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A CONCEPT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

Research paper written by Lieutenant L. Dorsey, U. S. Navy
Command and Staff Class of '59

INTRODUCTION

The American prospect for the future is not reassuring. Today's children, members of a generation who will one day ask, "What did you do about it?" face a long range prospect which is far from reassuring. The thought occurs that America should take some positive steps today beyond those already being taken. Americans are confused on what needs to be done to stabilize world affairs. Just what could be done? No one is sure. To many people it is hard enough to manage one's own life today let alone to set a course for the nation.

Americans have little previous experience in reorienting international relationships, in *determining* world power or *status quo*. Seemingly, America began completely free of outside influence. But for a long while the British stabilized world power relationships so that America was free to grow relatively untroubled by *major* foreign difficulties. But British power is no longer determining the *status quo* which Americans, unconsciously, found so comfortable. The *status quo* is being determined now, more and more, by the Communists.

Most Americans find this difficult to admit and mention the containment policy. Today there *is* a military containment or stalemate (which may not last) but a number of other Communist functions are not being contained within the Iron/Bamboo curtain; no amount of wishful thinking will make the fact otherwise. The Communists in fact have complete freedom for global action in many fields. They use this freedom to cause counter-actions favorable to their designs; thus, every move they make receives a counter move according to the containment policy of the non-Communists. By carefully preselecting global activities, the Communists hope to gain increasing control of determination of the world *status quo*. They "cause" or "trigger" Western actions since the Western philosophy is not to *initiate* but to *react*. This is very agreeable with the Communists. They are confident that when they complete adjustment of the *pattern* and sequence of

American national reflexes, they will have irrevocably attained control of America and the world.

Americans generally do not see these facts, hence the emphasis on military containment to the exclusion of many other types of containment. The static allied military containment is not altering the increasingly Communist determined dynamic *status quo* although it is indeed preventing a Communist military victory.

Will the Americans eventually desire to do more than contain, militarily, the Communists? They are accustomed to the British *status quo* and have no heritage in such astute practices (when given the opportunity to determine *status quo* at the time of Woodrow Wilson, they fled in horror). Will Americans remain satisfied with the increasingly Communist complexioned world affairs? They may not be discerning enough to alter a patchwork containment policy. And even if they sense their inadequate grip on world affairs they may not have the inclination for the harsh measures required. Benjamin Franklin's wise saw, "A fat kitchen makes a lean will", applies today to America, the world's richest nation, land of the most creature comforts per capita.

Serious steps (in addition to military) *can* be taken to reverse the global trend of an increasingly Communist determined *status quo*. Whether or not they *will* be taken by Americans (in time enough to make a difference) is the big question.

If the steps are to be taken, Americans must change, their leaders must change, and all Americans at home and abroad must vigorously act in accordance with a highly developed, highly sophisticated overall strategy. *The people, their leaders, and their strategy must be mutually identifiable.*

What should the American strategy be? That is the subject of this paper. Some introductory remarks will be made in addition to those just made. The remainder of the paper is devoted to the task of identifying a new strategy with Americans and with world affairs.

As will be seen, a strategy highly developed in its most modern sense will be the best answer for coordination of human affairs. But for years to come, this best of answers, this master plan, will at most provide only partial answers. The many seething conflicts of the age are only partially understood by the best minds of the age. Remedial actions may partially succeed; they may simultaneously produce vast unexpected events in turn partially understood and in turn partially manageable. This is the lesson of all recorded history, this is history's bequest to the present and to the future.

One can not turn ruefully from this lesson in man's inability to control events fully. Neither can one naively specify *the* strategy which *must* be followed. Great and complex problems afford more than one feasible solution; there would be elements common to all solutions, however. One should define the nation's goal while using the many lessons offered by history of civilization.

Some would complain that it is pointless to confuse present day problems with "dead" histories, centuries old. Yet, if one seeks to form an astute strategy (astuteness is needed here if nowhere else), one can not but see the folly of such a narrow view of the present. A view which does not look into the past, can not comprehend the present, and much less look into the future. Such a view can never come to grips with a forward looking Marxism; it can only content itself with its deftness in regaining its balance after each Marxist thrust. Such a view is present day "containment policy" and must be corrected. Such a view is a natural development of the "American Experiment" which began with cutting of all ties with Europe, and the "tainted" past.

A concept of national strategy must be acquired and implemented which gives unity of purpose to both domestic and foreign affairs. This strategy must make the nation strong through systematic concentration and application of talents and resources to the well springs of danger. There must be a sharing of contemporary responsibilities among Americans and by America among nations.

The problem of conceiving such a strategy lies in gaining a *true* perspective of the past, present and future. Having acquired this perspective, a new idea of strategy's role must be employed — more comprehensive than ever before. Pragmatic interpretations of Clausewitz's traditionally one-dimensional strategic concepts can be discarded. It was Douhet who said, "Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur". (30:218)

It will be seen that strategy has been both partially applied and misapplied; errors continue that do grave damage today. It will further be seen how America today is having difficulty in interpreting contemporary events as well as influencing them. Finally, the dangers facing America today are numerous; without applying a more comprehensive strategy, national survival is gravely endangered.

A CONCEPT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

CHAPTER I

PAST AND PRESENT STRATEGY

How Strategy Began. In the past four centuries of Western civilization, wars were fought according to the overall guidelines of a strategy. Strategy came to be regarded as the fundamental prerequisite to successful military actions. Complex operations tended to be successful if executed with an overall plan. Complete military and naval operations examined in national political context revealed rules applicable to the future. In 1513, Machiavelli advised in his book, *The Prince*, that success in war was determined by the political advantages gained, not victorious battles. (30:51)

Gradually, a body of strategies began to accumulate. This collection of interpretations was continually studied and variations were utilized. An example is the Nazi Blitzkrieg strategy. It developed after intensive study of Frederick the Great's "blitzkrieg" wars, Napoleonic Wars, American Civil War operations, then current writings of Liddell-Hart, Charles De Gaulle and others. Technological innovations were also integrated with older concepts.

Strategies, then, were an evolution of military concepts of political significance. Strategies almost invariably sought political advantage by *violent* or military force. The goal thus tended to be a static, finite situation. A recent example of this static goal is the combined strategy of the World War II allies: unconditional surrender of the enemy.

Nations became involved in wars from a variety of causes. These causes sometimes were the result of warlike actions of other nations. Some nations fought wars as a final consequence of their inattention, inaction, or even ineptness toward the sequence of international events. Strategies at first were modest even for the nations initiating a war. But as time passed, as nations evolved, strategies became more complex. Larger numbers of men, greater mobility, and larger quantities of material were the requirements

of later strategies. Nevertheless, nations pushed into a war were hard pressed to develop a sound counter strategy. In the Napoleonic Wars, for example, some nations were simply overwhelmed by a strategy they could not counter. Others, such as Russia in 1812, improvised a unique strategy which was effective.

When the medieval social structure disintegrated, the military organization of the Middle Ages declined. Monarchies or National States then formed. Social relations between these new entities also materialized. These relations in part consisted of wars. For example, Richelieu's France had a foreign policy of territorial aggrandizement. Military strategies were needed to implement the French policy. Richelieu's policies provided the impetus for the buildup of the military. And some years later under Louis XIV a great strategist developed, Vauban, the greatest master of siege warfare of all time. Thus, military "foreign socio-cultural relations" nurtured a buildup of military forces according, in this case, to the great Vauban's strategic role of fortresses.

There was never an effective system for preventing war. Police systems did evolve within nations for curbing domestic violence. But if a nation were to continue to exist, its first step had to be military power accretion. This was possible in either a transient military power coalition or in an independent development of national military power. In either case, there was the need for the strategist. He created the framework in which successful military action could be possible.

There were exceptions to this. Geographically isolated nations were sometimes isolated militarily. For such nations, defense was not necessarily the first consideration. Foreign relations tended to have non-military overtones — tariff regulations and the like. For such nations, operations for extended periods without a foreign policy was possible. Such nations hence did not have a military strategy of consequence since wars were only a distant consideration.

