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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND OBJECTIVES

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 20 September 1957 by
Professor W. W. Rostow

Admiral Ingersoll, Gentlemen:

I shall try, in the course of this hour, to define the national interest in terms which transcend any particular period of time, and then to consider the objectives which flow from that definition of the national interest under three historic circumstances: *first*, during the classic century — that is, the period of so-called “American isolation,” which runs, let us say, from Washington’s Farewell Address to the Spanish-American War; *second*, in the half-century of direct American involvement in massive ground force struggle for the balance of power in Eurasia, a phase which perhaps began to draw towards a close in 1953 with Stalin’s death, the end of the Korean War, and the achievement by the Soviet Union of fusion weapons; and, *finally*, the transitional period through which we are passing into a third phase of national objectives, whose character I shall now conceal in best cliff-hanger fashion, to be revealed in the final section of this lecture.

Only here in Newport at the Naval War College, in this famous place built, against dour opposition, by the remarkable line of men from Luce and Mahan to McCormick and Robbins — an institution built on the faith that abstract ideas and the analysis of history are important to the nation’s security — could a man feel at home in trying to cover so much of importance, so bluntly, in so little time.

* * * * *

First, then, a definition of the abiding national interest and a definition of two fundamental problems which flow from it. It

has been — and remains — the American interest to maintain a world environment for the United States within which our form of society can continue to develop in conformity with the humanistic principles which are its foundation. This definition, in terms of the progressive development of the quality of American society would, of course, include the physical protection of the country. But, on this definition the protection of American territory is viewed essentially as a means to a larger end: the protection of a constantly developing way of life.

The operative meaning of this definition derives from the geographic position of the United States. The United States — even if strengthened by close ties to Canada in the north and by its looser ties within the hemisphere to the south — must be viewed essentially as a continental island off the greater land mass of Eurasia. Various combinations of power in Eurasia have been, and remain, a potential threat to the national interest. A united Britain and France could have stifled the American effort at independence. During the nineteenth century, we expanded and consolidated American power in the Western Hemisphere only by systematically exploiting the power conflicts of Eurasia. In the twentieth century, we have been thrice placed in mortal jeopardy when a single power, or a combination of powers, threatened to dominate Western Eurasia, Eastern Eurasia, or both.

If this definition of the national interest is correct, the concrete objectives of American military policy and diplomacy have centered around two distinct — but connected — problems. Since, throughout our history, the combined resources of Eurasia could pose a serious threat of military defeat, it has been an abiding objective of American external policy to ensure that no dominating single power, or group of powers — hostile or potentially hostile to the United States — crystallized against us in Eurasia.

The second problem of objectives was to ensure that the ideological trend of events in Eurasia did not yield either a direct

or indirect threat to the survival of American society. An ideological threat to the United States can take several forms. It can mean that the ideological loss of an area results directly and immediately in a strategic loss and increased military danger for the United States. This is the most straightforward kind of ideological threat. But, in addition, the quality of American society would be damaged if the bulk of the world's peoples turned against the values of the democratic creed, leaving us an island in an autocratic or totalitarian sea. We would be forced to defend or to barricade our society politically, and this cannot be done without losing some of the essential qualities of an open society, which we are committed by faith and history to be. We would be further diminished if we were to lose the sense (with our nation since its birth) that its success and destiny had a meaning for the world beyond our shores. As in military affairs, so, ideologically, the national style is at its best on the offensive.

The concept of an American ideological objective must, however, be clarified and limited in three respects. *First*, our interests have never required, nor do they now require, that we seek societies abroad built in our own image. We are legitimately concerned that societies abroad develop and strengthen those elements in *their* respective cultures which elevate the individual as against the claims of the state. *Second*, the democratic process which we wish to see extended abroad must be viewed as a matter of aspiration, of trend, of degree — not as an absolute. The legitimate American ideological objective is not that all societies become immediately democratic in the degree achieved in the United States, but that they accept as a working goal a version of the democratic value judgments consonant with their culture and their history and that they move towards its realization with the passage of time. *Third*, the American interest does not require that *all* societies at *all* times accept democratic values and move towards their achievement. We are concerned with the balance and trend of ideological forces in Eurasia, not with total ideological victory, somehow defined. Given our geographic circum-

stances, our history, and the quality of our society, abiding American interests and objectives demand that we be ideological crusaders; but our crusade must be tolerant, long-term and selective, directed towards areas of importance, where our margin of influence may be effective.

* * * * *

I turn now to the manner in which these two interacting problems — one military, the other ideological — were translated into national objectives and related to each other in Washington's Farewell Address and in the subsequent century which was, in effect, dominated by his wise counsel.

The American Revolution had been fought partly as a colonial revolt in the name of national independence and of universal principles of human freedom and partly through a balance-of-power alliance with France. The Constitution had been drawn up and accepted in part to achieve a more viable internal balance between liberty and order and in part because of external threats to the national interest. Against this mixed background of military danger and ideological commitment, the new nation faced a peculiarly searching test during the 1790's in defining its relation to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, mingling, as those wars did, the worlds of national power and universal political concept.

What was the American interest in the outcome of these wars? Should that interest be determined by an assessment of its ideological content; by memories of past assistance from the French; by revulsion from the excesses of the French Revolution and a continued sense of racial and cultural connection with the British Isles; by the impact of the belligerents' actions on special economic or regional interests? Or, was there a distinctive American national interest that transcended instinctive ties of race, ideology, gratitude, memory, and, even, short-run economic advantage?

Washington, of course, answered the nation's questions by asserting and defining a distinctive American national interest. In his Farewell Address, he approached the matter in the context of a general theme which embraced domestic as well as foreign policy. His central objective was to strengthen the precarious sense of American nationhood. His method was to define, on the domestic scene, an area of national interest beyond region and party; also, to define a distinctive American interest in relation to the world. His military assessment asserted that in the short run the American nation could be protected by its own strength, combined, as opportunity required and offered, with that of other powers whose interests temporarily converged with ours. In the long run, he sensed that the rise in American military potential relative to others — if translated into a reasonably substantial defensive force at readiness and with a well-trained professional group at its core — could cope with whatever threats might arise over the foreseeable future.

Washington did not deny or ignore the reality of the American commitment to a distinctive set of values in political and social life. He spoke movingly of the nation's attachment to liberty. But he counseled that the nation exploit thoroughly the military possibility of a security achieved and maintained without taking up fixed positions in the European power struggle, and work out its ideological destiny within its expanding borders. The alternative course he regarded as both unnecessary and dangerous in the 1790's.

Accepting isolation, in Washington's sense, as a working formula, the nation from Jefferson's administration forward devoted itself to the living process of building and consolidating a continental structure. The United States managed to acquire the requisite territory and to neutralize the hemisphere from any increase in major power influence at remarkably little diplomatic or military cost. All this was done, step by step, with shrewdness and skill, systematically exploiting the conflicts and cross-purposes

of the major European Powers, none of whom was ever free enough of Eurasian conflicts and rivalries to challenge the hegemony of a virtually unarmed United States in this hemisphere.

The cumulative myth of American isolation was, however, a quite different affair than Washington's thoughtful prescription, or, in fact, the way our foreign policy evolved. A gap emerged between the concept of a virtuous, isolated America, uniquely free of involvement in wicked, balance-of-power politics and the way American relations in the world were actually conducted. We practiced balance-of-power politics abroad just as we did at home in party politics, conducted on a continental basis. When we used military force in the classic century, we used it for relatively clear and limited political and geographical ends, as in Florida and the Mexican War — not for unlimited crusade in the pursuit of absolutes. But the ideal concept of the nation made it difficult to articulate to ourselves or to others what in fact we did. By and large, the nation in its first century accepted its fortunate relation to the Eurasian power balance as a permanent gift of God and history, not as a transient accident of geography, communications, military technique, and the peculiar state of affairs in Eurasia.

* * * * *

I turn now to the momentous set of changes in the nation's external environment and in its attitudes and concepts about the national interest, which began to take shape around about 1900 and which set the pattern for the nation's security problems and objectives for about half a century. As befits the definition of the national interest presented earlier, my thesis is two-pronged: military and ideological.

Militarily, the nature of these changes quite suddenly required the United States to leap from a situation where a favorable balance of power in Eurasia could be ensured, with virtually no military effort by the United States, to one where the national

interest required the nation to accept as a regular operating objective the holding of the ground force balance on the Eurasian land mass. After a fashion, this leap was made. It was made in the sense that when placed in mortal peril in 1917, 1940-41, 1947, and 1950, the nation responded with vigor. But the leap was not made in men's minds. Neither the nation as a whole nor any substantial group within it has had a working military concept of the world we came to confront in the first half of the twentieth century which fitted the case and permitted us effectively to anticipate our problems.

