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AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, 1958

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 12 November 1958 by
Professor Melville J. Herskovits

Two and a half years ago, when I had the privilege of addressing the members of this class, the situation in Africa was so different than it is today that many of the things that were at that time envisaged as possibilities have come to pass, and many others not even discussed have taken place.

The most important thing that has happened, to my mind, is the change in the attitudes toward the future of the Continent found in Africa itself. If we roughly draw a line at the northern border of Portuguese territory, across Southern (and perhaps Northern) Rhodesia, and across to the northern border of Mozambique (Portuguese East Africa), we find that north of this area, without any exception, it is taken for granted that these territories will be African territories, politically controlled by Africans, and that this is going to happen soon. As a Minister of the Kenya Government recently remarked: "It is not a question of 'if,' it is a question of 'how' and 'when' we will transfer to a democratic situation, which will mean that control will be in African hands." South of the line I have drawn, the situation is different; in fact we can think of what is taking place there as a kind of "holding action." Europeans there have the hope, though it is not a very secure one, that they are there to stay, and various proposals and policies have been advanced to make it possible for them to continue to predominate as they have in the past.

A general principle which applies to Africa South of the Sahara, if not the whole of the Continent, is this: that the degree of tension in a given territory will be in direct proportion to the size of the permanent non-African population. The major problem is created by the presence of Europeans, as whites are called. Other aspects of the same problem arise where there are large Indian populations, as in Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika and the Union, and to

a lesser extent in the Federation and in Ruanda-Urundi, the Belgian Trust Territory. But it is the Europeans who are the crux of the interracial situation.

What are some of the specific changes that have taken place since I spoke before this group two and a half years ago?

At that time, the *loi cadre*, which granted autonomy in their internal affairs to the various territories of French West and Equatorial Africa, was about to be implemented. Not only has this been implemented, but under the voting for the Community of the Fifth Republic any African territory could opt for independence; and Guinée, accepting the offer, has become an independent nation, to which, within the past week, we and Great Britain have extended recognition. This new country, however, is faced with certain difficult problems as concerns its internal administration. Unlike the British in West Africa, who have carefully prepared Ghanaians and Nigerians for running their country by bringing them into the foreign service, the postal service, and teaching them other administrative skills essential for governing a country, the French have not done this. So Guinée, cut off without a shilling — or, as I suppose I should say, without a franc — is having to make its own way.

Again, since I last spoke here, Ghana has become self-governing. The date of its independence, as you know, was March 6, 1957. A conference in London between the governments of the three regions of Nigeria and the British has just ended, and it has been announced that the date agreed upon for the independence of Nigeria is October 1, 1960. And the French have just announced that they will give up their Trusteeship for the Cameroons, also in 1960.

The Sudan had just become independent. It has since had a change of government, which has placed power in the hands of the military. Uganda is moving toward a state of independence, and if the various tribal groups in Uganda can agree, this will come about fairly soon. In Tanganyika the political pot is boiling, and it is possible that the United Nations Trusteeship, held by

the United Kingdom, will be terminated in a few years. 1960 will also see conversations in London concerning the revision of the Constitution of the Federation, with all its implications for European-African relations there.

The Belgians, who have been most reluctant to bring Africans into the political scene have, so to speak, put a toe in the political waters with their *statut de ville*, under which both Africans and Europeans, heretofore entirely voteless, have been permitted to vote for burgomasters who will function in the various sections of the three cities where this system has thus far been tried under a chief burgomaster named by the Governor General of the Congo. These elections were held last year; three more cities are soon going to be allowed to have this privilege. More important, however, is the fact that the recently established government is now holding conferences in Brussels to reconsider the whole structure of Belgian policy in Africa.

From what I have said, it is apparent that the outstanding developments of the moment lie in the political field. This is understandable, for the power structure, which is the key to the situation, is by its nature political. Africans who have had university training recognize this clearly. Thus, when I have indicated to such Africans that they must become members of the faculties of their own universities, because this is the only way in which they can assure the continuity of knowledge that is essential if their countries are to take their place in the world society, they have almost always pointed out that because there are so few of them, they are compelled to get into the political arena.

