

1959

Divisive Issues Among the Allies

Edgar A. Mowrer

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Mowrer, Edgar A. (1959) "Divisive Issues Among the Allies," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 12 : No. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol12/iss3/3>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

DIVISIVE ISSUES AMONG THE ALLIES

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 31 October 1968 by
Mr. Edgar A. Mowrer

Mr. Presiding Officer and Fellow Students:

I won't apologize for coming here, but I am terribly impressed.

I would like to clear the ground by saying that I am making a basic assumption, which is: that we are in what is probably the most important struggle of our existence; that this struggle may go on for a long, long time; that we cannot possibly hope to win it without allies; that no country, including our own, is any longer economically or politically self-sufficient; therefore, that this complex net of alliances which we have set up is unquestionably (at least as far as I can discover in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* or otherwise concerning it) the most complicated set any country has ever erected.

England's mobilization of the Continent of Europe against Napoleon was "peanuts" in complications and in extent compared with what we have somewhat painfully, fairly successfully, and with some failures pulled together, to try to match the Soviet threat and, if possible, without a war — which would be presumably a major catastrophe for all involved. I see no sign of any slackening in Soviet aggressivity, and I am totally uninterested in the small juggle and friendly "zigs" that follow the sharp and painful "zags."

I said that we had a most 'complex net of alliances,' and I think we ought to go over them (although you know them as well as I do) in order to realize how complicated they are. Outlines of most of them are on the chart upon the wall.

As you see, there are four (4) *Multilateral Alliances*: the North Atlantic Treaty, the ANZUS Treaty, the Southeast Asia

Treaty, and the Baghdad Pact or Northern Tier — which is not quite a briefed alliance but at the same time probably involves us just as much as though it were. There are several *Bilateral Treaties*: one with the Republic of Korea; one with Japan; one with the Republic of China; and another with the Philippines. I might also say there are three (3) other *Bilateral Alliances* which are unbriefed: the first, of course, is with Canada — I need not speak to you of the importance of the DEW Line and the special arrangements which are going on outside of NATO; the second unbriefed alliance is, I presume, with Spain, since I cannot imagine we would send all that money there and set up all those bases unless we had some intention of protecting them in case of attack; the same goes for Morocco — although, as far as I know, we have no formal, briefed treaty of military alliance with that country.

All of these alliances (you may name nine, twelve or thirteen — according to what you wish to take into account) are different. They embrace over forty countries to which we give military assistance. There is, however, an enormous distinction between them in area and in quality. For instance, there is NATO, with fifteen (15) industrially-developed countries (if you count Portugal and Iceland as industrially developed — and certainly they are capable of it); there is the Organization of American States (which I neglected to mention as a Multilateral Treaty), a sort of historical hold-over, grouping states in various stages of industrial and cultural development; there is the American-Philippine Treaty, which is a friendly, “big brother,” protective arrangement that is intimate.

Each type of alliance brings different divisive issues, and sometimes different types of issues. Yet, certain traits are common to all alliances, and I am going to talk about them for just about one minute.

An alliance is always a grouping of independent states for a common purpose: defensive, offensive, or other. An offensive alliance was typified in the late and unlamented Rome-Berlin-

Tokyo Axis, which has also been known as the "Pirates' League." Our own alliances today are all defensive. But some centuries ago there was something called the *Hansabund*, which ran the length of those important commercial cities of Northern Europe stretching roughly from Brugge (in what is now Belgium) around to Danzig, and even almost over into Russia. This was an alliance formed simply for increasing trade. Incidentally, this alliance was so successful (as you may or may not have remembered) that on one occasion the single City of Danzig declared war simultaneously on Britain, France and the Low Countries. Well, that is quite a bit — even for a rich city — to take on. Most alliances in modern times tend, however, to be defensive.

I remember a former Italian diplomat — a very wise old man to whom I used to go, as a young correspondent, for advice. His name was Count Bosdari, and he was working (rather against his will) for Benito Mussolini.

I said to him, "Ambassador Bosdari, what have you learned in your own diplomatic career?" (He was retiring after fifty years' service).

He replied: "I have learned that when two or more states combine it is almost always *against* something and not *for* anything."

And I think that is true. Whether we should say that the recently-formed Soviet-Warsaw Pact is offensive or defensive, I will leave to you. But, also, it is more the hegemony of Moscow over other weaker states than it is a true alliance.

Since the essence of an alliance is usually a single interest or a single purpose, it follows that the alliance can last only as long as its members recognize the existence of this common interest, interpret it in much the same way, and agree substantially upon the necessary common measures to protect it. If the interest fades or disappears, if interpretations of the alliance vary too much or disagreements become too sharp, or if there is no longer any common agreement on the more important measures that

have to be taken to implement that alliance — then the alliance disintegrates.

