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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.**

THE SERVICE SQUADRON

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 20 November 1956 by

Captain Randolph Meade, Jr., (SC), U.S.N.

Good morning,, Admiral Robbins and Gentlemen :

I am pleased and proud to speak to you on the subject of *The Service Squadron*, a group with which I have had some experience, whose operations I admire, and whose principles I believe in. I hope that what I have to say here may serve some day to ease or simplify your work with the Service Squadron, or the Service Squadron's work for you as a Tactical Commander or on the Staff of a Tactical Commander.

As you know, there are five Service Squadrons in our Navy: Service Squadrons 1 and 3 operating in the Pacific, 2 and 4 in the Atlantic, plus Service Squadron 6 in the Med. I am going to deal today almost entirely with the Service Squadrons in the Pacific. Specifically, I shall concentrate on the activities of Service Squadron 3, the Logistic Support Force operating in the Western Pacific in support of all of our fleet at sea in that area. Service Squadron 3 has also been called upon to render specific support to certain of our forces ashore, such as the supply of Navy-type ammunition to the Marines in Korea, and, at times, to maintain recreational facilities such as those which were ashore in Okinawa and in the objective area during the Indo-China evacuation.

Command relationships in the Western Pacific during, and for a while after the close of, the Korean campaign were somewhat complicated, and there were times when it was difficult to tell for whom the Logistic Support Force was working. There were times when the First and Seventh Fleets were in the area simultaneously and making demands upon the Service Force. The Blockade and Escort Group, a United Nations Command operating



in the waters surrounding Korea was a steady customer, and operations under the control of Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, demanded our time. Seventh Fleet's HUK forces operated in the waters off Japan, requiring our support, and usually far from Task Force 77. Task Force 90, the Amphibious Force, was a customer in strange places for wonderful merchandise, particularly for the Indo-China evacuation. Of course, there was also the ever-possible grounding of a MSTS vessel or some Merchant Ship which might demand the attention of our salvage forces. You can picture, then, how very complicated our command relationships could get !

(SEE ORGANIZATION CHARTS 1 AND 2)

Although these Organization Charts cannot be found in any Fleet Organization Manual, this is about how our fleet relationships worked. In the case of the "Before" chart, which is the first one, sometimes we felt pretty much as the farmer did who was asked by a lady driver how to get to Hammond Corners. After several false starts, partial directions, and many corrections he finally admitted his predicament when he said, "Hell, lady, you can't get there from here !"

Actually, however, even in the face of the complications of area commands, joint commands and chop lines to be observed with some ceremony, we were all good friends and were never bothered materially by these complicated relationships and multiple customers.

Simply stated, Service Squadron 3 is the principal logistic agent of Commander Service Force in the Western Pacific in rendering Mobile Logistic Support to the forces afloat. As Task Force 73, it is an integral part of the Seventh Fleet and under the direct Military Command of Commander Seventh Fleet. Before the redefinition of responsibilities and duties in 1954, Service Squadron 3 also had and usually used the 92 designation as an element under COMNAVFE. In any event, and with or without any written



lines of authority, the Service Squadron must work closely with the local Area Commander, particularly in the coordination of many of the services rendered by the Service Force in an area. There must always be a balance reached between the services rendered by the Mobile Support Group and by the establishment ashore. CINCPACFLT's logistic concept states that the overseas bases other than Pearl Harbor are capable of providing only a minimum of replenishment and emergency services to the fleet, and that fleet units operating west of Hawaii will be self-supporting or will be supported to the greatest extent practicable by Mobile Logistic Support Forces. However, to meet certain specific demands by fleet units, some shore-base support has been provided in Guam, Japan and in the Philippines. The coordination and balancing of support from ashore and support from the Mobile Logistics Support Force must be the responsibility of the Service Force Commander. This requires close liaison and cordial working relationships to be managed successfully, and, since it must be remembered that both the shore establishment and the Mobile Support Force west of Pearl are capable of rendering only limited logistic support, an appreciative understanding of these limitations must be forthcoming from the supported forces as well if the service rendered is to be considered at all satisfactory. It should also be remembered that in our doctrine the advanced base is an integral part of Fleet Logistic Support. Certain base facilities are essential in the resupply and balancing-off of the underway replenishment units in ammunition and POL, and space is nearly always required ashore for transshipment of fleet freight.

Within the Seventh Fleet, Service Squadron 3 had its own little numbers game. Task Force 73 normally was divided into five main parts. Two of these were ghosts, called into existence by a wave of the wand when a situation needed them. Task Groups 73.1, 73.2 and 73.5 are the inport replenishment groups at Sasebo, Subic Bay and Yokosuka respectively. The senior service force officer present is the commander of each of these groups. COMSERVRON 3 usually wore a second hat as CTG 73.1. In the

past, with the fleet in Philippine waters, COMSERDIV 31, now disbanded, wore a second hat as CTG 73.2. Due to our own far-flung requirements with shrinking forces, and because of the growing capabilities of the Base and Supply Depot at Yokosuka, a not very large inport group was left at Yokosuka, master-minded by the senior service force skipper present with the assistance of various individuals from the CSR 3 Staff on a semi-permanent assignment.

Task Force 73.3 was our No. 1 ghost — our objective area support group, tailor-made to the occasion each time the situation demanded one, and made up from units of our other replenishment groups. The No. 2 ghost, Task Group 73.4, was our salvage group, called into being each time the salvage forces were needed, commanded by the senior tug captain assigned, and with the technical guidance of the Assistant Staff Maintenance Officer, who was the Force Salvage Officer and a real expert in his line. Incidentally, it was the consensus of the staff that this was our most consistently proficient group — as ships and as men — and this group of skippers, all mustang lieutenants and lieutenant commanders, carried our admiring respect at all times. These fellows were real “Pro’s.”

Our underway replenishment units, formed as needed, carried the subdesignation of the inport replenishment commander who was pulling the strings for the operation in question. Our incidental splinter units were similarly designated. For instance, the Kaohsiung oiler, out of the Subic group, supporting the Formosa patrol, was TU 73.2.1, while a replenishment unit out of Subic would be 73.2.2. One out of Sasebo, operating in the Okinawa or Japan or Korea areas, would be 73.1.1, 73.1.2, or 73.1.3, depending on the number of operations going on at any one time.

In any port the inport group commander has the responsibility for the general service force coordination and scheduling of supply and maintenance, and many other administrative details

of the controlling of all logistic support supplied to forces afloat, just as he would in an objective area.

The responsibilities of the Service Squadron Commander in the forward area are almost limitless. The Service Squadron Commander is "Mr. It." He supplies and does everything. Admiral Biggs used to say that his title more appropriately would be "Vice President in Charge of Things and Stuff!" There is no job too small or too large for him to do or to be called upon to do. He is the Operational Commander of a number of types of ships as well as their Type Commander in the forward area. Along with his responsibility for repairs, and for supplying all common and technical stores from his stores ships and tenders, he is responsible for the coordination of *all* repair and maintenance services in the area, for towing services, and for all salvage. His hospital ship was the source of medical aid for the Marines in Korea, and in the case of the Indo-China evacuation provided much needed medical assistance and for the evacuation of wounded at the objective area. In addition, the Service Squadron is called upon to provide a certain amount of administrative assistance, particularly in legal and personnel work. The Service Squadron is frequently a floating receiving station. During extended fleet operations the handling of transient personnel becomes a major task, and, unfortunately, one for which the Service Squadron is least well fitted. The Service Squadron operates the fleet mobile post offices as well as a mobile movie exchange, and for a long time in Okinawa operated a fleet recreation facility at White Beach. The fleet beach in Indo-China represented almost the only recreational outlet for a large group of ships for a considerable length of time and provided a most valuable boost to morale. A similar facility was operated in Subic Bay, with the assistance of the Base Commander. The net tenders were his, as was a deperming vessel, a mobile boat pool, a mobile warehouse group of barges, along with two service units, the mobile electronics technical unit, and the mobile ordnance service units. Two detachments of the Cargo Handling Battalion on Guam were

assigned to the Service Squadron at Sasebo and Subic, and they provided valuable stevedore training and supervision and some relief when crews were short-handed for fleet replenishments.

Some of these features may sound like minor services, but it is surprising how great the impact of each individually is, particularly when for any reason there may be a breakdown in one of them. At times it is particularly trying to maintain adequate mail service, and when the mail service breaks down everybody screams — from the senior staff who didn't get the latest word from Washington or Pearl to the apprentice seaman who hasn't gotten this week's letter from mother. Unfortunately, when the mail service gets off the track it has usually been brought about by factors outside the control of the Service Squadron Commander, but he must bend every effort to set up and maintain regular, rapid, effective mail service to all fleet units. A single missed opportunity to deliver mail to any of our ships is sure to bring vituperation down upon the Service Squadron's heads. And you should hear the uproar when the late movies don't "Go All The Way 'Round."

The salvage service operated by the Service Squadron is little known outside the area, but provides a highly valuable service. Two to five ARS's are maintained in WestPac, with salvage as their major task and with general towing as a secondary one. This service is so popular that CINCPACFLT has recently had to establish a priority list of eligibility for those services! One notable feat in the past worth mentioning is the salvage of the *San Mateo Victory*, a civilian ship operating under Government Charter, which drove herself head-on up the beach on Cheju Do, empty, doing 17 knots and at high tide. The salvage of that 5-million dollar ship cost only \$250,000, including repairs. This savings would pay the expenses of our salvage forces for some time to come. Business is rushing for this group during the typhoon season, with our MSTs LST's our most frequent customers. But, there are always calls to find a lost anchor or to go dig up a prop

thrown by some Air Force plane over water, the examination of which might throw some light on the accompanying accident or some future one.

In the area of repair and maintenance, there has been a long-standing argument concerning responsibility for the operation and control of the more highly specialized repair vessels — particularly the AD's dedicated to destroyer support and the ARL's of the Amphibious Force. These vessels, both large and small, have immense capabilities, but there have been instances when their usefulness was limited because complete coordination of their efforts by the Service Force Commander in the area was not possible. There has been a slowness in perfecting the load list of the destroyer tender, at least partly attributable to a resistance to the inclusion of any items in the load not specifically applicable to the ship's specialized support assignment. The need for these big ships as flagships has frequently limited their usefulness as tenders and has affected their positioning to the detriment of the actual support needed to be rendered. ~~It must be~~ apparent to each of you that with inadequate numbers of repair ships of all types available only the most meticulous planning of work loads, workload coordination, and the application of repair talent wherever it is needed can maintain the fleets in the forward area in an adequate state of readiness. In spite of a considerable resistance to using their stores issue capabilities for fear of jeopardizing their repair functions, when we were required to use an AR for every feature she could perform in the Viet Nam evacuation the AJAX performed almost every issue function of an inport replenishment group for some time with admirable success. This action was indicative of these big ship's capabilities in a pinch.