Ideologically, this new military relation to the world, combined with the rise of antidemocratic States and new techniques of communications, forced the nation to redefine its nonmilitary objectives. The days had passed when we could concentrate on building democracy on the American Continent while the democratic faith progressively advanced from one end of Eurasia to the other almost by natural law. We faced in Communism and Fascism explicit and dedicated opposition to the values of our society as well as to the military security of the United States. In short, Washington's fundamental assumption altered: namely, that an indecisive balance of power in Eurasia was self-perpetuating and that it was safe for the United States to concentrate its ideological interest and energy at home. What happened to alter Washington's assumption, and how did the gap develop between what happened and what Americans thought had happened?

Without undue violation to the complexity of history, it is possible to embrace the major changes both in the United States and in its world environment over the latter decades of the nineteenth century within a single phenomenon: the spreading process of industrialization. Each country touched by this process underwent a transformation in its political and social life, as in its economy. But, while the impact of industrialization on each particular nation — including the United States — was relatively gradual, its impact on the balance of the World's power was to

prove quite rapid, so narrowly had that balance been held by Britain in the century after 1815. Notably after 1860, almost simultaneously, Germany, Japan and Russia began to surge forward, as well as the United States.

Industrialization transformed the world arena of power in two distinct ways: *first*, it altered and extended the shape of the arena which had emerged at the time of Napoleon's defeat in 1815; *second*, it altered the relative military potential of the States within the new enlarged arena of world power. The world that Britain held in balance for the century after Waterloo consisted mainly of Western Europe and the maritime fringes of Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Russia, it is true, lurched from one side of its Eurasian cage to the other — first to the west and then to the east. But, down to 1914, it could be held within that cage with reasonable economy of force, as the Crimean and Russo-Japanese Wars indicated. The Western Hemisphere emerged as a special sphere, closely related to — but still separated from — the major power game by the Monroe Doctrine.

Industrialization and all that went with it brought not merely the United States but Germany, Japan and Russia into the arena in new active roles. The twentieth-century decline of Western Europe is thus mainly an optical illusion, caused by the spread and unification of the world power arena and the active entrance into it of a group of powers hitherto impotent, self-isolated, or neutralized.

Within this twentieth-century arena, clearly beginning to form up in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, Eastern Europe and China — two vast regions which lagged behind in industrialization — were to provide peculiar difficulty. Why should this have been so? Each of these two regions, if attached to any major power, had the geographic location, population, and long-run potential capable of shifting radically the Eurasian power balance. But, lagging behind their neighbors as they did, they

lacked the political coherence and economic strength to assert that potential independently; or, to avoid, down through the first half of the twentieth century, a high degree of dependence.

It was this differential alteration in the power balance — traceable to differences in the timing of the stages of economic growth, caused, in turn, by more profound noneconomic factors — that was to provide a terrible temptation to Germany in Eastern Europe, and to Japan in China. It was to serve ultimately as a source of fear and temptation to Russia in both regions. It was to offer chronic danger to France, Britain and the United States, whose strategic status was radically and permanently altered by both consequences of industrialization; that is, by the creation of a single interacting world arena of power and by the emergence of soft spots within it which made the pursuit of Eurasian hegemony appear possible and attractive at various stages to Germany, Russia and Japan.

In the three decades after the Civil War, the great areas of Germany, Russia, Japan and China — whose modernization was to reshape the world's balance of power in the next century — were at stages which did not lead to major aggression. The balance of power which had marked the classic century was being rapidly undermined. But this fact could be largely concealed, except from the most perceptive and imaginative men. In the 1890's, despite occasional gunfire from the Yalu to Cuba and from South Africa to Manila Bay, it was not too difficult to view the world as still held in balance by a British relationship to Eurasia which prevented any one power or coalition from dominating or threatening to dominate that area.

Thus, when Americans first felt impelled to play an enlarged part on the world's scene they could conceive of doing so in terms of an enlargement or an extension of familiar concepts and commitments. After all, the Monroe Doctrine could be extended to embrace quite a lot of enterprise in the Atlantic and the

Pacific; and, in principle, the nation had always recognized that it needed a navy.

There was very little understanding that the whole foundation of the American security position in the Eurasian power balance was about to collapse and to confront the nation with problems vastly more serious and substantial on the world scene than even the most ardent advocates of Captain Mahan and a large view were prepared to envisage in the 1890's.

The writing and influence of Captain Mahan presents a peculiar problem, for his total perception of the nation's security problem transcended the character of his public influence or even the naval doctrines associated with his name.

With reasonable legitimacy, the principal elements in Mahan's thought can be rearranged and summarized in the following sequence of six points:

- (1) The balance of the world's power lies in the land mass of Eurasia, and it is subject to unending competitive struggle among interior and exterior nation states.**
- (2) Although the balance of world power hinges on the control of Eurasian land, the control over the sea approaches to Eurasia has been — and can be — a decisive factor, as the history of many nations (most notably, Britain) demonstrates.**
- (3) In the end, naval power consists in the ability to win and to hold total dominance at sea, which, in turn, requires a naval force in being capable of meeting and defeating any likely concentration of counterforce. A naval power must, therefore, maintain as a concentrated tactical unit at readiness an adequate fleet of capital ships with adequate underlying support.**
- (4) Support for such a force includes forward bases, coaling stations, a merchant fleet adequate for overseas'**

supply, and perhaps certain territories whose accessibility — if not friendship — is assured at times of crisis. It follows, therefore, that a naval power should be prepared actively to develop an empire, as well as substantial foreign trade and an ample pool of commercial shipping.

- (5) The United States stood in the 1890's at a moment in its history, and in its relation to the geography of world power, when its full-scale development as a naval power was urgent.
- (6) The pursuit in times of peace of the prerequisites for naval power would have the following ancillary advantages: the challenge of commercial and imperial competition would maintain the vigor of the nation; acceptance of responsibility for Christianizing and modernizing the society of native peoples within the empire would constitute a worthy and elevating moral exercise; and the whole enterprise would be commercially profitable.

In Mahan's writing, however, the full significance of propositions (1) and (2) — concerning the meaning of power in the land mass of Eurasia — were obscured and slighted. For if they were taken seriously what was called for was not an exuberant American effort (mainly a naval effort) to assert itself unilaterally on the world scene, but an expansion of our total military power in alignment with those other nations which shared our interest in avoiding a concentration of power on the Eurasian land mass. Mahan was, it is true, steadily an advocate of Anglo-American understanding. Later, as the First World War approached, he helped to articulate the nature of the American power interest in its outcome. But, generally speaking, propositions (3) through (6) became detached from (1) and (2), leaving Mahan, in his net influence, mainly a propagandist for the expansion of the

American Navy and its forward bases, for the creation of the Isthmian Canal, and for the concentration of the battle fleet. He was less of a philosopher of the American interest and expositor of its strategic position on the world scene than he could have been, given his extraordinary acute insight.

The ambiguity between what we might call "Mahanism" and a correct interpretation of Mahan's insight was symbolized by the somewhat bitter joke played on the Navy in the First and Second World Wars. A force whose thought was systematically focused around a decisive, direct engagement of capital ships had to devote itself overwhelmingly to convoying, antisubmarine patrol, submarine operations, and amphibious operations. History in the twentieth century required, in short, that the United States, in its own interest, exert power directly on the Eurasian mainland with massive ground force units. The American Navy played an indispensable and effective role in supporting this process; and this outcome was in no way inconsistent with Mahan's fundamental propositions. But as "Mahanism" gained ground, toward the end of the nineteenth century, there was little premonition of the trenches of 1917 and 1918; of the battles of North Africa, Italy, France, and the Pacific Islands from 1941 to 1945; or, of Korea.

Mahan, himself, came as close as anyone to seeing the shape of the future when he perceived that for his generation of Americans the defeat of the German threat to the Eurasian power balance and to the democratic creed was the central task; but that the next generation might well have to deal with a parallel Slavic threat. That perception did not mesh well, however, with "Mahanism." Although Mahan left a powerful imprint — even a permanent imprint — on the nation's thought, his victory was incomplete. Many who accepted in some part of their minds the reality of the nation's expanding objectives were not prepared to accord them an overwhelming or even a very high priority in the period after 1900. What followed the Spanish-American War was

not an era of American military expansion, but the progressive period — focused, primarily, on domestic policy problems. And, in addition, a part of Mahan's doctrine was flatly rejected. What the nation rejected was Mahan's ideological rationale for the development of an American empire — a rationale in which a sense of Christian mission and commercial advantage converged. His views in this respect were very close to those of contemporary British Conservatives — for example, Joseph Chamberlain.

