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SPAIN: KEYSTONE OR MILLSTONE OF NATO?

**Research paper written by CDR John G. Dillon, CEC, USN
Command and Staff Class of 1960**

INTRODUCTION

"No one doubts that Spain is a part of the West, but few are sure what part she can play in Western defense." (4:648) Here Mr. Lawrence Fernsworth has neatly summed the issues underlying the continuing Western disagreement as to the place of Spain in, and her contribution to, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Valid arguments are advanced depicting Spain as a keystone to the Alliance; conversely, there are equally authoritative writings descriptive of her as a millstone to the West. Such opposing and often stridently expressed positions are epitomized in contemporary reporting of the Tenth Anniversary meeting of Western Foreign Ministers last May. Contrast "It would be difficult to think of a better way [admitting Spain to NATO] of undermining Western unity at this precarious moment." (21:4) with "Perhaps the most glaring gap at this Tenth Anniversary meeting of the NATO Alliance was the absence of Spain." (24:449)

The want of agreement, or even of moderation on issues involving Spain is reflective of the nature of the Spaniard and his country. For his is a land of harsh contrasts and sharp contradictions, a land with one foot in the past and the other belatedly searching for solid footing in the future. Removed from the Reformation, protected from 19th Century liberalism, and isolated from the full benefits of the industrial revolution, it is the country the calendar forgot.

Her Fascist government is an anachronism to Western idealists—it was the first of the West to fight the Communists, yet it remains opposed to the modern concepts of democracy as expressed in the words of the North Atlantic Treaty. Although Spain's geographical position plays an indisputably important part in the defensive plans of the Western military

strategists, who can be certain but that, upon the demise of Generalissimo Franco, the repressed political emotions of her people portend a legacy of anarchy that will require Allied troops to maintain or restore order.

The relationship and importance of Spain to NATO is a study of regional strategy. As such, the problem responds to and will be approached from the connotation of strategy as expressed by Air Vice-Marshal Kingston-McCloughry: "The strategic importance of any area depends on the extent of national sentiment and moral conviction, productive capacity, and the suitability of the area for offensive and defensive strategies." (13:56)

To be of uniform meaning, an evaluation of Spain with respect to NATO must be drawn against an agreed set of circumstances and conditions. However, there is neither general concurrence as to the specific nature of the strategic threat posed to NATO, nor as to the counter-strategy NATO has or should adopt. It is the purpose of this paper: first, to establish, by review of Soviet objectives, the nature of the threat facing NATO; thence, to develop an Allied defensive strategy; and finally, on this fixed framework, to analyse and evaluate in its many ramifications the strategic part Spain might play in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

SPAIN: KEYSTONE OR MILLSTONE OF NATO?

CHAPTER I

THE THREAT

"As long as capitalism and socialism (i.e., communism) exist, we cannot live in peace; in the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or world capitalism." (35:5)

From Lenin's edict of more than 40 years ago we perceive in a minimum of words the breadth and enduring nature of the threat of the Free World. But its long term existence, coupled with the absence of any overt act against NATO, conspires to build a false sense of security in some quarters of the West. It is the continuing task of NATO's statesmen to sift the varying tactical maneuverings of the Soviets and to label the Communist pre-occupation with Southeast Asia, Korea, and the Middle East for the opportunistic and diversionary measures they have. Distracting propaganda, willingness to negotiate unrealistic demands, and offers of peaceful coexistence—none of these lessen the strategic potential of Soviet nuclear capabilities, of the twenty Red divisions lurking behind the Iron Curtain, or of the 175 divisions available for employment as the dictates of Communism may order.

Lenin's threat has not been withdrawn, but reinforced. It is massive and constant; it is poised to strike in diverse ways as the mistakes or weakness of the West create the opportunity.

Objectives—Early, Intermediate, and Ultimate. Strategy includes the selection and time-phasing of specific objectives whose attainment will accomplish the broad aim. (3:5) An early Communist objective is a divided Free World, this to be attained by

forcing discordant issues upon the West, creating disension, and sowing distrust. In order to mislead and retard the West while gaining time in the economic, industrial, and missile fields, the Soviets attempt through the alternating of ambiguity with direct pressure to convey an indication of their own changing objectives, of vascillation, and of random effort. For a confused and quarreling NATO is a crippled Alliance, and is one step toward the ultimate objective of annihilation.

A lesser objective, but contributing to the breaching of Western unity, is that of expanded neutrality. For example, a neutral Spain by Communist logic weakens NATO, since she is a source of friction and is not contributing to the effectiveness of the Pact. Conversely, a Spain in NATO provides a solid base for divisive propaganda on the theme of "Democracy Embraces Fascism" which would be employed to advocate the neutrality of the Scandinavian countries. Here then, we have a glimpse of Spain as a pawn in the objective game of neutrality.

The early objectives of neutrality and division lead to intermediate goals: domination of Western Europe and then the Eurasian continent. With the acquisition and control of Free Europe the Soviet Empire gains those values and resources which now accrue to the West. Additionally and by default, with Europe comes the Middle East, the neutrals of Asia, and the control of emerging Africa. North America, the final goal, is far away; its occupation must await Communism overrunning those areas from which a final assault can be mounted and supported. Thus the key position of Free Europe in the plans of the Kremlin is apparent; it justifies maintaining an armed force capable of capturing and occupying the area.

But throughout this interlocking scheme of objectives of advancing power in any way or means runs a moderating or restraining objective—the objective of survival. (5:5)

Soviet Military Strategy.

"The objective of Soviet military strategy," a Soviet Colonel has written in a General Staff organ, "is the creation by military means of those conditions under which politics is in a position to achieve the aims which it sets for itself." (5:6)

Having discussed previously those political aims or objectives, it is now in order to analyze the probable military strategy of the Soviets as a foundation for the framing of a NATO counter-strategy. To achieve the ultimate goal of world-wide domination, the Communists require a strategy of comprehensive dimension. That is now in hand, and in effect, is a molding together of nuclear capabilities, huge land armies, full tactical air support, naval doctrine, and related weapons systems in preparation for all types and conditions of warfare.

To the Russian military mind the direct purpose of military operations is the destruction of the enemy forces. Underlying this thinking is the belief that wars will not be won by a nuclear exchange, however complete. Random and massive destruction of the industrial capacity, military targets, and even of the population centers of the enemy may contribute to victory, but this will not assure or be victory in itself. In the final analysis the victory goes to the side able to capture, hold, and employ those enemy areas critical to success.

