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# NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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## **SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE READER**

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VOL. XII, NO. 3

NOVEMBER 1959

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On page 21, line 13, change "conservative" to  
"constructive"

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The word "constructive" was used in the original speech. An error in transcribing from the manuscript to the printer's copy changed this vital word.

Because Vice Admiral Ingersoll is emphatic that the student be encouraged to put forward constructive criticism, it is particularly unfortunate that this inadvertent word substitution occurred.

The Naval War College requests that each recipient make the correction in his copy.

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly  
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## FACTORS PRODUCING THE CURRENT WORLD SITUATION

An address delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 1 June 1969 by  
*Mr. Frank Barnett*

This audience is in the rather unhappy position of the expectant gourmet who orders the rare venison steak printed on the menu, only to be told by the management that there is nothing left but meat loaf. Obviously, the meat loaf itself is honored to be included in this one hundred dollar a plate, intellectual smorgasbord of the Global Strategy Seminar; and I will do my best to repay the honor you have done me by trying to make the rest of your morning as miserable as I possibly can.

As Admiral Ingersoll pointed out, May 27, Khrushchev's deadline date for Berlin, has passed and the world, in spite of Communist attempted 'blackmail, is not at war. Yet, although we meet this morning in the sanctuary of a great military college, this is really a battlefield conference.

The war we are already fighting (and losing) is an unconventional, undeclared war — waged with camouflaged weapons and unorthodox rules. In this twilight war of protracted conflict there is no distinction between front lines, flanks and rear areas. Ours is an age of science that may shortly spawn gun platforms in outer space. Hence civilians can expect to be as close to enemy fire power as soldiers, sailors and airmen. Indeed, with the advent of massive propaganda, economic warfare, subversion and pressure group activity, *civilians* are often in the forward echelon of attack or defense. Conversely, officers on active duty are often barred from action on vital sectors of the protracted war, where politics, public opinion and sheer will power predetermine the outcome of skirmishes on the terrain of non-military combat. Since "the front is everywhere," strategy is no longer confined to the science of logistics or the war games of a general staff. The professional conflict managers of the Sino-Soviet Axis

pervert virtually every form of human activity to the cause of class struggle.

To the Communist mentality, art, trade, education, literature, sports, treaties, cultural exchange — even religion — are weapons. Moscow and Peiping wage total cold war. Hence strategy in the free world necessarily relates to: excellence in the classroom and research laboratory; the reputation and performance of American-style capital both here at home and overseas; the status, salaries and caliber of teachers, civil servants, scientists, and military personnel; the quality and character of citizenship training in American schools, homes and churches; and, perhaps above all, an alert, sophisticated and resolute public opinion in support of adequate national security policy. For all these reasons the enrollment of civilians in a postgraduate seminar of the Naval War College is not a publicity stunt, but rather a deadly serious exercise, with fateful implications for the posture of U. S. defense and perhaps the future of the entire free world.

Perhaps the one thing to criticize about this Global Strategy Seminar is that the discussions are restricted to such a handful of civilians. In a voluntary society such as ours, with limited government depending on the private sector for support and even initiative, at least 100,000 citizens should take some version of this course. In short, the underpinning of all the material components of defense is an intangible called "national will," which, in turn, is based on a mature and well-informed loyalty to the immutable values of American civilization and a clear perception of the objectives, strategems and techniques of world Communism. Deceit, diversion, and peace charades are so effective a part of Soviet tactics that somebody should persuade Washington policymakers to use kinescope, closed circuit TV, tape recordings, and visual aids to "package" some version of the Global Strategy Seminar for the college deans, corporation executives, university presidents, church officials, labor leaders, teachers, and editors who are *not* here this morning, but whose voices, votes and personal influence exert powerful leverage, either for strength or weakness, on the structure of national security.

The notion that "strategy is everybody's business" is relatively new and even radical. The concept has sturdy opponents both in and out of government. Some career officials in Washington (few I think) assume that foreign policy, and therefore survival policy, can only be entrusted to a self-perpetuating and largely anonymous elite who retain power regardless of the election results. Some businessmen, bankers, and educators seem to feel their personal responsibility for meeting the danger of Communist aggression stops when they render unto Caesar the tax money that goes to the Pentagon, Central Intelligence, the FBI, and the Department of State. It seems to me that both those who want to let George do it, and those who want to let no one *but* George do it are hopelessly mired in the thought patterns of Victorian diplomacy and the geopolitics of the Spanish-American War.

There are at least four 20th century phenomena which make it imperative to place the complex problems of Global Strategy on the agenda of American leaders in the private sector. These phenomena include: (1) a book, and the matchless organizational skills of its author; (2) the annulment of time and space; (3) the confluence of social, economic, political and scientific revolutions that threaten world civilization with total transformation, comparable to the earth-shaking tremors that accompanied the falling apart of the Greek world of city states, the disintegration of the Roman empire and the birth pangs of the nation/state system after long centuries of feudal anarchy; and (4) the spread of an American cult of doubt, or national guilt complex, which, in many cases tends to smother the American torch of creative optimism, individuality, and moral force that once burned and beckoned for all mankind. These are at least some of the major factors in the world environment that deserve the attention of participants in a Global Strategy Seminar.

The first item on my list, curiously enough, is a book. Fifty-seven years ago an unemployed lawyer wrote that obscure little book. Its title had no sex appeal. It was called, very simply, "What is to be Done?" What *was* done by the writer and his heirs affects the fortune and future of every American.



When the book was published in 1902 its author was in exile, living in a dingy boarding house. Living frugally on small subsidies from a political underworld, dressed in a cheap suit, and scorning all the values of his middle class heritage, this bald, squat lawyer was the self-appointed leader of a handful of other outcasts. To the property owners, statesmen and generals of the Victorian world, this man and his circle of impractical agitators, were a "rabble." The power elite of the Victorian world ignored his pamphlets and did not read his book; nor for the most part have the property owners, statesmen or generals of mid-century America read the book. Yet the man wrote it and his pauper disciples, exploiting the practical concrete ideas set forth in "What is to be Done?" have seized two continents and set fire to all the others by engineering the most skillfully executed power grab in human history. Today whole libraries, as well as the graves of at least twenty nations and forty million human beings, bear witness to the deadly political science of a movement whose cumulative conquests now exceed the combined empires of Alexander, Hitler and Tamerlane, and whose accelerating capability to lay waste the great globe itself must be the touchstone for determining our national and even our private objectives. The lawyer's name, of course, was Lenin.

Five thousand miles and nearly six decades removed from the publication of "What is to be Done?" Americans who never heard of Vladimir Ulianov confront the consequences of his mind and will and fearful talent. Until Lenin, various forms of socialism were misty sentiments, quack experiments, futile terrorism in the night; but to Lenin Communism was not simply an idea — it was a power technique.

