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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly
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THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 2 October 1958 by
Bertram D. Wolfe

I was prepared to assume that a talk of mine originally delivered at Oxford would be distributed in advance to this audience and that, like good boys, you would have done your home work by reading it.* Then, I was going on from there. But some last-minute briefing indicates that only fifty copies were produced. As I see there are more than fifty people here, I shall try to combine some aspects of that paper with some aspects of the talk I intended to give and that will explain something of the structure of my talk.

I want to begin by distinguishing in principle two types of society: *first*, a relatively *open* society, which changes readily in structure, which is dynamic, self-changing, relatively painless in its changes; *secondly*, a *closed* society, which seems to have built-in staying powers, which endures for considerable periods of time, which undergoes a history to be sure, but the changes in which may be described as *within-system changes* rather than *changes in the system*. There are in principle, then, *self-transforming* or open societies and *self-conserving* or closed societies.

This does not mean that the closed societies have no history. Take, for example, the case of China. If a Chinese official or peasant of the nineteenth century were to be suddenly transported back to a China of the days before Christ, he would feel very much at home there, for the structure of Chinese society had changed very little in 2,000 years. Nevertheless, during those 2,000 years China had a very turbulent history — invasions, famines, the

*The paper which was distributed in advance is one delivered at a conference at Oxford University. The conference was to discuss "Changes in the Soviet Union Since Stalin's Death," but Mr. Wolfe provocatively entitled the paper which opened the conference *The Durability of Soviet Despotism*. It has been published in *Commentary* (New York, August, 1957) and in *The Russian Review* (Hanover, N. H., April and July, 1958).

fall of dynasties and the rise of new dynasties, interregnums and restorations. However, there was a marked continuity of overall structure so that a Chinese of the nineteenth century would feel quite at home in the China of the first century before Christ. This is an example of a closed and self-conserving society with built-in staying powers, while the society in which we live and which conditions our very habits of thinking about history and about society is one in which change is constant and relatively easy — a self-transforming or open society.

Another example of a closed society is the Roman Empire. Following its history from the days of Julius Caesar to the days of Julian the Apostate, one would find three or four centuries in which the Roman Empire was recognizably the Roman Empire. If one took the Byzantine Empire, one could go for nearly a millennium with a recognizably continuous structure of Byzantine society. This is the first distinction which I want to make.

Present-day Russia belongs to the societies of the closed type, with built-in staying powers and with a tendency to conserve itself, so that the changes which its leaders consciously adopt and the changes which are forced upon it tend to be *within-system* changes, leaving the basic system untouched. I think that most of the foggy thinking of Americans concerning Russia would be dissipated if they kept in mind the distinction which I have just raised; that is, if every time they are approached with some rumor of startling change in Soviet society they would remember the basic type to which it belongs.

The second feature that I would like to make clear today is that, from the aspect as to where power resides, societies may again be divided into two types: *multi-centered* societies and *single-centered* societies.

In a multi-centered society power is diffused, even where there is a great power at the head. Thus, in the West we had several centuries of monarchical absolutism. The absolute monarchy during those centuries struggled hard to preserve its absolute prerogatives but it did not exist in a single-centered society.

Along with the monarch and his undeniably great power there were also the fortified towns with their burghers and their independent wealth; there was the independent nobility where often one felt that a monarch was less powerful than some of the most powerful of his nobles; and there was the Church. Thus, with three or four distinct focuses of power, the monarch was not the sole possessor of power in spite of the fact that he was an absolute monarch. As a matter of fact, it was precisely his effort to get funds from the towns, to get armed retinues from the aristocracy, to get the blessing and sanction of the Church (itself a temporal as well as a spiritual power) which gradually developed the limited monarchy, parliament, the approval of the budget, the approval of the size of the armed forces and the length of time which they were to serve; in other words, there developed the limited and constitutional monarchy as we know it. It is our experience as people who arose out of that tradition or heritage in a multi-centered society which leads us unconsciously to accept the general notion of easy, relatively continuous, and painless change.

The other basic type of society — the long-lasting and closed one which I referred to in my first point — is also a single-centered society, where the central power brooks no other focus of power existing along with it. How such societies arose is something I do not have the time to go into except to say that a plausible theory has been offered to the effect that these single-centered societies tended particularly to develop where great hydraulic works were necessary (huge irrigation and flood-control projects) on a scale so great that the whole of society had to be commanded by the central power to engage in the hydraulic works. Thus the state became so much stronger than society that the diffusion of power into plural social structures never occurred.

Where some diffusion of power did exist — as, for example, in Old Russia, where the boyars at least gave some sign of independence from the monarch — in the course of time the Czar subverted the independent power of the boyars, destroyed them, and substituted a state-service nobility which was ennobled merely

by service to the central power. If you served in a certain capacity to the central power, you became an hereditary noble. At this point Russia became a single-centered power, although it might have been a multi-centered power if an aristocracy had continued. Thus, some political scientists have the habit of saying that aristocracy is the source of freedom, and in that sense it is — at least it is another locus of power beside the power of the absolute monarch.

Both Old Russia and New Russia belong in principle to the single-centered type of society. They never developed a burgher class, or middle class. The towns in Old Russia were primarily administrative centers rather than independent centers, such as the Western towns which produced the Western burgh or town with a bourgeoisie. And the nobility became a state-service nobility.

Finally, bondage or serfdom was set up in Russia at a time when it was disappearing in the West. It was set up so that the central power — or the tax-gatherer and the recruiting sergeant — could find every man in his place and hold each community *collectively responsible* for a certain amount of taxes and a certain number of recruits. Therefore, the fixity which is so characteristic of Russian life: in which you are compelled to stay in your village, in which you are collectively responsible for the taxes and the recruits of your village, and of which it came to be said that while ordinary men consist of two parts (a body and a soul), Russians consist of three parts (a body, a soul, and a passport). This fixity inheres in the fact that bondage was introduced into Russia, a land of continuous wars, lying in the great open Eurasian plain, a land of continuous military expansion, from tiny Muscovy to something which today spills over one-fourth of the earth, as a glance at the map will tell you. This historical process developed the powerful, single-centered, Czarist society in Russia.

We come next to another question of basic principle in political science. That basic distinction is *the distinction between old-fashioned despotism and modern totalitarianism*. I know that it is very fashionable among some Russian experts to say that the

New Russia is nothing but the Old Russia with new uniforms, a new flag, new slogans and new decorations, but that its despotism is identical and continuous. This is not true. There is a basic difference in principle between the older type of despotism and modern totalitarianism.

The older type of despotism involved a monopoly of power by a single center, as modern totalitarianism does, but there the resemblance stops. The aim of the older type of despotism was to prevent any challenge of its power and any rival centers of power. But its aim never was, nor could be, to control all aspects of life, high and low, down to the life of the humblest peasant in the most far-flung corner of the Empire. The old-fashioned despot was satisfied if there was no challenger and no challenge. He was content to let his subjects feed themselves in their own fashion, sing to themselves their own songs, write for themselves their own poems, paint for themselves their own pictures, and tell themselves their own stories. There was what Karl A. Wittfogel, in his *Oriental Despotism*, has so aptly named a "beggars' democracy" in the village, along with the single monopoly of central power by the Czar. The peasant had his own little piece of land and all of the other things which were undisturbed because they did not affect or challenge the central monopoly of power.

The aim of modern totalitarianism is not only total power in the sense of a *single center* of power, but the aim is all-embracing power. It attempts to become coextensive with the whole of society and, indeed, the whole of life. If you want to paint in the New Russia, they will tell you what to paint and in what style. If you want to look at pictures, they will take you to the galleries and tell you which pictures are worth looking at and what you are supposed to see in them. If you want to hike, they hike you. If you want to collect stamps, they direct the stamp-collecting society. To us, this is unbelievable and fantastic. It is hard for us to think about Russia because we cannot grasp the fact that quite literally totalitarianism attempts to embrace the totality of social and individual life insofar as they can reach it — individual feelings and thoughts, economic, artistic, religious,

political, organizational, and whatever other activities there are. So the first fundamental difference between the New Russia and the Old Russia is the modesty of the aims of the old-fashioned despotism and the all-embracing character and immoderateness of the aims of the new totalitarianism.

A second fundamental difference is this: old-fashioned despots hated nothing so much as change. The enemy for a despot was, in a word, "revolution" — not only revolution within his own borders but among all of his neighbors, because he was afraid of the spill-over effect of disorder in any neighboring country. In a word, old-fashioned despotism based itself on the *status quo*.

But the new totalitarianism is wedded to *permanent revolution from above*. It has a blueprint as to what man must be made to become, and it wishes to continue transforming him until it has remade him according to its blueprint. That is the meaning of the term which you find in Soviet literature, the "New Soviet Man." Human material, being rather recalcitrant to the hand of this kind of potter, makes the effort continuous, strenuous, and all-embracing. So in place of being wedded to the *status quo*, totalitarianism is wedded to permanent revolution from above. Whereas despotism favors order everywhere (not only within the confines of its own country), totalitarianism spreads by promoting disorder wherever it sees a chance to promote it.

A feature which the Old Russia and the New Russia had in common was the fact that their organization of the state and their organization of industry were *for the sake of waging war*. When Peter the Great was defeated by Sweden (then a great power), when he saw his armies melt away at the Narva and he himself fled in panic, he took a lesson from that: old, backward, unwashed Russia would have somehow to be modernized technologically. He began to shave their beards, to change their clothes and wash them up, and he kicked them forward into modern technology. He did not bother to develop the spirit which the West had to (and did) develop in the course of the slow and organic development of modern technology, but by fiat and decree from

above he attempted to lift his people into such technology for the purposes of war as would enable them to defeat the Swedes, the Poles, the French, and the Germans, who were technologically more advanced than was his country at that time. Still, today, *industrialization is industrialization for the sake of war*. This, the Old Russia and the New Russia have in common.