This is not to indicate a complete disregard for nuclear capability; indeed, the latter has a critical place in the comprehensive strategy. But the moderating objective of survival governs. To deal out nuclear devastation is not adequate when risking in return more than survival of a political order can tolerate. Thus a nuclear exchange, even with total surprise, rapidly loses its attractiveness. Forty years

of Communist progress cannot be held lightly, especially when the nuclear threat can be used to further political objectives without its actual employment.

They reason that a nuclear capability offsetting that of the United States reduces the probability of the West indulging in pre-emptive attack or in massive retaliation for less than nuclear aggression. There develops a condition of nuclear stalemate, a condition wherein the Soviet nuclear arsenal, without firing a missile, effectively neutralizes that of the West. Consequently, Russia can revert to a military strategy for which they are historically prepared, tautly trained, and fully equipped—conventional warfare.

With stalemate, conventional forces become the final measure of the effectiveness of military strategy, and here the USSR presently excels and points to constant improvement in weapons, armor, training, and air support. She has retained and refined this conventional aspect throughout the perfection of her nuclear capability and the build-up to a state of counter-deterrence. When the USSR is content that stalemate is mutually recognized, the use of her present superiority in conventional strength is enhanced, because she is well aware of the relative weakness of opposing NATO forces. As an arm to blackmail, the use of this superiority to exert pressure, create border incidents, probe with force, and support limited aggression becomes increasingly safe. Such ambiguous aggression is encouraged by the growing Western reluctance to use the Strategic Air Command (SAC), for with stalemate the price to unleash the ultimate deterrent multiplies.

With these advantages the Communists could press into Western Europe while disclaiming the use of tactical nuclears and threatening the United States with nuclear destruction if we should invoke such tactical employment. Should the bluff be called and tactical weapons be employed, the eventuality has been provided for in the training and numerical superiority of

Russian troops as well as in the adequacy of her nuclear arsenal.

True, the pressing of limited aggression and other means of expansion might trigger general war, but not necessarily an all-out war. The Communists have ample reason to doubt that America would invite her own destruction in order to destroy Russia in an attempt to save Europe, particularly so when such an exchange would leave Europe standing and serving as a new or replacement arsenal for the overrunning Red troops. If it remains a general war restricted to conventional arms, there simply is not the NATO means in being to prevent Russia from occupying Europe prior to adequate reinforcement and mobilization. Soviet Naval doctrine completes the strategy here, as it is for the primary purpose of interdicting reinforcements of men and materials that the 400-plus submarines have been readied.

In summary, while prepared for a nuclearwar, Russia does not expect to fight one. Significantly her military strategy, and in turn her political strategy, is not restricted to nuclear combat. The older Soviet political strategy of pressure can now be augmented by the previous American monopoly of deterrence, or more aptly, counter-deterrence. From an implemented military strategic concept of providing the means of fighting all types of wars flows the guarantee of a flexible, full spectrum, political strategy. Finally, under the protective mantle of stalemate those conditions outlined by the Soviet Colonel are created: the political hand has been strengthened to one of a mailed fist.

If a genuine stalemate in intercontinental capabilities is achieved in a pre-hostilities period, the United States might be endangered by the neutralization of its entire strategy, and hence of its ability to act, whereas the Soviet strategy would be served by this development. (5:187)

CHAPTER II

A STRATEGY FOR NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the tangible expression of the fundamental community of interests of 15 nations—the signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty . . . It represents an effort by the treaty members to promote world peace by eliminating the weakness which invites attack by an aggressor. (33:4)

NATO is not conceived in the mold of the ordinary or traditional alliance; it is an agreement between sovereign states whereby they will exercise their sovereignty in prescribed ways. Decisions are reached unanimously, and a member may withdraw at his own volition. It is idealistically founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law, while safeguarding the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of the peoples represented. Thus it has assembled and united the ideals of the Free World as well as the material and military might in defense of Western civilization.

Admittedly it has failed to meet force goals; it has placed increasing reliance upon the political commitment, hidden from certain realities behind the deterrent, and has, without full rationalization, bargained away troops for tactical nuclears. But significantly, these acts, however different than a true supranational authority might have functioned, still represent unity of the Alliance. This unity is the symbol of the strength of its people. To a great measure it is this unity, not our woefully weak troops and increasingly stalemated nuclear deterrent, that has barred the way to Soviet expansion in Europe.

We have seen that an early objective of the Communist strategy is to divide NATO by carving neutrals out of Europe—out of NATO. To stand outside NATO, or to withdraw from the Pact, is to be neutral. Moreover, withdrawal is more serious in that it presages a crumbling of the essential unity.

There are arguments that Russia has made no overt move in Western Europe in ten years, that she has turned her evil attentions elsewhere (to areas, incidentally, where NATO offers no wall of will and force), and further, that NATO is serving no purpose. But it must be remembered that throughout the diversionary crisis of Korea, Egypt, and Asia the Soviet Union has consistently found time and occasion to exert pressure on the Berlin problem, to threaten various Western nations, and to "rattle her rockets" on one issue or another. Examination of these threats when removed from the shadow of Korea *et al* reveals justification for NATO many times over.

Regardless of the strategic geography of Spain and whatever other valued contributions she might offer, the effect of her membership upon the unity, the ideals, and the sum of the strengths of NATO will need be weighed cautiously.

Background for Strategy.

The basis of Allied strategy must surely lie first in a unity of interest and purpose arising from a consciousness that the common danger is so strong, so imminent and diverse, that none may stand alone. (13:259)

It was because of the necessity to stand against the Soviet menace that NATO came into being; the same factors shape the basic strategy as one of defense. In the beginning this defense was considered to require a force of about 100 divisions; however, for many

reasons—economic, political, and more significantly, that of public opinion—this force was never established even in definite planning. In its place was substituted a "forward strategy" whose thesis is one of defense at the Iron Curtain, thus taking military advantage of defense in depth as well as of the terrain. Psychologically this indicates to the Europeans that no ground is to be yielded to Communism without a struggle. There is no doubt that this strategy satisfies the artificial restraints prohibiting larger conventional forces; whether it satisfies the defense requirements of NATO will be discussed later in this chapter.

A defensive strategy must begin with a deterrent. (20:70) which in this case is to be provided in its ultimate form by SAC. Out of this combination of forward placed shield of army and tactical air forces and SAC comes the popularly titled concept of "Shield and Sword." The lesser deterrent is to shield Europe from border pressures, limit seizure of land, reduce the element of surprise available to the Reds, and increase the degree of contest before unleashing the Sword. To some minds the shield has now deteriorated in concept to a sort of trip-wire, designed to trigger SAC on slight provocation.