Communism after Lenin was more than a philosophy — it was a triumph of *organization*. Under his tutelage Communists became managers — conflict managers; and the business ethics of these conflict managers were modeled on those of Himmler and the Borgias. They formed a cartel which now controls two fifths the earth; today they are picking up options on another third of mankind. They libel their competition, they suborn the

courts of public opinion, they blackmail and infiltrate parliaments. They almost never keep a contract, and lying is a way of life for their board of trustees. Yet, owing to the most ubiquitous press agency and political gamesmanship the world has ever seen, the firm of Lenin & Company never wants for new customers, never lacks apologists, never fails to find a banker to overlook the fifty frauds and forgeries on the record. And it all started with Lenin who, weary of talk, asked the practical question, "What is to be Done?"

The position of America in 1959, of course, is not all comparable to the plight of Lenin, outcast and alone in 1902; but the odds against this republic are really far heavier than some may suppose. Because no cascading bombs illuminate the dark precinct politics of Communists in Afro-Asia, too many imagine there is still time to refer the conduct of the battle to another research committee. Because our defeats have been chiefly in the underground, ambiguous war of subversion, propaganda and sheer tenacity in trading, no dramatic scoreboard signals the loss of a free world bishop, or the enemy's deceptive gambit to advance the red queen — 15 moves hence — to check and mate. Indeed, for amateurs at chess or geo-politics, each move of an opponent seems to present an isolated crisis. The pattern is concealed; the savage end game not even imagined.

The red game can be predetermined by lead time in logistics and the laboratory. Although Nazi Germany and Japan seemed to sweep the board in 1942, their fate had been unobtrusively influenced in a laboratory in Chicago and on the production lines of Detroit. The Chinese Communist fighter pilots who died not long ago in sky battles over Quemoy were good airmen, but they were *dead* airmen when sidewinder missiles uncoiled from American jets. Technically, those pilots were still alive until the missile actually struck; or were they in a sense "dead" when the release button was pushed, since no skill or courage or wishful thinking on their part could prevent the robot closing in behind? Perhaps civilization, like aircraft and pilots, have a point of no return.

The conflict managers and chess players of Russia have planned on a century of conflict although they seem arrogantly confident we will now not last that long. The Communist conflict elite need not debate their one clear-cut objective, their tactics rather than their policies are flexible, and their economy is geared to the cost accounting of the battlefield. Finally, the Communists have gained a lead time of more than forty years in the arts of non-military warfare and the systematic training of professional cadres for ideological combat, sabotage and subversion.

Behind the iron curtain are more than one hundred academies and institutes in which Communists from all over the world are taught propaganda, guerilla diplomacy, psychological warfare, espionage, street fighting, and the art of engineering coup d'etat. And in the fifth decade of our ever-accelerating retreat before the thrust of the Communist conflict managers, a Bill is now before Congress to establish a West Point of Political Warfare in America. Probably the Bill will not pass, for many policymakers continue to regard their opponents in Moscow and Peiping as a set of unpleasant businessmen driving a hard bargain. We have not comprehended that the conspiratorial elite of the Sino-Soviet empire are not businessmen at all, but rather a fearful combination of theoreticians and thugs, philosophers, practical politicians, combat commanders and professional revolutionaries — men to whom ideological struggle is far more important than cost accounting or a balanced budget. To the American mind, which has experienced no real national tragedy since the Civil War, the normal state of the world is peace. To the Communist mind, "peace" is simply the cloak for the daggers of subversion, economic penetration and the infiltration of Afro-Asian parliaments. Peaceful coexistence, in the Soviet lexicon, means simply "conquest without hardware." Moreover, all of the instruments of what *we* would call peace are orchestrated by the Communists in their symphony of perpetual crisis. Foreign language training in the USSR becomes the key to the precincts of India. Sputnik was not simply the shadow of a weapon-yet-to-come; Sputnik was a symbol of successful Socialism, exploited by Communist sympathizers throughout the

Afro-Asian world as proof that Capitalism is obsolete. Only last week the Soviets converted the international Olympic games into a political tool by maneuvering to bar Formosa as the representative of the free Chinese. It is plain, therefore, that ceaseless protracted conflict, in every dimension, is a factor to be considered by American strategists.

The second item on my list is the annulment of time and space. In the past, America has been isolated from danger by the ramparts of her great oceans and the shield of the British Empire. Suddenly, we are cheek to jowl with the Orient. The Burma Road intersects with Main Street, and Newport is as close to Moscow as Richmond was to Washington at the time of the Civil War. Owing to science, the Atlantic Ocean is about as wide as the Rio Grande, the Pacific is no broader than Lake Michigan, the wastelands of the north can be spanned in a few hours' flight, and the Gulf of Mexico may serve simply as a highway for Soviet submarines armed with missiles and nuclear warheads. We Americans are literally face to face with the heirs of Genghis Khan, with no intervening space and no insulating wad of time to permit us, in time of emergency, to gradually convert our consumer goods production line into the arsenal of democracy. In the past, we could afford to muddle through until a tyrant struck some far corner of the earth and finally prodded us into belated action. Today we must plan ahead, prepare ahead, sacrifice in advance, for the American heartland has become target number one.

The third item on the list of factors in the world environment is the confluence of revolutions. Never in all of human history has a single generation been obliged to encompass in its thinking a thousand years of technical change compressed into one decade. The first industrial revolution, starting about 1800, by 1870 had not only radically altered the economy of England, but its social and political structure as well. Power, which from time immemorial, had lain only with kings and the landed aristocracy, rested briefly with the factory owners of Leeds and Manchester, and then almost before those captains of trade and industry knew what had

happened, slipped from their embrace to the arms of political leaders who appealed to the newly enfranchised workers in England. From the Iron Duke of Wellington, with his artillery for social reformers, to the Labour government of Clement Attlee in just one hundred years; and the face and habits of England changed more profoundly in that same time than in the preceding fifteen centuries since Roman sentries stood down from British walls.

But we are poised on the threshold of the *second* industrial revolution — a revolution which, as one writer put it recently, “may make the turbulent events of the 19th century look like the spray that precedes the tidal wave.” Indeed, our world revolves at the convergence of at least *seven* different revolutions:

1. The technical revolution spurred by automaton, the transistors, the giant calculators, the new chemistry, electronics, and the accelerating curve of invention in scores of fields.

2. The communications revolution, brought on by closed circuit television, inter-continental mass media, jet travel, missiles, international agencies, space satellites that will shortly carry radio, TV and the mail between continents; and, of course, new techniques from the behavioral sciences for influencing opinion through propaganda.

