

Naval War College Review

Volume 12
Number 4 *April*

Article 1

1959

April 1959 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

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Recommended Citation

Naval War College, The U.S. (1959) "April 1959 Full Issue," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 12 : No. 4 , Article 1.
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Vol. XI No. 8

April, 1959

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.**

THE U. S. NAVY'S ROLE IN GENERAL WAR AND CONFLICT SHORT OF GENERAL WAR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 10 December 1958 by

*Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations*

It is always a pleasure for me to speak to the Naval War College and to take on your barrage of searching questions.

Each officer here has been purposely selected to step aside from the daily main stream of immediately urgent problems. Your mission now, while you are here, is to think, to reassess and scrutinize established ideas, to size up new approaches to our problems, and, above all, to work on those problems.

In the coming years you are going to carry some very heavy burdens, and certainly you will have grave responsibilities. This is the year which has been allotted to you to prepare yourselves for those demanding years ahead.

For this reason, I am eager not so much to recount factual matter this morning, which you can absorb quietly by reading, nor will I speak to you about the Navy this morning. What I would like to do is to present to you a challenge — a challenge of a new outlook on some very serious problems that confront the United States. You are going to hear a lot more questions than answers from me this morning, but they are serious questions with which all of us are now faced, and will be faced until we either get some answers or quit.

I would like to start with a scrutiny of basic attitudes. It is obvious that our enemy is the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This is where the threat to us and to the entire Free World comes from.

How do you look upon the Soviet Union? If you look upon it as a traditional state, buttressed by great military strength, you are probably fairly optimistic that over the long haul we can contain it by military strength alone.

But most of us, I think, would vigorously protest that we do not look upon the Soviet Union in exactly this way. Instead, we would say that the Soviet Union was in the hands of a dedicated revolutionary group which believes that it is destined, as a party, to turn the entire world communistic and to rule it from Moscow.

But, regardless of our protests, many of us tend to slide into the error of judging the Soviet regime by traditional nation-state standards. We pride ourselves in liking to think in logical terms. We thus feel more at ease in judging an otherwise puzzling situation. The danger here is — and you can see frequent evidence of it — that we tend to believe the Soviet objectives are limited, that skillful compromise can solve our problems, and that the Soviets can gradually be educated to believe that reason is the best guide of conduct. In short, some of us erroneously believe that if we sit and wait, the situation will evolve within the Soviet Union to our satisfaction.

What I am getting at is simply this: as a people, we have indeed been very clearly informed by those who are running the Communist Bloc that we are their enemy, that we will be their victim, and that they intend to eradicate our way of life. For them, a campaign of attrition against us is the order of the day, and this has been going on for over forty years. For them, waging such a war of attrition is a virtue, for the world demands it — so they assert.

Our people have not squarely faced up to this problem. It is not surprising that the Communists are encouraged by the successes they have had. In short, they have clear, simple objectives and the will to pursue those objectives. They feel that they have nothing to lose and the whole world to gain.

Why are we, as a people, so unwilling to face up to this fact? Why can't we realize that we cannot react violently to one provocation and then sink back into lethargy? Why do recurring offers of Soviet peace stir a new, but vain, hope? Why do we tend to believe that the Soviets will give up their philosophy and watch their Communist edifice collapse?

One of the basic reasons lies in our national character. We are optimistic if we are left to our own devices. We find compromise a desirable solution when we think that honor itself is not sacrificed. We find deliberate, sustained hatred and aggressiveness alien to our spirit.

Therefore, when we are not faced with a dramatic Communist push we like to believe that things are not so bad after all. We tend to judge the Soviet leaders by the standards we use to judge a neighbor, an ally, or a traditional nation-state. I am stressing this simple, basic subject because confusion over the enemy threat can set off a whole chain of decisive, but disastrous, evaluations of that threat.

Let's look at this matter more closely. First, let me summarize what I believe is the Soviet approach to reaching its objectives. We must, of course, allow for every contingency in Soviet actions. The action which is most talked about is the possibility of a Soviet sneak attack against the United States.

Simple prudence on our part demands alertness for this type of attack. But certainly it does not demand hysteria or obsession. There is no real evidence that the Soviets have directed their energies toward such an attack. It is true that they have developed a long-range air force, but heavy bombers constitute only a small part of this force. We have seen what the Soviets can do with a project when they give overriding priority to that project. I think it is obvious that a deliberate intention to cripple the United States as soon as feasible by a sneak attack has not had such priority in the Soviet Union.

What, then, is their way of achieving their aims? I think we have ample evidence, not very difficult to find, that their means to an objective are not primarily military — and that includes navies as well as air forces and armies. The Soviets will never make the mistake of becoming militarily weak. But they prefer to gain their objectives through the *threat* of force and, on the other side of the coin, through the *prestige* of real military strength.

I believe that we have consistently erred as a nation in attributing to the Soviets an intention to gain their objectives solely by the use of military force. This implies that their military men have been given a mission of conquest for the Soviet Union.

The evidence, however, points the other way. It is a group of professional political conspirators who carry out the mission of the Communist World. Their design is to disintegrate the institutions of the Free World and to remake civilization. For them, military strength is an important instrument in political warfare, but it is only one of the several different means by which to gain their objectives, step by step, in the cautious manner of conspirators.

They have shown — and they now show — a rare skill in the psychological use of good military strength. They have often gained their ends without having to commit their forces, and that is important. But, more important, they are schooled in the discipline of the prudent use of military force. Their cardinal rule is that the destiny of Communism must not be jeopardized by hair-brained risk. This has been so in the past and it seems likely to continue in the future. This helps to explain why we miss the boat so often in trying to deal with such an enemy.

He has a clear objective. He disposes all of his resources in all of his territory in one integrated campaign to gain that objective. He fights in the fields of politics, of economics, of psychology, and of culture. He fights hard all of the time on all fronts and in every area. He aids and abets troublemakers throughout the Free World. He can increase or reduce pressure. He can talk gently, or he can bellow. Across the entire spectrum of this type of warfare he uses his resources to weaken the Free World, to confuse it, to frighten it, and, finally, to make it feel helpless.

The main point is, of course, that he is committed to making this kind of Communist war against us, and he never doubts this. For him, it is normal. For him, he must carry out that kind of a battle or he, himself, becomes an enemy to the revolution. We in the Free World somehow or other refuse to take this very seri-

ously. Theoretically, we recognize it, but we do not really act as though we took it seriously at all.

