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CONTENTS

THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1
Professor Andrew Gyorgy

SIGNIFICANCE OF INDIA'S LEADERSHIP IN ASIAN NEUTRALISM 33
Doctor Phillips Talbot

RECOMMENDED READING 51

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THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 12 September 1958 by

Professor Andrew Gyorgy

"Is there a key outlook on world affairs?" was the question raised in a recent international relations textbook entitled *World Affairs, Problems and Prospects.* The authors concluded that instead of viewing human life and history from the perspective of a single "outlook," this hazy discipline consisted more of a series of "vantage points," or "approaches." These attempt to interpret the various facets of world politics and to systematize the loosely related forces and factors which have characterized the recent development of the relations of nations.

By way of an introductory comment, it is important to stress that prior to the twentieth century it would have been premature and erroneous to talk in terms of a systematic discipline of International Politics. Indeed, the history of our subject is surprisingly brief, vague and frequently irrational. In the nineteenth century, it had largely bogged down in supersophisticated, highly legalistic and philosophically oriented dissertations which only occasionally revealed brief glimpses of international relations and dealt with practical political materials in a purely haphazard and incidental manner. Until the pioneering work of such German political geographers as Karl Ritter and Friedrich Ratzel, who successfully injected notes of down-to-earth realism into nineteenth century social science, international relations was more-or-less compelled to hide behind the cloak of some other discipline. This "portmanteau complex" was evident even in the brilliant writings of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, whose significant pronouncements on international political matters were carefully camouflaged behind layers of diplomatic history.

The turning point came with the new century, which brought a tremendous upsurge of interest in international affairs as well as a healthier and more realistic approach to problems of modern diplomacy. In retrospect, it is obvious that the climactic age of *total wars* has helped to usher in what Dean Acheson so aptly described as the age of "total diplomacy." The revitalizing influence asserted itself from two different and wholly unrelated sources. On the one hand, certain notable Anglo-American writers sparked this progress. Singling out three representative names from among the many pioneers, one must mention Halford J. Mackinder, whose classic paper on *The Geographical Pivot of History,* delivered in 1904, signaled the birth of modern geopolitics; T. Parker Moon, whose massive *Imperialism and World Politics,* first published in 1904, served as a useful general textbook and who for the first time in American educational history held the title of "Professor of International Relations"; and John W. Garner, Professor at the University of Illinois, whose prolific writings on international law and relations had an immense influence on a generation of college students.

Simultaneously, a number of Marxist writers — some more closely linked to Western European forms of Socialism, others clearly the forerunners of Russian Bolshevism — began to expound Communist doctrines on international politics and to offer concrete applications of Marxist dogmas to the realities of twentieth-century world politics. No student of this discipline can afford to neglect the early writings of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, or the differently oriented literary products of Kautsky or Bergson.

For American purposes, the first truly systematic and penetrating study of the entire field was prepared by Frederick L. Schuman, whose monumental *International Politics* first appeared in 1933. Having since matured through five successive editions, this work had a broad and continuing impact on the teaching, study and research of international relations both in the United States and in Great Britain.

A. FOUR MAJOR APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

1. *The Legalistic School*

This approach is derived from the study of international law and is imbued with legal systems, juridical values and expectations. Its principal emphasis is on the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and its overriding objective the maintenance and perpetuation of regional and global peace. It optimistically sets out to survey international relations primarily as *a set of restraints* imposed upon the individual nation-state by the community of civilized nations. This attitude assumes exceptionally high standards of international behavior and methods of day-by-day operation even when there seems to be little ground or few practical reasons for making such starry-eyed asumptions.

In order to insure a peaceful *status quo*, exponents of this school urge individual nation-states as participants in international disputes or crises, to resort to certain complex and highly developed techniques of conflict resolution. The three methods most frequently discussed in the literature are arbitration, adjudication and — last, but not least — negotiation. Arbitration in this context implies the voluntary submission of disputes by the individual states to a judge or group of judges of their own choice. It further implies the unanimous acceptance of the judicial award as binding, and postulates a continuing deep respect for the law. Important methods "approaching arbitration" have developed as parallel procedures of dispute resolution. These involve the use of Mixed Commissions, Commissions of Inquiry and of Conciliation, and have been widely employed throughout the nineteen twenties and thirties.

Adjudication assumes that the dispute is submitted to a permanent international court which, acting as the strong arm of a truly international judiciary, has firm powers of imposing sanctions upon the participating governments. Unhappily, both the Permanent Court of International Justice of pre-World War II vintage, and more recently the International Court of Justice are merely pale replicas of the forceful image of a strong and independent seat of international judicial power.

Of overriding importance is the well-established settlement technique of international negotiation which — at its best — can be defined as a diplomatic bargaining process based on the mutual assumption of successful settlement. Within the framework of such "Conference Diplomacy," whether secret or open, each side will strive to attain maximum national advantages with minimum concessions to the other side. Nevertheless, diplomacy by conference also presumes a friendly and constructive atmosphere in which workable international solutions can readily be hammered out without violations of that untouchable "taboo" of world affairs, the selfish national interest.

This last point leads to the most relevant criticism of the legalistic school. Its exponents tend to live in the clouds, hopefully anticipating both high moral standards of international conduct and selfless law-abiding patterns of national behavior. It is safe to state that the era of such high expectations irretrievably disappeared on June 28, 1914, when the tragedy of Sarajevo set off the new age of total wars. Other approaches to international politics had to emerge from the holocaust of World War I, as logical aftereffects and consequences of world-wide sentiments of disillusionment and despair.

2. *The Organizational-Idealistic Approach*

As a reaction to the tragedy of World War I, this school of thought expressed a glowing sense of the need for collective action against aggressor states. Steeped in the spirit of international organization, it carried the earlier and strictly legalistic approach a long step further by advocating the "firming up" and invigoration, first of the League of Nations and later of the United Nations. At its best, this approach also placed emphasis on such regional organizations as the Pan-American Union, the OAS, and more recently on NATO and SEATO. Its exponents engaged in a continuing argument concerning the primacy of *regional* vis-a-vis *universal* type organizations, an argument which could not be properly resolved in view of the many intangible considerations on both sides.

The idealism of this school was most apparent when it professed that the *mere existence* of a broad international organization was a sufficient safeguard for the maintenance of peace and harmony. It thus tended to ignore the impact of the nation-state and the many complicating ethnic, religious, demographic or geopolitical forces which — whether divisive or cohesive in character — certainly have a large determinant share in the make-up of the relations of nations.

Proceeding on the unexamined assumption that everything international was *per se* better than anything national, adherents of this approach overstudied such issues as disarmament or the pacific settlement of disputes, while the problems of national security, national interest and legitimate national policy objectives were largely ignored. Coupled with this omission was the broadly shared feeling that deplorable nationalistic attitudes were responsible for producing such vague evils as imperialistic foreign policies, conspiratorial groups of "munitions makers" or oil interests. Nationalism, equated with moral evil, was therefore to be exorcized from the realm of international relations.

In the interwar period, researchers imbued with this approach concentrated primarily on four major study areas: international organization, international law, international trade and finance, and recent diplomatic history. On the whole, as Professor William T. R. Fox observed in *World Politics,* the analytical model these scholars used for their case study investigations was the image of a "world commonwealth" characterized by permanent peace.

In the course of the past fifteen years the organizational approach placed a great deal of well-justified emphasis on analyzing the unsung and unpublicized, but tremendously important work of such technical U. N. agencies as UNESCO, IRO, ILO, WHO, FAO and the Human Rights Commission. Numerous useful and comprehensive surveys have ably presented the great humanitarian achievements of these agencies which have succeeded in cutting across national boundaries and promoting world peace — if not by solving the deadlocks on the most vital political or military issues, at least by "nibbling away" at the edges of international tensions or conflict areas. To the extent that this recent literature keeps analyzing the specific, well-defined and substantive functions for which these technical agencies have been established, it can well be described as the *functional* method or perspective of international politics.

3. *The Strategic-Realistic Approach*

Moving from the relatively simple expose to the more complicated, this approach must be viewed from a double perspective: first a comment on methodology is in order, then its principal areas of concern have to be analyzed. The strategic-realistic school relies on the *pragmatic* method, which postulates that the value of all political institutions is relative and that the ultimate test of every government lies in its ability to rule effectively *regardless of its political philosophy.* Pope's famous ditty is conveniently cited in this context:

> For forms of government let fools contest,
> Whatever is best administered, is best.

The pragmatic method has a basically antitheoretical orientation. As Professor Morgenthau cogently observed, it seeks to "meet the day-by-day issues of international politics by trial and error" and devises a pattern of international relations more in keeping with an *empirical* image than an abstract ideal. Its importance to the student lies precisely in that *practical concern* which wants to grapple directly with cases and issues rather than with an explicit theory of international politics.

Writing a 1958 editorial for *Borba,* the Belgrade daily of the Communist Party, a Yugoslav social scientist summarized this approach in the following manner: "Politics is neither an abstraction nor a science. Its objectives and its methods must be carefully fitted for a world which constantly changes . . . Politics and political doctrines come and go, but only peoples live forever."

The combination of practical concern and abhorrence of theory logically propels this mode of thought toward power concepts and ideas. It stresses the importance of the political power of individual states in order to insure their survival, which thus becomes both a goal and a technique of diplomatic operation. Pragmatism in international relations postulates that the fundamental source of almost all the tension that arises between nations is fear, based on insecurity. Thus, the entire history of international politics may well be viewed as a continuing series of attempts by individual nation-states to meet their need for security and allay their institutional fears. The obvious device to accomplish this objective has been the formation of alliances which in turn produced counteralliances, and these eventually led to various balance-of-power systems.

The historic balance-of-power theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries fit perfectly into the framework of strategic-realistic thinking on international politics. In a more primitive era of world affairs, the object of bilateral alliances was to bring preponderant strength to bear on a third party as a deterrent; it was then the normal state of affairs for European countries to be divided into two antagonistic groups. While balancing power in this haphazard manner may have focused a great deal of attention on the security interests of states and on the strategically vulnerable regions of world politics, it also multiplied tensions and fears — rather than reducing them.

As ably described by D. W. Crowley in his recent *The Background To Current Affairs,* the balance-of-power system could be effective only under two seriously limiting conditions:

a. If the opposing alliances generally settled down at approximately equal strength, and thus produced a political-military deadlock which helped to preserve peace, at least temporarily, or

b. If it was possible for the leaders of two major alliance systems to agree on some workable compromise. As long as the governments involved were of an absolute, dictatorial character, implying that the leaders were free to act largely as their own desires or calculations directed, such agreements seemed to be generally feasible. As long as "the leaders came to know each other personally, and were often able to develop relations of mutual personal trust," remarks Crowley, the delicately tuned balance-of-power system seemed to be adequate enough.