3. The fuel and power revolution which started with the dawn of atomic energy and looks now to solar sources as well.

4. The anti-colonial revolution of the Afro-Asian peoples.

5. The demographic revolution, triggered by the introduction of modern medicine to the countries of Asia, Africa and the Middle East, resulting in a population explosion whose magnitude in the social and economic fields may equal that of nuclear fission in the realm of weapons. (A story in this morning's NEW YORK TIMES reports that the world is increasing at the rate of 45 million people a year. Every four years the total population of the United States of America is added to the earth).

6. The extra-terrestrial revolution, which means that some of the great grandchildren of some of the men in this

world may not be born on earth, if indeed they are destined to be born at all in our thermo-nuclear age.

7. The Communist revolution craftily exploiting all the others.

The fourth and last item on the list is the growth of an American cult of doubt, which makes it difficult for our people to compete with the missionaries and conquistadors of the Communist church militant. What is happening to the internal sociology and value systems of America is almost as extraordinary as what is implied by science, the human earthquake of the world's non-white races and the latchkey to outer space. Here, too, in the habits, dreams, and myths of our own people, time has compressed the history of a whole civilization into the lifetime of a single man.

There is some evidence that the American economic system is so productive it may kill with kindness a nation which only sixty years ago was still a brawling pioneer giant, not quite finished with the conquest and taming of a new continent. In that time we have substituted the goal of personal security for the adventure of limitless opportunity. Horatio Alger now aspires to be a civil servant, or to work for a mammoth corporation whose pension plan resembles a government bureaucracy. Some junior executives turn down promotions because their wives object to too much overtime and travel. Den mothers with air mattresses and portable barbecues convert boy scout camps into a suburban housewife's cookout; and the growing spirit of togetherness means that father/son outings are limited by the climbing threshold of mother's skirt or little sister's fatigue level.

Two out of five men drafted under selective service are rejected, chiefly on physical grounds. Public schools discourage competition in the classroom, emphasize life adjustment and conformity to the group. Indeed, some schools now offer courses in hair grooming for boys, personality development, how to order from a restaurant menu on a date. One hundred different sex magazines flood the newsstands. 59.9% of U. S. youngsters fail one or more physical tests for muscular strength while only 8.7% European

youngsters fail identical tests, although American youth drinks milk, is taller, and presumably has better bone structure.

In Korea, for the first time in American history, hundreds of youthful U. S. prisoners of war collaborate with the enemy. Americans inform on their own comrades, help Communists prepare propaganda and turn sick fellow countrymen into the snow to die. A team of army psychiatrists, after a long series of interviews of returning prisoners, concludes that American youth has been ill prepared to stand for their ideals by school, home and church. Some churchmen themselves, no longer believing in moral law or absolute truth, lobby for the admission of Peiping to the United Nations, and American politicians who once prepared themselves for high office by a pilgrimage to Valley Forge now establish their credentials as presidential timber by spending a weekend with Khrushchev.

The mind of modern man is thus threatened by the paralysis of indecision in an environment in which all familiar facts, all comfortable signposts and cherished compasses are rendered useless by tomorrow's upheavals in the laboratory and the realm of geopolitics. Amidst pyramiding revolution and crisis that spiral upward in geometrical progression, no wonder leadership is plagued with inner insecurity. No wonder endless committees are commissioned to rationalize policy with the expertise of a dozen different disciplines, and no wonder that escapist solutions grow ever more popular with an anxiety-ridden public.

It was written in ancient times that whom the Gods would destroy, they first make mad. That maxim may help to explain some proposals now on the American agenda to strengthen American security. Or perhaps a more accurate critique would be, "Whom the Gods would make mad, they first make irrelevant." Napoleon once said, "It's worse than a crime — it's a blunder." He might have added, "It's worse than a blunder, it simply doesn't apply."

Many national objectives articulated by leaders in Congress — administration, business, labor, and other pressure groups, seem to me at this time not *wrong* necessarily, but irrelevant to this

moment in history. Specifically, the charge of irrelevancy would apply to the achievement of at least some of the following goals at this time: the 4-day week and 3-week vacation; a balanced budget, within the framework of present levels of taxation; further extension of the social welfare state; government guarantees of full employment; the zealous protection of the newest of the "civil rights," the right to conspire to overthrow the republic and to lobby in the service of a foreign power to undercut our military strength.

Two years ago the cry in this country was for full speed ahead in science and mathematics. Last year, under the impact of the "Ugly American," the slogan was better foreign language training for our diplomats. For the past six months we have been warned to look out for Soviet trade and aid. Obviously all of these dangers are real, but we must never allow ourselves to be so hypnotized by the Soviet clamor on one corner of the chessboard that we forget the other squares and all the other possible moves to come. The challenge of Soviet trade, aid, and patronage and manipulation of the world markets, must, of course, be met with effective counteraction. But some political leaders seem now to behave as though Soviet economic warfare were the *only* threat that remains. In both the Senate and House there are powerful blocs which seek to curtail military assistance to allies and shift to "straight economic aid," in many cases for neutral nations. To ignore the still-clenched, Soviet mailed fist, to ignore the fearful capability of Russia and China to export "volunteers" for guerrilla and proxy warfare is to be blind to the definition of strategy.

Strategy connotes perspective — the selection of priorities — relating the parts to the whole. If it is true that our Strategic Air Force cannot, with massive retaliation, prevent Moscow's subtle penetration of Latin American markets, it is equally true that economic aid to India cannot prevent coup d'etat in Iraq. Expanding technical assistance and United States business investments in Africa are vital to our security. It will not, however, avert butchery in Hungary or Tibet. It will not carry the cold war by non-military means into the restless, vulnerable empire of the enemy, where



the people of eastern Europe and Asia groan under Russian carpet baggers and Peiping's cruel version of the yellow man's burden. Economic aid to emerging new nations is important to our own future as a free people, but by itself this assistance will not necessarily obviate the danger of Communism. One does not win a non-military war, whose victories thus far have gone to the enemy, by simply denying that enemy a further series of advances onto free world soil. On the most extravagant assumption that the defense of the poverty-stricken neutralist areas could be 90% successful, we could still be pushed to the grave, ten yards at a time, vainly chasing about the ever-expanding perimeter of the Marxian commonwealth of nations on a time table fixed by strategists in Moscow and Peiping.

Moreover, American aid, whether private or governmental, will not offset the Soviet economic thrust, unless the managers of United States economic activities are themselves sensitive to ideological, political, military, and strategic nuances. Random largess, with no regard to specific goals or priorities, may be humanitarian and should be followed by our private foundations. It has nothing to do with strategy or the science of conflict management. The best selling book, "The Ugly American," amply illustrates how the Communists have applied Gresham's law to international politics — that is to say, bad propaganda drives out good deeds. To be specific, one million dollars worth of Communist agitation properly and skillfully applied can sometimes join with covert activity and blackmail to offset 100 million dollars worth of American economic aid distributed with no strings attached — indeed, not even the string of requiring prudent management and cost accounting. Probably we need to do more in the economic sphere, both through government and private channels, but surely we need also more trained, American conflict managers to disburse and coordinate those sums to insure better returns on our investments for free world survival.

