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Bonds and Strains in Soviet and Soviet-Satellite Relationships

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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BONDS AND STRAINS IN SOVIET AND SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS*

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 1 November 1956 by
Professor Andrew Gyorgy

Captain Moore, Gentlemen:

It gives me a great deal of pleasure to be able to talk to you this morning on a timely and exciting subject. Before going into it, I would like to commend the Academic and Curriculum Boards of the Naval War College for the diabolical cunning with which they scheduled the discussion of satellite problems for this week and then casually cast the problem of Middle Eastern politics for the week after next. I have not as yet been able to determine the full extent of this collusion with certain divine and other powers.

I would like to dedicate this lecture to the spirit with which the Hungarian people have fought the past few weeks. In a way, I think it should be dedicated to the martyrs of what will definitely be recorded in history as the Revolution of 1956, far outshining the impact of the Revolt of 1848.

In approaching the tremendous subject of "Bonds and Strains in Soviet and Soviet-Satellite Relations," I feel like the late Wendell Willkie, who, when the final campaign was on, said that he felt "very humble and very proud." I approach this problem with a great deal of humility, as well as pride, in view of the recent record compiled by at least two of these former satellites, Poland and Hungary.

***Editor's Note:** This lecture was delivered before the Suez Canal was closed.

I would like to suggest to you first of all that the area itself can be viewed in many different contexts. In effect, there are at least two or three prevailing approaches to what used to be a closed-off laboratory situation, a ten-year experiment in curtaining off this region with a population of 110 million people. I would like to suggest to you two major possibilities of viewing the region broadly and rather loosely described as Eastern Europe.

I would like to describe one view as the "Heartlandic" concept, going back to the great Scottish geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder, and his prophetic writings. According to this concept, we look at the European and Asiatic parts of the Soviet Union from the tremendous dimensions of the "Heartlandic" area. Judging from this perspective, Eastern Europe is indeed a very small and insignificant-looking slice in the northwestern corner of this huge territory. The "Heartlandic" view of this region in effect might be the underlying indication as to why the Soviet Union has been willing to withdraw temporarily its troops and advisors from Hungary and Poland. In effect there are other problems in the Soviet policy-maker's mind concerned with a zone of relatively insignificant satellite regions. A more significant "Heartlandic" view of the Russian position would turn the Soviet face primarily toward Asia, Siberia, Mongolia, China, and so on — not to speak, of course, of the Middle East. On the whole, I want to suggest to you that a heartlandic view would place the Eastern European-Danubian area in a relatively limited, and geographically somewhat de-emphasized, position.

The other way of looking at our region would be to take it as a very definite slice or area in which the Soviet Union has lasting and permanent interests. This would be the "security zone," or "sphere of influence" view, with its tremendous regional importance suggesting an overriding Russian interest; namely, that the Soviet Union wants to stay there, and has in effect realized in the past 10 years a 300-400 year old imperial dream. Looking at it particularly from the Central and Eastern European aspect of

the security problem, here lies the true strategic significance of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, and even to a large extent of Yugoslavia, if it can be counted upon. The tremendous importance of the Black Sea satellites — namely, Rumania and Bulgaria — as militarily useful buffer zones must again be emphasized for all of you. This would be the “non-heartlandic” or continental-central European view of the vulnerable lands bordering on the western U. S. S. R.

Probably the most basic way of describing the region would be to suggest that the Eastern European region has always been exposed to a relentless “Push Toward the East.” This historic process has then been matched by a similar “Push Toward the West” by powers that have invaded the Balkans from the east and have inevitably been pushing westward. One expert succinctly suggested in a recent book that: “The pressure from two sides was unfortunately the normal condition of Eastern and Central Europe throughout the whole course of its history.”

I would like to pin the phrase “pressure from two sides” down in nonacademic and absolutely practical terms. The following few lines attempt to summarize and describe this double-exposure, which is not so much a “southern exposure” as an exposure toward the West and the East. On the whole, there have been six major waves of imperial rule lashing over the unfortunate region that we are discussing here this morning. These are the following:

1. Austrian Rule — 1291
2. Turkish Rule — 1526
3. German Rule — 1848, 1940
4. French Rule — 1919
5. Italian Rule — 1934
6. Soviet Rule — 1944

I am suggesting here an initial date for each wave of empire as it washed over Central and Eastern Europe.