Returning again to the defensive character of the Alliance and its strategy, and recalling that earlier we found Russia preparing for war in all spectrums of weapons systems, we can understand the anxiety of some rational Europeans as to the true effectiveness of the Shield and Sword as now constituted. They fully realize that SAC is not under NATO control, and that, even though it were, the degree of nuclear stalemate now in being and the lead of the Soviets in ICBMs make the Sword more symbolic than effective. All too clearly they visualize the reasoning of Russia as to the United States' unwillingness to commit suicide to save Europe.

Building further on this, they see the stalemate becoming a Soviet shield under which the Red sword of massive land armies could quickly overrun such extensive portions of Europe as to require the use of megaton weapons be extended to the NATO countries. And this doubtful favor they would refuse. If the large nuclears of SAC could kill Russia, their generous use in Europe would result in "liberating a corpse." Thus the self-preservation instinct of the United States to let Europe go by default rather than invoke SAC is augmented by European preference to such a course as opposed to thermonuclear attack on the overrunning forces.

Only slightly less frightening to many countries is the SHAPE concept of tactical nuclear support of our limited forward strategy ground forces. Fear that such action would provoke retaliation in kind is aggravated by the fact of 335 simulated atomics having been employed by *one side* in Carte Blanche.

The foregoing paragraphs outline the most explicit requirement of change placed upon our strategy by stalemate: today, the present NATO strategy, with its stress on nuclear strategic and tactical weapons and its de-emphasis of conventional arms, fails of the test of acceptability.

Deterrence.

For the last decade the keystone of Western strategy with respect to Europe has been reliance on United States strategic bombing capabilities as the ultimate deterrent to Soviet aggression in Europe. The credibility of that policy is being questioned; that is the crux of the NATO dilemma today. (1:65)

In the preceding expression Mr. George Rathjens emphasizes the need to evaluate further the position

of the nuclear deterrent in NATO strategy. As long as frequent threats of massive retaliation are required in order to block aggression less than all-out war, our forward strategy is of doubtful efficacy. For the West is staking its survival on a concept that forces the issue of all-out war rather than aligning our strategy to prevent it.

Stalemate introduces a new phase of strategic requirements: the purpose and place of the deterrent is in the process of shifting. With the innovation of base hardening there is a consequent limitation of counterforce application of SAC, and without the capability of destroying the enemy missiles prior to launch the degree of stalemate is increased. Hence we can no longer rely upon nuclear superiority; no longer would victory be assured by SAC even in pre-emptive attack.

But assuredly the deterrent is required, for in the end, in the final summing of things when survival is at stake, we must be prepared to fight nuclear all-out war. If we are so prepared, this ultimate crisis is far less likely to arrive. On the other hand we must restrict this deterrent to this purpose and not use it as a club against various lesser gradations of aggression. Otherwise, it only loses its credibility for the final defense.

There are other shortcomings in depending upon all-out retaliation as the prime counter to aggression. If nuclears are as flexible and as powerful as our threats assert, the Europeans feel that they have little to contribute, or perhaps prefer occupation over death by our hand. Thus the overdependence upon the deterrent detracts from meeting force levels, a condition that may swell to a general reluctance to furnish even trip-wire forces. Hence, the current strategy has an ultimately weakening effect on the Alliance, which in turn renders the members more vulnerable to political aggression. More explicitly, an

inadequately supported nuclear deterrent invites the piecemeal, appeasement type dissection that Europe experienced in the 1930s.

Shield and Sword Transposed. "The nuclear stalemate may prevent all-out war. It will not deter other forms of conflict; in fact it may even encourage them." (14:126)

The effect of stalemate in diminishing the credibility of the threat of all-out war to deter lesser aggression makes Europe more attainable in the minds of the Kremlin. Lending further attractiveness is the lack of a Western conventional capability offsetting that of the Red land armies now in being and trained and equipped for the express purpose of capturing Europe without necessarily employing tactical nuclears. This is to say our deterrent does not match the full range of the threat.

In the absence of matching forces, SHAPE plans to defend Europe against less than all-out aggression by the employment of tactical atomic weapons. There are arguments that this SHAPE strategy is logical in that it merely contemplates the use of nuclears as a means of countering the substitution of man power for industrial potential on the part of the Soviets. This is difficult to accept, since the USSR undoubtedly can match the West bomb for bomb, at least to the number that would be significant to victory. More candidly stated, it is NATO that has done the substituting—that of nuclear weapons for its own unwillingness to provide adequate line divisions.

From a logical analysis it is not clear why the use of tactical nuclears is presumed to favor the Allies. As troop-killing weapons, they can only be assumed as being mutually lethal to both sides. With both defensive and offensive forces dispersed, the Russian man power advantage will be significant, particularly so with the Allies at a 1:2 disadvantage in tactical air means of delivery.

Whereas conventional warfare has a self-limiting feature, nuclear warfare is limited only by total destruction of our civilization. When tactical weapons are delivered from or to appreciable distances behind the area of contest, their controlled use quickly vanishes; atomic reprisals and overmatching retaliation spread with nothing being achieved but devastation. The only possibility of containing tactical nuclear combat is to forbid weapon use against targets within the Soviet Empire. This is to say the employment of tactical nuclears vice strategic types merely shifts the area of devastation from that of Russia and the United States to that of Europe—hardly a welcome gesture of assistance in the eyes of the European.

From the foregoing, NATO's strategy of Shield and Sword is inadequate in that: the nuclear deterrent is credible only against a like force or threat; the deterrent lacks balancing conventional forces; and substituted tactical nuclears fail in their logic of application. There must be developed a new strategy for the defense of Europe—a strategy that avoids the irrationality of overdependence upon a deterrent whose use is synonymous with national suicide, or upon tactical weapons whose employment has the doubtful blessing of making Europe less attractive to the Communists only by virtue of its devastation. Replacing the unacceptable and paralyzing political and military rigidity inherent in the present concept must be a permeating characteristic of flexibility—flexibility to meet and beat the Soviets in all forms and gradations of conflict.

Clearly the strategy for the future calls for vastly increased ground and tactical air forces. By this addition to SHAPE's order of battle there is born a full spectrum deterrent matching that of Russia. With such a redressing of balance, nuclear stalemate would have the effect of guaranteeing that war be confined to conventional arms. This in turn would essentially restrict the scope of any conflict to the

battle zone, protect our war potential, and bring to bear the concept of attrition. And "A war of attrition is the onewar the Soviet bloc could not win." (14:155)

Provision of adequate ground and tactical air strength is well within the man power capabilities of Western Europe and North America. Already significant infrastructure has been put in place to support such forces. Moreover, NATO was founded on the premise of conventional forces strategy, and European history contributes a wealth of knowledge and comprehension of this type of warfare. The original economic reasons preventing Europe from raising and supporting adequate forces no longer exist. More inherent to the Alliance are the political problems of developing a balanced force among countries of varying exposure, attitude, and national wealth. However, these are subject to resolution by forthright statesmanship.