This is why so large a number of the Africans who have taken higher degrees in England, France, or the United States, have gravitated to politics. A case in point is a young man named Gikonyo Kiano, who took a Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California about three years ago, and then was appointed as Lecturer on the Staff of Nairobi Technical College in Kenya. He was instrumental in breaking the color bar in university housing, he and his wife being the first non-Whites to live in the faculty section. He has, however, felt compelled to resign his

teaching post and run for election as representative of the Kikuyu, his own people, in the Legislative Council. And only last Thursday he, with Tom Mboya, the very brilliant young Luo who is the leader of the African group in the *Legco*, as it is called, organized a walkout during the Governor's speech, as another step toward breaking the Lenox-Boyd Constitution, which is held by the Africans not to give them the degree of representation they feel to be their due

I may give another example that shows how important the Africans have come to feel political action to be. In 1955, as I believe I mentioned in my previous talk to this class, I had the opportunity of talking with the leaders of the various African trade unions in Dakar. What struck me more than anything else was the fact that their interests lay essentially in economic questions; that is, they discussed how to get a better price for their peanut crops, or about ways and means to raise wages and obtain various fringe benefits for African workers. They sounded like labor leaders in an European country, or in the United States.

But in 1957, their interests seemed almost exclusively political. Why? Because under the new statute that had been promulgated, where a great deal of political power was being put into the hands of the Africans, they began to see that here was the place where they could obtain the things they wanted; things that without such power in their own hands they could not get.

With this background, let us consider one of the basic problems of present-day Africa which I was asked to discuss, since, as I was informed, it is in these areas your primary interests lie, the problem of race relations.

This has created situations which have importance not only for all the African continent, but for all the world. For in terms of winning the allegiances of the uncommitted peoples, the color question is one of the most pressing we must face at the present time. In this struggle our side is handicapped because it includes most of the colonial powers, as well as the United States, which itself has not at home done too well on this level. For us, therefore,

it is necessary to understand the resentments that the peoples of color all over the world hold against Europeans, and which provide the dynamics for the anticolonialist movement of the present. I am not assessing praise or blame against any position. I am analyzing a situation. What we must understand is that at the present time "colonialism" is for most of the world defined as something that a white man does to a man of color.

Shortly after the crisis in Suez, in talking to Africans about their attitudes toward this problem, I raised the matter of their attitudes toward the Russian action in Hungary. Their response was invariably the same: "That is different." Then I would ask: "But is not what the Russians are doing a kind of imperialism?" And their reaction would be, "This is a fight between Europeans. Imperialism and colonialism are things that white people do to people of color."

This is a fundamental fact in shaping international relations that cannot be lost sight of in phrasing our foreign policy in all its aspects. In Africa, it is supremely important, for even where the color question does not arise it is invariably present.

Let me sketch some of the background of this question.

It was only in relatively recent times that Africa came to be recognized as one of the oldest inhabited parts of the world. Within the last twenty-five years, however, the extreme south of the Continent has yielded certain prehuman forms called the Australopithecinae, which are now felt to have been very early forerunners of the human type. These were small animals, but apparently walked on their hind legs, and seemed to have used tools. Other parts of Africa show a long period during which prehistoric cultures were maintained. It is interesting to note that in East Africa stone tools have been found that date from periods that antedate the earliest stone ages of Europe by about 100,000 years.

Whatever the nature of the earliest inhabitants — and we are not entirely sure whether they were pygmoid, like the Pygmies of the Ituri Forest, or the Bushmen of South Africa, who certainly had a much broader distribution than they have at the

present time — other types are found as time goes on. Whether the Negroid was the earliest of these other forms, or developed at a later period, we do not know. But the written record of contact between Africa and the outside world goes back about 2,500 years, at least as far as the coastal areas are concerned. What we must understand is that there was a great deal of contact with the rest of the Old World long before the Europeans arrived. Voyages across the Indian Ocean were constantly undertaken along the east coast, so that during all this long period India, and perhaps even China, had relations with African peoples.