Service Squadron 3 vessels for several years were replenished exclusively by the Squadron's own pipeline of Service Force ships, and an AKA and an AF brought a West Coast resupply into WestPac on an interval of approximately every 26 to 30 days. This unflinching pipeline resupply went a long way to build

confidence in the effectiveness of Mobile Logistic Support. Effective resupply reached WestPac after a maximum of 60 days from requests for items in stock at Oakland, and, here, I would like to say that every resource of the Navy Supply System, at ComServPac's insistence, has been put at Oakland's disposal to maintain a guaranteed backup at West Coast Tidewater. The regular schedule of these pipeline ships greatly simplified consignment difficulties as regards the small amount of essential fleet freight now being carried. (I would like to digress for a moment here and speak of fleet freight. For years it was a bugaboo in the operation of the advanced base particularly. Frustrated fleet freight was one of the major problems at any advanced base during World War II. However, with the vastly improved load lists, and the very high availability percentages in all commodities carried by the Logistic Support Force, the fleet freight problem has slowly diminished and no longer is the major concern it once was. It can always be troublesome, however, if ships are not most thoroughly outfitted prior to leaving CONUS or Pearl, and unless Unit Commanders live within the precepts of limited support in the forward area). To go back to the Pipeliners: Employment of these ships is flexible within the area, with SERVON 3 able to use them for intra-area cargo consignment for the Mobile Support Force as well as for their direct delivery to the underway replenishment group of their regular resupply cargo. They were even pulled off their runs to service or augment an objective area group at times.

On two occasions in the fairly recent past the efficacy of Mobile Logistics Support in WestPac has been dramatically proved, both, strangely enough, during evacuations: one, a humanitarian effort — the Passage to Freedom from Indo-China; the other, the strategic withdrawal from the Tachens. Both efforts were accomplished unopposed, and, accordingly, some of the things that were done might not so readily be gotten away with in the face of enemy fire. Both, however, were true tests of the readiness of the Mobile Logistics Support Force and both were true tests

of Mobile Logistics Support doctrine. Let me dramatize for you in a few moments the support of the Tachens' evacuation during January and February, 1955.

The time is late January. ComServRon 3's forces were in a fairly typical disposition. With him at Sasebo were two of his large reefers, one ammunition ship, three oilers, and one rescue tug. At Subic were two more oilers and another tug. An AE, along with DIXIE — with Commander Service Division 31 on board — were in Hong Kong on a rest and relaxation cruise, while an oiler, a reefer, the general stores issue ship and one large fleet tug were out calling on customers at Keelung and Kaohsiung. Other vessels of the Squadron were variously employed at our usual ports, or in the Operation Areas. A fleet replenishment had been completed in the Subic Op Area on 20 January, and ServRon 3's next major replenishment job was expected to be required in that same area about 5 February.

Normally, these replenishment operations (much like the "grooved" replenishment operations during Korea), taking place within an easy day's steaming from the inport replenishment group, called for the replenishment group involved to fall in together at Subic Bay on the day previous, consolidate or arrange cargoes as necessary, take on some additional staff help, augment crews as necessary from Cargo Handling Battalion personnel, and set out.

The whistle blew for the Tachens Operation over just such a peaceful scene. However, a number of new factors were immediately thrown into the picture: first, the locale of the operation was a significant distance from the replenishment force; further, the combination of forces to be replenished was several times the force we normally serviced at sea. So — a lot more to go a lot further. Additionally, it would be a force some of which had already been out for some time, some of which were ready to go home, some of which were brand new — had never

operated with us and were unfamiliar with our routines — and all of which would or could be required to stay out longer than is normally required. Consequently, the requirement was introduced for significant amounts of items that ordinarily do not bulk too large in our replenishments at sea; i.e., mail, fleet freight, and passengers.

Our first job, then, was to determine what we felt we would need on the line to do the job. Examination of times, distances, and, above all, customers and their dispersal, indicated a need for 3 oilers, 2 reefers, 1 AE — with a second on demand — 2 rescue tugs, and the general stores issue ship on demand. Backing up at Sasebo would be 2 oilers and a reefer ready to shuttle into the replenishment group. The general scheme was to put a replenishment and rescue force into the area just outside the evacuation area in the open water north of Formosa and West of Okinawa, to go in and replenish on call, then withdraw for consolidation awaiting the next call. Two oilers, an AF, and an AE would be in readiness at Sasebo, and, in rotation, as required (about one every three days for the oilers in this case), a relief ship would go down, kicking his emptiest counterpart out of the operation. The empty ship would return to Sasebo, carrying mail and passengers out of the task force as well as some quantities of empty brass. This sounds reasonable, even easy, but to do it our oilers were stretched to their ultimate limit — one operating with a hole in her bottom, another with bad pumps, and a third actually had to be pulled out of the operation out of turn because of a breakdown of some of her inconspicuous but vital communications equipment that could not be repaired on the line.

It is interesting to note, as an aside, that we could not have achieved the rapid turn-around necessary to this replenishment force in any WestPac port other than Sasebo. With a multiplicity of fueling berths, with all items of POL products available in convenient proximity, Sasebo is unique in the area, and no-

where else could we count on the ready availability of a fueling berth at all times, ready with all products.

At the starting gun, ComSerDiv 31 and his staff transferred to CHARA, the AE, and proceeded to the Op Area to take over the replenishment force. The Subic oiler had already set out with a nucleus staff on board — admirable attitude, but unfortunate execution, for it put an extra staff at sea cluttering the already overworked radio circuits. However, this was remedied by a rendezvous and consolidation of staffs in the CHARA. The oiler returned to Subic in standby, where DIXIE was already returning to take over Task Group 73.2, the inport replenishment group at Subic.

The evacuation group arrived in the area about 27 January, and the first replenishment took place on the 30th. From that day, the replenishment group was in an almost constant replenishment or consolidation operation until 13 February. There were four forces to be taken care of: the combat air cover group of carriers and their destroyers; the gunfire support group of cruisers and their destroyers; the evacuation group (who, fortunately, are fairly "long-legged" and required little from us); and the destroyers of our own screen and of the Formosa Strait Patrol Force. Luck was on our side — there was no opposition, or our AE's would have had an almost insurmountable task in keeping so many muzzles fed. Even so, it meant that every evening was spent in a replenishment and every succeeding day in consolidation, preparing for the next replenishment that night. This constant effort was particularly hard on the oilers, for their crews had not been augmented and they were worked to the limits of endurance — both as to men and equipment. Unfortunately (or, perhaps, fortunately), such an all-out operation — sudden, but lasting only a week or two — does not permit the settling into a calm routine, a communications discipline and many other routines reach a somewhat hysterical pitch. There is not the time to correct the recognized short-comings. However, as an inex-

pensive lesson in logistics support discipline this was the best we have had in several years. Where the Indo-China evacuation showed us a few largely material shortcomings, this operation was most revealing in highlighting some operational problems.

There was no call for rescue service — no evacuation ship had to be pulled off the beach or off a rock — so the tugs were used as a mail, freight, and passenger shuttle service to Keelung, as a link in the air cargo line, and to carry conference passengers to the Task Force flagship at intervals. Face-to-face communication between the logistic support and supported commanders is essential to eliminate small but frequently critical problems and misunderstandings which are inevitable in such a “quickie” operation as this. So this service was invaluable.

An analysis of who did what for whom indicates that with 11 replenishment ships and 3 tugs in and out of the operation — i.e., 3 reefers, 2 ammunition ships, and 6 oilers — we kept at sea and on the line 6 large carriers, 3 cruisers, 28 destroyers, and 20 amphibious ships of various types for nearly three weeks and could have kept them there almost indefinitely. We delivered nearly 500 tons of ammunition, about 1,000 tons of provisions, and 560,000 barrels of fuels — not to mention over 1,000 pieces of freight, 1,600 bags of mail, and 500 passengers in and out of the force. In so doing, we again demonstrated conclusively the soundness, economy, and, above all, the readiness of Mobile Logistic Support.

With almost no specific advance preparation, with no accumulation at advanced bases of mountainous dumps of supplies to back us up, with no request for additional ships or men, we entered an operation knowing that we were perfectly capable of delivering the goods — and delivered them. With our “guaranteed pipeline” from the United States in food and technical support, it was easy to open the valve a little wider and to have our increased consumption taken care of before there was any noticeable impact on our normal safety levels, which ran at from two

to three months' stocks of our higher consumption-rate items. Within three days of the completion of the evacuation, ServRon 3 ships were back in their routine, ready to answer as quickly the next "general alarm" in WestPac.

It should be noted here that since the end of the Tachens Operation a considerable reduction has taken place in the Mobile Logistics Support Force. Although Service Force in WestPac could again support such a striking force, it could only do so at the probable sacrifice of some operational latitude on the part of the combat and evacuation groups. An early increase in certain types would be required, for much of the margin of safety has been eliminated by these reductions, and physical endurance would shortly be exhausted unless replacements were made.

Here is possibly a good place to stop and ponder on the success and difficulties of operating under the premises of Mobile Logistic Support. It is obvious that operation under the concept of Mobile Logistic Support has been a success in the Western Pacific — an unqualified success, and for a long time. It is equally obvious — to Service Force and customer alike — that this operation has been difficult at times, but frequently unnecessarily so. Your familiar texts on the subject are excellent, authoritative, simple, and easily understood documents. In WestPac, they have been elaborated by *Commander Service Squadron Three* and *Commander Seventh Fleet Logistics Guides*. Faithful adherence to the concepts enumerated in the tactical publications will result in Mobile Support being conducted properly and with a minimum strain on all concerned. Careful execution of the operations as laid down is essential to a successful underway replenishment. It is amusing how even small deviations, seemingly inconsequential, from established doctrine and procedures can really louse up an operation. The major source of trouble has been almost overwhelmingly in the area of "Discipline" — "Communications Discipline," and "Supply Discipline."

Although it has been the tacit motto of the Service Force for years that "The customer is always right!" — unfortunately, the customer at times has somewhat neglected his obligation to *be* right. The problems of the Tachens Operation were greatly amplified by this neglect.

Ships are encountered who allow their stocks to run down toward the end of a cruise and who are "caught short" at the sudden commencement of such an operation. This experience was duplicated at the commencement of the Indo-China evacuation and, again, in the Tachens. There is nothing to say that a shooting war wouldn't start with as little warning! Ships are still encountered who deploy to the forward area inadequately outfitted, and who place unnecessary requirements on the Mobile Support Group — both as to item and depth of requirement. In the area of technical supply, and her allowance lists, she should be almost indefinitely self-sustaining. This form of self-support is becoming doctrine, and is called "endurance loading" — it simply means that items of small bulk and well-defined demand are to be stocked on board to last from overhaul to overhaul.

There are ships who have still not really educated themselves as to the limitations of underway replenishment, and who ask for items not intended to be supplied by underway replenishment — "not intended" for reasons of essentiality, durability, security, or accountability. One of the carriers asked for sufficient ship's store and soda fountain supplies to have completely taken up all available deck space in two oilers, and she had ended an extensive stay in port only a week previously. To make sure that no opportunity to replenish is missed, CSR 3 now puts out a resume' of planned logistics opportunities — which, I think, is merely a Service Force device to make sure that the Supply Officer also sees the fleet operating schedule, even if under another name. It will surely highlight every logistics opportunity.

