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## Historical and Cultural Background of the U.S.S.R.

Hans Kohn

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# **NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW**

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## **HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF THE U. S. S. R.**

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 26 October 1956 by  
*Professor Hans Kohn*

Admiral Robbins, Gentlemen :

I was asked a few minutes ago whether I would discuss the most recent news from Poland and Hungary, and I answered that I should be glad to do that during the Question Period. But during my talk this morning I shall feel on safer grounds not to discuss anything which is happening there today. I shall discuss things which happened hundreds of years ago, and, therefore, the radio cannot bring any denial of what I say during the lecture itself.

Let me say, however, that events in Poland and Hungary bear out what the Captain chairing this meeting has just told you about history as a background of all contemporary events. These revolts against Moscow's rule were not an accident. They are not revolts against Communism; they are not only revolts against economic poverty, without which a Communist regime is unthinkable; and they are not only revolts against the loss of liberty — again, without which a Communist regime is unthinkable. They are also revolts against Moscow's control — revolts deeply ingrained in the history of Poland and Hungary, much more so than in the history of Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria. It is no accident that the people of Poznan or of Budapest were the first to rise against Moscow's control. The history of the feelings of the people in Poland and Hungary during the last one hundred years show that these two nations had, as they themselves claimed, the conviction of forming a bulwark of Western Christianity — the *antemurale Christianitatis* against the East — or, against Moscow and against Russia. This historical conviction has influenced their actions.

When I came here, I tried to get a copy of a famous book from the Library, a book which I wished to recommend to all those who desire to study the United States. Gentlemen, it is as important for Americans to know more about the United States as it is to know more about Russia. The book was written by a non-American, and yet there are many answers in it to questions being asked today from deep-reaching analysts. It is a book by a Frenchman by the name of Alexis de Tocqueville, entitled *Democracy in America*. I wished to read you a passage from this book, which shows the prophetic and unusual insight of this French aristocrat into the political-historical process. I cannot read it to you because there are only excerpts in the Library, and they do not contain the passage. But let me reconstruct it out of my memory.

The book was written in 1832, or more than 125 years ago. In that book de Tocqueville said that there were only two nations on earth then which were still growing; that all other nations seemed to have reached their maximum and were moving ahead slowly, if at all. He said that these nations grew up unobserved on the outskirts, so to speak, of history and of civilization, but yet each of these two nations was destined in a not distant future to control half of the globe. He said that these two nations were Russia and the United States. Both started from opposite points of view, with the Russians relying on centralized autocracy while the Americans relied on individual liberty, but in spite of the difference in their starting points and in their methods and ways of progress, each of them seemed marked out by Providence to sway the destinies of half the globe.

Mind, that book was written in 1832, when Russia was great but still semi-barbaric. Nicholas I then ruled in Russia, keeping Russia almost as strictly separated from Europe as did Stalin during his reign. The United States was still a very small, struggling country in the vastness of an unexplored and unopened Continent. Yet, I would call that political foresight on the part of de Tocqueville when he predicted something that was to happen

a century later. We shall come back to de Tocqueville and his prediction later on.

We will now turn to the Russians. We know, of course, that the Russians are Slavs and Christians. They are Slav-speaking peoples like the Poles and also Christians as the Europeans in general are. Yet, by history Russia was separated through most of its history from the rest of Europe by something which was broader than the Atlantic Ocean; by something spiritual, by the volition of free decisions on the part of the Russians and by the accidents of history. If we wish to understand Russia today, we have to recall to our minds that Russia throughout most of its history was not a part of Europe. It would, however, be a mistake to regard Russia as a part of Asia. Russia was *sui generis*: of its own unique kind, neither European nor Asian. That made it possible for Russia, whenever she decided to do so, to turn to Europe or to turn to Asia so as to be part of one or part of the other.

Russia itself, or the Slav-speaking Christian peoples which later became Russia, originated in what might be called today Western Russia: in the western part of Russia, along the rivers leading from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, along cities like Novgorod in the north and Kiev in the south. But this Russia still was near Europe, although it received its Christianity not from Rome but from Constantinople. Yet, this western Russian state was soon conquered and overrun by the Mongols. Kiev, its capital, was destroyed in 1240. For almost three hundred years Russia remained under Mongol domination, separated from Europe, no longer the Eastern march of Europe against Asia but a Western march of Asia against Europe.