Let me offer an illustration of how we unconsciously adapt ourselves to the Soviet ground rules. If you face up to the facts, you will have to admit that one of the ground rules laid down by the Soviets is that the battleground of the cold war is on Free World territory. It is never within the Soviet Bloc.

If you reflect upon this for a moment, I think you will also have to admit that most of the Free World has tacitly accepted that the Soviet Union will meddle or attack beyond its borders but that the Free World may not make trouble within the territory under Soviet control.

When the Geneva Summit Meeting was in preparation, you probably remember that the Soviets stated flatly Eastern Europe was not acceptable as a subject of discussion. Their attitude during and following the Hungarian uprising also followed exactly the same pattern. However, when Great Britain and France attacked Egypt, the Soviets had a great deal to say, including the threat to destroy France and Britain.

We witnessed a similar situation when Syria falsely claimed that Turkey was about to attack her. And, recently, the Soviets declared themselves involved when we responded to Lebanon's request for aid. What they say in effect is that what happens in the non-Communist World is their business, but what happens in the Communist World is nobody else's business. Unfortunately, the Free World has let itself be conditioned to accepting that Soviet point of view.

The Free World shudders at the thought of any Western interference within the Communist orbit. It also shudders when the Communists threaten to interfere with a Free World situation. I am merely laying bare for you a tacit principle of the entire cold war. It is not very pleasant to contemplate. Something very dangerous happens to the man who comes to accept that the other fellow will always carry the ball.

To what can a situation like this lead? It is simply this: you approach a situation where the enemy defines the issues, where the enemy makes the challenge, where the enemy selects the ground on which the conflict is to be waged, and where the enemy chooses the weapons.

This is very well worth reflecting upon, because it points up the power of purpose contrasted with the weakness of drifting. Lest you misinterpret that remark, I mean that the people of the United States, as a people, are drifting — not just the Administration, Truman or Eisenhower, not just Congress, not the Democrats, not the Republicans, but we, as citizens of the United States, are drifting. We cannot brush this off on somebody else's shoulders for the burden is on the shoulders of each of us.

I would now like to examine the role of military power today. Here, again, let's take a long look at some of the common working concepts which we have taken for granted.

In the first place, our nation has grown accustomed to thinking that the only problem of the United States lies in deterring an all-out Soviet surprise attack against us with nuclear weapons. This is a legitimate problem in itself, and all aspects of the threat to the United States must be examined, including that grave one. But to become totally preoccupied with this contingency alone can leave us helpless before the many other courses of action available to an imaginative enemy and, of all things we should have learned by now, we should have learned that the Soviets are imaginative.

Once having decided that prevention of an all-out attack on the United States represented the military facts of life, there was a temptation for us to try to make our military strength for strategic retaliation do the job of preventing the Soviets from any type of aggression. I do not mean by this any type of military aggression, but I mean any type of aggression, political, economic, as well as small military aggressions.

Massive retaliation, which became a slogan, reigned for a time under the guise of a practical concept and a simple solution.

What happened? The Communists continued the expansion of their influence and prestige, regardless of our ability to destroy them, regardless of the strategic nuclear threat.

A strategic nuclear stalemate has now come about. The Soviets fully realize — we have told them, and they are convinced that we mean it — that a sneak attack against the United States is filled with the risk, or probably even the certainty, that we will destroy Russia. They know, we know, everybody knows if they attack the United States, Russia itself will be wiped out. It will be destroyed. Thus, just as long as we have sufficient strength to assure them of significant retaliation, the possibility of an all-out attack becomes very remote.

The possibility should become even more remote once POLARIS is functioning in sufficient numbers. POLARIS brings out more clearly a misconception that we have had about deterrence. To deter general nuclear war, we must have a real, demonstrable, and, preferably, an invulnerable capability to inflict wide-spread destruction.

A true deterrent has no gradations. It does not need a condition of more deterrent or most deterrent. For these reasons, the Navy of the future may have only a relatively small percentage of its forces devoted to the all-out nuclear deterrent problem, but these forces will be virtually invulnerable. Regardless, however, of how much we think POLARIS can contribute, regardless of how much we realize that POLARIS can destroy Russia, it is not the only problem and it is not even the greatest problem. Therefore, while we have to have POLARIS, we do not need it in large numbers.

It is clear that if the Soviets had an intention to build up as rapidly as possible to attack the United States, their long-range air force would have long since been a true intercontinental force. They have demonstrated their capability of building this equipment, but intercontinental types of aircraft still constitute only a small part of their long-range air force.

I am not emphasizing these factors to challenge the necessity for preparedness against a sneak attack. That is necessary.

But that preparedness has been overaccomplished. We are over-insured for that one contingency. I simply stress that we must widen our sights to include the necessity for adequate preparedness against the more probable enemy courses of action. These enemy courses of action, which can be decisive in the long run, fall far below the flash point of general war.

Gentlemen, every American likes a bargain. We all prefer a quick and simple solution to our problems. This is fine, when we are working among ourselves or with allies who share our way of thinking. But it will not work with the Communists. It certainly cannot be applied to the military facts of life today.

We are not engaged in any tennis match where losing a set or so can be made up later. We are engaged in a power struggle in which the enemy is out for attrition. Through consolidated strength and rigid controls, he intends to make his day-by-day victories irreversible.

By tradition and temperament, we Americans think of the "white" of peace or the "black" of war. We are not very much at ease with the dragging, nagging cold war that is neither peace nor general war but that vast "gray" area in between. This gray area is the area of Communist warfare and the area of attrition. It is the avoidance of dramatic Soviet military attacks, but the constant nibbling all the way around the periphery of the world. And those nibbles are going to come faster, and faster, and faster.

Lebanon followed Suez, although there was quite a time in between; Taiwan followed closely on the heels of Lebanon; Berlin followed closely on the heels of Taiwan; and, several days ago, the Governments of Finland and Iceland fell.

The Government of Finland fell because of the economic pressure that was applied to it. The Soviets decided they did not like the leaders of Finland, so they broke the government. Finland did not want to break it, but the Soviets put direct economic pressure on her and said, in effect: "Either change your government or this pressure continues." And Finland changed her government. That will happen again. There are no Communists in the Finnish

Government; they are anti-Communists, and that is why they were broken.