There remains only the obstacle of public opinion. Here it is necessary that the facts be set forth in such a manner as to make the common interest in survival an effective power, and to develop a willingness to orient a nation to its responsibilities of over-all defense rather than to its material aggrandizement. Once nuclear stalemate is recognized and labeled for its corollary effect of reviving the importance and value of conventional armies, the Europeans would close ranks, throw off their indecision, and contribute to a balanced force.

In summary, stronger conventional forces would fill the most dangerous gap in our defenses while striking out the present weakening ambiguity of the United States providing the ultimate deterrent as well as a disproportionate share of the ground strength. By eliminating any remaining attractiveness of all-out war to the Communists and canceling the standing invitation to aggression by Soviet land armies, these new forces would constitute a major contribution to peace.

Finally, in broad aspect, there is offered a NATO strategy in which the nuclear deterrent is more appropriately employed as a Shield under which a new Sword of strengthened conventional arms could defend the West with some assurance of guaranteeing the survival of Western civilization while obtaining maximum participation from its members.

CHAPTER III

SPANISH GEOGRAPHY

To this point the threat to NATO has been reviewed and the general conclusions advanced that it is constant, diverse and imminent. By possessing the essential equivalence of our nuclear capability, and with unmatched strength in conventional forces, the Soviets have made more attainable their political objectives. While the threat of all-out war decreases with nuclear stalemate, the threat of conflict less than all-out will correspondingly increase.

It has been argued that NATO's present reliance on nuclear deterrence and tactical weapons as a counter to the complete nature of the Soviet military strategy is unrealistic, and that such reliance paralyzes the Western political effort. In order to restore the balance in military capability and create flexibility in political strategy, the tactical air and ground forces of NATO must be substantially increased.

The proposed new NATO strategy would place higher values on conventional arms, supporting facilities, broader economic base, and a people willing to fight on NATO's team. With the threat defined and the counter-strategy developed and converted into strategic elements, we can proceed to study the position of Spain relative to NATO.

Old Spain Reoriented. "With some 28 million inhabitants on an area of 195,000 square miles, Spain should be one of the important powers of Europe. Reality is quite different." (8:521)

Things, events, opinions, and values in Spain are neither always as we think they should be nor as we

would want them, for this country is to a large extent different from the remainder of Western Europe. As a consequence of 700 years of Moorish occupation, Spain is frequently assessed as being more African than European. Her past preference for tradition over progress has precluded her throwing off the Arab influence. Additionally, the enforced isolation, first from within and more recently from without, has served to perpetuate Spain in the time frame of the 19th Century. Contributing to this isolation are the Pyrenees, for these mountains held back the flood of French liberalism, the Reformation, and the full economic and social impact of the industrial revolution.

Today Spain is a backward country, having the lowest standard of living in Western Europe. Industry is struggling under the web of controls and monopolies of the corporate state; agriculture, the basic economy of Spain, is antiquated, neglected, and falling far short of its potential. But there are social, material, and political indications of the intent of Spain to step across the pages of history and enter the 20th Century chapter. People are stirring restlessly; they want less of poverty and more of progress and the improved standard of living it brings. The display of modern structures, new automobiles, quality merchandise, and high fashion in Madrid is not without impact on the nearby country villages where nothing has changed in a hundred years.

Finally, we can see by Franco's international dealings that he definitely intends to release Spain, at least to some degree, from her fixed place in the backwater of history, and ease her into the stream of modern international relations. A new Spain could be in the making.

Defensive Topography. The very mountains that have isolated Spain from Western progress are also a most attractive feature in a defensive strategy. With the protection of the Pyrenees and its few and readily

defended passes, the Iberian Peninsula is a natural redoubt. It is the logical position for a last ditch defense of Europe against overrunning ground forces; the next stop in retreat would be North Africa. Furthermore, the ports and airfields would provide for both evacuation and military resupply, enabling Spain to serve as a springboard for counterattack. Proof that Spain is recognized as "one of the most important geopolitical areas for defense of the West" (39:27) can be found in the present planning of SHAPE for the use of Spain *in extremis* both for defense and as a base for reconquest.

In spite of the advanced mobility of the long-range fleets of the United States, certain shore support is still required. The strategic Mediterranean and Atlantic coastlines of Spain, as well as her position of dominating the joining straits, led to the establishment of naval bases in Spain under the terms of the 1953 agreement. With the certainty of eventual expulsion of SAC from North Africa, the value of the air bases in Spain is enhanced. These, coupled with aircraft control and warning sites, fuel facilities, and related supporting items, add materially to the defensive strength of the peninsula. In ultimate intent and purpose all these unilaterally financed facilities are NATO bases, for the Sixth Fleet in war, when these bases would be most urgently required, would be a NATO fleet; similar logic applies to facilities to support SAC, the nuclear deterrent of the West.

In a way seemingly reflective of the dominating nature of its eastern border, the topography of Spain is indeed forbidding. Several ranges cut the land abruptly and without pattern. However, these sharp mountains and twisting valleys also provide a serious communications problem. "In fact, communications as far as modern warfare comprehends that term are almost non-existent." (4:656) Non-standard gauge railroads are single-tracked; equipment is ancient, some

locomotives being 100 years old. Highways are neither engineered nor maintained for heavy traffic. If Spain were to be truly integrated into the defense of the West, most assuredly vast sums would be required for basic communications infrastructure.

The Economy. "In peace or war, the economic strength of nations, i.e., their capacity to produce, depends on the magnitude, composition, and quality of their economic resources." (16:163)

Spain's economy is often characterized by the terms "backward" or "underdeveloped," but such terms are only relative. In comparison with her large neighbors of the West, yes, Spain is backward; yet her underdevelopment is not unlike that of NATO members Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Southern Italy. That there is an appalling degree of poverty is true; again this is also prevalent in the same four countries. Perhaps a more finite description is: "The fundamental defect of the Spanish economy is that it is entirely uneconomic." (7:10)

In an attempt to correct this condition, the corporate state is placing great emphasis on the broadening and deepening of the industrial base, but the planning is faulty in scope, in detail, and to a large degree in concept. The ignorance of Franco in matters of economics and finance (19:104) is manifested in the weak and inefficient administration and planning organizations. Politics, whim, and self-aggrandizement often displace judgment and experience in directing national effort into sound production channels.