I can't visualize their not attracting complete attention, command *and* staff, to every logistics opportunity. They are as

blunt as the story of the owner of a new mule, who had had no previous experience with these animals but who had been told by his friend, the former owner and an expert on mules, that *his* mule had been well and carefully raised, and were he always treated with kindness and consideration he would perform wonderfully. Imbued with this vision of kindness, the new owner was unable, however, to get the mule out of his stall for the first morning's work. The mule set his feet, laid back his ears, and calmly stayed in place. The owner, after failing with pleading and bribing, called his knowledgeable advisor on mules, who hurried over. The advisor took one look at the situation, picked up a piece of two-by-four, and, with a full-arm swing, whacked the mule across the nose. The mule thereupon walked docilely out of the stall. When the new owner protested that he was supposed to treat the mule with care and kindness, the Old Hand said: "Yes, that's right — but, heck, you've got to get his attention first!"

I'm sure that these new documents will readily get anyone's attention!

Finally, there is too frequently the ship who is plainly inconsiderate. There are only twenty-four hours in the Service Force day, and cluttering this day or demoralizing it by willful or unnecessary chores imposed upon these hard-working ships can only lessen the effectiveness of the essential services being rendered. Somewhat unlike the ingenue in the musical, "Oklahoma," the Service Force ships can take little pleasure from the song "I Can't Say No!" During the Tachens' replenishment, several tons of cheap Japanese dishes were unloaded on the oilers in third-class mail, and third-class mail is excluded from the list of items appropriate to underway replenishment. It served only to prolong along-side time unduly and to completely harass already exhausted crews.

In defense of the customer, it must be acknowledged that no ship has neglected her obligations to the extent of perpetuating

all these crimes. But the accumulation of individual violations of the precepts of Mobile Logistic Support can become very nearly overwhelming — particularly during extended operations. No one can deny that their existence, in any degree, makes a hard job much more difficult.

In almost every underway replenishment situation which we encountered the Combat Commander, or the supported Force Commander, was OTC during the course of the replenishment operation. The accomplishment of a fleet underway replenishment, with a minimum strain on all hands, requires the balanced consideration of the general strategy, the desired tactics of the moment, along with individual ship or unit limitations. Not infrequently an apparent failure to give due consideration to established doctrine, limitations, or other tasks confronting the Mobile Support Group has unnecessarily complicated or made *much* more difficult its exacting tasks.

A good Op Plan, as succinct Op Order, are keys to the successful conduct of any operation. In WestPac we found ourselves subject to some twenty-four different Op Plans, for which we were to give Logistic Support and for which we were to develop splinter plans to cover. The solution to this dilemma by our planning group was to write one broad Op Plan, aimed to cover Logistic Support for all the outstanding force and fleet plans we held — and, strangely enough, we found this fairly easy to do.

It must be plain to anyone that a force supplying beans, black oil, and bullets is going to have the same mission — peace or war — the difference lying largely in amounts delivered and in the degree of security or protection surrounding the operation. Accordingly, simple Op Orders could be written as the need arose to cover the situations of the moment, and Unit Commanders — with one basic and simple doctrine to fall back on — could be expected quickly to assimilate the problem, and be off and running.

In the last several years there have been a number of new techniques introduced into the methodology of Mobile Logistics Support, largely involving equipment and techniques used during underway replenishment. However, in the Atlantic a new ship type was introduced, which, although individually unsuccessful (principally because of support problems), if she were produced in numbers might considerably shorten replenishment times, significantly reduce the amount of time spent in replenishment formation, and in hooking-up and breaking-away. This is the one-stop replenishment ship, the AOR, the CONECUH. AOR's in small numbers could afford us excellent support for splinter operations, for HUK's and the like. To be effective in the support of a major force, however, we either must have large numbers of "CONECUH's" or we must have concentrated provisions, as well as weapons and fuel!

Another great step in improved techniques developed in the last eighteen months is the "Direct Issue" of provisions from reefer ships, without prior breakout, and this has greatly reduced losses from damage by handling or exposure. Its drawback is in the loss of some storage space in providing complete accessibility to all items of cargo. Further development of the vertical conveyor and elevators will minimize the space loss, however. Light-weight tarpaulins, nesting pallets, quick-opening hatches, gravity conveyors, constant-tension winches, wire-mesh shoring, to mention a few, represent new equipment serving to improve techniques and to simplify and improve replenishment at sea. Light-weight (floatable) hose is even now being tested in connection with astern refueling, is now being emphasized for the escort types, and may have application for either heavy-weather or close-in fueling — possibly reducing the exhausting work now involved in fueling our ships with the present heavy hose. In WestPac, we were even augmenting ships' replenishment crews with one hatch gang from our cargo-handling battalion, a great help to them in these days of our stringent personnel situation. The new and larger oilers and reefer ships are in service — and

appear to be an unqualified success. They have set almost unbelievable delivery records already.

In WestPac, we departed to some extent from the concepts of Mobile Logistic Support in that we used local markets which would be denied to us in wartime. We did all we could to develop sources of fresh produce in Japan and the Philippines in order to augment the supply of perishable fresh provisions being brought in by the pipeline reefer. We felt that this augmentation, largely in the area of highly perishables, so-called "luxury" items, morale-wise and economicswise, was worth some trouble as long as we did not cause some phase of Mobile Support — based on CONUS resupply — to atrophy. As an aside, I may say that we found out in so doing how much we are in the debt of the United States packaging industry, for the packaging was the main deterrent to really capitalizing on an excellent source of fresh produce. Their packaging was semi-primitive and totally unsuited for transfer at sea, so the application of indigenous fresh produce was accordingly limited.

A number of problems face the Service Squadron, and they are of all sizes and at all levels. The number and the characteristics of the ships in the Service Force are a problem. In these times of stringent budgetary and manpower limitations, the Service Force frequently is the first to "give," and there is neither the number of ships nor a manning level at times to render satisfactorily a level of support that the combat fleets expect or are entitled to.

Nearly every Service Force type has been an adaptation of some sort; few, if any, have been designed from the keep up for the job at hand; and nearly all are suffering badly from obsolescence and just plain old age. The replacement coming along the line looks mighty good, but is painfully slow in replacing our older ships.

The operation of C. O. D. was conducted entirely outside the Service Force sphere of influence and, I feel, most improperly so. I feel that it could and should be made an arm of coordinated fleet support, rather than what seems at times to be little more than a private messenger service operated from the Carrier Task Force. Operation FAST should throw this service into perspective, and may save it from possible oblivion.

Boats and boating frequently present a problem to the Service Squadron. Few service force types can lift enough boats to provide adequate services in an objective area, although a Mobile Boat Pool is usually an integral part of the Service Squadron. "Borrowing" an Amphibious Force "L. S. Dog" for the lift has been the solution on more than one occasion, although in many combat situations the Amphibious Force could be expected to have other overriding priorities which would preclude its assistance to the Service Squadron.

Communications discipline falls apart under emergency conditions. Every new operation seems to cause every ship and staff to break out in a rash of communications, and in many instances on the wrong circuits. Failure to set up replenishment circuits and to utilize them early in big operations has caused untold grief and resulted in countless hours of unnecessary work!

The most nagging of all Service Squadron problems, and a constant aggravation, is probably the one most susceptible of solution, with the wholehearted cooperation of ship commanders. This is the problem of poor supply discipline, on which I have already dwelled at some length. That, and, at times, a regrettable inconsideration for honest limitations, just serves to make the difficult impossible. However, this "impossible" is always a challenge, and the Service Squadrons will go on meeting the challenge.

In listening to me here, today, you may have suspected a certain bias in my views. If you have, I might remind you of the story of the driver of a bus tour through the southern battlefield,

who, as guide, kept up a running general comment like this: "Here, a handful of 'Marse Robert's' boys routed 3,000 Yanks . . . Here, one fine battalion from Georgia annihilated a whole corps of Yankee troops . . . Here, two boys from North Carolina disrupted the 5th Ohio Volunteers completely . . ." and so on.

Finally, from the back of the bus, in a New England accent, and obviously incensed, a little old lady asked, "Didn't the Northern soldiers win a single victory?"

"No, ma'am," said the guide, with some feeling, "and they won't as long as I'm running this tour!"

Thank you.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Captain Randolph Meade, Jr., (SC), U. S. N.

Captain Meade was graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1936. Following graduation, he served in the U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA for two years, after which he transferred to the Supply Corps. He served at the Naval Hospital, Pearl Harbor, and, as Disbursing and Commissary Officer, he placed the Receiving Station, Pearl Harbor, in commission.

During World War II, Captain Meade served successively as: Supply Officer, U. S. S. CINCINNATI; Force Supply Officer, South Atlantic Force; Senior Assistant Staff Supply Officer, Staff Commander Naval Forces Europe; and as Supply Officer of the Naval Advance Amphibious Supply Base at Exeter, England. At the end of the war, he was Storage Officer at the General Supply Branch of the Naval Supply Depot, Oakland. He then became Supply Officer, Staff, Commander Naval Base, San Francisco, and, later, was Executive Officer of the General Supply Branch at Oakland. Subsequently, he was Aide and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and later served in that capacity to the Under Secretary of the Navy.

From 1949 to 1952, Captain Meade was Supply and Fiscal Officer at the Naval Air Station, Quonset Point. He then attended the Advanced Management Course at the Harvard Business School, and the following two years was Executive Assistant for the Aviation Supply Office at Philadelphia. In 1954, he was Supply Officer on the Staff of Commander Service Squadron THREE, which was participating in the support of the Indo-China and Tachens evacuations. At present, Captain Meade is the Officer in Charge of the Navy Purchasing Office at San Francisco.

REALITIES OF INDEPENDENCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 26 November 1956 by
Dean Philip W. Thayer

It seems very appropriate indeed to be talking with a group of naval officers about Southeast Asia, for this is an area whose history has been associated for many centuries with maritime adventures and naval power. The crusading wars of the Portuguese against the Moors led Vasco da Gama into the Indian Ocean near the close of the fifteenth century, and it did not take him long to discover that a holy war could be combined in an interesting way with the profits of the spice trade. For nearly one hundred years the Portuguese, hardy seamen with ships noted for their seagoing qualities and cargo capacity, maintained an undisputed supremacy in the trade. In 1587, however, the capture by Francis Drake of one of these vessels, homeward bound with spices to the value of £ 108,000, stimulated British activity and contributed to the establishment of the East India Company. At about the same time the Dutch were busily outfitting an expedition which led to the formation of another huge enterprise, the United East India Company. Both these companies operated with varying degrees of success for almost exactly two hundred years, dependent throughout on maritime power for their continuing existence. In more recent times it was a British fleet under Lord Minto which brought about the surrender of Java by the Dutch in 1811, and a few years later the search for a naval base location which would not be exposed to the northeast monsoon led to the founding of Singapore by Stamford Raffles. Thus, the influence of sea power has been manifest throughout the years.

Although it is not necessary for our purposes to go back to the earliest times which have been mentioned, it is impossible to understand properly the realities of the present and the possibilities of the future expansion and decline of the English and Dutch East India Companies, and the second extends from that point into the twentieth century. In varying ways developments in both these periods have left a heavy impress on the current scene.