We have seen two wonderful examples of this in our own lifetime. One example was the falling apart of the Anti-German Alliance right after World War I. The victorious Allies had really not signed the Peace Treaty before they were bitterly squabbling over what to do with Germany. That separated them to the point where it looked for a moment as though the English and French might almost militarily clash over the French occupation of the Ruhr. The second example was a little less astonishing, and had to do with the falling apart of the United Nations after World War II. This also occurred over Germany, but it was provoked, of course, by the fact that Russia had never been an ally in anything but name. First, Russia had been, so to speak, “exploded” into the United Nations by Hitler’s attack. Secondly, even during the war, beginning in 1943, the Soviet Union indulged in a number of gestures — and, later, of outright annexations and subordination of other peoples — which made the continuation of that alliance very difficult. When it reached the point where we could no longer have agreement about Germany, which, you may remember, was to be a three- (later, four-) part occupation in harmony, that alliance split up. We then found ourselves at this point in virtual alliance with that very West Germany (and, if it had been possible, with East Germany) which it had been our common object to defeat.

That is all of the background that I would like to give, but I think it has to be kept in mind in order to understand what is going on in our own alliances — and what has gone on since 1945.

I shall talk rather of “difficulties” than of “divisive issues,” since it is a broader word but means the same thing. The greatest difficulty of all — and one about which we can do the least — lies in the very nature of any alliance of sovereign powers.

The story goes that after Napoleon Bonaparte had been exiled to Saint Helena, he had frequent conversations with his

keeper, Sir Hudson Lowe. On one occasion, Sir Hudson, who could not help but admire the great conqueror and general, said, "Sire, how was France able to carry on for twenty years against the concert of Europe?"

Napoleon replied: "It was extremely simple: my adversaries suffered from 'coalition sickness.' I was a united command."

That phrase, *maladie des coalitions*, comes to my mind every time I open *The New York Times* and read that somebody, somewhere — whether in Kansas City, Iceland, or Chile — is dissatisfied with the way the rest of the allies are running something. It was not new even in Napoleon's time.

Sir Frederic Maurice's volume, which I recommend to you (if you want to note it down or are interested in going further into this subject, please do so) and which is called *Lessons of Allied Co-operation — Naval, Military, and Air, 1914-1918*, shows the difficulties that the English and French particularly had — but, later, also the Americans, Belgians, and so on — in trying to run a single military campaign. They suffered from the *maladie des coalitions* until, finally, in 1918 if I remember rightly, they did succeed in establishing Marshal Foch as a Unified Commander.

Sir Frederic Maurice, speaking of Marlborough's Campaigns against Louis Quatorze in the early eighteenth century goes on to say: "The great leader spent more time in persuading allies than in conducting operations of war."

So there is nothing new about this at all. Sovereign governments are touchy, and if they are democratic governments the situation is complicated by the fact that their peoples are just as touchy — but not always in the same way. Let's face it: there is in every people an element of tribalism which tends towards national arrogance and xenophobia. Thus, for instance, during the recent outcry against our decision to defend Quemoy and Matsu, I noticed that some of my closest friends, who considered it only natural for National China, if necessary, to come to the aid of the Philippines, were rabid, however, at the idea

of the United States being "dragged into a war to defend Chiang Kai-shek." This national prejudice is inevitable, as peoples are today.

Another difficulty facing all alliances is that of writing a clear document. Of course the lawyers could usually spell out a treaty of alliance quite well, but there are cases which cannot be spelled out. Usually some government or other, for various reasons, feels that public opinion or some other factor will not allow it to make the basic document too specific.

I believe the SEATO Treaty, for instance, says that the members in case of trouble will act according to their "constitutional processes." Please permit me, as a cynical newsman, to say that this means nothing in particular. It is not a real commitment, for who can say in advance what the "constitutional processes" of these five countries are going to be?

Another final and inevitable difficulty is jealousy among allies as to who does what, who leads in what, and who gets what. In the present case it means who gets what share of mostly American arms and economic aid.

All these difficulties are quite inevitable.

Another inevitable difficulty is the discrepancy in power, wealth and arms between the United States and any one of its allies.

A third difference (and I am going to run over all of them and then come back to a discussion of them singly) is the difference of geography and outlook between the United States — separated, as it is, by its two one-time impassable oceans from most enemies — and other countries that have always had hereditary enemies on their doorsteps. This applies to all of our European allies, whereas Canada more or less has the same reaction that we have.