In the long run, it is of course obvious that this pragmatic "by touch and by feel" operation of international diplomacy would prove to be insufficient and unsatisfactory. The horror of modern warfare, the rise of belligerent twentieth-century nationalism and the emergence of a new form of "total diplomacy" combined to cause a temporary fade-out of other approaches and schools of thought and helped to push cold-war concepts and maneuvers into the foreground.

4. *Contemporary Approaches to Cold War Problems*

In the main, current approaches to the political problems of the cold war have two common characteristics: they focus on the great, all-transcending problems of war and national policy, and they are usually based on narrowly constructed and *wholly negative* initial definitions. All of them assume, however, that war — which in this particular context becomes "hot" or "shooting" war in contradistinction to "cold"-war type conflicts — is the supreme exercise of national power. In certain situations, so the reasoning runs, there is no obvious substitute for resorting to war. War settles a number of problems which are primarily in the political-diplomatic sphere. War determines which combatant shall have the chance to write the peace treaty, and it will also crystallize the nation's relative position in the postwar power balance on the regional, continental and intercontinental levels.

"Cold-war" concepts are generally concerned with the nature and identifying characteristics of total war. What makes modern war modern? — they query. Of the innumerable possible replies, the concise fourfold statement by Professors Mills and McLaughlin (in their *World Politics in Transition*) merits most attention. What has transformed modern war into an *ad horrendum* last resort or ultimate weapon in a nation's political and military arsenal is:

a. its dependence on the complex scientific discoveries of contemporary technology;

b. its incredibly high degree of industrialization and mechanical complexity;

c. the compelling factor of popular mass participation; and

d. its enormously increased total cost.

This is the modern monster which has to be avoided, circumvented or in turn chained down by a vigorous assortment of diplomatic, economic and political weapons which must be employed as parallel means of national action and policy. The principal feature of the cold war is thus a *negative* assertion: War must be avoided at almost all cost! Here one enters the challenging twilight (the double-negative world) of Max Beloff's 1949 remark about the cold war — "No peace, no war!"

Most recent definitions are merely variations on this negative theme. In Hans J. Morgenthau's opinion:

> The political relationship called the Cold War signifies the absence of peace between the two blocs in that there has been no moral and legal agreement upon their relationships and, more particularly, upon the boundaries between them. *Rather these political relationships are the result of the provisional de facto settlement established at the end of the Second World War primarily on military grounds.**

To illustrate the significance of recent cold-war thinking, this study first offers three brief clusters of definitions, and then — in the form of the Eccles-Gyorgy projection — it presents its own appraisal of the multifaceted cold-war process.

a. *Millis, Mansfield and Stein on Cold War***

While big theoretical issues of atomic energy, military unification and defense budget were being debated on the congressional level, the years 1947 and 1948 began to introduce into American public life many minor, but typically cold war issues. It was a complex pattern with many loose ends. The "new difficulties" implied mostly that major wartime decisions had to be made in times of non-war. Military policy thus had to be hammered out mainly in the conferences of budget officers and the hearing rooms of the military affairs committees. A crucial nonwar difficulty was to determine the proper allocation of production between civil and military demands. It is symptomatic of a cold-war period that usually a nation's economic and military policies are badly out of adjustment with the actualities of the perilous world confronted by the protagonists.

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*See his *Dilemmas of Politics* (italics are mine).

**This is a summary or highlight treatment of Chapter 5 (Cold War) from *Arms and The State* by Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield and Harold Stein, published as a volume in the Project on Civil-Military Relations by The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1958.

The authors rightfully stress that in such a period all great national issues are intimately related. They must be taken together and call for a broad, correlated and "global" policy; they cannot be handled in a piecemeal and *ad hoc* fashion, which is the luxury token of normal political times. The cold-war era thus clearly demands a newly formulated national political-military strategy different from the routine actions of the previous era.

In the cold-war context, assert the authors, basic policies are obviously neither '"purely military" nor "purely civilian" in their inspiration. Many different factors go into the construction of such a cold-war posture, and many men and institutions participate in the result — soldiers, diplomats, administrators, economists, congressmen, the press and public opinion.

The authors' approach is particularly helpful in focussing attention to the multiple impact of the cold-war era on the decision-making process in government. Non-war circumstances surrounding wartime measures, the need for mobilization procedures in the midst of an outwardly calm political atmosphere — these are some of the peculiar characteristics which Millis, Mansfield and Stein emphasize in *Arms and The State.*

b. *Raymond Aron and his The Century of Total War**

In this excellent work, Raymond Aron forcefully asserts that the classical definitions of war are valid but inadequate. As a new development, the cold war is largely the result of World War II and of the revolutionary actions waged by the Soviet-dominated

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**The Century of Total War;* A volume in the Beacon Contemporary Affairs Series, The Beacon Press, Boston, 1956.

and controlled Cominform since 1946. This cold-war situation can be characterized by two closely related background phenomena: the formation of the two opposing camps or blocs, and the depressing fact that these two camps are engaged in a seemingly permanent and irreconcilable struggle.

In this world political context, cold war means limited war — limited, however, not as to the *stakes* but as to the *means* employed by the belligerents. The mid-twentieth century cold war uses primarily four major techniques — namely propaganda, espionage and sabotage, agitation and mass movements, and civil war. These four "typical forms" appear usually in combination with each other. The most salient illustration of the cold war is the "Soviet program of world conquest" which is anxious to avoid open war or precipitate a serious military-type incident. While meticulously avoiding a *casus belli,* the U. S. S. R. is intent on building up a military superiority which *in itself* is one of the major weapons in the cold war.

Aron also has an important discussion of the objectives of the cold war. In military perspective, the cold war appears primarily as a quadruple race for:

(1) Bases
(2) Allies
(3) Raw Materials, and
(4) Prestige.

Bases must be secured from which the antagonists can attack or counterattack. The number and resources of potential allies must be increased while the number and resources of potential enemies are reduced. Attempts must be made to retain or regain control of the sources of raw materials which are indispensable to the *technological* operation and upkeep of modern war. And finally, the morale of the hostile world must be shaken and the prestige of one's own ideas and strength vigorously spread, thus implying that "the goddess of history has already decided on the ultimate triumph" of one's own side. Reaching over to the free world, Aron then offers a specific illustration for each of the four ingredients of the cold war as applied to American foreign policy. In its strategy, he claims, the United States has looked to the Pacific for *bases*, to Europe for *allies*, to the Near East for *raw materials*, and "more or less everywhere" in the world for reassurance and *prestige*.

Although the CW = LW (cold war *is* limited war) formula may not be a startlingly novel contribution to the mushrooming literature on the cold war, it does have the merit of focussing attention on the *limited, but all-out* features of such a pseudo-military situation. In addition, it offers a neat and systematic set of categories for both the components and the objectives of the cold war. While the four elements analyzed under each heading are truly significant, they do not constitute either an exhaustive or a complete listing of the multiple variables which make up the total, 360 degree view of modern cold war. However, in stressing the essential functions of such intangibles as propaganda, agitation and prestige, Professor Aron has performed a useful service in clearing away the underbrush and blazing a new trail in the jungle of semantics and political ideas.

c. *Kenneth W. Thompson's Views on the Cold War**

Kenneth W. Thompson presents an eloquent analysis of the present conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States in several of his recent articles. Being more than a decade old by now, the cold war — in Thompson's opinion — is plainly visible as a conflict with *at least two dimensions*. At one level, it is a struggle for men's minds involving the conflict between democracy and communism, with both ideologies claiming vitality and universality. At the other level, "the struggle engages two great configurations of power who by reason either of necessity or of design reach out to influence others."

Thus the author points up the moral aspects of today's cold-war picture, intimately involving the comparative strengths and weaknesses of democracy and communism. The cold war, in

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*"Theories and Problems of Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, Roy C. Macridis, editor, Prentice-Hall, 1958, pp. 351-378, and "The Limits of Principle in International Politics: Necessity and The New Balance of Power," in *The Journal of Politics*, August 1958, pp. 437-467.

this context, can readily be viewed as a continuing conflict between morality and the "national interest" factor. The principal issue is this: to what extent can a broader international community (in more precise terms, for example, the United Nations) harness, beguile or deflect the more limited, narrower national purposes of a single state, a single unit? Or can it ever transcend them? It is obvious that aspirations to justice and to a peaceful international order implies one set of values, while maintaining a semipermanent cold-war posture in a deeply troubled political world requires an entirely different set of standards and patterns of behavior.

Fundamentally, these two guidelines are in irreconcilable conflict. Paraphrasing Thompson's analysis, one perceives that within a relatively substantial outer circle of the "Vital National Interest" lies the much slimmer and less obvious inner core of "International Law, Order and Morality." By necessity, a cold-war situation directs public attention to the larger and more relevant outer covering of the ever-present complex of national interests.



PLATE 1

Despite this imbalance between the National Interest factor and the role of Order and Morality, Thompson's analysis does not neglect to emphasize the moral aspects of international politics. He remarks:

> Every legal or social reform that would be successful must take account of the moral infrastructure. The failure of collective security, of the outlawry of war . . . . are all examples of thinking that suffers from the illusion that moral foundations are unimportant. *The political community has its roots in moral factors unhappily sometimes missing in many of the areas that have recently become important in American foreign relations.**

The phrase "moral infrastructure" is a felicitous one indeed since it points to the ever-present — although occasionally nebulous — ethical criterion of politics without at the same time disputing the primacy of national interest considerations. Thompson thus rightfully views the cold-war situation as a fluctuating combination of purely political (interest) forces vis-à-vis the legal or ethical issues and imponderables which must enter into the national decision-making process.

d. *The Eccles-Gyorgy Chart on the Cold War.*

Utilizing the significant results of Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles' research in the field of logistics, the "Spectrum of Conflict" chart attempts to apply the logistical flow-chart principle to international politics. Since at this point we are concerned primarily with the cold war, the four major and distinctive features circled with black should be examined one by one. They are listed in the middle of the flow chart under "Characteristics" in order of their political-military importance (See Plate 2).

(1) The "Agreement to Disagree."

This crucial feature reaches to the core of the cold-war problem and involves a tacit agreement between the two

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*Italics are mine.



THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT
MAJOR FEATURES AND AREAS OF OVERLAP

PEACE–WAR CYCLE	FEVER CHART	CHARACTERISTICS	BLACK & WHITE ZONES IN WORLD AFFAIRS
ABSOLUTE PEACE	HOT PEACE	"PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" WITH MINIMUM OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION; SWEETNESS AND LIGHT; FRIENDLY COOPERATION IN UN, ELABORATE SUMMITRY	AREA OF NEGOTIATION
RELATIVE PEACE	LUKEWARM PEACE	NATIONAL DISAGREEMENTS ERUPT IN DISPUTES LEADING TO ECONOMIC, CULTURAL & POLITICAL COMPETITION; ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE NEUTRALS, UNCOMMITTED NATIONS + "LESS DEVELOPED" AREAS	
INCREASING TENSION	↑ COLD PEACE ↓	NARROWING SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION; INCREASING TENSIONS, WIDENING CONFLICT AREAS; CRISES & INCIDENTS PLACE STRESS ON MILITARY ALLIANCES; UNILATERAL NATIONAL POLICY DECISIONS AND MOVES INSTEAD OF FRIENDLY MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS	
		PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS, POLITICAL SABOTAGE + SUBVERSION, INTENSIFIED ECONOMIC PRESSURES (BOYCOTT, ETC.)	
	↑ COLD WAR ↓	AGREEMENT TO DISAGREE NEAR-PERMANENT STALEMATE OF DIPLOMACY SHARP POLARIZATION OF POWER; A "WORLD OF BLOCS"	
		ATTEMPTS TO ALTER BALANCE OF POWER WITHOUT OVERT RESORT TO FORCE; FULL MOBILIZATION OF ENTIRE GAMUT OF NON-MILITARY INSTRUMENTS	
		UNHOLY MIXTURE OF MASS PROPAGANDA, MOB VIOLENCE AND SECRET POLICE TERROR (OR THREAT OF TERROR)	
LIMITED WAR		RIOTS, UPRISINGS AND REVOLUTIONS FOMENTED FROM OUTSIDE "INTERNATIONAL CIVIL WAR"	
	↑ HOT WAR ↓	SEIZURE OF TERRITORY PARTIAL MOBILIZATION	
		AIR AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENT FULL MOBILIZATION	
UNLIMITED TOTAL WAR		SUBMARINE SINKINGS EXPANSION OF SCOPE AND AREA	
		EXPANSION OF OBJECTIVES	
		USE OF T.N. WEAPONS GAS AND BACTERIA WAR	↑ AREA OF FORCE

THE ECCLES – GYORGY PROJECTION

PLATE 2

protagonists not to engage in broad, general negotiations or discussions concerning the issues of disagreement. Such a cold-war posture therefore assumes the absence of a formal, full-dress, and across-the-board conference — whether of the "summit" or "below the summit" character — which would engage in a comprehensive review or reappraisal of the basic military and political problems separating the two camps. Particularly such sensitive issues as atomic and conventional disarmament, the unification of Germany, or the renegotiation of the veto in the United Nations would be classified as "untouchable" in this context, automatically reducing the area of negotiation to peripheral problems of far less significance or relevance. Thus even if a "summit" type conference were held, it would be largely ineffective and be concerned primarily with empty posturing for global propaganda purposes and for amateur, rather than professional, "consumption."

The Spectrum of Conflict Chart clearly indicates the two major and inevitable consequences of this process of a hardening of diplomatic arteries:

(a) a near-permanent, and highly frustrating stalemate of diplomacy, and

(b) a sharp polarization of political and military power: a world in which two blocs of nations keep glaring at each other across the "iron curtains" and barbed-wire barricades.

(2) Cold war is a covert form of warfare in which overt resort to force is quite exceptional and limited primarily to geographically marginal or remote areas* or to civil-war type revolutionary situations of an unusual emergency character.**

Within this limitation, however, the cold war utilizes all the non-military aspects of war. The entire gamut of highly refined economic, political and psychological warfare techniques is fully mobilized and used either in a meticulously planned chronological sequence or — in most cases — paralleling each other and employed in close combinations. In a world of relentless psychological warfare campaigns, the cold war stresses the myriad non-military aspects of what has traditionally been an exclusively military venture. Indeed, the cold war has successfully demilitarized war itself!

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*Such "nonheartlandic" conflicts would, for example, occur in Greece, Malaya, Korea, Indo-China and Algeria — distant and localized crises not directly involving the leaders of the power blocs.

**Here the ruthless 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary and the East Berlin uprisings of 1953 might be cited as the most convenient illustrations of this pattern of behavior.

(3) This feature attempts to define further the character of cold-war incidents and conflicts. These local brush-fire situations appear to be sharply limited in terms of the space, techniques and methods of operation involved. They seem to develop and explode on two levels simultaneously:

(a) the *visible* impact of mob violence and unruly demonstrations touched off by the unchecked flames of mass propaganda, by the reckless manipulation of modern media of mass communication, and

(b) the *invisible* impact of a secret police induced terror situation in which there are two possible alternatives. People are either driven forward by this terror in the direction desired by the government or the continual *threat* of terror operates in reverse, and a popular explosion occurs against the hated police apparatus. In the latter case, an angry populace is seeking an outlet for its pent-up emotions and revenge for years of fear, bitterness and frustration. The cold-war history of the Soviet Union and satellite Eastern Europe abounds with illustrations of each type of incident, with East Berlin, Poznan and Budapest pointing toward the second category of conflict. Similar visible and invisible forces combined to set off the frightening eruption of July 14 and 15, 1958, in Baghdad, where the King and Prime

Minister of Iraq were ruthlessly murdered by irate street mobs.

(4) This characteristic carries the previous story a step further by injecting the notion of *externally* fomented and encouraged revolutionary situations. Cutting across national boundaries, local political parties and regional sets of economic interests, these familiar acts of indirect aggression add up to a veritable "international civil war," to quote Sigmund Neumann's prophetic phrase. In terms of the techniques employed, we witness here an immensely broad spectrum of operation with such seemingly minor incidents as individual acts of subversion, fifth column work, infiltration at one end of the scale, and landing of troops on foreign soil, invasion attempts, temporary seizures of territory and mass riotings encouraged by foreign agents at the other end. The common denominator of unusual interest to the student is the emphasis here on *transnational* acts of aggression, both of a direct as well as indirect character.

Professor Neumann forcefully stresses that the revolutions of the modern era, commonly regarded as merely internal upheavals, have become real world phenomena. Their true significance must be measured in terms of their *international* effect. "Radical upheavals, as all great revolutions are," observes Neumann in his excellent *Modern Political Parties*, "must be played on an international stage. Every region has become sensitive to the developments of far-distant lands." Areas that have been geographically and historically far apart, have now been politically compressed to the point where one major ideological movement immediately provokes revolutionary reactions in seemingly distant and unrelated regions. Cold-war situations and contemporary revolutions are inextricably interwoven: they cannot be isolated in neat and separate compartments, since they parallel each other and cut across traditional lines of political demarcation.

What this fourth feature of the *spectrum* really emphasizes is the confluence of external and internal factors in a given cold-war situation. The Soviet Communist blueprint of such situations is actually based on the scientific mobilization of this "double pincer," in which two forces are employed in joint and overlapping operation:

$$CW = ICW = Ex\ (Iv) + In\ (V)\ R,$$

where the cold war is equated with an international civil war composed of an external (frequently invisible) and an internal (always visible) revolutionary pattern. Where the two patterns meet and overlap, there emerges a full-blown international incident frequently approximating lukewarm or even hot war.



PLATE 3

Nobody is more acutely aware of the complexities of the contemporary cold war than our Communist opponents. Not for a moment can the Western public indulge in hopeful illusions concerning the naivete of Soviet statesmen or the primitive views of Communist political writers in assessing the true character of cold-war situations. If anything, they approach this aspect of world politics probably more realistically and soberly than we do. Writing on "Disarmament and International Tension" in the December 1958 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* Soviet Academician A. V. Topchiev made the following illuminating remark: "It is in the interests of international confidence that the 'cold' and the 'psychological' wars be done with, once and for all, *with their artificial increase in international tension, propaganda of power politics, and of hatred and animosity toward other countries.*"* In an interesting afterthought, Topchiev then added: "In rebuffing the 'atomic ideology' and in circulating the hope of peace and friendship among nations, scientists of all countries must play a prominent role."

B. NEW FACTORS AND PROBLEM AREAS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

There are myriads of more-or-less latent forces and problems which have directly affected the long-term development of international diplomacy and its day-by-day conduct among individual states. In order to present a profile of these problem areas, four major issues have been selected for brief treatment.

1. *The Changing Nature of Modern Diplomacy*

There have been numerous revolutionary changes in the nature of modern diplomacy — both of a quantitative and qualitative character. One of the most challenging recent developments has been the gradual decline in the role and importance of the professional diplomat and professional diplomacy itself.

At first blush this broad statement appears to be highly questionable. International politics, after all, is made by men and for men, and since among men the lines of communication and interpenetration can never be drawn sharply or permanently, there would seem to be an ever-increasing need for highly skilled and truly professional communicators on the international level. Despite this need, however, there has been a steady and obvious depreciation of professional diplomacy since World War I. In his encyclopedic textbook, *Politics Among Nations,* Hans J. Morgenthau offers three primary reasons for this decline. The most obvious factor is the development of modern communications. Speedy and regular communications in the form of the airplane, radio, telegraph, teletype and long-distance phone have immensely broadened the scope of direct negotiations between governments at the expense of the permanent representatives stationed abroad. Often the most sensitive negotiations are carried on not by diplomatic representatives but by special delegates who may be the foreign ministers themselves or highly-placed technical experts.

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*Italics are mine.

A related facet has been the world-wide condemnation of secret diplomacy which forcefully espouses the view that the secret machinations of diplomats shared a great deal, if not the major portion, of responsibility for World Wars I and II. This opinion, as Morgenthau remarks, also stresses that "the secrecy of diplomatic negotiations was an atavistic and dangerous residue from the aristocratic past, and that international negotiations carried on and concluded under the watchful eyes of a peace-loving public opinion could not but further the cause of peace."

