranquilize the world. . . (23:34)

The President was followed by Secretary of State Hughes. After a long conventional introduction the Secretary startled the audience by stating that; "We can no longer content ourselves with investigations, with statistics, with reports, with circumlocution of inquiry. . . The time has come, and this Conference has been called, not for general resolutions or mutual advice, but for action." (10:45) Then, after the applause had abated, Secretary Hughes made the astounding declaration that the way to disarm was to disarm, and that the time to begin was now, not in the distant future. He proposed a ten-year holiday in the construction of capital ships and the scrapping of other battleships built or on the ways, so that the navies of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan would be reduced to the ratio of 5-5-3 respectively in all categories. His proposal meant the scrapping of 30 United States' capital ships. (23:35-36) Professor Bailey has the following interesting account of the conference:

> This proposal was breath-taking. It combined idealism with what was perhaps the only practicable plan. Even if Hughes had then sat down his speech would be labeled as one of the most sensational utterances ever made by an American statesman. But Hughes did not sit down. Not content with having sunk 30 American ships, he proceeded to tell the British and Japanese delegates in a tomblike silence just what they should scrap. In less than fifteen minutes he destroyed 66 ships with a total tonnage of 1,878,043—more, as one British reporter put it, "than all the admirals of the world have sunk in a cycle of centuries." It was not only the greatest naval encounter on record, but probably the most dramatic moment in American diplomatic history. (1:691)

Agreement to these conditions meant that the United States would have eighteen capital ships in service, Great Britain twenty, and Japan ten, France and Italy would both retain their existing ten ships. Replacement tonnage for capital ships was to be fixed at 500,000 tons each for the United States and Great Britain, 300,000 tons for Japan, and 175,000 tons each for France and Italy. No new ships were to be built for ten years. Ships which were twenty years old could be replaced by new ones whose keels were not to be laid until the ships were seventeen years old, provided such construction did not come within the "holiday." The maximum size of capital ships was to be limited to 35,000 tons. (23:37)

Great Britain and the United States were able to agree on this ratio and as to which ships were to be scrapped after only a few discussions and exchanges of communications between the capitals. Britain, almost bankrupt by the war, was in no position to engage in a protracted naval race with the United States.

Japan, however, was not so eager to agree. It was only after Britain agreed not to fortify Pacific possessions and the United States consented not to further fortify our Pacific islands (particularly Guam, the Philippines, Samoa, and the Aleutians) that the Japanese consented to the short end of the deal. They had accepted a smaller ratio, but had gained greater security. We had left some of our possessions relatively unprotected (a mistake as we were to find out at a later date) but had retained greater battleship tonnage. (23;58)

With the 5-5-3 ratio settled it was generally considered that the remainder of the proposal would be agreed to in short order. But such was not the case. France, traditionally worried about the Germans, almost upset the conference by insisting that she should have just twice the tonnage that she was initially allotted. The French eventually bowed to world opinion and accepted the lower ratio with the understanding that there would be no limitation on the numbers of cruisers, destroyers, or submarines. Italy agreed to accept the same ratio, and the Five Power Naval Treaty was finally drawn up and signed on 6 February 1922. (1:695)

In addition to fixing the ratio of tonnages, the maximum size of capital ships, and agreeing to a *status quo* in the Pacific the treaty also specified the following:

> Article VI.—No capital ship of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a caliber in excess of 16 inches (406 millimeters).

> Article X.—No aircraft carrier. . . shall carry a gun with a caliber in excess of 8 inches. . .

> Article XII.—No vessel of war. . . other than a capital ship, shall carry a gun with a caliber in excess of 8 inches.
>
> Article XVIII.—Each of the Contracting Powers undertakes not to dispose by gift, sale or any mode of transfer of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the Navy of any foreign Power. (23:365-368)

Although the Naval Treaty is probably the most notable and spectacular accomplishment of the Washington Conference, the same group of delegates dealt with other knotty problems. The following four additional treaties were drawn up at the same conference: (1) Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare. (2) The Shantung Treaty—in which Japan and China attempted to resolve their differences. (3) The Four Power Treaty—a device to get rid of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and replace it with an agreement by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan to maintain peace in the Pacific. (4) The Chinese Tariff Treaty—the object of which was to secure an increase of revenue for China. (23:386-402)

Professor Ichihashi, writing in 1928, predicted that the Washington Conference had ushered in an era of peace. (23:350) History, however, was to prove him wrong. It is apparent to this writer that the main motivating factor behind the Naval Treaty was not necessarily humanitarianism, but more probably the omnivorous appetite of the military budgets. The provisions of the treaty, although appealing to the public imagination, were largely illusory. Construction of battleships was stopped, but the armament race shifted to smaller ships which were not limited in number by the treaty. Events following the conference proved once more that, in the absence of a constructive effort to establish a world community, disarmament conferences turn into armament conferences.

Geneva 1927.

By 1927 a race in the construction of cruisers, submarines, and other smaller vessels was in full swing. The United States had fallen behind in these categories and was even below the battleship strength allowed by the Naval Treaty. President Coolidge, worried and hoping to equal Harding's successful conference of 1921, issued a call for a disarmament conference at Geneva. Of the nations invited, only Great Britain and Japan accepted. Italy and France begged off with the excuse of prior commitments to the League's disarmament program. The United States endeavored to have the 5-5-3 ratio extended to smaller ships and to bring about a reduction in the existing cruiser strength. A compromise proved to be impossible, however, due to the fact that each of the Powers had conflicting ideas as to their defense requirements. For example, Lord Jellicoe explained that 70 cruisers were an absolute minimum for England since a hundred forty cruisers had been hardly enough to save England from destruction in the war a few years before. (28:229) The difficulties encountered once again demonstrated the importance of military power as an instrument of national policy. As pointed out by Salvador de Madariaga in his book *Disarmament:*

> It is not so much actually in order to shoot her guns at England that America wants her cruisers; nor to defend her supplies from American cruisers that England is so particular about her superiority at sea. It is because naval preeminence means international prestige; preponderance in the counsels of the world; authority in troubled areas such as China; power to have one's way; political backing to financial economic and commercial penetration. (28:231)

In my opinion, those same basic motivations probably account in part for the rapid build-up of Soviet military power after the second World War. Even today, in early 1960, France is attempting to stage a comeback as a world power through an all-out effort to join the "World Atomic Club." Possession of a nuclear weapon capability was essential to France's prestige. General Charles de Gaulle is now in a position to claim a place for France at the Big Power conference on banning nuclear tests.

London 1930.

President Hoover's turn to deal with the disarmament problem came in 1929. The naval race in cruisers and lighter ships which had started almost as soon as the Washington Conference ended was proving to be extremely expensive. The President realized, however, that nothing constructive could be accomplished until the United States and Great Britain had resolved their differences which had flared up at the Geneva Conference. After several months of discussions between Britain's Prime Minister MacDonald and the United States Ambassador Dawes, the problem was close to solution. The President then invited the Prime Minister to Washington for friendly discussions on their mutual problems and after an amiable twelve-day visit, the Prime Minister returned to London and sent out invitations for a Five-Power Naval Conference. (I:718)

The treaty, which was formally completed on 22 April 1930, extended the ratio principle of the Washington Conference to all categories of warships of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. Although the representatives of France and Italy were also present and signed the treaty, they did not subscribe to all clauses and agreed only to the relatively unimportant parts. France was still concerned about her traditional enemy and wanted a guarantee of military support in exchange for her cooperation in limiting arms. The United States was opposed at that time to any such entangling alliance.

It was the intention of this conference to call a halt to the competitive building among the great Powers. However, in addition to the weakness in the treaty due to the fact that two of the nations could not agree to its limitations, it contained another glaring fault in Article 21, the so-called escalator clause. This clause provided that if any nation not bound by the treaty should commence a building program and thus jeopardize one of the signatory powers, the limitations imposed by the treaty were no longer valid. (17:41) In retrospect, it looks as if the drafters of the treaty realized that it would never work. Once again it is evident that the national security of each individual nation dominates the picture. How can a nation disarm and be certain that its existence is safe? The events of history have continually shown that "security on paper" is a risky method of safeguarding a nation.

Geneva Again 1932.