The United States was such a nation. Prior to entry into World War I, a U. S. naval strategy was conceived in spite of the

fact war was not politically considered. The strategy turned out to be extremely useless; in 1917, an entirely new naval strategy had to be hastily conceived and executed. (20:452) Valuable time was lost. The U. S. Army was considerably strengthened in the years preceding World War I, but this was not due to existence of a national military strategy.

Clauswitz Interprets Strategy. In the Napoleonic era war and underlying strategy changed. No longer did strategy fashion war for dynastic claims of *limited scope*. War now became a great violence upsetting the territorial and social order of all Europe. National survival, national philosophies were now in the scope of war. Single battles (rather than long campaigns) were of strategic finality now.

To Clauswitz who interpreted this new development, war was the supreme act of *violent force*; he did not define the supreme act of non-violent force. He went to great lengths, however, to reveal the nature of the violent force. Violent force was only one method. Clauswitz emphasized, of conducting relationships between nations or among social, cultural, and political entities. The basic principle of strategy was to locate the enemy "center of gravity" against which force would be applied. Application of violent or military force should, according to Clauswitz, not be subordinated to political considerations. But he returned again and again to his more fundamental thesis that war is merely a continuation of state policy by other means.

For the violent military force aspect of foreign relations, Clauswitz laid down many profound (but often ambiguous) truths. His teachings among those of others were widely applied in the development of total war strategies in the 20th century.

Clauswitz alluded to *non-violent* means of overcoming enemy "centers of gravity". But he left many questions unanswered in this respect. The foremost of which was how to formulate and apply a grand strategy which properly integrated not only violent (military) foreign relations *but all the other non-violent methods as well*.

Marx and Engels gravitated toward attaining these answers. Unfortunately, the answers are too tenuously interwoven with Communist ideology. Accordingly the answers have escaped understanding or application by non-Communists. Sorokin, a sociology professor, at Harvard came far closer to these answers in 1937, but his works have passed almost unnoticed until the past few years. His works, enormous in scope, are a frame of immensely significant inquiries into culture and society. His inquiries are much closer to the truth than those of Marx, Engels, Spengler, Toynbee, and Pareto. Sorokin points at the centers of gravity of world socio-cultural systems and examines their susceptibility to modification through the ages by both violent *and non-violent* force.

Popular Interpretations of Clausewitz. Today strategy is still regarded as Clausewitz seemingly saw it: the framework for military action. Matters of strategy are regarded as almost exclusively a military affair. American politicians today tend to gratefully avoid strategy tasks in deference to military expertise as is evidenced by increasing military preoccupation with this area. (4:42 and 18: ix, 368, 468) Ignorant default to military expertise is the basis for an unbalanced national strategy. The results are plain: highly intellectual progress in war potential, non-intellectual stone-age progress toward peace. The effect of this default in the long run *could* be the equivalent of the substitution of gasoline for water in fire hoses.

A very important thing is lacking in Clausewitz writings and generally lacking in strategy concepts expressed since Clausewitz. Great bloodshed has been the result of overlooking this. The factor is that the ultimate *strength* of a state is not *military* potential (although this is highly important); the ultimate strength is the health, the progressive stability or *dynamic equilibrium* of a well integrated socio-cultural structure. This puts in fuller perspective Clausewitz's strategic degrees of violent force in state relations. Military strength is indispensable to any strategy. But overemphasis or underemphasis on it are serious errors.

For instance, when military paralysis set in on the Western Front in 1917, need was keenly felt for a new look at strategy and

its place in a nation's affairs. Military events of 1917 were one long rending catastrophe. Bad military strategy and political deference to "military expertise" made calamity follow calamity. Nations in their agony earnestly began to seek a way out. Military strategy, the conventional one-dimensional interpretation of Clausewitz, left the bitter failure of a muddy stalemate.

Two schools of strategic thought arose. One school was that the war had to be fought on the Western Front against the main concentration of German strength. It would be fought by throwing vast numbers of men and equipment against a fully prepared enemy and counting heads afterward to compute the victor of the battle. The other school considered it hopeless to attack the enemy where he was strongest *and* recommended consideration, at least, of other ways of outflanking, or dismembering, or blockading, *or otherwise demoralizing and defeating him.* (37:25-26)

The war of course ended as it began — according to the first school. However, political rules were set for a coordinated Allied direction of the military operations in the remainder of the war. For the French, British, and American political coordinators, *enemy centers of gravity* were still military, however. Here, pragmatic interpretation of Clausewitz's advice is obvious. Such a reading of Clausewitz has always found the centers of gravity to be military. The pragmatic reading of Clausewitz thus is superficial in that it hands over to the military expertise the job of outlining a strategy for exerting international force. Such a course as taken in World War I and World War II by the Allies still leaves unquestioned, unanswered, the problem "*of otherwise defeating or demoralizing the enemy.*"

The non-Communist nations have not answered this question yet. This is in spite of the fact that the Soviets *have* found an answer and are successfully applying it. But before them, Hitler did well similarly before he went to war. The answer is of course that a strategy must now be background for *all* of a nation's affairs. It must lose its purely military color. Strategy, not violent force, must be the ultimate core of *any national policy determination in either internal or external affairs.*

Present Strategy — A Second Look. Liddell-Hart notes that a great many people today say that the horror of nuclear weapons have now made war impossible. These people therefore say that since war is impossible, strategy (or the need for strategy) is cancelled out. (10:147)

This statement shows clearly the pragmatic interpretation of strategy; the one-dimensional (purely military) application or meaning is still very much embraced today.

The statement reveals, also, a callous disregard for the bloodier pages of history. It is as well a surrender to the tense emotionalism so much in vogue in some circles today. The fact is that atomic weapons would have made a number of historic battles far less horrible. Take only the 1917 Ypres campaign of World War I, for instance. The 450,000 Allied casualties (and additionally, a comparable number of German casualties) of the summer and autumn of 1917 were made far more horrible by "conventional" weapons — explosives, gas, and drowning in mud, etc. *Each* of the many artillery barrages themselves amounted to several multi-kiloton atomic bombs. Would not one or more megaton bombs have been more mercifully swift? Would not the casualty numbers have been nearly the same? Would not the permanent "conventional" wounds approximate the non-fatal permanent effects of nuclear radiation?

Liddell Hart derides as ill-founded and misleading the idea that the atomic bomb cancels out strategy. Quite the opposite to being cancelled out today, atomic weapons are "stimulating and accelerating" an adoption of non-violent methods of interstate force which are the essence of modern strategy. Warfare and interstate relations *because of the atomic bomb* therefore are being endowed with intelligent properties that raise them above the brute application of violent force.

On the surface this would seem encouraging (it would appear that war — violent forces — will tend to become less useful). Not so! As France fell by surprise violent force one spring week

in 1940, an unwary America could for instance fall quickly by non-violent force if the Soviet strategy is successful.

The atomic deterrent today to direct military aggression is really causing a deeper strategic subtlety on the part of aggressive Communism. Thus, at the very time when America is thrust into the limelight of world leadership, strategy of the aggressors is not using violent military force in the conventional way. And the deterrence to aggression by America tends to be strategically oriented to the centuries-old method of violent (or military) force. Yet, American strategy *seems* new because of the many spectacular breakthroughs in military technology. However, regardless of all of the radically new military hardware — missiles, nuclear submarines, etc. — the American concept of deterrence is shackled to inapplicable features of the past: abnormal dependence on military (violent) force. Political default to the military, not military parochialism, is the cause of this.

In the one-dimensional interpretation of Clausewitz, America does have a strategy today — military deterrence. This is hardly strategy in the modern sense because it is designed to cope only with situations that occurred years ago but possibly not again — direct and large scale military aggression. In the modern sense, America does not have a strategy, merely some loosely connected ideas — called positions or policies. Today there exists no mechanism which is comprehensively protecting American resources from international non-violent force. Nor is there a comprehensive channeling of American resources into non-violent “force-legions” against modern aggressors. This is not to say for instance that a need does not continue for the Continental Air Defense Command or the Strategic Air Command, nor that they are not more fully employable also as non-violent forces under a more comprehensive strategy which makes balanced use of all national resources.