The first wave came in 1291, with the appointment to the Austrian throne of Hapsburg Prince Rudolph, who became in a broader sense the first emperor of a new and rapidly developing Austria. The second wave, which, incidentally did not mean the end of Austrian rule but was a conflicting situation with two complicated imperial patterns developing in the western and eastern parts of this region, was the Turkish rule. In 1526, both the initial phase of a partial occupation of Eastern Europe as well as the high tide of Turkish rule was reached in the historic battle of Mohács fought on Hungarian soil. The Turkish armies then pushed on westward and were defeated in front of the gates of Vienna, in what was generally labeled the "First Battle for Vienna." From then on, having reached the high tide of its imperial power, the Turkish wave began to recede.

The third round consisted in effect of the first impact of modern German imperialism on the Danube Valley and the Balkans. Germany's influence covered the years 1848 until 1944, with major interruptions during the French interlude and the Italian experiment. Bismarck and Hitler certainly spelled massive disaster for the entire region!

I feel that the fourth wave can be much more precisely pinpointed. 1919 is a date that stands out clearly, suggesting that the end of World War I, with the Versailles Peace Treaty settlement, brought about a temporary ascendancy for the French. The brief French interlude, marked by the brilliant diplomacy of the years 1919-1934, brought peace and a certain amount of stability to the harassed region. This relatively peaceful era was abruptly and unfortunately interrupted in October, 1934 — almost twenty-two years from this date — with the infamous Marseilles murders of both King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the brilliant exponent of French diplomacy, Louis Barthou, French Foreign Minister.

The dramatic incident of this double assassination was the end of the French chapter, and ushered in the brief and ugly next round, which was marked by Italy's ascendancy. Mussolini's im-

pact on Eastern and Central Europe asserted itself through various Machiavellian types of diplomacies, with which he tried to turn country against country and exploit the obvious issues of international conflict. Italian rule ended in the summer of 1940, when the Italian army suddenly invaded France. This was the end of *Il Duce's* prestige and power position in Eastern Europe.

The sixth and last wave of empire consisted of the establishment of Soviet control over Eastern Europe. Soviet rule started in 1944, with the east to west sweep of the Red Armies through the Danube Valley. From 1944 on, we have been witnessing the development of the sixth and most recent chapter in the "colonial" history of this region.

This is a simplified way of looking at the Eastern European area, where the six waves left in their residue a great deal of bitterness, confusion, and national and local frustrations of every type. As part of this pattern of historic confusion, we must also observe that throughout the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries there were at least 380 political units in this area, centered around the Kingdom of Bohemia and the Empire of Austria. These small political entities were composed of tiny duchies, states, small towns, and frequently of nothing more than castles and small customs areas. I think it can be well said that Napoleon consolidated this part of Central Europe in 1805-1806, and cut the 380 political units drastically down to about one-tenth in number, or approximately 38. This was the prevailing pattern of fragmentation and uncertainty which has characterized the last 600-700 years of Eastern European history. No wonder that the region has been in the headlines and has never settled down to politically stable living at any time!


As the next section of my discussion, I would like to comment briefly on the history of World War II. The most recent and terrible disaster was the fact that World War II plunged the nations of Eastern Europe into a turmoil of conflicting interests,

which were complicated by the oppressive features of a prolonged Nazi-German occupation. It is important to remember that by June, 1941, the date for the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler either controlled or directly occupied all of the countries in the Danubian-Balkan area. The economic and political features of Hitler's "New Order" were then put on a full-scale wartime footing. So years of total war raged back and forth over this unfortunate area, draining its human, material, and strategic resources.

It is important to note while we are on this subject that the area has always been a tremendous magnet for outside powers. Certain strategic materials have drawn an immense amount of military interest and focused it on this region. Let me illustrate this point by the map dealing with the physical features of the area.