Finally, in any discussion of strategy it is imperative to keep science on the agenda. A nuclear war over Berlin this summer may be improbable, but we dare not delude ourselves with the wishful

cliche that hydrogen bombs have made war "unthinkable." The categories of thought employed by the heirs of Ivan the Terrible and Lenin are not necessarily the categories of thought which prevail in the peace-loving democracies of the west. Stalin cheerfully scorched the Russian earth and sacrificed 25 million of his countrymen to stop the Nazis. Hitler was prepared to let all Germany burn in some mad Wagnerian sacrifice to Thor and Woden. Mao and Chou En-lai will not blink at the loss of 100 million Chinese, upon whose broken bodies in the next decade they intend to rear the heavy industry and nuclear armaments of the sweatshop anthill state. Khrushchev, who helped Stalin starve to death 3 million Ukrainian peasants, is not likely to be more squeamish about liquidating Americans en masse if he ever has the chance.

Let the Russians spend more for basic research — let them shorten the lead time between invention and production — let Moscow develop some as yet unknown, electronic defense against our aircraft and missiles — let Soviet engineers erect that defense system only six weeks before we have a similar capacity to ward off their rocket-launching submarines and ICBMs. In short, let the Kremlin for once enjoy over us the weapons advantage we doubtless still hold, but with ever more precarious grasp, and America will have another demonstration of how Khrushchev defines "peaceful co-existence," a definition closer to home than the corpse-littered gutters of Budapest. In this country not even our military leaders whisper of preventive war, but Cominform journals and Soviet military publications are full of the doctrine of strategic surprise, the importance of deception in the nuclear age, and the advantage of preemptive war.

What is to be done? Lenin's question challenges all of us, military and civilians alike, not only to think but to implement.

Some responses to that question can only be made by government. For example, twenty million dollars for a special political warfare fund to organize intensive, persistent propaganda throughout all Afro-Asia against Chinese machine guns in the monasteries of Tibet, or 200 million dollars, if necessary, to form a NATO

board of economic warfare to make flooding the market bad business for the Kremlin. We must also free our own propaganda from the enemy's categories of debate. The world is still talking about Little Rock; it has forgotten Hungary, although the two events are not even remotely comparable. Why? Because we ignore the principles of *persistence* and *repetition* in our half-hearted propaganda themes. Four months is about as long as the free world can maintain any unity over the murder of a small nation. At the end of that time familiar voices again call for appeasement and trust in the Russians.

In our domestic political warfare games we are not so listless. Democrats campaigned for twenty years on the issue of Herbert Hoover's depression. Republicans are still running against F. D. R. But on the platform of world politics we seem unwilling to provoke the enemies of all mankind by rubbing sandpaper on old scars. "Whom the Gods would destroy they first make mad."

To wage the war of protracted conflict perhaps America should also create a career service for intelligence and psychological warfare officers. Under our present system, just as a man begins to learn the trade of non-military combat he is sent back to troops and hardware or is retired. New incentives should make it possible for a few men at least to specialize in the techniques of irregular, non-military combat. Retired officers who have served in military intelligence, OSS and CIA might be given part time assignments. Reserve officers with the same qualifications should be used to wage the continuous battles of public opinion. Finally, we need to actively promote free enterprise and the growth of the middle class overseas. We do not wish to *impose* the American system on others, agreed! But some people seem to have such a guilt complex about our business society, they want to lean over backwards to inhibit the growth of free enterprise overseas.

American-style capitalism is as different from the ruthless cartel capitalism known to much of Europe and Asia as it is from the state capitalism of Nazi Germany or Communist Russia. America has actually created the private, voluntary, welfare state with-

out central planning to regiment the entire economy. American business is not only efficient; it is increasingly attentive to social, human, cultural and ethical values. By and large it is doing a good job overseas, training foreign nationals to become managers and technicians, sharing the profits, engaging in all kinds of new community welfare projects. Those efforts should be expanded and encouraged by the American government.

In considering new goals for economic assistance we might ask ourselves first, "What can business and voluntary agencies do if they are given more opportunities, more contracts, more protection against illegal seizure?" Then after we have thoroughly explored the answers to that question we might ask, "What is still left over for government?"

I cannot conclude without referring to America's "secret weapon" for protracted conflict, a weapon largely ignored and misused. I allude to the Reserve Officers, the retired officers, and the National Guard officers of this nation. Here are men forming a natural bridge between the military and civilians. Here is a group of citizen officers who can speak up boldly and resolutely in defense of American ideals against the pressures of Communist propaganda. The Reserve Officer is often a member of the Chamber of Commerce, the Bar Association, the Rotary Club, the local school board. As a civilian the Reserve Officer may be an editor, college professor, a banker, a business leader or the executive secretary of an important trade association. Thus the Reserve Officer is in a key position to help transmit adult education in survival to his civilian friends and professional colleagues. He is a key man in the job of harnessing the vitality of the private sector to national defense. If the Reserve Forces Policy Board would only recognize this new dimension in defense and give official credit to Reserve Officers who serve on the battlefronts of public opinion, in civil defense and economic warfare, this nation would profit from a billion dollars worth of manpower in the war of protracted conflict, and it would not cost the taxpayers a single extra cent. (My sincere congratulations go to the planners of the Global Stra-

tegy Seminar who invite to these sessions senior members of the Naval Reserve).

May I say one word in conclusion? Last week a soldier was buried at Arlington. He did not come from West Point or Annapolis. He wore no uniform. The battlefields on which he served were not the beaches of Normandy, Inchon, Quemoy, or Lebanon. Yet no citizen more deserves the honor to lie down in peace with other warriors of the republic. The war he fought (sometimes it seemed almost alone) blazes now on all fronts: at Geneva, in the back alleys of Berlin and Budapest, in the ravines of Tibet and the jungles of Indo-China, in Iraq and the Formosa Straits, in the precincts of India, the villages of Africa, and the once-gay city of Havana not far from our own mainland. Skirmishes of that same irregular war rage also in America's classrooms, pulpits, newspapers and civic forums.