The World Disarmament Conference of 1912 came as a result of twelve years of preparation by various organs of the League of Nations. It was doomed to failure, however, before it ever convened. On the eve of the conference Great Britain had experienced an economic and financial crisis which resulted in the resignation of the Labor Administration. The new Prime Minister, who was to preside over the conference in Geneva, was a political enemy of Britain's first delegate to the conference. The German attitude toward disarmament was one of inferiority and she demanded equality. Either the other nations should disarm to her level, or she would be compelled to arm herself up to their level. The position of France, of course, was just the opposite. Three times in 100 years she had been invaded by German armies and she was anxious to avoid a fourth. The compelling force which drove the United States toward disarmament was still economic. America's national debt was becoming a colossus and drastic measures, such as cutting the

navy by one fifth and closing a number of naval stations, were being proposed. (48:7-11)

The United States' delegates participated actively in all phases of the work and urged the abolition of all offensive weapons, especially the submarine, poison gas, and bacteriological warfare. When the conference began to stall out, President Hoover made the sensational proposal, on 22 June 1932, that all existing arms should be reduced by about one third. (1:720)

By the end of the first session, in July 1932, the world situation was even worse than at the beginning and a solution to the disarmament problem was further away than ever. Germany had walked out of the Conference and Japan was openly defying the League of Nations with its attack on Shanghai. Mr. Wheeler-Bennett summarizes this phase of negotiations in his book *Disarmament Deadlock* as follows:

> At best the whole thing had been a race against time and the growth of Nationalism in Germany, and the Conference had merely figured as an "also ran." By their refusal to face facts and reach an agreement on the question of equality with Dr. Bruning, the statesmen of Europe had ruined what slight chances had remained of limiting and reducing armaments, and had opened the way for the final tragedy of the Nazi revolution. The Conference was moribund in July, 1932, and all subsequent attempts to resuscitate it were only the desperate attempts of physicians to prolong existence. (48:64)

The Conference, attended by representatives of 60 nations out of 64 that were invited, dragged on for over two and a half years. The original draft treaty which had been drawn up by the preparatory commission was buried under proposed amendments and amendments to

the amendments. It was soon forgotten in the maze of new ideas and plans. Mr. Anthony Eden, on 9 June 1934, stated the position as follows:

> We have in no sense solved the main difficulties of the European situation, which consist in the present relations of the chief Powers of Continental Europe. Unless they can be improved, there will be no disarmament agreement, no political entente . . . (48:238)

By the summer of 1934 the deadlock was complete and all hopes for disarmament had vanished. The General Commission met for the last time on 11 June to appoint the chairmen of four committees which had been established by a resolution on 8 June and then adjourned without a date for reconvening. Events in Europe and the Far East had overtaken and passed the discussions at Geneva and the world was now well on its way to World War II. On 29 December, Japan formally denounced the Washington Naval Treaty, as she was privileged to do according to the treaty provisions, by giving the necessary two years' notice. The dreams and hopes of the Washington Conference were now completely shattered and by 1938 President Roosevelt had concluded that it was foolish for the United States to continue to fall behind in the armaments race. Accordingly, he asked Congress for a billion dollar naval appropriation and the United States, late as usual, jumped into the race with both feet. (1:743)

Writers during this period between the wars made dire predictions concerning the probable weapons and conduct of the next world war. The following, written by Mr. Hudson Maxim in the *New York Tribune* in 1921, is an example:

> In the next great war not only will the most deadly poisonous gases be spread broadcast over actual contending forces, both on

> land and sea, but also over inland cities . . . we are going to see germs of the most deadly diseases sown broadcast by airplanes. We are going to see inland cities smothered in poisonous gases and tens of thousands of inhabitants, men, women and children killed in a few minutes. Fleas and cooties or body lice will be infected with bubonic plague and typhus fever and other deadly ailments and sowed by billions over the inhabitants of enemy countries. (39:42)

History, of course, was to prove the above prediction wrong. Except for the use of gas chambers by Hitler's gestapo in the organized and methodical destruction of the Jewish race, such weapons as poison gas and bacteriological warfare, even though a capability of both sides in the conflict, were not used. The most probable reason for not using such weapons was the fear of retaliation in kind. History also proves, however, that a nation will resort to any expedient that promises success and victory in war if there is no fear of retaliation in kind. World War II was to give birth to a new weapon with a destructive capacity far beyond the wildest dreams of the military planners of the "thirties."

CHAPTER III

DISARMAMENT AFTER WORLD WAR II

"Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of fear."

Bernard Baruch, 14 June 1946.

A New Era.

On 25 April 1945 President Truman opened the San Francisco Conference (The United Nations Conference on International Organization) with these words: "If we do not want to die together in war, we must learn to live together in peace." (1:825) The United States had not yet tested the new weapon which was under development by the Manhattan Project so perhaps Mr. Truman was not really aware of the true portent of his statement. In July of that year the first atomic device was successfully tested in New Mexico and in August Hiroshima and Nagasaki were virtually flattened within a few seconds after atomic bombs were exploded over those cities. Thus, a new era of world history was ushered in with the harnessing of atomic power. Since the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons is theoretically unlimited, the world is for the first time facing the possibility of the complete destruction of civilization as we know it. The development of nuclear weapons systems added an entirely new element to the historic problem of control of armaments. In fact, control of nuclear weapons has been the main concern of most disarmament conferences and negotiations since the end of World War II.

This new era is unique not only because of the advent of nuclear weapons, but also because the United States, for the first time, recognized that there

could be no security in isolation. After the first World War President Wilson was unable to "sell" the League of Nations to the Senate, although during the war and for a short period afterwards, the general American public appeared to support the tenets of his program for world peace. The acceptance of the United Nations charter in 1945 is a remarkable contrast. President Truman personally presented the Charter to the Senate on 2 July 1945 and, unlike Wilson on a similar occasion, he was given a warm reception. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was concerned about the veto provisions of the charter and the commitment of military forces to the Security Council but after only five days they reported it out without a single amendment or reservation. Twenty-six years earlier Senator Lodge's committee had attached 49 reservations or amendments to the proposed League of Nations treaty. Formal debate on the Senate floor lasted only six days, compared to eight months of debate on the League, and there was only one major speech in opposition. The Senate, with a vote of 89 to 2, gave almost unanimous approval to the charter. We never did become a member of the League of Nations nor formally approve the Treaty of Versailles, but the United States was the first nation to take final action on approving and ratifying the United Nations Charter. (1:850)

The Baruch Plan.

The problem of atomic weapons was discussed by the United Nations almost a year before they touched on the so-called conventional arms. In January 1946 the General Assembly approved the resolution which established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission whose task was to prepare specific proposals on the following items:

1. Extending exchange of scientific information for peaceful ends.

2. Control of atomic energy.

3. Elimination from national armaments of atomic and other weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

4. Effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect nations against hazards of violations and invasions. (40:10)

Mr. Bernard Baruch, the chief United States' delegate to the commission, presented our proposal at the first meeting. The plan provided for international control of atomic energy, whereby the United States would give up its atomic monopoly, destroy or dispose of its atomic stocks, and turn over atomic secrets to the proposed international agency. The international authority was to conduct continuous inspection of all phases of the production of fissionable materials—from the mines to the final product. One of the primary reasons for the failure of past attempts of disarmament and arms control had been the lack of effective guarantees that treaty provisions would in fact be carried out. A law, no matter how good, is not effective without a police force. Mr. Baruch was well aware of the past failures and the reasons therefore and was determined that this treaty would have "teeth in it." The following quotation is from his address to the commission on 14 June 1946:

> We of this nation, desirous of helping to bring peace to the world and realizing the heavy obligations upon us arising from our possession of the means of producing the bomb and from the fact that it is part of our armament, are prepared to make our full contribution toward effective control of atomic energy. When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective

> operation and condign punishments set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes, we propose. . . There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes. (17:192-193)

The control of atomic energy was to shift gradually from national to international by a step-by-step procedure over an indefinite period of time. The Agency would also have had the exclusive right to conduct atomic weapons tests and research in atomic weapons systems. (11:168)

To this writer the Baruch plan sounds like a reasonable proposal; particularly at that time when we were the only nation in possession of atomic weapons and the stockpile was very low. To the Soviet Union, however, it apparently was not so reasonable. In considering the events of this period, one should remember that the Soviet Union had also been working on the atomic bomb problem for several years; not through the tool of research as we had, but through espionage. Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet net in Canada and to such people in the United States as the Rosenbergs, Harry Gold, and David Greenglass, by the end of the war the Soviets were probably well on the way to putting the pieces of the puzzle together. It is small wonder then that they were not at all receptive to the United States' proposal and insisted on a sharply different approach. They needed a few more years in which to develop a weapon of their own and thus have a bargaining device for negotiations.

On 19 June 1946, just five days after the United States' plan was presented, the Soviet Union's draft convention (Gromyko Plan) to prevent the production and use of atomic weapons was proposed to the commission. One essential difference between these two proposals was the lack of provisions for international

control and inspection in the Soviet version, a point about which we would still be arguing some fourteen years later. One glaring weakness was their provision for punishing violators. Each nation was to punish itself for violations. As stated in their draft convention:

> Article 2. The high contracting parties declare that any violation. . . is a most serious international crime against humanity.
>
> Article 3. The high contracting parties shall, within a period of six months from the day of the entry into force of the present convention, pass legislation providing severe penalties for violators of the statutes of the present convention. (17:226)

The proposal was so ludicrous that it makes one wonder if the Soviets were really serious. If you steal the candy, punish yourself by slapping your own hand! Most likely the proposal was made solely for the purpose of, and as a basis for, arguing. As long as nations were busy at the conference tables, there would be less chance of fighting. The Soviet Union could then go quietly about her business of consolidating the gains of World War II and building her own atomic bomb, while at the same time deriving the maximum propaganda advantage from her cry of "Ban the Bomb."

The U.N. Atomic Energy Commission published its first report in December 1946 and approved by a vote of 10 to 0 (Poland and the Soviet Union abstaining) the essential elements of the Baruch plan. Even at this early date it was noted that it was technically possible to organize a satisfactory international control, but whether or not it would ever be politically possible was the critical question. They also recognized that difficulties would arise from the fact that the uses of atomic energy for peaceful or military purposes were so closely connected with each other as to

be almost inseparable. (6:21) Late in 1948 the United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 40 to 6, approved the AEC's majority plan which was based on the United States' proposal. The Soviet bloc voted against the plan, contending that it would give the new agency arbitrary control over the national life and development of other countries. (11:141)

Conventional Arms.