Gentlemen, it would be most unjust if I did not add that it was an accident which saved Europe from this fate. You have probably heard so much recently of Imperialism and of Colonialism. It appears that some propagandists say that Imperialism

is a kind of Western disease, a statement which naturally is historic nonsense. The great empire-builders, except for the last three hundred years, were Asian nations. From the time of the Persian Empire until the Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683 — not so long ago — Europe trembled before Asian conquerers. Although it is my deep conviction that immense blissful results came to India or Ceylon by the transformation that they underwent through the vitalizing effect of British rule and Western civilization, no similar good came to other races by the domination of the Mongols. Yet, Europe was threatened by them after they had conquered Russia; the Mongols were marching into Germany. They were then facing the knighthood and the chivalry of the West in what is today Silesia. They would have overrun it, too, but for an accident. They suddenly left! Today, we know why they left: the great Khan had died in far-off Mongolia and the commanding officers hurried back to be there when they appointed a new Khan, or a new ruler. This was an accident which saved Europe from the barbarization by the Mongols which Russia underwent.

Looking at Russia, we should recall that we could have been in a similar situation. For three hundred years — and three hundred decisive years — Russia was cut off from Europe and was part of the Mongol Empire. When Russia arose and revolted it was no longer under the rule of Kiev, which had been destroyed; Russia's center was no longer on its Western border. Kiev is on the Dnieper River, and the Dnieper flows into the Black Sea and down through the Straits into the Mediterranean to the seats of ancient civilization. But it was from Moscow that the new Russia arose. Moscow is northeast of Kiev. It had been then recently settled by Russian peasants, or by Russian pioneers if you like, and was primeval land until then. Again, Moscow is on a river, the Moskva; in fact, Moscow got its name from the Moskva River. We speak of a period of history when the course of rivers was determining much of history, of trade, of civilization. The Moskva flows into the Oka, and the Oka flows into the Volga at a place formerly called Nizhni Novgorod but now called Gorki, because

Gorki, the famous Russian Socialist writer, was born in Nizhni Novgorod; the Volga flows, as you all know, into the Caspian Sea, and the Caspian Sea flows nowhere for it is an inland lake in Asia. The roads from Kiev still led to Constantinople, to Greece, and to the Mediterranean, but the roads from Moscow led nowhere but to the Asian Steppes.

So in Moscow the new Russia arose at the very same time that a new Europe was born, when the Renaissance and the Reformation laid in Europe the seeds of liberty and individualism. Russia was then under great rulers in Moscow who ruled from the the Kremlin. The Kremlin is not a European palace, but a fortified compound, an imitation of the Sacred Cities in which Asian despots lived and ruled, something like the Forbidden City in Peking, very close in spirit to this traditionalist Asian theocratic autocracy. There arose in the Kremlin great authorities, of which I shall name only two: Ivan III, and his grandson and second successor, Ivan IV, or Ivan the Terrible, as he was called in history. It was these strong princes who forged the new Russia. I cannot compare them to Khrushchev because as a historian I know too little of Khrushchev yet. But they were certainly alike Stalin, because living under Stalin was like living under the Moscow and the Kremlin of Ivan the Terrible.

The last speech which Khrushchev made — the famous Secret Report to the Twentieth Communist Party Congress in February of this year — depicted Stalin as a second Ivan the Terrible, before whom everybody trembled who approached him. One never knew when one left the face of Ivan or of Stalin whether one would go from there to one's home or to prison and death — death under torture from Ivan or Stalin. These great princes, Ivan III and Ivan IV, who were the contemporaries of the Renaissance and of the Reformation, and who were the contemporaries of the birth of liberty in Europe, destroyed completely the remnants of what had been liberty in Russia.