The past has indeed left the present a harmful legacy. The unimaginative, one-dimensional concept is still very much in vogue today. Military preparedness must of course be such that a sudden materialization of a hot war (fought with history’s most powerful

weapons) would not cause a consequent American defeat. Yet the hot war need never be fought. The cold war may be the source of all strategic victories dreamed of by a century of Communism.

But the cold war can not be won by navies, armies and air forces. If this can not soon be realized, if America's trust is placed in the wrong weapons and an inapplicable strategy, America will lose the war of ideas. If this happens, ruin of "the West" will be swift, complete, and irrevocable. (27:164)

One statement of Clausewitz seems as a ghostly voice of approval of Communist cold war strategy. The same statement sounds as a derisive, macabre critique of America's present quasi-strategy: "OFTEN ALL HANGS ON THE SILKEN THREAD OF IMAGINATION." (26:111) The great irony is that this statement is made by one whose writings have been so frequently studied, yet so often misinterpreted and misapplied through lack of imagination!

Does it require a great deal of imagination or mental effort to apply the words of General Sun Tzu Wu written in 500 BC? "The supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting." (30:216) Is it impossible to find the present day strategic implications to America of the advice of Flavius Vegetius? He wrote the following during the twilight years of the Roman Empire, a century before its final end:

It is better to overcome the enemy by imposing upon him famine, surprise, or terror *than general (military) actions*, for in the latter instance fortune has often a greater share than valor. (30:217)

CHAPTER II DILEMMA IN STRATEGY

The Essential Element of Tragedy. In Shakespeare's plays, a flaw in character is the cause of the tragic ending. In the American democracy, a flaw in the system of government seems to prevent the giant steps needed, awaited, by the world. One crisis after another mounts and crashes against America. And America braces

against the blows, hoping, wrongly believing they must end. The flaw in the American system, like a flaw in character prevents the strategic rising up without which only final catastrophe can result. The flaw generates a tragic sequence of events which if left unchecked will culminate in national and international disaster.

The Mackinder Flaw. America's founding fathers created a governmental system which seemed close to perfection. But at its inception, a tiny, unnoticed inner flaw existed. Technological progress and the recent explosion of world events have reduced the size of the earth causing this tiny flaw to become more noticeable. In 1919, Sir Halford Mackinder pointed out the flaw:

Democracy implies rule by consent of the average citizen who does not view things from the hilltops, for he must work in the fertile plains. (15:24)

In the placid development of the great nation, geographic isolation kept America away from the main stream of world events. National survival was solved from an equation of mainly domestic factors. The scope of the domestic factors was not such that government influence was always needed or decisive. Thomas Jefferson argued to limit the scope of government.

But when national survival began to be considered in terms of a number of important and volatile international factors, government influence became more critical. Now, the government's action is in demand not only for national survival but for survival of a great many more nations besides. The government must act not only now and then but quickly, sensitively, constantly, and *consistently*.

The changing times which have dwarfed the globe have expressed the need for government to ascend to higher plateaus of action. The separation from the "average" citizen's plateau of action and that of his government increased. The Mackinder flaw became much more noticeable, thereby. Requirements for fast government action were met with citizen consternation and delays in approval.

In addition, the government found itself dealing with many complex socio-cultural elements, structures, and forces seemingly very dissimilar to the American configuration. The government found itself attempting to stabilize a number of these dynamic relationships concurrent with the American structure. Yet sociologists are in disagreement that histories yield any discernable patterns of performance, and therefore, that future socio-cultural performance patterns are neither predictable nor capable of pre-determination.

This emphasizes the Mackinder flaw. The American has only a superficial understanding of his own dynamic socio-cultural milieu. He tends to see others only in his own terms of reference. His political leaders are usually recently from the "average citizen" ranks. He is poorly prepared to take either fast or forehanded actions on the higher governmental level. It almost seems to be asking too much that such actions taken by our government departments be timely and correct *and in addition* consistent with similar types of other departmental actions *and simultaneously approved by the citizens*. Yet these things must occur!

A Trans-Physical (Metaphysical) Enigma. In complex issues, analogies are helpful. Analogies are used in teaching physics, chemistry, electronics, mechanics, and other *physical* sciences. The following analogy is used to illuminate the existence of a complex trans-physical enigma.

America is in a dilemma in trying to move its culture and social structure (including other satellite free world national structures) toward a "reasonable", dynamic equilibrium. The structure is not entirely understood; neither is the goal. The directors appear like the blind men in the classic poem *The Blind Men and the Elephant*.

It was six men of Indostan
 To learning much inclined,
 Who went to see the elephant
 (Though all of them were blind),
 That each of them by observation
 Might satisfy his mind.

The first approached the elephant,
And, happening to fall
Against his broad and sturdy side,
At once began to bawl,
"God bless me! but the elephant
Is very like a wall!"

The second feeling of the tusk
Cried: "Ho! what have we here
So very round and smooth and sharp?
To me 'tis mighty clear
This wonder of an elephant
Is very like a spear!"

The sixth no sooner had begun
About the beast to grope,
Than, seizing on the swinging tail
That fell within his scope,
"I see," quoth he, "the elephant
Is very like a rope!"

And so these men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right,
And all were in the wrong!

So, oft in theologic wars
The disputants, I ween,
Rail on in utter ignorance
Of what each other mean,
And prate about an elephant
Not one of them has seen! (18:8)

Many believe they understand the structure but really understand aspects "within their scope." Without a concept of the complete structure, the directors have difficulty in setting the elephant in motion in the right direction. The difficulty is further compounded when they suspect that the beast is ailing in some bodily members. They do not comprehend the extent of the ailments. Nor are they certain if they can be healed.

This is not all. This elephant is confronted by another predatory beast (Communism). Although the blind men have only

a compartmentalized concept of the menace, some fear it since a few realize their lives depend on making their sick elephant well and either overcoming the menace or cowing it into submission.

Besides the Soviet threat there are also other vague elements fast developing into structures which may threaten the sick elephant (such as nascent nationalism in Africa, Asia and the Middle East). Their bodies have not yet reached a definite shape and even when they do, the "blind men" will continue to have difficulty in perceiving their structures.

It is plain, then, that the blind men must agree without delay on what it is they are up against if they are to save themselves and their beast.

Some Deny The Problem. This view is not shared by many Americans today. It would seem too serious, too hysterical, too perplexing, and certainly too unreal. Yet, the blindness does exist:

Some (U. S. Governmental) officials who help to spend about \$40 billion a year on defense have never systematically studied the global strategy of the Communists and apparently feel, as each succeeding crisis subsides, that the prospects for national security are improving. (3:428)

Some do *sense* that something is wrong. A few years ago thoughtful writers of American domestic and world affairs began to describe an "uneasiness" in their views. Today this word is used or implied constantly. Nationally syndicated columnists noted for conservative attitudes now use it frequently. The *Rockefeller Reports* use it now. And many other reputable authors, speakers and writers use it too. They all have become uneasy and express their anxiety from specific situations which they describe — military posture, diplomacy, economic strategy, domestic economy, civil defense, general Soviet progress, domestic educational progress, American advertising, etc. They present many increasingly sobering points with which there can not be wide factual disagreements. The disagreement comes as to what should be done. But as with the blind men, *only those aspects of the problem within the scope*

of the individual are of importance to him. No overall relationship can be agreed on beyond the immediate scope. Without conception of an ultimate relationship, no overall strategic remedy can be agreed on or adopted. Everything is piecemeal. And, everyone becomes more "uneasy." If anything, more fragmentation rather than unity of concepts occur as the individual issues enlarge without resolution. The elephant becomes more of a riddle than ever!

The "Mackinder flaw" creates these conditions. Too many work too long "on the fertile plain." Those few who come to the hilltops from these plains stay too briefly there and while there see events more in terms of the plains.