Agriculture and mining, two prime sources of export, are being neglected; in spite of an overabundance of farm labor the former is unable to keep pace with the swing to industrialization. Spain does not have the natural resources essential to a rich country, yet full share of attention to their modernization

is not being afforded. Consequently, raw materials which must be imported for the new plants more than offset exports, resulting in a perennial trade deficit.

With the impetus of two billion dollars advanced by the United States under various agreements and aid plans, great strides have been taken, although at a lesser expansion rate than her neighbors. Yet today, Spain again faces bankruptcy. "The rising curve of industrial production was wound up at a financial dead end." (31:69)

Part of her economic ills stems from the self-perpetuating nature of her poverty caused by 83% of the population accounting for less than one-third of the income. (19:110) Such maldistribution precludes the accumulation of savings upon which investment capital may be drawn for the advance of the economy. In its stead the government provides capital, but with trade and budget deficits; the only source is new money with its consequence of inflation eating up the benefit of progress. Currently these crises of investment capital and inflation are more than Spain can cope with alone and still progress.

Although investment capital assistance is required, this is only a partial solution. The entire economic structure requires overhaul, and this is fundamentally a Spanish responsibility. Significantly, the financial assistance rendered by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and other agencies is coupled with the requirement that Spain take positive steps to untangle the skein. Experts are furnished by creditors to insure funds are spent productively on a line of balance, rather than on plants for whose product there is no need or for whose support there are no raw materials.

Much publicity is given to related progress in reducing the more than 800 overlapping, contradictory,

and stifling economic agencies which plague the corporate system. But to date only ten have been dis-established, and the beneficial effect is as yet imperceptible. Government subsidies and tax benefits conspire to insure the inefficiency of the system of public and private monopolies which are already otherwise protected from both Spanish and foreign competition.

Recent disclosures of widespread corruption, the faltering transport system, predominantly antiquated industrial equipment, government budget deficits, and the most perverse weather in Western Europe complete the list of ailments which must be met and overcome if Spain is to break from her economic isolation and survive in the process.

As a potential contributor to the economic strength of NATO, Spain's present value is dubious; some may classify her as a liability. But the significant point is the intent of Spain to join the economic family of Western nations. Her value lies in the future, and will be a direct function of the degree and type of outside assistance provided.

CHAPTER IV

THE SPANIARD AND THE WEST

From Greatness Backward. "There was no lack of greatness, for a few handfuls of Conquistadores not only conquered a New World, but founded a civilization that exists to this day." (19:7) The Spain of our history books was a great power. She drove the Moors out of Europe and secured the strategic peninsula to the West; her far-ranging ships literally opened the world to Europe. But the 16th Century Spanish supremacy was shortly to slip into a decline of power and of empire.

In a last attempt at old international glories, Spain's entanglement with Napoleon broke her completely as a sea power and military threat. Violent internal divisive issues have served to sap her strength subsequently, and she has never regained her position in the world. The final blow to her hopes was the bitter civil war of 1936-39, whose physical, social and emotional scars will require many decades of healing.

It is still argued amongst partisan authors as to the true extent Communism played in the cause of the Civil War. Assuredly there was a Communist Party, and Communists participated in the Second Republic; but basically this was a liberal government, internationalist, equalitarian, and importantly for this argument, anti-military and without a state church. Communism was not an issue in the early declarations of Franco; his pronunciamientos were clearly a bid for power under the guise of restoring the old traditional order. Only as Red aid and Red leaders filled the Republican needs was there a significant Communist involvement and a consequent anti-Communist line by Franco. His victory preserved the old ways of traditionalism, i.e., a strong church, a veritable Spanish army of occupation, isolationism, and authoritarian rule.

Franco was able to keep Spain out of the Second World War, but at a price to be paid in subsequent years in the form of the hatred and distrust of the Allies. While on one hand he went to the extreme of sending the Blue Division to the Eastern Front, on the other he refused passage of Hitler's armies to Gibraltar. One might say that the Spanish were not pro-Ally, but neither were they totally against us. As the tide shifted against the Axis, Franco shifted also and was an anxious collaborator with the West by 1945.

Nevertheless, his early support of Hitler was not to go unpunished, and in April 1945 the United Nations passed a resolution (later to be confirmed at Potsdam) barring "nations whose regimes have been established with the aid of armed forces of countries that have fought against the U.N., as long as those regimes continue in power." Subsequent U.N. actions turned down Franco's application for membership, as well as advocating withdrawal of all ambassadors from Madrid.

Although the United States softened toward Spain as early as 1947, the latter was denied participation in the Marshal Plan, much to her detriment relative to the rest of Europe. Our prompt re-establishment of diplomatic relations following the withdrawal of the "no ambassador" sanction in 1950, a sharpening of the Cold War, and the interest of United States military men in bases behind the Pyrenees—all these led to the Spanish Bases Pact in 1953, and eventually to Spain's admittance to the U.N. in 1955.

Here it is necessary to note that Franco yielded no ideological ground in any of these diplomatic gains. His government still prohibits freedom of the press, speech, and religion; it is still an authoritarian regime contrary to the principles expressed in the U.N. Charter, in the NATO Treaty, and in the United States-Spain bilateral treaties. Notwithstanding, it is today a stable regime, perhaps because no opposition is tolerated, or because the Spaniard will

bow deeply to avoid another Civil War. But while stable today, it would paradoxically topple tomorrow, for it is a government of one man—Franco. There is no provision for a successor; no one is allowed to develop national leadership, even in Franco's own party, and so gain the ability to succeed him gracefully.

Thus despite Spain's having plummeted from world supremacy to a nadir of instability and weakness, she is now in the process of re-establishing herself in the family of nations. There can be little question that she has far to go by Western standards; but the most significant step is the initial one, and this has been taken firmly and in our direction.

The Spaniard and His Politics. "The Spaniard is individualistic, proud, courageous and unruly. He conforms to no pattern; he fits no mold; he shuns moderation." (19:15) If a nation of individuals can be so briefly characterized, H.L. Matthews has succeeded in the foregoing. These characteristics can be perceived throughout Spain's explosive and self-consuming history; they explain the lack of national unity, and are the reasons for the forest of splinter groups, each holding to some small divisive issue rather than contributing to homogenous effort for greatness of country.

Unfortunately, the schools and churches, two major sources of hope for correcting such outlooks and channeling efforts and emotions to common good, are failing the Spaniard. The education system is clearly the most backward in all of Western Europe; her illiteracy rate is estimated at 25%, with no significant progress having been made since 1939. (1:142) Anti-clericalism amongst the workers is growing; in general this is diagnosed as stemming from a resentment of the strong State-Church bond, because a bond with Franco is not a relationship to inspire or encourage esteem.