The other day Mr. Khrushchev made a speech in which he said, "I know perfectly well that hydroelectric power is more economical than thermal power stations and will cost less per kilowatt. But we must overtake the West in a hurry. The one thing we cannot afford is time, but we can afford to spend more per kilowatt. Therefore, we are going to abandon many of our hydroelectric projects and are going to increase the number of thermal power stations because we can build them faster, even if they cost more — even if they cost more per unit."

This is the mood that our country gets into only when we are actually at war: "Never mind the cost, everything for the sake of winning the war. Never mind what goes down the drain, everything for the sake of the war." But modern totalitarianism is *perpetually at war* and perpetually in a war mood. You need only read the Russian press to find that there are "fronts" everywhere and at all times. There is a grain front; there is a coal front; there is an art front; there is a music front — everything has a "front." Everything has the language and the sense of urgency and emergency that go with the spirit of war, for, indeed, totalitarianism is engaged in *an endless twofold war: war on its own people* to remake them in the image of its blueprint, and *war on the world* to win it for the same blueprint.

This war is perpetual. Of course it flares up and then becomes relatively quiet — I don't mean to say that it is always at the extreme stage, but it is always war. This war is quite literal; I am not using a figure of speech. They make war on their own people. Psychological warfare is continuous and unending on their own people; there is a war of nerves; a war of propaganda; there is physical war, with concentration camps; there is war in the

form of a bullet in the base of the brain — all the things that are necessary to atomize, fragment, drill, and put the people into the mood that is required of them. This war is waged continuously and has been waged ever since Lenin took power. It was waged under Lenin, under Stalin, and under Khrushchev. Whatever the ebbs and flows of its intensity, this war on their own people is never for a moment abandoned or forgotten.

Similarly, we would get into less trouble in meeting various emergencies if we recognized that never for a moment have the men in the Kremlin renounced their determination to take possession of the rest of the world for the same infallible blueprint. They may recoil when they meet opposition, but they look for a weak spot; they feel out here, and they feel out there. They make agreements, but their agreements are as the French say: "*Reculer pour mieux sauter.*" They never make agreements for the sake of ending tension or ending the effort to win the world, but merely to gain a new vantage point from which to advance further, or to avoid a particular defeat.

The fundamental error which our experts, our diplomats and officials have made is to regard the agreement by the Soviets in its own terms, as if it were a real agreement to end this effort to win the world. When Mr. Khrushchev says, in one of his more frank and cordial moments, "We will bury you!" — we are gravely mistaken to think that he does not mean it.

As we look at totalitarianism in the Soviet Union, we find the following features: (1) A state stronger than society; (2) a single-power center; (3) a managerial state; (4) a total lack of independent organizations separate from and independent of the state, and capable of bringing organized pressure upon the state; (5) a lack of independent social orders. When the totalitarians move into a new country the first thing they attempt is, to use Hitler's phrase, *Gleichschaltung*, or coordination. They take the independent organizations which happen to be in existence and gear them into the machine of the omnipotent and all-embracing state.

Are there parties? They penetrate all parties and reduce them to one party. Any party which does not lend itself to co-ordination is framed up as treasonable and destroyed. That is why the purges are a natural accompaniment of their moving into a new society.

Are there churches? The churches are either turned into state churches which will serve the purpose of the state, or framed up and destroyed. Even if they agree to serve the purpose of the state, insofar as religion can be destroyed by the state by a slower and more subtle process, the men in the Kremlin have a blueprint which pledges them to "destroy it."

Are there trade unions? They are geared into the state. In place of their being a possession of their members, used by their members to make pressure upon the employer, now the state, they become a possession of the state, are used by the state to make pressure on their members.

So when you get a totalitarian society fully working, there is *no organization independent of the central power*, the state and the party. It is true that there continues to be opposition, but the *opposition is unorganized*. They neither can nor really imagine they can completely destroy opposition to what they are doing. *But they can deny to it the power of organization* and independent expression of any sort.

The old Czarist censorship tried to keep certain obnoxious expressions out of the press: anything which affronted the dignity or the power of the Czar. Other than this, the press could say what it pleased. The new censorship not only consists of censorship, but *the government is the owner of the press*. It not only dictates what should be kept out of the press but what should go into the press.

When it comes to the artist, who buys his pictures? The government. Who decides which picture shall be hung and which shall not be hung? The government. Who decides what music shall be composed and in what style? The government. If you write

a play, who is your impresario? The government. Who owns the theaters? The government. Who decides who gets tickets and how many, and which people are to be in the audience? The government. When you are put on trial, who decides who shall sit as "the public" to witness the trial and snarl at you at the appropriate moments? The "public" in the courtroom is a professional audience selected by the N. K. V. D. to fill up the seats so that their snarls may be heard over the air along with the victim's and the prosecutor's indictment of the accused as something subhuman and bestial.

So it is difficult for us to realize what we are talking about. We glibly use the word "totalitarianism," but we just do not envisage the structure of the kind of society I have been describing.

There is one more difference which I would like to make clear in this first half of my talk: the relationship of modern totalitarianism to technology and to literacy. Many learned people tell us that this cannot last. They say: "Everything changes." Everything does change, but I began by showing that many societies lasted through the most drastic changes with their basic structure unchanged. Others comfort themselves and us (and we are hungry for comfort) by telling us that once everybody learns to read, they cannot be kept in subjection; that literacy is incompatible with totalitarianism. Another "comforting thought" is that modern technology is incompatible with totalitarianism — "once everybody learns how to run machines, they will also know how to run their bosses."

I do not need to go into Russian society to prove that that is not so. I want to take another modern totalitarian government, the German. When Nazism arose, the Germans had the most universal literacy and the widest higher education of any people in Europe. If literacy and education make totalitarianism impossible, we could never explain how Hitler came to power with many professors cheering, not to mention those who merely knew how to

read and write. Technologically, too, Germany was the envy of Europe, but nevertheless it became a totalitarian power.

Indeed, we must go farther. We must recognize that modern totalitarianism is *only* possible with modern literacy and modern technology. The older despotisms could not aspire to penetrate every nook, cranny and recess of the country and of the spirit of the people. Totalitarianism needs modern, high-speed communication such as the radio, telegraph and telephone. It needs modern literacy, so that everybody reads the same slogan at the same moment. It needs modern techniques for conditioning the mind, so that every mind can be conditioned in the same fashion.

A nineteenth-century Russian thinker, Herzen, once ominously said: "Some day Jhinghis Khan will return with the telegraph." Tolstoi tried to bring that up-to-date and said: "Some day Jhinghis Khan will return with the telephone." If you want to be the latest Russian prophet, you may say: "Jhinghis Khan has returned with electronics and the atom and hydrogen bombs." In other words, modern technology *enables one to control a wide area — and to attempt to control it in depth*, as no earlier despotism could even have aspired to do. Let no one tell you that we have an easy remedy that will cost us nothing; that we have only to watch the Russians educate themselves and learn how to run machines, and all of our troubles will be over.

Well, as you can see, neither the distributed paper (some parts of which I have been summarizing) nor the talk I had planned to give you today (which I now enter into briefly) is very cheerful. I do not come as a bearer of comfort and consolation.

I want now to say a few words about the enemy we face. First, it is truly a great power — great in population, great in resources, great in technology, and great in military strength. Secondly, it has a great state machine which is in a condition of permanent semi-mobilization, and which attempts to keep its people mobilized. Finally, it is an enemy which is resourceful enough, wealthy enough, and determined enough, to do what we have not had the determination to do (although we have had the resources

in the West in much greater abundance): namely, to keep simultaneously an atomic striking power and a massive conventional striking power in being. It has a definite advantage over us at this moment because it is geared to both types of warfare. It believes that both types are necessary and that they must be integrated into a single plan.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, one European in seven was a Russian, or under Moscow rule. At the beginning of the twentieth century, one European in four was under Moscow rule. At the middle of the twentieth century, approximately one European in two is under Russian rule. This in itself is enough to give us pause. I do not have to tell this group that there are one hundred and twenty-five divisions in Russia in being, while we have approximately fifteen.

It is a deadly enemy! It is a deadly enemy because never for a moment does it abandon its two basic aims: to remake man, and to conquer the world. It is particularly our enemy — not because we so choose, but because it has chosen. It regards the strength and the way of life of the United States as the chief obstacle to its plan to remake its own people and to remake the world in the image of its blueprint. We have been picked as Enemy Number One.

No matter what Eisenhower says or does, no matter whether Dulles conducts himself with tact or tactlessness, no matter how well the tourist behaves when he goes to the Soviet Union for his three weeks — we will still be Enemy Number One. Whether our working class is prosperous, or hungry and jobless, or jobless and not hungry, we will still be Enemy Number One. Whether we treat our Negroes decently, or indecently — or somewhere in between, as we are doing at present — we will still be Enemy Number One. Whether we pull out of Lebanon or Quemoy or do not pull out of Lebanon or Quemoy, we cannot disengage ourselves from this enemy.

Let us not listen to the siren song of those who tell us that we can get a release of tensions and a little peace in our

time if we only "disengage" ourselves. If we disengage ourselves, we leave another strip to be occupied, a new place from which battle will begin.

They know, to be sure, that they cannot conquer us. They know something about our strength. They do not covet for a moment the risks of all-out war with us. There are two things that they are determined with all their might to avoid: one is all-out war, the other is all-out peace. They will keep us in between as long as they have the power to do so. They do not wish all-out war because they believe that time and history are on their side. When they consider how their system has been expanding, I must say it seems to them that they have some empirical confirmation for their belief that time is on their side.