The Icelandic Government fell for a different reason and because of a different kind of Soviet pressure: Soviet political pressure from the Communist Party of Iceland. This is power demonstrated in the way they intend to use it. This is the power that we, as Americans, are going to have to combat. You cannot combat that kind of power with strictly military force. It is in this gray area of cold war that we have been living for the past thirteen years, an area in which we will go on living for a long, long while in the future. It is high time, therefore, for us as a people to face up to this and to coldly plan to operate on this basis for generations ahead.

Nations usually die not from being clobbered from without, or from beyond their borders, but because of what happens to them from within. They die because they lose their stamina, their will, their willingness to work, and their character. Take Germany, for example. She was clobbered twice, yet she is now a strong nation in Europe. Nations die because the people of the nation become so self-interested, perhaps even so selfish, that they allow that self-interest to interfere with their public interest. Their selfish interests become paramount, while their public interests take second place. They use public affairs to make private gains.

The history of the first democracy of the world, which fell, proves that this has been going on for a long time. Athens was the first city to have a democratic form of government. When it started out, it was one of the most powerful city-states in the world, and it lasted for a long, long time. It died not because of what Sparta could do, for Athens defeated Sparta over and over again. It died not because of what the Macedonians did to it externally.

It died because the Athenians no longer would support their State, no longer would they give their services, no longer would they go out on the battlefield to fight, and no longer would they internally resist the pleasures that come from soft living.

Philip of Macedonia made slaves of the Athenians. He made happy slaves of them, so that they were people who were perfectly happy and contented. All Philip asked was tribute, for them not to engage in any external affairs, and for them to be satisfied with living their lives out, which is a terrible thing to contemplate.

What happened to Egypt and Rome? Let's look at France.

France is a nation of great people. Why does de Gaulle have the strength that he has in France at the present time? De Gaulle may have faults, but he has one great virtue. It is a virtue which Frenchmen now recognize. He works for France. He does not work for de Gaulle. He does not work for a party. He works for France. Right or wrong, everything that he does in the international arena he does for the glory of France. He will bring France up, and she will come up, by doing things which others may not like. But when de Gaulle dies, what happens to France? What can happen to France? Is there a large group of Frenchmen who are willing to follow de Gaulle? Will de Gaulle generate a successor of his own qualities? These things are serious things.

If we, as a nation, should ever come to convince ourselves that situations like Berlin, Greece, Lebanon, Korea, Quemoy and Taiwan are really little pieces of real estate of no decisive value, we shall then surely be on the road to disaster. It is quite true that any one of these situations, if taken by itself in terms of narrow logic, does not seem vital. But if they are all taken together, and with the others that are certain to come along, they can be decisive.

To what conclusion does all of this lead? Simply to this: the real aggression of Communism is on the day-to-day scene. It is not likely to be in an all-out nuclear attack against us so long as we maintain an adequate strategic nuclear deterrent. We have already witnessed how many people readily equate our defense against local aggression as the first step in a chain reaction leading to all-out nuclear warfare.

We know that the Soviets do not want the all-out nuclear exchange any more than do we. When they sponsor a local war, or

when they shoulder us in a situation like Berlin, the Soviets are really in control of the situation. If they meet firm resistance in that situation, they talk, and the action peters out. If they do not meet resistance, it is another addition to their power. The situation never again arises because that situation has then been included within the Soviet Bloc.

Here, then, is the area in which we must expect to take them on, and where we will *have* to take them on. This is the area where the true imbalance of our preparedness now exists. If we buckle in this area through lots of talk and inadequate preparedness or inadequate willingness, we are submitting to defeat by attrition.

Under such circumstances, there will be no death agony. There will be a prolonged, gradual, almost painless ebbing of the life and of the spirit of the Free World.

Remember that the Communist aggression calls for a lot more than the proper type of military preparedness. Military preparedness in itself *is* vital, but Communist aggression calls for a lot more than that. The problem which we face is one for the entire nation, for every individual. Our country has always been dedicated to the pursuit of happiness. But far too many of our people have narrowed this to the pursuit of material happiness. The Soviets, on the other hand, are dedicated with a discipline to the pursuit of power. This is what is involved in Berlin, in the Taiwan Straits, and all over the Middle East — power.

Too many Americans are prone to react to these situations by extremes. One reaction is that a small area of the Free World is not worth fighting for. The other reaction, often coupled with the first, is that the Soviets will initiate general war if we contest Communism campaigns in any one of these local areas. Neither reaction is worthy of us. The first reaction throws overboard our principles and our honor; the second brings on psychological paralysis in the face of every Soviet move.

In this power struggle of today, general war is remote because the Soviets do not want it and are not going to jeopardize

their power base for any non-Soviet territory. This has been proved over and over again. Every time they have been faced with the possibility of a fight, they have walked back the cat. Berlin is a challenge, and the Soviets would like to see us fold, a victim of our own fears. If we stand firm in this and all of the other day-to-day pressure areas, they will turn off the heat on Berlin and wait for another day and another place. We cannot give in to attrition, and this is where the decisiveness and the struggle will surely and eventually lie.

Gentlemen, the cold war in which we now are engaged will last just as long as we shall live. How we make out in this war will be largely dependent upon what we, as a nation, are willing to do, how hard we are willing to work, whether we have enough strong men to shoulder the public interest and let their private interests go.

The creed of service and action has been the creed of the Navy for a long time. As naval officers, you have great responsibilities for the future of your country, responsibilities of example, of advice, and, quite frequently, of action.

May you have the knowledge, the power, and, above all, the willingness to carry those responsibilities.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, United States Navy

Admiral Burke was graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1923. After various duty assignments, including post-graduate training in Ordnance Engineering, he had his first command in the U. S. S. MUGFORD in 1939.

During World War II, he served in destroyers in the South Pacific and, later, as Chief of Staff to Admiral Mitscher, Commander Fast Carrier Task Forces. In January, 1945, he became Chief of Staff to Commander EIGHTH Fleet, and in September of the following year he became Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

Following a year of duty with the General Board, Admiral Burke assumed command of the U. S. S. HUNTINGTON, after which he returned to the Navy Department as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Organization, Research and Policy Division). In January, 1950, he became Navy Secretary of the Research and Development Board.

During the early part of the Korean War, Admiral Burke was Deputy Chief of Staff to Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Far East. In the spring of 1951, he assumed command of Cruiser Division FIVE. While on this duty he was ordered as a member of the Military Armistice Negotiating Team in Korea.

Admiral Burke became Director of the Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in December, 1951. After serving as Commander, Cruiser Division SIX from April, 1954 to 20 January 1955, he was Commander Destroyer Forces, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. Since 17 August 1955, Admiral Burke has been Chief of Naval Operations.