Under the present population distribution the lack of unity or of federal spirit is unlikely to improve spontaneously. Over one-half her people are directly dependent upon agriculture; even more significantly, underemployment in this field is estimated at 33%, with a consequent multitude existing near or at subsistence level. The interrelationship, or cause and effect, of illiteracy, poverty, and growing distrust of a rich church is apparent. Such circumstances and conditions, complicated as they are by poor communications, are further explanation of the principal concern of the Spaniard for local issues and his related desire for local autonomy.

The preceding paragraph is not to imply that formal political organizations, other than the Falange, are permitted, for they are not: even the Boy Scouts are banned. Ironically, in spite of Franco's chest thumping anti-Communism, the Party, though small, is the best organized and strongest of all non-Falangist pseudo-political groupings. Russian finances, Radio Prague, and the natural adeptness of the Communist for underground clandestine work foster the movement to which riddance Franco is so publicly dedicated.

Much has been made of the growth of Communism by the Republican leaning authors. "Franco's habit of identifying almost all opposition as Communist gives them great prestige and popularity." (7:10) Exaggeration is suspected here, but the facts are clear that the corporate state economic system, with its inflation, corruption, mismanagement, and failure to provide a generally improved standard of living for the populace, offers a fertile ground for Communism. To the working man or even to the middle class people who must hold two jobs to support a family, Capitalism as it is represented by Franco's economics has little attraction. Nor has American support of a dictator contrary to our own ideals and heritage served to inspire to democracy those who despise Franco.

A case can be made for strong anti-American feeling on the part of university faculties, students, small businessmen, shopkeepers, the autocracy, and right wing Catholics, while others will argue that United States-Spain relations amongst the majority of Spaniards are excellent. Nevertheless, the fact is present, and will be with us for an indefinite future, that a significant proportion of the Spanish literate population opposes any and all who support the Caudillo, for in their eyes such support only serves to prolong his tenure. Unfortunately, this support of Franco by the United States is identified with the Spanish Bases Agreement.

This same group, with an inborne distrust of foreign entanglements harking back 200 years and believing that Franco would have failed of bankruptcy in the early 1950s and again in 1959 except for outside assistance, can be expected to oppose NATO membership for Spain just as they opposed OEEC participation.

A strategy based upon or including to a material degree the participation and contribution of the Spanish people has a future beyond the control of its molders. It would contain an element of risk directly related to the long term instability of Spain's political future. To many Spaniards it is only the existence of Franco that separates the regime from anarchy. The explosive dissension and even civil strife that will possibly follow his demise will be difficult to restrict to the homeland in its divisive influence.

On the other hand, the optimist may contend that only through broadened international relations will Spain stabilize and improve her economy, absorb the social benefits of fraternization, soften the authoritarian government, and in so doing learn of how life and liberty are being enjoyed in the West—that only through such interplay of men and ideas can Spain scramble into the present.

Forces and Facilities. Under the concept of the strategy advanced in Chapter II, NATO will require additional forces as soon as possible. The import attached to this build-up places special premium on any ability of Spain to contribute first-line troops and supporting facilities to SHAPE.

Although the Spanish Army has been variously estimated from eighteen (21:4) to 30 (2:608) divisions, in one respect most sources do concur: the army is not modern in the NATO sense of the word. It is ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-paid; many of its members must work part time in addition to military duties to support a family. More seriously, it is inadequately trained, equipped, and supported. To compare the Spanish Army and Air Force with those of Western nations is to compare a guerrilla or constabulary group with a line division. Only now that the United States is contributing dollars and talent has the military taken a small step toward obtaining the facilities that a modern force requires for effectiveness.

The modern concept of war, that of men fighting with machines, has in the main passed the Spanish soldier by. This handicap is extended by his disinclination to technique, (2:635) which in turn is compounded by the high illiteracy rate. The predominant source of soldiers is the countryside—the underemployed, semi-literate army of poverty-stricken agricultural workers. To turn elsewhere and draw trained men from an economy that is just beginning to grow would detract seriously from broader national capabilities.

As an individual, there is no question that the Spaniard has a fine reputation as a soldier. They fought in their Civil War with bravery and gusto. Equipped as they would be with knowledge of the terrain, the Spaniards fighting in defense of their own country would add great weight to the NATO troops manning this last redoubt in defense of Europe. On the other hand, a picked division failed to distinguish

itself with the Nazis on the Russian front. The history of Spain is so replete with unsuccessful foreign wars wherein the issues were obscured in political maneuvering that the people hold a certain repugnance for, or unwillingness to become enthusiastic about, engaging in what they might call someone else's war. Spain's neutrality in WW-I particularly, and to a large extent in WW-II, can be attributed to this.

It has been Franco's policy that his Army be considered primarily as a means to support his regime, but without the Army becoming strong politically or developing popular leaders. Publicly he has stated ". . .of various fronts, the most dangerous is the internal." (21:4) Strictly speaking, he has not constituted a military force, but a political army of occupation; the adverse effect on the quality and popularity of the armed services is understandable.

A standing army of respectable numerical strength, even though ill-equipped and trained, has a potential that can be measured in two degrees. Is it organized in tightly knit cadres for ready expansion and intensive training? Or is it merely an agglomeration of raw man power with little more than certain items of uniform to mark the men as soldiers? Unfortunately, Franco's army is of the second grouping. It would require complete rebuilding from basic facilities all the way through to individually equipping and training the men in uniform before it would be acceptable in the NATO international arena.

Motivation. "The war potential of nations consists not only of resources such as man power, economic resources, and administrative skills, but also of the will to utilize these resources for waging war." (16:63) It is a matter of distinguishing between the ability and the will to fight, for without the latter a nation's contribution to a military alliance is measured on a vastly reduced scale.

The Spaniard's motivation in NATO's cause hinges on two fundamental factors: firstly, his xenophobic viewpoint built up during generations of isolation, and secondly, the automatic relating and evaluating of major events with their effect on Franco's regime—a problem of leadership. As to the former, it is difficult to anticipate any general enthusiasm for NATO's cause, particularly when participation implies complex alliances, foreign wars, and foreign troops on Spanish soil. In any successful alliance such as NATO, national sovereignty must be sacrificed to some degree; this would be difficult for the Spanish to comprehend and accept.