Kissinger sees this condition as a difficulty in attitude — a psychological difficulty. In discussing the criticisms heaped not long ago on former Treasury and Defense Secretaries Humphrey and Wilson he states:

They may know in their heads *but can not accept* in their hearts that the society which they helped to build could disappear as did Rome, or Carthage, or Byzantium which probably seemed as eternal to their citizens. (13:426-427)

Professor Rostow addressed the Naval War College in a similar vein:

There are serious, dedicated, and able Americans *who do not believe* that it matters greatly to us whether, for example, India succeeds or fails relative to China in its next 5 year plan, and who could hold that the only meaningful touchstone for American policy in India is whether the responsible men in New Delhi are prepared to join us in military alliance. Similar men believe that our only job in the Middle East is, somehow, to assure the continuity of the eastern oil supply and to keep Soviet military power out of the area. There is a widely held view that our job in national security is simply and solely to put ourselves in a position where overt Communist military strength, in the form of atomic weapons can not be rationally used against the Free World. (25:36-37)

Kissinger and Rostow refer to views that are certainly not "from the hilltops." Louis Halle sums it up in an outspoken way, by saying that the President can lead not in the direction he conceives as best. Rather it is the direction in which the "fertile plains views" (domestic forces) persist or force the President. (11)

The View From The Plains. The view from the plains is in control. What is it really? The answer is deeply disturbing. American (and the Western powers) mistake the world in which they live and act. As a result of this misjudgment, the people of the fertile plains sometimes have no desire to act at all. If it were not for the meddlesome Communists, they say, the world would roll merrily on its way in some easy, self-regulated manner. The crises can not be seen from the plains. World violence, catastrophe, deepening socio-cultural revolutions are sweeping in at hurricane force. Communism seldom is successful in creating these conditions, but it enlarges them whenever possible. Once the crises come, Communism provides the convenient mold for capturing, shaping, and stabilizing, in its own image. (35:57)

The aggregate organism of present day civilized society and culture, according to Sorokin, seems to have not a number of local or superficial ailments, but to be undergoing one of the deepest crises of its many centuries of life. The crisis is far greater than the ordinary (infinitely deeper than most people recognize), its depth is unfathomable, its end is not yet in sight. (31: xiii Vol I and 532 Vol III)

The "plains-people" seem content to live in an increasingly Soviet crystallized *status quo*. They let their government take steps only as determined by the onslaught of events, yet some events are accomplished past the point of counter action.

The tragedy of this flaw, if not overcome, will soon have a predictable ending. Actions on a national level which are schizoid (as on a personal level), logically culminate in disaster. The action could become realistic. But unrealistic views cannot cause realistic actions. Thus the flaw in the system produces the dilemma in strategy, and the tragedy in events.

There has been argument for sometime that there exists a political vacuum in action on world events. Some say that since this vacuum exists, military expertise must be (and is being) relied on to develop America's plan of action amid the global hurricane building up. Others contend that not only is the military expertise not calling the tune to the nation's strategy but that diplomacy backed by military force is accomplishing the national interests.

Patchwork Policy v.s. Strategy — The Dilemma. These intense arguments continue. Yet both sides are superficial and miss the main point. American strategy today consists mainly of a patchwork of military and territorial positions (policies), political response to the aggressive non-violent forces of Communism. The superficiality of such strategy seems too plain for comment. Yet, on it are staked most of the hopes and plans of the non-Communist world! For one thing, such a strategy is seemingly a modern concept. Really it is a small improvement over an isolationist policy — a non-strategy! And as such it is mistaken for soundness and well balance when it is greatly out of balance: rich in some territorial political and military factors, poor in other qualities. It is a "fill-the-breach" technique.

Under the increasing Soviet *status quo*, much wider ranges of non-Communist response may soon become urgently required. It may be that such response will not be possible from a one-dimensional territorial and military reflexive orientation. Only a narrow band of the total Soviet strategy spectrum has been used thus far. (32:13-38)

An increasingly Soviet determined *status quo* throughout the entire socio-cultural spectrum develops as the Soviet becomes more proficient in relating more and more world forces to its strategic ideology. Thus far, cold war battles have been confined to a narrow range of the spectrum. As more complete application is reached by the Soviets, non-Communist responses will become more difficult by reason of being outside non-Communist strategic terms of reference. The consequence could be an increasingly schizoid type of reaction and increasingly ineffectual responses.

The strategic dilemma exists today because vision is lacking, enlightened guidance is not always present because of the Mackinder flaw. One has only to look back over the past few years to confirm this. Errors committed since World War II because of this lack may be setting the final, fateful course in Western Civilization's long and gaudy history.

A Strategic Failure in Education. Three important post World War II books give eloquent testimony to this lack of vision.

Thirteen precious years ago, Professor Bailey completed the third edition of his famous *A Diplomatic History of the American People*. He fully recognized the Mackinder flaw when he uttered this sober warning in 1946:

The (Hiroshima) atomic bomb is but the primitive proto-type of the push button weapons of a potential World War III. It is no longer One World but One Room. We must dispose of the maniacs and learn to live with the others.

The tragedy of modern man is that while he is clever enough to blow up the world, he has thus far not been clever enough to live in peace with his neighbors. The physical sciences have developed with frightening speed, while the social sciences in some respects are back in the days of Noah's Ark. If this gap is not substantially closed the finish of everything can soon be expected.

If the American people, through their Congress, insist — indifferent, ignorant, or mislead — upon (various) impediments to world recovery, they will have their way — with consequent disaster.

A tremendous job in public education needs to be done . . . Proper education is a relatively cheap form of international life insurance.

Upon every citizen in our democracy rests a solemn obligation to inform himself, so that he may shape American foreign policy — *his foreign policy* — along constructive, far sighted, lines. (2:869-871)

However, six years later in 1952, General Willoughby concluded his documentary book, *Shanghai Conspiracy: The Sorge Spy Ring*, with a stinging warning "unless (Americans) learn the art of international self-defense, we will have the suicide of Western civilization on our conscience." General Willoughby saw the mortal dangers arising from naive tolerance of Communist penetrations, thefts of atomic secrets, political dupes and perverted liberalism. (36:315)

Ten years after World War II ended, Edwin O'Connor in his Atlantic prize novel of 1955, *The Last Hurrah*, put his finger on the heart of this dilemma with a question:

He sometimes wondered . . . whether they, who seemed to have overcome so many of the old passionate prejudices of their ancestors, had not also overcome some of their old passionate virtues? In these neutral, tolerant times, do Americans feel deeply about anything? (21:106)

It would seem, then, that the greatest single factor to overcome the Mackinder flaw would be a good means of informing, educating, the people. According to a good many reports — for example, the Rockefeller Report on Education (34) — education has some considerable defects today. The one big chance, then, since World War II, the really important means toward international "self protection", toward a basis for a sound strategy has been lost in the post World War II years.

It remains for future events to spell out whether or not the strategic dilemmas that this creates will eventually be fatal to America. Years ago Kipling said in his poem, *The Route of the White Hussars*:

It was not in the open fight
We threw away the sword,
But in the lonely watching
In the darkness by the ford. (30:110)

Were the post World War II years (those years of intellectual darkness for America) a time when "the sword" was thrown away?

CHAPTER III

AMERICAN ASPIRATIONS

The Golden Door. National aspirations are important to strategy. Seemingly, nothing could be harder than to give a brief, yet concrete summary of the great heterogeneity of American motivations, hopes and desires. Seemingly, the sources are numberless and indistinct; the merging pattern of these aspirations is almost mystical. The inscription on the Statue of Liberty sums this up:

. . . Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses . . . Send these homeless, tempest-tossed to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!

Ostensibly, America is a great "melting pot" of peoples, ideas and ideals. Only the best is sublimated and saved. The greatest American strength seems to be this healthy refinement of diverse ideals for the common good.

This condition has resulted in the development of vast national wealth, of prosperity, of well being and comfort without historic parallel. National aspirations are strongly for a continuation of these fine conditions. This is considered to be the primary obligation of everyone, most of all, the government electorate. Prosperity has only lately reached the present high level. Wars, depressions, droughts and other hardships have long been endured. Now, at long last, when wealth and comfort are available to so many, nothing must be permitted to interfere.

At first glance, the "comfort cult" seems almost natural and logical. Actually, it is being carried to proportions which exclude other important concepts.