Ivan IV, or Ivan the Terrible, in a certain way made himself, (as did Stalin) an omnipotent autocrat who was unequalled anywhere else. He did it by one means: namely, by making everybody equal in Russia. Mind, there was no equality in Europe at the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation. But this lack of equality saved liberty because it meant that every class and every group had its own rights and privileges, which nobody dared — or should dare — to break down; it meant that each class had its own sphere, within which it could move freely. But Ivan abolished the rights of the aristocracy in Russia, the rights of the *boyars*, or what might be called “the ruling class,” and he made them equal with everybody else. He made everybody equal in being nobody before the Tsar, the ruler, with a complete equality in rightlessness. He created this equality of abject subjects, mere worms before the autocrat, and Stalin restored this form of “equality.” During the reign of Stalin, as you know from Khrushchev’s speech, Khrushchev or Molotov had exactly as few rights before Stalin as did any other man in the Soviet Union. This autocracy before which all are equal and before which everybody is nobody, except for *one* autocrat, is one of the great contributions of Ivan IV to the Russian tradition.

Why did he do this? He did it not only because he was probably a complex and yet barbaric personality, which he undoubtedly was; he did it not only because he was half-mad, which he probably was. He did it because he believed that only a strictly centralized state could undertake those conquests which would bring about the grandeur of Moscow.

It was under Ivan the Terrible that Russia began to expand to the Baltic Sea and into Siberia, that two-fold expansion to the west and to the east which has continued until today. You should not forget that the first nation to knock at the doors of China was not the British in 1840. The Russians knocked at the doors of China during the 17th century and forced China into treaty arrangements with Russia. The Russians reached the Pacific Ocean

long before the Anglo-Americans did — in the 17th century. And you know that they expanded even beyond that point a little later down the American Pacific Coast into Oregon. This was one of the contributions of Ivan.

There was a second contribution by Ivan to the formation of Russia, one that is equally important. To understand this, let me say a few words briefly. In 1453, Constantinople, the Sacred City of Eastern Christianity, fell to the Turks. That does not mean very much to us today, but five hundred years ago it made a tremendous impression. Constantinople, the city consecrated by the Roman Emperor Constantine I in 333 as the new capital of the universal Christian Roman Empire, was from then on the real Rome, the second Rome, the new Rome. It was the center of the Mediterranean world; it was the sacred seat of ancient and venerable Orthodox Christianity. Yet, in 1453 it fell into the hands of the enemy whom the Christians regarded as the infidel. The crescent went up in place of the cross over the holiest church of Christendom, and at this spectacle an immense terror went through the Christian Orthodox World.

Now the question was: Who would be the legitimate successor to Constantine, the Roman Emperor? The answer given in Russia was very simple: there was only one mighty Orthodox Prince left. From the Russian point of view the Western Church was unorthodox, was heretic, was not truly Christian. The only truly Orthodox and Christian Prince was the Prince of Moscow. He was just rising in power by breaking the Mongol yoke and taking all the Russian lands. From that moment on, Moscow regarded itself, as the official word went, as the third Rome. The proud word went forth that there would be no fourth Rome; that the third Rome would remain the center of a world order and a world faith. The Russians were convinced that they, the guardians of the true faith, had to preserve it from contamination — contamination not by the infidels, but by the heretics, by the not entirely Christian Western Christians. They were convinced that

Moscow would once guide the world towards salvation, towards peace, towards a realization of their faith. This conviction has deeply remained in the hearts of many Russians. The West was regarded by Orthodox Moscow as something unorthodox, something to be saved by Moscow from perdition.

The next great break in Russian history came under Peter the Great. Peter the Great, who ruled, as you know, from 1689 until 1725, decided that he must modernize Russia, primarily by means of more modern armaments in order to make it equal to or stronger than the West. Peter the Great, as Aleksandr Pushkin the great Russian poet tells in a famous Russian poem, "broke a window into the wall which separated, like a Chinese wall, Russia from Europe." He transferred, as a symbolic gesture, the capital of Russia from Moscow and from the Kremlin to St. Petersburg. He built this new city by imperial order. This was land which had not had any Russian or Asian tradition. It was land on the Baltic Sea, where the Neva flows into the Finnish Gulf; where the winds were from the West, from Europe — from Germany, from Holland, from Denmark, and from England — a city which did not turn towards Asia, as did Moscow, but which turned towards Europe. The Russian government no longer resided in the Kremlin — that medieval monstrous building — but in the Winter Palace, which was built by Italian architects according to the most recent taste at that time.

From Peter on, and especially with his great successor, Catherine II — a woman of great mind, a German princess who reigned until the end of the 18th century — then through her grandson, Aleksandr I, who, as you know, defeated Napoleon in 1812-1813 and who was the leading man in the Council of Vienna and settled the first Napoleonic Europe, this window was slowly widened. Then through it there came what might be called "Western ideas."