In fact, Africa was never really cut off from the world, as is popularly supposed. The reason we get the picture of "Darkest Africa," and assume that Africa was not "opened up" until the nineteenth century, is because we think of African contacts with other continents from the point of view of Europe, which means we think of it essentially in terms of approaches by sea on the Atlantic side. Yet caravans have gone across the Sahara from time immemorial, implementing trade between Sub-Saharan and North Africa and thus, indirectly, linking Africa South of the Sahara with Europe. The impulse for the Moorish attacks on Spain came from Mauritania, one of the fundamental reasons for this being their control of the trade in gold that in early days was transported across the Sahara to Europe from mines of Senegal, traditionally cited in the ancient kingdom called Ghana. In later times, there was trade in leather, slaves, and other commodities across the desert to the north.

What we always seem to think of first, when relations of Africa with the outside world is considered, is the influence of Egypt on Africa. Because of the swamp (sudd) area of the upper and middle Nile, however, this seems to have been minimal. The few Egyptian remains found in some of the archeological deposits in East Africa seem to have been traded around the Sudan rather than to have come due south. The influence of Egypt on Negroid Africa is certainly much slighter than we thought in earlier times and, conversely, the relations of the Sub-Saharan region with North Africa have been somewhat greater than we had recognized.

There is no need to repeat here the tale, with which I am sure all of you are familiar, of the initial European voyages of discovery down the coast of Africa that resulted in the circumnavigation of the Continent in the search of a route for India. These brought the Portuguese, and later other peoples, to the west coast very early in the sixteenth century. Yet this later contact of Africa with Europe, though, an important incident in the overall history of the Continent, was only the continuation of something that had been going on for a great deal of time.

If you will look at a relief map of the Continent, you will see at once why penetration of Africa from the sea was difficult. Except in West Africa, there is everywhere a coastal plain of varying degrees of narrowness, from which an escarpment rises to the interior plateau that ranges from 3,000 to 6,000 feet and more. There are almost very few harbors. Where the rivers did not have falls that impeded shipping, sand bars prevented ocean-going vessels from sailing inland as they did up the North American rivers.

Turning to the present situation as regards race relations, it is only in more recent times that racial problems have in certain parts of the Sub-Saharan Continent become acute. Kenya offers a good example, since the three-level pattern of race relations found in Eastern and Southern Africa was established there quite early. One reason for the British going into Kenya was to build a railroad to Uganda; since Uganda was the scene of early exploration and missionary activity it was felt that it needed communication with the sea. To build the railroad, there had to be technicians and a managerial group; these were brought from Europe and remained at the top. The descendants of the laborers brought from India comprised the second level and, finally, there were the Africans, who, though they came to participate in the new economy, remained in the lowest socio-economic stratum. This pattern has maintained itself in all the area to the present time. If one takes any index of status — whether it be the standard of living, social position, or opportunity — it will be found that the

European is highest, the Indian is next, and that the African is lowest in the scale.

Elsewhere, however, this pattern did not develop, perhaps because there were few residents of nonindigenous races. It did not develop in the Belgian Congo, except in the Lake Kivu region, where some Belgian planters have settled. In most of the Congo, however, development has been encouraged by giving agricultural and mineral concessions to large companies, so that the managerial group does not come to settle, but to work for a period and then return home to Belgium.

In West African territories under British control, Europeans have not been allowed to own land, which made it impossible for a class of white settlers to be established. Until very recent times, indeed, when pharmaceutical developments and medical research made it possible to cope with the indigenous disease, this area was avoided by Europeans, except for short tours, since it is the region classically known as the "white man's grave." Today, the European population is a fraction of one per cent. I do not mean that the Europeans do not keep to themselves, and do not on occasion have their own clubs — though even this is minimal in Ghana and Nigeria — but there is no official sanction for discrimination. The process of "Africanization" of the civil services, on all levels, giving Africans full access to primary, secondary, and higher education and placing them in managerial posts and in all kinds of business enterprises, goes on apace. The middle layer does exist in West Africa, however, where it is composed of Lebanese and Syrian merchants. They have come in since the turn of the century, and perform the same entrepreneurial function in West Africa that is performed by the Indians in the eastern and southern parts of the Continent.