Another divisive issue or difficulty is the fact that the United States is inevitably the hub of a wheel of which the separate alliances are only the spokes. Therefore, in Washington, Secretary

Dulles and President Eisenhower have to view this problem differently. They cannot embrace one of the spokes wholeheartedly, so to speak, in the way that other countries can. The latter can differ among themselves, but the United States has to try to satisfy all of them. We have this incredible and still largely unshared general responsibility. The fact that we have this general responsibility stimulates another quite natural but dreadfully disruptive tendency on the part of the smaller allies: simply not to pull their weight in the boat. They say: "If we do not have much responsibility, why should we make much effort?"

Still another reason is the relative inexperience in world affairs of the American people. After World War II, they suddenly found themselves literally prodded into a position of world leadership which most citizens did not — and do not yet — like very much. In fact, I know very few Americans who would not exchange all the glamor and glory of world leadership for two tickets to the next world series.

Then there is another complicating element, as though these were not enough: the Soviet threat and the anti-Soviet struggle happen to coincide with a world-wide movement for liberation and improvement among formerly backward, colonial, and more or less undeveloped peoples. This not only complicates the main job of scotching the Soviet threat, but it frequently causes us to carry out nationally acts which would normally be done for and through the alliances. Mr. Dulles and Premier MacMillan, for instance, thought Americans and British could safely land in Jordan and Lebanon respectively, but that we must not have the French there. It was presumed (and I imagine properly) that the landing of French soldiers would revive the old Arab animosity toward the French, who had had mandates over Syria and Lebanon before and who were not particularly popular. This emergence of formerly submerged peoples calls for constant compromises between the task of stopping Soviet expansion in the simple way and conceding to the awakening neutrals' privileges, which, in the short run, may contrast or even weaken the anti-Communist pressure.

A final divisive issue (and one that is very important) is the world-wide hope of a viable and peaceful world order centered around the United Nations. Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the United Nations' Charter reads:

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner [note the large way in which it is written] inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

There is no doubt but that this responds to a popular feeling and therefore it, too, acts as a handicap on many of the measures which would otherwise be taken to counter the Soviets. Need I refer to more than the action of the United States, acting with the U. S. S. R. at Suez, to block the military action of our two closest allies — Britain and France — against Nasser of Egypt? At the same time we were saying that because the United Nations was weak and because the danger of war was so great, we must not take any armed action to assist the embattled Hungarian people, whose liberation would have been a weakening of the Soviet Union and a great help for us.

It seems to me that these are the seven (7) chief divisive issues today. Of course they could be otherwise classified, but they would boil down to more or less the same points. And now I would like to take up each of them separately.

The first point — the overwhelming divisive issue inherent in a coalition — is today the varying degrees of belief in the extent and nature of the Communist danger and how it should be met. Since we have people in our own country who think that the danger of nuclear weapons is greater than the danger of

Communism, and since we have people in our own country — like a very famous industrialist — who think that the Soviet Union is no danger whatsoever; if only we would sit down at “Whitewash” (or “Hogwash”), and discuss our differences freely with them, we would all come to an easy agreement. Since all of this is true, we cannot be surprised that it affects our alliance. As the Soviet pressure seems to let up, the normal counterpressure of human beings — not to make so many sacrifices, to lead a more normal life, to perhaps have a better car or to have a car if one has only had a bicycle — takes precedence over a willingness to put enough armed divisions into the field to meet the Soviet Union on the ground.

Moreover, both the American people and our allies suffer from what I call a “basic schizophrenia” towards Communism. They deeply wish to preserve freedom and restore it, if possible, to Communism’s victims — not by a major war, to be sure, but by all other methods. Therefore, they are willing to provide a good deal of military power.

On the other hand, the President himself has (properly) expressed such a deep abhorrence of nuclear war that he is waging peace. He is unwilling to provoke Communist governments by applying what he calls “excessive power.” This means, in practice, a strict defensive. It means that in our football games (if you can irreverently refer to Korea as any such thing) we must not cross the 55-yard line; that we must not attempt to punish aggression, but sort of bounce it back in a brilliant “cushion” fashion; that we must leave no opportunity for peace with Moscow unexplored; and that we are told we must shake any outstretched hands.

In other words, on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays the free peoples are resenting Communist actions and preparing to resist them, if necessary, even by nuclear war. But on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays they are trying to believe what the Communists say about wanting to avoid war, and hoping that natural reason in such a dangerous situation will eventually bring the Russians to relax tensions and modify their aggressivity —

in which case we are more than willing to kiss, make up, and forgive all. Therefore, we accept negotiations on disarmament, on various kinds of co-operation, on the relaxation of tensions, and on stopping nuclear tests. And, now, we are looking for some way to prevent surprise attacks, etc.