I do not know whether you remember the years before 1945, when Hitler was defeated on the snowfields of Russia. At that

time there were some people in this country who did not know Russian history or Russia, but who were just good-hearted people and believed that the Russians were our ally, as Britain was. In fact you found people in high command who were more distrustful of the so-called "British Empire machinations" than of the future plans of the Soviet Union. Good-hearted Americans praised Stalin and the Bolshevik regime because, supposedly, it enabled the Russian people to defeat Hitler. What nonsense! Hitler was defeated, but not by Stalin. We have it today even from Khrushchev's own speech that it was not by the Bolshevik leadership that Hitler was defeated. Do not forget that on the snowfields of Russia Napoleon was defeated, too, and probably (although I am not an expert in this) he was a greater general than Hitler. He was defeated, and nobody said: "Look at what a great man Aleksandr is! He has defeated Napoleon!" Nobody said, "How wonderful the Russian regime is! They have defeated Napoleon!"

In both cases it was not the regime which defeated Hitler and Napoleon. It was the expanse of Russia; it was the vastness of the country; it was the unprecedented early and hard winter; it was the stamina of the Russian people then (and also recently). The Tsarist and the Bolshevik regimes are both bad regimes, but let us say that the Bolshevik regime is even worse as far as human liberty is concerned than the Tsarist regime in modern times was.

In the 19th century, through this window that had been broken in the wall (of which I formerly spoke), there came Western ideas. Gentlemen, you have to remember one thing: Russia was the first non-Western society that was Westernized. What has been happening during the last decades in China, in India, in the Middle East, was first attempted in Russia. In a certain way the Asians are right if they think there is a certain similarity between their situation and the situation of the Russians a short while ago. Russia was the first non-Western society to be Westernized. This Westernization aroused in the educated Russians who were a very small minority, the demand for the Western

way of life: for individual liberty, for rights, for civilized ways of life. It led to a struggle between the autocracy and the educated classes, a struggle which started in December, 1825, at that time the first uprising, an uprising led by officers of the guard regiments of St. Petersburg. From then until March, 1917, there was a revolutionary movement in Russia which demanded one thing: to make Russia a European State, a State like France, like Britain, like Sweden or Denmark — a civilized, free State.

But the Russian intelligentsia, these Russian intellectuals and this Westernized class which first came from the high aristocracy — and later on from the newly-rising middle classes — labored under two drawbacks. One, and a very important one, was national pride. In some of these intellectuals there arose the old feeling that they had nothing, or very little, to learn from the West. We call them (and, in fact, they call themselves) Slavophiles — lovers of the Slavic or Russian way of life, of the old way of life. Their conviction was that the West was in reality disintegrating, decadent; that the West was threatened by lack of faith, by lack of fervor, by skepticism, by class and racial struggles. They believed that Russia was the Rock of Faith, ordered and orderly. The Slavophiles maintained that although Russia might be backward in outward civilization, it was very much richer than the West in the spiritual life.

Some of this feeling was repeated later in their own way by Asiatics, by Indians, who, again, over-compensated their inferiority by so-called "spiritual superiority," very much as the Russians did in the 19th century. The Slavophiles maintained that while Europe was doomed, Russia would be the Rock of Salvation by its spiritual life.

There was one difficulty in what I would call "civilizing" Russia's political life: this was the deep-seated nationalist pride and arrogance which you find again strong in the Asian countries. But many Russians did not share this view. Many of them were

willing to learn from the West — and to learn well — so well that in everything, including political ideas, they became an integral part of the West.

But the second hindrance was that the Russian masses did not care for Western constitutions and liberty. Do not forget that the Russian masses had been serfs until 1861 — very recently, as history goes. Constitutional rights meant very little to them. So it came about that when, during March, 1917, in the midst of the First World War, a revolution broke out in Russia, the masses — just as the Chinese masses in 1949 — did not care for liberty in that sense either. Maybe they care more for it today than they did a few years ago, after the experience of Mao's regime, but I do not know. But I would say that the revolt in 1917 was against the corrupt and inefficient government of the Tsar, for the government, both backward and inefficient, was unable to lead the nation successfully through the difficulties of war.