Whatever the moral implications, it is clear that a concerted campaign against secret negotiations has been successful in restricting both the formal scope and the substantive range of action of the professional diplomat. "Open covenants openly arrived at" was no empty or ineffective Wilsonian slogan, but one that had a continuing impact on the history of the subsequent thirty years. Secret intergovernmental discussions were thus equated with evil intentions and conspiratorial political techniques. Few experts phrased this public revulsion more forcefully than professional diplomat and ex-Ambassador Hugh Gibson, who made the following remarks in his *Road to Foreign Policy* (New York, 1944):

> As a matter of fact, there is such a thing as secret diplomacy, and it is reprehensible. This might be defined as intergovernmental intrigue for wrongful ends, resulting in obligations for future action of which the people are kept in ignorance . . . There are also secret negotiations between governments to infringe the rights of another.

Interestingly, however, even Ambassador Gibson has to admit that "open diplomacy" is often close to being a contradiction in terms, and that the glare of "pitiless publicity" can wreck the most promising international negotiations. He is also convinced that secret diplomacy might frequently involve the "systematic exploration of a subject _in private by trained negotiators._"* This admission then brings him around the full circle, and attempts to vindicate the much-maligned professional diplomat in his role as secret agent or negotiator for his government.

The third reason for the over-all disintegration of diplomacy — closely related to the previous two — is the evolution of a new, parliamentary-type diplomacy which has succeeded in introducing a major qualitative change into the area of international political intercourse. The League of Nations and the United Nations developed this pattern which Morgenthau describes in his _Politics Among Nations_: "International problems requiring solution are put on the agenda of the deliberative bodies of these organizations. The delegates of the different governments discuss the merits of the problem _in public debate._ A vote taken in accordance with the constitution of the organization disposes of the matter."*

This new diplomacy "by parliamentary procedures" seems to be dedicated to two principles acting in close cooperation: openness of deliberation and teamwork of technical experts. Both tend to restrict and qualify the traditional, historical scope of diplomatic operations. Even if an occasional screen of transparent semi-secrecy is drawn in front of these "new-fangled" conferences, world public opinion is still allowed to follow the principal phases of the debate as reported by the various delegations to the competing media of modern mass communication.

2. _Emphasis on Political Flexibility_

This important attribute of modern international politics injects both the short-lived _human_ and the more long-range _ideological_ aspects into our discipline. The former suggests that — above all else — politics is an art. "The richness of human nature," observed Dr. Ladis Kristof in a recent article on "Political Laws in International Relations," "— its elasticity and the gamut of desires and capabilities it displays — gives the statesmen an infinite number of opportunities to combine, adjust and realign humanity . . . in such a way as to strike a working balance between the need for stability and the desire for change."

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*Italics are mine.

In a fluid field such a tenuous balance can be accomplished only by utmost flexibility in the focus of research, in the over-all objectives sought for, and in the means employed to reach these goals. Years ago Professor Lasswell talked in terms of alternating currents of national (or international) attitudes of satisfaction and dissatisfaction as useful units of "thermodynamic measurement" in international relations. Since Lenin's time, Communist revolutionary authors have freely used such military phrases as "Advance and Retreat," "Strategy and Tactics," etc., denoting the need for diplomatic-political flexibility.

More recently, Professor Quincy Wright attempted to circumscribe the role of the individual as the subject of international politics from a fourfold perspective. Individuals, he suggested, are influenced at the "biological level," the "social level," the "psychological level" and the "action level." Within this field, the individual choices, decisions and actions important for international relations must be measured by various and complex political, economic, psychological, sociological and ethical criteria in order to arrive at systems of international political action.

Undeniably this formalistic stratosphere is not very useful to the student in search of practical information. More concretely speaking, it is clear that in the contemporary world beset by cold wars and a continuing competition between rival power blocs, the focus of international relations must be centered on the concepts of "friend" and "enemy" in the political sense. Our Communist opponent has no staked-out monopoly on the battle cry, "Know Your Enemy"! — closely linked in these times of political warfare to the slogan, "Know Your Friend!" (or Ally).

The flexibility of international politics breaks down at this point. There must be a strong and continuing emphasis on the image of the "enemy" (or opponent) whose built-in picture seems to characterize the contemporary foreign policies of the major powers. Just as the United States has largely replaced Great Britain in the focus of Soviet-Russian antagonism, so has our diplomacy centered around the all-pervasive and seemingly permanent image of the Soviet bloc as our arch-opponent in the cold war. These are truly inflexible categories limiting our field of international vision, our complex political horizon. Only slowly and painfully do these "built-in" national images fade and dissolve. Nicholas J. Spykman was bitterly criticized in 1942 when he prophetically stated that after World War II, Germany and Japan would become the close allies of the United States while the allies of yesterday may become the mortal enemies of a postwar tomorrow. Despite the obvious geostrategic relevance of Spykman's remarks, it took American public opinion at least six or seven years from the end of the war to familiarize itself with the *newly focussed* images of a friendly allied West Germany or a Far Eastern bulwark Japan.

3. *Security: The Strategic Focus of International Politics*

Despite the evident fluidity of subject matter and haziness in problem areas, twentieth century international politics has a distinct and well-outlined focal point: the concept of national security. In the present age of thermo-nuclear weapons, *security* as a truly national goal must be accorded top-billing and top-primacy in a country's diplomacy. Even the most conflict-ridden leadership groups of a given society must admit that the *entire national community* ought to identify itself with the complex requirements of national security, cutting across the fabric of the *entire* country as a *universal* goal.

Although theoretically universal within the boundaries of the nation-state itself, security is also a curiously *relative* concept in many ways. Is it possible — ask Haas and Whiting in their *Dynamics of International Relations* — to specify more precisely whose security is to be protected against whom? Assuming a primitive "state of nature" for the world, the search for security by each state would be the single dominating factor, and since the search for security by one implies the future insecurity of the others, the search for security by one state would be almost automatically countered by the power policies of other states. Hence the relativity of one nation's security and the inevitability of conflict as a result of the opposing interests of nations, each searching for its own version of national security.

In other cases the security concept remains relative if it cannot be equated with the will or the interest of the *whole* nation. Only in theory does the principle of national security always imply unanimous agreement on the immutable needs of the nation. In practice, as Haas and Whiting explain, it is frequently subject to the fluctuating interpretations and understandings of the particular social groups concerned. Security may, therefore, imply "the particular conception of interest *for given groups* in the nation at a given time, but not necessarily for the whole nation for all time." Specific group aims may thus frequently prevent the solid formation or crystallization of broader national interests. *In practice* there is seldom a permanent, all-inclusive and universally valid definition of security for any one state over a long period of time.

As the strategic focus of international politics, the concept of national security is apt to create international insecurity. A distinguished British author, D. W. Crowley, ties the entire history and development of international organization to the ubiquitous phenomenon of political insecurity. In his *The Background to Current Affairs,* Crowley asserts that the traditional and historically acceptable methods used to obtain national security have proved ineffective in recent times. The fundamental source of almost all the tension that arises between nations is *fear, based on insecurity.* Ever since the emergence of the nation-state as a typical form of political organzation, nations in small or large groupings have tried to formulate security devices of various types. The author briefly summarizes two major attempts:

a. the "balance-of-power" system, and

b. the concept of the United Nations as a "fresh attempt" to organize internationally against collective insecurity.

The balance-of-power system fights insecurity by means of an obvious device — the formation of alliances. But alliances produce counteralliances, and thus lead to balance-of-power systems. It has therefore been the normal state of affairs for European nations to be divided into two antagonistic groups. The result has been to *multiply* tension and fear rather than to reduce them.

The author correctly states that this system works only if the opposing alliances are generally of equal strength, thus producing a deadlock, or if the leaders of two alliances agree on some compromise relating to vital issues — such as strategic territories. On the whole, the practical and long-term operations of the system have become "quite unendurable."

The emergence of modern nationalism has rendered the process of continual compromise-making between nations much more difficult. Diplomacy has lost its past effectiveness precisely because the conduct and day-by-day shaping of foreign policies has become much more impersonal at a time when the world has become smaller and complicated by many more conflicting national interests.

In this context, the real value of the League of Nations and United Nations efforts is seen in terms of replacing the dubious alliance systems by "collective security." Crowley defines this concept as "the deterrent force of an unchallengeable alliance consisting of the great majority of all the nations." Unhappily, this novel-type alliance failed in its principal purpose — that of providing true national security for its member states. When faced with a crisis, the League was unable to operate the machinery with sufficient vigor and effectiveness. By the middle of the 1930's the individual member nations had reverted to an old-fashioned balance-of-power system. It was World War II that reemphasized the urgency to devise a better and more meaningful method than the historically discredited balance-of-power system. Thus the decision was taken to project a new world organization which could approach the haunting dilemma of collective security by attempting to bring the combined resources of *all its members* to bear against armed aggression. Whether the United Nations has successfully laid the specter of global as well as national insecurity, remains to be seen.

4. *The Restraints on Violence — National and International*

One of the principal and seemingly insoluble problems of international politics is the absence of any legal or institutional restraints on the use of power. Since the application of power leads to violence, both latent and obvious, the crucial issue is to construct tangible restraints on the assertion of violence in international relations. In legal terms this is impossible. It has been frequently stated that the only *legal* limitation of sovereignty is its duty to admit of no legal limitations.

Side-stepping the permanent dilemma of state sovereignty, the student must search for other instruments acting as restraining forces on the indiscriminate uses of violence. Following the sensitive analysis of Professors Haas and Whiting in their *Dynamics of International Relations*, two major types are worth noting: ideological and institutional restraints on violence.

Ideological restraints imply a recourse to certain political belief-systems, or sets of ideas, opposing the limited or unlimited use of force in international relations. Pacifism, for example, has been a major and successful ideology opposing violence. Isolationism, the systematic non-involvement in the affairs and conflicts of other countries, has operated as an effective deterrent to numerous countries from active participation in wars.

The ideological restraint is most effective when coupled with moral and spiritual considerations. In such situations, aggressors are made to realize that the use of force simply "does not pay," and that there are such intensive emotional barriers erected against the assertion of violence that the would-be aggressor shrinks back from open challenge. These restraints are *self-contained* within the ideologies and myths of the individual nation-states or of the various social groups within the nation. They are never institutionalized or incorporated into specific laws or actual operational principles of political science. Rather, they express the ethical dictate, the voice of national — or group — conscience on the international political level.

Slogans, catchwords, emotionally loaded propaganda phrases, if effectively manipulated, can become significant symbols advocating either restraint on or resistance to violence. Hitler's "Holy War Against Bolshevism!" battle cry was countered by Winston Churchill's "Grand Alliance," by Franklin D. Roosevelt's call for a "War for Survival," for "Unconditional Surrender," and by Joseph Stalin's slogan of "The Russian People's Great Patriotic War." Thus ideologically motivated symbols can play an enormously important role in organizing against or restraining the massive use of violence on the international scene.