The soldier in Arlington, of course, is John Foster Dulles. The war he fought, and we must fight, is the war of nerves — the battle of public opinion, of courage in the face of nuclear blackmail, of character against deceit, the war of sheer will to face down tyranny and survive. The former Secretary of State, like his predecessor Dean Acheson, knew that peace in an imperfect world can only be won by the strong and the brave. Good will and hopes for the best do not necessarily prevail against International Murder, Incorporated, whether that syndicate is called Nazi or Communist. Some Americans, whose thinking apparently relies on sentiment instead of facts, feel that "flexibility" is the path to world Utopia. But the Communists, to do them justice, have a purpose, a plan, and a passion: to dominate the planet by the end of this century. In the face of brutal determination and cunning, how will compromise, appeasement or another scrap of paper signed by Khrushchev save America from the fate that overtook France in 1940 — except that the blitzkrieg of tomorrow may be nuclear, the subversion of the Communists more massive than Nazi fifth columns? One of the most persistent criticisms of the U. S. position as formulated by Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles was that they tried to stand up for something ethical. The argu-

ment of those who disagree runs something like this: "There is no place for morals in foreign policy. Let's face it. The tyranny of Red China and Red Russia is a fact. It is here to stay. Why not make the best deal we can?" But a nation expedient in its dealings with others will decay internally, too. Moral force counts for a great deal in human affairs. Once America abandons her ideals in behalf of freedom for all men, she will have nothing left but money and hardware. Neither can buy security if others lose faith in our mission and we no longer believe in ourselves.

What about the argument that Communism is a fact? The bake ovens of Nazi Germany were a fact — the seizure of the Philippines by Imperial Japan was a fact — the might of Prussia under the Kaiser was a fact. The armies of Napoleon that trampled all Europe were a fact. The overwhelming superiority of the British in the winter of Valley Forge was a fact. Those facts were refuted. Free men are always under pressure to make deals, give ground, take the easy way out, face "realities." Some of the most lasting realities are those intangibles of character, courage, and faith in freedom that adhere to the spirit of John Foster Dulles, and to so many other Americans who gave their last full measure of devotion to this country. The men who died at Bunker Hill and Gettysburg, the men who left sight or mind at Chateau Thierry and on the Marne, the marines at Tarawa, the sailors in the Coral Sea, the airmen at Ploesti, the doughboys on the road to Rome — none of those fought to barter away the dream that is America to some murderous minion of Stalin or cousin of Genghis Khan. One great soldier was buried last week at Arlington. In the century of total war the front is everywhere. We are all soldiers now, civilians as well as military personnel, and if, when life's burden is done, not every citizen can hope for the honor to sleep in Arlington or Valley Forge, we living can help pick up the check for those who do.

## **WELCOMING REMARKS**

### *WELCOMING REMARKS TO THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE STUDENTS*

*Academic Year 1959-60*

*on 21 August 1959 by*

*Vice Admiral Stuart H. Ingersoll, U. S. N.*

It is a great pleasure to have this opportunity to address a few remarks to you and to, officially, start another college year on its way. I shall make my remarks intentionally brief because all too soon you will be inundated in a deluge of words from many very distinguished lecturers. I wouldn't want to tire you out right at the outset of the year. I do want to give a very sincere and warm welcome to all of you in the student body. Particularly I want to give a warm welcome to you from our sister services and from the other departments of our government, and a particularly warm and special welcome to you distinguished naval officers from our friends and allies, twenty-nine nations of the free world, who are with us also. The staff and I are very happy to have all of you here and we are looking forward with a lot of anticipation to a year of mutually beneficial association.

You are a select group. If your seniors hadn't thought that you have the capability to develop the qualities necessary for high command they wouldn't have sent you here. Many responsibilities are going to be yours as the years pass by and they will not be simple responsibilities. They should not be lightly assumed or lightly regarded. They will be onerous and complex responsibilities, becoming more so in a rapidly changing world, and I ask that you approach this year's work here at the War College with a sense of urgency.

This country desperately needs better and better brains. We have them. We are, and will be, engaged in a protracted conflict. This is an expression which I have borrowed from a book recently published by our good friends in the Foreign Policy Research Institute headed by Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe', and it is a good ex-

pression to keep in the forefront of your minds. We are engaged in a protracted conflict and we need more people who are conflict-minded and who can develop into conflict managers. This struggle in which we are engaged is just as deadly as a shooting war. In fact, it is more deadly because if we don't win it everything which makes life worth living to us is going to be destroyed, and I don't think we want to live in the sort of world which we would then have.

Regardless of what many wishful thinkers believe and regardless of occasional moments of sweetness and light emanating from the Kremlin, there is no change in the Communist determination to dominate the world. You won't find one word in any statement ever issued by anyone from the Kremlin which takes back what they said long ago about eventually running everything their way. We are faced with an international communist conspiracy whether certain naive people in this country think we are or not, and you have a most important part to play today and tomorrow in keeping this fine, free world of ours safe from the threat which can well overthrow everything we hold dear.

Now, we here are very proud of our War College and I think that probably all our graduates are proud of it, too. It has a splendid reputation both at home and abroad. I didn't make that reputation; I am merely trying to preserve it and in some small way enhance it; but the reputation of an institution such as this is a very delicate thing and I am mindful of the fact that in the final analysis it depends upon the quality of its product. We are the oldest of the War Colleges, not only at home but in the world, and you will find that we are a college within the classical definition of the term "a body of equals engaged in the pursuit of matters of common interest." Quite naturally, since we are a Naval War College, we deal largely with naval warfare and with command and staff work as it affects the Navy; but we go far beyond any narrow treatment of purely naval matters, or purely naval warfare, in our search for better understanding of the fundamental principles of war. This is the only place within the naval



service where war is studied as a broad entity and where the art and science of warfare are examined in the broadest perspective. We offer you a rare opportunity to escape from the distractions of operational and administrative demands, from the plague of day-to-day tasks and the burden of current pressures, and hope to give you the opportunity for full and unobstructed quiet thought and reflection. I hope you can make the most of it.

We advocate no dogma here, no fixed set of rules, no party line, and particularly no narrow or parochial approach to anything with which you will be engaged. We ask that you contribute an open mind to this course. You are asked to try to develop broad vision, train yourselves to think clearly, and to dissent — if you can do so in a <sup>constructive</sup> ~~conservative~~ way. You will find that we stress the careful weighing of courses of action, of advantage and disadvantages, of capabilities and limitations, in order that you may develop good judgment and demonstrate it when the time comes and make sound decisions. We want free discussion, reflection and an inquiring mind. We want to help you to develop logical thought processes. We don't expect you to produce the single best solution to any of our problems because I doubt if anyone could say that any one solution was the best unless it were put to the test of actual war itself.

Now war, today, is no longer the special province of the professional in uniform. That's good to a certain extent, but in a way it's bad, because there are many half-baked ideas offered by many would-be strategists and tacticians. However, I think this should serve to keep us on our toes and make us appreciate more fully the need to be articulate both in the written and spoken word to the end that we who should know, are able to refute certain ill-conceived, although plausible sounding, ideas. Our thinking, because of the national and worldwide feeling about defense matters, armed forces, and warfare, must be very broad. It must reach beyond any narrow service concept; and it must reach even beyond a national viewpoint, because we are committed today economically, politically, militarily, all over the world, and our

commitments are complicated by the fact that we cannot act unilaterally.