Of course, they do not want all-out peace, for their two fundamental aims do not permit them to be at peace either with their own people or with the rest of the world. If our statesmen and experts wish to make a test of any fresh proposal of theirs to see whether it really intends peace, there is a simple test. *When they are ready to make peace with their own people*, then we will know — and only then — that they are ready for real peace with their neighbors and with us. Otherwise, when they use the word "peace" it is just one of the gimmicks in their waging of war.

Until then it is well to remember that Khrushchev is said to have two sets of teeth, one to smile with and one to bite with. And the more dangerous of the two is the set with which he smiles.

My next point is that "by the Russia we face," I do not mean the Russian people. The Russian people are not and have never been our enemies. They have not chosen and they do not choose their government. They do not control its policies — except by their mute and silent pressure. And those who tell us that "when the Russian people mature" they will be able to control their government and its policies, are deceiving themselves and us. No mere "maturing" of the Russian people will change their system, nor does their system allow them the organizational

scope and independent activity, the genuine information and the right to judge which alone permit of "maturing."

The Russian people are not unfriendly to us, only ill-informed, deeply curious, well-disposed towards us, and a little envious. If the gates were opened, they would "vote with their feet" by the millions in favor of our "system." In fact, wherever they have had a chance to cross the line, they have crossed by the millions. Two-thirds of all the Chinese "volunteers" whom we took as prisoners during the Korean War refused to return to their native scenes, families and lands, preferring the half-world of barbed-wire camps to returning to a country where their government makes unending war upon them.

The real reason for the Kremlin's endless hostility towards the United States, regardless of what we do, is that they regard us (and rightly) as the main obstacle to their underlying plan. This will not be changed if Khrushchev should come to New York and "see our skyscrapers," or if he should then go to Detroit and see how many automobiles our workingmen have. The Russian leaders are ruthlessly friendly. They talk of "easing of tensions." In our society, "tension" is a bad word. We can thank the Freudians for that, I suppose, for they talk of the "age of anxiety" and the "age of tension." To anybody who comes with a panacea for easing tensions, we open our arms and our hearts. However, if every time they speak of "easing of tensions" you would substitute for the word 'tension' the word "concern" (which is a more neutrally or differently colored word), you would see that what they are asking us to do is to *stop concerning ourselves with the freedom of the world and with our own freedom*. Then you would realize that we must hug our "tensions" to our breasts as long as the dangers exist which have caused the concern.

When I say that nothing we can do will change this, I do not mean to say that it makes no difference whether our workingmen are prosperous and employed or not, or that it makes no difference how we treat our colored population, for it does make a difference. But the difference is in the winning of allies, not

alienating them; in winning the secret support of the Russian people; in strengthening our prestige with neutrals. However, we will not disarm or change the philosophy or the goals of a mortal enemy. Nor do I believe with those who think that if we but disarmed everything would be easy (of course that sentence is not complete: it would be easy *for the men in the Kremlin*). I have never believed that the best way to get thieves to reform is to remove the locks from our doors.

The world is in serious and even mortal danger now, as it was in Hitler's day. Every country in the East is in mortal danger from China, with its huge population. Every country in Western Europe, the cradle of modern thought and liberty, is in mortal danger. Every country on the Mediterranean, which was the cradle of Western civilization and culture, is in mortal danger. The Near East, which was the cradle of our faiths, is in mortal danger at the present moment.

We have tried the gesture of "Let's be friends and see if that won't work" — we have tried it more often than our historical memories permit us to recall. I remember when Franklin Roosevelt said to Mrs. Perkins: "I really believe that I can get Uncle Joe to go along with me." Well, we tried it. So, at the end of the war, it turned out that there were three kinds of occupation zones. There were countries which Russia occupied (liberated) exclusively — they lost their freedom and were sucked behind the Iron Curtain. There were the countries which were jointly occupied — all of those except one have been partitioned, and the Russian-occupied half of each is behind the Iron Curtain (North Korea, East Germany, and so on). One country was occupied exclusively by us, Japan, and there the occupied country is free to criticize and disagree with its occupiers and liberators. If the experience of those three types of occupation does not teach us not to play this costly game of seeing if we cannot hypnotize them into abandoning their blueprint or into just being nice, then nothing will ever teach us. In the end we will perish, and deserve to perish, for being fools incapable of learning.

They are now proposing (and have been proposing for some time) a "unification" of Germany. Unification consists, as they have made abundantly clear, in having the two Germany's linked together and then in seeing how Communist Germany can gradually take possession of West Germany as well. We tried that before, too. We tried it with the two China's during World War II, and we see how it turned out. We tried it with the two Korea's, and we also see how that worked out. Some poor fellows tried earnestly to cooperate with them in Eastern Europe. But the Communists took the key posts in the Cabinets and popular-front governments; they took the Ministry of War, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Propaganda (Education); and, in the end, they took the country, by what Rakoczi called "Salami tactics," in which you slice off one slice, then another slice, and then another slice, until you have the whole salami sliced up.

If you are still tempted by poisoned semantics (one of their deadliest weapons) to believe that the word "peaceful" means "peace," and that "coexistence" means "mutual tolerance" and "live and let live," I don't know at this late date what I can tell you except perhaps, it now being October, I might offer a homely metaphor: the farmer is perfectly willing for the turkey to coexist with him *until Thanksgiving Day*. If you keep that in mind, you will have a general notion of what they mean by "peaceful co-existence."

The mistakes which our public figures have made, our statesmen, experts, journalists, diplomats — and our military men as well when we were in a joint military effort with Russia — have all sprung up from the same thing: the virtual incapacity of a people brought up in an open society to understand the nature of the system we have been examining, and the aims and plans of its rulers. I could illustrate that with errors made throughout the last forty years since 1917. But let us start with World War II and the "Grand Alliance." Not understanding that our ally of the moment had been, was then, and at the war's end would be also our enemy, we did not plan the peace during the war. We did not make it a self-enforcing peace, which we could

only have done by planning our military conduct of the war to ensure a decent peace by the position of our armies at the war's end. Therefore there has been no peace.

We have failed to understand that "agreements" with such an unrelenting and continuing foe are carried out only if there are deliberate provisions to make them self-enforcing. Such provisions involve the proper disposition of our military forces to ensure enforcement.

Thus, when we say "free elections" for Germany, and they say "free elections," it behooves us to remember that the "elections" they have in the Soviet Union are what they call "free elections." We must spell out any agreement on "free elections" so as to include multiple parties, a press owned by individuals, associations and parties not controlled by the government, empty prisons and closed concentration camps, and the like, and *joint occupying troops in quantity in all sectors*, to enforce the rights and liberties we mean by the thus defined free elections.

When they say "peaceful unification" arranged between the East and West German "Governments," we must remember that that is what they said of Korea, of Vietnam, of wartime China. Agreements that are not spelled out and self-enforcing are merely semantic poison to prepare and "justify" conquest.

Above all, we are not giving our own people a clear vision of this opponent, and the nature of our struggle. How often have I sat down in taxicab or train and been asked: "What is your racket?" I answer, "Russia." Invariably the taxi driver or traveling companion follows up with: "Tell me, is Russia really as bad as our newspapers say it is?" Always I must answer, "Much worse, man! Our newspapers are not doing a good job." That depressing and forever recurring question shows how our leaders have failed to make our people understand — because they do not really understand themselves — the nature of our self-appointed opponent. Since both political parties must appeal and do appeal recklessly and demagogically to a people to whom they have not **given decent leadership and proper political education**, each party

poses as "the party of peace" while the enemy chooses to continue to make war on us. This is the most dangerous feature in our political life.

At the war's end, we demobilized our troops too soon, because we had not prepared our own minds nor our people for keeping them mobilized until a decent peace was assured.

We failed to make effective use of our then monopoly of atomic weapons in ways which would have furthered a decent peace and effective and controlled disarmament, not because this could not have been done — it probably could — but because we were not sufficiently aware of the need to do so, and too frightened by our awful preponderance of power to make wise and restrained use of it for bringing about genuine peace and genuine liberation of the "liberated" countries.

We left Korea without adequate defenses because we were afraid that Koreans might use our arms to unify their country and we did not have the understanding to realize that the puppet government of North Korea would surely use Russian and Chinese Communist arms and forces for the "peaceful unification" of Korea, and the "liberation" of Korea from its independence. We even withdrew our troops and made the fatuous and inviting statement that Korea was not part of our "essential defense perimeter." What could be expected from such a foe under such circumstances? When we finally had to fight to save Korea, we did an inspiring job. But under such self-imposed limitations that it was easy for Communist China to reconquer the northern half of the country, and restore the same impossible condition that had brought us into war.

Our policy of containment has not contained; and our policy of liberation has not liberated; as our acceptance of the poison semantics of "peaceful coexistence" and the propaganda circus of "summit conferences" has given us neither genuine conferences for agreement on anything, nor peace, nor the mutual tolerance of "coexistence."

All these errors — and, alas, I could enumerate many more like them — come from a failure to understand the difficulties and intricacies of the problems, because of a failure to understand the nature of our enemy, his system, his power, his ruthlessness and unscrupulousness in negotiation and action, his aims, his determination, and the role of his ideology in his efforts to conquer the world and remake man. This failure of vision or understanding, which is at the root of our failures in action and omission and negotiation, is the central thought of the second half of my talk.