(SEE PLATE 1)

In my opinion strategic resource Number One is the Danube River, which flows through Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, and then through Rumania — with Bucharest only fifty miles away — finally winding up in the tremendous delta region of the Black Sea. The 1,800-mile-long Danube River, with 1,400 miles of its course controlled by the Soviet Union, is the most significant strategic resource of the region. I want to point out to you two additional and very important assets, with one localized in Hungary and the other in Rumania. The tremendous oil resources of Rumania are located about 40 miles north of Bucharest, in the Carpathian Mountains. This is the single largest oil deposit in Continental Europe, first developed by the Germans, then seriously damaged by our bombers in World War II, and more recently, intensively developed by the Soviet Union. The other resource of interest is the large-scale bauxite deposit in southern Hungary, the second largest source of bauxite in Europe. Its military implications and increasingly important role cannot be emphasized sufficiently.



7

PLATE 1

To continue with the historical narrative, I would like to suggest that when the military operations of World War II ended in Eastern Europe, and the Red Army was safely in control of the entire region, the nations of this area were sharply divided in two groups. This division, which, in my opinion, is not sufficiently recognized in Anglo-American literature, pitted the two camps against each other. After the liberation from German occupation one set of countries emerged on the victorious side, and was promptly given a voice in drawing up the peace treaties and in penalizing the countries which lost the war. I am referring here to three very important nations, which are playing a key role in the historic pattern, namely, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. It is very important for all of us to remember that these three countries were already members of the United Nations through their governments in exile and their refugee statesmen; that they were given a major voice in the peace conference negotiations in Paris during the summer of 1946; and that all along they had been officially on the victorious Allied side.

We may now turn to the other side and suggest that there were three countries, the former Axis satellites, which were immediately penalized for their most unfortunate and disastrous role in World War II. These three were Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Under terrific pressure, they had thrown in their lot with Hitler, and naturally they now had to be punished morally and politically for the disasters of World War II. We find that the significance of this long-term division between the two groups of nations lingers on in the minds of the people and is still of tremendous importance in the historic recollections as to who won or lost World War II. In addition to this basic division between the two camps we must cite the single most important complicating factor: the continued presence of Soviet occupation troops and officials.

In the past eleven years there have been three major

phases of development in the evolution of the "Peoples' Democracies," as the Soviet Union laughingly describes them. Before we get into this three-phase theory it must again be stressed that the presence of Soviet occupation troops and officials (highly trained experts in military government) actually predetermined the specific political and ideological development of each satellite nation. There were countries like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, where the Red Army showed up only briefly, put in a purely token appearance, and quickly withdrew. Obviously, therefore, the Czechs and Yugoslavs have different feelings about the Soviet Army and its practices than the countries which suffered as much as Hungary or Poland.

I would like to mention the three phases here briefly, and then describe each of them with its salient features. The first phase is the so-called "take-over process," engineered by Soviet troops and occupation officials. This began in 1945 and ended sometime in the spring of 1948. I would like to describe Phase Two as the process of "Total Satellization" or "Total Sovietization," of which the initial date would be the spring of 1948 — possibly the Prague Revolt of February, 1948 — and the terminal date (this is the most important date to remember in all this narrative) the death of Stalin in March, 1953.

The third phase began with the announcement that the hated dictator had just died, or had been murdered (experts are still discussing this fine point, but it makes very little difference in the long-term process of de-Stalinization), and it ended with the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution in October, 1956. What has happened since the end of October could possibly be described as a new and fourth phase in this development.

The most important point in connection with the first or "take-over" phase is that there was at that time a political and military vacuum in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union had a minimum of difficulty in filling it. It is depressing to realize in

retrospect how little trouble the U. S. S. R. had and how few obstacles were put up by the brave and recalcitrant spirits who have masterminded the recent Hungarian and Polish revolutions. Since the take-over process has been analyzed often and in detail, I will merely suggest that politically, militarily, diplomatically, and economically the Soviet Union had been firmly entrenched by the spring of 1948. I suggested to you earlier that the February revolt in Prague was a convenient, if frightening, terminal point for the first chapter of this story.

The second phase is much more important since it denoted the high point of Stalinization, exploiting every available method and avenue of action. We are talking here about the 1948-1953 period, and I would like to emphasize two of its highlights. The most significant single factor was the open and violent use of mass terror to an extent which was new and startling even to the 110 million captives of Eastern Europe. (I am including the Yugoslavs here because Tito engaged in the practice of the same methods of repression with his 17 million captives). In this connection, I would like to stress the role of the Ministry of the Interior, which was the source of such mass repression and open violence that it bordered on genocide in some of the countries reviewed here. The people of Eastern Europe lived in constant terror, while the Minister of the Interior, as the governmental head of a tremendous Secret Police, a Cultural Police, Political Police, and Economic Police, operated in a fashion that certainly kept the individual nations in complete submission.