When the nation began soberly to assess the pain, the cost, and the inner conflict required to deal with the Philippines (so lightly acquired in 1898), it turned its back against further such imperial acquisitions. The nation's fundamental ideals and values made it difficult, if not impossible, to undertake in good conscience the burdens of empire. The rejection of a quasi-British concept of empire did not, however, end the matter. The nation was forced to articulate its ultimate purposes as it moved beyond the confines of Washington and the Monroe Doctrine.

In the First World War, Wilson substituted for it, and for Mahan's hard-headed view of power, an extreme ideological rationale for American participation; and he presented an equally ideological rationale for the American interest in the postwar settlement. Wilson had deep, personal, almost religious inhibitions against acknowledging the reality of power in the equation of foreign policy. He moved directly towards a solution of the nation's security position in terms of such general principles as national self-determination and collective security, principles authentically embedded in the nation's history and in its thought — and he did this without careful or explicit attention to the conditions of power and politics which would make such a world system workable.

Wilson was closer than Mahan to the ultimate purposes which our nation and society would in fact pursue on the world scene. Mahan, however, understood and did not shy away from the medium of power in which these purposes would have to be

expressed and executed. In speaking to his countrymen, Wilson denied the realities of power as vigorously as Mahan had asserted them. When, in the postwar years, the ugly facts of power did emerge to the surface, the nation was confused; it felt cheated and a little naïve.

In 1919 and 1920, the two interpretations of the nature of the American interest on the world scene struggled in the persons of President Wilson and Senator Lodge in the heightened context of party politics. Tragically, both Wilson and Lodge lost. Lodge defeated Wilson, it is true; but it was Harding and Borah who took over the field of action — not Lodge, Root, Stimson, and the others who belonged, broadly speaking, in the Mahan tradition. Power was left in the hands of men who did not understand, or who refused to understand, the deep historical forces which in the three decades before 1920 had been steadily drawing the nation into the expanding, shifting arena of world power.

In terms of this view, Franklin Roosevelt sought — in the “destroyer deal,” “lend-lease,” and the “shoot-at-sight” policy in the Atlantic — to limit the extent of the American engagement, while preventing British defeat. In his maneuvers of 1939 to 1941, there are many respects in which Franklin Roosevelt appeared as a disciple of “Mahanism.” But the power position in Eurasia had been permitted to disintegrate much too far to permit a peripheral policy to protect American interests. From Pearl Harbor, we turned at last to the problem of bringing to bear directly on the Eurasian land mass sufficient American strength to defeat the Axis bid for hegemony.

Instinctively, the nation repeated this pattern of reluctant, gradually increasing commitment of strength when a Soviet threat to the Eurasian power balance promptly emerged in the wake of the Second World War — a threat whose roots lie in part in the nation's lack of grasp on the power contours of the Eurasian land mass and in a consequent underestimation of the strategic significance of the Polish and Chinese issues during the war years.

There is, however, an interesting progression. Just as Franklin Roosevelt sought to avoid Wilson's errors (as he understood those errors), Truman sought to avoid the errors (as he understood them) of the interwar statesman. Truman's duel with Stalin and with Mao was consciously an exercise in seeing whether a forehanded policy — in which the Eurasian aggressors were made to feel at an early stage the presence of active American strength and will — might prevent a major war.

In the Middle East and in Western Europe, by and large, this policy worked: from the warning over Iran — late in 1945 and early in 1946 — to the Berlin airlift. But the cutback in usable ground force strength in 1945 to 1950, combined with the somewhat casual military attitude towards the Korean Peninsula, proved too great a temptation for Stalin and Mao; and the Korean War resulted.

For the special purposes of this lecture, however, the main point is this: down through the Korean War and its settlement, both Truman and Stalin were thinking primarily in terms of the possibility of one power or tight coalition cleanly capturing the Eurasian power balance. Stalin, building on the enormous base he acquired from the Second World War, sought to succeed where the Kaiser and Hitler had failed — and to do so without a major war. In pursuing his purpose, Truman could act with a more mature consensus behind him in the nation than his predecessors had enjoyed.

In their own way, the citizens of the United States had come to make their own synthesis of Mahan and Wilson. The Communist threat was widely understood to be a threat both to the nation's military survival and to its way of life. In the Marshall Plan, we exhibited ability to sustain a policy which was based on a subtle appreciation of the connection and interaction between the two threats. In the end, the acceptance of the need to fight for South Korea was based more on a commitment to the

Wilsonian principle of collective security, including the commitment to NATO, than on any narrow national military purpose in Korea.

What I am asserting, then, is that in the first half of this century the nation on three successive occasions faced threats to the Eurasian power balance arising from the vulnerability of Eastern Europe and China to attachment by more advanced powers. In each case, the nation sensed — late in the day, but progressively less late — that a threat to our society was involved; and the nation's reaction was progressively more mature in the sense that it reflected a progressively better balance and blending of American power and ideological interests on a world basis in substitution for the more restricted formulae of George Washington, John Quincy Adams, and the others of the classic century whose assumptions had become outmoded by the spread of the industrial revolution.

* * * * *

We come now to my alleged next stage in national objectives — a stage whose beginnings, I have suggested, might be dated from about 1953.

Let me first state that, of course, history does not turn corners in any such sharp and clear fashion. The forces which led to a change in national objectives around about 1900 had, for example, been developing since at least the 1860's; and this new stage has equally long roots. More than that, in real life stages overlap. We are even now living in a nation where the concepts — and even some of the concrete problems — of the classic century of isolation still exist. For example, there are American relations with Latin America; and, surely, the problem of preventing a recurrence of a direct Hitlerite or Stalinist bid for the balance of power in Eurasia has not been completely solved.

Nevertheless, I shall be most useful to you this morning if, for the moment, I set aside the protection of professorial re-

finement and caution and present as sharp a picture as possible of the setting in which the third stage in national objectives will have to be pursued: the world of diffused power.

Like most important historical changes, this one is coming about because a number of quite separate forces push in the same direction, the direction being a situation where it will become increasingly difficult for any single power or tight coalition rationally to envisage as an operating goal the dominance of Eurasia and the world. Specifically, there are six such forces now at work, all of which interact on each other to produce a new situation:

First, the gradual spread of the conviction in Eurasia that the United States will not again withdraw into isolation. There are still doubts, of course, as Adenauer's reaction to the announcement of American ground force cutbacks indicate. But it is increasingly reckoned in Eurasia that the presence of the United States is a permanent feature of the scene. Both our friends and our enemies in Eurasia have come to this conclusion much more recently than we Americans are likely to believe. It is easy to forget that the basic decisions of the Kaiser and of Hitler were predicated on American abstinence or impotence in Eurasia; and that a good deal of Stalin's hope must have been based on Roosevelt's assertion during the course of wartime diplomacy that the United States was prepared to stay as an occupying force in Germany and elsewhere in Eurasia for only a few postwar years.

Second, the presence of forces within Soviet society — not yet fully reflected in Soviet policy-making for a decline of aggressive ambition in external policy and a dilution of centralized absolute power internally. This is not the occasion — nor is there the time — fully to consider the nature, power, and limits of these forces. They include at least the following: the costs and probable indecisiveness of the arms race; the political and ideological bankruptcy of Communism in Eastern Europe; the ambition of the Russian peoples for improvements in material welfare

and the evident capabilities of the Russian economy to provide them, if freed of the pathological ambitions and domestic institutions of Communism; and, above all, the groping of an increasingly literate and well-informed population for status as a dignified citizenry. As I say, these forces are real and active in Soviet society but by no means dominant.

Third, the hardening-up of the two great soft spots of the first half of the century — China and Eastern Europe. At the moment, of course, Eastern Europe is in effect under Soviet military occupation and China is bound to Moscow by an alliance that I, at least, would judge firm for the immediate future because of certain believed mutual interests in Moscow and Peking. Nevertheless, the trend in Eastern Europe is clearly towards a situation where Soviet power to act freely is being restricted — and I believe, as a matter of historical trend, that the same is likely to be the case with China as its industrialization proceeds.

Fourth, the peculiar nature of the weapons of mass destruction. As we all know, they have two revolutionary characteristics: first, it is difficult to define circumstances where it would be rational for any two powers to use them at full strength; second, as time goes on, more and more powers are going to acquire some atomic weapons' delivery capabilities — and, with them, a considerable nuisance or bargaining value. This value will exist because the delivery of a few of these weapons can do great damage. Thus far, only the first of these two characteristics has been strongly felt. Together, however, they tend towards a violation of the old rough proportionality between industrial capacity and military potential. It is no accident that the trend of recent years has been for small powers increasingly to tell major powers to go to hell. Tito started it, in a sense, but the list of his successors is getting quite long: Nasser, U Nu, Ben Gurion, and Gomulka. This does not mean, of course, that the small power always succeeds. Under certain circumstances, a major power can bring to bear its ground force capabilities, as the Soviets did in

Budapest. And, if we are so-minded, there are other ways to handle Nasser than those which tempted Eden so tragically last year. All I would assert is this: over an important range of issues, the peculiar nature of modern weapons in a stand-off arms race has given minor powers a bargaining position disproportionate to their industrial capacity and military potential — and this tendency may well increase.