Institutional restraints comprise specifically defined procedures by which governments can settle disputes without using their military establishments. In addition to arbitration, mediation and conciliation, which were discussed above, we must consider here the *institutional aspects* of international organization. If any one of the United Nations' members chooses to disobey the legal limitations of the Charter, "enforcement action" or sanctions will be applied against it. Force in such a case is not truly restrained, but merely rechanneled or redirected: it is utilized by the society of states rather than by single states.

In successful situations, such as in effective UN police actions or in the uses of a UN emergency police force, the institution of international organization, observe Haas and Whiting, is actually "able to act as a restraining force against the ready appeal to arms in crises in which *the unilateral action of single states* would not have deterred the use of violence equally well." This is an excellent, but highly theoretical formulation of the problem. In reality, institutional restraints are exceedingly weak and primarily in an embryonic state. The " enforcement actions" of the United Nations have been infrequent and largely ineffective. Behind the facade of "institutional" restraints there hides not a majority of UN members, but only a few nations supporting the specific action or sanction for reasons of their own and motivated by their own national interest. As Walter Lippmann correctly remarked in his *U. S. Foreign Policy*, international organizations like the League of Nations or the United Nations are only as strong (or weak) as the big powers supporting it.

C. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

One of the principal conclusions to be drawn from this survey is that international politics presents a particularly fluid and dynamic field of study. *World Politics in Transition*, a recent textbook co-authored by Professors Mills and McLaughlin, has been given a suitable title indeed. There are several reasons for this continuing state of flux and for the uncertainties of scope and content. First of all, it seems to be impossible to state concisely, or to "codify" as it were, the principles and problems of international politics. Vague and somewhat unprecise in character, international relations has no tangible laws, no closely identifiable body of rules or prescriptions that could be handed down from generation to generation, from student to student. The whole setting of the discipline changes almost continually, and the political environment in which it has to operate is steadily exposed to major seismographic shocks and revolutionary upheavals.

It has been frequently, and quite accurately, stated that international politics suffers from chronic exposure to a cultural and political lag which keeps it approximately twenty-five to fifty years behind the contemporary setting and day-by-day sweep of history. Thus it is clear that the French Army was ready by 1870 to refight and win the Battle of Waterloo; was set by 1914 to correct the military disasters of 1870-71, and fully prepared by 1940 to profit from the strategic and tactical lessons of the 1914-1918 period. Unhappily, it is also true of world politics that by the time a new military conflict or severe diplomatic crisis arises, it is usually ready to cope with the previous wave of wars or crises, and willing to apply several years later the lessons derived from past difficulties. While history may teach us a great deal, it obviously cannot offer a complete blueprint for the next wave of problems. Hence the chronic state of semi-bankruptcy in the academic discipline of international politics!

In addition to this "historic gap," the vagueness of scope and content must be stressed again. In the field of international diplomacy, two and two seldom add up to four but seem to vacillate in a truly quixotic manner anywhere between three and eight. Albert Einstein undeniably spoke his frank opinion when he remarked that "Politics is harder than physics." It was the great fallacy of medieval natural law scholars to concentrate on, and attempt to codify, a set of immutable laws governing the political relations of both individuals and nations. Such unwavering principles do not exist in world politics. Even the scholars who keep referring to a "law of political vacuums" (asserting that the place of a weak, practically nonexistent or defunct political system will be promptly taken up and filled by a stronger and more aggressive regime or governing elite) have to qualify and generously footnote their slowly evolving principle in order to give it a degree of *relative validity.* Even the most modest political generalizations have to be surrounded by defensive "ifs and buts" to the point where their pedagogical value and historic significance may rightly be questioned by student and expert alike.

One of the few tenable generalizations, which ought to be formulated here in conclusion, is that every facet, aspect and operational detail of international politics is focussed today on the climactic and all-pervasive struggle between democracy and totalitarianism. The global conflict between these two opposing ideologies affects every analysis, discussion and research project in this field. While cold-war studies may be only incidental and somewhat peripheral phases in the sweep of world history, the emergence of totalitarianism itself is truly a "historically unique and *sui generis*" political form, as Professors Friedrich and Brzezinski observed in their pioneering study on *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.*

The all-pervasive conflict lies between the challenge of free-world type democracy on the one hand and totalitarian (or total) dictatorships on the other. The challenge is complicated by the political fact that this monster is a "beast of many spots." All Fascist (right-wing) and Communist (leftist) totalitarian dictatorships are basically alike, or at any rate, more nearly like each other than like any other system of government. Thus a new revolutionary type of political ideology, subject to a single power center from which it exerts an absolute rule over its people, moves into the realm of world affairs with a systematic and ruthless challenge of any other way of life or political belief. The ensuing global struggle casts a deep and dark shadow over the cold war, over international conferences, whether in the United Nations or outside of it; over military and political negotiations, whether top secret, highly sensitive, or open to public knowledge; and, most importantly, it tends to be of a *divisive character* giving our political world an unnatural black-and-white coloring on a seemingly permanent basis.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Andrew Gyorgy

Professor Gyorgy received his A.B. and J.D. degrees from the Law School of the University of Budapest, and his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of California.

He studied law and politics at the Sorbonne University in Paris during 1936 and 1937, followed by two years of study at the University of California on a Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship. From 1940 to 1942 he was a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of California at Los Angeles, where he received his Ph.D. in 1942.

During World War II, Professor Gyorgy was first an instructor in the Army Specialized Training Program at the University of California and later in the Academic department of The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

After serving as assistant professor of government at the University of New Hampshire during 1945 and 1946, he was assistant professor of political science at Yale University until 1950. During 1951-1952 Professor Gyorgy was a research associate at Yale University, and the following two years held the position of research associate at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Since 1952, he has been professor of government at Boston University.

He took leave from Boston University to act as Consultant for International Relations and Social Sciences at the Naval War College during the first term of Academic Year 1956-1957, and is occupying the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy there during Academic Year 1958-1959.

Professor Gyorgy is the author of *Geopolitics, The New German Science,* and *Governments of Danubian Europe.* He is also the editor of *Soviet Satellites, Studies in the Politics of Eastern Europe,* and *Problems in International Relations.* At the present time he is completing a book dealing with certain aspects of contemporary international relations, to be published under the auspices of the Naval War College.

SIGNIFICANCE OF INDIA'S LEADERSHIP IN ASIAN NEUTRALISM

from a lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 4 November 1958 by
Doctor Phillips Talbot

When my family and I lived in Delhi some two years ago, we temporarily sublet a house in the new Diplomatic Enclave on a street called Kautilya Marg. Now, Kautilya was an Indian Machiavelli who more than two millennia ago gave his prince some very practical ideas of statecraft. It is intriguing that today's Indians should have given his name to a street built for the residences of foreign diplomats, in an era when India itself looks rather archly at power politics.

But Kautilya Marg is also on the route between the Prime Minister's house and Delhi's international airport. During our weeks of residence there I was fascinated at how many times my children would come rushing in from play to announce that "We've seen Mr. Nehru again." And sure enough they had, for the Prime Minister in his police-led motorcade was often busy welcoming or bidding farewell to some distinguished visitor.

In a fairly brief period Chou En-lai passed through several times, the Dalai Lama and the Pan-ch'en Lama were in and out of the capital repeatedly, Haile Selassie had come on a state visit, the Foreign Ministers of the Western "Big Three" had paused for talks, and leaders of several of the new states of Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia had come to meet Indian leaders. Few national capitals can have attracted more visitors — from the "Free World," from Communist countries and from the nonaligned nations — than Delhi in recent years. One of the facts of modern diplomacy is the degree to which India is noticed by other nations.

But Nehru has not spent all his time greeting visitors at home. A persistent, peripatetic traveler himself, sometimes called "the most travelled foreign minister in the world," not excluding our own, he has not only seen the great capitals of the world but he has everywhere been received handsomely. It was the "red carpet" treatment for him when he visited the United States in 1949, the "red carpet" in the Soviet Union and in Communist China, and the "red carpet" in Japan when he went there not too long ago. If India has been discovering the rest of the world, India's leader has made a vivid impression wherever he has gone.

To Indians — articulate Indians, that is — the popularity of Delhi among distinguished foreign visitors and the demonstrative welcomes given Nehru on his tours abroad have had a tremendous symbolic importance. They see these demonstrations as evidence that India's foreign policy has been dramatically successful in what was after all the very first decade of the country's independence. More specifically, they see three very important fruits of their foreign policy:

1. They believe Indian policy has contributed to the preservation of peace. They are proud of the role which India has played in a wide range of world crises, from Korea and Vietnam to Suez.

2. They welcome the prestige that foreign policy seems to have given India. This is particularly important because India's domestic problems at the beginning, if you will recall them, were incredibly difficult. The price of independence in 1947 was the partitioning of the India that had a certain historical unity and had been molded into a political entity during the period of British control. The partition loosed massive passions that engulfed Hindus and Muslims of northern India and western Pakistan in murderous rioting, mob violence and the breakdown of both civil order and military control. For a time there was some question whether Delhi could be maintained as the capital of India. (On the Pakistan side, conditions were equally bad). Within a dozen weeks more than ten million persons were uprooted from their homes in India or Pakistan and forced to flee across the newly-erected international frontier. Some hundreds of thousands of victims died violently. The shock of all this to the Indian mind, steeped as it had been for generations in dreams of independence, was such as to make

freedom at first seem the road to disaster rather than to a promised land.

Very early, too, came awareness of the considerable difficulties India faced in organizing its resources to increase production and alleviate poverty in the face of rapid population growth. Food crises and monetary crises in the early years raised questions in the minds of many Indians about the capacity of free India to solve its people's most immediate problems.

There were other difficulties as well that contributed to the malaise of the early years of independence. But, almost from the beginning, India's posture in foreign affairs brought national satisfaction. The recognition given their new state, the consideration shown the views articulated by its Prime Minister — even by those who disagreed vigorously with his diagnoses and prescriptions — and the apparent success of many early foreign policy moves (except in the Kashmir case, to which we shall refer later), all these gave Indians reason for pride and for confidence that the country would move forward.

3. They believe their foreign policy has effectively served their national interests. By not becoming aligned with any power bloc, they hold they have had greater freedom of action and won more respect for their views than would otherwise have been true. Few of them put an allied point bluntly (and many would argue it is not only extraneous but libelous of India's intentions), but there are Indians who ask themselves how better to get the whole world trying to help you than to have a foreign policy that somehow strikes a responsive chord in the West and in what Americans call the East? And the fact is that India is the recipient of economic assistance and occasional political support from both the Western powers, including the United States, and the Communist-controlled powers. This is not necessarily bad; my point is that the existence of this condition heightens many Indians' confidence in their foreign policy.