Motivation for a NATO war is a measure of placing the international welfare above that of the nation, and the national interest above that of the individual. We have seen that the Spaniard is, by Western standards, primarily concerned with local problems, problems which bear on his concern for survival. In some regions there is such a strong centrifugal sentiment for local autonomy that one is led to believe that without a centripetal dictatorship the country would fly apart. Under such circumstances, with poor internal communications, illiteracy, and above all the restriction of press and speech, it is held unlikely that the preponderantly noncosmopolitan Spanish people will put aside their own problems for a Crusade against Communism. Follow orders they will, but comprehend and, with dedication to the cause of Western civilization, make the sacrifices required, they probably will not. Again, they would have the feeling of being used, of being in somebody else's war.

Undoubtedly Franco's ministers see with proper realism the advantages to be gained by fighting the Communist on foreign real estate under NATO's flag; to this end they might commit forces. But this does not represent the will of the people or inspire them to the cause.

Though motivation of the majority is today less than adequate, we know that motivation is a function of leadership. Under proper circumstances the Spaniard could quite possibly be re-oriented to full Western outlook. Those who could provide this quality of national leadership in Spain are of two source categories: pro-Franco and anti-Franco. The former are held back, their popularity discouraged, and anonymity encouraged—all on Franco's order. Thus there remains only one leader—Franco. That his voluntary following may or may not represent a majority of the nation is not significant to this argument, for he has not demonstrated by deed those virtues and qualities required to motivate the Spanish people under the long-term conditions the Alliance visualizes.

Considering the anti-Franco leaders, we find that they too have been throttled in any widespread unity of purpose or in public leadership. Examining further, we can characterize this group as being the cosmopolitan, the group upon whom the true facts of NATO and its responsibilities are not wasted. These are the men who could truly be expected to demonstrate by all means necessary the need to gather under NATO's banner and defend the West. But consider their perplexing plight. Any action such as providing quality troops in the Cold War, or manning Eastern ramparts in warmer degrees of conflict, advances the position of Spain. Ironically this advances in parallel the position of the dictatorship and perpetuates at home those Fascist viewpoints to which these opposition leaders are so basically opposed.

CHAPTER V

KEYSTONE OR MILLSTONE?

Passions and Politics. From a purely military viewpoint, certain facts and the three dimensions of topography cannot be turned away. Spain occupies a most strategic area of Europe; she provides a defensive bastion of ports, airfields, and rugged terrain. It was these strategic values that led the United States to figuratively open the door to Spain in 1951. Though Spain's economy is not strong, it leads that of Turkey. Her motivation for foreign wars may be questioned, but Norway and Denmark, for example, forbid the basing of Allied troops in peacetime. Admittedly her troops leave much to be desired, but they are of greater value than any force contribution Iceland could make. Yet, despite the military logic involved, Spain is not a member of the military Alliance—NATO.

Besides the military aspects, NATO is a political pact, and it is on the political (or one might venture to say, ideological) aspects that Spain's course to membership in NATO is blocked. The strong, near emotional position of pundits and statesmen on the Spanish question become particularly strident when leaving the finite features of military strategy and passing into the more nebulous and opiniated issues of politics and ideology. While this paper attempts to present the issues rationally, it perhaps falls short when striving to evaluate accurately the deep passions felt in the matter by the Norwegians and the Danes. These people, long of liberal outlook and with vivid memories of harsh occupation by the Nazis, bitterly oppose the Franco regime for its present authoritarianism and its past cooperation with Hitler.

Today Portugal is a strong advocate of Spain's membership in NATO; Turkey, Greece, and Italy are

favorable; Belgium is yielding, France has made friendly sounds, Britain could be swayed, the United States and Germany are even anxious; but the outspoken threat of veto by Norway and the reiterated anti-Spain position of Denmark in March of this year are effective in keeping Spain off the agenda. The United States fears that the price of her entrance, if compromise could be attained, would be to risk the unity of NATO through loss of full cooperation, perhaps even the membership, of such founding members as Norway and Denmark. So, in essence, we continue to treat Spain as if she didn't exist politically when she is, to the maximum extent possible under the circumstances, integrated through United States bases and SHAPE planning into the military strategy of NATO.

Because opposition is not confined to Franco as an individual but extends to the authoritarian form of government, it is important to stress here that, although authoritarian, the regime is not totalitarian any more than is that of Portugal. The latter through her willingness to cooperate with the Allies regarding bases in the Azores, and her alliance with Britain, seems to have reduced the authoritarian stigma and paved the way to membership. Spain now essentially parallels these requirements by virtue of the network of American bases built pursuant to the joint treaty.

With eloquent quoting of the Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty, it is thundered that to admit Spain to NATO is to ". . . stain NATO's banner with a lie." (2:638) Although the Treaty lists what might be called ideals of membership, it does not prescribe an entrance test. Furthermore, isolating an authoritarian government such as Franco's will not necessarily cure it or convert it to democracy. It is more logical to conclude that close association and sharing of problems and responsibilities will show the way to liberalism. Because Franco desires NATO membership just as he sought entrance to the OEEC, it is entirely feasible to require some liberalization concessions in

the same manner that guarantees were extracted for economic improvement as a condition to his OEEC participation. But it hardly seems logical to impose a way of life upon the country as the Scandinavian countries insist; this would be a paradox of authoritarian democracy.

In the ultimate sense, NATO was conceived as a military and political means of protecting and preserving Western civilization, of which Spain is now not only a part, but has been a great contributor in centuries past. Maximum participation of Western nations would certainly be a most important consideration in building the defense. What is gained then by the exclusion of a nation? More aptly, how much is lost?

Although the imminence of the Communist threat may be wasted on some, this is war. Neutrality in Europe is a Communist victory in the sense that NATO is being deprived of its full potential. Whereas SHAPE planning acknowledges that a general crisis may require NATO use of Spain's defensive terrain and whatever else she may offer in the way of forces, facilities, and material, optimum integration of such contribution into defense plans is not possible today. Until SHAPE is enabled to plan, build, and even improve upon Spain's potential as a full member of NATO, rather than depend upon hasty action in an emergency, the West is at less than full strength. In answer to the question, our exclusion of Franco punishes not him, but NATO. By failing to mobilize all rational means of girding the West, NATO truly does not fulfill its role in preparing the defense.

There are now eight political-economic organizations linking the West European countries in various combinations of membership. The common, underlying aim is to integrate European effort and through cooperation to exploit proximity, varied resources, and diverse economies rather than to consider them as

polemic issues. Spain is a full member of OEEC; her exclusion from the others, NATO in particular, will serve only to retard her. Already she has suffered the lack of Marshal Plan benefits, and United States aid can never make up for those lost years. The longer the delay in full membership as a European partner, the wider is the economic gulf, and greater is the problem of eventual integration. Too soon it will be too late to make the transition.