Fifth, is the further enlargement of the world arena of power to include Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa — not as dependent or passive colonial areas but as increasingly assertive political units, with some kind of bargaining leverage in the world arena. In a sense, that part of Mahan's thought (and it is as interesting as anything he ever did), incorporated in *The Problem of Asia*, has now come fully to life. This enlargement of the world arena raises many new issues. But, above all, it adds to the number of effective powers at work; and it thus further diffuses authority. It does so, among other reasons, because the military approaches to Southeast Asia, to Africa, and even to the Middle East are by no means as easy, logistically, as the German or Russian approaches to Eastern Europe or the Japanese or Russian approaches to China.

Sixth, is the ideological problem posed by the coming to life of independent centers of power in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Since it is not easy for either the Soviet Union or the Free World to occupy these areas — due to the first and third factors in combination — they must be dealt with to some degree on the principle of overlapping interests. The interests of these areas are clear enough: they want political independence; dignity on the world scene; and, above all, economic and social progress. The existence of these vast areas in revolutionary transition does not, of course, rule out forms of action other than diplomacy, economic aid, cultural exchanges, and so on. There is ample play, as Moscow has long perceived, for subversion, guerrilla

operations, and even quite substantial war. Nevertheless, the nature of the aspirations and interests developing in these new and strategically important areas sets a limit on the kinds of force that are rationally usable; and it thus contributes — in conjunction with the other forces cited — to the further diffusion of power.

What are the operational implications of this new third stage, given abiding American interests? Even in a world more or less freed of the danger of atomic war, freed even of the danger of Communism, the national interest could be threatened. It could be threatened by a democratic failure in the underdeveloped areas; it could be threatened by limited wars; it could be threatened by new schisms in the world — as dangerous, perhaps, as that caused by Communism; for example, a split along color lines. Above all, and probably as a result of some combination of these threats, the United States could be threatened by the emergence of a new coalition which felt it both safe and profitable to violate the armaments control agreement which I am assuming in this third stage.

To protect the national interest, we would thus have to seize and maintain the ideological leadership in the transition of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa to modern status; we would have to maintain a flexible range of military capabilities, short of all-out war, and the understanding and will to use them; and we would have to create and develop policies which prevent major conflicts from developing, either within the major regions of the world or between the underdeveloped areas and the industrialized areas. In short, we would have to continue to lead a world-wide coalition which shared our essential interests, including our interest in maintaining the assumed arms control system.

There is nothing in the forces which I have described that would again permit the national interest to be protected by a passive hemisphere policy. Taken all in all, however, the American problem in the third stage of diffused power, within a world arena which is for the first time truly global, appears less dangerous,

if more complex — but, I must say, more messy — than the problem of dealing with the three direct bids for Eurasian hegemony of the first half of this century. It is also a problem congenial to our native political gifts. Our whole society is, after all, built on the proposition that the diffusion of power is the basis for human liberty. Our domestic political skills and social habits are accommodated to achieving order and direction from situations of diffused power. We ought to do reasonably well in a world where history has imposed that proposition as a working basis for international life.

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But, of course, we are not yet in the third stage. The Soviet Union has not yet accepted the status implicit in the third stage as merely one among a group of major national powers. It is still working along the paths which look to Eurasian and world hegemony. The arms race is still on. And the fundamental reason, in my view, is that any effective arms control agreement would end Bolshevism within Russia, converting Russia into a virtually open society, focused around the long-delayed expansion of consumers' welfare ardently desired by the Russian peoples and fully within Russian economic capabilities.

Men do not lightly surrender the dreams of their youth, nor the operating objectives and vested interests of heavy bureaucracies. The pattern of aggression, looking to Eurasian and world domination, is built into the minds of the present Soviet leaders and the institutions they dominate. We thus live in an exceedingly dangerous time; for, we are seeking the day when responsible Russians acknowledge that Communism is no longer a viable creed for their nation — and no less is required for the third stage fully to come to pass.

Why, then, raise the vision of this third stage in which we would be free of the two great nightmares — aggressive Communism and atomic warfare? The reason is this: in a curious

way, we have already half entered the third stage. We are half living in the sort of world we would have to face if an effective control of armaments agreements were to be negotiated with the Russians, for that agreement would not bring peace in any final sense; it would simply ratify and, with some continuing degrees of risk, would guarantee a situation where power and influence were pursued without the ultimate forms of military force.

The historic forces making for the third stage are already at work. They are at work, however, in a context where Moscow's ambitions remain unlimited. We are, therefore, observing a systematic effort by Moscow to use certain of these forces for its own purposes — notably, the confusion and ambitious fervor in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The protection of the national interest demands, then, that our objectives and day-to-day policy embrace problems of both the second and the third stages. We must both deter Soviet strength and atomic weapons' delivery capabilities and lead the transition of the underdeveloped areas along democratic lines. We must both maintain NATO and develop a mobile force to deter or to prosecute limited wars in other vulnerable areas. We must both maintain our old friendships with the Western European States and the new friendship with Japan, while also weaving the newer nations of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa into a meaningful Free World coalition.

This is a big, tough job. But if we relax or grow complacent, Moscow could achieve a dangerous and even decisive breakthrough in any one of a number of forms: possible, but least likely, a lead so substantial in relative delivery capabilities that it would be judged rational in Moscow to try and take out our retaliatory power at a blow; a major ground force assault on Western Europe, based on the assumption that the United States lacked the capabilities to meet such an assault on its own terms, or the will to exchange all-out atomic attack for anything short of direct assault on the United States; a successful campaign of atomic blackmail, leading to the break-up of NATO; the ideological loss of India

and Southeast Asia in general to Communism, should the Indian second Five-Year-Plan fail; a Communist breakthrough in the Middle East; and so on.

In the end, however, we have the fundamental assets — if we have the wit and the will to use them. There is no good reason why we cannot fully stay the course in the arms race. We have in being almost all we need, except the will and the airlift, to create an effective deterrent against limited war. Western Europe and Japan have now an economic vitality which even the greatest optimists failed to predict a decade ago, and they can bear an increasing weight in the alliance if we create the conditions for true partnership. In the Indian Peninsula — that is, in India and Pakistan — we have a foundation of institutions, plans, and ardent men and women who could, over the next decade, demonstrate that the technique of consent can be more efficient than compulsion in making the transition to self-sustaining growth if the United States throws its weight behind them. Algeria is a hideously difficult problem; but, south of the Sahara there are hopeful possibilities if we are reasonably forehanded.

The third historic stage in national objectives emerges, then, not as a fact nor as a prediction but as a goal for national policy over, say, the next decade. I believe it to be an attainable goal.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor W. W. Rostow

Professor Rostow received his B.A. degree in 1936 and also his Ph.D. degree in 1940 from Yale University. He attended Oxford University from 1936 to 1938, receiving an honorary M.A. degree from that institution in 1946, and also received an honorary M.A. degree from Cambridge University in 1949.

In 1941, he joined the faculty of Columbia University for one year as an instructor. He was Harmsworth Professor of American History at Oxford University during 1946 and 1947, and Pitt Professor at Cambridge University during 1949 and 1950. Since 1950, he has been Professor of Economic History at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Professor Rostow's principal fields of interest have been Modern Economic and General History.

PROBLEMS FACING NATO

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 12 December 1967 by
Professor Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.

I don't feel that people have done me any great favor in scheduling a talk just before the NATO Council meets in Paris. In fact, I came up here believing that a slight bit of optimism mingled with a lot of pessimism was probably going to be a true calculation as to the results of the Council meeting. However, there has been so much gloom in the press that I am beginning to revise my position, because the press usually is wrong on what happens at NATO. NATO problems have been so much in the news of late that I would propose this morning, instead, to try to discuss what seems to me to be some of the underlying factors which have produced these specific problems.

Maybe some of you have read the long and excellent book by James Gould Cozzens, *By Love Possessed*, and remember the story that runs through that book as a sort of a motif about the man who falls off the roof of a high building. As he passes the view of the horrified people on the sixteenth floor he waves at them, and says, "Don't worry! All right so far."

It seems to me that some of the problems of NATO are like that: everything is all right *so far*. I believe that one of the things that can also be said about NATO is that, unlike other areas of policy, there is no dearth of ideas. The difficulty is to generate the determination, the unity, and the will to put some of the ideas into effect. The NATO Powers are split; they are not united on any particular policy. Therefore, it is always easier to decide to do nothing rather than to decide to push ahead with one particular decision, recognizing the costs and recognizing that a minority — and what may be a very strong minority — is going to oppose the decision.