This is very tough on an alliance. People are inclined to make sacrifices (and all alliances involving great military expenditures are expensive) only when they feel a real danger. When the danger abates, or we let it down, people want to let up. In consequence of a policy that goes back and forth between the two — although that policy responds to the normal instinct to have enough defense but with as little trouble and as little monetary sacrifice as possible — there results a confusion, a lack of interest in public affairs, and frequently conflicting national attitudes. It also condemns us (as I repeat) to the permanent defensive which we see in Korea, in Lebanon, at the Formosa Strait, and so on, where we are taking somewhat of a military posture at the present time. This wobbling lead one American (in a sarcastic vein) to write during the Korean War the following quatrain:

Our arms are strong, our strength is great,
So let the dastard foe beware!
But win the war? Oh, never dare,
Lest we the foe infuriate.

Such a policy encourages wishful thinking and threatens the alliance, because any waning of the sense of Communist danger will destroy the complicated structure that we have set up.

I pass now to point number two: the difference in power and size between the United States and other allies. We are smaller in population than all of our allies in Europe taken together, but we are greater in military power, in industrial output, and in available cash. Therefore, even with Britain — our first most powerful ally and the second most powerful country in our coalition — there is an enormous difference which British people resent. Collectively, a group like the other NATO countries (fourteen of them against us) would be terribly influential, if only by geog-

raphy and the fact that we still have not got enough nuclear missile-shooting submarines or intercontinental missiles to get along without bases. But, individually, each of these countries is much weaker than the United States.

A typical relationship is that of the U. S. to Canada. I suppose that you are aware that recently the Canadian irritation with the United States has flared up. It seems that almost everything we do up there is wrong, in spite of the fact that in many ways our outlooks are very similar. If you care to look into the recent disputes, there is an excellent book on this subject just out. It has been on the stands for about a week, and it is the best I have read on the subject. It is called *Good Fences Make Good Neighbors* and is written by a man called Joseph Barber. There is an especially interesting chapter on the discussions and arguments concerning the DEW Line.

Our discrepancy with the Philippines, of course, is even greater. One result was the dispute (which I hope is now more or less settled) concerning American jurisdiction over Filipinos on American bases in Philippine territory.

The little countries react to U. S. easy assurance by being extremely touchy. European countries react to it by thinking that — although we just happen to be big, lucky and strong — they have a deeper culture and probably understand these problems very much better than ourselves. Therefore, they hate like anything to have to submit to our "erroneous and childlike fads," as they put it.

The same is true for Latin Americans — they are terribly touchy. I do not need to do more than refer to Mr. Nixon's recent experience. One particular subject of touchiness is our unwillingness to distribute nuclear weapons to our allies. This is coming to a head in the decision of the French to try to build (and, I suppose, successfully) nuclear weapons of their own. It came to a head when General de Gaulle told Secretary Dulles last summer that, as a general, he knew only one way in which weapons should be distributed: according to the tasks that are given to the vari-

ous military elements. He said that if French divisions need tactical nuclear artillery and nuclear weapons to defend themselves, they should be given those weapons; if they do not need them, they should not be given the weapons. "If we are going to get rid of conventional armaments and you expect to have French soldiers," said de Gaulle, "you are going to have to come across with the nuclear weapons, or we will make our own."

Furthermore, a very high French official said to me: "Get this straight, Edgar, and tell your people: we are unwilling to have the question as to whether France is going to be defended, decided by a sick man 3,500 miles away on a golf course. Once we get nuclear weapons of our own, we will shoot them off when we choose — just as you will — for this is our country." It is hard to argue against any such thing as this. Yet, here is a Congressional law — and here is a feeling that if there is a chance of getting rid of these weapons we ought not to spread them too broadly.

There is also the probability that Sweden and Switzerland will follow France. Prime Minister Fanfani told me in Rome last summer that if France gets nuclear weapons Italy will have to get them too, and so it goes. I cannot imagine my old friends, the Germans (among whom I spent nearly ten years), ever lagging behind very long in any military situation of inferiority that they could remedy, despite what they saw recently.

Therefore this is a peculiarly irritating form of power discrepancy, and is bound to produce a divisive influence.

Differences of geography bring about different interests. Thus, Latin Americans think that we are giving far too much attention to Europe and Asia, and that we should do more for the Western Hemisphere. The Europeans consider that the Far East is much less important than the Middle East; that it was ridiculous we allowed Nasser to put himself in a position where he might threaten their oil when we were worrying about Quemoy and Matsu. We did nothing about Hungary, did we? And that is important! On the other hand, the loss of China to Communism

(which I consider a major tragedy in postwar history) left most Europeans completely cold. They seemed to think that it could just be written off as a matter of no great importance. All of this was due to geography.