The Tsar himself, at the moment Nicholas II, was a weakling and was ruled by his wife. His wife, as you all know, was ruled by a very intelligent but not otherwise understanding kind of "miracle worker" named Rasputin. You see that these things are not so unique. What is happening in Holland today, where the Queen seems to be under the influence of a similar "miracle worker," is like the incident connected with Rasputin, again, for the very same reason as in the case of the Tsar. The son of the Tsar, the young ex-tsarevitch named Alexis, was suffering from an incurable disease of the blood, from that bleeding called "hemophilia." Nobody could cure him. Then this Russian Siberian peasant, Rasputin, came. He no doubt healed him to a certain extent. What his powers were we do not know, but that Rasputin had powers there is no doubt whatsoever. You must understand that naturally the child's mother was elated when Rasputin performed this miracle, so he became a man whose word was law in the court. This did not make for an efficient government there, I can assure you.

So the patriotic educated Russians saw Russia defeated in the war — defeated because of an inefficient and corrupt administration. For patriotic reasons they arose to reform Russia and to make Russia more Western, to make it something like Britain or France. It was a hope in March, 1917, but it did not succeed!

I was then in Russia. Within two weeks all of the Tsarist Police State was abolished and Russia was as free a country as is the United States. The United States is an old English country, prepared by five hundred to six hundred years' growth of liberty. But remember that Russia was completely unprepared, except in the small upper and middle class groups. The peasants did not care for constitutional liberty. There was only one thing for them to do: to make an end of the war; to go back to their farms and to have more farmlands.

But, secondly, there was the German General Staff. The German General Staff has always been too cunning for its own good. It was willing to use any method to destroy the Second Front in Russia and to throw all of its forces against the West. It sent Lenin into Russia, knowing very well who Lenin was, expecting him to undermine the democratic regime in Russia. Lenin, a genius in organization, in propaganda, and ruthless in his purpose, succeeded.

In November, 1917, as a result of the chaos, as a result of the experience, as a result of the war which went on, Lenin seized power in Russia and ended the brief dream of Russian liberty and of Russia being a part of Europe. Mind, it was in many ways a symbolic gesture that he transferred the capital from Petrograd (now Leningrad) back to the Kremlin in Moscow, back to those mediaeval palaces, where, with the spectral ghost of Ivan, it was as secluded and shut off as it was later under Stalin.

Lenin's rise to power ended the period of Russia as a part of Europe. Consciously, Lenin turned Russia away from Europe

and toward Asia. From the very beginning, he believed in the closest alliance between the Russian-Leninist Revolution, or what I would class as the anti-democratic counterrevolution of Lenin, and the Asian nationalist leadership, above all in China. He hoped to get an alliance with Turkey, but he was disappointed there. So there remained as his hope the future closest alliance between the East and Russia against the West.

Two hundred years ago the *rapprochement* of Europe and Russia had started with Peter the Great, and this hopeful development ended in November of 1917. Russia became again completely *sui generis*, or of its own kind, away from Europe and un-European. Mind, what the Polish and Hungarian workers rebel against today is not Socialism. They have no liking for Capitalism, with which they are not acquainted; they have no liking for America; they have no liking for things which this country could offer them. They hate Asian Moscow. They do not wish to become Capitalistic; neither do they wish to return to the bad governments which they had in Hungary under Admiral Horthy and in Poland under Colonel Joseph Beck. Do not make any mistake about that! But they wish to belong to Europe, and not to Moscow.

But I do not wish to conclude upon that note but to conclude upon another note. In 1918, what de Tocqueville had foreseen happened for the first time. The United States had then entered World War I, and in my opinion rightly, not to make the world safe for democracy but to make democracy safe in the world. In case of a German victory, woe to democracy and woe to Western ideas!

When America entered the war, Woodrow Wilson was President — I can think back to 1918 for I am so old as to remember it very well. In 1918, the world was weary of war; it was tired and fatigued to a degree which we cannot understand today. You must understand that World War I came as an immense shock to Western mankind, while World War II was expected by most people and did not shock us. If World War III should come (which I do not think will happen), it will not shock us for we are prepared



for it. But World War I shook my generation to a degree which the present generation cannot understand. In 1913, we did not expect a great war; we were mentally not prepared for a great earthquake.