The Soviet Union brought up the question of limiting conventional armaments in November 1946 when it advocated in the United Nations that members should report the size of armed forces which they maintained in foreign countries. Tied in with this proposal was a general demand for a reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic energy for military purposes. (17:368) In retrospect the Soviet reasoning behind such a proposal is obvious. If adopted, it would have improved the Soviet military position in Europe by putting pressure on the Western bloc to withdraw their troops. Secretary Forrestal was apprehensive of just such a move as early as October of that year as evidenced in a letter from him to Dr. Phillip Brown: ". . .There are many signs of a gathering drive to cut down our Armed Forces and to persuade the people that we should haul out of Europe and out of China as well . . .However, don't be discouraged. I am confident there is a sound core of American opinion, not very vocal but with an instinctive awareness of dangers." (20:214)

The General Assembly adopted a resolution by a unanimous vote late in 1946 which recognized the necessity for regulation and a reduction of armed forces and armaments. Specifically, it made the following recommendations:

> . . . the Members to undertake the progressive and balanced withdrawal, taking

> account of the needs of occupation, of their armed forces stationed in ex-enemy territories, and the withdrawal without delay of armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties. . . a corresponding reduction of national armed forces, and a general progressive and balanced reduction of national armed forces. (17:82-83)

On 13 February 1947 the United Nations Security Council established the Commission on Conventional Armaments and specifically directed it not to consider atomic weapons. These were to be the sole province of the AEC. The new commission was to work out practical measures for regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and for the establishment of an international agency to supervise the reduction. (40:12) The Western position was that control and reduction of conventional arms would be possible only under conditions of international confidence and security and urged immediate action on the part of the members to supply the armed forces to the Security Council as provided for in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. (11:170) The Soviet Union insisted that a reduction in armaments would in itself create a better international climate. In 1948 (and repeated at intervals thereafter) they proposed a one-third reduction, within one year, of the Naval, air and ground forces of the permanent members of the Security Council. Tied to this proposal was their traditional demand for the unconditional ban of all atomic weapons. This proposal, of course, was unacceptable to the majority of the nations and was defeated by a vote of 40 to 6 with five nations abstaining. (40:14)

The commission adopted a French proposal in 1949 which provided for a complete census of conventional arms and armed forces of all nations. An international control agency was to collect, verify, and publish the

information. Although the Soviets themselves had proposed in 1946 that nations should submit such information (without any provision for verification) they denounced the French proposal on the grounds that it did not include atomic weapons and that it was a system for gathering information rather than reducing arms. A Soviet vote of "nyet" in the Security Council killed this proposal. (11:171) Obviously they could not afford to have foreigners snooping around within their borders. The problem of inspection which was apparent at that time would continue to crop up in the ensuing years.

Korean Interlude.

By 1949 it was obvious that the postwar conferences were becoming entangled in the same basic disputes which had plagued negotiations in the twenties and thirties. Which should come first—disarmament or security? The authors of the United Nations Charter realized that one of the primary weaknesses of the League Covenant had been the lack of enforcement powers and in writing the new charter they attempted to avoid this pitfall by providing for an international military force to keep the peace. In accordance with Article 43 all members were to make forces available to the Security Council under whose direction the Military Staff Committee, top military men from the Big Five nations, would organize and direct the force. At this writing, some fifteen years later, the United Nations still does not have its police force. The states of this world, particularly the Soviet Union, are not yet ready for true internationalism; and the Charter will not work any better than the Covenant did until states are ready to give up some of their sovereignty. Although the authors thought that they had eliminated one defect, they negated this action by writing in another—the power of a veto in the Security Council.

On 23 September 1949 President Truman announced to the world that the United States had evidence that an atomic explosion had taken place in the Soviet Union. (40:15) Our atomic monopoly had ended and our big stick at the conference table was beginning to shrink in size. If there was still doubt in our minds as to whether or not the Russians were really serious about disarming, we should have been firmly convinced early the next year when the Soviet representatives walked out of all United Nations' organs. The walkout was intended to dramatize their insistence that Communist China replace Nationalist China in the United Nations. (40:16) The tactic backfired, however, when the boycott made possible concerted United Nations' action regarding Korea a few months later.

In June 1950 Communist aggression touched off the Korean War and the United States, pared to the bone by a unilateral disarmament program, was caught with its pants down. A frantic and costly re-arming program ensued and we learned for the first time that even though we possessed a nuclear capability, the conventional forces were indispensable. The writer firmly believes that if we had not cut our forces so drastically in 1948 and 1949 and if the Soviet Union had not successfully tested an atomic device, the aggression in Korea would not have occurred. With an atomic weapon of their own (they thus possessed a sort of mutual deterrent against the use of such weapons) and superior strength in ground forces, the Communists probably felt that the Korean probe was worth the risk involved. The United States had almost invited the aggression by disarming, withdrawing troops from Korea, and stating that we had no further interest in the area. Stalin was no doubt surprised when the Korean incident expanded to include other U.N. members and became, in effect, a United Nations Police Action. As Admiral Biörklund points out in his book *International Atomic Policy*, there were two divergent views in the Kremlin: "With regard to the Korean war, the Stalinists were of the opinion that it would help to exhaust

the Western Powers, while Malenkov and the Reformists considered that it would stimulate them to increased armaments to the disadvantage of the Soviet." (6:75)

The importance of the possession of a nuclear capability at this time is illustrated by the contrast between the Berlin Blockade and the Korean War. The Soviet Union backed down on the blockade (spring of 1948 to the spring of 1949) after it was apparent that the West meant business. Without an atomic weapon they probably felt that they could not afford to force our hand and precipitate a war in which the United States held the trump card. This was not the end of the Berlin problem, however, as we were to find out in 1959 when once again the Soviet Union would bring the stew to the boiling point and then turn down the fire for fear of generating a nuclear war.

During the Korean interlude there was very little activity in the field of arms limitations. The Soviet Union used this period for building up their own atomic capability while at the same time conducting a large scale propaganda offensive against the United States—continuing their theme of "Ban the Bomb," claiming Wall Street was responsible for the war, and accusing the United States of using bacteriological warfare.

One significant event was the Western Tripartite Proposal in November 1951 which was based on the following principles:

1. Necessity as "first indispensable step" for a progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces. . . and armaments including atomic.

2. Verification must be based on effective international inspection.

3. The U.N. majority plan should continue to serve as a basis for control of atomic energy unless a better or no less effective system could be devised.

4. There must be an adequate system of safeguards to ensure observance and detect violations while causing minimum degree of interference with the internal life of each country. (40:17-18)

The Proposal was a combination of the French census plan and the Baruch plan. Atomic weapons had been included as a concession to the Soviets. Initially, the plan looked good and it won widespread approval in the United Nations. However, as was customary for all good Western proposals, it was duly criticized and rejected by the Russians who offered their traditional counter-proposal—ban the bomb, then reduce arms, then take a census, and do the inspecting last. On this occasion, however, the propaganda victory went to the West; as Mr. Frye points out in his pamphlet on disarmament:

> Vishinsky helped the West to its propaganda victory by a colossal blunder; he said the plan "kept me awake most of the night laughing." Country after country, including the Arab-Asian neutralists, rebuked him for this cynicism, whereupon he had to march back up to the podium and all but apologize. (21:41)

The only other significant accomplishment regarding disarmament was the establishing of a single disarmament commission by the United Nations General Assembly in January 1952. This commission, replacing both the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, was to be composed of members of the Security Council plus Canada. (11:145) Combining functions and changing names did not help in finding a solution to the basic problem—trust and

mistrust. Soviet delegates continued to reject Western proposals and to reiterate the previous Soviet assertions and plans.

Turning Point.

With the death of Stalin in 1953 the tactics of the Kremlin began a gradual change. The Korean War was brought to a close and new approaches to the disarmament problem were put forward. By this time not only did both the United States and the Soviet Union have atomic weapons in their arsenals, but hydrogen bombs as well. The world now faced the danger of fighting a nuclear war with megaton weapons. The idea of trying to reduce international tensions by stages began to gain ground. If the antagonists could not come to agreement on maximum control, perhaps an agreement incorporating minimum control had some merit.

In 1954 the British and French introduced a joint proposal to the disarmament subcommittee which refined the previous Tripartite Proposal of 1951 and included some of the traditional Soviet ideas. All nations were to agree to prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons except in defense of aggression and the memorandum outlined a series of stages during which there would be progressive disarmament. First, however, the international control authority had to be in position and operating. Total elimination of nuclear weapons was to come after major reductions in the conventional armed forces and weapons. (17:332-333) Mr. Nutting in his book, *Disarmament*, made the following statement regarding this plan:

> Of all the many proposals and counterproposals now filling the waste baskets of the Disarmament Sub-Committee, the Anglo-French plan was undoubtedly the fairest and best-balanced attempt to ensure that disarmament and security proceeded hand in

hand. In sum, the West was saying for the first time to the Soviet Union, "We will ban the bomb if you will accept proper control plus parity in ordinary armaments and armed forces." (36:11)

At first the Russians rejected the new plan completely. Mr. Malik contended that it contained nothing new and insisted that the Soviet plan was superior. It is probable, however, that even if he had thought it was a workable plan he would not, or could not, have so stated. A few months later, 30 September 1954, during the Ninth General Assembly Session, Vyshinsky astonished the members by accepting the Anglo-French plan as a basis for further negotiations. (6:39) His new proposal still contained the flaw of a veto in the Security Council, under whose authority the Control Commission should operate, and was naturally not acceptable to the West.