Once the French and the Dutch withdrew from the Far East, once the English possessions were restricted to Hong Kong (which, for various well-known reasons, many Englishmen still think are far more important than Formosa), these geographical afflictions became more and more important. Moreover, right here at home in the last few weeks I have heard from certain Americans that they were weary of all this network of alliances; that the sooner we could get the ICBM's, withdraw to FORTRESS AMERICA, and tell all of our allies to "go jump," the happier they would be. That, too, I presume is due to geography.

Then, of course, there is history, which causes France to take a permanent interest in the Middle East simply because such an interest was established at the time of the Crusades, even after their actual power in Lebanon had been withdrawn.

Differences of geography and history doubtless account for that very disruptive element of U. S. "anticolonialism." There is no doubt but that the United States, having been subjected to Britain, has sympathy for all countries trying to throw off a foreign hegemony. On the other hand, this looks cockeyed to Europeans. I remember an Englishman angrily saying to me: "The trouble with you Americans is that you think you are supporting Washington against the Red Coats when, really, you are supporting Sitting Bull against Custer. After all, you did not treat your natives so well that you can give us lessons in it." I had to fall back on the fact that we had exterminated most of them, or reduced them to impotence, whereupon he came back with the natural rejoinder, "Because you killed all the Indians, I suppose it was all right for you to stay there?" In other words, there is an issue here upon which I believe our own position is at least open to attack. It is not a clear, forthright thing, and it does make trouble.

Correlated with differences in size and geography among the allies is the fact that each of our alliances is local and limited, and apparently the Administration wishes to keep it so. We are the protector of the entire Free World. This means a constant struggle for priority among alliances. Latin Americans emphasize the fact that they were there first; that the Monroe Doctrine, as developed into the Organization of American States, kept the Western Hemisphere inviolate, and that it should be our most important preoccupation. The NATO countries come in to say, "After all, we have been the controlling power. We are the only real military element outside the United States (with the possible exception of Japan) that you can find. Without us, you are by yourselves. What are all those little countries off there to the Free World? Why should you give them any priority over us?" It is very difficult.

One of my friends has described the President and Secretary Dulles as a couple of jugglers engaged in tossing aloft ten or a dozen glass balls, any one of which can cause a good deal of harm if it drops and breaks. He says it is a fine stunt if you can do it — but how long can even the virtuoso, Dulles, continue to keep these inviolate?

This brings us into an unenviable position. Since the amount of U. S. resources which Congress is willing to dedicate to alliances is not unlimited (quite properly), practically each of our allies feels that in some respect it is not being properly treated and that it should get more.

There is, too, the question of our own lack of personal experience. I won't make quotes because they would make no sense unless I accompanied them with names, but certain statements on this subject which I have heard from people in positions of great authority in Washington, where I live, make me think that some of them have not quite taken the trouble to do their home work about ascertaining the position of the United States. Therefore, one wonders if they are going to be able to make the proper kind of decisions.

I think that if we had got into the international game after World War I, when it had become quite evident to some of us that we could not profitably stay out, by this time we would have trained a generation which would be extremely competent. After all, we have come a long way. But in 1945 we were caught short — short of people, short of understanding, short of languages, short of the proper approach, and short of willingness gladly to undertake the task of leadership after World War II. The result has been one of the greatest improvisations of history. When you consider that only twenty-one years ago we passed the last neutrality legislation, by which, like the groundhogs up on my New Hampshire property, we retreated into our hole and pulled the world in after us, what we have done by 1958 is extraordinary — and I think we have reason to be proud of it.

After all, we produced the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Atlantic Alliance. We have spent some 60 billions on aid to other countries, and we are spending 40 billion-odd (and God knows how much more indirectly) on protecting ourselves and our allies. We are making an immense and constant effort to meet the Soviet challenge. So far, even if we have not prevented Soviet aggression from advancing into some areas, we have at least restricted our losses. This is a tremendous achievement. But, undoubtedly, had we been prepared, we could have done more. We have simply lacked the right number of prepared people and, sometimes, we have followed the wrong policies.

Some of us have erred by condescension towards foreigners. After all, they did not enjoy the American way of life. How could a fellow, let us say, know anything about how to treat China who had not got two cars at home? It is as simple as that! Sometimes we have insisted too much abroad upon the American way of life. I, myself, felt that ghetto-izing our Americans at Bonn was a great mistake, after we had decided that we would make friends with the Germans. I would have preferred to have seen them scatter out so that their children could play with German children, for that was the way to cement an alliance.

Some of us have erred by innocence, and have been taken in by gullible foreigners who have not been at all reluctant to get a few extra billions, or special privileges, out of Americans who did not not know exactly what they were doing.