When the English and Dutch companies entered the field of Southeast Asia trade in the early days of the seventeenth century, both did so with a weather eye on the profits to be derived. National backgrounds, however, caused a basic difference in operating methods which had a profound influence on future developments. The Dutch did not come from a producing country and had no exports to push. They were the middlemen of Europe. In going to the Indies their goal was to capture the carrying trade, not only the carrying trade between the East and Europe but also that among the local ports of Southeast Asia, loading up with spices on the best terms obtainable and disposing of their cargoes in the most favorable markets. This was an ambition which carried with it the possible need to use force and to exert authority. It is thus significant that the original charter of the Dutch Company gave it the right to build forts and maintain armed forces. In the long run, it was the burdensome cost of keeping such military strength that contributed to the downfall of the company.

Unlike Holland, England was an exporting country, and its principal export commodity was woolen cloth. The English were eager to reap the riches of the spice trade, but in the process they hoped also to create new markets for their woolen cloth and other exports. Where the Dutch went into the area to wring tribute from the land and drive their competitors from the seas, the English entered more as traders and salesmen. A certain

amount of empire-building was involved in both cases; but, the motivation was different.

The ensuing two hundred years saw the translation of these aims into terms of operation. So successful were the efforts of the Dutch to get a monopoly on shipping that the English soon were obliged to withdraw most of their activities to India. Although they were able to establish factories in Bandjermasin and in Bencoolen, and to call from time to time at other ports, their trade was sporadic and they ceased to be a major factor in Southeast Asia until the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The French were latecomers in the field. The French East India Company was organized in 1664, and Pondicherry was acquired nine years later. Aside from temporary successes in Siam and in Burma, the French never had a dominant position in the trade and were forced to give up their pretensions in India in 1763. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, French activities in Indo-China were limited to those of missionaries.

By the end of the eighteenth century, definite patterns of operation and administration had become established. In their efforts to get the most for the least and sell at the highest, the Dutch had discovered early in the game that the best results could be obtained under a system which would guarantee the delivery at their factories of fixed quantities of the desired commodities at fixed prices. The success of the system is indicated in an example from the clove trade. At the height of Dutch influence in the Moluccas a pound of cloves which cost three pence in Amboina, to which another three pence was added for the costs of carriage, sold regularly in Amsterdam for six shillings. The Dutch found, also, that these gratifying results could be obtained with a minimum interference in local government. Native rulers, instead of being displaced, were enlisted as allies and used as collecting agents, since it was easier and more effective for them to procure the required deliveries from their people than it would have been for European officials. The consequences of the system were

inevitable. The agricultural peasants were exploited, at times even reduced to downright slavery, for the benefit on the one hand of their native lords and on the other of their Dutch masters. Nevertheless, commercial interests were satisfied; indirect rule, coupled with forced deliveries, became cardinal principles of Dutch policy.

The English, we have noted, were salesmen as well as traders. The compulsory extraction of produce was of no use to them unless it also opened up new markets — and that would not be its natural tendency. Purchasing power did not go hand in hand with slavery and forced labor. Kept for many years from any large share in Southeast Asia business, the English had not lost sight of these markets and had learned some valuable lessons in India. With the naval defeats of Holland and France in 1781 and 1782, England could claim with conviction to be Mistress of the Seas, and no time was wasted in following up on a return to Southeast Asia. As part of its stock in trade, the English Company brought along the policies and practices which had been found successful in India. These were a direct antithesis of Dutch methods. The British knew from experience that if a demand for their textiles was to be stimulated, an educative process was involved, better accomplished by guidance and development through an assumption of the functions of government than through local alliances to exploit native production. If all this led perforce to greater attention to political, economic and social progress than under Dutch methods, it is not necessary to seek any morale element in the fact. Direct rule under the English system brought returns in land rents and revenues which compared very favorably indeed with the gains from forced deliveries. To put it concisely, a reasonable amount of welfare was good for business.

With the dawn of the nineteenth century, and the collapse of both the English and Dutch Companies as private enterprises, new factors were beginning to come into the picture. The liberal ideas embodied in the French and American Revolutions, with their emphasis on freedom and the rights of man, were sweeping the

world. These were utterly inconsistent with the operating methods of the Dutch, and only to a slightly lesser extent with those of the British. In the case of both the Dutch and English Companies throughout the eighteenth century, in words quoted by Furnivall, "their polestar was profit, and their lodestone greed." When Stamford Raffles took up his brief tenure in Java in 1811, he was influenced by liberal pressures of the time as well as by British experience in India. His announced aims included the abolition of forced deliveries, freedom of cultivation and trade, and the introduction of land rents and revenues under government control. With the return of the Dutch a few years later, however, notwithstanding their profession of liberal principles, the complete Raffles' recipe proved to be too rich for them. Finding it inadequate to meet the financial needs of their plans for general economic development — which had led to the establishment of the Netherlands Trading Society in 1824 and of the Java Bank in 1827 — they substituted what became known as the culture system. Under this system the State claimed the right to one-fifth of the produce of all cultivated land in lieu of a land tax. Since the government directed the course of agricultural production and dictated the nature of the crops to be raised, this was merely forced delivery with a new look. Coupled with the firmly established principle of indirect rule, the system continued into the present century, although with gradually diminishing force after 1860. Compulsory production of coffee was not abolished until 1917, and of sugar only a few years earlier.

British return to Southeast Asia was accompanied after the Indian pattern, by direct rule and a quest for new markets. There ensued a long period of conquest and commercial expansion, culminating with the invasion of Upper Burma in 1885 and the organization of Burma as a new province of India. Since the various steps in the conquest had been accomplished under the aegis of the Government of India, this was a natural enough development from the point of view of ease of administration. In that it failed to take into account the peculiar features of Burma and

the Burmese, however, the move was a mistake. For many years to come, Indian infiltration and influence in Burma was to be a source of trouble. By way of contrast, the extension of British influence throughout the Malay Peninsula came at a later time, when control fell under the Colonial Office, so that it was possible to develop independent administrative machinery. Where the Civil Service of Burma was merged with that of India, an entirely separate Malayan Civil Service was established.

The French captured Saigon in 1859 and gradually instituted a system of government which in theory called for direct rule only in Cochinchina, with indirect rule in Laos and Cambodia, which were treated as protectorates. Actually, the residents installed in the protectorates had the real authority, and the result was more akin to British methods in Malaya. On the economic and commercial side, the French regarded Indo-China as a private preserve. As recently as 1938, although the Chinese had a heavy financial stake in the area, 95% of the European investment was in French hands.

Siam has been protected from direct European incursion by her position as a buffer state between French and British interests. She has maintained political sovereignty, but at the cost of economic independence. It has been European investment and capital which have been responsible for progress in shipping, communications, and banking, while the Chinese have entrenched themselves strongly as the wholesale and retail traders.

The breaking up of the chartered companies and the liberal tendencies of the time opened up an era of enlarged opportunity for general investment which has led to tremendous economic growth continuing in the present century. The period has been marked by the enormous expansion of facilities for transport and communication, by the introduction of new industries such as rubber and oil, and by increasing efforts to develop other natural resources. As in the case of Siam, this economic exploitation

was dominated by Europeans, to a lesser extent by Chinese whose penetration of the area as tradesmen was thorough, and with the addition of Indians in Burma and in Malaya. Indian influence in Indonesia was not so prominent.

The rapid pace of economic expansion has wrought many changes in the social life of the countries of Southeast Asia. The great mass of the population was made up of agricultural peasants whose traditional way of life has been subsistence farming in a village environment. Conversion to a money economy has had a profound effect. Either the payment of taxes or compulsory production of specified commodities calls for something more than subsistence farming. In the one case, surplus production is necessary in order to produce the tax money; and, in the other capital, may be required to finance cultivation. Either way, the hapless farmer might find himself obliged to borrow from the money lenders, Indian and Chinese, who were always ready to make advances at interest rates often running to more than 100% yearly on the security of his land. The native adat law of Indonesia or the customary law of Burma might have been able to deal fairly with these situations with the guidance of the village headmen. Courts administering European law, however, with its regard for the sanctity of contracts, made short shrift of the landowner, and farmer after farmer found himself working his land for the benefit of an absentee landlord. Getting into the hands of the money-lenders was a ruinous business.

Economic progress produced its impact in other fields as well, notably in that of education. Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, comparatively little attention had been paid to education in any part of Southeast Asia. The combination of indirect rule and the culture system in Java did not lead to any demand for educated individuals, even on elementary lines, to fill subordinate positions in either business or government; and, in writing of education in Burma, Furnivall noted that it "was left almost entirely to private agency; western education to the mis-

sionaries, and Burmese education to the monks." Economic development, however, brought a corresponding need for trained personnel, with the inevitable result that education became geared to the requirements of a changing economy. It was concerned, in the words of Brian Harrison, "with making a living rather than with life." Under circumstances of this kind slight importance would be attached to cultural values, for to most of its recipients the virtue of education lay in the fact that it provided the key to a job which would pay a much higher salary than that of an ordinary laborer. Outside of the missionary schools, little effort was made to give any appreciation or understanding of European cultural backgrounds or to encourage local cultural studies, although the French were a notable exception in Indo-China. Only in Saigon was an opera house to be found, and Furnivall has chided the Burmese on the nonexistence in their country of either a national museum or a national library — a strange failure in the case of a people with a genuine cultural heritage. The practical emphasis was on the degree and kind of education which was necessary for a livelihood, and this did not go so far as higher education. To quote again from Harrison, with reference to Indonesia, "there were over 2,300,000 children in elementary schools in 1939, but only 53,000 in primary or intermediate schools; while a mere 777 students passed out of the secondary schools." In the same year he estimated that although half a million children were attending elementary schools in Indo-China, only 10% would go on to higher elementary schools, and about 1% to secondary schools. In none of the Southeast Asian countries was higher education in the arts and sciences made available at the university level until 1920, or later, although Singapore had had a medical college since 1905. Vocational and technical training have been increasingly in demand since the turn of the century.

It is noteworthy that in educational policy, as well as elsewhere, the difference between direct and indirect rule was felt. Under a system of indirect rule it was logical that the Dutch should leave educational matters in Indonesia in local hands,

whereas it was equally natural that the British, with direct rule, should take more interest and exercise more control. An educated man was more likely to become a good customer. In the recognition of education as instrument of health and welfare, the Dutch seem to have been earlier and more effective than the British. Certainly, healthy workers would be an asset to a system of forced production.

The educational problem in Southeast Asia always has been complicated by the existence of a plural society with a tendency to preserve racial identities. This has resulted in the widespread establishment both by government and private agencies of separate schools at the lowest vernacular level and often up through the secondary grades. The Chinese in particular have been prone to operate their own primary and secondary schools, and in recent years have been taking steps to found a Chinese university in Singapore. The question may be raised whether separate education along these lines has not done more to enhance than to solve the problems of a plural society.