In March of the next year Soviet delegates presented another plan to the disarmament commission calling for a treaty which would prohibit any increase in armed forces or budgets above the level of January 1955. Their reasoning behind this proposal was probably their desire to prevent the re-arming of West Germany. Under the NATO treaty the German Federal Republic was to furnish twelve divisions. (11:152) One of the Soviet Union's short range objectives, of course, is to break up the United States' system of alliances for collective security—the prime target being NATO. Her next plan for disarming would have been a step in this direction if it had been adopted. The Soviet plan of 10 May 1955 (the day after West Germany became a member of NATO) provided for the dismantling of all foreign bases among other things.

The 10 May plan was a big shift for the Soviets in several ways. For one thing, they finally accepted the West's position on timing the complete ban on nuclear weapons in relation to a reduction in conventional arms. They also gave up the argument for an

across-the-board one-third cut in conventional armaments and agreed to accept specific numerical ceilings for each of the Big Five. In addition, they admitted that there were "possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control." (17:389) They also recognized the requirement for permanent control and the establishing of inspection posts. This last item contained the basic weakness of the plan, as one can see by reading between the lines:

> a. In order to prevent a surprise attack . . . the International Control Organ shall establish. . . , on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and on aerodromes. The task of these posts shall be to see to it that there is no dangerous concentration of military land forces or of air or naval forces.
>
> b. The International Control Organ shall have the right to require from States any necessary information. . .
>
> c. . . . shall have unimpeded access to records relating to the budgetary appropriations of States for military needs, . . . States shall periodically, within specified time-limits, furnish the control organ with information. . . (17:390)

To the West these last proposals sounded too much like those which were currently in effect under the truce in Korea. There were too many loopholes through which they could wriggle and thus prevent an adequate inspection. It is always better to collect information rather than have it handed to you under

circumstances where it probably can not be verified. Under the Korean armistice agreement neither side was to build up forces nor to bring in new arms. This provision, however, did not seem to prevent the North Korean forces from acquiring jet fighters; and the neutral inspectors were never able to "legally" sight them.

Finally, the Soviet plan incorporated a number of new suggestions, such as a ban on nuclear weapons tests, a proposal that use of nuclear weapons in self-defense should be subjected to the approval of the Security Council (and hence to a veto) and the inclusion of Communist China in negotiations concerning her armaments. (17:385-391) Since we have consistently refused to recognize Red China, this last suggestion was completely unpalatable to the United States.

It is not possible to determine at this time, whether the 10 May proposal was meant to be taken seriously, or whether it was a tactical gamble on the part of the Soviet Union to put the West on the defensive and thus win a propaganda advantage for the Russians. At any rate, the United States fell back to re-group and in view of the Soviet admission of the impossibility of a fool-proof inspection system, we placed a reservation on all our past positions. (36:18-19) It should be remembered, however, that the U.S. delegate at the time, Mr. Stassen, was new on the scene and probably a little unsure of just what stand the United States should take. Furthermore, a summit meeting was forthcoming in July.

Peaceful Coexistence.

On 18 July 1955 the Heads of Government of the United States, France, England, and the Soviet Union met for a "Summit Conference" at Geneva. The purpose of this high level meeting was to relax the world tensions and to see what could be done about disarmament.

Nothing concrete was accomplished regarding arms limitation but tensions were eased somewhat and the period which followed this meeting was characterized by the press as the "Spirit of Geneva."

President Eisenhower opened the conference and proposed that the problem be approached by developing a system of effective mutual inspection to safeguard against a surprise attack. Prime Minister Faure, of France, proposed financial and budgetary controls. The nations were to agree to restrictions on their military expenditures and allot the savings to an international fund for economic development and mutual assistance. Prime Minister Eden proposed, as a pilot project, the joint inspection of armed forces in a specified zone on both sides of the Iron Curtain. He thought the plan would increase mutual confidence. (40:67-103)

Premier Bulganin, in his opening speech, made the following statement:

> The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear. We have always been in favor of peace among peoples and of peaceful coexistence between all nations, irrespective of their internal systems, regardless of whether the state concerned is a monarchy or a republic, whether it is capitalist or socialist, because the social and economic system existing in any country is the internal affair of its own people. (40:69)

Following this statement he reaffirmed the Soviet proposal of 10 May and in addition suggested a system of collective security which would include all of Europe and the United States.

On the surface the Soviet proposals actually looked rather good and in our younger and more naive days we might have been tempted to accept them. In the

opinion of this writer the validity of Mr. Bulganin's statement regarding Soviet foreign policy being clear is subject to doubt. There is, however, no question as to the final goal of the Kremlin and International Communism—"world domination via the easiest path."

It was also at this conference that President Eisenhower presented the aerial inspection plan. Like the British plan, it was intended to further the growth of mutual confidence. It was proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union exchange blueprints of their military establishments and then through the "open skies" mutual aerial inspection plan be able to verify this information. It was hoped that the plan would aid in preventing surprise attacks. In the words of the President:

> . . . we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension. (17:340)

The Summit Meeting ended on 23 July 1955 with the publishing of a joint directive by the leaders of the Four Powers to their foreign ministers instructing them to continue consideration of the German Question, Disarmament, and the development of contacts between East and West. As noted above, considering the talent available at the conference and their power to make decisions, the results were rather meager. In effect, the "C.O.'s" merely recognized and reaffirmed the problems and then passed the "buck" to their "J.O.'s." In the following years it was only in the field of "contacts between East and West" that progress was

made. A few of the barriers which interfere with communications and trade have been eliminated and travel of individuals between the two areas has increased considerably.

The "Spirit of Geneva" was destined to be short-lived—only a little over a year. This period was characterized by an exchange of letters between the President and Premier Bulganin regarding disarmament. Bulganin's letters ranged from cordial to insulting and the President was thoroughly irritated and angered at times as indicated by his letter of 21 October 1956 to the Premier:

> . . . the sending of your note in the midst of a national election campaign of which you take cognizance, expressing your support of the opinions of "certain prominent public figures in the United States" constitutes an interference by a foreign nation in our internal affairs . . . your statement with respect to the Secretary of State is not only unwarranted, but is personally offensive to me . . . you seem to impugn my own sincerity. (40:227)

For a time during this exchange of letters the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union seemed to be moving closer together; but then in May 1956 the gap widened again when the Soviets denounced the "open skies" plan as an intelligence collection device which would not contribute to disarmament nor to the establishment of controls over the reduction of arms. (11:178) The gap was widened even further by the Hungarian revolt and the crisis over the Suez Canal.

Following the "Summit Meeting," as directed by the Heads of Government, the United Nations' Disarmament Commission Subcommittee resumed its talks in August 1955, only to bog down again on the problem of inspection and recessed in early October. Sessions

were renewed in London in March 1956 and recessed again in May when a deadlock was reached regarding the control issue. During the 1956 negotiations the Soviets introduced a proposal for partial disarmament of conventional weapons with a ceiling on the armed forces of the Big Five Powers. No mention was made of the nuclear problem other than to restate the view that atomic weapons should be banned. On the day of adjournment the four Western Powers presented a declaration listing measures which they thought should be included in a disarmament program—proceed by stages, under effective international control, with significant reductions, etc. Ten days later the Soviet Union announced a planned reduction in armed forces by over one million men by May of the following year and called on the other nations to follow the Soviet example. (40:40-41)

In 1957 the pattern which had been set continued. The talks resumed in May with the main point of discussion being atomic tests and proposals submitted for their suspension. With their scientists working on a new surprise for the West, the Soviet delegates were reluctant to agree on anything and the discussions deadlocked again. On 6 September the London Disarmament negotiations were suspended indefinitely. On 5 October the Soviet Union fired its first earth satellite into orbit and opened the "Missile Age." In the United States the general public reaction was one of shock and the President found it necessary to give a TV address explaining that we were in no immediate danger. We had "lost face," however, and "crash" programs were put into effect to get us back in the space race.

CHAPTER IV

OUR PRESENT DILEMMA

"The government of the Soviet Union has arrived at the conviction that the surest way to practical solution of the cardinal international problem of our days—the disarmament problem—is the way of *general and complete disarmament of all nations.*"

Nikita S. Khrushchev, 18 Sept. 1959

The arrival of nuclear weapons complicated an already difficult problem and the development of long-range missiles with nuclear warheads has made the disarmament question even more complex. A satisfactory solution is nowhere in sight. The purpose of this chapter is to examine briefly some of the more important areas of the current dilemma.

The Problem.