It is easy in discussing "India's" foreign policy to leave the impression that this entity can be equated to our prevailing concept to American foreign policy or British foreign policy. Because this may be misleading, I must define the term "India" as I use it in discussing foreign policy.

India's foreign policy is certainly not the expression of a consensus arising from serious consideration and debate among the 400 million citizens of the country. Nor is it, in fact, the outgrowth of views expressed widely among the, say, 65 million people who are supposed to be literate, or the eight million people who, according to one estimate, "read newspapers regularly," or the two million or so who have been through college. (These are all very rough figures, used only for illustrative purposes). These larger masses in the community have been important not as generators of policy but as responsive chords to the melodies created by the responsible leadership. Just as Mahatma Gandhi had extraordinary power to evoke mass support for the calculated positions he took during the nationalist struggle, so the design and conduct of Indian foreign policy since independence must be regarded mainly in terms of one individual and his immediate associates, however wide the popular support for the postures adopted.

Jawaharlal Nehru concerned himself with foreign affairs many years before he became Prime Minister of India. Back in 1939, when Nehru was between two of the terms in jail to which the government of the day periodically consigned him, I happened to be in the United Provinces (now the state of Uttar Pradesh), attending a meeting of the Provincial Committee of the Indian National Congress. This 'Congress' was and is a political body, of course, not a legislature. Some 20,000 people were present, as I recall. Some were from towns, but the bulk had come from their simple villages. Many looked as if they lived near the average income level for India: about $50 per person per year. Probably few of them had ever been to a big city. Their knowledge of the outside world must have been woefully meager.

And yet Nehru addressed himself to these people — in a long, avuncular talk — not only on local or nationalist issues but on international struggles far distant from India. He spoke of the Spanish civil war, of Nazism and Fascism, of the World War then just starting. Indians should be concerned with these problems, he said, because someday India would be involved. This was a point he pressed wherever he went.

Ever since his youth Nehru had perceived the Indian nationalist struggle in a world context. A product of Harrow and Cambridge, he knew Europe well. In 1927, ten years after the Bolshevik revolution, he visited the Soviet Union. From the end of the 1920's he became — and has remained — the architect of the resolutions on foreign affairs so often passed at the annual sessions of the Indian National Congress. Many of these resolutions showed Nehru's — and most Indian nationalists' — concern over the subjugation of one people by another. There were resolutions of sympathy to the Chinese people during the Japanese occupation, resolutions of good will to Arabs under European rule, resolutions saluting victims of Fascism and Nazism, and many others. However much or little it may have been realized at the time, Nehru was preparing the Indian people to assume a posture in international affairs when the country became independent. He was also preparing himself to be foreign minister. And he was functioning — as did Gandhi — in an interesting and complex philosophic climate that drew from ideas of toleration and nonviolence embedded in Hinduism, ideas of political liberalism expressed by the Western philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and a lively sense of the changes introduced into the world by modern technology and comunications.

When I speak, then, of "India's" foreign policy in the dozen years since independence, I am really referring to the product of attitudes developed mainly by Jawaharlal Nehru — attitudes in which his immediate associates have been educated (by him and by their own similar experiences) and which, generally speaking, have become the elements of a national consensus achieved without very much collision or adjustment of conflicting views. Not that Nehru stands alone and could guide his country in any direction whim might dictate; he is the creature as well as in large part the creator of his environment, and his strength comes substantially from the sensitivity with which he perceives and articulates national urges in India.

This emphasis on Nehru's transcendant role in India's foreign policy up to now does not imply that Indian postures are certain or even likely to change materially when he passes from the scene. Given roughly comparable conditions in world affairs, it would be a better guess, I believe, that the views and aspirations he personifies would continue to shape Indian policies. A succeeding Prime Minister might be more enmeshed in domestic affairs, less acutely sensitized to foreign affairs, and consequently less electric in his impact on international opinion and diplomacy, but his general posture might well be similar.

In examining India's foreign policy the first thing to notice, I believe, is that, like the foreign policies of most other countries, it has in fact been a combination of strategic self-interest and of a kind of ideology. Because the ideology underlying many of India's postures is relatively well perceived, let us look first at the ways in which India views its immediate national interest.

Where the direct protection of the nation is concerned, India no more than any other country shows itself neutral or unduly tolerant. As Nehru once said after he had been asked whose side he was on in world affairs, "I am on India's side." India has made it clear that its national interests will be defended first, foremost and last. The most dramatic example of this position is, of course, India's posture toward Pakistan. The partition which came in 1947 had the effect of turning sharp domestic tensions (mainly between Hindus, along with Sikhs and Muslims) into international friction. I need not recite the conflicts that have plagued Indo-Pakistan relations: the treatment of minorities in each country, evacuee property, trade and currency problems, and the allocations of river waters for canal irrigation, for example. It is enough to look at the Kashmir case.

For some years the basic dilemma in the Kashmir dispute has been that India wants it treated as a legal issue and Pakistan as a political issue. In the Indian view, Kashmir (that is, the State of Jammu and Kashmir) is legally part of India because the Maharaja of the State signed an Instrument of Accession which, though executed when conditions in the State were stormy, followed agreed procedures. India's position on Kashmir has been intransigent (in the eyes of a foreign observer) in the sense that India has clung to the apparent legality of its position to the exclusion of procedures for a political solution proposed by the Security Council, a commission and various mediators of the United Nations. There is some basis for the Indian claim that its legal position is unassailable; my own impression is that India could probably sustain its case before the International Court of Justice, if the issue were to go to that body.

But it seems equally clear to me that if India were to accept a political resolution of its conflict with Pakistan over the final disposition of Kashmir, along the lines India has sometimes urged on disputants in other parts of the world, the result could be different. No one can predict with confidence, I believe, how a plebiscite would go in Kashmir; during visits to Kashmir at different times since 1947 I have sensed substantial swings of opinion among Kashmiris. But now, or at least last year, I would have felt safe in concluding that the majority of the people of the villages of Kashmir, as well as the townspeople, would not prefer to remain with India. I am not sure they would want to be attached to Pakistan either, if given a free choice; they would probably prefer the demand now widely discussed in the Valley for an autonomous Kashmir. Seeking out the preferences of the Kashmiri people is, however, not the immediate goal of Indian policy; it is, rather, to maintain the integrity of the areas that are considered legally part of the country, including Kashmir.

It is because India regards Pakistan as the one visible threat to its national interest (because of the possibility of conflict over Kashmir, canal waters, etc), that India has often reacted to other countries inversely to the level of their involvement with Pakistan. As Americans, we discovered how the agreement in 1954 to give military assistance to Pakistan critically strained our relations with India. Indeed, the fact that the United States has helped Pakistan strengthen its military posture has in recent years been the principal irritant in Indian-American relations.

There are other issues touching the national interest on which India has taken a firm position. Take, for example, the Portuguese territory of Goa. To Indians it is a continuing shame that a foreign flag should fly over this small territory, which they consider part of their motherland. One Indian once told me that the Indian nationalists had not imagined that when they finally chased the British lion out of their country after two generations of effort, "a few fleas would remain." The tiny French enclaves did indeed go to India, after several years of negotiation. But the Portuguese Government has shown no similar inclination to give up the bits of territory it has in India. Rather, it has stood on a legal claim of sovereignty which it is prepared to test before the World Court. Unhappily for India, which has publicly renounced the idea of using force to "liberate" Goa, no means of denting Portugal's legalistic position have yet been found. I have the impression that when India urged its Western friends, Britain and the United States, to point out to Portugal the wisdom of withdrawing, they observed that they were nonaligned in this dispute between these two nations that were both their friends. How much this kind of response was appreciated in New Delhi, I can only guess; but the absorption of Goa is still plainly on India's list of unfinished business.

Another area in which India's policies have been dictated primarily by a sense of direct national interest is the northeast frontier region, where the borders of India and its protectorates march with those of Communist China. Since the Peking regime translated traditional Chinese suzerainty over Tibet into direct control, India has kept a particularly careful eye on the Northeast Frontier Areas of Assam (where Chinese maps still show the international frontier deep in what India regards as its territory), Sikkim and Bhutan (which Nehru has recently visited, Bhutan for the first time) and Nepal.

"Our interest in the internal conditions in Nepal has become still more acute and personal," Nehru told the Indian Parliament at the end of 1950, "because of the developments across our borders, to be frank, especially those in China and Tibet . . . Much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security."

I have mentioned these forthright positions not to challenge them, but to remind you that, like other governments, the New Delhi government is concerned first and centrally with the security of India — as it should be. Differences which a foreigner perceives between India's blunt positions on these issues and its postures in wider world affairs stem, it has seemed to me, from the fact that India rarely has regarded its own national interest to be clearly on one side or the other of the biggest conflict of our age, the cold war. Rather, India has approached many of these wider problems from an ideological point of view emerging from its pre-independence position.

For example, the Indian intelligentsia who found imperialism bad in their own country have continued to look at many world power issues as issues of colonialism — colonialism which by its nature is bad. We should remember, of course, that Indians normally understand colonialism in the terms in which they experienced: the domination or control of Asian and African peoples by Europeans, or, more simply, of colored peoples by whites. Colonialism and color-consciousness are closely linked. (Within Indian society, too, there is color-consciousness, as is testified by the matrimonial advertisements in newspapers that seek or offer prospective brides whose skin is the desired "wheat-colored," rather than darker. But in world affairs Indians' emotions are linked to the colored peoples rather than to the whites).

It is an important part of the Indian conviction that many of the colored peoples of the world, including the Indians, had magnificent civilizations in ancient times, in medieval times and right down to the industrial revolution, but then fell behind the rest of the world as they came under the domination of the newly advanced Western white nations. It would follow that the only way in which they can now catch up — a fond ambition — is to break through the predominance of power and control that has been established by the white races.

Any Indian would recognize in the statement I have just made a gross oversimplification; but also, I believe, a kernel of truth that has powerfully affected attitudes. It is obvious that interracial clashes in the United States contribute to the stereotype of the white American trying to maintain his dominance at home — and abroad. What seems less obvious to many peoples is that by constantly describing the cold war as an East-West conflict, we are not only increasing the identification of the United States with these "white, Western" stereotypes, but we are actually helping the Soviet Union in its efforts to identify itself with the other side of the dichotomy, the "East," or Asia. Considering these built-in images of the world, it is no accident that Indians have had a hard time equating the imposition of Communist regimes on Eastern European nations with their concepts of imperialism. Many of them call the troubles of the Slavs just another aspect of Europe's long-continuing civil wars.