Today, no nation can truly stand by itself. We must be mindful of the fact that the very foundation stone of our national policy is the principle of collective security within the framework of the charter of the United Nations. We, the nations represented here, and all of our friends around the world, have different national interests, different philosophies, different national ideas and ideals and aspirations, all of which are precious to each of us. It's a difficult and continuing problem to resolve different viewpoints and to find within our coalition a means which is agreeable to all its sovereign members of establishing common policies for the common security. If we are to seek and find a true mutual security we must forego many selfish national interests. Therefore, I repeat that our thinking must reach out beyond our national problems. We must think about and learn to know other peoples if our global thinking and the plans we make are to have any validity.

Today's period of so-called peace is an extremely complex period, thanks to this communist conspiracy which confronts us all. The pressure of the present situation is tremendously increased for us by the fact that the United States, whether we like it or not, is in a position of world leadership which has been forced upon us by our national resources; and we must exercise that leadership effectively. In our American system the military always operate within a political policy framework established by our civilian leaders, and this is as it should be; but we must be prepared to give advice on the formulation of policy and strategy. If we don't do it we fall down on the job; therefore, we must be more than military leaders — we must be military statesmen, too.

I want to impress upon you that I think it's necessary for all of you here to be most serious about your work and that you feel a sense of urgency in preparing yourselves to better discharge your obligations, to be a part of keeping our people ready. Today's world places a great premium on intelligence, individual thinking,

upon mental flexibility, and upon a willingness to adapt one's thinking to changing situations. We want to help you develop these qualities here at the Naval War College. We'll do our very best to provide you with an understanding of the underlying philosophy of warfare, to develop familiarity with and practice in logical thought processes, and to nourish your understanding of political, sociological and military factors which affect the national and the world situations. We hope that we can help you to acquire the best possible judgment for making command decisions, to acquit yourselves creditably around national and international conference tables. That's where the generals and the admirals more and more find themselves. Upon you and your contemporaries will fall the burden of a formulation of the strategy for victory and it is a challenge of impressive proportions. It will call for all your energy, all your intelligence, and I am quite sure your time spent here at the Naval War College will be an invaluable preparation for meeting that challenge.

This concludes the few remarks I wanted to make to you this morning, and the thoughts I hoped to leave with you. Enjoy your stay here but work hard at your courses. I hope to see much of you all — and once in a while will impose myself on you from this platform. Again a warm welcome to the Naval War College.

## **RECOMMENDED READING**

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel,  
(G14)  
Department of the Navy  
Washington 25, D. C.

Commandant ELEVENTH Naval  
District (Code 154)  
937 North Harbor Drive  
San Diego, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH  
Naval District (Code 141)  
Navy No. 128  
Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces,  
Marianas  
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 17  
Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

U. S. Naval Station Library  
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection  
Building C-9  
U. S. Naval Base  
Norfolk 11, Virginia

## BOOKS

Anderson, George L., ed. *Issues and Conflicts*. Lawrence, Kans., University of Kansas Press, 1959. 374 p.

Do formal statements of philosophies of history come after the event and when such limited validity as they may possess has already become largely if not altogether obsolete? A writer claims that Mahan's book on the influence of sea power upon history, published in 1890, came after the end of the monopoly by sea of the world's basic pathways of communication. Steam locomotives or rails had already opened land masses to challenge the sea as the bases of power. Mackinder's statements of the land mass basis of power — his geographical pivot of history — was fully elaborated after air power had already become a reality. Before World War II was over, Mackinder was discredited. Has the challenge of the mid-twentieth century reduced geography to a status so definitely minor in relation to technology that all military thinking and traditional theories of power must be reappraised? Just how has the contriving brain acted as a pivot of history? Why has anti-Americanism thrived in Latin America in spite of the New Deal and Good Neighbor Policy, and why is it a factor to be considered in the international relations of the United States today? Do Latin Americans have a hatred for American imperialism, customs, conception of life, incapacity for the fine arts and lack of ideals? Should Hispanic culture and values be defended and protected at all costs from the encroachment of United States culture? Does history repeat itself in the identification of interests achieved in recent years between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany which offers a striking parallel to the development of German-American relations after the First World War? Is American influence in Europe based on Germany, and does Germany's position in the world depend largely on American success? Why is the close sympathy and instinctive understanding between Americans and Germans difficult

to analyze and to explain? Why does the German find the Frenchman too logical and precise, the Englishman too vague and instinctive, the Italian too subtle and ingenious and the Russian too insincere, but the American at once practical and convincing? These questions and many others on a wide variety of subjects are presented in a collection of essays prepared for a symposium on American diplomatic history held at the University of Kansas in 1957. The director of this symposium has edited them in a book entitled *Issues and Conflicts*. They are generally highly interesting, some controversial, and all brief enough to read individually in less than one hour. There are fifteen in all and if time is of the essence only those that hold a particular interest to the reader may be read. You may not agree with the authors' viewpoints, but after you read the individual essays, your thinking is guaranteed to be stimulated on the particular subject considered.

Eccles, Henry E. *Logistics in the National Defense*. Harrisburg, Pa. Stackpole, 1959. 347 p.

In this comprehensive study of logistics, RADM Eccles has incorporated and expanded many of his earlier writings and lectures. His own views are well supported by liberal quotations from other authorities, and by extensive reference to other works. Throughout this book, the author places primary emphasis on "perspective of command"; the need for a thorough understanding of the interrelationships among the various aspects of logistics; and the proper relationship of logistics to strategy and tactics and to the national economy, to enable the military commander to exercise proper control and coordination to his logistic support. The author stresses also the need for effective advance planning, to insure that the proper materials will be available when and where needed, and in proper amount — to insure equitable distribution among various subordinate commanders, in proportion to the importance and urgency of their respective missions, without serious deficiency or needless waste. His comments on organiza-

tion, and particularly on the proper relationship between military and civilian control, deserve special attention.

Hunter, Edward. *Black Book on Red China*. New York, The Bookmailer, 1958, 172 p.

As an American newspaper editor in China in 1928 and as a propaganda warfare specialist in Asia during World War II, Edward Hunter is especially well qualified to report the black case on Red China. In support of his conviction that U. N. membership be denied to the Chinese Communists, Mr. Hunter documents his work with material of an official and semi-official nature released by Peking. He asserts that Red China by its conduct publicly brands itself manifestly ineligible for admission to that organization on both legal and moral grounds. The author's charge is supported by tracing the acts of aggression, both overt and covert, which China has engaged in since its occupation of the mainland. He contends that the hierarchy has, by utilizing "brainwashing" and genocide tactics, reduced 600 million Chinese to the status of "serfs." Totalitarian methods, as Mr. Hunter elaborates, include the manipulation of religion into a political arm of the Party, the outlawing of jurisprudence and the extermination of the family system. One of the most interesting chapters in this book describes how Communist subversive activities abroad are carried out by international crime syndicates whose operations are financed through the sale of narcotics. The drug traffic, which is much too lucrative to leave to ordinary criminals, is conducted under the auspices of a government-established bureau. Written in an easy-to-read newspaper style, this publication is recommended for those who are interested in the perennial issue of Red China's admission to the U. N. or in the fundamentals of how Communist ideology is applied in that country.