In French Africa, racial tensions are likewise minor. I was present when the elections to the *Assemblée Territoriale* of French Equatorial Africa were held at Brazzaville, on March 30, 1957. The electoral lists were very interesting from the point of view of race relations. Candidates were selected by party caucuses in which Africans, being fully enfranchised, predominated in great majority.

Yet on each party list, among eight or ten nominees, there were the names of two or three Europeans which, obviously, had been put there by Africans.

This is important, as evidence of an attribute too often ignored in discussing contemporary Africa. I am convinced that where the African sees the road is clear for him to exercise political responsibility, and opportunity of participating in the government of his own country is accorded him, he is not anti-European. Africans in all parts of the Continent have, with various phrasings, said to me, "When we get free, we are going to have to have Europeans with us for a long time, for we are going to need technical assistance and advice of all kinds." This is quite in line with what Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah said to me four or five years ago: "I cannot run a modern country by myself. I need advisors, but I want to make the policies." And as far as I can ascertain, that is the attitude of Africans everywhere. In other words, they are not anti-European; whether they will continue to maintain good relations with Europeans depends on how the Europeans behave. As I see it, the failure to recognize this is at the basis of the difficulties in human and interracial relations we find in being, or in the making, over all Eastern and Southern Africa.

The Portuguese territories present a special case. No political activity is allowed in what are now called the Portuguese Overseas Provinces — as you know, these are juridicially no longer "colonies," but have been declared integral parts of Portugal. On the economic level, Portuguese Guinéé, Mozambique and Angola represent the closest approximation existing in Africa today to classical colonialism, which is to use the resources and man power of a given overseas territory for the benefit of the Metropole. In those territories the African has less access to education than anywhere else on the Continent, and is subject to arbitrary controls of various kinds over all phases of his life, enforced by corporal punishment, forced labor, and other devices.

This is why, therefore, everything is calm in Portuguese territories. There is no political agitation or labor organization

there because of the rigid restraints that apply to the Africans. Hence, when I discuss significant recent developments in Africa, I exclude the Portuguese territories, since there we find no political, economic, or social developments of any kind, so far as the Africans are concerned. We understand this if we consider that even in the small concessions that are made to Africans in terms of permitting them to become *assimilados* (assimilated citizens), they must pass tests to achieve this, demonstrating a knowledge of Portuguese, being a Christian, sleeping in a bed, being monogamous, eating with a knife and fork, and the like. Moreover, the requirements have been raised in recent times because too many applicants were attaining the status of *assimilados*.

As I have indicated, racial tensions are most serious in East Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and South Africa. Here various attempts have been made to solve this problem of interracial living: in East Africa, the formula most often called on is designated "multiracialism"; in the Federation, it is called "partnership"; and in the Union it is called *apartheid*, a term with which, I am sure, you are all familiar, and which is officially translated as "separate development." Realistically, all these formulae are essentially to be thought of as phrasings of the strategy exercised by a stratum of society that has a highly privileged position to continue their privileges in the face of a growing realization on the part of the underprivileged majority of their deprivations under the current system, with a concomitant drive to participate in the benefits the new order can bring them.

If one looks at eventualities in these parts of Africa objectively, if only in terms of the population masses involved, the disparities in numbers make the inevitabilities clear. Thus in the Union of South Africa, there are almost 10 million Africans, 1.5 million people of color, and a little more than 2.5 million Europeans. In Southern Rhodesia, there are about 230,000 Europeans as against 4 or 5 million Africans. Kenya has about 60,000 Europeans and 130,000 Indians, with between 5 or 6 million Africans.

As I have stated, the implications of this disparity in numbers are acknowledged by Europeans everywhere north of the line

I drew and, as I indicated at the outset of this discussion, as Europeans south of the line become frank in their conversations it soon becomes apparent that it is also recognized by them.