Besides strong feelings about colonialism and about race relations, a deep sense of Asianism helps shape Indian foreign policy attitudes. This is the idea that in our generation the renaissance of Asia is at hand, and that any step forward by an Asian people should be supported and applauded. This has been India's attitude toward the struggles of Southeast Asian countries to get political freedom, and — at least until recently — it has seemed to be the main component of prevailing Indian attitudes toward China. Indians claim to know something about China. They point to the thousand years of cultural contact between India and China that made possible, among other things, the transfer of Buddhism into Eastern Asia. (But these contacts virtually dried up in the eleventh century, not to be resumed very actively until our day).

Many Indians interpreted the postwar revolution in China as a Chinese act of rejection of Western domination, a domination considered real even though indirect. The Chinese Communist movement was certainly the instrument of this rejection, these persons agree, but they judge the postwar changes as basically a Chinese resurgence, and therefore part of the Asian renaissance. Recent developments — to which I have yet to refer — have caused quite a few Indians to modify their opinions, but these opinions have been important in the shaping of Indian policy attitudes to date.

Add to these views the belief widely found in India in what Nehru has called the "area of peace" idea, and you should have a clear idea of how many Indians look at the cold war. Nehru has stated repeatedly that neither capitalism (as he understands it — which I think may be a sort of 19th century textbook capitalism) nor Communism is suitable for India's conditions.

He recognizes that modern India has borrowed its major political institutions from the West, is culturally influenced by the West, and has its closest economic ties with the West, but he finds much that repels him in Western policies and institutions. On the other hand, he feels that the Soviets have something to offer India, for note the progress they have made in just forty years; perhaps India, too, by learning something from the Soviets, can be well up the ladder in another generation. But Nehru has only recently, in one of his rambling essays, predicted the eventual collapse of communism, on the ground that it does not sufficiently recognize the dignity of the human individual.

Feeling that there are virtues and also serious vices in both systems, and that both systems are backed by great power, Nehru and his associates have the view that India's danger is to get caught between the two systems. Prudence, they hold, dictates India's nonalignment with either bloc. They argue further that the chances of preventing war between the two blocs will grow as more areas of the world declare themselves to be uncommitted to either; that is, to be members of a third grouping, the "area of peace." Because this seems the best path that India can follow in the quest for world peace — which Indians regard as essential if their country is to have a chance for political stability and economic development — many Indians argue it is a more important purpose than would be the effort to choose between the values of the West and those of the Soviet Union.

This posture has from time to time given India the opportunity, or responsibility, to help mediate cold-war disputes. It is interesting that this role corresponds in Indians' minds with that of the peacemaker in an Indian village who gains prestige because he has sufficient influence to mediate when other people quarrel, as they often do. Indians have regarded their contribution to the resolution of disputes in Korea and Vietnam, for example, as prestigious.

It is worth our looking, now, at how some of these Indian foreign policy concepts work to the advantage or disadvantage of the Soviet Union and of the United States. First, let me note that — from the Indian point of view — hardly any Soviet policy has so far cut athwart India's direct national interest, whereas American policies have repeatedly done so. When we say, for example, that we need the support of the Northern Tier countries and of Southeast Asia and of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization countries in order to prevent or repel Communist aggressions, many Indians are skeptical. They tend to look at these military alliances as evidence that the imperialist Westerner is finding new ways to return to control of parts of Asia. And the Soviets encourage this view, while pointing out that the Soviet Union and Communist China keep no military bases on the soil of West Asian nations.

More specifically, our Treaty alliances and the military assistance pact with Pakistan touched India at its most sensitive spot: the strengthening of its only visible rival. India has reacted vigorously. It has sought to maintain the military superiority over Pakistan that was determined at the partitioning of the old British Indian armed forces in 1947. As Pakistan has received jets from its American ally, India has bought more jets from other sources. Recently India has also, as you know, ordered an aircraft carrier from the British. And many Indians, saying they acknowledge that the United States did not intend to damage India's interests by giving military equipment to Pakistan, still blame the United States for their increased military outlays. In this, of course, they are encouraged by the Soviet Union, which has also sidled up to India with a more favorable stand (from India's point of view) on the Kashmir issue than the Western nations have heretofore adopted.

I have put the Indian view of American policies in Asia fairly strongly to suggest to you the emotions which get in the way of better understanding between the United States and India. Similarly, when colonial issues come before the Trusteeship Council or other organs of the United Nations the Indians are more likely to find the Soviets clearly on their side than the Americans. The Soviets had no African empire (Russian expansion had been westward, by land) ; they can afford to press for the precipitate liquidation of imperialism. We, however, committed to our European allies and, by now, recognizing the complexities of transfers of power, have stood on the general principle of self-determination but with what I would call realistic caution. We have often exercised a braking influence on the pace of change demanded by African nationalists, and this has often made Indians think the Americans are less sympathetic than the Soviets to the aspirations of colored peoples to be free.

I mention these points not on their merits, or in an attempt to analyze Indo-American relations. There are other facets of Indian-American relations we could examine — if that were our purpose today — to understand how it is that two countries with an almost uncanny capacity to irritate each other have, in spite of all, maintained quite effective relations since 1947. Indeed, I should say that Indian-American relations today are more understanding, and in many ways more fruitful, than they have been heretofore. But my purpose today is to point out why Indians have not automatically and vociferously chosen our side of the cold war, as we have often felt they should.

In thinking about why India should continue to be unaligned with either power bloc, let me come back to the special case of China. To all the Indians whose views I can remember having heard expressed, China means the mainland, Communist-controlled China. (The Formosan-based Government of the Kuomintang is considered discredited). I have said that in India there is a feeling China is important. Indians constantly argue that China's claims to admission to the world community should be honored. China was the first country with which India signed the 'Five Principles' of peaceful coexistence. But, in my opinion, Indian opinion about China has of late become increasingly ambivalent.

It is not only the worry about Chinese penetration of Tibet and possible intentions toward the mountainous buffer areas between Tibet and India; the Indian Government has been bracing its defenses against pressures from that direction. Concern is also growing over the emerging stereotype of a China that by Communist methods is pushing ahead economically more rapidly than is democratic India. To the extent the Chinese succeed, some Indians fear that the image of a massive, vigorous Communist China will give aid and comfort to the Indian Communist Party and its friends. Since the 1957 elections, when the state of Kerala in southwest India elected a Communist-controlled legislature, more and more Indians — but perhaps still a very small part of the opinion-influencers — have come to feel that a powerful China will not necessarily be a friendly neighbor. Some Indians in public life now express these fears openly. As a generalization, however, the most that can be said is that there is more ambivalence toward China now than there was even a couple of years ago.

In a sense, the uncertain attitudes toward China reinforce those doubts about the Western powers and about Soviet Communism that have persuaded India that the policy of nonalignment is the most effective pattern of international relationships India could adopt. It is a pattern that Indians have also persuaded a number of other new nations in Asia and Africa to examine (and that it shares with Tito of Yugoslavia), and a pattern that has been found increasingly attractive by other countries. Even in 1947, just before India became independent, Nehru voiced this theme at the Asian Relations Conference. Addressing this meeting of unofficial personalities from all the countries of Asia (except Japan, which was then under Allied occupation, and including the Soviet Republics of Asia), he said: "The emergence of Asia in world affairs will be a powerful influence for world peace."

Eight years later India was one of the sponsors of the Bandung Conference, where African as well as Asian states were represented, and was still suggesting this course. At that time perhaps fourteen of the twenty-nine participants in the Bandung Conference could be described as nonaligned. Since then several of the other countries — Ceylon, for example — have shifted into the nonaligned category as contrasted to the viewpoint their spokesmen expressed at Bandung in support of positive identification with the nontotalitarian, democratic countries of the world. Surveying the postures adopted by the majority of the newer states of Africa as well as Asia, one has the impression that nonalignment — what in this country is often called neutralism, though that term is distasteful in India — is the prevailing posture of the emerging states.

You have asked me to comment today on the significance of India's leadership in Asian neutralism. The points we have been discussing suggest the active role India has been playing in this field. India was, after all, by far the most populous and fully developed of the countries which emerged from European colonial rule to political independence after World War II. This fact plus the extraordinarily dynamic leadership that has been given by Nehru, who symbolizes a great many of the aspirations of people in other Asian and African countries as well as in India, make it inevitable that India should take a leading role in this field despite constant protestations that it did not seek a position of leadership. Its spokesmen in the United Nations and elsewhere have often extended a big-brotherly hand to colonial peoples in Asia and Africa. And just as they have helped force the pace of political independence, they have encouraged new states to avoid entangling alliances.

Even though the role of India has been and remains extremely important, however, I sometimes think that Indians can overestimate their own influence on other countries in Southeast and Southwest Asia (and perhaps in Africa, but I don't know enough about conditions there to judge). I have the impression that many of these other countries also appreciate the idea of a noncommitted or unaligned "area of peace," that they are as concerned as India is about postcolonial crises and new kinds of problems confronting them, and that they have been inspired by Ghandi and Nehru and are going the same road as India. Yet, they seem extremely anxious to make a visitor understand that far from being camp followers of India they would prefer to get credit for thinking for themselves and to speak for themselves.

Furthermore, there are increasing indications that the time is passing when India's voice does in fact speak for many others. Three years ago an Indian could say with conviction that Nehru and Krishna Menon were counseling Colonel Nasser. Today it would be a brave Indian who would suggest that Nasser is in any way dependent upon India's guidance. This may be reading a good deal into what seems to me to have been a subtle but significant change in the relationship between the leaders of India and Egypt. But, although the area of uncommitted nations remains, and may indeed be growing, India's earlier symbolic leadership of the area is being crowded now by the interests of other countries also coming to the forefront.

Now, how does all this concern the United States? I believe it suggests some of the realities which American policy can ignore only at its peril. One is that this concept of nonalignment is a fact — a fact which seems to fit local ideas of peace, of national interest, and of prestige. And it is a fact that is unlikely to evaporate just because other people in the world, including American policy-makers, do not believe it to be the most effective safeguard of peace.