The combination of economic development and educational expansion coincided with the period which saw the rise of nationalism. The spirit of nationalism, the urge for self-determination and independence, was probably the natural outcome of such a combination. The spread of education brought to a steadily increasing number of people, small to be sure in the total but nevertheless influential, a growing awareness of Western thought and theory, both political and social. This process of course was speeded with the dawn of higher education, and particularly when numbers of the best students went abroad for European training. It is noteworthy that many of the present leaders in Indonesia and in Burma were studying in the Dutch universities in the 1930's, or were fellow students in Rangoon University during the same period. To these relatively few educated members of the community the wide disparities between the have's and the have-not's

— which were a by-product of economic progress — were painfully apparent, and they became ever more restless under the concentration of political and commercial power in the hands of a small group to which they were not eligible for admission. In British, French and Dutch possessions alike, the principal social clubs were not open to natives, often not even as guests.

At times, moreover, education outpaced economic expansion, and there were not enough jobs to go around. The dissatisfaction of those who had acquired an education but were not able to capitalize on it was thus another element in the flowing tide of discontent, although it is possible to attach too much importance to it. The universities themselves became notorious centers of ferment. Student strikes have been a consistent feature in the history of Rangoon University, and, although these have had a legitimate basis, as in the strike of 1936, which first brought the post-war leader Aung San into prominence, they also both in Rangoon and elsewhere have furnished a ready means for agitators to encourage demonstrations and stir up trouble.

By 1940, nationalist feelings had come close to the boiling point. It is probable, therefore, that the onset of war a year later merely hastened, perhaps unduly, a process which in any event would have been inevitable. It is not necessary to linger over the details of the war years nor to discuss the impact of Japanese occupation. Hall has described the latter as succinctly as possible, saying "The Japanese in Asia, like the Germans in Europe, showed a genius for alienating any people over whom they established control." In the result, the Burmans were ready to hail the return of the British with enthusiasm, and the Indonesians were thoroughly disgusted with Japanese rule, even though both still clung firmly to their ideals of independence. There is indeed ample ground to believe that if the interested European Powers had not shown such incredibly bad judgment in some of the steps taken immediately after the war, the separation of Indonesia might have been accomplished with far less anguish, and Burma even now might

be an autonomous nation within the framework of the British Commonwealth. In Indonesia, the lack of negotiating skill and vacillating policy of the Dutch served merely to stiffen nationalist determination; while in Burma the insistence of Britain on the return of Indian civil servants and landowners, as well as on certain financial points, more than outweighed her otherwise constructive and even generous attitude toward Burmese independence. The French most of all persisted in looking on the war as an interlude after which everything would go on as before, and refused to admit any basis for international concern in her handling of the post-war situation in Indo-China.

Within a few years after the close of the war Burma and Indonesia attained independence, the former on January 4, 1948, and the latter on December 27, 1949. Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia did not achieve the same distinction until some years later, and negotiations are still under way in Malaya, where the British requirement of continuing control over foreign affairs and internal security has met with strong opposition in Singapore.

With the acquisition of independence and sovereignty, the major Southeast Asian countries have reached a goal the attainment of which has brought with it a considerable measure of disillusionment. To many people in these countries freedom was the answer to all their troubles and there was too general a feeling that with the achievement of independence all other difficulties would be automatically resolved. To such people it came as a rude awakening to find that freedom was not an end in itself but only a beginning. Nor did their placid belief that everything had been done which needed to be done help thoughtful leaders who were only too keenly aware that prodigious tasks lay before them.

On final balance, the present picture in Southeast Asia is just about what the past has made it. Direct and indirect rule have produced differing patterns of administration which in turn have given distinctly variant trends to education and to economic and social development. It is necessary to bear this in mind in

looking to the future, for, although there are many similarities in the problems of a newly-found independence, the capacities of countries to meet and solve these problems may differ even as their backgrounds have differed.

The expressed aims of Southeast Asian leaders have much in common. Broadly speaking, they are directed toward economic development in the interests of social welfare, the well-being of the people. There is a general desire to improve standards of living. In this connection, however, an important point should be noted. When these countries won their independence, they lost temporarily something without which it is futile to talk in fixed terms of economic development. Economic progress can be made successfully only under conditions of political stability and internal security, and whatever may be said of the evils which accompanied European domination, the European Powers at least provided stable governments and internal security under which the vast economic expansion of the last century was accomplished. The handing over of sovereignty, with the attendant responsibilities of government, to the new countries of Southeast Asia did not find them completely ready to fill the void caused by the sudden withdrawal of former authority. All these countries in varying degrees have had trouble in the maintenance of stable and effective governments. All of them without exception are having difficulty in the field of internal security. It would seem, therefore, that their most pressing problem is to be found in these directions.

When it became necessary to take over the functions of government, Burma and Malaya were in a better position than other countries in the area. The earlier incorporation of Burmans into the Civil Service, and their admission to other positions in the government — sometimes at high levels — gave an advantage in the availability of personnel and insured greater possibility of continuity of operations. The overwhelming concentration of strength in the principal political party has contributed to a situation in which there is little danger of real instability. The organi-

zation of Burma as a Union, however, made up of States with differing interests often in conflict, has had and continues to have an unsettling effect, raising questions of Cabinet and Parliamentary representation and of the authority of the central government. In Indonesia, less well equipped with trained personnel to go on with the business of government, the multi-party system and the persistent rivalry between military and civilian branches of government have been further causes of weakness. It is interesting to note that President Sukarno himself is urging a reduction in the number of parties.

On the whole, with steady progress along constitutional lines, with rapidly expanding facilities for education at all levels to take care of the personnel shortage, the problem of political stability does not seem so portentous as that of internal security. In no one of the new countries of Southeast Asia has the government been able consistently to insure the maintenance of order in all parts of its territory. The leading statesmen of these countries are well aware of this fact and have a thorough realization of the detrimental effect on economic development and welfare. Some recent remarks of U Win, Burmese Ambassador to the United States and until last year Minister of National Planning, are typical in this connection. Speaking in New York last month, U Win said:

“It was not before 1950 that we were able to break up completely all organized attempts to overthrow lawful authority by force and bring these insurrections under control . . . Even then, insecurity, caused by the scattered splinter groups of those rebels roaming within our borders, precluded any significant progress for some time. We are now making every effort to wipe out these remaining traces of lawlessness as quickly as possible. In a country such as ours, the size of Texas, and covered with mountains and

dense jungles, this is no small undertaking. Experiences of even small-scale guerrilla activities during the last war and in post-war Malaya show what a drain they could be on the resources of a country . . . Until the last vestiges of lawlessness in our midst are overcome, we cannot realize our full potential for growth. Our honorable Prime Minister, U Ba Swe, has placed security at the top of the list of priorities of his administration."

It may be assumed that these views would be heartily echoed by other Southeast Asian leaders. Realization, however, is not accomplishment, although it is the first step toward accomplishment. Lack of internal security already has contributed to the reappraisal in the light of realities of Burma's eight-year plan for economic development, and has retarded seriously similar planning in Indonesia and Viet-Nam. To the extent that a strong government is better able to maintain order than a weak government, the question of political stability is also involved.

It has been noted that nationalism was a product of historical backgrounds and that it was the spirit of nationalism which led to the independence of the new countries of Southeast Asia. With its purpose thus accomplished, the guess may be hazarded that nationalism in its former connotations may become of waning importance. This is not to say that the countries of Southeast Asia are likely to lose their sense of national identity nor their pride of sovereignty; merely, that nationalism will not have the meaning in the future which it has had in the past. An indication of this is to be found in the use of which is being made of nationalism by Southeast Asian Communists. The Communists, it would seem, are supernationalists, even more vehement in their professions of nationalist sentiment than the nationalists themselves. This prostitution of patriotism is bound to defeat its own ends, but in the process it cannot fail to affect the spirit under whose name it masquerades.

It would not be wise to minimize the reality or the dangers inherent in Communist infiltration in Southeast Asia. There is no doubt that the Communists are active, and the size of the Communist vote in the Indonesian and Burmese elections was a shock to many. On the other hand, it is well to remember that the real goals of Communism are imperfectly understood and would be foreign to the basic thinking of the great bulk of the population, inclined toward socialism rather than Communism.

The attitude of neutralism adopted by many of the Southeast Asian governments has called forth strong Western criticism, and perhaps has been wrongly interpreted in many quarters. Here again it should be remembered that neutralism is the natural reaction of a country projected suddenly into a world with whose creation it has had nothing to do and in which it must struggle for its own existence. It is noteworthy that the readiness of the countries of Southeast Asia to establish international relations with Communist countries has not deterred them from dealing firmly to the best of their ability with Communist inspired uprisings and agitations within their own borders. Reports would indicate that on his recent trip around the world Sukarno was impressed by what he saw in Yugoslavia, and even more so by Communist China; but that he was greatly disillusioned by the scene in the Soviet Union. Recent events in Poland and in Hungary also have served to open many eyes. In the case of China, there is an understandable tendency to be impressed by the accomplishments of a fellow Asiatic, and to feel that the conditions of accomplishment are worthy of study.

If the possibility, even probability, of solving their major problems be granted, the future of the new countries of Southeast Asia is bright. Their natural resources are enormous. Their leaders are men of integrity, of no mean ability, and with no illusions in regard to the labors which they face. It would be difficult to find anywhere men more suited to guide their people in paths of progress than U Nu and Ba Swe in Burma, Sukarno and

his principal associates in Indonesia, and Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam. There is every reason to hope that with sympathetic but not patronizing assistance from the West, their goal of economic development in the interests of social welfare may be attained. The one thing certain is that in the prosecution of this aim they want help, not interference.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Dean Philip W. Thayer

Dean Thayer received his A. B. and LL.B. degrees from Harvard University. He served as a Lieutenant (jg) in the United States Naval Reserve during World War I. From 1920 to 1931, he was engaged in the export and import business in the Far East. During 1925 and 1926, he was a research supervisor in foreign trade at Harvard Business School. He was Professor of International Commercial Law at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy from 1933 to 1942, and Research Associate in Comparative Law at Harvard Law School during 1936 to 1946.

During 1941 and 1942, Dean Thayer served in the Department of State. For the next three years he was stationed at the American Embassy, Santiago, Chile, as Cultural Relations Attache' and as Special Assistant to the Ambassador.

He was an expert consultant on legal affairs to the Secretary of the Army during 1948. Since 1948, he has been Professor of International Law and Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D. C. During this same period, Dean Thayer also has been visiting Professor and Lecturer at the University of Rangoon, University of Washington, Brooklyn Law School, University of Concepcion (Chile), and University of Virginia Law School. He was appointed to the Commission on Occupied Areas in 1949, and was Chairman of the Panel on Legal Affairs, American Council on Education. In 1950, he was an advisor on German and Austrian legal exchanges for the Department of State.

LEADERSHIP AS RELATED TO THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY LAW

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 7 February 1957 by
Rear Admiral Chester Ward, U. S. N.

Gentlemen :

It is a pleasure to be here. The introduction mentioned my title, which is somewhat misleading. Actually the Judge Advocate General of the Navy is neither a judge, nor an advocate, nor a general. But I do try at times, when permitted, to be an advocate for the Navy.