So in 1918 we all looked for a new world to emerge and for a new message to come forth. In 1918, for the first time in history, this new message came from two new sources; one came out of Washington, and Woodrow Wilson was the spokesman; the other came out of Moscow, and Lenin was the spokesman. Each one started from opposite points of view, with opposite methods — but each promised peace and a better order.

For a short while it seemed that this bipolarization of the world, of which de Tocqueville spoke in 1832, would happen in 1919. But, as you know, it did not happen. It did not happen because the American people voluntarily withdrew into isolationism and the Russians had no other choice but to also withdraw into isolationism, for they were much too weak at that time to do otherwise. The Europeans and ourselves, unfortunately, were misguided by the fact and believed that the European Powers were still strong and that Russia was to remain weak behind the *cordon sanitairs*.

Gentlemen, in 1945, to our great astonishment, and I think to the astonishment of the Russians also, we and the Russians met at the Elbe; we met at the border of Manchuria. Unexpectedly, circling the globe, de Tocqueville's vision had come true! In a way which Americans did not expect and did not wish to happen, America — by history, by geography and by economy — had become the foremost power of what might be called "the Western World." This was something unexpected except by de Tocqueville and a few other individuals. Russia regarded herself as the great counterplayer, as the great adversary, antagonist of, and future victor over, the Western World. Moscow hopes for the support of the Asian and Arab rising nations, and it must be our main concern to win these nations, especially the Arabs, to feel nearer to

the West than to Moscow. Then, by Western unity and by friendship with the Arabs and the Asians, we will defeat Moscow's plans. These plans are there not because Lenin or Stalin willed it so, but because there is something in Russian history which drives them in that direction.

But there have also been strong opposite trends in Russian history. It is not true that Lenin was necessarily the outcome of Russian history. If there had not been a World War I, or if the German General Staff had not been as super-clever as it was, Lenin would not have come to power. Today, Russia might be a part of Europe. There is nothing inevitable in history; there are no inescapable laws of historical development. There is still the hope — not today and not tomorrow, but in the not too far distant future — that the great Russian people, with their immense stamina, will turn again to become a part of the Western World. Mind, there is a brief century or less that Russia was practically part of Europe. From 1825 until 1917, this *rapprochement* brought about a most productive cross-fertilization. An astonishing Russian literature arose from Pushkin to Dostoevsky to Chekhov which much enriched us in the West. And Russia received from the West the seeds of civilized liberty under law, the freedom of creative expression. All this was destroyed, for the time being, by Lenin. There may be again in the future a fortunate encounter between Russia and the West.

## BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

### Professor Hans Kohn

Professor Hans Kohn was born in 1891 in Prague, Czechoslovakia. During World War I, he served in the Austrian Army and became a prisoner-of-war in Russia, where he lived for five years in Turkestan and in Siberia, witnessing the Russian revolutions and civil war. After his return, he lived from 1921 to 1931 in Paris, London, and Jerusalem, studying the history of nationalism, especially in the Middle East, and modern history.

In 1931, he came to the United States through the Institute of International Education in New York to lecture in American colleges on the Near East. He became professor of modern history at Smith College in 1934, occupying the Sydenham Clark Parsons Chair in history from 1941 to 1949. For two years he taught government at Harvard and at Radcliffe. In 1949, he became professor of history at City College of New York.

Professor Kohn has taught in the summer sessions of Harvard University, the University of California, the University of Colorado, Yale University, and the University of Minnesota. He was a Guggenheim Fellow in 1940, and a member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton in 1948 and 1955. He is an editorial advisor of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

Among his books are three basic studies on nationalism in the Middle East: *A History of Nationalism in the East* (1929); *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (1932); and *Western Civilization in the Near East* (1936). More recently, three books were published by Macmillan: *The Idea of Nationalism* (1944), now in its fifth printing and in Spanish, German and Italian translations; *Prophets and Peoples, Studies in 19th Century Nationalism* (1946); and *The Twentieth Century, A Midway Account of the Western World* (1949). His latest books, *Panslavism, Its History and Ideology* and *The Mind of Modern Russia* try to explain Russian policy. A new book, *Nationalism and Liberty*, was published in September, 1956.