CURRENT U. S. MILITARY STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 8 December 1958 by
Major George Fielding Eliot

Admiral Lyman, Gentlemen:

It is an honor and a privilege for me again to have the opportunity of addressing the faculty and students of America's oldest institution of higher military education. In fact, I have never visited the Naval War College, either as a guest lecturer or as a participant in a discussion group, without personal pleasure and professional profit. I have yet to leave your hospitable doors without knowing that I took away with me gifts far more valuable than any that I had brought.

This morning, my assignment is a challenging one indeed: an analysis of current U. S. military strategy and how it supports the participation of our armed forces, either under circumstances of general war or of conflict short of general war.

At the very outset, I had a problem. What is our strategy? What policy objectives is it designed to support? What role are the armed forces assumed to play under current policies in support of these objectives?

Fortune was very kind to me, or perhaps I should say that Secretary Dulles was kind to me, for just four days ago the Secretary of State delivered a speech in San Francisco in which he set forth the clearest thumbnail analysis of our national strategy which I have seen from so authoritative a source in several years.

This speech is of special significance because it indicates so forcefully the increased weight which is being given to military considerations in the formulation of national policy, and this has not always been so. No one would claim for military opinion a preponderant place in the determination of policy. But, as the late Edward Mead Earle once wrote: "Diplomacy and strategy, political commitments and military power are inseparable. Unless

this be recognized, foreign policy will be bankrupt. Strategy, therefore, is not merely a concept of wartime but it is an inherent element of statecraft at all times." With this view, few students of the Naval War College (or any other of the War Colleges) would be likely to take issue. It has, however, not always prevailed at the higher levels of political decision.

I recall not many years ago attending a background briefing session for newsmen in Washington on the subject of "U. S.-Soviet Relations." It was supposed to be a Joint State and Defense effort. Presiding was an Assistant Secretary of State, who introduced his colleagues about like this: "Gentlemen, I would like you to know Mr. Jones, who is an outstanding expert on Soviet foreign policy and one of the principal advisers of the Department of State on that subject. This is Doctor Brown, our leading expert in the State Department on the Soviet economy. And this is Captain Smith, from the Pentagon." That was eloquent of the level of importance which was then ascribed to military considerations in the making of our foreign policy. It is encouraging, today, to find the Secretary of State himself coming around unmistakably to the view that diplomacy and strategy, political commitments and military power are indeed inseparable.

I cannot possibly do better by way of introducing my assigned subject than to quote briefly two portions of Secretary Dulles' speech (incidentally, I think you would find it rewarding to read the whole of it). It is printed in the *New York Herald Tribune* for December 5:

It is our policy to check the Communist use or threat of force by having retaliatory power, and the will to use it, so that Communist use of force would obviously be unprofitable to them.

I emphasize both the power *and* the will. One without the other is useless. Also, that will must be made sufficiently manifest that political aggressors, when they make their calculations, will calculate that they could not aggress without disaster to themselves . . .

It is, however, not enough merely to have great retaliatory striking power. It is necessary to have forces-in-being at endangered points. Nations which are in close proximity to powerful aggressive forces need the reassurance of some visible force within their own territory. They are not content to be wholly dependent upon forces and decisions elsewhere.

Furthermore, vast retaliatory power should not be, and will not be, invoked lightly. There must be an ability to oppose what may be limited probings in ways less drastic than general nuclear war.

A capacity quickly to help Lebanon; such power as was rapidly deployed in the Taiwan area; the presence of United States forces in such areas as Berlin, West Germany, and Korea — all contribute essentially to the peace and security of our country.

These remarks that I have just quoted were in the forepart of Mr. Dulles' speech, which dealt generally with the situation of the Pacific. Then, at the close, he defined the basic objective of American policy:

But history has demonstrated again and again that democracies are almost always stronger than they seem and despotisms are always more vulnerable than they appear. For example: It is impossible for Communist nations to develop into modern industrial states without a large degree of education. But minds so educated also penetrate the fallacies of Marxism and increasingly resist conformity.

Also there are increasing demands on the part of the subject peoples for more consumer goods, for more of the fruits of their labor. These demands cannot be indefinitely repressed or satisfied merely with recurrent promises.

Such internal pressures are bound to alter the character of the Communist regimes, particularly if

these regimes are denied the glamor and prestige of great external successes.

Then, very significantly, the Secretary continues:

To deny external successes to international communism is not merely a negative, defensive policy. It accelerates the evolution within the Sino-Soviet bloc of governmental policies which will increasingly seek the welfare of their own peoples rather than exploit these peoples in the interest of world conquest.

There, in plain words, we have the basic mission of our armed forces in support of U. S. policy objectives as seen by the Secretary of State. That mission is, let me repeat: "To deny external successes to international communism."

It would be outside the scope of this talk for me to try to evaluate the political premises on which Mr. Dulles bases this statement of military requirements. He prescribes a military posture which is essentially defensive in order to deny the enemy any escape by military adventures from the otherwise inevitable consequences of the internal contradictions of Communist doctrine.

The overall policy itself may not be negative and defensive in character, as the Secretary says, but the part to be played by our armed forces is certainly defensive. If there is to be military initiative, under this policy, it will come from the other side.

The military mission defined by Mr. Dulles is to be performed by two kinds of forces: (1) Great retaliatory striking power, together with the manifest will to use it; (2) Forces-in-being to deal with limited aggression, or probings, or to aid our allies in doing so. These forces are to be used, let us note, not only to check the Communist use of force but also their use of the threat of force. Mr. Dulles speaks in one place of a manifest will to react forcibly; in another, of visible power. Our force should be such as to deter the enemy from aggression and to bolster the confidence of our friends in our ability to do so. We must be strong enough not only to deny international communism external success

by actual attack, but also by blackmail and subversion under the threat — latent or explicit — of attack.

Since the military initiative, however, remains with the Communists, and especially as both the President and the Secretary of State have repeatedly pledged this nation never to start a major war, we must begin any analysis of our national strategy by considering the nature of the military threat which we must be prepared to deter or to defeat. That threat resides chiefly in the military and industrial power of the Soviet Union. Without Soviet support, the Chinese Communists offer little present threat to the United States, whatever their potential for the future may be.