We can observe, for example, how far the world has moved from the bipolarization of power that was almost complete just after World War II. In this year's session of the United Nations General Assembly, our country finds it no longer easy to rally a two-thirds vote on an agenda item that seems anti-Soviet to many Asian and African members. Considering the new nations likely to be admitted to the United Nations within the next five or six years, one can foresee a day in which the unaligned countries will have a real balance of power in the General Assembly. (This does not mean, of course, that issues between the Western Alliance and the Communist camp will not continue to turn substantially on their respective power positions).

It should also be acknowledged, I believe, that the devotion to nonalignment does not mean that India and likeminded countries are Communist-inclined. There are domestic factors in India that seem to me to make the expansion of Communist influence in Indian states a distinct threat, but that is another subject. Sometimes, as we have seen, an unaligned position seems to support and get support from the Soviet Union more than the West. But India's posture of nonalignment in foreign affairs has, I believe, been developed in spite, rather than because, of the influence of Indian Communists on domestic politics. And nonalignment has at times irritated the Soviets (as in the Hungarian case) as much as at other times it has irritated Americans. The importance of nonalignment to Americans is the question it raises as to American strategic goals in relation to the nonaligned countries. It is easier, knowing where our allies stand, to shape our policies in relation to those countries. Does it follow, therefore, that the major object of our policy toward these uncommitted countries be to persuade them to join our alliances? Should our primary emphasis be on persuading, say, the people around Nehru to declare themselves in favor of the free countries that are trying to restrain the expansionist tendencies of Communist-controlled nations? Or is it more important in our long-run interests that the question of alignment or nonalignment be subordinated to problems of how these countries can achieve enough political stability and economic development to prevent internal collapse? Would that, in the end, be an even more effective strategy against the designs of the Communist powers?

I leave you with these questions and with my appreciation for your very close attention.

Thank you!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Doctor Phillips Talbot

Doctor Talbot, the Executive Director of the American Universities Field Staff, began Indian studies in 1938 under the auspices of the Institute of Current World Affairs. Since then he has spent about eight years in India and Pakistan on various assignments: as a student, as wartime United States Naval Liaison Officer in Bombay, as a *Chicago Daily News* correspondent, and as the American Universities Field Staff representative.

A graduate of the University of Illinois, he took later training at the London School of Oriental and African Studies, and holds a doctorate in International Relations granted by the University of Chicago. He has taught courses on India and Pakistan at the University of Chicago and at Columbia University.

Doctor Talbot has edited the Harris Institute volume titled *South Asia in the World Today* (written cooperatively with S. L. Poplai), *India and America*, which was published by the Council on Foreign Relations, and has also written many articles.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel, (G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

Commandant ELEVENTH Naval District (Code 154)
937 North Harbor Drive
San Diego, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District (Code 141)
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces, Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 48
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U. S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
U. S. Naval Base
Norfolk 11, Virginia

BOOKS

Inoguchi, Rikihei, et al. *The Divine Wind.* Annapolis, Md., U. S. Naval Institute, 1958. 240 p.

An authoritative and detailed account of the desperate aerial kamikaze tactics employed by the Japanese against the United States Navy in the final stages of World War II in the Pacific. Written by two key officers of the Japanese Naval Special Attack Force, and ably translated into English by an American naval reserve officer, the book vividly portrays the story of the suicide pilots. This Force was originally organized in October, 1944 as a short-term project to assist the Imperial Japanese Navy in preventing the imminent American landings on Leyte. The initial objective was limited to rendering the flight decks of the U. S. carriers inoperative for about one week, so that Admiral Kurita's surface forces, including the big battleships MUSASHI and YAMATO, could strike the large concentration of American transports off the Philippine Islands without air opposition. The kamikaze concept, however, was subsequently adopted for all defensive operations as the best means to employ dwindling resources in aircraft and pilots against overwhelming enemy forces. The book contains photographs of kamikaze pilots, their planes, and some of the ships damaged by suicidal attacks. Also, at the end of the volume are appendices, itemizing in tabular form the results of all recorded kamikaze attacks during the entire campaign. The closing chapter of the book is a compilation of last letters written and sent home by some of the kamikaze pilots about to go on their final missions. The kamikazes were unusual in that their operations were sustained for many months, in contrast to the short duration of the traditional last banzai charges made by Japanese ground troops when faced by a hopeless situation. It is interesting to note that there was much adverse public opinion about the kamikaze tactics, even inside Japan, many people feeling that resort to such extreme methods was not justified and should not have been ordered.

Thursfield, H. G., ed. *Brassey's Annual* 1958. New York, Macmillan, 1958. 390 p.

Brassey's Annual 1958 contains 29 well-written articles on various subjects of interest to officers of the armed forces.

The following are especially appropriate reading: Chapter 1, "The Object in War"; Chapter 2, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization"; Chapter 5, "Naval Strategy Today"; Chapter 6, "Cold Weather Warfare Training in the Royal Marines"; Chapter 12, "Foreign Navies"; Chapter 14, "Limited War"; Chapter 15, "The Arab Shore of the Persian Gulf: Its Political and Military Problems"; Chapter 17, "Selection and Training for High Command"; and Chapter 22, "A Balanced Fleet."

Vulliez, Albert, and Mordal, Jacques. *Battleship Scharnhorst.* Fair Lawn, N. J., Oxford University Press, 1958. 256 p.

Battleship Scharnhorst is the story of the wartime career of the second of the famous German battleships to bear this name. Strangely enough, it is the work of two French naval officers who certainly did a marvelous job of reconstructing history, not only from log books and contemporary documents, but from personal contact with several of the German officers who served on the *Scharnhorst.* For naval officers, many lessons in tactics and determination can be learned. Neither can one overlook the value of intelligence and the successes to be gained from careful planning, which was shown by the British on several occasions. At the same time, the authors generously recognize coverage on both sides, and this, too, cannot go unnoticed by the reader. At times the story drags in detail, but it reads easily, and fór a naval officer who desires to read history to learn, it provides a good reference for surface ship encounters.

Hough, Richard. *The Fleet That Had to Die.* New York, Viking, 1958. 212 p.

This book is a straightforward account of one of the greatest sea disasters in history, the Battle of Tsu-Shima, May 26-27, 1905, and of the events which led up to it during the Russo-Japanese War — the first of the modern wars. *The Fleet That Had to Die* is, of course, the Russian Baltic squadron led by Admiral Rozhestvensky. The author describes how Rozhestvensky brought his coal-fired fleet of 42 cumbersome ships around Eurasia and Africa (18,000 miles) without benefit of any sure bases, only to meet with almost complete destruction at the hands of Admiral Togo, who had a highly trained fleet, securely based and serviced, which had been awaiting Rozhestvensky for nearly five months. It was a victory for the Japanese far more spectacular than Jutland. The Russians lost 5,000 men, eight battleships and seven cruisers; Admiral Rozhestvensky (wounded and half out of his mind) surrendered, in company with large numbers of his sailors. Richard Hough says that he assembled his material from contemporary accounts, official and otherwise, and from captured papers and diaries. This book is considered background reading for all officers, mainly because it is an accurate account of one of the two genuine "fleet actions" (the other being Jutland) that were ever fought along classic, Mahanite lines during the period from the end of sail to the coming of the airplane.

PERIODICALS

Keirn, Donald J., Major General, United States Air Force. "A-Power for Aircraft." *Ordnance,* January-February, 1959, p. 568-570.

A description of the problems, current status and future outlook of the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program (ANP), with some views on the strategic implications concerning their operational capabilities.

Grewe, Wilhelm G. "The Berlin Crisis." *Vital Speeches of the Day,* February 1, 1959, p. 226-229.

The German Ambassador to the United States explains why the so-called "free city" proposal is unacceptable.

Klein, J. K. "The Soviet Espionage System in Germany." *Military Review,* February, 1959, p. 77-80.

A very interesting article, pointing out that Soviet underground organization activity is more intense today than at the time of the Weimar Republic.

Witze, Claude. "Too Tough to Tackle?" *Air Force,* February, 1959, p. 35-40.

An interesting discussion of the feasibility and advantages of SAC's use of the ALBM (Air Launched Ballistic Missile).

Kranish, Arthur; Sakell, Achilles N.; and Eller, E. M., Rear Admiral, United States Navy (Retired). "Who'll Pick Up the Free Man's Burden?" *Navy,* February, 1959, p. 6-17.

A study of the Indian Ocean Area in three parts: an indication of scientific aims for a study of the Ocean itself; a resume of the strategic importance of the Middle East; and an analysis of the vacuum that exists in the Indian Ocean and the urgent need for the United States to fill it.

Hook, Sidney. "Which Way Japan?" *The New Leader*, February 9, 1959, p. 3-7.

Sounds the note of alarm regarding the leftist-dominated Socialist Party of Japan, which, the author states, offers a grave danger to Japanese national independence and democratic Socialism

"Nationalism in the Middle East." *Current History,* February, 1959.

Eight articles examine the forces at work in the Middle East area and evaluate the rising tide of Arab nationalism.

Ulam, Adam B. "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy." *World Politics,* January, 1959, p. 153-172.

Attempts to analyze Soviet ideology, to explain the shifting trends of Soviet policy, and to point out the involved nature of the ideological element in the policy as a whole.

Brodie, Bernard. "The Anatomy of Deterrence." *World Politics,* January, 1959, p. 173-191.

A study of the theory of deterrence in today's strategy.

Norstad, General Lauris. "Three Elements of Western Strategy Today." *European-Atlantic Review,* Winter, 1958-1959, p. 10-11.

In considering the history of NATO, General Norstad discusses three tripartite subjects: the elements of the deterrence, the objectives of NATO strategy, and the task of the Shield.

Lemnitzer, Lyman L., General, United States Army. "Organization and Functions of STRAC and STRAF." *The Quartermaster Review,* January-February, 1959, p. 8-9, 148-151.

The Vice Chief of Staff discusses the organization and functions of STRAC and STRAF in such a way as to make clear the force position in the total Army structure.

Barnett, Frank. "Communist Semantics." *Navy Public Statements*, January, 1959, p. 43-55.

Discusses the terms, "fourth dimensional warfare," "aggression," "inevitability," "coexistence," and "witchhunt," marking the differences between propaganda and psychological warfare, and the twists given to the meaning of words and terms of Communist propaganda forces.

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Our foreign policy should be responsive to the needs of new conditions and evolutions. New policies, however, will not end a cold war which we have made efforts to end by just agreements, but which Russia perpetuates by adamant adherence to the promotion of international Communism.

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By switching from a strict defensive to a diplomatic and limited military offensive, the cold war might be won and a future world debacle be avoided.