Some of us have erred on the other side, and been moralistic. We have acted as though the United States were a "Paradise of Innocents" — as though we did not know the situation in our major cities or on the New York waterfront; as though we had never heard of "fur coats" in government, or anything of the kind. We have said, "How can we consort with a man in Egypt who is not totally honest?" Or, "Just look at what people stole in China under Chiang Kai-shek!" And, so on. This, again, reminds me of the same poet, in a couplet which goes:

Are *we* at home corrupt? Much is forgiven

Are *they* corrupt? Denounce them to high heaven.

That is precisely what we have frequently done — and certainly not to the advantage of our own country. There are still people who would be happy if we would cast off Chiang Kai-shek — not because they do not care about Formosa or want to lose it, but because they have been persuaded that he has tolerated *mores* which were not in accordance with the Golden Rule. There are others who say, "After all, just look at those Pakistanis. They may be the best fighters between Turkey and Japan (which they undoubtedly are), but the way they run their government — why I am told that the Prime Minister himself got a gift of a motor car." This is a form of political immaturity, but it is very real in our midst.

Our deficiencies, therefore, have been psychological and linguistic. Also, we have exhibited — if not flaunted — our superior wealth. Americans (some of whom consider having to live abroad not as an educational treat but as a punishment) have insisted on more pay for foreign service, and on spending it all right there. I shall never forget the irate protest of the wife of an Indian Cabinet Minister to my wife. She said: "Why, your secretaries spend more money than we do, and they will not associate with our sec-

retaries." This was perfectly true; therefore, as political missionaries, such secretaries are valueless. They do not and cannot associate with their likes. I am told that the U. S. S. R. has trained its diplomats, its specialists, and its propagandists far more highly and made them (at least, on technical and historical planes) far better than we are.

I would like to tell you about one linguistic error that we almost made. My own daughter was working for E. C. A. in France (she was born in Rome, but was brought up in Paris and therefore happened to be bilingual). E. C. A. had prepared a series of posters to be put up all over France. This poster was actually sketched out and came to my daughter's desk. It was supposed to read: "More bread, thanks to E. C. A.; more wine, thanks to E. C. A.; more work, thanks to E. C. A." Instead, owing to the author's faulty knowledge of French, it read: "*Plus de pain, grace a E. C. A.; plus de vin, grace a E. C. A.; plus de travaille, grace a E. C. A.,*" which means "No more bread, thanks to E. C. A.; no more wine, thanks to E. C. A.; no more work, thanks to E. C. A." My daughter was just in time to prevent that poster from getting further down the line — whether it would have actually gone out, I don't know. But this is an example of what happens. In the same way, I believe that the indoctrination of our military personnel could sometimes be improved — but you know more about that than I do.

The claims of "neutrals," or of "backward" peoples, are a terrible trouble to us. It is impossible to explain to the Pakistanis why they, who are willing to die fighting Russia, should not get greater aid than India — that flaunts its neutrality. We can explain the need for keeping India democratic but we cannot convince the Pakistanis that India is as valuable to us as fighting Pathans and people of that sort who could certainly make any Russian advance southward by land across the Indus delta a rather unpleasant process. They made the British plenty unhappy when they were fighting them!

Another similar case is France. How on earth are you going to convince the French that if we stepped in and helped Tunisia

and Morocco, when they are trying to put the "squeeze" on them, we were not taking an anti-French attitude? On the other hand, if we do not help the Moroccans (where we have three or four bases) and help the Tunisians (who are trying to stay independent), either may go Communist or completely into the Nasser Camp. So we put on a continual juggling act, as I said, with both parties bound to be dissatisfied. Therefore, it seems to me that almost the greatest — next to the very nature of alliances — divisive issue among our allies today is the fact that we feel more than they do, on the whole, the necessity of making concessions, aiding backward peoples, and sometimes even in supporting such backward peoples against their former or actual European rulers.

A final cause of division is the fact of these new awful weapons. I think you would agree that it is the terrific weapons which we have that has caused so many Americans, and people elsewhere, to believe that somehow or other the preservation of peace is almost more important than stopping Soviet aggression. They are honest people; they are not Communists; but they are sentimentalists, to some extent; they are optimists about the Soviet Union. They support any kind of cock-and-bull story that says the Russians are ready to do this, that, or the other (and the Russians are experts in putting up such stories).

In my opinion, a democracy is a very heavy truck with a very poor gear shift. One cannot throw it into reverse quickly, once it is gotten steamed up; neither can one get it going in one direction very quickly, once it has stopped. But shifting back and forth between the military need of stopping the Communists and the attempt to make peace by negotiating with them, by supporting the United Nations, and such things, is an enormous and (so far) an unsolved difficulty. Whatever the President does in this matter, one may say, is wrong. We can only hope, in evaluating the relative merits of the cases, that he and the existing Secretary of State will always take the course that does the least harm.