First, a definition of terms is in order. The word "Disarmament," which has been overworked, overstressed, and overused during the past fifteen years, implies a total abolition and destruction of all weapons. Disarming, *per se*, would mean that all implements which could possibly be construed as a weapon would be destroyed. This in turn leads to the problem of defining a "weapon." Theoretically, the sportsman's shotgun and the bow and arrow on the archery range could fall into this category. A similar problem has always been encountered in international law in attempting to define munitions of war and contraband. After World War I there was even discussion regarding "Chemical Disarmament" and control of dye factories on the basis that such factories were chemical plants that could very easily switch their production to explosives and poison gases. (39:278)

Terms which more adequately describe the problem are: "Limitation of Armaments" and "Control and Reduction of Armaments." The latter term seems to be preferred by the United States Senate. Even Mr. Khrushchev when he used the phrase "general and complete disarmament of all nations" in his speech before the United Nations' General Assembly on 18 September 1959, did not really mean what he said. As he pointed out in the next paragraph of his speech, it would be necessary for nations to keep their police forces in order to maintain internal security within the country. (27:17)

The problem of the 1960's then is to find some means of reducing, limiting, and controlling aggressive weapons and armed forces in order to preserve world peace and perhaps the human race itself. If limitations and control of arms proves to be an impossibility, then an effective substitute must be found.

Nuclear Test Ban.

There are two theoretical advantages from a cessation of tests of nuclear weapons. First, it tends to prevent refinement of nuclear weapons systems and hence has a stabilizing effect on the arsenal. Secondly, it might prevent a dangerous contamination of the earth's atmosphere with radioactive particles. There is a divergence of opinion on both of these effects, particularly on the latter. Some scientists maintain that the dangerous level of contamination has not been reached and that tests on the past scale could go on for a number of years without harm. On the other hand, persons like Dr. Albert Schweitzer maintain that we are in serious danger now. In his book, *Peace or Atomic War*, he made the following statement: "It is high time to realize that the question of continuing or ceasing nuclear tests is an urgent matter for international law. Mankind is imperiled by the tests. Mankind insists that they stop, and has every

right to do so . . . There is no time to lose." (44:19)

The last time the United States exploded a nuclear device was on 30 October 1958, the day before the Big Three opened negotiations at Geneva on a permanent test ban. On 31 October we suspended testing for one year and the British followed suit. Three days later the Soviet Union conducted their last test and declared that they would abstain from testing as long as the West did. Great Britain and the United States subsequently extended the no-test period to 31 December 1959 and although we are currently under no obligation prohibiting a resumption of tests, we have conducted none to date. France, however, as pointed out in a previous chapter, exploded an atomic device in the Sahara in February 1960 and has more tests programmed. At the present time, the Soviet Union has not indicated that she intends to resume tests.

Negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests and on the establishment of an appropriate international control system have been conducted sporadically since 31 October 1958. This conference, like most of the others in which the Soviets have participated since World War II, has followed the usual pattern of on-again-off-again with nothing much in the way of results other than reams of paper. Of all the proposals dealing with the limitations of armaments this one aspect—cessation of nuclear tests—seems to hold the most promise of an agreement. On the surface it looks fairly simple. All that is required is a treaty prohibiting the tests and establishing inspectors to detect violations. The problem of inspecting, a perennial thorn in any discussion of disarmament, is less of a problem in this field. A Senate study in 1958 indicated seismographic stations manned by international inspection personnel and properly spaced over the world would have a ninety per cent probability of detecting nuclear explosions of one kiloton or higher. Furthermore, the numbers of personnel required to man

these stations would be considerably less (estimates ranged from 200 to 600 personnel) than those required for an adequate inspection of 'total disarmament' or even for a 'nuclear disarmament.' (11:497-512) Scientific experts at the Third Pugwash Conference in late 1958 agreed that a network of 160 to 170 control stations should be sufficient on land and that an additional ten stations on ships at sea would be required. (19:11)

The problem is not as simple as it looks, however, and the talks stalled over the question of detection. According to United States scientists, contrary to earlier East-West findings, new experiments showed that some underground explosions emit shock waves that are the same as those of earthquakes. The Russians finally agreed to a new study of underground blast detection in November 1959 but at this writing no final agreement on a test ban has been reached. An article in the *New York Times* of 20 December 1959 quoted the leader of the United States scientists, Dr. James B. Fisk as saying, "The Soviets agreed on all things that make the control system look better and on nothing that makes the system look worse."

A new Western proposal was introduced on 18 January 1960 which would have permitted the Big Three to formalize a treaty on test suspension in those areas (high altitude and space, underwater, and high power underground explosions) where an agreement had almost been reached during previous discussions. In other words, we are willing to agree to ban all tests that can be detected now and not wait for refinements in the detection systems. Furthermore, we would agree to as few as twenty-one "on-site" inspections annually in the Soviet Union if the plan were accepted. As Professor Rosenfield stated in his article in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:* ". . . any sort of test ban is important not so much *per se* but as a first step toward inspection and arms limitation. We cannot afford to wait until we concoct an 'utterly foolproof' first step." (41:103)

Perhaps the Soviet Union will agree to our latest proposal. They seem to be genuinely desirous of reaching an agreement as has been indicated by their important concessions in accepting the principle of a detection network and on-site inspections in the Soviet Union. Their motivations, however, are probably not entirely altruistic. They are likely very worried about the spread of nuclear capabilities to other nations—particularly since the first ones (such as France this year) are likely to be allies of the Western Bloc. Development of such a capability by one of their satellites would probably be viewed as a catastrophe and any such activity would no doubt be ruthlessly suppressed. Furthermore, such a ban would emphasize the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons and would support world opinion that military forces should not employ such "inhuman weapons." Thus, the Eastern Bloc with a superiority in military man power would have a military advantage.

Inspection and Control.

From a review of the history of negotiations on control of armaments, it is evident that the heart of the problem lies in the inspection and control features. It is also evident that while the West desires maximum control and inspection, the Soviet Union desires minimum inspection. In analyzing the situation, however, one should remember that the Russians are traditionally a suspicious lot. Their main objection to maximum inspection is the fear of espionage and it is only fair to admit that inspection and control teams would have a tremendous capability of gathering information of intelligence value.

The United States has held to the position that inspection is necessary to provide against surprise attack and to insure that the signatories are complying with the treaty provisions. To be really effective an inspection and control system should include ground

and aerial inspection and some form of budgetary control. It is extremely unlikely that nations will ever again reduce their armed forces to ineffective and dangerous levels on the basis of paper promises. The list of broken treaties is a long one and the solemn word of the Russians regarding disarmament is perhaps no better than their promises to pay for, or return, the lend-lease material of World War II.

Is effective inspection and control feasible? This question will probably remain unanswered until inspection and control have been tried. In his book *Inspection For Disarmament*, Mr. Seymour Melman suggests that it would be technically feasible to inspect and control future production of nuclear weapons and tests of major weapons but is dubious about the possibility of locating and controlling past production. (33:vii) After fifteen years of production the stockpiles are taking on sizeable proportions while the physical size of the warheads has been decreasing. It would be fairly easy to conceal and not declare hundreds of the latest nuclear warheads. Due to the design of modern weapons, the nuclear component emits only a minute amount of radiation; detection is possible only with extremely sensitive instruments in close proximity to the weapon.

The number of personnel required for inspection would probably reach staggering proportions. An estimate has been made on the numbers required for the United States, assuming a three million square mile area, which indicates a need for about 40,000 people in order to cover everything from aerial inspection, nuclear reactors, uranium mines, and aircraft factories down to conventional explosive plants. (33:49) Equating this figure to the Soviet Union, something over 8 million square miles with the satellites included, the number required for that area would be approximately 106,000. The writer cannot imagine the Kremlin permitting such a large number of "foreigners" behind the Iron Curtain and giving them the freedom

of action necessary to conduct their work. To this, of course, must be added the problem of inspection in Communist China. Police states such as the Communist Powers do not even allow their own citizens such freedom of movement; and the presence of such an inspectorate inside their borders would certainly be a threat to their continued existence. To this large number of inspectors must also be added the personnel required for the administration of the organization. One conservative estimate on such an international inspectorate envisaged a staff and budget of greater size than the present United Nations.

If we assume that host nations will be cooperative, and if in fact they are cooperative, then the inspection teams would have very little difficulty in accomplishing their objective. However, under the prevailing condition of world tension and mistrust it seems likely that some nations would be less than cooperative and would in fact attempt the clandestine construction of weapons. Would the inspecting agency be able to discover illegal production? The writer believes that the answer to this question is evident in the following quotation from Mr. Melman's book.

> In the case of Palestine, a population under alien rule backed a secret army and its armament system. These operated with a high degree of success despite determined efforts, especially after the Second World War, to stop illegal arms production. The Palestine record is made significant for the present study owing to the fact that the inspectorate—in this case the British Army, police, and civil service—represent a highly experienced, intelligent, resourceful, and well-equipped inspecting body. Its members were able to carry out systematic and extensive inspection on roads, at airports, and at seaports. They were also able to

> carry out house-to-house searches under curfew conditions . . . This skilled inspectorate did not discover more than one per cent of the illegal arms produced in that small country or imported from abroad. Moreover, this inspectorate, operating in a relatively small land area, was unable to stop shipments of arms, first small and then large-scale (truck loads) within the country! The inspectorate was unable to stop the operation of fairly extensive network of workshops, whose staffs ranged from a handful to over a hundred workers, which kept a constant flow of small arms moving to the illegal army. (33:27-28)

One may argue that the production of small arms is one thing but the production of atomic weapons is another. The writer submits, however, that with a well-motivated population (or small segment thereof) and the backing and participation of the government such a feat is not beyond the realm of possibility. In 1945 not even the Vice President of the United States was aware of the purpose of the Manhattan Project.