Since Admiral Robbins mentioned that I was Judge Advocate General of the Navy, I might mention to you several things that I am not and that I perhaps am, so that you can discount whatever else I may say this morning. It ties in with the introduction which I have here because I remember only one other introduction in my career in the Navy which so impressed me and which to the audience was so impressive. It was when I reported for duty on the staff of one of the greatest naval commanders of this century, or of any century. He was reputed to be the roughest, toughest, orneriest four-star admiral in the Navy.

That morning when I first met him he apparently determined to turn on his famous charm. I may say, with due deference to our friends in the State Department, that when he *does* turn on the charm he can out-charm all of the diplomatists that I have ever met. I went in expecting to meet a scowl, but I was confronted instead by a broad grin which spread clear across his face.

He said: "Ward, I am sure glad to meet you. I am so happy that they didn't give me one of those God-damned law specialists as my staff legal officer!"

I replied: "But, Admiral, I am a law specialist."

He then said: "At least you are a Naval Academy graduate."

I answered: "But, Admiral, I am not a Naval Academy graduate."

So after we had chatted about the weather for a while, I went back to my office to consider what an enchanted tour of duty I could contemplate. Gentlemen, it was one of the most magnificent tours I have ever had. It gave me the happiest years of my life — and, when you start having happy years after age 45, they are pretty impressive!

So my situation here is much the same as it was when I first met him. I represent, and will take your time to do a little talking on, two of the most misunderstood and resented elements of the United States Navy. Have no fear, I will get around to the subject of *Leadership as Related to the Application of Military Law* before the end of the period.

The Navy lawyer is typically met by reactions like that of the great commander whom I mentioned. We have won acceptance in the Navy as individuals, but not as a group. There is hardly a senior commander in the Navy who, if questioned (and I take every opportunity to question them about how they like their lawyers), will not say: "Well, it is just a coincidence that my lawyer happens to be a good man. He thinks and acts like a real naval officer. He has turned out to be pretty useful around here. But lawyers, as a group, are ruining the Navy."

Each commander is convinced that he is the only one in the Navy who needs a lawyer — and he generally needs four or five when he puts in his request. Such unpopularity must be deserved — or, at least, it must appear to be deserved. So I have inquired into the subject with some attention and amuse-

ment. I find, as is usual, that the motivation underlying this resentment concerns the mission of the Navy and the impatience of the professional naval officers with anything that they feel will interfere with the performance of the Navy's primary mission; that is, to win wars and not merely fight them.

Thus the naval officer who resents Navy lawyers feels that every officer lawyer in the Navy is depriving the Navy of one seagoing fighting officer. In fact, my predecessor in the Office of the Judge Advocate General made that statement in a public address at Norfolk. If I felt that I was depriving the Navy of one seagoing fighting officer by being in this blue uniform, I would turn in my suit and resign. I would also try to persuade all Navy lawyers to do the same.

On this same point, however, I would like to refer to a lesson just borrowed by our friends, the Marines, our 'gallant allies.' "Every Marine a fighting Marine" has been their motto for generations, or for centuries, you might say. But they are sponsoring legislation right now to create the law specialist type legal officers in the Marines. They are doing it because they find that they can no longer afford the luxury of assigning general service line officers to do legal jobs. They figured out that they have about 125 legal jobs to do in the Marine Corps. They also found out that they would have to use about 375 general service line officers to man those 125 legal billets. They further found that they were sacrificing the careers of hundreds of good fighting Marines by rotating them through legal billets.

If you have one legal billet, and you want to man it with a legally-trained general service line officer, you have to have three of them to go through that. The complications and complexities placed upon the professional Naval officer or Marine officer today by reason of our new weapons systems, and everything connected with their effective employment, etc., are such that he cannot afford to compete on the basis of part-time participation. So the lawyer who is doing an essential legal job for

the Navy is not depriving the Navy of one seagoing fighting officer, or depriving the Marines of a fighting Marine. He is freeing an expert, effective fighting officer to do his job as a line officer.

Furthermore, every lawyer filling a legal billet is adding to the effectiveness of three general service line officers, who do not have to dilute their careers with legal training (which takes three years full-time) and legal assignments, which would rob them of a third of their careers in command assignments. To my mind, this is the highest prerogative to which any man can ever attain.

The other reason that lawyers are resented in the Navy, and have no group acceptance, is that many of the senior commanders feel that the Navy lawyers wished the Uniform Code of Military Justice off on the Navy. Gentlemen, that is an abortion of the truth — we didn't have anything to do with it! The Uniform Code of Military Justice was created by Congress, and I must say that it was largely based on Army experience. The Navy never had any substantial amount of difficulty under the Articles for the Government of the Navy. The new Code was the result of post-war evaluation by Congress, and, as I said, was based largely on Army experience.

No one likes to have his education repealed. Even more, no one enjoys having his experience repealed. Many senior naval officers were naturally resentful when the Code went into effect in 1951. They felt that it was going to handicap them and their duties, and their reaction was emotional rather than logical. They felt that it would hurt the Navy — and you strike a naval officer in his deepest emotion when you threaten to hurt the Navy, or its readiness and effectiveness.

So the Uniform Code of Military Justice got off to a bad start in the Navy. Everyone was convinced that it would not work

— and they were so thoroughly convinced that few of them bothered to read it.

We went into the Korean War with the Code brand new. There were dire predictions of what would happen as a result of the Code going into effect. Everyone was speculating on the imminent collapse of our system. But, as a practical matter, it turned out that the new system worked very well — in fact, amazingly well, considering that command knew very little about it and cared less.

The first year, the Code was almost unanimously hated and despised; the second year, they just hated it; about the third year, they merely objected; during the fourth year, some toleration was in evidence; and in the fifth year, which was last year, promise began to appear. Some of the senior naval officers had decided to check up and see how the Code was working.

Admiral Radford, in the Pacific, decided to have a survey made of all of his ships that were participating in the Korean War. He found out that it made practically no difference; discipline had reached a very high state, and morale was high. The only universal complaint by his commanders was that of the loss of the Captain's Powers at Mast — not the loss of his Mast Powers, but the lessening of those Powers. That was a valid criticism, but it really had nothing to do with the Code.

The Code's system is completely independent of the Mast Powers problem. That is the one amendment to the Code that the Navy is fighting for right now. We are going to bat in the present session of Congress to increase the Mast Powers of the commander because that is the finest way we have in the Navy of educating our people and preventing them from getting into serious trouble, without fouling their records. In the Navy, the commander has to be the embodiment of direct authority, and the Mast Powers represent this authority.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice, something like the title of the Judge Advocate General, is misleading. Everyone has an idea that it is merely a new type of court-martial procedures and speaks in those terms. Actually, it is the entire system of government of the Military Forces of the United States. Before you resent the Code, please remember that the only thing that sanctions any order that you give, any command that you give, or any regulation that you promulgate, is the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Articles for the Government of the Navy were repealed upon the enactment of the Code.

So, gentlemen, the Code is our system of government; it is the support of everything that we do to run an effective Navy. That is why I say that it is misunderstood, and that you, as the true leaders of the Navy, have to be more familiar with this instrument. It is an instrument which Command must use to establish discipline and promote morale.

We run into a paradox. As you know, we could not have leadership without sanctions to back up the commands and orders of leadership. But the higher the quality of leadership which you give the Navy, the less need there will be for the application of military law. In fact, I hope to talk myself out of a job in military law this morning because leadership is the answer, gentlemen, not courts-martial.

The test of leadership is the personal loyalty that the leader commands. If the leader has to rely upon courts-martial to have the men do what must be done, he has largely failed as a leader. The failure of accomplishment of leadership can frequently be found in the incidence of courts-martial, and even in the incidence of Mast punishment.

The Navy right now is doing a perfectly swell job. Important offenses are coming down year by year. This last year, we tried Staff Sergeant Matthew C. McKeon by general court-martial, and we tried about 5,000 other serious cases — either general

or special cases. There was practically no public criticism, not only in the McKeon case but also in any of our other 5,000 serious cases. But, more important, this past year, there were 13% less serious offenses in the Navy than during the previous year. It is a tribute to leadership, and it is a tribute to the willingness of the coming generations of leaders in the Navy, to make the system work.

I remember a ship in the Service Force, Atlantic, where the incidence of Mast punishment was 120% within the year. They changed commanding officers, and the incidence on the same ship during the next year was 11%. Now, of course, we can't blame the commanding officer for all of that. But one index of leadership is the incidence in all types of punishment. One way to check up on how you are doing when you command your ship is this: How are you making out with respect to the incidence of punishment as respects the Navy as a whole, or your particular type?

The primary offense against military law is the "absence" offense. During World War II, some 85% of all military offenses were absence offenses. That is one field in which leadership can effectively reduce the necessity for the application of military law. You are aware of all the books, pamphlets and papers that have been written on "Leadership." I certainly would not even attempt to mention the subject of "Leadership" to this audience, because in this field all of you are the professionals and I am the amateur.

You know the trite saying about the best swordsman in the world — by definition, having nothing to fear from the second best swordsman, but he might be killed by the unknown, inexperienced dualist who does not know what he is supposed to do next. The only thing which I could possibly contribute on my own to the subject of "Leadership" would be by the merest accident of not knowing what I am supposed to do or say next.

I have read much of the material on "Leadership," and it is all tremendously interesting. I also have the advantage by about

ten seconds, say, of conversation with one of the really great leaders of the world today, and that is Admiral Arleigh Burke. (In my position, I can afford to say true things like that because flattery will get me nowhere. When I leave the Office of the Judge Advocate General, I cannot aspire to three stars or a command at sea. That is one of my limitations as a law specialist). But Arleigh Burke, who, as you know, has spent many years as a great leader, in thinking about "Leadership," seems to have boiled it down to one sentence.

I saw him walking down the corridor one day, engrossed, as usual, bearing, as he does, the cares and responsibilities of membership in the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the Chief of Naval Operations. He looked so troubled that I said, "Admiral, can I help you?"

He awoke from his concentration on some major problem, looked at me, and said, "Yes, you can. I want every member of the naval service to feel that his job is the most important. Can you help?"

Now, I am sure that Admiral Burke tells that to everyone because that *is* his ambition, and it summarizes his entire philosophy of leadership. But it certainly made an impression on me. I immediately went back to my office and wrote an article for the *JAG Journal*, entitled "Law and the Navy's Mission." It was a short article — a little over one page. It ended up this way: "Your job is important to the Navy." I was asking our lawyers to take a sound new attitude, and to be advocates of the Navy — and for the Navy. In our job in military justice we frequently have to act in judicial capacities. But, outside of that field we are advocates of the Navy; we are the house counsel for the Navy. When command wants to do something, we do not come up with a legal veto which command cannot and will not accept. The objective is to find a legal way of doing what command feels needs to be done.

To get back to Arleigh Burke's one sentence, "Make each member of the naval service feel that his job is most important." After thinking about that for a while, I realized that that is the answer to the absence problem. If you can make each member of the naval service feel that his job is the most important in the Navy, he is not going to be absent without leave, or "over the hill" when he should be on the job. There is a catch in this, however, and it is not as easy as it sounds. You just cannot go up to Seaman Joe Zilch and merely say, "I think your job is the most important to the Navy." Your *actions* have got to convince him that you are serious about it.