I have used the word *enemy* in this talk, and I should not like to close without saying something about the choice of this word. I recognize that it is not a nice or pleasant word. But do not be afraid of it. We did not pick the Men in the Kremlin as enemies; they picked us. We have tried not to believe their statement of their aims. They said “world revolution,” but we preferred not to believe they meant it. We have tried many times to show our good will and friendship. We offered to help them with arms in 1918 to reestablish a front against the invading Germans, but all that came of it were the misunderstandings of intervention. During the so-called “intervention,” we helped them to get back Siberia after they had lost it, and we forced the Japanese by our pressure to give up their occupation of Siberia. When war and civil war and the follies of the socialization of every grain of wheat and every inkpot brought on universal famine, we helped to save millions of Russians from starvation by our generous famine relief. In the period of their forced industrialization, we sent them technicians and engineers, whole factories and machinery, and helped them to build dams and power houses.

In World War II, after they had made their pact with Hitler to divide Europe, and Hitler turned on them, our help was generous and unstinting. Instantly, and not only after Pearl Harbor, but in June 1941, Harry Hopkins flew to Stalin to offer planes, and tanks and trucks, and guns, and wool and meat and fuel and bread. When Stalin asked Harry Hopkins quite naturally: “What do you want in return for all this?” . . . Again came the failure of vision and understanding. Harry Hopkins boasted: “I told

him we were not interested in conditions. All we were interested in was getting them the planes, the guns, the tanks, and the other things they needed."

They have picked us as the enemy of the things they are trying to do to their people, and to their neighbors. If we forget that for a moment, in any one of their maneuvers, we fail in leadership. Yet always, with each maneuver, we are prone to forget afresh. We have failed to learn from a monotonous multitude of repetitions. We have failed in understanding. We have failed in leadership and enlightenment of our own people and other peoples. We have failed in political courage. Above all we have failed in vision — and here, truly, where there is no vision the people perish.

I would not have you understand that we have done nothing right in these forty years, or recently. We have done many fine things. I do not count generosity among our errors, only the generosity which defeats and undoes itself.

A power which wishes to preserve peace and prevent an upsetting of the *status quo* by force is always at a disadvantage when dealing with a revolutionary power. I recognize that. Moreover, our life in this recent period has had its great moments: the first stage of the Korean War; the Berlin airlift; the Marshall Plan — in which we even offered to include Russia if she would use it for genuine healing of the wounds of war. These have been noble moments, and there have been others like them.

But our vision is faltering, our understanding blurred; we are too easily deceived and too ready to deceive ourselves, to the world's detriment. So the purpose of my twofold talk today has been only a single one: to give such awareness of the nature of the Soviet system that the hand can be steadier, the vision clearer and more unflinching, so that each new maneuver of a tactical nature which the Soviet Government undertakes can be appraised in the light of a deeper, overall understanding of the nature of the system that torments its own people and is vowed to our destruction.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Bertram D. Wolfe

Mr. Wolfe received his B. A. degree from New York City College, and his M.A. from Columbia University and the University of Mexico.

He is a teacher and writer in the fields of history and political science. His interest in the Soviet Union dates from the Spring of 1917, when he predicted (in print) after the February Revolution that a second revolution would occur before the year was up and would take Russia out of the war. He has made three trips to the Soviet Union and was personally acquainted with Stalin, Bukharin, Molotov, Zinoviev, Trotsky, and a number of other Soviet leaders and ex-leaders. At the outbreak of the Korean War, he set up and headed for the State Department the Ideological Advisory Staff of the *Voice of America*.

Mr. Wolfe has been a Guggenheim Fellow three times and has also been a Senior Fellow in Slavic Studies at the Hoover Library at Sanford University and, later, at the Russian Institute at Columbia University. He has lectured previously at the Naval War College.

Since 1939, he has been at work on a three-volume history of the Russian Revolution. The first volume has been published under the title of *Three Who Made a Revolution*. In progress are a second volume, to be called *The Conquest of Power*, and a third entitled *The Uses of Power*. Two of his other books in this field are: *Six Keys to the Soviet System* and *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost*. He has also contributed articles to such magazines as *Foreign Affairs*, *Russian Review*, *Slavic and East European Review*, and other foreign journals. During World War II, he edited the journal entitled *Russian Affairs*, until it was closed down under pressure from the Soviet Union.

DIVISIVE ISSUES AMONG THE ALLIES

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 31 October 1968 by
Mr. Edgar A. Mowrer

Mr. Presiding Officer and Fellow Students:

I won't apologize for coming here, but I am terribly impressed.

I would like to clear the ground by saying that I am making a basic assumption, which is: that we are in what is probably the most important struggle of our existence; that this struggle may go on for a long, long time; that we cannot possibly hope to win it without allies; that no country, including our own, is any longer economically or politically self-sufficient; therefore, that this complex net of alliances which we have set up is unquestionably (at least as far as I can discover in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* or otherwise concerning it) the most complicated set any country has ever erected.

England's mobilization of the Continent of Europe against Napoleon was "peanuts" in complications and in extent compared with what we have somewhat painfully, fairly successfully, and with some failures pulled together, to try to match the Soviet threat and, if possible, without a war — which would be presumably a major catastrophe for all involved. I see no sign of any slackening in Soviet aggressivity, and I am totally uninterested in the small juggle and friendly "zigs" that follow the sharp and painful "zags."

I said that we had a most 'complex net of alliances,' and I think we ought to go over them (although you know them as well as I do) in order to realize how complicated they are. Outlines of most of them are on the chart upon the wall.

As you see, there are four (4) *Multilateral Alliances*: the North Atlantic Treaty, the ANZUS Treaty, the Southeast Asia

Treaty, and the Baghdad Pact or Northern Tier — which is not quite a briefed alliance but at the same time probably involves us just as much as though it were. There are several *Bilateral Treaties*: one with the Republic of Korea; one with Japan; one with the Republic of China; and another with the Philippines. I might also say there are three (3) other *Bilateral Alliances* which are unbriefed: the first, of course, is with Canada — I need not speak to you of the importance of the DEW Line and the special arrangements which are going on outside of NATO; the second unbriefed alliance is, I presume, with Spain, since I cannot imagine we would send all that money there and set up all those bases unless we had some intention of protecting them in case of attack; the same goes for Morocco — although, as far as I know, we have no formal, briefed treaty of military alliance with that country.

All of these alliances (you may name nine, twelve or thirteen — according to what you wish to take into account) are different. They embrace over forty countries to which we give military assistance. There is, however, an enormous distinction between them in area and in quality. For instance, there is NATO, with fifteen (15) industrially-developed countries (if you count Portugal and Iceland as industrially developed — and certainly they are capable of it); there is the Organization of American States (which I neglected to mention as a Multilateral Treaty), a sort of historical hold-over, grouping states in various stages of industrial and cultural development; there is the American-Philippine Treaty, which is a friendly, “big brother,” protective arrangement that is intimate.

Each type of alliance brings different divisive issues, and sometimes different types of issues. Yet, certain traits are common to all alliances, and I am going to talk about them for just about one minute.

An alliance is always a grouping of independent states for a common purpose: defensive, offensive, or other. An offensive alliance was typified in the late and unlamented Rome-Berlin-

Tokyo Axis, which has also been known as the "Pirates' League." Our own alliances today are all defensive. But some centuries ago there was something called the *Hansabund*, which ran the length of those important commercial cities of Northern Europe stretching roughly from Brugge (in what is now Belgium) around to Danzig, and even almost over into Russia. This was an alliance formed simply for increasing trade. Incidentally, this alliance was so successful (as you may or may not have remembered) that on one occasion the single City of Danzig declared war simultaneously on Britain, France and the Low Countries. Well, that is quite a bit — even for a rich city — to take on. Most alliances in modern times tend, however, to be defensive.

I remember a former Italian diplomat — a very wise old man to whom I used to go, as a young correspondent, for advice. His name was Count Bosdari, and he was working (rather against his will) for Benito Mussolini.

I said to him, "Ambassador Bosdari, what have you learned in your own diplomatic career?" (He was retiring after fifty years' service).

He replied: "I have learned that when two or more states combine it is almost always *against* something and not *for* anything."

And I think that is true. Whether we should say that the recently-formed Soviet-Warsaw Pact is offensive or defensive, I will leave to you. But, also, it is more the hegemony of Moscow over other weaker states than it is a true alliance.

Since the essence of an alliance is usually a single interest or a single purpose, it follows that the alliance can last only as long as its members recognize the existence of this common interest, interpret it in much the same way, and agree substantially upon the necessary common measures to protect it. If the interest fades or disappears, if interpretations of the alliance vary too much or disagreements become too sharp, or if there is no longer any common agreement on the more important measures that

have to be taken to implement that alliance — then the alliance disintegrates.

We have seen two wonderful examples of this in our own lifetime. One example was the falling apart of the Anti-German Alliance right after World War I. The victorious Allies had really not signed the Peace Treaty before they were bitterly squabbling over what to do with Germany. That separated them to the point where it looked for a moment as though the English and French might almost militarily clash over the French occupation of the Ruhr. The second example was a little less astonishing, and had to do with the falling apart of the United Nations after World War II. This also occurred over Germany, but it was provoked, of course, by the fact that Russia had never been an ally in anything but name. First, Russia had been, so to speak, “exploded” into the United Nations by Hitler’s attack. Secondly, even during the war, beginning in 1943, the Soviet Union indulged in a number of gestures — and, later, of outright annexations and subordination of other peoples — which made the continuation of that alliance very difficult. When it reached the point where we could no longer have agreement about Germany, which, you may remember, was to be a three- (later, four-) part occupation in harmony, that alliance split up. We then found ourselves at this point in virtual alliance with that very West Germany (and, if it had been possible, with East Germany) which it had been our common object to defeat.

That is all of the background that I would like to give, but I think it has to be kept in mind in order to understand what is going on in our own alliances — and what has gone on since 1945.