Soviet military policy is designed, as is ours, to support Soviet progress toward national objectives. In their case, the principal national objective is simply a conquest of a monopoly of power throughout the world, eliminating all opposition. There is little indication that the Soviet leadership thinks this objective can be quickly attained. It is rather to be reached by steady, unswerving, day-to-day and year-by-year progress — a progress in which the aim of the leadership never wavers from the goal. In the course of this advance, all elements of policy of the Soviet States — political, psychological, economic and military — are consistently made to bear their due share of the total effort as members of the Soviet team.

The influence of Soviet military policy on the overall policy of the Soviet government is gauged by their own cold estimate of Soviet military potential as an instrument of Soviet purposes. This estimate seems to be based not only on what they believe they can do in a military way from time to time, but also on what they hope they can induce others to believe they can do.

For initiating full-scale nuclear war (to take the major case first), the actual Soviet potential today is not as great as it is going to be within the next two or three years. For an attack against the United States bases in North America now, the Soviets would have to depend on a combination of the piloted

aircraft of their long-range air army and such missile-bearing, conventionally-powered submarines as they could manage to deploy and keep alive long enough to launch their birds within striking distance of our coast, supplemented perhaps by a very few ICBM's of uncertain accuracy. In none of these elements is their existing striking power very great.

Our defenses against aircraft and against submarines are also growing more effective with the passage of time. The Soviets must therefore expect to receive very nearly the full scale of retaliatory effort that the Strategic Air Command could deliver from its home bases. Their intermediate-range ballistic missiles, it is true, could strike many of SAC's overseas bases and probably wipe out such aircraft as they caught on the ground there. But from these bases there would still be some aircraft that would probably be able to take off, or that would be already in flight. From the bases in Spain, probably most of the available bombers would get off, since these bases are at extreme range for existing Soviet IRBM's. Finally, the Soviets will have to take the full effect of our Navy's striking power, launched from attack carriers at sea which are moving targets that cannot be zeroed in by ballistic missiles and which the Soviets cannot count on destroying by surprise in any other fashion available to them.

The net amount of retaliatory nuclear weapons-yield, which, under today's conditions, could be expected to penetrate the Soviet defensive system, would add up to unacceptable punishment in anybody's book. Probably a sufficient degree of damage to the Soviet Fatherland would tear apart the tight control system upon which the tenure of power — and, hence, the personal existence — of the Soviet leadership depends.

On the basis of these calculations the Soviets are deterred, for the time being, in seeking to settle accounts with us once and for all by a surprise nuclear attack. This does not mean that the *threat* of such an attack remains negligible. The threat lies not in the realm of military reality, but in another reality: the fact that if it were attempted, an indispensable feature of the operation would be a maximum effort by Soviet intermediate-range missiles

against every overseas U. S. air base and missile base within their reach in Western Europe, Turkey, and the offshore islands of Asia. For such an effort, a significant Soviet military capability exists. Every people which has such a U. S. base within its borders is painfully aware that this is true; every people to whose government a proposal is made by Washington to add to these bases additional launching sites for American intermediate-range missiles knows that these missile bases are to be set up within the arcs of fire of Soviet IRBM's which are already in place and operational.

The facts as to the blast, heat and fall-out effect of hydrogen warheads have been endlessly discussed in the free press of both Western Europe and Japan. They have been emphasized by recent Soviet missile tests — deliberately planned, as it seems, to be the dirtiest of the dirty. On top of this, the Soviet government has publicly warned every nation concerned of the possible consequences of harboring United States bases from which the Soviet Union could be threatened. We should not be complacent because most of the governments concerned have officially rejected these warnings. Every one of them, except perhaps that of General de Gaulle in France, could be upset by a sufficient swing of public opinion to the opposition. Most opposition parties in Western Europe are making hay with this threat of nuclear annihilation, and offering one form or another of appeasement as a panacea.

The bold confidence which the Soviet government has recently displayed — notably, in its virtual ultimatum regarding the future of Berlin — is derived directly from its understanding that our European allies, facing a threat of being turned into radioactive particles, with two to three minutes of warning time, are reluctant to support any "get tough" policy turned up in distant Washington. Soviet diplomats today, says the experienced Drew Middleton of *The New York Times*, "discuss issues in terms of power rather than of Marxian dialectics." One such diplomat the other day calmly enquired, in a public interview, whether we did not realize that the fate of Berlin was already decided by the existing facts of the balance of power in Europe.

It is the intermediate-range missile, in operational quantity, which forms the basis for this confidence and for the extreme distress of many of our European friends. The latter know that if the Soviets do try a surprise attack, their primary targets must be the bases of our retaliatory forces — whether airfields or missile bases. They know that if those bases are located in their lands the fact that these missiles are not completely accurate weapons (in their present stage of development, at any rate) requires the use of high-yield warheads in order to be sure of clobbering the targets at which they are fired and, with consequent result, the surrounding populations, of which they also are very, very much aware. So it happens that of the intermediate-range missiles which we had hoped to establish abroad, we have so far only been able to get the somewhat tough-minded British to accept them. There are reports that there will be some established in Italy, but this is still hanging fire.

For the future, we may well ask: How much actual deterrence are we going to get from weapons of this type, or from weapons of any type, which depend on the concurrence of other governments besides our own for their use? The reaction time to a surprise attack by ballistic missiles is short enough anyway, without undertaking a debate as to whether we are going to shoot back.

Some of these shortcomings of the fixed-base intermediate-range ballistic missile, as an instrument of our current strategy, appear to be taking root in Washington. We are having a cutback in that particular type of missile, and it is quite possible that these programs will not be continued after current commitments have been met. We are told that the reason for this is that breakthroughs in the development of intercontinental missiles make these “increasingly attractive” (I believe this was the term which the Secretary of Defense used) in relation to the IRBM’s.

We can ask whether this is really true in terms of the strategic objective which we are thinking about. In fact, gentlemen, I think we may well ask whether any fixed-base weapon

(especially a fixed-base ballistic missile) is anything else but a target for the enemy under conditions of enemy armament with a high-speed striking weapon *and* the privilege of shooting first.