Take one of the typical absence cases in the Navy, and try to relate it to that problem. The accused in this typical case had been recruited as a nineteen or twenty year old non-married man. He had been in the Navy for a year or less. On boot leave, he had married his high school sweetheart, who was 17 or 18 years of age. He then left her with her parents while he joined his first ship. He intended to bring her to his home port to join him, but he could not find adequate housing — and he could not have afforded it if he could have found it.

He had intended to take out an allotment for her support, but the red tape involved in getting a copy of the marriage certificate and putting in the necessary forms to the disbursing office would have delayed his doing so.

He received a letter from his wife in which she said she was sick; she was pregnant; she was having troubles — financial troubles; his family was giving her a bad time and her family was giving her a bad time.

What was he doing? Well, the Navy made him a mess cook, which he was darned sure was a waste of his talents. He tried to see the disbursing office to get the allotment started. The disbursing clerk told him that it was no use until he had the necessary supporting documents. He then tried to tell his division offi-

cer his troubles, but the division officer was so busy taking out reports and doing paper work that he said, "Go see the Chaplain. He can help you."

This mess cook finally got a week's leave and went home. While he was there, his wife was hospitalized. He took a job in an attempt to pay the debts that had accumulated. Obviously, he did not make enough in a week to do much in the way of help to his family. Why didn't he wire for an extension of leave? Well, why should he? That was the way he looked at it. After all, he did not think it would be granted. His officers had not paid any attention to him when he was there in person trying to get help in his difficulties.

At the expiration of his leave he just stayed home. After 60 or 90 days he had either got things straightened out or else he had got tired of his wife, who did not seem as attractive then as she had a few months earlier. So he thought he would go back to the Navy — and he turned himself in.

The chances are that he was tried by a General Court for desertion, and convicted of unauthorized absence. In the first place, they should not try him for desertion — but, generally they do. (I am trying to straighten that out). As you know, they have to have the intent for desertion. In most of these cases you cannot fairly presume desertion just on the basis of the length of the absence.

What about that case? Wherein could leadership have prevented this case from arising? If, when he reported to his ship, his division officer had taken some interest in him, if the commanding officer of his ship had demanded that the division officer knock off some of that paper work and get to know his men this could have been avoided. Actually, in too many cases we give these boys courts-martial when they deserve sympathy. A little sympathy and interest would have avoided that offense.

I heard and saw Bishop Sheen on television last Sunday. He was talking about "Law and Love." He said that if you had love, you did not need law. He made his point by one illustration. He said: "Is there any law that requires a man to give his girl an engagement ring when they are engaged?" Then he went on to say there was no such law, but the man did it out of love — that when you have love, you do not need law.

Well, I am not going to advocate love to that extent in dealing with your men. In fact, if you carry it too far that causes complications and court-martial — although, generally, the court can be avoided. In the Navy, interest will take the place of love. You have to be interested in these people! You have to give them their mission in life!

I have often wondered what makes the great leader of men in the Navy — and I have almost always found the same answer. I do not mean what makes the great strategist or the great naval statesman, but what makes the great leader of men. What is the test? I finally found out that the common answer is this: the great leader is one for whom his men will cheerfully give up their lives. That is the real test of leadership. And if the men will not only give up their lives at your command but do it cheerfully — then, by God, you are a leader.

What will induce a man to cheerfully risk his life for his commander? Well, it is one of those strange paradoxes about us humans. The only thing worth giving up your life for is to have a reason for living. These leaders are the ones who are able — by their actions, by their attitudes, and by their personalities — to project to their men the fact that they are important to the Navy and that they have an important mission in life. When, by your actions as well as words, you make them recognize their importance to the Navy and their reason for living — then, they are willing to cheerfully obey your commands that take them to the risk of almost certain death.

When you get a man so convinced of the importance of his mission that he will do that, you certainly have a man who is so convinced of the importance of his mission that he will not be absent without leave. He feels the Navy needs him. He will come to his division officer for help in a personal problem that would otherwise require his attention. Once we get that feeling, the absence offenses drop off and there is practically no need of the application of military law except in those rare instances where there is a criminal act, which would be a crime anywhere — in civilian life as well as in the Navy.

The application of military law, then, is much more difficult than the application of any civilian-type law. You have seen the two arms of justice: in each balance you have the rights of the individual and the needs of society for protection. In the military situation, you have to somehow add a third arm to that balance of justice because you also have to protect the interest of the military service, morale, and discipline; otherwise, the whole system is going to fail.

We have this revolution in the materiel which the Navy uses. All of you have seen the change-over from oil to nuclear propulsion, from guns to missiles, from subsonic speed of aircraft to supersonic speed, from gun powder to atomic warheads. All of this materiel is near magic, but it still takes people to employ it. It is unfortunate that we do not have people who are as much improved as are our weapons systems. But because we have only men to man all of this materiel, and only officers to lead them, the task of leadership is ever more difficult.

A leader must employ the instruments of leadership needed to create the high state of discipline and the high state of morale essential to winning wars — not merely fighting them. That is why the leader has to be able to employ his lawyer as an instrument; that is why he has to be familiar with the Code and employ that as an instrument.

The great resentment of the professional naval officer, or the commander, against the Uniform Code of Justice was caused by his feeling that it deprived him of part of his authority as a leader. Gentlemen, it did not! Under the Code the commander is still the commander, just as he was under the Articles for the Government of the Navy. None of his authority and responsibility is curtailed or shifted. True, the Code requires that lawyers perform certain services for the commander — but, notice they are *for* the commander, not instead of the commander or not in place of the commander.

Can I, a Navy lawyer, convene a court? No — that is the commander's prerogative. Can I conduct Mast? No — that adheres only to the commander. Can I even convene an investigation, or a court of enquiry? No — there, again, it is the commander's prerogative. After a case has been tried and reviewed, can a Navy lawyer exercise clemency? No — there, again, it is the commander who has the authority and responsibility.

The most the Code makes you do, with respect to your lawyer, is to listen to his advice; it does not make you follow his advice. If you did follow his advice blindly, you would soon lose stature as a leader. You would certainly lose stature as a leader in the eyes of your lawyer because all he can offer is law. The commander offers justice — and justice is quite another thing than law.

What kind of justice do you, as a commander, want to administer to your command? All the justice that I know I have learned from great commanders. One of the greatest of these commanders never achieved more than two stars because of his aversion to duty in Washington (an evil which you must all learn to bear if you want to serve the Navy to the utmost of your capacity and get those three and four stars). When I reported to this great leader as his staff legal officer, he was also able to put his thoughts in a very few words. He said, "Ward, I want justice administered in my command exactly the way I would want other

commanders to treat my sons who are in their commands." (And he *did* have sons in other commands in the Navy).

Did that mean that he wanted soft justice? Not at all. As a great commander, he knew that soft justice defeats both ends. It is bad for the Navy because it is bad for discipline and bad for morale. Your good members of the naval community are discouraged if slackers and wrongdoers are not brought up sharply, promptly and fairly. You would spoil this commander's sons if you dealt out soft justice — so he does not want soft justice.

On the other hand, does the commander want hard justice for his sons? Obviously not, because there again the purposes are defeated. The individual is injured and the service is injured because morale falls with hard justice.

What that commander wanted was understanding justice, and he, out of his experience in command, was able to furnish that understanding. There, again, interest is taking the place of law. If the commander is sufficiently interested, he needs very little application of naval law.

That commander was smart enough to point out that it was not necessary to throw the book at a boy the first time. He expressed it very inelegantly, but with real force. He said: "If he is a louse, he will be back in our hair again — and we can give it to him then." And believe me, he did! The second time was one time too many. He was always willing to give a boy a break the first time (these boys are terribly young), but the second time he knew with what type of character he was dealing.

You notice that he went a little better than the Golden Rule. Of course the Golden Rule says, "Do unto others the way you would have them do unto you." But he wanted more for his sons than he would ever ask for himself. That is the type of justice he wanted. He knew enough to use the Uniform Code of Military Justice and to use his lawyers to achieve justice. That is the real challenge of command in the field of law and justice.

I would like to talk for a few minutes on why we have lawyers in the Navy for things other than military law. Do they justify the billets which they are taking up? I had to stretch this pretty far to get into the field of International Law, which I am dying to talk about, because I know Admiral Robbins is interested in it — and I think most of you are, too.

In addition to military law, the Navy needs its interests protected in the field of international law. Concepts are changing. The law is in a state of flux.

The United Nations has at this session convened a conference of plenipotentiaries on the subject of "The Law of the Sea." Gentlemen, are we going to let the Navy be unrepresented in the formation of the United States' position on a complete re-vamping and reclarification of the Law of the Sea? We simply cannot afford it!

You are familiar with the old quip that when the greatest naval power in the world was Britain, there was an international lawyer on the bridge of each British flagship. We have to admit that in many respects the British have been much smarter than we in those fields.

One officer on a ship can help man that ship. One officer lawyer working at international law, with the Navy's interest uppermost, can frequently contribute more than merely assisting in the manning of one ship.

I once was consulted on a war plan. The objective of the plan was to deny strategic materiel to a certain Mainland; that is, to prevent the shipment of strategic materiel by water to that Mainland. The concept on which this plan was based was that of blockade. The forces to be employed to attain this objective by use of the blockade concept were something like 36 destroyers and one large carrier task force.

An examination of the plan indicated that if you shifted to another legal concept — that of declaration of contraband — you could accomplish the same objective with 6 destroyers instead of 36, and with a few patrol planes instead of a large carrier task force. Furthermore, you would not be deploying your destroyers in areas where they were vulnerable to the enemy's land-based air, to submarine and to mines.

That is tremendously important, gentlemen! Just think of the exhaustion of national resources and Navy resources if you employ 36 destroyers and a large carrier task group to fill a job which could be done by 6 destroyers and a few patrol planes! So there, again, you need to know the law to put the law to work for the Navy.

Another necessity for lawyers in the international field has developed from all the alliances which the United States now has with countries of the Free World. We Navy lawyers are often accused of having created jobs for ourselves. That is the echo of the criticism of the Code.

But I ask you: Did we Navy lawyers enter into 42 international agreements, including SEATO and NATO? No. In the administration of all of those treaties you can see that the United States is going to come out on the short end unless the United States has representation.

Did we Navy lawyers have anything to do with the construction of United States' bases throughout the entire world? No. But they generate many legal problems which need to be handled by lawyers in order to protect the interests of the Navy.

In summary, I ask you gentlemen to give your Navy lawyer a chance to help you — that is all he is for. His sole purpose is to assist command, to assist you in making the sea power of the United States more effective. In the Navy, we have 400 professional lawyers. If we add the Marine lawyers, we would have

approximately 525. These are for a total Navy and Marine population of about 800,000. The Army and Air Force, with very little more population, each have approximately 1,200 lawyers. So each of your Navy lawyers is servicing about 2,000 population, while the Army and Air Force lawyers are servicing about 800 population. So I do not think we are occupying too many billets. We are just trying to man the essential billets which will give the Navy the highest quality legal services at the lowest possible cost in money and manpower.