Comfort Strategy. In 1953, a leading advertising researcher warned that Americans would *have to learn to live a third better* if they were to keep pace with growing production and permit the United States economy to hit a four hundred billion dollar gross national product in 1958 (actually it shot past this mark in 1956). To help Americans learn to live better by consuming more of the national product per capita, *Tide* solicited assistance from

a number of "leading" sociologists. Professor Allen of the University of Virginia, for one, responded. He mapped out a systematic program by which more people could achieve greater addiction to comfort. He stressed that his scheme would require (among other things) the concerted effort of the major social institutions — particularly educational, recreational, and religious. In mapping out the "grand design", the basic assumption was accepted without question that achieving the one third goal is worth any manipulating that might be necessary to achieve it.

The comfort cult, then, is carrying everyone along by a process that is becoming an end in itself and which threatens to overwhelm everyone. Producer, businessman, and consumer are all caught up in a whirl which is becoming so much the substance of American life that it is difficult to get outside long enough to look at it, let alone to see where it is leading. (22:260-264) (17:12-14, 19, 21, 31, 299-300)

Comfort, once possessed, tends to attract an excessive attention to the exclusion of other things. Also, comfort excites in its possessors a certain amount of avarice, fear and obstinacy when they are faced with the prospect of its loss. This may be the background for the accusation made by Hans Morgenthau that "our defense policy has been deflected from a bold, decisive course by the spectre of an unbalanced budget, our foreign policy has been paralyzed by a fear of the unknown . . . all of which is caused by Russia a nation having less than one half the national product of the U. S. A." (19:11-16)

Americans on the whole are aware of there being some trouble with the Communists. But after all, they say, "Every problem has its solution, let the electorate solve this one and quickly, too." Americans know that the lack of military power among the allies and lack of allied unity were contributing causes of both World Wars I and II. They insist that these mistakes be avoided this time; then they settle back to enjoy unprecedented domestic comfort. They are of course aware of rising tides of nationalism in the world today also. But somehow, they mistakenly see this

as an effect of the meddlesome Communists. They feel that neither Communism nor Nationalism would be a problem to anyone in the U. S. A. if only the bureaucrats in Washington would cut the red tape and solve the whole thing. If the present set of politicians can't get the thing straightened out, why then, some "better people" should be given the jobs next election. Americans probably feel that more than "enough" money is being provided; the basic philosophy in giving this money is "Every problem has its price." (6:112) The politicians are therefore being allowed to do everything "within reason." Everything, that is, except disturb the comfortable domestic tranquility. But, some say that even if the politicians make a complete mess of things, there is always war at the eleventh hour to "solve the problem." This has always worked in the past. This is Clausewitz speaking in ambiguous terms again — that war is the "ultimate" force. The whole idea is outmoded!

The Unwise Goal. It goes without saying that the present national aspirations which make a cult of uniformity and comfort are pathetically naive and tragic. Comfort has come as a quest but remains as master. The great grass roots heterogeneity — once the great American strength — has been dissolved and fused into a uniform desire for comfort. Frankly, many do not want to be told (or will not readily believe) that prosperity, comfort, et. al. should *not* be considered as foremost. For anyone to say that Communism and Nationalism are rising hurricanes today, against which our nation is in grave peril, seems just a little unreal and radical. No elected Federal Government Representative who grasps the danger of Communism (many apparently don't) wants to be the one to tell the Americans, for example, that an all-out Cold War should be launched at the expense of prosperity, for the time being at least.

One is reminded here of the similarity of American actions to the classic reaction of some medical patients when told they have cancer. In place of courageously seeking out competent physicians and surgeons, they retreat to "quack" doctors. They pay staggering

sums for fake, "painless" cures, a prolongation of comfort. They waste critical time in this; when a cure is hopeless, when the pain becomes unbearable, when death is near, they realize their error. By then it is too late. Of course, the threat of Communism may be more complex than cancer. Yet the selection of political representatives who are only mirrors of empty hopes will not bring the painless sure cure (the existence of which the patient seems certain).

Americans are not insensitive to the sufferings of other peoples of the world. Therefore, a moderate amount of government assistance to underdeveloped nations is considered. Pains are taken to avoid letting these nations become Soviet targets for military aggression. After all, it was military aggression which brought on World Wars I and II. Aggression and war are to be avoided. Thus, assistance takes the frequent form of military material, training, and treaties. This is linked with economic aid. The military aid often is not large and might not be decisive. The economic aid is even more modest when compared to the poverty and hunger existing. The hope, however, is that nations will emulate the American system and attain comparable levels of comfort and prosperity. The comfort cult tends to be self propagating.

Yet the system of foreign aid and alliance is not always producing the power developments hoped for. Some nations have less of an idea of the Communist danger than Americans. They even are suspicious of American aid, as is the case in some countries bordering the Indian Ocean.

Character Evaluation — A Key To The Future. It is not difficult to see that all is not well with the U. S. A. today. Some would say otherwise. But then this denial is an element characteristic of tragedy. History fairly brims over with examples of proud nations slowly sinking into catastrophe and oblivion amid the denials. Today there are many people who hotly deny that the future can be seen soon enough to do anything about it. They forget that nations do not disappear mysteriously overnight.

In 1938, the German biographer, Emile Ludwig, exiled by Hitler, wrote:

The man who regards raw materials as more important than a people's philosophy, or believes that figures decide history and not feelings, is liable to be surprised . . . Philosophers, and only philosophers, have accurately forecast developments . . . From Plato and Cicero to Nietzsche. We have a modern example in Norman Angell who in 1912 foretold all that happened later . . . Statesmen who have no philosophers to advise them are lost. Today, if the Americans and English would study the German Character, they might yet ward off the war . . . (14:451)

Today, doesn't the answer to the immediate future lie in the character of the Americans and the Communists? Have Americans bothered to study the Communist character sufficiently to foretell the outcome of the present course of events? There are many parallels.

The question is raised that perhaps events have already passed the turning point. Perhaps the fall of China will be regarded in later generations as the decisive victory of the Cold War. The next few years could indeed be the last years of American greatness.

The Broken Ideal. The cult of comfortable uniformity has replaced a great ideal. The present must be enjoyed; this is the American ideal today. What was it in the beginning?

Once it was a trust in the future, a preparation for posterity. John Adams called it "the best opportunity and the greatest trust . . . that Providence ever committed to so small a number since the transgression of the first pair." Americans believed themselves the inheritors of all previous civilizations, yet also the founders of a wholly new one . . . Turgot, called it the "hope of the world." Lewis saw in the aspiration, "an epitome of all societies . . . more universal than the Roman Empire . . .", destined to lead not just Europe but mankind into the first truly cosmic age of peace. (33:283)

What happened to take American eyes from the stars? Well, in many ways American ideals consisted of vague, loosely connected principles never formally related nor stated. Twentieth century events have shattered some of these principles. Comprehensiveness is now lacking more than ever from American ideals and hopes. The American ideal seems shaky to many who retreat to material comfort, togetherness, security, uniformity, etc. As stresses are applied to American ideals, implicit contradictions become explicit. Seeming unity of aspirations and ideals break down or become fragmented. Schizoid actions thereby result in nations (as in individuals) under stress which lack true unity in basic beliefs. The comfort cult today is one such schizoid reaction. Explicit contradictions are acknowledged because current pressures expose a lack of specific comprehensiveness in aspirations. Actions and realities get mutually "out of phase."

Communist principles on the other hand are completely formulated and ostensibly provide cohesive standards for judging all things (morals, religion, art, literature, history, science, politics, economics, etc.). The complex of Communist theories impress any one by their coherence and completeness regardless of their falsity, of whether or not they are true. Anyone can be impervious to Communism who possesses a complex of larger and richer answers, an equally coherent body of doctrine to which they are already attached prior to "exposure" to Communism. (12:274-275) But when Communists militarily defeat their opponents, the defeated ask "Why?". They question their own principles naturally, in defeat. German and Japanese prisoners of the Communists in World War II and American prisoners of the Korean War, puzzled and homesick, had the desire to accept any positive teaching presented. Americans, puzzled today by Communist Cold War victories, want to fall back on their own principles for sustenance; but at this they strike more confusion; traditional American goals are obscured. The future is now feared. Yet building-for-prosperity was *once* the central theme of American Ideals! Building for the future, making history, is by paradox the central thought of Communism today.

