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## The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations

Paul W. Schroeder

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countries are documented in a clear, forceful manner. Information difficult to obtain under totalitarian regimes is gained concerning how and why these people feel the way they do about their government and the state of the world. To some extent, this study should aid in indicating ranges in response by satellite populaces to future events. While it is limited because of the nature of the material on which it is based, the study sheds considerable light on possible developments as related to Western propaganda efforts directed at the satellite orbit; the effect of "limited" wars, such as Korea, on satellite nations; and the results which peaceful coexistence will have on the will of enslaved peoples to continue effective resistance.

Schroeder, Paul W. *The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations*. New York, Cornell University Press, 1958. 246 p.

The principal contribution of this book is that it underlines the fact that Japan's role in the Axis, prior to Pearl Harbor, was a very vague one. Few Americans understood that Tokyo had little interest in the European War and still less in the cause of Hitler, but was merely jockeying for position in the world power balance when signing the Tripartite Pact. Strangely enough, from this distance, it seems that the Japanese hoped their Axis tie might somehow motivate the United States to a settlement in the Pacific. Mr. Schroeder shows how it had the opposite effect, largely because Secretary Hull was unable to put any credence in Japanese allegations of real desire for a peaceful solution. It was the implacable Hull who dissuaded President Roosevelt from meeting with Prince Konoye when FDR wavered toward Tokyo's blandishments. Mr. Schroeder has drawn an excellent picture of the naivete of United States diplomacy at a time when the hard-boiled pressures of power diplomacy were beating upon us just before World War II. He clearly indicates the American predilection for high moral preachment in international dealings, and our failure realistically to appraise the situation because of our historic persistence in trying to fit all peoples and nations into our own mold.