In the Congo, for example, the change in attitude on the part of Europeans is most striking. Four or five years ago, when talking to high government officials, to ordinary Belgian merchants, or to small entrepreneurs, they would speak of their future in Africa in terms of an indefinite period. Last year, however, they were saying: "Our children have no future here. We are going to be through!" When they would take the position that the African, in power, would necessarily be hostile to Europeans, and I would state that I did not get this impression in talking to Africans, they would reply: "Oh, you feel that way? Would you like to buy my newspaper? Would you care to buy my business? Would you like to come here to settle?" In Kenya, as I have stated, they are beginning to say: "Perhaps we can hold our position for a while." This is in contrast to Rhodesia and the Union, where Ministers of the Government can be heard to say: "This is a white man's country — and it is going to stay so!"

On the political side, the development of the various forms of African nationalism we encounter today is of major importance. In the early pictures of conquest and control, there was no place for such nationalism. But the paradox of colonialism arises from the fact that it has had certain benevolent facets, for in the long run there can be no such thing as a benevolent colonialism if the colonizing country wishes to retain its controls indefinitely. In realistic terms, the only efficient colonialism in Africa today is that of the Portuguese. But the moment a power speaks of its benevolent colonialism, its idealism, and begins to give its subjects access to its schooling and technology, then, sooner or later, the people are going to use the instruments that have been placed in their hands to obtain freedom of action. And this is precisely what has been happening all over Africa.

Obviously, a people cannot be taught literacy, and then have two wars for democracy, supported by such a statement as that of the Four Freedoms without taking them seriously. Members

of dependent societies cannot be employed in the military forces of the governing power without learning competences which they are later going to use. It is a very interesting fact, for example, that most of the leaders of the Mau-Mau revolt, or what is referred to in Kenya as the Emergency, had seen service in the British Army in Burma. Benevolent colonialism is thus a contradiction in terms, because it inevitably brings on its own downfall.

The Africans, who have an excellent base in their own culture for debate, for argumentation, for political maneuvering, have proved themselves superbly competent to employ European political tactics to achieve their ends, with recourse to a minimum of violence. Mau-Mau was a striking exception; this is one of the few times armed rebellion has occurred on any significant scale, at least in Sub-Saharan Africa, during European occupation. Nationalism has lodged primarily on the level of political action. By walking out of a Legislative Assembly, two constitutions in Nigeria were broken; as I have mentioned, in Kenya, Mboya is using a constitutional technique to break the present constitution. For the constitution requires there be one African Minister in the Cabinet, and no African will take a Ministry; and the obvious outcome must be more negotiation, with constitutional revision, under which the Africans will obtain more political power.

In British Africa, National Congresses are everywhere found, even in the Federation and the Union. In Nigeria, political parties, which have been developed more or less on a tribal basis, are, for the moment at least, coming together so as to obtain independence, though what is going to happen when they get it cannot be predicted. In Ghana, there is almost a monolithic party in control, though a parliamentary opposition also exists. In French territory, African political parties show certain tendencies that indicate they may follow the pattern of the Metropole. By and large, however, the dominant RDA (*Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*) and the smaller political groupings are all moving toward one objective: self-government.

In Belgian territory, where no participation in government was permitted anyone, African or European, there has been some

political development in the last three years. About that time, a professor at the Colonial University in Ghent, A. A. van Bilsen, published a paper in which he presented a thirty-year plan for the political development of the Congo, which would at the end of this time bring the Congo to independence. Congolese intellectuals picked this up, and a group called *Conscience Africaine*, in Leopoldville, issued a manifesto in which, while not disclaiming future association with Belgium, asserted that thirty years was too long to wait. Then another group, the *Abaco*, published another manifesto which, while agreeing that thirty years was much too long to wait for self-government, flatly stated that the Congo of the future was to be an African State, completely independent of any association with Belgium. When, in 1957, the *statut de ville* was promulgated, and the voting for burgomasters in three major cities I have mentioned was authorized, the Belgian authorities were surprised when, in Leopoldville, the candidates supported by the *Abaco* were elected by large majorities.