The other important political fact that I would like to point out to you has been the elimination of the well-formed political parties and groups of this area. I think the most striking feature of the so-called "Peoples' Democracies" has been the elimination of the traditional political forces which has governed Central and Eastern Europe for at least a hundred years. The new system ruthlessly alienated and submerged every possibility of developing political groups in the monolithic one-party state.

Writing on October 31, 1956, John MacCormac of *The New York Times* made this observation on the then current situation in Hungary: "The major political parties in Hungary, even the Communist Party, have now united in a common front against the Soviet Union and for a return to democracy." He implied here that the political parties which supposedly had died as a result of the ruthless drive toward full Stalinization and the extirpation of political movements, had in effect survived in underground positions, in guerrilla-fight postures, and had then emerged to the point where they were openly challenging the Stalinist regimes.

The "People's Democracy" can easily be defined by suggesting that in it the one-party state appeared in a full-blown form; that the so-called "Workers' Party" achieved a monopoly position, while other political groups had to go underground.

Specifically in three countries the Soviet Union ran into severe trouble in its ruthless attempts to carry out the process of Stalinization. We are referring here to the two countries which have assumed headline importance in the last few months, Poland and Hungary, but I would certainly want to add Czechoslovakia as a third.

Let me start with Czechoslovakia. A lot of us are surprised that the Czechs are not more active or vocal at this point. However, I would like to counsel a certain amount of patience. Two factors have militated against the ruthless process of Stalinization in Czechoslovakia. One was the total absence of the Orthodox Church; in other words, not the presence of other churches but the absence of one of the principal instruments of Soviet-Russian control. This leads to the further observation that the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia has produced awe-inspiring martyrs and has had a fine record of resistance in every way. The other factor which separates Czechoslovakia from the rest of the satellite world has been the absence of the Pan-Slavic tie which some other countries, and notably Bulgaria, possess to a large extent. You simply can-

not tell the Czechs that they are the Slavic brothers of the Russians because the Czechs feel they are an entirely different type of people. They are culturally, linguistically, and politically Western-oriented; the Pan-Slavic nonsense does not appeal to them.

Let's move on to Poland. I would like to point out two factors which, in my opinion, are clear-cut reasons why the Polish revolt had started and why it has been so successful in such a short time. One of the two main areas of resistance to Stalinization has been Polish nationalism. Nationalism, the spark of which, as one writer observed, "each Pole seems to imbibe with his mother's milk," may be a vague cliché for some of us, but to the Pole it is a specific and definite phenomenon. The impact of Polish irredentism thus helped to bring into the foreground a national Communist leader and Poland's own version of Tito, Wladyslaw Gomulka. The other factor in this case is clearly economic. The low standard of living and the generally cruel economic treatment of the Polish people caused a tremendous revulsion and hatred toward the regime. These pent-up feelings then exploded in the Poznan riots of June, 1956.

While talking about Stalinization, I want to suggest that in Hungary the resistance moved along two lines. One was clearly religious, in a country where there are about 70% Roman Catholics and such outstanding personalities as Cardinal Mindszenty. The other area of resistance was based on a vigorous tradition for divergent political parties, whose leaders have tried to resume their careers in the course of the 1956 revolution, but were ruthlessly suppressed by Soviet power and Communist treachery.

One final comment on this period, and then I will cover the last three years briefly. Another major Communist instrument of power must be cited here, one which has aptly been described by a British author as the "mental Bolshevization" of the region. What he meant by "mental Bolshevization" is the colossal battle for the minds of the captive peoples, or, to modify

the terminology, the imposition of a "Cultural Iron Curtain." The "Cultural Iron Curtain" has implied a capture of the minds, a Communist re-streamlining of all educational possibilities, and the subversion of the religious and ideological affiliations of the people. Freedom of press, the right to free speech and the right to assembly have disappeared completely. This "mental Bolshevization" has probably been the most painful and horrible aspect of Soviet rule. This is what the people have hated most and this is why they have revolted recently in Poland and Hungary.