I shall talk rather of “difficulties” than of “divisive issues,” since it is a broader word but means the same thing. The greatest difficulty of all — and one about which we can do the least — lies in the very nature of any alliance of sovereign powers.

The story goes that after Napoleon Bonaparte had been exiled to Saint Helena, he had frequent conversations with his

keeper, Sir Hudson Lowe. On one occasion, Sir Hudson, who could not help but admire the great conqueror and general, said, "Sire, how was France able to carry on for twenty years against the concert of Europe?"

Napoleon replied: "It was extremely simple: my adversaries suffered from 'coalition sickness.' I was a united command."

That phrase, *maladie des coalitions*, comes to my mind every time I open *The New York Times* and read that somebody, somewhere — whether in Kansas City, Iceland, or Chile — is dissatisfied with the way the rest of the allies are running something. It was not new even in Napoleon's time.

Sir Frederic Maurice's volume, which I recommend to you (if you want to note it down or are interested in going further into this subject, please do so) and which is called *Lessons of Allied Co-operation — Naval, Military, and Air, 1914-1918*, shows the difficulties that the English and French particularly had — but, later, also the Americans, Belgians, and so on — in trying to run a single military campaign. They suffered from the *maladie des coalitions* until, finally, in 1918 if I remember rightly, they did succeed in establishing Marshal Foch as a Unified Commander.

Sir Frederic Maurice, speaking of Marlborough's Campaigns against Louis Quatorze in the early eighteenth century goes on to say: "The great leader spent more time in persuading allies than in conducting operations of war."

So there is nothing new about this at all. Sovereign governments are touchy, and if they are democratic governments the situation is complicated by the fact that their peoples are just as touchy — but not always in the same way. Let's face it: there is in every people an element of tribalism which tends towards national arrogance and xenophobia. Thus, for instance, during the recent outcry against our decision to defend Quemoy and Matsu, I noticed that some of my closest friends, who considered it only natural for National China, if necessary, to come to the aid of the Philippines, were rabid, however, at the idea

of the United States being "dragged into a war to defend Chiang Kai-shek." This national prejudice is inevitable, as peoples are today.

Another difficulty facing all alliances is that of writing a clear document. Of course the lawyers could usually spell out a treaty of alliance quite well, but there are cases which cannot be spelled out. Usually some government or other, for various reasons, feels that public opinion or some other factor will not allow it to make the basic document too specific.

I believe the SEATO Treaty, for instance, says that the members in case of trouble will act according to their "constitutional processes." Please permit me, as a cynical newsman, to say that this means nothing in particular. It is not a real commitment, for who can say in advance what the "constitutional processes" of these five countries are going to be?

Another final and inevitable difficulty is jealousy among allies as to who does what, who leads in what, and who gets what. In the present case it means who gets what share of mostly American arms and economic aid.

All these difficulties are quite inevitable.

Another inevitable difficulty is the discrepancy in power, wealth and arms between the United States and any one of its allies.

A third difference (and I am going to run over all of them and then come back to a discussion of them singly) is the difference of geography and outlook between the United States — separated, as it is, by its two one-time impassable oceans from most enemies — and other countries that have always had hereditary enemies on their doorsteps. This applies to all of our European allies, whereas Canada more or less has the same reaction that we have.

Another divisive issue or difficulty is the fact that the United States is inevitably the hub of a wheel of which the separate alliances are only the spokes. Therefore, in Washington, Secretary

Dulles and President Eisenhower have to view this problem differently. They cannot embrace one of the spokes wholeheartedly, so to speak, in the way that other countries can. The latter can differ among themselves, but the United States has to try to satisfy all of them. We have this incredible and still largely unshared general responsibility. The fact that we have this general responsibility stimulates another quite natural but dreadfully disruptive tendency on the part of the smaller allies: simply not to pull their weight in the boat. They say: "If we do not have much responsibility, why should we make much effort?"

Still another reason is the relative inexperience in world affairs of the American people. After World War II, they suddenly found themselves literally prodded into a position of world leadership which most citizens did not — and do not yet — like very much. In fact, I know very few Americans who would not exchange all the glamor and glory of world leadership for two tickets to the next world series.

Then there is another complicating element, as though these were not enough: the Soviet threat and the anti-Soviet struggle happen to coincide with a world-wide movement for liberation and improvement among formerly backward, colonial, and more or less undeveloped peoples. This not only complicates the main job of scotching the Soviet threat, but it frequently causes us to carry out nationally acts which would normally be done for and through the alliances. Mr. Dulles and Premier MacMillan, for instance, thought Americans and British could safely land in Jordan and Lebanon respectively, but that we must not have the French there. It was presumed (and I imagine properly) that the landing of French soldiers would revive the old Arab animosity toward the French, who had had mandates over Syria and Lebanon before and who were not particularly popular. This emergence of formerly submerged peoples calls for constant compromises between the task of stopping Soviet expansion in the simple way and conceding to the awakening neutrals' privileges, which, in the short run, may contrast or even weaken the anti-Communist pressure.

A final divisive issue (and one that is very important) is the world-wide hope of a viable and peaceful world order centered around the United Nations. Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the United Nations' Charter reads:

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner [note the large way in which it is written] inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

There is no doubt but that this responds to a popular feeling and therefore it, too, acts as a handicap on many of the measures which would otherwise be taken to counter the Soviets. Need I refer to more than the action of the United States, acting with the U. S. S. R. at Suez, to block the military action of our two closest allies — Britain and France — against Nasser of Egypt? At the same time we were saying that because the United Nations was weak and because the danger of war was so great, we must not take any armed action to assist the embattled Hungarian people, whose liberation would have been a weakening of the Soviet Union and a great help for us.

It seems to me that these are the seven (7) chief divisive issues today. Of course they could be otherwise classified, but they would boil down to more or less the same points. And now I would like to take up each of them separately.

The first point — the overwhelming divisive issue inherent in a coalition — is today the varying degrees of belief in the extent and nature of the Communist danger and how it should be met. Since we have people in our own country who think that the danger of nuclear weapons is greater than the danger of

Communism, and since we have people in our own country — like a very famous industrialist — who think that the Soviet Union is no danger whatsoever; if only we would sit down at “Whitewash” (or “Hogwash”), and discuss our differences freely with them, we would all come to an easy agreement. Since all of this is true, we cannot be surprised that it affects our alliance. As the Soviet pressure seems to let up, the normal counterpressure of human beings — not to make so many sacrifices, to lead a more normal life, to perhaps have a better car or to have a car if one has only had a bicycle — takes precedence over a willingness to put enough armed divisions into the field to meet the Soviet Union on the ground.

Moreover, both the American people and our allies suffer from what I call a “basic schizophrenia” towards Communism. They deeply wish to preserve freedom and restore it, if possible, to Communism’s victims — not by a major war, to be sure, but by all other methods. Therefore, they are willing to provide a good deal of military power.

On the other hand, the President himself has (properly) expressed such a deep abhorrence of nuclear war that he is waging peace. He is unwilling to provoke Communist governments by applying what he calls “excessive power.” This means, in practice, a strict defensive. It means that in our football games (if you can irreverently refer to Korea as any such thing) we must not cross the 55-yard line; that we must not attempt to punish aggression, but sort of bounce it back in a brilliant “cushion” fashion; that we must leave no opportunity for peace with Moscow unexplored; and that we are told we must shake any outstretched hands.

In other words, on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays the free peoples are resenting Communist actions and preparing to resist them, if necessary, even by nuclear war. But on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays they are trying to believe what the Communists say about wanting to avoid war, and hoping that natural reason in such a dangerous situation will eventually bring the Russians to relax tensions and modify their aggressivity —

in which case we are more than willing to kiss, make up, and forgive all. Therefore, we accept negotiations on disarmament, on various kinds of co-operation, on the relaxation of tensions, and on stopping nuclear tests. And, now, we are looking for some way to prevent surprise attacks, etc.

This is very tough on an alliance. People are inclined to make sacrifices (and all alliances involving great military expenditures are expensive) only when they feel a real danger. When the danger abates, or we let it down, people want to let up. In consequence of a policy that goes back and forth between the two — although that policy responds to the normal instinct to have enough defense but with as little trouble and as little monetary sacrifice as possible — there results a confusion, a lack of interest in public affairs, and frequently conflicting national attitudes. It also condemns us (as I repeat) to the permanent defensive which we see in Korea, in Lebanon, at the Formosa Strait, and so on, where we are taking somewhat of a military posture at the present time. This wobbling lead one American (in a sarcastic vein) to write during the Korean War the following quatrain:

Our arms are strong, our strength is great,
So let the dastard foe beware!
But win the war? Oh, never dare,
Lest we the foe infuriate.

Such a policy encourages wishful thinking and threatens the alliance, because any waning of the sense of Communist danger will destroy the complicated structure that we have set up.

I pass now to point number two: the difference in power and size between the United States and other allies. We are smaller in population than all of our allies in Europe taken together, but we are greater in military power, in industrial output, and in available cash. Therefore, even with Britain — our first most powerful ally and the second most powerful country in our coalition — there is an enormous difference which British people resent. Collectively, a group like the other NATO countries (fourteen of them against us) would be terribly influential, if only by geog-

raphy and the fact that we still have not got enough nuclear missile-shooting submarines or intercontinental missiles to get along without bases. But, individually, each of these countries is much weaker than the United States.

A typical relationship is that of the U. S. to Canada. I suppose that you are aware that recently the Canadian irritation with the United States has flared up. It seems that almost everything we do up there is wrong, in spite of the fact that in many ways our outlooks are very similar. If you care to look into the recent disputes, there is an excellent book on this subject just out. It has been on the stands for about a week, and it is the best I have read on the subject. It is called *Good Fences Make Good Neighbors* and is written by a man called Joseph Barber. There is an especially interesting chapter on the discussions and arguments concerning the DEW Line.