Nationalism in Southern and Eastern Africa is somewhat different. South Africa, of course, is independent. At any time it may opt to become a republic, and may even leave the Commonwealth. What we find there is white nationalism holding down the development of black nationalism, which, in terms of good dialectics, is a response to it. Even in the Union, however, the exponents of black nationalism do not talk in terms of violence. I have met many of the new young leaders of the African National Congress, and their thinking seems to be developing in this way: "Since we have no political power, and since our labor is needed, what we must do to get our rights is to exert our economic power by strikes, slow-downs, and other means of this kind." When one considers that it is today illegal for more than ten Africans to assemble, one can see the magnitude of the task these leaders have set for themselves. Yet the Africans are facing up to this, and the younger ones to whom I talked were very frank about the fact that in their determination to attain better conditions for the African they were responding to the currents of thought and action emanating from the more northerly parts of the Continent.

In the Federation, which is pressing for complete independence in 1960, the position of Britain as regards Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is that Africans are not to be subjected to the control of the local Europeans unless there are guarantees as to their rights in the future. In the Federation as a whole, Europeans are saying: "Ghana has her independence, and Nigeria will soon have hers. Aren't we as competent to govern ourselves as the Africans?" Africans have certain political rights, in terms of what is called a "qualitative franchise." Under this system, the number of votes a man may cast varies with the amount of his income, his education, the type of house he lives in, and the like. However, when looked at in realistic terms, it is apparent that this system guarantees the continuation of European control.

There is another form of nationalism that manifests itself in Africa, and which should not be overlooked. This might be called "religious nationalism." A notable example is the Kitawala, which staged one of the minor revolts in the region of Luluabourg, in the Belgian Congo. "Tawa" is the Congolese pronunciation of "tower," while "ki" is the Bantu prefix that means "thing." So that Kitawala becomes the form for the watchtower movement. There are about 3,000 Belgian Africans who, because of their affiliation with it, are in exile, which means they must live in another part of the country from their own, under surveillance.

These religious movements have developed over all of Africa as reactions against foreign missionary control, and comprise what we technically speak of as "nativist churches." They are independent; they all accept polygamy; and they all have large components of aboriginal African belief and ritual — most of them, for example, include the worship of the ancestors as well as of God, and drums are sometimes used as an accompaniment to singing hymns. The total complex then comes to symbolize wider African control. I may say that this phenomenon is not restricted to Christian sects; the same thing happens with regard to Islam, there being a number of separatist Islamic sects which are a manifestation of this same deep-rooted tendency in African culture

toward fragmentation that has a political significance which would be fascinating to explore, did our time permit.

If I may summarize certain wider aspects of the African political situation as I see it, I would say that while elsewhere the present forms of anticolonialism are something that stress the conflict between white and colored worlds, in Sub-Saharan Africa the acutely bitter quality that it takes on in, let us say, North Africa, is not present.

By and large, relations between Europeans and Africans have not been bad. Certainly the feeling of Africans about the United States is heartening, and sometimes favorable to a point of being romantic. The Cairo Conference was important, but the coming Accra Conference of nationalist leaders will be even more so. I have the feeling that as soon as there is a number of independent Sub-Saharan African States, the influence of the Moslem North will lessen considerably, for Africa, in actuality, is a geographical fiction, with Northern Africa pointing to the Near and Middle East far more than to the territories south of the Sahara.

My feeling about this arises from various conversations I had in centers of French West Africa, where Moslem influence is strongest. At Bamako, in the French Sudan, for example, I talked to one of the important Moslem leaders. Nasser, to him, was only another Nationalist, who could not even feed his own people. "Why should we follow Nasser?" was his comment. In the Sudan, my impression was that the Sudanese are not too enthusiastic about the Egyptians. They have experienced Egyptian control, for it was a condominium that ruled the Sudan; this was why it was called the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. It is of some significance that the technical advisers they are calling on to help them are British, not Egyptians. All this, and much more I have no time to consider, makes me feel that once there is a body of independent African States, they are going to take their own position vis-à-vis the problems of the rest of the world — in the U. N., in various international conferences, and so on, much as Ghana is already doing.

As far as the United States in its relations to Africa is concerned, we must remember that while we have to respect the sensibilities of our European allies, we must also not forget that the future of Africa is going to be in the hands of the Africans. This is obvious from the way in which developments have been going in the last ten years, and in the accelerated crescendo of change; and it calls for knowledge and flexibility in our diplomacy. With this, however, I am confident that we shall succeed in holding the friendship the peoples of Africa have for many years extended to us.