What I want to try to do, then, in this brief period is to try to discuss, as I said, the specific problems — such as German unification, French weakness, British military strategy, nuclear armament in Europe, and so on — within the context of what seems to me to be some of the basic underlying factors that have been with the Alliance from the beginning and which have produced this fairly complete stalemate of the Organization.

The first factor which I believe to be important in this context is that NATO is an attempt to create and operate a military command in peacetime. From this obviously stem some of the difficulties that trouble the Alliance. The absence of conflict — the fact that this is peacetime of a sort — creates problems in allocating scarce resources. There is no clear, compelling priority, such as would exist if war should break out. Therefore, there is the problem of NATO *versus* other military demands as in the case of France, and there is military *versus* other foreign policy demands as in the case of Britain and the United States. Then there is another type of problem in the decision as to whether to allocate these scarce resources to foreign policy needs at all as against internal requirements of the nation.

One solution which is implicit in this problem of allocating scarce resources in peacetime is for the United States to bridge the gap between what is needed and what others are prepared to do. This solution has always been inherent in the NATO system. The United States would define the nature of the threat and would assume command to bridge this gap between the Soviet threat and European capabilities with its own resources. However, as you all know, at least since 1953 the United States has not been prepared to do this; also, at least since 1953, the other countries have not been prepared to accept the American definition of “the threat.” Therefore, in some instances they are no more anxious than the United States to permit us to bridge this gap between what we Americans feel to be “the threat” and what the other countries are prepared to do to meet it.

A second problem that seems to me to be allied with the first is that North Atlantic Treaty or the Alliance itself, on which NATO rests, is that of equality among the member nations. That is contrasted with the obvious necessity of a military hierarchy in the assignment of power and responsibility, for one cannot run the Organization on an equinational basis. On the other hand, it is obviously not possible to assign responsibility entirely on the basis of power and military authority. Therefore, some of the NATO organizational problems within the military field seem to me to stem directly from this factor: a way of reconciling the juridical equality of all members of the alliance with the need for disparity in military responsibilities.

Some organizational compromises, as you all know, have been made as a bow toward equality. Once these compromises have been made, they are difficult to change; hence, the Organization itself is difficult to change. Military decisions really have to take place within this political context — and the political context is in very delicate balance, if it is in balance at all.

Hence, the final problem under this general heading is that the issues within the Alliance tend to be batted eternally back and forth. What the French would call a “navette” is set up, or a badminton game, if you will, between political and military authorities. These are batted back and forth because problems are theoretically soluble on different levels, and one solution is not necessarily applicable at a different level. Therefore, I would say that the third category of problems, or the third underlying cause of NATO problems, is that NATO rests on a multinational basis. Yet, the Organization in some respects obviously is designed — and indeed has — supranational or supernational aspects.

The control powers and responsibilities of the supreme Command over subordinate commanders and over national contingents take on some of these supernational features. Therefore, the Organization is in some degree over and beyond the multinational

Alliance which forms its foundation. But, the question is: In what degree? Here, the element of vagueness and mistiness enters the NATO concept. Surely, one of the problems with the European Defense Community (this is perhaps not the *most* important, but it is at least one of the problems) was that it proposed to create a true international army, with an international command. At the same time, it proposed to put it in a subordinate position to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization which has fewer supernational characteristics.

Some of the states which resent recurrently the supernational features of NATO are inclined to retreat from the Organization to the Alliance; or, to belong to the Alliance and really not to the Organization at all. The two must be kept separate, then. I think if you would consider Denmark for a moment, you might find there at least a partial illustration of a country that is a member of an Alliance much more than it is a member of an Organization, and there are some other national instances that might be mentioned.

Other states look at the problem the other way: they want to get away from national status; they want to emphasize the trend to supernational features of the Organization; they want to develop a political counterpart to the military organization, which would likewise be supernational. These counterpressures tend to keep the features of the Organization rather blurred and at times to reduce its operating effectiveness.

The next problem which I want to mention is that the Organization appears at the same time to be too restrictive and not restrictive enough in relation to the trigger mechanism, or the *casus foederis* of the Alliance. Article V of the Alliance says that if something happens, then the allies agree to do something about it. That is the trigger mechanism. Yet, if you have read Article V lately you will know that it is really quite vague as to what the "something" is that happens — the kind of armed attack. And it is even vaguer as to what should be done about it.

In fact, Dean Acheson, when he was trying to get the Treaty before the Senate to have it ratified, made quite a fetish out of its vagueness. Senators and members of the press kept asking him, "What is it that we are supposed to do? What are we committed to do under this Alliance? Acheson's answer was always, "Stick to the terms of the Treaty itself. We are committed to maintain — and, if necessary, to restore — the security of the North Atlantic area." But this does not really mean very much in actual practice, or it can mean many different things. So, in answer to the question, "What activates the *Alliance* ?" — everything really activates the Alliance; yet, in a real sense, nothing activates it.

If you ask the question, "What activates the *Organization*?" the answer is "military attack by a particular country in a particular area." But that does not get you very far if you want to say, "Activates it how?" This trigger mechanism which I am talking about is military; the area of decision is military. Yet, real decision may effectively elude the Alliance itself. Surely, this is one of the most serious specific problems that NATO now confronts.

The pre-activation posture of the Organization obviously goes far toward determining the manner in which the Alliance will respond if it is tested. Therefore, there are recurrent and very deep-rooted disputes over the fundamentals of that pre-activation posture — whether it has to do with military bases, missile bases, or with the extent and nature of German rearmament, and so on.

But this is not all there is to the story. Lately, Secretary Dulles has made explicit what many people had already realized — that the nature of the response, if it were to take place, would be partly local and partly automatic. If this is true (and I think it is obviously in the cards that it is true), then it means that effective decision may well really escape both the political apparatus of the Alliance and, indeed, the military hierarchy of the Organization itself. In the event of a crisis, both the political

system and the military organization may be reduced to the *ex post facto* role of making legitimate what has already taken place.

The war in Korea shows that this can happen. In the tactics phase the local response is made in military terms, and the nature of that local response goes far toward determining what can be done and what will be done from then on out. Moreover, the manner of the American entry into the Korean War shows that there can be great confusion and argument over just what an "automatic response" is, and where the shadowy dividing line rests between an automatic response (a reflex action) and a calculated, determined policy decision.

The nature of the response, moreover, is partly national and thus escapes the Alliance — resting in large part with the United States and to a far less extent with a couple of other countries. Therefore, the *real* authority of the political and military command under various circumstances must be questionable.

Another set of problems has to do with the contrary demands of others inside the Alliance. Greater and greater NATO control over the nature of the military response is one demand which is set up by some States in the Alliance. There are others, not so vocal, who sort of like things the way they are — and who pressure for less rather than more NATO control.

I said a couple of minutes ago that *everything* activates the Alliance, not the military organization. Of course, I believe this to be true. Articles I and II of the Treaty place economic and political problems within the purview of NATO. As they are all within the purview of NATO, NATO can look out and see all of these problems. But the essential purpose of NATO is military. Therefore, another broad category of problems may be stated as, "What do you do about these political and economic implications and features of the Alliance? What do you do to get beyond the 'talkie-talkie' stage in discussing them, in looking at them — and

in looking at them again and again?" Diplomatic discussion takes place now inside and outside of the Alliance. In fact, I have been told (and am prepared to believe) that there is hardly a problem inside and outside NATO that is not batted back and forth inside the Organization in the discussion stage. It is not that these problems are undiscussed, but that they are talked to death. There is so much talk that talk became a substitute for action. The reason why there is talk and not action, quite obviously, is that any action may weaken the Organization and the Alliance, without necessarily solving the problems which confront the Organization.

The next underlying, fundamental, bedrock problem which I want to mention is the question of the Community within the fifteen-nation Alliance. There has been a lot of loose talk, as you all know, about the North Atlantic Community, or just the Atlantic Community. What does it mean? The most significant thing is that it means a lot of different things to different countries and it means practically nothing to a number of countries. If you ask, "What, really, is this form of Community, and on what does it rest?" — the answer obviously has to be that it is negative; that it rests upon a negative agreement; that we do not like the Soviet Union, and intend to oppose it. With the subtlety and maneuver that post-Stalinist Russia has introduced into international diplomacy, this negative agreement has faltered and has weakened. Therefore, there has been a search for a greater sense of Community upon which to rest an Alliance which faces different problems in 1957 than it did in 1949.