It is difficult to understand the theory that when we must take the first blow we should adopt armament which requires us to provide the enemy with a locatable target, and stand still to be shot at. We are told that a great dispersion of air and missile bases can so diversify the enemy's target problem that he cannot meet it. This simply means that we think we can build bases faster than the enemy can build missiles to destroy them, which seems a little uncertain. We are told that hardening of these bases — i.e., the provision of massive concrete defenses — will so reduce their vulnerability that the enemy cannot count on destroying them. This is the old argument which goes back, I suppose, to an argument between the battering ram and the wall and continues through gun and armor and various other phases. As long as it is a question of penetrating armor of any kind, and as long as the technological race continues, there is no great security in that seesaw. We still have the really terrible problem of reaction time. This might amount to as little as ten to fifteen minutes for intercontinental missiles, as these become operational in enemy hands in greater quantities, and as little as two or three minutes for the intermediate-range missiles at overseas bases.

The truth is this: in a period of military history where the principal armament of our principal opponent is a weapon which strikes within time limits of that kind, position warfare is dead; the side that shoots last is dead, too, if it adopts a war of position. For the side that shoots last, mobility is the only hope — either of survival or of effective deterrence. The old principle of fire and movement, which I learned as a second lieutenant, included: do not let your men bunch up and stand still to be shot at. Standing still to be shot at when the enemy's weapons are rifles is foolish; standing still to be shot at when the enemy's weapons are nuclear warheads, carried by ballistic missiles, is just suicidal.

Yet, the idea of these giant missiles is taking hold on the imagination of the public to a very considerable extent and, apparently, on the official imagination as well. As an illustration of how far what appears to me to be wrong-headed, wishful thinking can go, I invite your attention to the current issue of *Newsweek Magazine* on the successful firing of an ATLAS test missile from Cape Canaveral:

For all practical purposes, the U. S. now has what Air Force missile strategists call "emergency operational capability" in the ICBM missile field. In other words, if the Russians should attack this country, and President Eisenhower proposed to retaliate by firing an ATLAS at Russia, it could be done from Cape Canaveral.

Then the article goes on immediately to say: "It would take some hours to fuel and prepare the missile."

Question: If the Russians should attack this country under such conditions, what would be their number one target?

It seems to me that the primary requirement of a deterrent force whose object is to deter surprise attacks by ballistic missiles is not to possess the *surprise attack potential* of the ballistic missile but to possess a *survival potential* against surprise attack — not only to possess it, but so clearly to have the ability to survive as to make the enemy certain that retaliation will come, whatever his efforts may be. That deterrent, besides being reasonably immune from surprise destruction, must be sufficient in strength to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy; and, in order to be believable, it must be situated far away from populated friendly areas. This is so because as the tensions rise it will be less and less believable — either to our friends or to our enemies — that we will take great risks and go to the brink of war under conditions which might produce an enemy decision to strike at the bases of our deterrent force, if these were located in our own heartland. A deterrent operates on the minds of the enemy leadership; if, in their minds, it is not credible and convincing, it is not a deterrent.

Fixed-base confrontation across the Atlantic or across Western Europe immobilizes not only our weapons but our minds and our will. Our alliances are already suffering strains under the pressures thus generated. The will of our own people to resist aggression may progressively weaken as their own safety is brought into question by studding our heartland with fixed targets.

Of course we cannot make drastic overnight changes in the whole aspect of our weapons procurement programs, but we can make changes in emphasis and priorities. I believe that an analysis of our current strategy should include the changes that seem to be indicated by the enemy's policies and the weapons and methods with which he supports them. If we are not going to be able to place many missiles of intermediate range in friendly lands overseas, and if the safety of the air bases overseas (on which a great part of the Strategic Air Command's striking power still depends) are increasingly compromised, in what direction should we begin to make changes in emphasis as we seek to secure the future against the time when the Soviets will have a striking power in their intermediate and intercontinental missiles capable of threatening our bases at home as well as abroad?

I do not see where, for the next few years at any rate, we can hope to deploy a sufficient measure of striking power to maintain our deterrent forces except on the broad reaches of the sea. It may well be that we shall have to take for our own the words which Charles II wrote in the Preamble of the old British Articles of War: "It is upon the Navy, under the good providence of God, that the safety, honor and welfare of this realm doth chiefly depend."

This is said not because I am standing on the platform of the Naval War College. It is said out of a deep conviction that we must find an adequate means, a believable and convincing means, of deterring the Soviets from launching surprise missile attacks upon our country and a visibly effective means of doing so in order to prevent them cashing in upon the blackmail possibilities which otherwise would be open to them as their missile threat increases.

A shift in emphasis, starting now, toward mobile sea-based deterrent weapons does offer a possible (if partial) answer, and is one that we barely have time to make. As you all know, the acceleration and expansion of existing programs, while not always easy, is far easier than starting new ones. We do have a considerable existing and developing capacity in attack aircraft carriers, and in planes and missiles suitable to be operated from them. We have a potential capacity in missile-firing submarines. In the operation of these and of nuclear propulsion plants, we are well ahead of the Russians. Somewhere on the drawing board, we have a nuclear-powered seaplane. It is possible to deploy both atmospheric and, if necessary, ballistic missiles in other types of surface ships; in fact, there has been a proposal to put them in battleship hulls. There is a diversity here of weapons types and of potential tactical combinations which is highly attractive to the imagination and would seem to be suited to the initiative and self-reliance which are inherent in the American character.

We have a great sea tradition; we have a long experience in dealing with the exigencies of sea warfare. While the Russians have some experience at sea, it has mostly been unfortunate and their navy lacks a tradition of victory. Indeed, almost throughout its history it has been handicapped by having been under the control of the army, and considered by dominant army opinion in national policy decisions as a mere adjunct to use in the defense of the army's flanks or for the furtherance of short-legged amphibious operations.

One advantage of a mobile deterrent force of the proposed character — indeed, its principal advantage in this connection — is that the enemy cannot count on destroying it by surprise. This does not mean that it is invulnerable; it means that the weapons available to the Soviet Navy do not permit any calculable safety factors with regard to preventing retaliation by American sea-based nuclear power by surprise destruction. Attacks upon these forces and their defense would be a matter of the chances of war. They introduce an "X" factor into the Soviet calculations which, as their delivery capacity increases, rises to prohibitive levels.

The air defense of the U. S. S. R. under these conditions also becomes increasingly difficult because of the unpredictable directions from which attack may come.

From the point of view of our allies, we have here a visible deterrent power — one where the will to use it can be made far more manifest and believable than the use of a deterrent power based in our own country or in theirs. We return to a freedom of action almost comparable to the days when we had atomic weapons and long-range delivery systems and the Russians had none.