Uncohesive Ideology. Important beliefs have been removed from the ideology of the so-called American Experiment; "Comprehensiveness", (as seemingly offered in Communism), is lacking. The failure of President Wilson's efforts for a "just and holy peace" to make the world "safe for democracy" was the first stunning blow dealt to the stellar American belief in a unique destiny. A second similar chance to secure peace was lost in 1945 in default to Communist treachery.

Another cherished, typically American idea, (that mankind is making steady progress) similarly was splintered by events. The worse-than-medieval-methods of Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler in consolidating German and Soviet power were viewed by Americans with horror in the 20's and 30's. The 1945 scenes of death at Buchenwald proved with nauseating vastness a fallacy in another American ideal. The 15 million Chinese slaughtered in 1951 re-emphasized this fallacy.

Even the existence of a moral universe is doubted. This fundamental belief was written about by Melville as being a perpetual scene of battle by man — good against evil. Some writers say that the muscles of the American belief have now become weak; they cite a chief justice of the U. S. Supreme Court who recently declared that "there are no absolutes", that "all concepts are relative." (33:287) These writers believe that if Americans lose faith in a moral universe (society founded on moral absolutes), the whole American experiment would be at an end, that the disregard today of such *fundamental* absolutes as *right* and *wrong* would signal disaster. (5:69-73) These writers remember that a similar destruction of moral absolutes a hundred years ago by people such as Marx, Turgenev, and Proudholm historically set the stage for the events of 1917 in Russia.

If the Mackinder flaw of democracies is not to prove fatal, there must be an awakening of Americans to realities. It may not yet be too late. Resolute action has been known to change many a foreboding situation. A properly aroused American public is indispensable to resolute action.

Confidence Confers Success. The Communists feel confident of success because they realize certainty is conferred just as much by a philosophy as by fact. By stern imposition of purpose to world events, they have been richly successful. They were told by Marx that national ferments would occur, (this was a highly accurate prediction, although Marx erred as to the cause being economic) and they provide a mold for capturing the molten product.

There is no reason why America can not bring itself certainty of victory. A richer, more comprehensive, philosophy than Communism is available to Americans if they would but formulate it and apply it. The present idea of merely recovering balance after each Communist thrust is little more than craven intellectual surrender. It permits them, not the U. S. A., to confer certainty to world events according to a particular purpose. Thus, the more adequate (comprehensive) one's definitions for reality and the more apt one's program for changing it, the less complex does the scene of action appear; the converse is true, also.

There may be yet time to reverse the pattern even though it is difficult for a nation to escape habits of a lifetime. It might be possible, however, if the people really understood that failure to do so would make their defeat (in their lifetime) a virtual certainty. At least the attempt should be made.

Americans Must Aspire to Greatness. What then is the national interest? To what should the people aspire, mainly, if not to prosperity and a comfortable security of uniformity?

Should more power be given to the government to work more freely? Probably not; Augustus tried this 2000 years ago and only arrested momentarily the decline of the Roman Empire. Possibly it is the course already being taken today. However, more governmental power for Augustus did not reverse the lethargy, the inertia of Rome.

More than anything else, a reawakening of patriotic altruism is needed from the people. The government which has distributed so many blessings and comforts to the people is in grave

trouble. Disaster is imminent, sacrifices should be commensurate to the extent of the danger. The inner health of the nation's social order must be restored. The nation's integrity and ability to cope with its own problems, cultural strength and attractiveness, the promise of its own ideals and achievements (10:143) must be greatly increased and strengthened. None of this can be legislated. Concerted action by many people could make a great deal of difference (people closely aware of world realities today as well as historic national failures). Americans must possess a comprehensive set of ideals easily communicated to others without inspiring suspicion. These ideals should not be vague, general principles but specific, meaningful concepts worthy of attracting nations. In countering global Communism care should be taken not to appear to "infiltrate" other nations so that American motives become suspect. The American position should not attract comments of the following type made recently by a nation in South Asia.

Initial American overtures were regarded with suspicion, but by a judicious combination of joint economic and military aid, by pandering to the local jealousies and rivalries and by closing its eyes to the real motives that prompt the recipients to accept military aid — which is far from coincident with American interests — the U. S. A. has succeeded in obtaining wide military concessions by a series of separate treaties. (7:135)

If founded on fact, can such an American position be sound? Will it attract a community of nations to rally to its cause? Can such a criticism be identified with American aspirations today?

Great Maxims Are Needed Today. It can be seen that present aspirations of Americans have a number of features which uncorrected can bring great harm to everyone. It is axiomatic that people usually get what they *really* want. Action should therefore be taken to literally save Americans from themselves. The first step is to arouse interest in wholesome American goals. In the development of a strategy great consideration should be given to the most important of all resources — the aspirations of

a free people. In a democracy, no good strategy can be conceived, can endure unless it is truly for the good of the people and the people realize the fact.

It might be possible to conceive a complete American strategy without detailed public criticism. Yet, public understanding would be needed to place it into effect. Public identification with national aspirations is essential.

Today, issues are very complex. In an editorial, a Mr. Alexander noted:

The ruthlessness of the enemy, the fecklessness of the . . . Administration, the multiplicity of our military problems, the complexity of the inflationary peril, the degeneracy of our people, especially our youth, and the admitted perplexity of our few remaining statesmen.

Then he said,

The Congress is too sparse in its talents and too diffuse in its purposes. The job to be done while not beyond our nation's strength, is too big for anything except a grand and heroic effort. (1:4, Sect I)

Simplicity is important to national aspirations, the strategy must be devised and be presented to the people in the most understandable of terms. In the year 1908, Admiral Mahan quoted Sir John Seeley on this score:

Public understanding is necessarily guided by a few large, plain simple ideas. When great interests are plain, and great maxims of government unmistakable, public opinion may be able to judge securely even in questions of vast magnitude. (16:viii)

CHAPTER IV

IDEAL NATIONAL STRATEGY

Examples of Cohesive Universes. Within each human heart is the dream for a better tomorrow. Yet Americans are faced with the loathsome prospect of Communist domination.. Piecemeal military, diplomatic, and economic concepts are not containing

the danger. The nation needs a cohesive strategy which points the way to a better tomorrow despite all dangers. Every American needs to end each day with the knowledge that he personally has done his share according to the national aim. (Remember the NRA and "We do our part" during the depression?)

Consider for a moment the solar system and the stellar or celestial universe beyond. One notes here a classic dynamic equilibrium explained for the first time by Copernicus in the year 1543. Precise, well ordered movements continue with timeless regularity.

Consider the universe of the atom (first explained by Mendeljeff in 1871). All matter, even one's self is composed of complex, well-ordered, atoms in dynamic (and static) equilibrium. Electricity is produced and used, nuclear fission takes place, chemical combustion occurs. In every case, the sub-microscopic "building blocks" of the atomic universe rearrange with infinite accuracy according to pre-ordained relationships.

Knowledge of the celestial and atomic universes (the material world) was slow in accumulating. The bulk of it was gathered in "break-throughs" in the past 600 years. As this knowledge was accepted many old errors were discarded. The world was no longer thought flat; the misguided practice of alchemy ceased entirely. People for a while, however, were burned at the stake or guillotined for accepting or propagating the new knowledge.

Consider now the universe of man, the sociological universe. Here one finds very little absolute knowledge in existence today. Few break-throughs have occurred since Aristotle's time. Sociological and cultural elements exist but few can agree on their nature nor how they can be channelled. Man works with these elements attempting to crystallize a dynamically stable relationship to create a "golden peace." Man fails continually in these efforts without an absolute knowledge of the elements and forces with which he works. His efforts in this are very much like his earlier efforts at alchemy — inept.

The Knowledge Needed. The significance is plain. Man has mastered, to a high degree, his material (physical) world. He

still understands little of his sociological (trans-physical) universe. His material progress (Industrial Revolutions, Population Revolution, Nuclear Weapons, etc.) are all the results of dazzling material progress. Yet the implications on man's sociological universe are only dimly perceived, if at all. For instance, weaponry has progressed at such a rate that the situation is now comparable to placing a revolver in the hands of a monkey. He may unwittingly destroy himself or others. The material progress therefore produces great cracks in the social structure, the depth and degree of which can not be, have not been, fathomed.