Of course there is a legal issue in this. Mr. Dulles belongs to the school of lawyers who think that international law exists in the same way that domestic law exists: that is to say, starting

with English common law and custom, if we can get a habit of renouncing violence and moving towards peace, we will eventually translate that habit into real law, with sanctions. Then the U. N. will grow and be able to enforce that law. Another school of lawyers (and this seems more plausible to me) says that without a sanction, an international treaty, even the U. N. Charter is just a promise; that history is strewn with the remains of broken promises; and that it would be utterly unwise for the United States ever to subordinate a concrete and tangible interest to the hope that the United Nations will later develop into something capable of establishing what the President has eloquently called a "peaceful and viable world order."

Therefore, in 1956 we took the side of Nasser. The other evening the President made what to me was a quite extraordinary speech in speaking of Quemoy and Matsu. He said that we must be prepared to stop Communist expansion by violence. It seemed to me that we must be prepared to stop Communist expansion, period. Furthermore, I suspect that there is a little bit of unconscious double-tonguing in such remarks.

Let us suppose that Denmark went Communist. Then it would have every right to invite the U. S. S. R. to occupy Greenland. Would the United States be willing, as it is in more remote areas, to allow the U. N. Assembly to decide whether or not the Russians should stay in Greenland? Or, would they already have alerted most of you people here, so that your presence would be missing from this pleasant place, and you would be busy up in the northeast portion of the United States preparatory to preventing the Russians from ever getting into Greenland? This, of course, raises the issue (which our European allies think is very real) of U. S. hypocrisy. They say we have a different tune for Guatemala than we have for European possessions; that when it is a question of putting up force to enable a fellow who is thrown out of Guatemala to move back in and put down a government which we dislike, we act — but when they act in Egypt, we side with the Soviet Union against them, and what kind of an alliance is that? It is difficult to answer.

Here, then, is a very incomplete list, and I am going to ask for four minutes more. I want to give you my own suggestions on partial remedies. So far, I think I have been dealing in the realm of facts and that the issues which I have outlined (doubtless there are many more which you will think of) exist more or less as I have analyzed them. At this point we get into the field of opinion. Unless you are optimistic about the transformation or decay of the U. S. S. R., then it is remedies that we need and not just more analysis.

The chief remedy consists in keeping our common interest — that is, the Communist threat to all the alliances — in sharp focus, and not allowing it to subside merely because Khrushchev has mumbled some nice words or sent some pretty ballerinas to New York. (Having been in Moscow and studied the ballerinas as closely as I could, I think they could turn out to be a first-class divisive influence). I think that we should steel ourselves against that kind of thing, just as we have to do against Mr. Khrushchev's double-talk. I call your attention to the fact that there is a new book out by Lin Yutang called *The Secret Name* (I brought it along to show you). This is a study of what he thinks is the essence of Communism, and I like the book. I do not say that Lin Yutang is absolutely right about the essence of Communism, but I say that it is the first task of all governments — particularly in NATO — to make up their minds on what the nature and extent of the Communist threat really is, and stick to that opinion. Unless we do that, all our alliances are going to decay because there will be nothing to hold them together. We had just as well make up our minds about this. This argument implies, of course, an agreement on a common approach and common measures to meet the threat.

If the British and French have one idea and we have another, not much is going to be accomplished. And I suppose that if the Japanese get sulky and will not co-operate, whatever contribution they might make is not going to be their main purpose. Sooner or later, I presume, Japan (nations generally run true to form)

will again become a fairly powerful nation, whose aid could be really valuable in case the Chinese Communists got tough.

I think the second need lies in improving the nature of our alliances by simplifying them. This means both an extension and, if possible, a partial integration. I think there are too many rival alliances. I do not believe we are going to be able to maintain, for instance, the present rule on nuclear weapons. Unless we change it in time, the French and the others will go ahead and make their own. Having made their own, they will be far less amenable to discussion of common tactics than they were before they had the weapons. In my opinion, now is the time for us to move. If the only way we can stop the French from making their own weapons is an occupation by the Marines (although that might be popular with those Marines who once saw Paris), it would be a difficult task and Congress would hardly approve of it. Therefore, we have got to face an inevitable choice.

In the same way, I see no reason why the budding Latin American demand for some greater integration of the Organization of American States with NATO should not be listened to and discussed. I could tell you of several Latin Americans who have spoken to me and said that their basic wish is to draw on Europe to a greater extent for their cultural background and to draw upon the United States more economically and militarily. After all, they are (with the exception of the Indians) of European origin, and we all share a common civilization.