The fixed-base ballistic missile, gentlemen, is just not our weapon — it is their weapon. It is a surprise attack weapon, and surprise attack against fixed targets is its only military use. Its military qualities, however, give it a considerable blackmail value as well. We do not intend to make a surprise attack on anyone; this has been repeatedly laid down as a basic tenet of our policy. We need not a surprise weapon, but a weapon that can survive surprise and live to strike back.

Now we come to the question of limited war; of a need for a means for dealing with local aggressions, or “probing,” as Mr. Dulles called them, where it would be unsuitable to invoke the mighty deterrent and it would not be believable that it would be used.

Remember that the mobile deterrent system, which includes a large proportion of sea-based weapons, must be based on control of the sea. Control of the sea is a very large order, if you consider that 70% of the earth’s surface is covered by salt water. It is generally construed as the ability to establish zones of maritime control where our interests for the time being require us to do so; zones in which we will have a reasonable degree of freedom of action without undue risk and which we will be relatively able to deny to the enemy, except under conditions of extreme risk to him.

If we acquire this capability (this indicates, of course, that we go far beyond deterrent weapons such as POLARIS), and

continue to be able to maintain against any conceivable enemy challenge the ability to go where we need to go — which involves a good many weapons systems and techniques beyond the mere deterrent weapons — and it becomes a condition of our survival in necessarily acquiring it, we have laid the strategic groundwork for a global mobility that will enable us to react very quickly to limited emergencies as well.

Further, it may be observed that to the degree our deterrence system is relatively invulnerable to surprise attack, it can be fitted to our concept of what constitutes in the Soviet mind an unacceptable risk. We do not have to maintain our deterrent on the basis of a margin of survival; we do not have to kill them three or four times. We formerly had to have the ability to do so in order to retain the ability to kill them once after they had hit us. The problem thus tends to level off. To the extent that it does so, resources will be released for other purposes — for research and development in the construction of future weapons, for ground forces, and for other purposes that go along with the need for maintaining the deterrent in all of its forms. Of course the sea-based form is not the only form that we will require.

Looking toward the future, the possibilities are literally fantastic — and no man can say what they will be. I am here concerned with *current* strategy as the limit of my discussion, and current strategy is concerned with staying alive so that we can get to this wonderful future.

We have seen in Lebanon and Formosa cases in which we were able to act with commendable speed and in time, and to present — either directly or by supporting our friends — a sufficient weapons superiority to accomplish useful objectives which have had political repercussions. It is necessary that we continue to do so under circumstances in which the Communist missile threat is increasing.

General Maxwell Taylor, the Chief of Staff of the Army, in a message to the Infantry Conference at Fort Benning, said the other day that “the Communist bloc will continue to wield

the instrument of limited aggression with increasing truculence under the cloak of fear, imposed by mutual deterrence"; that is, the idea of a mutual standoff. Of course the Soviets do not mean to have a mutual standoff; they do not mean to have a balance of terror. They mean to upset the balance in their favor. There will be nothing mutual about deterrence if it originates from bases that are safe from surprise attacks; there will be no "cloak of fear" under which the Soviets can shelter.

Of course the time is *now* to review these matters, to look ahead, to choose the weapons, and to make the right choices. The Soviet missile program, like all Communist programs, has a definite goal. There is some suggestion that they think they have it made; that they think they are now progressing along a path in which they cannot be overtaken.

Mr. Adlai Stevenson, in recording his interviews with Mr. Khrushchev, noted this confidence on Mr. Khrushchev's part. His confidence is justified if we do no more than try to overtake the Soviets in building weapons which are suitable for their purposes but of little value for ours. If we shift to a strategy and weapons of our own choosing, suitable for our purposes, in the end they will be running to catch up if they continue to use military power as an instrument of their policy. They will have to find a means of countering our mobile deterrent forces at sea. This means that they will have to undergo a sea change in their whole concept of strategy — and that will take them quite a while!

Will we do this — are we going to do it? I don't know! There are some things happening to the budget right now that are not too promising. But the final decisions have not been taken, and will not be taken until Congress comes to take a look at the budget.

We may, however, take present encouragement from the very heartening similarity in principle between the words that were spoken by the Secretary of State four days ago and words that were written by the Father of our Country, President Washington, when he proposed a military establishment which should

“appear truly respectable to our friends and formidable to those who might otherwise become our enemies.” This, gentlemen, it would seem, is still the basic purpose of the American government and people. This precept, laid down by a great military genius who won our War of Independence, is a precept which we still must follow in seeking to maintain that independence in a world containing dangers of which General Washington never dreamed.

Thank you very much, gentlemen!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Major George Fielding Eliot

Major Eliot received his B.A. degree from Melbourne University in Australia in 1914. For the next four years, he served with the Australian Imperial Force in the Dardanelles, the Western Front, and France. He then served in the United States Army for eight years (1922-1930) in the Military Intelligence Reserve, attaining the rank of Major.

After contributing to fiction magazines for several years, he began writing extensively on military and international affairs. He has since become widely known as an author, journalist, radio and television commentator, and lecturer. He was military correspondent for the *New York Herald Tribune* from 1939 to 1946, and was then a correspondent and columnist for the New York Post Syndicate from 1947 to 1949. Since 1950, he has been affiliated with the General Features Syndicate. He was a military analyst for the Columbia Broadcasting System from 1939 to 1947, and since 1950 has been associated with the Mutual Broadcasting System as a commentator.

Major Eliot is the author of *The Ramparts We Watch*, *Bombs Bursting in Air*, *Hour of Triumph*, *The Strength We Need*, *Hate, Hope and High Explosives — A Report on the Middle East*, *If Russia Strikes*, *Caleb Pettengill*, *USN*, and *Victory Without War*, 1958-1961.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel,
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Washington 25, D. C.

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Commander Naval Forces,
Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 48
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U. S. Naval Station Library
Attn: **Auxiliary Service Collection**
Building C-9
U. S. Naval Base
Norfolk 11, Virginia

BOOKS

Overstreet, Harry and Bonaro. *What We Must Know About Communism*. New York, W. W. Norton, 1958. 348 p.

