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Satellite Mentality

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BOOKS

Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Report III. *Foreign Economic Policy for the Twentieth Century.* Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, 1958, 82 p.

This report is the work of Panel III of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project, and it seeks to outline the economic challenge facing the mid-twentieth century world. Economic and social growth has become a matter of primary concern everywhere, and it is felt that, by basing these growth aspirations upon national and human dignity, a more enduring world community will result. This report traces the rise of the current problem, from the disintegration of the nineteenth-century political system, and the emergence of the world-wide desire for a better living standard to be achieved through political action, if purely economic efforts were not sufficient. And this world-wide social revolution has attained an even greater urgency because of the rise of militant Communism. The interdependence of nations of the world is demonstrated, and the importance of the United States as a market and as a source of supply fundamental to the economic growth of the free world. The report endeavors to outline an economic structure to be followed by the United States to advance world-wide economic growth. Many specific recommendations are made: on financing, on agriculture, on the role of private enterprise, on trade policies, on regional and on functional development arrangements, and others. The lack of continuity and meaningful purpose of our present foreign economic policy is decried, and it is advanced that implementation of the recommendations made in the report will greatly strengthen the United States and the free world.

Kracauer, Siegfried, and Berkman, Paul L. *Satellite Mentality.* New York, Praeger, 1956. 270 p.

This study records and analyzes interviews conducted in 1951-52 with several hundred escapees from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It provides a detailed account of the manner in which communism works amongst peoples of satellite states and methods by which the latter offer resistance to Communist pressures. The political attitudes and hopes of peoples of these

countries are documented in a clear, forceful manner. Information difficult to obtain under totalitarian regimes is gained concerning how and why these people feel the way they do about their government and the state of the world. To some extent, this study should aid in indicating ranges in response by satellite populaces to future events. While it is limited because of the nature of the material on which it is based, the study sheds considerable light on possible developments as related to Western propaganda efforts directed at the satellite orbit; the effect of "limited" wars, such as Korea, on satellite nations; and the results which peaceful coexistence will have on the will of enslaved peoples to continue effective resistance.

Schroeder, Paul W. *The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations*. New York, Cornell University Press, 1958. 246 p.

The principal contribution of this book is that it underlines the fact that Japan's role in the Axis, prior to Pearl Harbor, was a very vague one. Few Americans understood that Tokyo had little interest in the European War and still less in the cause of Hitler, but was merely jockeying for position in the world power balance when signing the Tripartite Pact. Strangely enough, from this distance, it seems that the Japanese hoped their Axis tie might somehow motivate the United States to a settlement in the Pacific. Mr. Schroeder shows how it had the opposite effect, largely because Secretary Hull was unable to put any credence in Japanese allegations of real desire for a peaceful solution. It was the implacable Hull who dissuaded President Roosevelt from meeting with Prince Konoye when FDR wavered toward Tokyo's blandishments. Mr. Schroeder has drawn an excellent picture of the naivete of United States diplomacy at a time when the hard-boiled pressures of power diplomacy were beating upon us just before World War II. He clearly indicates the American predilection for high moral preachment in international dealings, and our failure realistically to appraise the situation because of our historic persistence in trying to fit all peoples and nations into our own mold.