As a foundation to Western defense, the importance of European unity of purpose has long been recognized by the United States in its policies. The flaw in the unity represented by the exclusion of Spain forced the United States to enter into bilateral agreements in order to build the bases the defense of the West requires. For reasons discussed earlier, this agreement has resulted in a growing degree of anti-Americanism amongst the liberal Spaniards. With the downfall or death of Franco our bases will be jeopardized if these liberals (as we hope) ascend to power. The only logical guarantee, and it is not total, of retaining these facilities for common defense is by multilateralization of the treaties, i.e., admitting Spain to NATO and making the bases part of the common infrastructure.

The threat is the Soviet Union; the security interest is common to both NATO and Spain. With this common interest, Spain's membership in the Pact would meet the four objectives of an alliance outlined by Mr. Ben T. Moore: the objective of certainty—the intent to constitute a unit, to act together; the objective of strength—the combining of forces and strategic territories; the objective of efficiency—the pooling of resources in combination according to national circumstances and specialization; and the objective of equity—the adjusting of contributions to benefits received and varying abilities to contribute. (20:192)

If, as we have read, Spain is of a value militarily, and if her exclusion from NATO stems from antipathy of various liberal and socialist nations because of the authoritarian regime, how best to solve this political problem in order that Spain can serve as a geographical keystone? In final analysis we have a problem of determining which is better for NATO: by full cooperation, perpetuate Franco while leading him and his country to liberalism: or by isolation, force his downfall and gamble on the consequences.

Examination of the latter alternative reveals that Franco is avowedly out to defeat 19th Century liberalism and to preserve the ultra-conservative traditionalism of past centuries. With such mismatched building blocks as anti-liberalism, anti-communism, and anti-protestantism, he has fashioned a regime whose primary objective is its security. It has no political system, no dominant party, (19:166) and no rational philosophy. He has faced many crises and overcome them, often with opportunism, but never with significant yielding of his authoritarian powers.

With the army in his control, Franco can probably withstand any crisis, even though he may drag Spain to the very pit. Communism, though growing, is far from the position of power required to overthrow him. All other opposition is kept divided and beset with intramural quarrels. Suppressed emotions can only grow with repression as Franco holds down the lid on liberalism, and repression will increase with each crisis. As long as Spain is held in isolation the only access to Pandora's box of freedom of expression will be when Franco dies. It would appear that the longer Spain is held apart the more certain is the guarantee that Franco will be succeeded by Civil War or Communism. This is a risk NATO can ill afford.

On the other hand, Spain has voluntarily stepped out of her role of neutrality and isolationism for the first time since the Napoleonic era. As an opportunist, the Caudillo finds this a means of maintaining

his power, but at the same time it opens the way to liberalism. For with increased organizational memberships there follows a corresponding rise in the exchange of people, ideas, and philosophies, all resulting in a broader exposure to democracy. This close contact and interchange, which would not otherwise exist, can only have a subtly softening effect on Fascism, and at the same time condition the Spanish people to make a peaceful transition when Franco leaves the scene.

We must not lose sight of NATO's goal of freedom. How better to spread it than by association and cooperation? The benefits that will accrue to the people in Spain through cooperation with and integration into the West will in time be perceptible to them. True, such actions will appear at first to be underwriting Franco's regime, but in the long term these advancements will have the effect of turning the Spanish people away from radicalism and of reorienting them toward the West.

Summary. With nuclear stalemate essentially *fait accompli*, it has been argued that NATO military strategy is not tailored in size or pattern to contain the full spectrum threat it faces. As a consequence of this military weakness, the political strategy is seriously compromised. A remedial military concept has been advanced that would employ SAC as a protective shield in conjunction with increased conventional arms. Such a strategy would yield the necessary strength and freedom of maneuver to counter each threat, military or political, with the proper combination of force or action indicated. It follows that this concept places a premium on additional quality army and tactical air units with supporting facilities and economy.

Examination of Spain in the light of the foregoing has revealed the serious extent of national debilitation resulting from prolonged isolation, a

crippling Civil War, and 20 years of Fascist rule. Her forces are pitifully short of NATO standards. Neither troops nor populace, however westward leaning, are international in outlook. Despite having had the benefit of quality diagnosis, been given a prescription for recovery, and been administered the initial remedial treatments, the economy remains weak.

But these national deficiencies are fully offset by Spain's geographical location; the strategic importance of the latter is reflected in SHAPE unilateral emergency planning. Notwithstanding this recognition of her favorable balance of military values, Spain's desire for NATO membership has been rebuffed on political and ideological grounds. Norway and Denmark promise to veto any membership action on the basis of Franco's past cooperation with Hitler, and his present authoritarian rule.

Conclusions. Although Spain has much to contribute to NATO in the way of defensive terrain and sites for bases, the urgent need under stalemate is conventional forces; here Spain can offer only raw man power with substandard degree of motivation and inadequate material and economic support. Thus from a military standpoint, it is concluded that Spain is not such a vital keystone of NATO's arch of defense that her absence is certain to cause its collapse. But unquestionably she is of such geographic importance (ironically this is increased by the lack of conventional forces in NATO) as to benefit NATO by her full integration as a Treaty member into SHAPE planning.

In the broader aspects of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty—economic collaboration, political stability, and friendly international relations—there is grave cause for concern. It is in this sphere that Spain may become a millstone to NATO. For the Spanish people require an improved economy, gradual introduction to liberalism, and a parallel orientation to internationalism if they are to take their place in

the Free World. This can best be provided through expanded economic, social, and political intercourse with NATO members via the medium of NATO membership. As a corollary, her military value will increase in step with social and economic improvement.

Thus Spain's weight as a millstone can only be lightened by accepting her into NATO, giving her full status in the Western family of nations. To refuse her this is to turn our backs to a problem that will not disappear, but may perversely become more serious. Continued ostracism will breed internal instability and generate a series of crises that can disrupt Western unity and give the Communists a free hand in Spain if civil war erupts.

Certain NATO countries must remember that NATO was founded to protect and promote democratic ideals. These goals cannot be attained from a position of ivory tower exclusiveness, but require cooperation and political partnership. Democracy cannot be instilled by teaching and preaching; it must be absorbed through example and association as well.

Spain is not fighting against us—she is but struggling to become one of us, albeit on different lines than our liberal background conditions us to accept, but on the only terms she now understands.

Today there is a need of realism, a call for maturity, and a want of compromise. Today NATO and Spain would mutually benefit by her admission to the Alliance. Tomorrow may be too late.

Every day the millstone becomes heavier.

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