I would like to move on to the most recent period. This third and last phase covers the days from Stalin's death to the political de-Stalinization which has taken place until recently. In view of the limited time, I want to summarize a long and complicated story in three specific points.

The first point is that the Anglo-American public is making, in my opinion, a serious mistake when viewing this region as a fully homogeneous, political area, suggesting that Eastern Europe is merely a replica of the U. S. S. R. six or seven times over. I would call this the danger of "clichéitis," implying that these countries are simply local variations of general Communism; that the Czechs are like the Poles, and the Albanians are like the Hungarians in terms of their politics; that you look at one, and have the other six or seven also clearly identified. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Hungarians and Poles have rebelled so obviously and are apparently so different from the other countries that we can pass over this point by suggesting that there are here 110 million people in seven countries, with seven different political units, and with enormous variations in political and ideological orientation.

The second point worth stressing is the essentially negative or passive characteristic of Eastern European politics. (However, this feature would certainly not apply to the Poland and Hungary of 1956 and 1957). Several of you raised such well-justified

questions as: Why haven't the Czechs moved? What is going on in Rumania? Why not Bulgaria? What about East Germany? There is indeed an essentially negativist and passive feature here which I think we must seriously consider as a sort of Balkan or Eastern European version of the "mañana" or "nichevo" way of life. The Eastern European version of: "It is hopeless," or "Let's do it tomorrow," or "Why hurry?" or "Why not adjourn to the coffee house?" This is the feeling of what appears on a higher plane as the phenomenon of "passive resistance," an inclination or affinity toward civil disobedience, toward patient sabotage below ground, which in the long run can be a very effective nationwide countermeasure. It is not proven yet whether the "open-revolt" angle of the Hungarian Revolution is more successful than the concealed "subterranean sabotage" in which the Czechs have always excelled and have gathered additional recent experience under the Nazi and Russian occupations. Latent forms of industrial sabotage are brilliantly carried out in countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland. Do not underestimate the quiet type of resistance that goes on in these countries!

Let me summarize the two points mentioned so far: namely, that each of these countries has its own problems but also its own way of life, and, although essentially negative and passive in their politics, there is a point where either underground or aboveground, these peoples' patience is bound to break. This leads me to the third, and probably most important comment. Place the process of de-Stalinization on top of all of these factors, combine all of them, shake them up before using, and you will undoubtedly have a boiling pot of soup, a soup that has boiled for so long that it suddenly spills over and burns the bystander.

Political de-Stalinization is in many ways the most interesting and inspiring recent development which can readily be applied to the whole region. As an ideological phenomenon, this is nothing new. Other countries and other dictators of the past have found that the danger of giving people only a little bit of

freedom is immense. Freedom is something that you cannot disburse on the installment plan, that you cannot ration! Once the prison door is an inch, even a mere fraction of an inch open, the prisoners will rush immediately in that logical direction. The process of de-Stalinization in this area did not start with the famous Khrushchev speech of February, 1956. It started with the so-called "New Course" which was first announced in the satellite countries in the summer of 1953. The slogans then launched have reached their fruition in the fall and winter of 1956. These slogans are very simple: "Bread and Freedom," or, by reversing them, we can assert the emphatic battlecry for "Freedom and Bread!"

One of our two great national parties frequently talks about "Peace and Prosperity." The peoples of Eastern Europe are, of course, not used to either. Still, even in their minds, you cannot separate this double-edged platform and withhold freedom while giving bread, or give freedom while withholding bread. What I would like to suggest to you at this point is that the events of the last few months can best be appraised as the *long-term* and *run-away* implications of de-Stalinization. What I meant by the following equation

$$F + L - EC = OC(IR)$$

is to suggest the danger of having "F" plus "L" ("*Ferment*" plus "*Liberalization*") — this is Ideological Ferment plus Political Liberalization — *minus* the EC factor, which is "*Economic Concessions*." In other words, freedom, but no bread. The presence of "*Ferment*" plus "*Liberalization*", while withholding "*Economic Concessions*", will inevitably lead to an "*Open Challenge*" of the regime. This "*Open Challenge*" I have tried to describe in a further and secondary development by referring to an "*Incipient Revolution*." What has caused, therefore, the present massive outbreaks throughout Eastern Europe were the processes of political de-Stalinization combined with the infectious spread of an impressive amount of freedom suddenly handed out to these people. At the same

time, the complete withholding of EC, or "*Economic Concessions*," has naturally led to one overriding result: namely, the obvious and open challenge of the whole system.