Our discrepancy with the Philippines, of course, is even greater. One result was the dispute (which I hope is now more or less settled) concerning American jurisdiction over Filipinos on American bases in Philippine territory.

The little countries react to U. S. easy assurance by being extremely touchy. European countries react to it by thinking that — although we just happen to be big, lucky and strong — they have a deeper culture and probably understand these problems very much better than ourselves. Therefore, they hate like anything to have to submit to our "erroneous and childlike fads," as they put it.

The same is true for Latin Americans — they are terribly touchy. I do not need to do more than refer to Mr. Nixon's recent experience. One particular subject of touchiness is our unwillingness to distribute nuclear weapons to our allies. This is coming to a head in the decision of the French to try to build (and, I suppose, successfully) nuclear weapons of their own. It came to a head when General de Gaulle told Secretary Dulles last summer that, as a general, he knew only one way in which weapons should be distributed: according to the tasks that are given to the vari-

ous military elements. He said that if French divisions need tactical nuclear artillery and nuclear weapons to defend themselves, they should be given those weapons; if they do not need them, they should not be given the weapons. "If we are going to get rid of conventional armaments and you expect to have French soldiers," said de Gaulle, "you are going to have to come across with the nuclear weapons, or we will make our own."

Furthermore, a very high French official said to me: "Get this straight, Edgar, and tell your people: we are unwilling to have the question as to whether France is going to be defended, decided by a sick man 3,500 miles away on a golf course. Once we get nuclear weapons of our own, we will shoot them off when we choose — just as you will — for this is our country." It is hard to argue against any such thing as this. Yet, here is a Congressional law — and here is a feeling that if there is a chance of getting rid of these weapons we ought not to spread them too broadly.

There is also the probability that Sweden and Switzerland will follow France. Prime Minister Fanfani told me in Rome last summer that if France gets nuclear weapons Italy will have to get them too, and so it goes. I cannot imagine my old friends, the Germans (among whom I spent nearly ten years), ever lagging behind very long in any military situation of inferiority that they could remedy, despite what they saw recently.

Therefore this is a peculiarly irritating form of power discrepancy, and is bound to produce a divisive influence.

Differences of geography bring about different interests. Thus, Latin Americans think that we are giving far too much attention to Europe and Asia, and that we should do more for the Western Hemisphere. The Europeans consider that the Far East is much less important than the Middle East; that it was ridiculous we allowed Nasser to put himself in a position where he might threaten their oil when we were worrying about Quemoy and Matsu. We did nothing about Hungary, did we? And that is important! On the other hand, the loss of China to Communism

(which I consider a major tragedy in postwar history) left most Europeans completely cold. They seemed to think that it could just be written off as a matter of no great importance. All of this was due to geography.

Once the French and the Dutch withdrew from the Far East, once the English possessions were restricted to Hong Kong (which, for various well-known reasons, many Englishmen still think are far more important than Formosa), these geographical afflictions became more and more important. Moreover, right here at home in the last few weeks I have heard from certain Americans that they were weary of all this network of alliances; that the sooner we could get the ICBM's, withdraw to FORTRESS AMERICA, and tell all of our allies to "go jump," the happier they would be. That, too, I presume is due to geography.

Then, of course, there is history, which causes France to take a permanent interest in the Middle East simply because such an interest was established at the time of the Crusades, even after their actual power in Lebanon had been withdrawn.

Differences of geography and history doubtless account for that very disruptive element of U. S. "anticolonialism." There is no doubt but that the United States, having been subjected to Britain, has sympathy for all countries trying to throw off a foreign hegemony. On the other hand, this looks cockeyed to Europeans. I remember an Englishman angrily saying to me: "The trouble with you Americans is that you think you are supporting Washington against the Red Coats when, really, you are supporting Sitting Bull against Custer. After all, you did not treat your natives so well that you can give us lessons in it." I had to fall back on the fact that we had exterminated most of them, or reduced them to impotence, whereupon he came back with the natural rejoinder, "Because you killed all the Indians, I suppose it was all right for you to stay there?" In other words, there is an issue here upon which I believe our own position is at least open to attack. It is not a clear, forthright thing, and it does make trouble.

Correlated with differences in size and geography among the allies is the fact that each of our alliances is local and limited, and apparently the Administration wishes to keep it so. We are the protector of the entire Free World. This means a constant struggle for priority among alliances. Latin Americans emphasize the fact that they were there first; that the Monroe Doctrine, as developed into the Organization of American States, kept the Western Hemisphere inviolate, and that it should be our most important preoccupation. The NATO countries come in to say, "After all, we have been the controlling power. We are the only real military element outside the United States (with the possible exception of Japan) that you can find. Without us, you are by yourselves. What are all those little countries off there to the Free World? Why should you give them any priority over us?" It is very difficult.

One of my friends has described the President and Secretary Dulles as a couple of jugglers engaged in tossing aloft ten or a dozen glass balls, any one of which can cause a good deal of harm if it drops and breaks. He says it is a fine stunt if you can do it — but how long can even the virtuoso, Dulles, continue to keep these inviolate?

This brings us into an unenviable position. Since the amount of U. S. resources which Congress is willing to dedicate to alliances is not unlimited (quite properly), practically each of our allies feels that in some respect it is not being properly treated and that it should get more.

There is, too, the question of our own lack of personal experience. I won't make quotes because they would make no sense unless I accompanied them with names, but certain statements on this subject which I have heard from people in positions of great authority in Washington, where I live, make me think that some of them have not quite taken the trouble to do their home work about ascertaining the position of the United States. Therefore, one wonders if they are going to be able to make the proper kind of decisions.

I think that if we had got into the international game after World War I, when it had become quite evident to some of us that we could not profitably stay out, by this time we would have trained a generation which would be extremely competent. After all, we have come a long way. But in 1945 we were caught short — short of people, short of understanding, short of languages, short of the proper approach, and short of willingness gladly to undertake the task of leadership after World War II. The result has been one of the greatest improvisations of history. When you consider that only twenty-one years ago we passed the last neutrality legislation, by which, like the groundhogs up on my New Hampshire property, we retreated into our hole and pulled the world in after us, what we have done by 1958 is extraordinary — and I think we have reason to be proud of it.

After all, we produced the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Atlantic Alliance. We have spent some 60 billions on aid to other countries, and we are spending 40 billion-odd (and God knows how much more indirectly) on protecting ourselves and our allies. We are making an immense and constant effort to meet the Soviet challenge. So far, even if we have not prevented Soviet aggression from advancing into some areas, we have at least restricted our losses. This is a tremendous achievement. But, undoubtedly, had we been prepared, we could have done more. We have simply lacked the right number of prepared people and, sometimes, we have followed the wrong policies.

Some of us have erred by condescension towards foreigners. After all, they did not enjoy the American way of life. How could a fellow, let us say, know anything about how to treat China who had not got two cars at home? It is as simple as that! Sometimes we have insisted too much abroad upon the American way of life. I, myself, felt that ghetto-izing our Americans at Bonn was a great mistake, after we had decided that we would make friends with the Germans. I would have preferred to have seen them scatter out so that their children could play with German children, for that was the way to cement an alliance.

Some of us have erred by innocence, and have been taken in by gullible foreigners who have not been at all reluctant to get a few extra billions, or special privileges, out of Americans who did not not know exactly what they were doing.

Some of us have erred on the other side, and been moralistic. We have acted as though the United States were a "Paradise of Innocents" — as though we did not know the situation in our major cities or on the New York waterfront; as though we had never heard of "fur coats" in government, or anything of the kind. We have said, "How can we consort with a man in Egypt who is not totally honest?" Or, "Just look at what people stole in China under Chiang Kai-shek!" And, so on. This, again, reminds me of the same poet, in a couplet which goes:

Are *we* at home corrupt? Much is forgiven

Are *they* corrupt? Denounce them to high heaven.

That is precisely what we have frequently done — and certainly not to the advantage of our own country. There are still people who would be happy if we would cast off Chiang Kai-shek — not because they do not care about Formosa or want to lose it, but because they have been persuaded that he has tolerated *mores* which were not in accordance with the Golden Rule. There are others who say, "After all, just look at those Pakistanis. They may be the best fighters between Turkey and Japan (which they undoubtedly are), but the way they run their government — why I am told that the Prime Minister himself got a gift of a motor car." This is a form of political immaturity, but it is very real in our midst.

Our deficiencies, therefore, have been psychological and linguistic. Also, we have exhibited — if not flaunted — our superior wealth. Americans (some of whom consider having to live abroad not as an educational treat but as a punishment) have insisted on more pay for foreign service, and on spending it all right there. I shall never forget the irate protest of the wife of an Indian Cabinet Minister to my wife. She said: "Why, your secretaries spend more money than we do, and they will not associate with our sec-

retaries." This was perfectly true; therefore, as political missionaries, such secretaries are valueless. They do not and cannot associate with their likes. I am told that the U. S. S. R. has trained its diplomats, its specialists, and its propagandists far more highly and made them (at least, on technical and historical planes) far better than we are.

I would like to tell you about one linguistic error that we almost made. My own daughter was working for E. C. A. in France (she was born in Rome, but was brought up in Paris and therefore happened to be bilingual). E. C. A. had prepared a series of posters to be put up all over France. This poster was actually sketched out and came to my daughter's desk. It was supposed to read: "More bread, thanks to E. C. A.; more wine, thanks to E. C. A.; more work, thanks to E. C. A." Instead, owing to the author's faulty knowledge of French, it read: "*Plus de pain, grace a E. C. A.; plus de vin, grace a E. C. A.; plus de travaille, grace a E. C. A.,*" which means "No more bread, thanks to E. C. A.; no more wine, thanks to E. C. A.; no more work, thanks to E. C. A." My daughter was just in time to prevent that poster from getting further down the line — whether it would have actually gone out, I don't know. But this is an example of what happens. In the same way, I believe that the indoctrination of our military personnel could sometimes be improved — but you know more about that than I do.