The Overstreets have made a thorough and penetrating study of Communism — the theory, the Party and the Soviet Union — and have presented their findings with the aim of helping Americans to understand this force, and of stimulating and clarifying the thoughts of the individual. Beginning with a brief study of the conditions that led to the introduction of Communism into Russia, the authors analyze Marxist theory and outline its development up to the present time, including a summary of economic and doctrinal problems that Khrushchev has inherited from his predecessors. They next discuss the origins, activities and tactics of the CPUSA and of other Western Hemisphere nations, and their relationships, past and present, to the Communist Party of the USSR. Finally, they outline the ultimate aims of Communism, the tactics and techniques used to achieve those aims, and the “stakes,” or elements of civilization, that we must fight to preserve. The study is thoroughly documented by quotations from basic Communist and non-Communist sources. Of particular note are the extensive bibliography, the listing of periodicals that provide a continuous source of information, and the list of research centers from which “new materials of dependable scholarship are constantly being made available.”

Haley, Andrew G. *Rocketry and Space Exploration*. Princeton, N. J., D. Van Nostrand, 1958. 334 p.

Haley has provided an excellent source book for anyone seeking information on the history of rocketry from the vantage point of one with long acquaintance with his subject matter and with the personalities of all nations who have contributed to the present state of the art. It is a needed contribution to the astronautics field in that the author has covered for the first time many of the steps in the development of rocketry without becoming too technical or covering subject matter adequately treated in other works. For the student of rocketry or astronautics, this book provides the necessary background of what has been done, by whom, when, where, and under what circumstances. He has not missed the chance to “Monday morning quarterback” the historical events he presents, nor

has he neglected the opportunity to look into the crystal ball of the future. Most eye-opening is the perspective given on the magnitude of the present research and development effort in missiles of all sorts by many nations. Much of what is presented has hitherto been available only in classified publications.

Buss, Claude A. *Southeast Asia and the World Today*. Princeton, N. J., D. Van Nostrand, 1958. 192 p.

The first half of this short and readable book presents a synopsis of the origins and history of the countries and colonies which comprise Southeast Asia. The problems (political, economic and social) confronting the fledgling nations of this vital strategic area are analyzed and summarized in an attempt to make clear the reasons for the attitudes assumed by these nations toward more powerful countries and toward the ideological struggle between East and West. The second half of the book consists of supporting documents of varied content. A short index makes the book of some value as a reference work.

Neal, Fred Warner. *Titoism in Action*. Berkeley, Cal., University of California Press, 1958. 331 p.

This volume covers the birth of a revised Communism in Yugoslavia from the time of the split with the USSR in 1948 through 1957. The book is extremely well written in that it presents a complex subject in a manner that is easily understood. The form of government, its operation and its future potential are portrayed in a logical pattern that leaves the reader with a feeling that he understands the inner workings of the Yugoslavian type of government.

PERIODICALS

"Agreement with the European Atomic Energy Community." *The Department of State Bulletin*. January 12, 1959, p. 69-74.

The text of an agreement signed on November 8, 1958 by representatives of the United States and the six-nation European Atomic Energy Community, providing for establishment of a joint nuclear power program.

Kravath, Fred F., Captain, CEC, United States Navy. "Nuclear Development in Continental Europe." *The Military Engineer*, January-February, 1959, p. 1-5.

Summarizes the potential and development programs of fifteen Western European countries in the nuclear power field; points up the necessity and evaluates possible economic and political results of these programs.

Ramsey, F. A., Jr. "Damage Assessment Systems and Their Relationship to Post-Nuclear-Attack Damage and Recovery." *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, September, 1958, p. 199-219.

Presents some thoughts on the problems of post-nuclear-attack disaster in terms of damage assessment or analysis systems and their relationship to post-attack recovery.

Bidlingmaier, G. F., Commander, Federal German Navy. "Importance of the Baltic Sea for N. A. T. O. and the Federal Republic's Part in Naval Strategy." *The Navy (Gt. Brit.)*, January, 1959, p. 5-6, 24.

The Federal German Navy is an important factor in the protection of the Baltic Sea, which is a decisive area for NATO, since it has become Russia's most efficient supply route and is supplied with a strong Russian fleet.

"Contemporary China and the Chinese." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1959.

An issue reflecting current thinking and research on China — the first section reviewing trends in China from 1900-1950, appraising the present situation and delineating the current U. S. policy; the second section presenting the domestic scene and the international relations of Communist China; and the final papers dealing with Taiwan and the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.

Dallin, David J. "The Main Traits of Soviet Empire-Building." *The Russian Review*, January, 1959, p. 3-13.

Three main traits of Soviet empire-building are: outright incorporation of new territories into the Soviet Union; refusal to tolerate any second Socialist power of equal rank with the Soviet Union; and Soviet supremacy based on purely military power rather than cultural superiority over its satellites.

Camacho, J. A. "Latin America and the English-Speaking World." *International Affairs*, January, 1959, p. 24-32.

An attempt to explain the Latin American point of view toward Britain and the United States.

Taylor, Maxwell D., General (Chief of Staff), United States Army. "Improving Our Capabilities for Limited War." *Army Information Digest*, February, 1959, p. 2-9.

General Taylor presents a five-point program to meet the possible challenges posed by limited war. These include: modernization of appropriate equipment; improved strategic mobility of limited war forces; preplanned use of air and sea lift; expanded joint planning and training; and the publicizing of limited war strength.

Strausz-Hupe, Robert. "The Middle East." *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, January, 1959, p. 23-29.

An interesting article discussing the problems of the Middle East, weaknesses in the Western Powers-Middle East policy, and Communist strategy in the area.

Frye, William R. "Are We Realistic About Communist Powers?" *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, January 15, 1959, p. 65-66.

Outlines the major points of a plan involving both disengagement and rollback in the Central European area, and points out possible effects of such a plan.

Clepton, E. W., Vice Admiral, United States Navy. "Formula for the Future: Military/Industry Cooperation." *Armed Forces Management*, January, 1959, p. 13-14.

Discusses the problems connected with research and development contracting, and defines the Navy's policy in awarding such contracts. Takes a look into the future requirements of research, development and engineering procurement.

Rubinstein, Alvin Z. "Soviet Policy in ECAFE: A Case Study of Soviet Behavior in International Economic Organization." *International Organization*, Autumn, 1958, p. 459-472.

Shows that Soviet participation in the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East seeks to advance Soviet political objectives in the vital southern Asian area.

Kennedy, Ralph. "Hydrography in the Soviet Navy." *Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR*, December, 1958, p. 3-14.

Gives data on the structure, personnel and equipment of the Soviet Navy's Hydrographic Service.

Bratter, Herbert. "Mikoyan's Merchandise." *America*, January 24, 1959, p. 495-497.

Presents the risks involved in trading with the Soviet, to whom international trade is an instrument of Communist policy rather than an economic objective.