I would like to make three or four concluding remarks and suggest to you that we can carry this trend of thought a couple of steps further, and maybe even look briefly into the immediate future — although I will do that with a great deal of trepidation and modesty.

I firmly believe that recent events at least foreshadow the relative certainty of a further spread of Titoism throughout the very countries which we have surveyed in this lecture. The further and massive spread of a national form of Communism is one of the likeliest developments in this region. To the Russians the "specter" and to us the "promise" of Titoism has already acted as a sort of "sorcerer's apprentice," a magnificently constructed Frankenstein, where the master tries to stop the monster or his apprentice but is incapable of doing so. Therefore, we have a typically run-away situation, which is all to the good as far as we are concerned, and which simply means that the old "His Master's Voice" label must be changed radically, since the little dog is not listening to the well-known blaring of the voice any longer!

Another conclusion I would like to draw is to suggest to you what we might almost call a law in physics as much as a law in international politics. Recent developments in Hungary and Poland have not only accelerated the process of de-Stalinization, but they have also pointed up a major and cheerful thesis in international politics. This Soviet satellite empire, like four of five other imperial units in recent history, was *quickly gained and quickly lost*. Today, I think we can confidently say that the Soviet leaders can ill afford to indulge in imperial dreams for the more distant future.

One other expectation has also gone sour as far as the Soviet rulers are concerned. The artificial and irrational state form which they have planned and prepared so carefully throughout the past fifteen years, the so-called "People's Democracy," has failed completely and miserably. This hybrid was at best a transitional state form. To that extent, the transitional period of the People's Democracy was a particularly interesting one since, in my opinion, the transition does not have to go forward, it can also be pushed backward. The peoples of Eastern Europe are now "transitioning" backward to some sort of a pre-Communist status quo. I would like to paraphrase the old Latin remark: "Sic transit gloria mundi" and suggest to you the other Latin possibility: "Sic transit democracia populi!"

Finally, I would like to suggest that there is an opportunity for us in the next few months to emphasize our greatest national interest, which is to develop a belief in human dignity and freedom even in the seemingly most hopeless parts of the world. It is of the greatest American national interest today to push forward and bring about a broad lifting of the Iron-Curtain complex in at least three immediate directions, in the *foreign political* field, the *cultural* and the *international trade* directions. Beyond these, there may be the possibility of a more dynamic, forward-looking policy which would develop new governments, new ideas, new leaders, and constitutional forms of government for the suffering and exploited peoples of Eastern Europe. Above all these possibilities, we must lay the foundations for a growth of the most cherished values of Americans, Hungarians and Poles, the flowering of democratic ideals for peoples and individuals alike.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Andrew Gyorgy

Professor Gyorgy received his A.B. and J.D. degrees from the Law School of the University of Budapest, and his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of California.

He studied law and politics at Sorbonne University in Paris during 1936-1937, studying the following two years at the University of California on a Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship. During 1941-1942, he was a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of California at Los Angeles.

During World War II, Professor Gyorgy was an instructor in the Army Specialized Training Program at the University of California, and, later, an instructor in the Academic Department of the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

After serving as Assistant Professor of Government at the University of New Hampshire during 1945-1946, he was Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University until 1950. For the following year, he was a Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. During 1951-1952, Professor Gyorgy was a research associate at Yale University, and for the following two years was research associate at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Since 1952, he has been Professor of Government at Boston University and Lecturer on Eastern European Affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Professor Gyorgy is the author of *Geopolitics, The New German Science*, and *Governments of Danubian Europe*. He is also the editor of *Soviet Satellites, Studies in the Politics of Eastern Europe*, and *Problems in International Relations*. Professor Gyorgy is on leave from Boston University to act as Consultant for International Relations and Social Sciences at the Naval War College during the first term of Academic Year 1956-1957.