Absolute knowledge on the sociological universe will slowly accumulate as it did on the atomic universe. If man can avoid a final lunge to catastrophe, enough knowledge may be accumulated within the next century or two to permit a highly stable (dynamic equilibrium not a Soviet static equilibrium) global socio-cultural structure to crystallize. Progress is already being made by the Soviets at an accelerating rate toward a stable global prison. Paradoxically, the Communist religion is materialism but one of their greatest sources of power may be in the trans-physical science of the sociological universe (metaphysics).

However, without the requisite knowledge, formulation of a strategy will continue an inexact art, not a science. Lack of such knowledge is a distinct handicap in efforts to formulate a well balanced national strategy. Lack of this knowledge explains why current strategy treatises dimly visualize the factors other than military, economic and political which must be integrated into a national strategy. For that matter, it is difficult to integrate properly even the military, economic, and political factors. Lack of sociological knowledge also explains the improper political deference to military expertise in national strategy matters. Explained also is the pragmatic, predominantly military, interpretation of Clausewitz writings which dwelt on strategy for international relations (war being only one among many such relations). Generally, strategy becomes a highly ambivalent term when taken out of context from the socio-cultural structure in which it is intertwined.

These things are not generally understood. Strategy may once have had a purely military structure, but no longer. Any student of strategy must humbly accept the underlying uncertainty of strategy. Then he will not accept such shallow explanations as "inter-service-rivalry" or "military parochialism" as major causes for there being no fully integrated national strategy today in the U. S. A.

It is all very well to say (as many do today) that the nation that does not heed history's lessons is doomed to repeat them. It is another thing, entirely, to create a strategy which countenances history's lessons. Few government officials can agree on what the lessons are for the nation today.

The nation, the world, can not stand still until some distant date when national strategy is more than a medieval art. Nor should governments any longer consider strategy a military matter. The results of World Wars I and II *should* have settled this for most people.

Strategy Must Be Based on Truth. All things have a beginning. Thus it is with a strategy formulation. The most important principle must be the advice of Polonius to his son, to thine own self be true and thou canst not then be false to any man (nation). This nation must turn back again to the fulfillment of ideals on which it was founded. (24:4-6) It must sort these out, update them, and rededicate itself to their fulfillment: a preparation for posterity. American ideals once seemed as the hope of the world; the cult of comfort is not the hope of the world no matter how many would like this to be.

But ideas and ideals, regardless of how excellently conceived or how noble, will not alone lift a nation on to the proper path. Nor will they, alone, move a nation to its goal. They are important, however.

But what more is needed? Can a nation legislate itself to security? Sometimes, yes. But not today for America.

What then of reorganization of the government? Will this work? Will dismemberment of the present system pave the way for a healthier Federal system? No, this will only waste valuable time. A reverse of the Parkinson Law trend (progressive organizational elephantiasis) would be healthful to the Federal Government, however.

The fact is that ideas, legislation, and reorganization tend more toward partial solutions or tend to direct a nation toward a goal of static equilibrium. Static equilibrium even if attainable, is of little use in a fast changing world. The static goal was attained at the end of World War II — military victory — and was of little lasting importance.

The nation needs to acquire a firm basis for continued stable existence in the future ages to come. Not only must such a relationship exist with Communism but with nascent nationalism the world over.

Metaphysical Forces Need Be Applied. Co-existence with Communism is not likely to be ever dynamically stable since the situation is one of continual gain, overt or covert, by the Communists. Stability can only be achieved by *active* measures other than reflexive containment on the part of this nation against the Communists. Such measures must continue throughout the coming generations of protracted conflict. Consistent acts must occur against the Communists which will also nibble away power — *physical or trans-physical* — from them.

Meanwhile, other world structures in formation can not be excluded from the global dynamically stable structure. For many years, Communism was such a structure in formative, hardening states. Yet little care was given toward bringing it into a dynamically stable relationship. Now, at the eleventh hour, such attempts are almost too late and promise little. Of course, domestic troubles for many nations and rising Naziism made many nations too preoccupied to consider Communism adequately. The same mistake must not be made with Communism today — it should not

monopolize all attention and material concern at the expense of African nationalism for instance.

Overcome National Ignorance. By now, several things are plain. One is the need for enlightened people who can compensate the "Mackinder flaw" in democracies. The people should see the need for a lessening of the frenzied striving for personal success which is spelled out in terms of a materialistic, seemingly comfortable and secure anonymity. They should rather see the need for an increase in development of comprehensive national ideals compatible with American Allies. Enlightenment is necessary since as Pope Pius once said in a worldwide broadcast, ignorance is man's *greatest* enemy. But the enlightenment of the people in national affairs can only go so far. Beyond this there must be a greater *trust* in government leaders. A more enlightened people would elect officials more worthy of this trust. The government is in a position to enlighten the people without, of course, propagandizing them. A central feature of the enlightenment must be a realization of the nature of the threats against the U. S. A.

Career Government Needed For National Strategy Preparation. The government, to best fulfill the interests of the people, can not be "turned out" with regularity by the voters. They must be a body of career government officials who keep a steady hand on the helm despite the changing world and domestic scene. This does not propose rigidity of purpose, rather it proposes a dynamic stability.

Within the government structure there must be a reduction of the vast numbers of minor "policy makers." Unintegrated policy is often worse by far than no national policy.

A properly conceived strategy could provide the framework for most Federal action. But to prepare such a strategy would be a hard job. The trend has been to turn it over to military expertise. The military, as well as in other governmental departments, operate according to their own peculiar systems of orientation. It is gravely wrong for the military to be given a large share of the task of national strategy formulation.

The national strategy must not be a total mobilization of national resources only for violent acts of war. Total national resources must be used in time of peace. Peaceful resources can be more powerful than wartime resources. War permits destruction but peaceful resources permit an increase in national power.

Strategy, Doctrine and Implementation. The strategy must be an integration of national policies. Thus at the highest level, strategy would be formed. The governmental departments would implement this strategy *by preparation of departmental doctrine.* Thus, national strategy could countenance such a thing as Communism. The departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, Health, Education and Welfare, etc. would devise separate departmental doctrines which would be in accord with the strategy. All being in accord with the same thing, the departmental doctrines *would be in accord with each other.*

The formation of strategy and its implementation just described would not result in a huge monolithic state. Rather, it would tend to reduce governmental size relative to that of today. Elimination of large numbers of "minor policy makers" would be a reduction in itself. The clarification of departmental actions would cause some reduction in confusion and consequently in governmental employees.

The strategy would not be a static thing. It would, with adequate non-delayed horizontal and vertical communications, achieve a condition of dynamic stability within the American system as well as in American foreign relations. Dynamic stability would enable a cohesive, healthy and victorious evolvement of the American system and the world system.

Toward Political Expertise. One notes with particular interest the recommendations of Mr. Barnett in ORBIS. He visualizes the need for a fourth service — a non-military service. He visualizes this political service as being headed by an Assistant Secretary for non-military Defense — of cabinet rank. There would also be a joint congressional committee on Cold War Strategy. The service itself would contain career service people expert in use of propaganda and

psychological warfare. There would be a *West Point of Political Warfare*. The whole idea is predicated on the belief that conflict by communications, psychological combat, subversion, and political warfare require as much professional competence as commanding an aircraft carrier or an infantry division. (3:432)

Barnett sees in America, vast resources which could, if properly directed, be used for non-military combat: universities, professional and technical societies, trade associations, corporations with overseas investments, labor unions, newspapermen, private foundations, international legal organizations, and nationality groups. (3:431)

Barnett seems to recognize several things. One, that military conflict (according to Clausewitz) is but a part of the larger political picture. He probably recognizes that the great destructiveness of weapons as Liddell Hart points out is making strategy become more obtuse and political. And most of all, he probably realizes as Brodie said, that politicians today are not equipped for, and spend hardly any time in, thoughts or acts of strategy.

Barnett's article represents significant thought in the right direction. Already the Herlog-Judd Bill is in Congress proposing the "Non-Military West Point."