The claims of "neutrals," or of "backward" peoples, are a terrible trouble to us. It is impossible to explain to the Pakistanis why they, who are willing to die fighting Russia, should not get greater aid than India — that flaunts its neutrality. We can explain the need for keeping India democratic but we cannot convince the Pakistanis that India is as valuable to us as fighting Pathans and people of that sort who could certainly make any Russian advance southward by land across the Indus delta a rather unpleasant process. They made the British plenty unhappy when they were fighting them!

Another similar case is France. How on earth are you going to convince the French that if we stepped in and helped Tunisia

and Morocco, when they are trying to put the "squeeze" on them, we were not taking an anti-French attitude? On the other hand, if we do not help the Moroccans (where we have three or four bases) and help the Tunisians (who are trying to stay independent), either may go Communist or completely into the Nasser Camp. So we put on a continual juggling act, as I said, with both parties bound to be dissatisfied. Therefore, it seems to me that almost the greatest — next to the very nature of alliances — divisive issue among our allies today is the fact that we feel more than they do, on the whole, the necessity of making concessions, aiding backward peoples, and sometimes even in supporting such backward peoples against their former or actual European rulers.

A final cause of division is the fact of these new awful weapons. I think you would agree that it is the terrific weapons which we have that has caused so many Americans, and people elsewhere, to believe that somehow or other the preservation of peace is almost more important than stopping Soviet aggression. They are honest people; they are not Communists; but they are sentimentalists, to some extent; they are optimists about the Soviet Union. They support any kind of cock-and-bull story that says the Russians are ready to do this, that, or the other (and the Russians are experts in putting up such stories).

In my opinion, a democracy is a very heavy truck with a very poor gear shift. One cannot throw it into reverse quickly, once it is gotten steamed up; neither can one get it going in one direction very quickly, once it has stopped. But shifting back and forth between the military need of stopping the Communists and the attempt to make peace by negotiating with them, by supporting the United Nations, and such things, is an enormous and (so far) an unsolved difficulty. Whatever the President does in this matter, one may say, is wrong. We can only hope, in evaluating the relative merits of the cases, that he and the existing Secretary of State will always take the course that does the least harm.

Of course there is a legal issue in this. Mr. Dulles belongs to the school of lawyers who think that international law exists in the same way that domestic law exists: that is to say, starting

with English common law and custom, if we can get a habit of renouncing violence and moving towards peace, we will eventually translate that habit into real law, with sanctions. Then the U. N. will grow and be able to enforce that law. Another school of lawyers (and this seems more plausible to me) says that without a sanction, an international treaty, even the U. N. Charter is just a promise; that history is strewn with the remains of broken promises; and that it would be utterly unwise for the United States ever to subordinate a concrete and tangible interest to the hope that the United Nations will later develop into something capable of establishing what the President has eloquently called a "peaceful and viable world order."

Therefore, in 1956 we took the side of Nasser. The other evening the President made what to me was a quite extraordinary speech in speaking of Quemoy and Matsu. He said that we must be prepared to stop Communist expansion by violence. It seemed to me that we must be prepared to stop Communist expansion, period. Furthermore, I suspect that there is a little bit of unconscious double-tonguing in such remarks.

Let us suppose that Denmark went Communist. Then it would have every right to invite the U. S. S. R. to occupy Greenland. Would the United States be willing, as it is in more remote areas, to allow the U. N. Assembly to decide whether or not the Russians should stay in Greenland? Or, would they already have alerted most of you people here, so that your presence would be missing from this pleasant place, and you would be busy up in the northeast portion of the United States preparatory to preventing the Russians from ever getting into Greenland? This, of course, raises the issue (which our European allies think is very real) of U. S. hypocrisy. They say we have a different tune for Guatemala than we have for European possessions; that when it is a question of putting up force to enable a fellow who is thrown out of Guatemala to move back in and put down a government which we dislike, we act — but when they act in Egypt, we side with the Soviet Union against them, and what kind of an alliance is that? It is difficult to answer.

Here, then, is a very incomplete list, and I am going to ask for four minutes more. I want to give you my own suggestions on partial remedies. So far, I think I have been dealing in the realm of facts and that the issues which I have outlined (doubtless there are many more which you will think of) exist more or less as I have analyzed them. At this point we get into the field of opinion. Unless you are optimistic about the transformation or decay of the U. S. S. R., then it is remedies that we need and not just more analysis.

The chief remedy consists in keeping our common interest — that is, the Communist threat to all the alliances — in sharp focus, and not allowing it to subside merely because Khrushchev has mumbled some nice words or sent some pretty ballerinas to New York. (Having been in Moscow and studied the ballerinas as closely as I could, I think they could turn out to be a first-class divisive influence). I think that we should steel ourselves against that kind of thing, just as we have to do against Mr. Khrushchev's double-talk. I call your attention to the fact that there is a new book out by Lin Yutang called *The Secret Name* (I brought it along to show you). This is a study of what he thinks is the essence of Communism, and I like the book. I do not say that Lin Yutang is absolutely right about the essence of Communism, but I say that it is the first task of all governments — particularly in NATO — to make up their minds on what the nature and extent of the Communist threat really is, and stick to that opinion. Unless we do that, all our alliances are going to decay because there will be nothing to hold them together. We had just as well make up our minds about this. This argument implies, of course, an agreement on a common approach and common measures to meet the threat.

If the British and French have one idea and we have another, not much is going to be accomplished. And I suppose that if the Japanese get sulky and will not co-operate, whatever contribution they might make is not going to be their main purpose. Sooner or later, I presume, Japan (nations generally run true to form)

will again become a fairly powerful nation, whose aid could be really valuable in case the Chinese Communists got tough.

I think the second need lies in improving the nature of our alliances by simplifying them. This means both an extension and, if possible, a partial integration. I think there are too many rival alliances. I do not believe we are going to be able to maintain, for instance, the present rule on nuclear weapons. Unless we change it in time, the French and the others will go ahead and make their own. Having made their own, they will be far less amenable to discussion of common tactics than they were before they had the weapons. In my opinion, now is the time for us to move. If the only way we can stop the French from making their own weapons is an occupation by the Marines (although that might be popular with those Marines who once saw Paris), it would be a difficult task and Congress would hardly approve of it. Therefore, we have got to face an inevitable choice.

In the same way, I see no reason why the budding Latin American demand for some greater integration of the Organization of American States with NATO should not be listened to and discussed. I could tell you of several Latin Americans who have spoken to me and said that their basic wish is to draw on Europe to a greater extent for their cultural background and to draw upon the United States more economically and militarily. After all, they are (with the exception of the Indians) of European origin, and we all share a common civilization.

I think that even if the present juggling act appeals to the jugglers, reducing the number of balls being thrown in the air would diminish the chances of dropping one or more of them. After all, we in this country are not doing too well in the Cold War. We have taken many steps, but the question arises: Have we taken them rapidly enough to meet the danger? All one has to do is to look at the map and compare where Communism was in 1943 with where it is in 1958 — no words are necessary. Next, I think that Americans abroad should work through foreigners where possible. We would not like a lot of foreigners over here

unless they were willing to work with and through Americans. Within our alliances, it would be useful to put forward suggestions through some ally, particularly a small ally. The United States should be big enough to forego the credit. Then we need to have to put better choices in key positions, from ambassadors down. We are going to have to give them better training. It is no longer tolerable that important diplomatic posts be given as "political plums" to vested politicians unless they happen to have the qualities necessary for those posts. Since 1945, we have made great improvements in our diplomatic preparation. But if you would like an ugly criticism of what we are doing, there is a new book called *The Ugly American* which is good reading and which I suggest some of you might take to bed with you.

Finally, there is the question of how Americans in large groups — military, mostly — should behave when they are quartered among allied peoples. There, again, we catch it whatever we do. If we mix too much with the inhabitants they may say we are rowdies, although I am told that the Army and Air Force are doing quite well in Britain on a broadly-mixing platform. If we do not mix with them — well, there is the thing which I met in France, in which a whole French village said: "*Les Américains sont tres gentils*" — "The Americans are quite nice," yet added, "but we want them to go home." When I pressed a friend to say just why, he replied: "Your men have nothing to do with us. They are a foreign body — we don't like foreign bodies in our midst." Well, I shall not try to decide that one, because I know it is a ticklish matter.

Also it concerns this question: Should we take our own food and give the impression that we eat out of P. X.'s because we do not *know* that Viennese cooks can do it better, or because we think we have greater hygiene than Switzerland? Either, of course, would be absurd. Or, should we take *their* food and be subject to the charge that we are stripping their countryside to feed our hordes in their midst? It is not an easy problem. Don't think I'm a smart Alex and think I know how it ought to be

solved. But the problem should be met better than it is being met, and I think more thought should be given to it.

My own prejudice is in favor of mixing with allies. I think that on the whole most Americans are pretty likeable, easy-going chaps. If they were better prepared, and told that local customs and products have their own reasons and are something better than ours (for instance, French sauces), they would get along quite well. We should tell those Americans that they do not have to be ghetto-ized, lead socially-restricted lives, or go to the same dances and all do the same things twenty-four hours a day.