Some people base this sense of Community on the heritage of the North Atlantic Treaty area from Greco-Roman culture. This is fine until you begin to spell it out. What do you mean by "Greco-Roman culture?" It is impossible to spell it out in geographic terms, in economic terms, or in political terms. These foundations of Community are all incomplete and leave the only form of accepted cooperation, then, the basic one of military cooperation against the Soviet Union. Therefore, there are many

people inside the Organization who feel that this historical community base is not enough; that this negative military agreement is not enough; that the Organization must deepen the Community between the member States. In other words, they must cooperate more.

The trouble with this is that once they begin to try to cooperate more, there are very grave fears that disagreements rather than agreements might be uncovered — disagreements so basic that they will further weaken the rather tenuous negative agreement which now exists. There are equally great fears that this cooperation might succeed — and might succeed along lines which are hostile to national development. What I am saying here is that in this search for greater cooperation there are some who fear that it won't work; there are others who fear that it will work and that they will lose out in the process of having the North Atlantic Community rather than their national institutions decide national policy.

The next problem which I want to get to is the problem of the political alliance as the culmination or capstone of allied relations. The top of the alliance structure is political; inside of this is a core area in Western Europe. The basic trouble with the political system can be seen by looking at the core area, where the relationships among the partners are complicated, are overlapping, and, at the same time, are incomplete.

Take Scandinavia as an example. The leader of the Scandinavian group, Sweden, is out. Another member, Finland, is close to being involved on the other side. Or, take Britain and Western Europe. Britain is keeping one foot in the door of Western Europe so that the Western European countries won't slam the door in her face. There have been recurrent statements by the French that the greatest enemy of European unification is the British, the reason being that they don't want to get involved in European unity; nor do they want European unity to proceed without Britain. So they pursue a policy of now encouraging and now giving

the back of their hand to European unity. The reasons are very easily understood. Even in this core area there is one country which certainly belongs in every respect except the military, which is determining, and that is Switzerland.

Yet, behind this political alliance structure you see that essentially it is a bilateral system, with particular countries on the one hand and the United States on the other. There are some problems which arise because of the essentially bilateral pattern. One of the problems is the great scramble before the door of the American Treasury to see who is first in line for the hand-out. This scramble, which takes place perhaps not as much now as it did seven years ago, is a recognition and a tribute to the essentially bilateral nature of NATO. Another feature of the same scramble is that the countries which are not first at the door of the American Treasury, or first in the hearts of the American people, resent this fact. The resentment is particularly located in France. The French resent the fact that Britain enjoys a special bilateral relationship to the United States. The French, therefore, do three things: they try to outscramble the British for a position at the door of the American Treasury or the American State Department (and they usually fail in this); or, they make overtures to the British, trying to work out a bilateral Anglo-French position so that the two of them can go as a team to the United States and get a better deal than France could get by itself (and this also usually fails); or else they make overtures (as they have done quite recently) to the West German government, such as: "How about you and me forming a little team and readjusting the balance — again, on a bilateral basis with the United States and also with Great Britain?" Of course the West Germans turn this down. Why shouldn't they turn it down? They have been at least second in line with the United States for some time now, if not first.

What I am saying here is that there is a lack of mutuality in the relationship between the United States and its so-called

“partners.” Sometimes this lack of mutuality is such that the system almost resembles that of a planet, with satellites revolving around it in different and rather confusing orbits. In this respect, the system is different, but not different in kind, from the Eastern European system of a planet Russia with some Communist satellites revolving around it. In effect, this is the “cold war” pattern — built by, maintained by, and dependent upon the existence of a “cold war,” that is at times not so “cold,” with the Soviet Union.

Before getting into that, there is one more basic, bedrock problem which I want to mention: NATO poses as a regional arrangement within the meaning of the United Nations’ Charter, yet it really is nothing of the kind. “Collective security” (which is what NATO is supposed to exemplify) means institutionalized procedures, including the use of force, for the settlement of disputes — *internal* disputes. The Inter-American system is an example of a true regional collective security arrangement. However, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization does not qualify. Disputes are not even brought formally to the Organization, let alone settled. Arms for Tunisia and Cyprus, and the Saar question are all examples of internal disputes which fall within the geographic framework of the Organization but which effectively escape its political control.

Furthermore, there is no internalized focus or consistency of concern with political and economic problems. Of course the reason is that these political and economic problems do not concern all members of the Alliance to the same degree. As I have mentioned, there are those which are outside, such as Sweden and Switzerland, but which, on an economic level, are more inside Western Europe than some of those which are in the so-called “North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” such as Iceland and Turkey. It seems to me that it is axiomatic that before a bloc can be formed on extra-NATO problems — problems lying outside of the NATO area — there must be some effort to come to grips with the

internal problems which beset the Alliance. Only after the Alliance can make some claim to being an internal problem-solving operation can it really lay claim to being a united expression of policy outside the NATO area.

The final point which I want to make here (and a culmination of the others) is that NATO is vulnerable to penetration and to ossification by reason of these bedrock problems which I have been mentioning. I hardly need to remind you that the purpose of NATO is to deter Soviet attack by building and maintaining automatic, overwhelming retaliatory power — plus ready, mobile delaying forces — to raise the stakes risked by a potential attacker. Yet, there has been an existing undercurrent of disbelief in this basic purpose of the Organization. This disbelief is a triple one.

In the first place, there is disbelief that the retaliatory and delaying forces do, or will in fact, exist and will be recognized by both the allies and the enemy as in existence. You can say, and prove in fact, with high-level secret information, that these forces do or do not exist for this purpose. What I am saying is that far more important even than this is the *belief* on the part of other allies — and of the Soviet Union — that these forces do or will exist. The element of disbelief says, “Regardless of the facts — we do not know the facts and we have to disregard them — so, disregarding the facts, we do not believe that these forces do or will exist.”

There is another type of disbelief, and that is that these forces of one or of both types are in fact needed. This has to do with a view of Soviet behavior and Soviet motivation in both the pre-Stalin and post-Stalin periods. I submit that you cannot prove this proposition one way or another. Therefore, in the light of Soviet behavior, there is always going to be an undercurrent of disbelief that such forces are needed. The danger lies in the fact that the Soviet Union has not always been so stupid as

to limit the area of disbelief by making direct threatening gestures at the West. Indeed, at fairly periodic intervals in post-Stalinist Russia there has been a deliberate effort to lull the West to sleep; to encourage the interpretation in the West that these forces of one type or another, or both types, are not needed.

The third element of disbelief here is that these forces — especially the retaliatory forces — would be used in the most likely contingencies. I need not spend very much time on this because I am sure that this question is familiar to all of you. It involves, primarily, Western European (although some American) military sources putting in a row, in descending order of probability, the kind of attack which might be expected from the Soviet area; next, putting in another row the kind of response which NATO is prepared and able to make; and then showing — or purporting to show — that there is no meeting of these two rank orders of probability, and that the most probable forms of Soviet threat are the ones that we are least able to meet. Now, this can be argued both ways, but all I am saying here is that there is also a fairly substantial level of disbelief on this score.

Hence, once countries in the Alliance make their formal acknowledgement of the cruciality of NATO, they get on with what they regard as the business at hand, and the business is domestic, European, and non-NATO problems: the viability of their national economies, the unification of Germany, the unity of Europe. As they go about their day-to-day business with these very serious and crucial problems, having made a polite bow in the direction of saying, "Well, NATO is crucial; NATO is fundamental," and so on, they begin to ask themselves, "Does the existence of NATO really help to solve our problems or does it, in fact, hinder their solution?" So far as German unification is concerned, the answer appears to be that there are many people who feel that NATO is a hindrance.

Therefore, it is just one step from here to saying that the Alliance is vulnerable to penetration and exclusion. There

are other devices and areas open to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union has been exploiting them in the Near East, and so on. It is an unsoluble question and, therefore, it is not really worth discussing as to whether this shift has been occasioned by the success of NATO or whether the area outside NATO is more vulnerable to Soviet penetration because NATO exists. What we are confronted with is the attempt by the Soviet Union to encircle and enfeeble the Organization by concentrating on other areas.

I submit that the Alliance is vulnerable in another sense (this is controversial, and maybe you will want to take me to task for it). I am saying here that there is greater *common* interest on some issues between East and West than there is within the Western Bloc itself.

As an example, I would cite Suez, where there was a greater meeting of specific interests between the United States and the Soviet Union than there was between Britain and France on the one hand and the United States on the other.

On German disunification, there is greater specific interest between the United States and the Soviet Union than there is between the United States and some of our allies in Western Europe.