The recent treaty on the Antarctic (November 1959) which bars any military activity in that area and sets up an inspection system, may be pointed to as evidence of the Soviet Union's good faith. After all, didn't they agree that a nation could designate any one of its own nationals as an inspector and that he could go anywhere in the area that he wished at any time? This of course, is true, but we should also ask ourselves what the Soviets had to lose in this case. Inspecting the bleak wastes of the Antarctic is one thing; inspecting behind the Iron Curtain is another.

Strategic Considerations.

At the close of the Second World War the atomic bomb became an instrument of our national policy. It

was believed that the peace could be kept by a threat to use atomic weapons and the fact that Soviet forces were withdrawn from Iran under pressure from the United States tended to give credence to this theory. When the Soviet Union had developed atomic weapons and placed them in their arsenal the role of the bomb changed. The Russians moved into the Balkans and the West did nothing to stop them. It was obvious that we did not want to risk an atomic war at that time over the issue—the Balkans were not of *vital interest* to us. When the threat of the spread of communism by the Soviet Union was finally recognized we shifted from relying on the "threat of the bomb" to a system of collective security. Our reduction of conventional forces after World War II reflected our dependence on the threat of the atomic bomb and the Korean War resulted. The United States did not use nuclear weapons in the Korean War because we did not want to run the risk of spreading the "police action" into a general nuclear war.

Eventually, the United States' policy evolved into one of containment, massive retaliation, and deterrence. How effective is this policy? Of what value is a deterrent? Mr. Alexander Bregman writing in the *Western World Magazine* In October 1959 gives a partial answer to these questions.

> Would Hitler have attacked Poland if she'd had a few nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them? It is a fair assumption that nuclear weapons, provided they were not limited to a few Powers, could have saved the peace twenty years ago . . . If, in the autumn of 1956, Hungary had possessed the bomb and the means of delivery, and if in those circumstances the new government had declared its readiness to destroy Moscow, Rostov, Kharkov, Kiev, and Smolensk, would the Soviet tanks have moved into Hungary? Of course not—and because of this the USSR

> would never tolerate, let alone facilitate the nuclear armament of its satellites . . . This explains also why the Soviet leaders are so eager to see atom-freeze zones everywhere in Europe . . . (7:14)

There is little doubt that the atomic punch of NATO has so far helped to deter Soviet aggressions in Europe. The possibility of several hundred nuclear weapons being delivered on their homeland probably gives the Russians much food for thought—particularly since there would still be such a possibility of a massive blow even if they attacked first. General Leslie Groves has been quoted as saying, "If Russia knows we won't attack first, the Kremlin will be very much less apt to attack us . . . Our reluctance to strike first is a military disadvantage to us; but is also, paradoxically, a factor in preventing a world conflict today." (8:300)

The Western Bloc has based its defense on nuclear weapons and is relatively weak in conventional forces. The Soviet Bloc has the military advantage in conventional forces and there is no prospect of a build-up of Western conventional forces in the immediate future. In fact, the current trend has been to cut down on such forces. West Germany is perhaps the only exception to this—her growing army is now approaching twelve divisions. At the present time nothing really stands in the way of Soviet domination of Eurasia except the reluctance to pay the price of a nuclear war. The Soviet Union has systematically attempted to paralyze the West's will to use nuclear weapons by stocking the Soviet arsenal with nuclear weapons and at the same time seeking a general treaty which would outlaw nuclear weapons. The immediate objective of the Soviet Union in their campaign to ban the bomb and stop nuclear tests is probably to prevent the spread of such weapons to other European Powers.

As history should indicate to us and as Mr. Kennan states in his book, "Force is, and always will be, an indispensable ingredient in human affairs." (26:55) If the United States accepts an arrangement for partial disarmament in the form of a ban on nuclear weapons, what then will be the cornerstone of our strategy? Could we replace the nuclear aspect of our massive deterrent with ICBM delivered chemical and bacteriological agents? This, of course, would not solve the problem but only change the terms of reference. As the writer sees it, the basic objectives of the current disarmament talks are to lessen the possibility of a surprise attack and to ensure survival of the human race. Surprise is achieved by the tremendous speeds of modern missiles. Our survival is threatened by a massive nuclear exchange. Since the missile is not an economical vehicle for delivering conventional warheads, it would be next to useless without nuclear or bacteriological and chemical warheads. Thus, by eliminating the warhead the objectives are achieved. But is this possible? It is remotely possible that some time in the future the nuclear nations will reach an agreement on test bans together with a system of control and inspection. It is not considered likely that the East and West could agree to a total ban of nuclear weapons and the destruction of present stockpiles. The United States' requirement for complete and adequate inspection and control could never be acceptable to the Kremlin under their present system of government.

The present military posture of the West is such that a nuclear disarmament agreement would probably be tantamount to unilateral disarmament on the part of the West. Inspection under the best of conditions will be difficult—under the restraints which would probably be imposed by the Soviets (even though a treaty stated otherwise) it would be next to impossible to conduct an adequate inspection. In the writer's opinion not even a test ban treaty should be accepted without ironclad inspection and control. Furthermore,

the West should re-build its depleted conventional forces and "beef-up" its collective security.

Like the poison gases of World War I, as long as we maintain the capability of retaliation in kind, the nuclear weapons may never again be used. The cornerstone of our strategy will then revert to conventional weapons under a system of collective security and balance of power. We must learn to live with the continuing and ever-present possibility of war, with or without nuclear weapons, as long as rival governments and opposing ideologies exist. Rival nations or groupings of such powers will inevitably lead to friction—either military or economic, or both—and finally result in a test of strength. The only alternative to such tests is adjudication in an international court and at this stage of our development the nations of the world have not been able, nor willing, to give up their individual sovereignty—a necessity if an international organization is to succeed.

A Soviet Weapon?

It is generally conceded that the goal of World Communism—and hence the goal of the Soviet Union—is world domination. In February 1946, shortly after the end of World War II and after several years of relatively close cooperation with the United States against a common enemy, Stalin delivered a speech in which he outlined Soviet postwar policy. He attributed the victory in the war to the foresight and preparation of the Communist Party leaders in the prewar years and then went on to say that peace was not yet assured. Capitalism continued to exist and therefore preparation for war was again necessary. (35:28) The Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels set forth the objectives clearly in 1848 and although the line of reasoning has been modified through the years by Lenin, Stalin, and lately Khrushchev, the objectives remain clear.

> Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things . . . they labour everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries. The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble . . . (31:103-104)

In 1956 in a speech to a meeting of the Young Communist League, Khrushchev restated the principle of the "irreconcilable struggle" in these words: ". . . As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace. In the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism." (18:113)

The Communist objective, of course, is in direct conflict with the objective of the United States. Our goal is, or should be, the establishment of internal and international environments which will permit the continuation of progress and growth according to the American tradition. In other words, an international community from which the threat of war has been removed and which is based on a respect for individual dignity and national dignity.

The threat to the security of the United States is not necessarily limited to an all-out military attack by the Soviet Union. It is a combined political-military-economic threat. To the Communists there is no such thing as a sharp division between war and peace. They are always at war with non-communists and actual armed conflict is just one means of waging the war. In their strategy, infiltration, propaganda, subversion, espionage, economic aid, and even negotiations on disarming are weapons. They are determined to exploit every element of disunity and confusion in the

Western Bloc in the hope that we will eliminate ourselves as rivals to Soviet power. The theory of divide and conquer is still a valid one.

In the past few years the Soviet leaders have become particularly adept at creating world conditions in which the United States is unable to make an adequate response. From the last Berlin threat they gained a summit meeting with no agenda and a basic split in NATO unity—all leaders are conferring separately with Mr. Khrushchev. Trouble in Israel followed the "Spirit of Geneva" and trouble for the United States in Cuba has followed the "Spirit of Camp David."

One may ask himself what the Soviet Union could hope to gain in their protracted conflict by negotiations on disarmament. The answer, I think, is obvious. The items listed above are prime examples. At the present time the Western policy seems to be to do nothing which would jeopardize the outcome of the current disarmament negotiations or the pending summit meeting. We have a tendency to handle everything with "kid gloves." In the meantime, Kremlin-backed Communists are making inroads in Cuba, Argentina, Panama, Venezuela, other Latin American countries, Africa, and Southeast Asia. The following statement from the 18 January 1960 edition of *U.S. News & World Report* is an example of their strategy: "The slickest Communist propaganda in Latin America is coming in multi-colored publications of high quality, written in perfect Spanish and originating in Red China. Moscow is using Communist China to handle most propaganda and proselyting in Latin America while the Russians handle the 'peaceful coexistence' line." Both Moscow radio and Peiping radio took the same line—Castro's—regarding the leaflet bombing of Havana on 12 October 1959.