Welton, Harry. *The Third World War*. London, Philosophical Library. 1959. 330 p.

Mr. Welton uses a number of case studies (taken largely

from British industry) to show the technique of Communist economic warfare. He states that Soviet tactics aim at increasing production at home, entwining actual and would-be satellite economies with that of Russia, and simultaneously sabotaging production in the democracies by undercover union activity. This technique has been successful to date, and unless soon recognized as a threat to the free world fully as potent as a shooting war, will eventually bring on the collapse of democratic economies, while Soviet economic power expands. Communist economic war is effective because the threat is subversive, not easily recognized, and because ". . . too many good men do nothing." Mr. Welton succeeds in revealing the tactics of Soviet economic war and in pointing out some of the measures required to defeat it.

Brodie, Bernard. *Strategy in the Missile Age*. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1959. 423 p.

Doctor Brodie has written his latest book first "for the officers of the U. S. armed services, especially those who are students in the war colleges, and secondarily for the increasing number of civilians . . . who are becoming seriously interested in national security problems." Part I traces the development of certain characteristics of military thinking which now influence our national security policies. The development of modern strategy is followed from Napoleon through Clausewitz, Jomini and Mahan to the modern disciples of air strategy, Douhet and de Seversky. Much of Part I has been expressed by Dr. Brodie in War College lectures and in previous articles; he suggests, in fact, that some readers may desire to plunge directly into Part II, wherein are found problems of nuclear weapons and of defense against nuclear attack, of preventive or pre-emptive war, massive retaliation, deterrence, limited war and finally of the effect of peacetime budget processes upon national strategy and defense requirements.

Many naval strategists will disagree with Dr. Brodie in the relative importance of Douhet over that of Mahan in the



origins from which evolved our present strategy of air power. Scant reference is made to the fact that Douhet's theories of total war and of massive retaliation came almost word for word from Mahan simply by substituting the word "air" in every place for the word "sea." Unlike Mahan, Douhet felt that control of the air is sufficient in itself. Adaptation of a doctrine of sea power into a national strategy of massive offensive air power leaves unanswered certain unacceptable assumptions. The "strike first" doctrine contemplates a preventive or pre-emptive war which is strictly contrary to national policy. Second, the basic assumption that the bomber always gets through presumes that there is — or will be — no effective defense against aircraft, which may be conjectural. Third, the success of the offensive bomber presumes that there is no effective defense against air attack for either side. In Douhet's words, "We must resign ourselves to the offensives which the enemy inflicts upon us while striving to put all our resources to work to inflict even heavier ones on him." The two statements, "the people's morale will be shattered" and "we must resign ourselves to the offensives the enemy inflicts," when set side by side, place the entire Douhet concept on shaky ground.

The above is important because it may be the key to reading Dr. Brodie's book, for the entire massive attack philosophy of total war stems from Douhet, whereas the current limited war peripheral philosophy of the Navy is largely developed from principles of Mahan. Regardless of the viewpoint to which the reader may subscribe, *Strategy in the Missile Age* is a clear, well-written study by one of the best qualified in the field of national strategy, and it will be of exceptional value to the student of national strategy in an objective search for the answers to the problems of national security in the missile era.

Fisher, Carol A. and Krinsky, Fred. *Middle East in Crisis*. Syracuse, N. Y. Syracuse University Press, 1959. 213 p.

This slim volume consists of two sections: first, an historical

review of the peoples, the territory, and the problems of the Middle East; and second, a collection of documents relating to old and new developments in that area. The historical review presents in capsule form an outline of the geographic, demographic, social, political and economic factors which have contributed to the evolution and complexity of the Middle Eastern nations as currently constituted. Special attention is given to the matters of nationalism, oil, the Suez Canal, Soviet interest in the area, and Israel — with, perhaps, a disproportionate share of the limited text being accorded the last. This section of the book has the virtue of giving the reader, in short space, the main features of a critical and complicated area in which the United States has great interest. It raises important questions of policy alternatives. The section suffers, however, from its brevity in that significant elements are not thoroughly analyzed nor adequately interrelated. It undertakes no critical appraisal of policy decisions; it offers no policy proposals for the area. (This point may be excused as the collection of documents is for the avowed purpose of guiding “the citizen in formulating his own view of United States’ policy in this troubled zone”). The selected documents relate to the Suez Canal, the state of Israel, the Eisenhower Doctrine and various contemporary occurrences in the Middle East. It is advantageous to have such a collection readily at hand in a single volume.

Wint, Guy. *Dragon and Sickle*. New York, Praeger, 1959. 107 p.

A timely and readable summary of the Communist seizure of China, and of the changing relations between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party. Highlight discussions include Mao's subordination of Communist dogma to opportunistic action, and his strategy for military revolution; Stalin's original indifference to Mao's progress, and his abortive effort to spread Communism throughout Asia on the Chinese pattern; and Khrushchev's reversal of the old Comintern ban on advancement of Communist aims through parliamentary

action. Although not too well documented, the author's facts appear correct and his theories credible. It is unfortunate for the student that the reading list mentioned in the book's table of contents is non-existent.

## PERIODICALS

"Second Phase of Geneva Talks Closes without Agreement."

*The Department of State Bulletin*, August 24, 1959, p. 265-270. Secretary Herter's statement at the closing session of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Geneva on August 5, together with the text of a Four Power communique issued at the close of the meeting, a Four Power declaration on disarmament, and Mr. Herter's statement upon his return to Washington on August 6.

Drake, Col. C. B. "Decision: The Essence of Command."

*Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1959, p. 54-57.

Considers four ways in which leaders are concerned with the process of decision and three distinct areas in which they find cause to make a decision.

Thayer, Charles W. "Our Ambassadors." *Harper's Magazine*, September 1959, p. 29-35.

A retired career diplomat gives an intimate appraisal of our diplomatic system and the men who practice it.

"Where We Would Disarm if"; "Where We Would Disengage if."

*Newsweek*, August 24, 1959, p. 36-38.

NATO and Soviet military strength is compared graphically and statistically, and the chances for disarmament and disengagement are weighed.

Geyl, Pieter. "The Myth of European Unity." *The New Leader*, August 31, 1959, p. 18-21.

A European historian presents reasonable objections that may be made to the supranational institutions aimed at European unity.

**"U. S. Missiles vs. Russia's — How the Race Stands Today."**

*U. S. News & World Report*," September 7, 1959, p. 76-79.  
An interview with Dr. Herbert F. York, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, who supervises all U. S. Army, Air Force and Navy missile development.