In the regulation and control of armaments, there appears to be (at least on some specific points) a greater feeling of interest at times between the United States and the Soviet Union than between the United States and Britain and France. Hence, the fear which has been periodically expressed, and which arose almost to a level of hysteria on the part of France, that the United States would, in the disarmament negotiations, conclude a deal with the Soviet Union behind the backs of our NATO allies. Surely one reason why Dulles temporarily recalled Stassen and then himself went to London was to reassure the Western European countries that we would not in fact do this.

Indo-China, Algeria and Cyprus are other examples of greater meeting of the minds between East and West than within the West itself.

All in all, I submit an imposing array of special problems exist which are not soluble within the NATO framework, and, furthermore, in which there is a positive incentive to get outside NATO itself.

In conclusion, I think one must agree with Secretary of State Dulles on the inexorable imperative of NATO: that it has got to move forward or backward; that by standing still, it does in fact move backward — and backward toward a formal, ceremonial role for the Organization. There is even some doubt on the degree of formality and ceremony which now exists. So much doubt, in fact, that I would take it that one of the prime purposes of President Eisenhower's trip to Paris was purely ceremonial and formalistic in order to assure the other NATO countries that we love them "in December as we did in May"; to assure them that we intend to be friends, pals and buddies with them from henceforth and forever more. This does not say what we will be pals with them about; neither does it say what problems we propose to solve with them. In fact, it is rumored that the final communique' of the Conference is already drawn up. It is furthered rumored that Paul-Henri Spaak who drew it up and sent it to Washington, saw the words re-written there in order to take most of the sting and, in effect, the substance out of them.

The Organization has to move, then, either forward or backward. This is the final dilemma which I will leave with you here: to move toward tighter bonds of Community. But, as I said, these bonds are difficult to forge. Furthermore, they depend upon a situation of bipolarity in the international environment which created NATO in the first place. Hence, there is great emphasis — among American military circles, in particular — on viewing international politics within a bipolar framework. This makes problem-solving easier. If we have one big problem, or one big enemy, then we may know what to do.

But I question whether bipolarity really describes the international environment or whether action, on the basis of pre-

sumed bipolarity, in all instances increases national and international security. It seems to me that not only in the rise of neutral states but in such instances as Hungary, Suez, and the Near East, that bipolarity — as an operating premise — did not work. In fact, Hungary appears to me to reveal that the Organization is prepared to act only in one type of bipolar situation and bipolar conflict and maybe not necessarily in the most important type of bipolar tension. Hence, we are confronted with recurrent proposals to ease the bipolar situation; to make some gesture toward what is stated to be the reality of the new and contemporary international setting.

These proposals range all the way in the European framework (which is the only one I will talk about now) from a very limited proposal that we do not set up missile bases within "X" miles of the dividing line in Germany to Fritz Erler's suggestion that it is in the Western interest to promote German unification, even at the expense of seeing this united Germany outside NATO altogether.

I return in the last minute, then, to where I started. I don't think the question is a lack of proposals; I think the question is a lack of unity, a lack of determination and desire to carry one or another of these difficult choices through to decision and implementation.

Maybe some of you read in *The New York Times* the wonderful story of a reporter who called up the Pentagon after the satellite misfired. A breathless colonel came on the 'phone and said, "I'm sorry — I can't talk to you now. The Emergency Plan has gone into effect."

The reporter was very interested, and asked, "Oh, really? What emergency plan?"

And the colonel replied, "The emergency plan to let all Pentagon employees off early in the snowstorm. Goodbye!"

This kind of emergency we are prepared to cope with, but whether we are prepared — and, indeed, anxious — to do anything about the other type of emergency remains to be seen.

Thank you!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.

Professor Furniss received his A. B. degree from Yale University in 1940, where he was a Social Science Resident Council Fellow during 1946 and 1947. The following year, he received his Ph.D. degree from the same institution.

He was appointed Assistant Professor of Political Science at Princeton University in 1947, serving in that capacity until 1955, when he became Associate Professor there — a position which he presently holds.

Professor Furniss was coauthor of *American Foreign Policy*.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The listing herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Books on the list which are not available from these sources may be obtained from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are available for loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel
(G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

Comandant ELEVENTH Naval
District (Code 154)
937 North Harbor Drive
San Diego, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH
Naval District (Code 141)
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces,
Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 48
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Title: *New Understandings of Leadership.* 158 p.
Authors: Ross, Murray G., and Hendry, Charles E. New York, Association Press, 1957.

Evaluation: A comprehensive discussion of leadership principles, including theory, practices and problems. The authors have reviewed a large number of studies and summarized the thinking expressed therein into a readily understandable document which deals with a complex subject. Designed for use by those involved in leadership training, it contains many helpful suggestions and ideas which could be of practical value.

- Title:** *System and Process in International Politics.*
283 p.
- Author:** Kaplan, Morton A. Chicago, University of Chicago, 1957
- Evaluation:** This book represents "a systematic effort to cope with the many aspects of international politics from an abstract, theoretical and semiformal point of view." In doing so, Doctor Kaplan utilizes system analysis procedures and game theory as vehicles for his examination of the various forces at work in international affairs and their interaction with each other. He fully recognizes the limitations of such an approach from the practical standpoint. However, he makes a contribution toward organizing the vast amount of data that must be considered in this complex area. The book also contains a good discussion of game theory, exclusive of Doctor Kaplan's application of it to international politics.
- Title:** *The Yoke and the Arrow.* 203 p.
- Author:** Matthews, Herbert L. New York, George Braziller, Inc., 1957.
- Evaluation:** A summary of the author's impressions and experiences in Spain between the start of the Spanish civil war in 1936 and the present. The text is based largely on the articles written by Matthews for *The New York Times*, and largely reflects a newsman's slant on the subject. The writer has tried very hard to present an unbiased view, as he sees it. However, he is obviously enchanted by the land and the people, and this sometimes appears to color his view. As a whole, the work is intensely interesting and of utmost timeliness in view of our new interest in Spain and its growing influence on our military planning in NATO.
- Title:** *Reporting the Wars.* 322 p.
- Author:** Matthews, Joseph J. Minneapolis, The University of Minnesota Press, 1957.
- Evaluation:** Lecturing before the Naval War College in 1913, a former war correspondent vigorously advocated "rigid, very rigid censorship in wartime." This anecdote, one of many in a highly readable history of two centuries of war reporting, is illustrative of the multiple problems of press coverage in war. Censorship, propaganda, the role of war correspondents, military communiqués,

service newspapers, and the organization of the press for war are a few of the subjects discussed. Tracing these problems from the time when Napoleon began issuing military bulletins for propaganda purposes, the author concludes that World War II was "the best reported war in history" and the most accurately covered. Both the military and the press were more responsible and realistic about the issues of security versus publicity than ever before. Even World War II, however, had its military-press feuds. All of the American armed forces were targets of press attack: the Navy for delays, the Air Force for distorting the picture of aerial damage assessment, and Army Headquarters in SWPAC for its communiqués. There is ample opportunity for polemics in a history of this kind, but, realizing that news policy has become a vital weapon of total war, Professor Matthews refrains from such tactics. He is always objective, without being pedantic. Although he does not believe that a period of such striking changes in journalism and warfare permits sweeping generalizations, he manages to sustain reader interest throughout.

- Title:** *Around the World in 90 Minutes.* 248 p.
- Author:** Woodbury, David O. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1958.
- Evaluation:** *Around the World in 90 Minutes* deals with the life of the first United States space satellite. The book is a mixture of good sound fact and science fiction. Questions on propulsion, putting a vehicle in an orbit, guidance, construction and aerodynamics are treated very well in layman's terms. The latter part of the book deals with space travel and space stations. Very prominent men in this field provided engineering data included in this book.
- Title:** *Soviet Russia in China.* 392 p.
- Author:** Kai-Shek, Chiang. New York, Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957.
- Evaluation:** Chiang Kai-Shek has written a study of communism in China. He tells the history of Soviet Russia's intrigue, the implacability of her strategy for conquest, and the ruthlessness of her methods. His writing is commendably objective; he does not hesitate to point out his own errors. Although Chiang's treatment of the loss of the mainland is objective, this does not mean that he has

nothing to sell. He argues that Soviet Russia's "biggest political weapon is their basic tactic for World Revolution, namely, 'peaceful coexistence'"; that 'peaceful coexistence' is merely a cover for communist political and social warfare, and that the Western powers are even now losing this latter type of war. Chiang points out that an all-out preventive war is out of the question for the United States and her democratic allies. But he also shows that our "status quo" strategies of containment and massive retaliation are passive at best, and, so far, unsuccessful in preventing Russia's further growth of power. He submits that the Western bloc should follow a *positive* policy, one designed to *reduce* the Communists' power. This policy should be the "policy of liberation," with the "strategy of indirect warfare against communism . . . as (its) highest guiding principle." The indirect warfare to which the author refers is a war of national revolution by the Eastern peoples against the Communist colonialism; in short, a back-to-the-Mainland movement by Chiang and his ChiNats, with the exploited Chinese people rising to his banner and overthrowing the ChiComs.