In Cuba, unless Castro attempts to take over the United States' naval base with force, our hands are tied. Having denounced the Russians for their ruthless

suppression of the uprisings in Berlin and Hungary, an armed intervention in Cuba seems impossible. Such a move would be a tremendous propaganda victory for the Soviet Union and even though justified, would not endear us to our other Latin American neighbors.

With regard to signing a formal disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union—even if they agree to our stringent terms of control and inspection—the writer is inclined to agree with Mr. Strausz-Hupé. First, there is no assurance that, even if Khrushchev is sincere about disarming and peaceful coexistence, his successor would feel the same way. In fact, Khrushchev's policies might well be denounced by his successor as he denounced Stalin's. Furthermore, a formal agreement on total or partial disarmament would not halt Communist expansion. It would only broaden the battlefield in areas where Communists are proven masters. (46:46) Nikita Khrushchev might well be correct when he says they will bury us economically. It would be difficult to persuade the American public (under conditions of disarmament) that higher taxes, a tightening of the belt, and an all-out effort were necessary in order to win the economic war. Americans tend to take up one problem at a time and are prone to see a general shift for the better when a particular form of tension is relaxed. This is a dangerous attitude in the present circumstances. (34:37) With an assurance that the United States was in no danger of nuclear attack we might be content to sit at home and watch TV and have much less concern about world conditions.

CHAPTER V

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

"While neither we nor any other free-world nation can permit ourselves to be misled by pleasant promises until tested by performance . . . We must strive to break the calamitous cycle of frustrations and crises which, if unchecked, could spiral into nuclear disaster, the ultimate insanity."
President Dwight D. Eisenhower
State of Union Message, Jan. 1960.

Two closely related East-West conferences are currently underway in Geneva. The Big Three Conference on the issue of banning tests of nuclear devices is now into its sixteenth month; and the new ten-nation disarmament conference held its first session on 15 March. The ten-nation conference was called as the result of a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly late last year. The Soviets have always been displeased with the unequal representation on the United States Disarmament Commission and the new conference reflects a concession to them in that representation from both the Eastern and Western Blocs is now equal. The United States, Great Britain, France, Canada, and Italy sit at one table and the Soviet Union. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Roumania at the other.

Western Proposal.

According to the text of the Western Proposal which was printed in the *New York Times* on 15 March 1960, we have called for a three-stage plan of "comprehensive" disarmament through "phased and safeguarded" agreements. An International Disarmament

Organization (IDO) would be established immediately and would control and supervise the measures to be taken in all three phases. The essential elements of the three steps are as follows:

Step I -

1. Establish IDO.
2. Prior notice to IDO required on space shots.
3. Collect information on current force levels.
4. Reduce U.S. and U.S.S.R. force level to 2,500,000 each.
5. Place in storage agreed types and quantities of conventional weapons.
6. Collect information on military budgets.
7. Commence joint studies on other related subjects.

Step II -

1. Ban space weapons.
2. Prior notice to IDO required on missile shots.
3. Stop production of fissionable material for weapons.
4. Transfer agreed quantities of fissionable material to peaceful uses.
5. Establish measures to prevent surprise attack.
6. Disarmament conference with other nations that have significant military capability.
7. Reduce forces from 2,500,000 to 2,100,000 and place more weapons in storage.
8. Verify the budgets.
9. Further development of the IDO.
10. Establish an International Peace Organization.

Step III -

1. Further unspecified reduction of armed forces.
2. Ban nuclear weapons and reduce stockpiles.
3. Establish international control over military budgets.

4. Ban chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction.
5. Complete establishment of international organizations and arrangements to preserve peace.
6. Final reduction of armed forces to the levels required to maintain internal security.
7. Control the production of armaments to ensure that production is limited to only those required by the police forces.

The Western plan is considerably more complex than those in the past because of their position that disarmament is not a step, but a complex process which requires control. Each step would be examined carefully and the controls would be in place before the step was taken.

Eastern Proposal.

The Soviet representative, Valerian Zorin, called the Western plan impractical stating that it did not have the real measures necessary for carrying out general and complete disarmament. The Eastern plan, based on Premier Khrushchev's proposal to the General Assembly last September, was then presented. The Soviet plan which calls for total world disarmament within four years is also in three stages:

Step I -- U.S.S.R., U.S., and Communist China reduce their armed forces to 1,700,000 each within eighteen months.

Step II - All armed forces wouldbe disbanded and all foreign bases liquidated within two years after Step I ends.

Step III - All types of nuclear weapons would be destroyed. The Soviets also insist that all nuclear weapons tests be banned before any agreementon disarmament is implemented.

Essential Differences.

1. *Timing:* The Western plan has no timetable. The Soviet plan is based on a four-year timetable with eighteen months for the first stage, up to two years for the second, and one year for the final stage.

2. *Controls:* The Western plan calls for control and supervision of each step by an International Disarmament Organization. The Eastern plan merely mentions controls and is vague as to what form they would take.

3. *Conventional Arms:* The Western plan provides for supervised reduction of forces from 2,500,000 in the first stage down to only those required for internal security in the third stage. The Soviet plan calls for 1,700,000 in the first stage and "total demobilization" in the second stage.

4. *Nuclear Weapons:* The Western plan provides for steps toward nuclear control and disarmament in each stage with elimination of nuclear weapons and missiles in the third stage. The Soviet plan postpones action on nuclear disarmament until the final stage when, within one year, all nuclear weapons and missiles would be destroyed.

Prospects.

As in all past attempts to negotiate a treaty, the critical issue is once again that of control. Soviet insistence on a timetable for disarming seems to throw some doubt on their willingness to examine the control and inspection problem thoroughly. The Soviet bloc maintains that the West wants inspection and espionage without disarmament and the West holds that the East wants paper disarmament without adequate control and inspection. After a week of relatively quiet negotiations the tempers began to flare. As reported in the *New York Times* of 23 March, in the

United States, Senator Anderson stated that we should break off the Geneva negotiations if the Soviet Union did not negotiate more realistically about controls; and at the conference in Geneva the delegates from the United States were speaking sharply about foreign bases and a delegate from Czechoslovakia branded the West's plan to gather information for verification of disarmament as "a sort of blueprint for espionage by aggressors." In the opinion of the writer very little, if anything, will be accomplished by the ten-nation conference until after the Summit Meeting. The world is probably in for another long-drawn-out disarmament session with millions of words and no action.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

"The most dangerous spot is our own country because the people are so eager for peace and have such a distaste for war they will grasp for any sign of a solution of a problem that has had them deeply worried."
James Forrestal, Oct. 1948.

Summary.

Man has dreamed of a permanent peace for centuries but has been unable to attain such an idealistic goal. Limitation of arms and disarmament are not new concepts. Such proposals span the years from at least 546 B.C. to the present hour and with few exceptions past attempts have consistently failed. At the most, they have only postponed war a few more years. Rules for the conduct of war have been formulated and pacts drawn up outlawing war as an instrument of national policy; but warfare has continued.

Prior to the beginning of World War I the negotiations were focused primarily on the size of armies and efforts were made to reduce and limit their size. Between the World Wars the emphasis was on the so-called aggressive weapon, the capital ship, and some effort was made to regulate submarine warfare and outlaw the use of poisonous gases. "Holidays" on naval shipbuilding were proposed to halt the arms race. Dire predictions were made that in the next war entire cities would be smothered with poisonous gases and bacteriological agents. The first attempt in modern times to organize a world community, the League of Nations, failed due primarily to the activities of a militant Germany and Japan and the lack of League enforcement powers.

With the end of World War II the United States recognized that National Security and a policy of isolation were not compatible and we became one of the foremost sponsors of the United Nations. Initially, the United States, the sole possessor of atomic weapons, called for international control of atomic energy and under conditions of adequate control, was willing to share nuclear secrets. The Soviet Union, however, rejected this proposal and insisted that the bomb should be banned as the first step.

The 1950's saw the advent of several nuclear powers, the development of hydrogen weapons, the nuclear stalemate between East and West and the Missile-Space race. Although numerous conferences were held and dozens of proposals presented by both sides, no real progress was made toward a workable disarmament agreement. The essential difference between East and West proposals is in the area of inspection and control. The Western Powers insist that an adequate system of inspection and control must be in place and ready to operate before nations can safely disarm. The Soviet Bloc labels the West's plan "espionage" and "control without disarmament." Until recently the Soviet Union has consistently maintained that the nuclear weapons must be banned as the first step. Lately they have shifted their position somewhat and now insist only on a test ban treaty before continuing with other agreements. They now admit that control and inspection are desirable but are vague as to just how such controls would function.

Studies have indicated that about 40,000 people would be required for a disarmament inspection of the United States, and at least 106,000 personnel for the Soviet Bloc (excluding Communist China). Inspection and control of a nuclear test ban would, of course, require considerably less personnel and would be easier to administer. The case history of a postwar disarmed Palestine indicates that complete control of arms production is not feasible.

As in the past, dire predictions have again been made regarding the conduct and results of the next World War: a massive nuclear exchange in which not only are all opponents annihilated but the world is made unfit for human habitation. At the present time the world is more or less stabilized under the threat of a nuclear exchange and the disarmament statesmen are busy at the conference tables in Geneva.