But even if the "Non-Military West Point" were approved today it would take years before its graduates reach experience levels comparable to the infantry division commander or the aircraft carrier captain. The Soviet's have been graduating personnel from their many irregular warfare institutions for years. James Burnham acidly observes U. S. naivete compared to Soviet experience in political warfare. He says the aim of the latter is to defeat their enemies; for the U. S. the aim is to be loved. (6:189)

Thus, the Barnett proposal and the Herlog-Judd Bill are steps in the right direction. They may not be too late. In any event, there seems to be a growing recognition of the prime role of the non-military in today's strategy formulation and execution. This would reverse the trend of wrongful deference to military

expertise. There are *so many* avenues of non-military relations with the world that purely military strategy is not the answer.

Until man acquires a more sophisticated view of his socio-cultural universe it is unlikely that he can do much better than speedily accept the Barnett proposals on the Herlog-Judd Bill. Meantime, serious efforts should be undertaken to acquire a better knowledge of the non-materialistic, socio-cultural universe. Acquisition of this knowledge now seems possible.

It is first of all fair to say that necessity has given to strategy a completely wide scope role in national affairs. National survival may be decided quickly as in the past by military means; strong strategy and military wherewithall is required. But national survival may now be decided *by means other than war. The nation that can, without war, bring about the most effective mobilization of the total range of its resources (human as well as physical) stands the best chance of cold war victory.* Here one can see the new role of strategy. Here also is found the decrease of usefulness of national policy determination as now understood.

Basis For An Ultimate Ideal Strategy. Strategy once was the military development of national policy. Now, the strategy must develop first. No longer can there be a patchwork of national policies from which strategic positions are developed. Now the broad strategy must be developed from phased estimates at the highest national level. Afterwards, and concurrently, there must be a coordinated implementation in each government Department concerned. Departmental Doctrine must be formed from which operations will occur. From this must come the swift, consistent, and effective action required from the government *as an entity* on both the domestic and the international scene.

Lack of public understanding has caused considerable difficulty to the support of a program of strategic development of the type required. Urgent nationwide measures in education are needed in which the people are made more aware of their world and can elect political representatives more and more responsive to the national need during these dangerous times.

One, however, finds that these tasks seem difficult in the extreme today as well as in the immediately foreseeable future. The new role for strategy would seem highly difficult for the same reasons that some claim sociology to be an impossible riddle. "Can anybody," says Professor Geyl, "embrace with his mind the records of human activities in many countries and in many ages? Doing so, can he derive from that immense chaos conclusions which would be evident to every other human intellect as would a proposition of Euclid?" Geyl says, "No." (9:155) He concludes that all "large syntheses of history are vitiated by an insufficient appreciation of the infinite complexity of the many-sidedness of the irreducible variety of the life of all of mankind in all its aspects." (9:162)

Although Professor Geyl may be one of the greatest living historians, he probably is unaware that his denial of sociology is *per se* a denial of the new role that strategy can and must play. Strategy must now reflect a comprehensive understanding of history and must go one step beyond understanding. From this understanding of the past must come comprehension of the present, a prerequisite of a strategy to shape future trends, future sociological events.

Strategy must orient non-violent social as well as violent military forces. This is a fact of life. Today, it is clear that the cold war consists of a focusing of the entire repertoire of social forces as weapons and weapons systems. (23:45)

In the coming decades it will be necessary to prove Geyl wrong, to develop the understanding and the ideal national strategy.

Until serious effort begins to take place to acquire more information in the socio-cultural field there are a few men who have variously contributed through the ages: Aristotle, St. Augustine, Bousset, Condorcet, Hegel, Marx, Buckle, Wells, Spengler, Toynbee, Pareto, and Sorokin. Of these, some (such as Marx) are noted for their misuse of facts and logic. People such as Marx have done more harm than good for sociological students, especially

by such total falsehoods as a claim of scientific basis for fraudulent opinions. Yet all of these names have made contributions to the technique of historic synthesis. Sorokin's works are of particular interest as perhaps being the most factual, the most highly documented, and the most comprehensive in scope — vital prelude to the important large scale pure and applied socio-cultural research which must occur as a preliminary to large scope strategy development.

Large scale data processing is the most important help that can be gotten for accurate socio-cultural interpretations. When Professor Geyl of Holland denied with such ease the possibility of accurate interpretation, he probably was unaware of the possibilities of data processing to vastly complex socio-cultural problems. He was also undoubtedly unaware of almost fantastic work being accomplished lately in electronic data processing.

Charles Babbage, in the early 1800's, formulated a number of the important concepts essential to alpha-numeric data processing. The next step, development of punched "IBM type" cards did not take place until about twenty years ago; this was the first practical development of Babbage's ideas. Then, at Harvard University, came the Mark I Automatic Calculator in the year 1939. The year 1943 saw the development of the ENIAC in which electronic data processing began. (29:245) Today, the UNIVAC exists and more advanced transistorized, miniaturized models are rapidly developing.

Success in data processing equipment has spurred a very important development. A highly organized, serious effort is being undertaken to *organize all recorded knowledge for its effective use* (the key task said to be impossible by Professor Geyl). Top national leadership among industrial management, operations research, equipment designers, scientists, lawyers, government administrators, librarians, documentalists, publishers, and educators have made a start toward solving this problem. It is here that results can be readily collated and applied for national strategy development. It is not likely that the full scope, the importance

of this project is understood by its directors; only brief mention is made in Mr. Shera's book of the applicability of the project results to the *military* strategist in the realm of decision making. (29:449-450) Yet note here that the outmoded, "one-dimensional view" of strategy is applied military strategy!

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary. America today has the reins of free world leadership. And yet many dangers of vast proportion beset America. A remorseless, confident Communism is but one of these dangers today; it may turn out to be the only one of consequence if America is overcome. America therefore needs a highly developed plan, a strategy, total and complete in nature and scope. It must provide the means for dealing effectively with the realities of the hour or of the age. But Americans and their leaders must change if they are to grasp the realities of the hour or of the age. Only by understanding the danger can counter-plans be prepared which are realistic in nature. Only by understanding the danger can it be overcome and the strategic initiative be seized.

How should Americans change? The following statement was made in 1937 but it is much more important today:

The most urgent need of our time is the man who can control himself and his lusts, who is compassionate to all his fellow men, who can see and seek for the eternal values of culture and society, and who deeply feels his unique responsibility in this universe. (31: Vol. III, 538)

Each American, should change somewhat in this direction, then. More personal victories, then, are needed to prevent a general Communist victory. Remember, it was once said that General Washington's greatest victory was over himself . . .

How should American leaders change? Benjamin Franklin's observation (in a negative sense) *is* still applicable in the Atomic

Age. This need for increased responsibility in leadership is becoming more and more the need of free men everywhere.

Few in public affairs act from a mere view of their country, whatever they may pretend . . . Fewer still in public affairs act for the good of mankind.
(8:105)

Conclusion. America, in a position to wield world leadership, should attempt a truly "all-out, heroic effort" at effecting events, at overcoming dangers and saving itself. Public opinion should be mobilized as well as all other human and material resources. It still may not be too late; therefore, every effort should be applied. With public opinion fully mobilized, the best possible national strategy must be placed in effect. Meantime, every effort should be made to acquire more basic socio-cultural information for the enlightenment of strategy. Man must strive to crystallize a stable socio-cultural universe in a form other than the loathsome stability of a "well-regulated" Communist global prison.

In the generations to come, more competent strategies will cause military force to achieve a more balanced, less dominant, relationship with the other non-violent socio-cultural forces. This will be possible after acquisition of a fund of knowledge on the socio-cultural universe. As the fund increases fraudulent socio-cultural concepts such as Marxism (Communism) will be discarded just as alchemy was discarded when knowledge of the atomic universe accumulated, just as the Witch Doctors give way to the Medical profession.

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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

LT Dorsey graduated from the Naval Academy in the class of '48 and commenced his commissioned service as an Ensign in USS TOPEKA. Subsequently he served in USS KEARSARGE, USS NORFOLK and USS H. J. THOMAS. For duty ashore he served on the staff of CINCPAC-CINCPACFLT and in the Training Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

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