I think that even if the present juggling act appeals to the jugglers, reducing the number of balls being thrown in the air would diminish the chances of dropping one or more of them. After all, we in this country are not doing too well in the Cold War. We have taken many steps, but the question arises: Have we taken them rapidly enough to meet the danger? All one has to do is to look at the map and compare where Communism was in 1943 with where it is in 1958 — no words are necessary. Next, I think that Americans abroad should work through foreigners where possible. We would not like a lot of foreigners over here

unless they were willing to work with and through Americans. Within our alliances, it would be useful to put forward suggestions through some ally, particularly a small ally. The United States should be big enough to forego the credit. Then we need to have to put better choices in key positions, from ambassadors down. We are going to have to give them better training. It is no longer tolerable that important diplomatic posts be given as "political plums" to vested politicians unless they happen to have the qualities necessary for those posts. Since 1945, we have made great improvements in our diplomatic preparation. But if you would like an ugly criticism of what we are doing, there is a new book called *The Ugly American* which is good reading and which I suggest some of you might take to bed with you.

Finally, there is the question of how Americans in large groups — military, mostly — should behave when they are quartered among allied peoples. There, again, we catch it whatever we do. If we mix too much with the inhabitants they may say we are rowdies, although I am told that the Army and Air Force are doing quite well in Britain on a broadly-mixing platform. If we do not mix with them — well, there is the thing which I met in France, in which a whole French village said: "*Les Américains sont tres gentils*" — "The Americans are quite nice," yet added, "but we want them to go home." When I pressed a friend to say just why, he replied: "Your men have nothing to do with us. They are a foreign body — we don't like foreign bodies in our midst." Well, I shall not try to decide that one, because I know it is a ticklish matter.

Also it concerns this question: Should we take our own food and give the impression that we eat out of P. X.'s because we do not *know* that Viennese cooks can do it better, or because we think we have greater hygiene than Switzerland? Either, of course, would be absurd. Or, should we take *their* food and be subject to the charge that we are stripping their countryside to feed our hordes in their midst? It is not an easy problem. Don't think I'm a smart Alex and think I know how it ought to be

solved. But the problem should be met better than it is being met, and I think more thought should be given to it.

My own prejudice is in favor of mixing with allies. I think that on the whole most Americans are pretty likeable, easy-going chaps. If they were better prepared, and told that local customs and products have their own reasons and are something better than ours (for instance, French sauces), they would get along quite well. We should tell those Americans that they do not have to be ghetto-ized, lead socially-restricted lives, or go to the same dances and all do the same things twenty-four hours a day.

You will notice (I am sorry to be overtime) that I have said nothing about the horror of nuclear weapons except that I think we ought to talk somewhat less about them. That is because, unlike some of my science-and-sociology-minded friends, I do not believe that the presence of a new danger will quickly bring about any change in human nature. I note that when warriors went out in primitive times they knew that many, if not all of them, would not come home. I read that Tamerlane managed to put all the population of Samarkand to the sword — 300,000 men, women, and children — and left nothing of the city. Therefore, I suspect that we are exaggerating the deterrent elements inherent in new weapons (not but what they exist) ; that people can be expected to continue acting more or less as they always have acted; that, in the long run, even the most acute danger loses its power to scare; and that today's individuals will follow the age-old historical pattern. Frankly, to imagine that whole peoples will follow new peace patterns because they seem reasonable is to bet on a frail reed. When in history have you ever known peoples or rulers over a long period to act in accordance with strict reason? In consequence, the steps I have suggested for strengthening our alliances are those that can be taken on the assumption that we and other peoples are going to remain much as we have been. They are those that seem to me possible today.

Thank you, and excuse me for talking too long!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Mr. Edgar A. Mowrer

Mr. Mowrer received his A.B. degree from the University of Michigan in 1913, and later studied at the University of Chicago and the Sorbonne in Paris.

He began his journalistic career as a war correspondent with the *Chicago Daily News* in France, Belgium and Italy during 1914 and 1915. Following World War I, he was Chief of the *Chicago Daily News* Bureau in Berlin and then Chief of the Bureau in Paris. He worked in Washington, D. C., from 1940 to 1941 and then, after touring the Far East, became the Deputy Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and Office of War Information until 1943.

Mr. Mowrer has recently become a member of the Executive Committee of the coming U. S. Delegation to the meeting called by the NATO Parliamentarians, which is to be held in London next June to study what should be done to strengthen our principal alliance.

He has been the American editor of the international magazine, *Western World*, since 1956. He is the author of *Immortal Italy*; *This American World*; *The Future of Politics*; *Germany Puts the Clock Back*; *The Dragon Awakes*; *Global War* (co-author with Martha Rajchman); *The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy*; and *Challenge and Decision*. He has contributed to American and English magazines since 1913, and is still a columnist on foreign affairs and a broadcaster. He was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for overseas reporting in 1932.