Conclusions.

If a scientist conducted a series of experiments to test a theory and the experiments consistently failed, he would most likely conclude that the theory was faulty and reject it. In this respect scientists are much more intelligent than world statesmen who have time after time attempted to solve the problem of war by efforts to disarm or to limit armaments. There seems to be very little basis for the theory that weapons cause wars. Why have disarmament efforts been so persistent in their failures? Is the problem of disarming insoluble? Researching for this paper led the writer to the following conclusions:

1. Disarmament is not the real problem. Weapons are not ends in themselves but merely a manifestation of the basic problem of mistrust and lack of confidence in other nations.

2. The only practicable way to disarm is to remove the necessity for the weapons. Even then, however, it would be unrealistic to assume that "total and complete" disarmament is feasible. It seems that now, and for the immediate future, the world will have to be content with a relaxation of tensions and perhaps a modest reduction of weapons.

3. Under the cloud of the capabilities of the present weapon systems world and national survival are, in a large measure, dependent on a willingness

to join and support an effective international organization. The United Nations must be strengthened by removing the veto in the Security Council, furnishing it with a police force, and increased utilization of the World Court.

4. If a truly international organization cannot be achieved, then we should not disarm. Weakness has almost invariably invited aggression. We should not be seeking "total disarmament," but an effective system of limitation and control.

5. If disarm we must, then we should continue to insist on workable and adequate inspection and control. "Security on paper" is a risky business. Even if the thug throws away his pistol, we must be certain that his hip pocket does not contain a blackjack.

6. Previous disarmament efforts and limitation proposals have not necessarily been motivated by a fear of war nor a true desire for peace. The thread which seems to run from century to century and decade to decade is composed of dollars, rubles, pounds, francs, yen and lira. Armies and navies have always been an economic burden to a nation. Only in recent years has a genuine fear of war in the form of total nuclear annihilation been a real factor in negotiations. Statesmen (and congressmen) still bemoan the high cost of national defense and point out how much better the money could be used in other fields.

7. The Soviet Union is really serious about wanting a test ban treaty and may even be willing to permit a limited number of foreign inspectors on their soil. It is essential to their security that the spread of nuclear weapons be halted or at least retarded. The next nuclear powers (like France) are most likely to be on the side of the West. The Kremlin could not safely permit the satellite nations to construct or have control of such weapons and they could not, by themselves, outproduce ten or fifteen other

nations in nuclear weapons. A test ban treaty between East and West is a possibility by the end of 1960.

8. Total and complete disarmament is not feasible. The West would not subscribe to such a treaty without ironclad inspection and controls. The Soviet Union could not safely carry out such a plan and still hold the millions of subjugated peoples under their fist. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that the Kremlin would permit the tremendous numbers of foreign inspectors, which would be required by such a treaty, the freedom to roam around behind the iron curtain. There is no absolute guarantee that all weapons could be detected and located. A nation so inclined could, with a little effort, secrete sufficient weapons with which to control the world after the other nations had disarmed. What about Communist China? Little has been said regarding her inclusion in a treaty. Would she be willing or could we force her to accept agreements arrived at with the Soviet Union?

9. The Soviets do not want war in the form of open-armed conflict at this time. This, however, does not mean that they will discontinue their "war" against non-Communists in the other mediums of propaganda, subversion, espionage, and economics. Their objective of the moment is to disarm the West mentally, if not actually, and to allay the unrest and fear within their own country and the satellites. With the inherent advantage of a dictatorship in decision-making, of being able to concentrate effort and resources on certain programs and areas, unless the free world stays awake, the Soviets may be correct in their prediction of "burying us economically."

10. A total nuclear war is becoming less and less of a possibility. Both sides are aware of the tremendous destructive capacity of the current weapon systems and are unwilling to risk retaliation in kind. History has tended to indicate that use of such weapons of mass destruction will take place only when one

side is the sole possessor. Even a skunk does not use his weapon an another skunk and they fire at an enemy only as a last resort avoiding getting their distinctive scent on themselves.

11. The salvation of the world may depend upon a gradual evolution within the Soviet Union and other totalitarian states. The Khrushchev brand of government has given the average Soviet citizen a little more freedom of action and freedom from fear than he has had in the past. A little taste of freedom may breed a desire for more freedom. At any rate, the Western World must tighten its belt and prepare for a long haul. We will be in severe competition, both military and economic, for many years to come. If we can prevent further spread of Communist imperialism we have a chance of winning—once communism stops growing, it loses its dynamic effect and begins to fail. As reported in the Worldgram section of the 25 January 1960 edition of the *U.S. News & World Report:* "Pravda calls for a massive new program to make Communism more appealing to the Soviet people . . . All the talk of peaceful coexistence . . . more consumer goods and less fear . . . is giving Russians the idea they can relax. When Russians relax, Pravda notes, they become apathetic toward Communist propaganda." Premier Khrushchev's plea for "total and complete disarmament" within four years is a propaganda maneuver and is not to be taken seriously. We cannot risk our future security on paper agreements until all signatories are men who represent an open political system which is responsive to the will of the people it represents.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

LCDR Robert O. Coulthard, U.S. Navy

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS:

Naval Aviator, Carrier Squadrons, Jet Fighters
Naval Intelligence & Language (Swedish)
Photo Reconnaissance Pilot (VFP Jet)
Photographic School, PNCLA

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND:

Univ. of Nebraska, 1 yr. (1940-41)
Univ. of Omaha, Summer Term, 1941
USNA (Class of 1945)
Naval Intelligence & Language School, 1951

DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

LTPHOTORON 61 (VFP-61)	Ops Off, Admin Off, OinC Deployed Photo Detachment	6/57-7/59
NAVTECHTRAU, PNCLA	Student in Naval Photography	11/56-5/57
JTTU, NAS, Olathe	Student, Jet Transition	9/56-10/56
NavIntelSch, Wash., D.C.	Intelligence Faculty	5/54-8/56
COMNAVFE, Japan	Intel Plots & Briefings, Aide to CofS	1/52-3/54
NavIntelSch, Wash., D.C.	Student, Intelligence & Swedish Language	12/50-12/51
NAAS, Chincoteague	Asst Ops, Crash & Salvage, Ops Duty Off	11/49-12/50
VF-131	VF Pilot & Admin Off	9/47-10/49
Adv. Flt. Training	Student, VF Type	2/47-7/47
Basic Flt. Training	Student	2/46-2/47

Primary Flt. Training	Student	9/45-2/46
BB-56	JDO (Gun), JWO, OOD in port	9/44-8/45
USNA	Midshipman	8/41-6/44

SPAIN: KEYSTONE OR MILLSTONE OF NATO?

Research paper written by CDR John G. Dillon, CEC, USN

Command and Staff Class of 1960

INTRODUCTION

"No one doubts that Spain is a part of the West, but few are sure what part she can play in Western defense." (4:648) Here Mr. Lawrence Fernsworth has neatly summed the issues underlying the continuing Western disagreement as to the place of Spain in, and her contribution to, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Valid arguments are advanced depicting Spain as a keystone to the Alliance; conversely, there are equally authoritative writings descriptive of her as a millstone to the West. Such opposing and often stridently expressed positions are epitomized in contemporary reporting of the Tenth Anniversary meeting of Western Foreign Ministers last May. Contrast "It would be difficult to think of a better way [admitting Spain to NATO] of undermining Western unity at this precarious moment." (21:4) with "Perhaps the most glaring gap at this Tenth Anniversary meeting of the NATO Alliance was the absence of Spain." (24:449)

The want of agreement, or even of moderation on issues involving Spain is reflective of the nature of the Spaniard and his country. For his is a land of harsh contrasts and sharp contradictions, a land with one foot in the past and the other belatedly searching for solid footing in the future. Removed from the Reformation, protected from 19th Century liberalism, and isolated from the full benefits of the industrial revolution, it is the country the calendar forgot.

Her Fascist government is an anachronism to Western idealists—it was the first of the West to fight the Communists, yet it remains opposed to the modern concepts of democracy as expressed in the words of the North Atlantic Treaty. Although Spain's geographical position plays an indisputably important part in the defensive plans of the Western military

strategists, who can be certain but that, upon the demise of Generalissimo Franco, the repressed political emotions of her people portend a legacy of anarchy that will require Allied troops to maintain or restore order.

The relationship and importance of Spain to NATO is a study of regional strategy. As such, the problem responds to and will be approached from the connotation of strategy as expressed by Air Vice-Marshal Kingston-McCloughry: "The strategic importance of any area depends on the extent of national sentiment and moral conviction, productive capacity, and the suitability of the area for offensive and defensive strategies." (13:56)

To be of uniform meaning, an evaluation of Spain with respect to NATO must be drawn against an agreed set of circumstances and conditions. However, there is neither general concurrence as to the specific nature of the strategic threat posed to NATO, nor as to the counter-strategy NATO has or should adopt. It is the purpose of this paper: first, to establish, by review of Soviet objectives, the nature of the threat facing NATO; thence, to develop an Allied defensive strategy; and finally, on this fixed framework, to analyse and evaluate in its many ramifications the strategic part Spain might play in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.