Title: *International Security, The Military Aspect.* 64 p.

Authors: Rockefeller Brothers. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1958.

Evaluation: This sixty-four page booklet is publicly known as "The Rockefeller Report." Before it became available as a fifty-cent paperback, Dave Garroway gave approximately two hundred thousand away free to television viewers. It is one of the most widely read documents in the United States at the present time. The Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, Inc., has formed seven panels of experts to assess major problems and opportunities which are likely to confront America over the next decade. The subject report is the work of Panel Two, and is the first report to be published. While this report deals with international security, others are being prepared on United States' international objectives, foreign economic policy, domestic economic and social objectives, education and manpower, the democratic process, and the moral framework of national purpose. This "Rockefeller Report" concerns itself with problems which are the every-year concern of military planners and war colleges, and which, since Sputnik, have become the concern of many gentlemen of the press and of a segment of the American public. The preparation of this report has been under the direction of Doctor Kissinger, the author of *Nuclear Wea-*

pons and Foreign Policy, and the influence of Doctor Kissinger is evident. Whether one agrees with his thinking or not, his writings have had tremendous influence in the past six months and have become required reading for officers who wish to keep up with the times. The report examines the state of United States' defenses, the threats posed by the Soviet Union, concludes that all is not well, and then makes specific recommendations for solving the problems which we face. Very little fault can be found with the conclusion of the report, as to the difficulties which abound, but professional officers will probably raise more than one eyebrow over the solutions which this report recommends. If these proposals are carried out, they will radically alter the structure of the Defense Department and the roles and missions of the Armed Services.

Title: *Recent Soviet Trends*. 107 p.
Author: Hoffman, George W., ed. Austin, Tex., University of Texas, 1956.

Evaluation: *Recent Soviet Trends* is a collection of five papers presented by five different authorities at a conference on Soviet Union Studies held at the University of Texas in October, 1956. The first paper, "Geographic Factors (and fancies) in Russian and Soviet Expansion," is a discussion of the politico-geographic expansion of Russia and the Soviet Union, with special emphasis on the current need for sufficient agricultural land to feed the rapidly growing population. In this article, too, is some comment on Mackinder's heartland geopolitical theory. The second paper, by Professor Hazard of Columbia, is entitled "Recent Developments in Soviet Law." The author points out that the trend is one in which the regime is gradually being forced to extend to the people some of those guarantees formally written into the Soviet constitution. Hazard is somewhat optimistic about this liberalization, although he does point out that no doubt the regime will try to effect it without sacrificing their real concept of government leadership. Father Bissonette, former Chaplain of the United States Embassy in Moscow, has as the subject of his paper, "The Soviet Union Since Stalin." This paper addresses itself to two subjects: the struggle for succession since Stalin's death, and the new attitude of friendliness toward foreigners on the part of Soviet officials. The fourth paper is called "Trends of Soviet Foreign Policy in Asia." It touches on the early frustrations suffered by Soviet expansionists in South and East Asia. But

the principal theme is the strengthening of Soviet economic ties in Asia. The final paper, "Soviet Foreign Economic and Technical Assistance," is already out-of-date, and is of very limited value. In addition to the papers, the records of the round-table discussions of each paper are presented.

PERIODICALS

- Title:** *Last Chance in North Africa.*
Author: Hahn, Lorna.
Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January, 1958, p. 302-314.
Annotation: North Africa confederation, linked with the French economically, is proposed as a solution to the West's problem in this area and as a block to Nasser's Pan-Arab ambitions.
- Title:** *Speed-Up on Atomic Plane.*
Publication: LIFE, January 20, 1958, p. 37-38.
Annotation: Describes plans for a nuclear-powered airplane, and pictures the possible forms it might take.
- Title:** *Moscow Plays Up Role of Amigo.*
Publication: BUSINESS WEEK, January 25, 1958, p. 87-88.
Annotation: Shows how the Reds are courting Latin American countries with trade missions and propaganda.
- Title:** *The Illusion of German Neutrality.*
Author: Hottelot, Richard C.
Publication: THE NEW LEADER, January 20, 1958, p. 15-18.
Annotation: Sees little purpose in neutralizing Germany, and no valid reasons why the Russians want an agreement on Germany.
- Title:** *Political and Humanitarian Approaches to Limitation of Warfare.*
Author: Jessup, Phillip C.
Publication: AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, October, 1957, p. 757-761.
Annotation: This article comments on Henry Kissinger's book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, and suggests that

in considering the future possibility of limited war the realists should not fail to appreciate the contributions made by the moralists and legalists.

Title: *The Middle East: Conflict in Priorities.*
Author: Badeau, John S.
Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January, 1958, p. 232-240.

Annotation: Examines the basic issues in the Middle East — as the West sees them and, then, as the East sees them, in order to find the differences and similarities.

Title: *A World at Stake.*
Publication: NEWSWEEK, January 20, 1958, p. 53-69.
Annotation: A special section, describing the nature of the Russian challenge. It covers the military dangers, diplomatic problems, and the intellectual and spiritual implications of the struggle.

Title: *The Pentagon and the Research Crisis.*
Author: Boehm, George A. W.
Publication: FORTUNE, February, 1958, p. 134-135, 153-160.
Annotation: Describes the manner in which the Defense Department supports basic research, and the need for large sums if our scientific advances are to keep up to Russia's.

Title: *A Critical Appraisal of SEATO.*
Author: Thomas, M. Ladd
Publication: THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY, December, 1957, p. 926-936.
Annotation: Objects to SEATO as being unsuited to this area because it alienates other nations in the area, duplicates bilateral defense agreements, and leaves the most important states in Southeast Asia out.

Title: *Dulles Weighs Hopes, Dangers in Any "Peace Talk" With Reds.*
Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 24, 1958, p. 100-104.
Annotation: Excerpts from an address by the Secretary of State, giving an up-to-the-minute outline of U. S. foreign policy.

- Title:** *Placing the Vanguard Satellites in Orbit.*
- Author:** Hagen, John P.
- Publication:** INTERAVIA, December, 1957, p. 1245-1250.
- Annotation:** Extracts from a brochure published by the United States Naval Research Laboratory, giving first-hand information on the development of "Vanguard," and what is to be accomplished by placing "Vanguard" in orbit. (Written prior to launching attempt).
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- Title:** *The Cordiner Committee Story.*
- Author:** Carrison, D. J., Captain, U. S. Navy.
- Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, January, 1958, p. 1-11.
- Annotation:** Background information on how the Committee obtains its facts and the reasons for its recommendations.
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- Title:** *Danger: "Little Wars" — But U. S. Is Ready.*
- Author:** Pate, Randolph M., General, U. S. Marine Corps.
- Publication:** U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 10, 1958, p. 50-54.
- Annotation:** The Commandant of the Marine Corps, in an interview, discusses limited wars and the type of forces needed to fight them.
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- Title:** *Europe Stakes Its Claim for Full Partnership.*
- Author:** Taylor, Edmond.
- Publication:** THE REPORTER, January 9, 1958, p. 14-16.
- Annotation:** Sees NATO as a stronger organization, as a result of the recent meetings, with the European nations seeking an "equal partnership" with the United States, rather than leaning toward neutralism.
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- Title:** *Who Won at NATO.*
- Author:** Barraclough, Geoffrey.
- Publication:** THE NATION, January 4, 1958, p. 3-5.
- Annotation:** Analyzes the recent NATO meetings, and finds that the real issues have been side-stepped and remain to be solved.

Title: *Admiral Blandford Defends JCS; Warns Against
'Military Solomon' or National Protector.*

Publication: ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE JOURNAL, January
1, 1957, p. 11, 28.

Annotation: Remarks made by Admiral Blandford before the National
Press Club on January 6, laying down arguments in op-
position to proposals for a single chief of staff.

Title: *Toward A U. S. General Staff?*

Publication: TIME, January 6, 1958, p. 12-13.

Annotation: A critical appraisal of the Department of Defense, listing
reasons for and against an armed forces general staff
system.

Title: *The Kennan Ideas That Are Stirring Up Europe.*

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 10,
1958, p. 69-73.

Annotation: George F. Kennan, former Ambassador to Russia, answers
questions concerning his ideas for a new approach to
Western strategy.

Title: *Why We Are Losing To The Russians.*

Author: Niebuhr, Reingold.

Publication: THE NEW LEADER, January 13, 1958, p. 6-7.

Annotation: Lists critical areas in international affairs where U. S.
foreign policy is failing: in the Middle East, in NATO,
in uncommitted nations, in foreign trade, and over the
"Sputnik."