ADDENDUM

During the four months that have elapsed between the delivery of this lecture and the revision of the recorded text, the events that have taken place in Africa give the most effective documentation of the rapidity with which changes, particularly in the political sphere, are taking place. The independence of Guinée has been followed by the Ghana-Ghinée pact. The Accra Conference, held in December, affirmed the separate identity of Sub-Saharan African States, present and future, and provided a stimulant to more action, looking toward African independence. All the other former territories of France have become autonomous Republics within the French Community, but four territories in the west — Senegal, Soudan, Upper Volta and Dahomey — have proposed a Federation, to be named Mali, still within the Community. The political map continues to change; Ubangi-Shari has become the République Centrafricaine, while the Middle Congo has become the République du Congo. Elections in the British Cameroons indicate a desire of those in the south to be independent of Nigeria, and perhaps they may join their fellow-Cameronians who have lived under French tutelage.

All this has had repercussions in Belgian territory. On January 9, riots broke out in Leopoldville, and extended to Thysville and Matadi. They are said to have been inspired by the *Abaco* group, now proscribed, with its leaders under arrest. On January 13, by previous arrangement, a new Belgian policy for

the Congo was announced, pledging the Government to gradual extension of political participation to Congo inhabitants, the abolition of all forms of racial discrimination, and the future admission of Africans to all ranks of government service. *Abaco* being a Bakongo movement, the potentialities that have appeared in terms of a drive to have a future Bakongo state, embracing the lower Belgian Congo, the Republique du Congo, Cabinda and the Bakongo area of northwestern Angola have profound political implications.

Nyasaland and the rest of the Federation have experienced considerable unrest, with military and police reserves being called up in late February to contain growing nationalist activity. And in the Union of South Africa many local protests by women against the newly passed laws, and the anticipated stronger implementation of *apartheid* under Dr. Vorwoerd, do not seem to indicate any lessening of tension.

I should emphasize, however, that the drama of these developments should not cause us to overlook the less striking, even course of events that mark the life of Africa everywhere in its economic, social and other aspects. What they do is to underscore the need of the United States, as I mentioned in my lecture, to exercise imagination in our approach to African affairs, imagination that must be based on sound knowledge and proper perspective, and implemented by flexibility in the implementation of policy.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Melville J. Herskovits

Professor Herskovits received his Ph.B. degree from the University of Chicago and his A.M. and Ph.D. degrees from Columbia University. In 1923, he received an appointment from the Board of Fellowships of the National Research Council which enabled him to pursue a three-year research into the anthropometry of the American Negro. During this time he was serving as a lecturer at Columbia (1924-1927), and was also engaged in research and lecturing at Howard University during 1925.

Professor Herskovits was appointed an assistant professor of anthropology at Northwestern University, where he became an associate professor in 1931 and a full professor in 1935. Since 1951, he has also been Director of the Program of African Studies.

He headed several field expeditions under the auspices of Columbia and Northwestern Universities to study the ancestry of the American Negro. He visited Dutch Guiana during 1928-29, West Africa in 1931, Haiti in 1934, Trinidad in 1939, and Brazil during 1941-42. He received the title of honorary professor of anthropology from the Facultad of Filosofia at Bahia, Brazil.

During 1937 and 1938, Professor Herskovits was a Guggenheim Memorial Fellow. During World War II, he served on the Council of Human Relations of the Forestry Service of the Department of Agriculture (1939-1945) and as a member of the advisory committee on music in the State Department's Division of Cultural Co-operation. He was also chief consultant with the Board of Economic Warfare during 1942 and 1943.

In 1953, Professor Herskovits spent nine months in Africa, visiting most of the territories of the Continent south of the Sahara (his area of specialization). The following year he visited Dakar, and in 1955 visited Liberia, the Gold Coast, the Belgian Congo and Uganda in connection with the meeting of the C. C. T. A. at Bukavu. Last year, he again made a nine months' tour of the Sub-Saharan Continent, continuing his research into the general problem of continuity and change there.