You will notice (I am sorry to be overtime) that I have said nothing about the horror of nuclear weapons except that I think we ought to talk somewhat less about them. That is because, unlike some of my science-and-sociology-minded friends, I do not believe that the presence of a new danger will quickly bring about any change in human nature. I note that when warriors went out in primitive times they knew that many, if not all of them, would not come home. I read that Tamerlane managed to put all the population of Samarkand to the sword — 300,000 men, women, and children — and left nothing of the city. Therefore, I suspect that we are exaggerating the deterrent elements inherent in new weapons (not but what they exist) ; that people can be expected to continue acting more or less as they always have acted; that, in the long run, even the most acute danger loses its power to scare; and that today's individuals will follow the age-old historical pattern. Frankly, to imagine that whole peoples will follow new peace patterns because they seem reasonable is to bet on a frail reed. When in history have you ever known peoples or rulers over a long period to act in accordance with strict reason? In consequence, the steps I have suggested for strengthening our alliances are those that can be taken on the assumption that we and other peoples are going to remain much as we have been. They are those that seem to me possible today.

Thank you, and excuse me for talking too long!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Mr. Edgar A. Mowrer

Mr. Mowrer received his A.B. degree from the University of Michigan in 1913, and later studied at the University of Chicago and the Sorbonne in Paris.

He began his journalistic career as a war correspondent with the *Chicago Daily News* in France, Belgium and Italy during 1914 and 1915. Following World War I, he was Chief of the *Chicago Daily News* Bureau in Berlin and then Chief of the Bureau in Paris. He worked in Washington, D. C., from 1940 to 1941 and then, after touring the Far East, became the Deputy Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and Office of War Information until 1943.

Mr. Mowrer has recently become a member of the Executive Committee of the coming U. S. Delegation to the meeting called by the NATO Parliamentarians, which is to be held in London next June to study what should be done to strengthen our principal alliance.

He has been the American editor of the international magazine, *Western World*, since 1956. He is the author of *Immortal Italy*; *This American World*; *The Future of Politics*; *Germany Puts the Clock Back*; *The Dragon Awakes*; *Global War* (co-author with Martha Rajchman); *The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy*; and *Challenge and Decision*. He has contributed to American and English magazines since 1913, and is still a columnist on foreign affairs and a broadcaster. He was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for overseas reporting in 1932.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel,
(G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

Commandant ELEVENTH Naval
District (Code 154)
937 North Harbor Drive
San Diego, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH
Naval District (Code 141)
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces,
Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 48
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U. S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
U. S. Naval Base
Norfolk 11, Virginia

BOOKS

Brandt, Conrad. *Stalin's Failure in China.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958. 178 p.

Through extensive research and study of Chinese-Soviet writings, including Trotsky's Archives, and personal interviews with former Chinese Communist leaders, Conrad Brandt has come up with a very interesting and informative account of the first Soviet attempt to engulf China in the Communist system. The roles played by the leaders of the Comintern, the Kuomintang, and various oppositions in their struggle for power in China during the 1924-27 period are described in excellent detail. Conrad Brandt covers the historic period from Sun Yat-sen in the early 1920's to Chiang Kai-shek's coup, the Nangh'ang Rebellion and finally, in the mid 1930's, the Communist's Long March to the Northwest. The author repeatedly emphasizes the failure of Stalin in China (1924-27) as due to the Red leader's rigid adherence to Marxist assumptions, unrealistic policies, poor intelligence, miscalculations and party rivalries. It is significant to note, however, that although the Communists in China had their ups and downs during this very short and violent revolutionary period, in the long run Stalin gained his objective. Michael Borodin, Stalin's chief agent in China, envisaged in the mid-1920's that the Communists would withdraw to the Northwest — as they did in the mid-1930's — to await their chance to swoop down when the enemy seemed the weakest. The Communists' return under Mao fulfilled Borodin's prophesy. In reading Conrad Brandt's book, one cannot help but reflect on this, the Chinese lesson of the past, and see all too clearly the striking similarity of the same Communist tactics at work elsewhere throughout the free world today — ruthless, methodical, but, most important, patient and unmindful of the time and effort involved in gaining an objective.

Laqueur, Walter Z. *The Middle East in Transition.* New York, Praeger, 1958. 513 p.

The contributions of 34 authors of various nationalities from the West, Middle East and Soviet Union provide an interesting collection of essays representing a wide range of opinions and views on recent political and social trends in the Middle

East. The main theme of the topics throughout the book deals with social and economic developments in the Arab world, political history of the area, the elements of Arab unity and dissensions, the Israel issue, relations between the Arabs and the West, and the effects of Russia and Communism on the Middle East. Many of the articles represent a wide expanse of varying schools of thought as to the solution for the present turmoil in the Middle East. Although the contentions of one school tend to refute the arguments of an opposite school, the pros and cons developed provide a comprehensive analysis of the situation and its peculiar problems. Among the many considerations advanced in the text, the arguments for and against a cooperative scheme for economic development of the entire area, as well as controversial assertions regarding a lack of understanding and cooperation among the Western powers are of considerable interest. Basic misconceptions in Western thinking about the Middle East are advanced to point out the need for a reappraisal of unfamiliar factors in the situation which have misled Western attitudes and policy. Discussions of Nasserism, the Ba'ath party and Communism provide an interesting contrast in reactions, since some of the contributors are naturally sympathetic to their emergence, while others are highly critical of such radical movements. Although the reader will emphatically disagree with some of the views expressed in the text, they are illuminating in that they represent significant thoughts which should be taken into account by the student of Middle Eastern affairs.

Tang, Peter S. H. *Communist China Today*. New York, Praeger, 1957. 536 p.

Peter Sheng-hao Tang's background prepared him admirably for the truly large task of writing this book (536 pages). He served as a staff member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Chungking and as an attaché at the Nationalist Chinese Embassy in Moscow before receiving his Ph.D. from Columbia. *Communist China Today* is a comprehensive, almost encyclopedic, study of the Red Giant of Asia. It is so objective as to be completely unemotional (and, accordingly, not the easiest reading in the world). However, this treatment by a painstaking author has produced a worthwhile analysis of Chinese Communism — its ideological and historical background — and an unbiased study of today's leadership, mechanics and operations.

Wheatley, Ronald. *Operation Sea Lion*. London, Oxford University Press, 1958. 201 p.

This is a very interesting account of the planning and preparation that transpired within the German high command concerning the invasion of England. The source material is official records, diaries, memoranda and other official and semi-official papers. The book gives a good picture of the interplay of personalities and its effect on Hitler. Perhaps the major lesson learned by reading this book is that sea power is mandatory in conducting amphibious operations. The lack of appreciation of sea power on the part of certain members of the German General Staff is reflected in many of the decisions presented. Even with the advent of air power, superiority at sea is necessary for invasion. *Operation Sea Lion* also highlights the effect of no coordinated planning.

PERIODICALS

Wolfe, Bertram D. "Marxism — Yesterday and Today," and Lichtheim, George. "Marxist Doctrine in Perspective." *Problems of Communism*, November-December, 1958, p. 24-31 and p. 32-37 respectively.

Two essays surveying the status of Marxism today — whether the doctrine is essentially abstract and unrealistic, its concepts broken down and its prophecies shipwrecked; or whether it is akin to practical "liberalism" less utopian and revolutionary than it is generally believed to be.

"Report on Taiwan." *The Atlantic*, December, 1958, p. 4-8.

Looks at the Formosans on Taiwan, their position in and reactions to the Nationalistic Chinese Government.

Railsback, E. H., Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps. "Let's Face It." *Marine Corps Gazette*, November, 1958, p. 52-60.

Contends that the Amphibious Task Force, composed of Naval amphibious and Fleet Marine Force elements, is the only truly integrated force-in-being today capable of meeting all the initial requirements of limited war.

"Soviets Flight Testing Nuclear Bomber." *Aviation Week*, December 1, 1958, p. 27-29.

Describes the aircraft and nuclear engines of the bomber which this article claims is being flight-tested in the Soviet

Union; briefly discusses U. S. efforts along this line, stating the nuclear plane's military mission, and giving a calendar with progress notes on the U. S. Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Program.

"Report on Communist China." *Current History*, December, 1958.

The entire issue is given to a consideration of Communist China, its politics, trade, industry, agriculture and social conditions.

"Special Issue on Decision Making." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, December, 1958.

Includes such articles as "Studies and Theories of Decision Making," "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea," and "Operations Research and Managerial Decision Making."

Brannen, Phillip B., Captain, United States Navy Reserve.

"Strength and Weakness in the Asian Littoral." *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, December, 1958, p. 68-84.

An excellent analysis of the economic, political, military and social problems of the Asian countries, concentrating on Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The influence of Communism is discussed, with the related problems of formulating an effective U. S. strategy to retain the free countries of the area as allies.

Davis, Morgan J. "Let's Stop Selling U. S. Reserves Short." *The Oil and Gas Journal*, December 8, 1958, p. 80-85.

An enheartening report, supported by statistics from the NPC, API and AGA, estimating the current availability of petroleum supplies, the adequacy of future domestic supplies, and the ability of the industry to meet increasing requirements at reasonable prices.

Lind, John H. "Strategic Materials We Must Depend On From Outside Sources." *The Magazine of Wall Street*, December 6, 1958, p. 237-239, 264-265.

The United States has changed from being virtually self-sufficient in raw materials to importing 80-100% of 81 commodities. This article interprets what this means to our national security and suggests measures to reduce the risks involved.

Dulles, John Foster. "Principles and Policies in a Changing World."
The Department of State Bulletin, December 8, 1958, p. 897-904.

Identifies six areas where forces for change are conspicuous and suggests ways in which the United States can respond to the challenge of such changes.

Kennan, George F. "American Troops in Russia: The True Record." *The Atlantic*, January, 1959, p. 36-42.

This article stems from recent research into the reasons for American participation in the Allied intervention in Russia in 1918-1920.