**"Khrushchev: The Real Story of the Man and His Deeds."**

*U. S. News & World Report*, September 7, 1959, p. 58-63.  
A record of the background and steps in the Soviet Premier's climb to power, showing the means employed to reach his present position.

Dupuy, Col. R. Ernest. "Communist Columns Spark New War Tension in Laos." *Army-Navy-Air Force Register and Defense Times*, August 29, 1959, p. 21

Col. Dupuy considers the contingencies of the Laos Communist-inspired revolt.

**Doerfel, Ulrich. "Guided Missile or Piloted Aircraft?"**

*Interavia*, August 1959, p. 953-955.

Investigates to what extent man can be employed by the air forces in any future war.

**"N. S. Savannah — Nuclear Forerunner."**

*Marine Engineering/Log*, August 1959, p. 75-83.

This article concerns the world's first nuclear-powered merchant ship which will usher in a new era of shipping. It describes the launching ceremonies of 21 July 1959, and gives a complete description of the ship, including the reactor plant, method of shielding and the radiation monitoring system.

**"Popular Delusions About Russia." *Whaley-Eaton Service***

*American Letter*, August 15, 1959, Supplement.

A special report seeking to present a balanced picture of Russia's economic progress and problems.

Goedhard, Frans J. "Summit Conference a New Soviet Maneuver in the Cold War." *International Peasant Union Monthly Bulletin*, June-July 1959. p. 26-28.

Affirms that the free world must not give up its rights, and points out that Khrushchev's proposals for neutralization involve only the Western world in return for which there would be no neutralization of any part of the Soviet Union.

Hammond, Thomas T. "Firsthand Look at the Soviet Union." *The National Geographic Magazine*, September 1959, p. 352-407.

An eyewitness report by an American professor of Russian history, directed largely to the life of the Russian citizen and his children.

Howard, William E. "SOLARIS Might Salvage Missiles." *Missiles and Rockets*, August 31, 1959, p. 16-17.

Outlines the various uses for the remotely controlled submerged object locating and retrieving/identification system now being developed by Vitro Laboratories.

Harrigan, Anthony. "Defense by Seapower." *The New Leader*, August 31, 1959, p. 11-13.

Suggests that a mobile, well-balanced U. S. missile fleet would provide a war deterrent of massive proportions, and discusses the requirements to produce such a fleet and the significance of the Navy's duty of explaining to the country the new role of sea power.

"The Case for Manned Lunar Flight." *Missiles and Rockets*, August 31, 1959, p. 24-25.

Some NASA officials contend that man can accomplish more than instruments and outline plans for flight direct to the moon.

Means, Paul. "NASA to Try Moon Orbit in October." *Missiles and Rockets*, August 24, 1959, p. 33.

Tells of the plans for placing a payload in orbit around the

moon in early October, using an Atlas-Able vehicle, and explains the objectives and operating technique of such a venture.

Cabell, Gen. C. P. "What the CIA Has Learned About the Communist Threat." *U. S. News & World Report*, September 7, 1959, p. 100-103.

A close-up of the way the Reds are using a triple-threat strategy to try to turn the world against the United States.

"Alphabet Conspiracy Against Enemy Subs." *Naval Aviation News*, July 1959, p. 6-10.

The first of three articles on antisubmarine warfare, this installment being an interview with VAdm. Cooper, ComASDFLant.

Dupuy, Col. R. Ernest. "Soldiers Gone Sour?" *Army-Navy-Air Force Register and Defense Times*, August 22, 1959 p. 11-12.

An analysis of charges made against the quality of personnel and leadership in the armed services, citing Hanson Baldwin's article "Our Fighting Men Have Gone Soft" in a recent *Saturday Evening Post*.

Marshall, BGen. S. L. A. "Was Baldwin Wrong?" *Army-Navy-Air Force Register and Defense Times*, August 29, 1959, p. 24.

Examining recent criticisms of U. S. society, the author concludes that armed forces critics are overly harsh.

Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L. "Why We Need a Modern Army." *Congressional Record*, August 11, 1959, p. A6923-A6925.

The Army Chief of Staff emphasizes the particular importance of a modern army today, giving some of the key qualities which make an army modern.

Lindley, Ernest K. "We've Done This Right." *Newsweek*, August 24, 1959, p. 28.

Gives eight reasons for the better understanding and more

friendly attitudes between Asians and Americans, concluding that despite mistakes, our Asian policies are sound, reasonably well executed and productive of good results.

"Building the Nuclear Navy." *Nucleonics*, September 1959, p. 73-85.

Consists of two articles, the first by John E. Kenton, a survey of the great stride made by the Navy and giving a progress report on the nuclear Navy and its suppliers, and giving a rundown of the new A-sub fleet and surface ships; the second section is a discussion of the mass production of power reactors for the Navy.

Hooper, Capt. Edwin B., USN. "Reorganizing and Maintaining Momentum," August 1959, p. 36-38.

Depicts the steps and problems in the reorganizing of the Research and Development Division of the Bureau of Ordnance, giving the objectives and the factors which contributed to the smoothness and success of the change.

Shor, Franc. "Pacific Fleet: Force for Peace." *The National Geographic Magazine*, September 1959, p. 283-335.

A splendidly illustrated article on the U. S. Pacific Fleet in action, stressing the amount of good will that this powerful striking force is creating for the United States in the Orient.

Barclay, C. N. "Can World War III Start by Mistake?" *The New York Times Magazine*, August 23, 1959, p. 11, 90-92.

The author explains why he thinks the odds are now against war starting by mistake, but warns that the risk will increase as more nations join the "nuclear club."

Zorlu, Fatin R. "A Turkish View of World Affairs." *Vital Speeches of the Day*, September 1, 1959, p. 684-687.

The Foreign Minister of Turkey offers a brief background on his country and goes on to discuss the Soviet determination toward penetration and the climate found by the Soviet bloc in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, noting Red exploita-

tion of the desire of the underdeveloped countries for economic development.

LeMay, Gen. Curtis E., USAF. "Military Communications in this Era." *Signal*, August 1959, p. 12-13.

Discusses the Air Force defense problems and the vital importance of warning systems — strategic and tactical.

Dulles, Allen W. "Analysis of the Soviet Threat." *Vital Speeches of the Day*, September 1, 1959, p. 687-690.

Points out flaws in the Communist system and calls attention to the nationalistic trends recently favorable to the West, but warns against any relaxation of measures to counter Soviet political, economic and subversive penetration in the Free World.

"The Flames in Asia — Hotter?" *Newsweek*, September 7, 1959, p. 25-28.

Examines Red China's thrusts into India, the "extermination" in Tibet, hostilities in Laos and Peking's show of strength; includes a chart-map of the shooting zones.



**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**  
**STAFF AND STUDENTS, ACADEMIC YEAR 1959-60**

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