Gentlemen, my 60 minutes are up, so I will close. I know that probably the principal reason, if any, of having me here was to subject me to a question period, which Admiral Robbins assured me will follow in a few minutes.

Thank you very much for such a warm reception.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Rear Admiral Chester Ward, U. S. N.

Admiral Ward enrolled as a naval aviation cadet in the United States Naval Reserve in 1927. He completed naval aviation training at the Naval Reserve Bases at Squantum and Norfolk and at the Naval Air Station, Pensacola. He was commissioned as an ensign and designated a naval aviator in February, 1928. Duty assignments subsequent to his aviation training brought the total of his early active duty to three years, and included tours at the Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida; Torpedo and Bombing Squadron 9-S at the United States Naval Academy; and Scouting Squadron 6-S, and as Junior Aviator aboard the U. S. S. DETROIT. He was released from active duty in June 1930, but participated actively in Reserve Aviation Training for over ten years.

Prior to his return to active duty, Admiral Ward received his B.S. degree from Georgetown University in 1931. He was awarded both an LL.B. degree in 1935 and an LL.M. degree in 1936 from The George Washington University Law School. He later did graduate work in Economics at the American University from 1939 to 1941.

Admiral Ward has been admitted to practice law in the District of Columbia since 1935, and is a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States. In 1940, he became Associate Professor of Law at The George Washington University Law School, having taught there from the time of his graduation in 1935 — first, as an Instructor and, later, as an Assistant Professor of Law. He has been Senior Legal Editor and Assistant Editor of *The United States Law Week* and legal Editor of *Labor Relations Reporter* and *Labor Relations Reference Manual*. He served as Faculty Editor-in-Chief and, later, as a member of the Faculty Board of Associate Editors of *The George Washington Law Review*. He has written leading articles for the Harvard, Yale, Vanderbilt, and George Washington University law reviews. His civilian law practice also included work as a consultant in contract law and labor relations.

Admiral Ward returned to active duty in June 1941, and has been on active duty continuously since that time. His first tour of duty in the Office of the Judge Advocate General began in September 1941. Among other duties in that office he served as Chief of the General Law Division, when that Division handled all admiralty, taxation, international law, legal assistance, and claims matters for the Navy. He later served as Director of the Administrative Law Division.

In December 1949, Admiral Ward was transferred to duty as District Legal Officer on the Staff of the Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, where he served for three years during the height of the Korean War activity. In December 1952, he became Staff Legal Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. He served on that staff first under Admiral Arthur A. Radford, and then under Admiral Felix B. Stump. On 3 August, 1956, Admiral Ward took office for a four-year term as The Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The listing herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Books on the list which are not available from these sources may be obtained from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Services Collections. These collections of books available for loan to individual officers are maintained in the Bureau of Naval Personnel; Headquarters ELEVENTH, FOURTEENTH, FIFTEENTH Naval Districts; and Commander Naval Forces, Marianas, Guam. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest Auxiliary Library Service Collection (See Article C9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

- Title:** *The Soldier and the State.* 534 p.
- Author:** Huntington, Samuel P. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957.
- Evaluation:** Every professional officer in the armed forces should be familiar with the contents of this book. Professor Huntington has sacrificed much public popularity by his unemotional and objective analysis of the professional military officer corps as contrasted with the practitioner of military science. He concludes: "Historically, the virtues of West Point have been America's vices, and the vices of the military, America's virtues. Yet today America can learn more from West Point than West Point can from America. Upon the soldiers, the defenders of order, rests a heavy responsibility. The greatest service they can render is to remain true to themselves, to serve with silence and courage in the military way. If they abjure the military spirit, they destroy themselves first and their nation ultimately. If the civilians permit

the soldiers to adhere to the military standard, the nations may themselves find redemption and security in making that standard their own." Many people will not agree with what they read during the profound running analysis of the emergence and the course of military professionalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but they will find the source material documented in forty-eight pages of notes following the text. Professor Huntington has given a deep sense of historical perspective to the military profession that has heretofore been lacking in civil-military relations analysis. The author opens with a short introductory summary of national security and civil-military relations: "The principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state." Part One is concerned with the theoretical and historical perspectives of military institutions and the state. He considers: officership as a profession; the rise of the military profession in Western society; the military mind; civil-military relations in theory; and two case studies of civil-military relations in practice — Germany and Japan. Part Two covers the historical experience of military power in America from 1789 to 1940. Part Three deals with the crisis in American civil-military relations during 1940-1955. In these latter parts, the author examines the ups and downs of the military professional officer in terms of the stresses engendered between the extremes manifested by the absolutes of the liberal ethic and the conservative realism of the professional officer corps as tensions wax and wane in the international scene. Viewed in that perspective, the political roles of the Joint Chiefs and the structure of the Department of Defense take on a new meaning, as does the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In his last chapter the author takes a look at the contemporary scene and, while the present does not look too bright in the sense of our national security, he finds indications — slight though they may be — that a change for the better might be taking place in the public mind.

- Title:** *Death of a Navy.* 351 p.
- Author:** Andrieu d'Alba, Emmanuel, Captain, French Navy Reserve. (Translated by Anthony Rippon; Introduction, Notes and Comments by Rear Admiral R. A. Theobald, U. S. N. (Ret.). New York, Devin-Adair, 1957.
- Evaluation:** Captain d'Albas is a career naval officer, now in the French Navy Reserve. He is married to the daughter

of a Japanese admiral and speaks the language fluently. His book is based on first-hand questioning of participants, as well as Japanese documents he has been able to consult. This work again verifies the fact that Japanese naval leaders did not favor an attack against the United States. Admiral Yamamoto's prediction that Japan could look for military successes for not over a year is brought out clearly. At the time of his death in the jungles of Kahili, in April 1943, the tide had already turned at the battles of Midway and Coral Sea, at Guadalcanal, and at the landings in the Russells and at Bougainville. Subsequent American operations served only to strangle further the life lines of the island empire and hasten its collapse. The drain on strategic materials and the Japanese industry became too great. Lack of replacements for ships, planes, and trained personnel led to such desperation measures as Leyte Gulf and the Kamikaze attack and spelled certain defeat for the Japanese. The end for the navy, when it came in April, 1945, was swift and complete and is allegorized by the sinking of the Yamato. Death of a Navy is cognizant of the hopelessness of the Japanese naval leaders in the face of curtailed support and the opposition of the army. Oriental concern with face and the predilection of the Japanese with death rather than retreat proved costly in terms of manpower and able leaders. Captain d'Albas has drawn skillful and sympathetic characterizations of several Japanese naval commanders: Yamamoto — "There was only one Yamamoto"; Tanaka — "tenacious Tanaka"; Nishimura — "Bah! We will do our best"; Yamagushi — "It is right that the responsible leader should share the fate of his ship." This account contains excellent descriptions of many major battles familiar to most naval officers. Accuracy may suffer at times because of the impressionistic style, and the narrative is sometimes disjointed. The latter is more than offset, however, by the explicit notes and comments inserted throughout by Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald. These serve to keep before the reader the over-all strategic and tactical situation as the account unfolds.

- Title:** *New Frontiers for Professional Managers.* 117 p.
- Author:** Cordiner, Ralph J. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1956.
- Evaluation:** A collection of three lectures that Mr. Cordiner gave at the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, in 1956. In them he sets forth the business philosophy of the management of the General Electric Company. In a very clear and scholarly manner, he discusses the

problems of long-range planning; how to make business decisions; the objectives of his company; and control and communications. The role of big and little business, and their proper relations with each other, are discussed in such a manner that one gets a rare top-level viewpoint. Basic to the entire book are the ten principles which express the General Electric philosophy of decentralization and how his organization has been redesigned within these principles to meet the challenge of private enterprise in a highly competitive society. The success of these principles, of course, can be measured by the high degree of success of this company.

Title: *The Sphinx Awakes.* 217 p.

Author: Sparrow, Gerald. London, Robert Hale, 1956.

Evaluation: A report (obtained through Egyptian sources) of events just prior and subsequent to the 1952 revolution that resulted in the establishment of Nasser and the leader of the government. Although the book deals with the present, the author found it necessary to review certain parts of Egyptian history, seeking a better understanding of the motivations of the present leader of Egypt. His account contains an interesting report on Nasser the man, his relations with other Arab nations, his dreams of Arab leadership, and his views on Western colonialism and influence. The Egyptian social and economic problems are discussed, as are the new government's plans for improving the welfare of its people. What is most controversial is the chapter on Israel, where the author reports that Israeli persecution of Arabs is as bad as the Nazi treatment of the Jews in Germany. This book must be reviewed in the light that the source material is almost exclusively Egyptian. However, it is extremely interesting in that it presents an insight to the problems facing Western diplomaey if it is to stabilize the area and deny Soviet penetration on a large scale. It accomplishes a worthwhile purpose because it sets forth in general terms the Egyptian Government's thinking regarding Israel, the Arab States, Colonialism or Western influence, her economic ambitions, and, above all, Nasser's dream of leading the Arab nations to a world power bloc.

Title: *The Challenge of Soviet Education.* 329 p.

Author: Counts, George S. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1957.

Evaluation: This is a story of Soviet education — a comprehensive one which includes all of the basic features of education

under the communists, yet avoids the multiplicity of detail. The author delves somewhat into the pre-Soviet period, giving to the reader a contrast between education under the czars and the communists. The contrasts under the "dictatorship of the proletariat" are clearly brought out. He shows how the methods of the past have changed, how they are changing today, and how they will doubtless change in the future. He discusses the army of revisionist writers at work. After Stalin's death, the historians revised the textbooks covering the Stalin era to support the new line of the party. Dr. Counts reflects throughout on the use of education in all its forms as a political weapon controlled by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. It is through Soviet education in its broadest aspects that the party attempts to control the mind of an entire society. Dr. Counts spent over twenty-five years gathering material for this book. He made many trips to Russia, and travelled extensively within the borders of this communist state. Other authors have written about Soviet education, but this work provides a comprehensive understanding of Soviet education in all its many aspects. Soviet education, in the final analysis, will be one of the major factors contributing to the undoing of the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

- Title:** *Diversity of Worlds*. 178 p.
- Author:** Aron, Raymond, and Heckscher, August. New York, Reynal, 1957.
- Evaluation:** The subtitle is "France and the United States Look at Their Common Problems." Two prominent political writers — Raymond Aron, a Frenchman, and August Heckscher, an American — who were delegates at a World Peace Foundation conference in New York in 1956, report on the discussions covering United States and French interests, bonds, and conflicts, based on the historical, cultural, economic and political climates distinguishing the two nations. Professor Arnold Wolfers of Yale University, who was chairman of the conference, contributes the Preface. The authors' reports form a sympathetic and objective debate, dealing with German rearmament and unification, NATO, reaction to the Soviet threat, colonialism, and aid to underdeveloped countries. Throughout runs a heavy thread of economics, reflecting the similar yet divergent conceptions of individualism and industrialism. This book goes a long way to shed light on the basic ties binding the French and Americans, while illuminating the divergences in culture, political sophisti-

cation, and economic experience separating the two Western Allies.

PERIODICALS

- Title:** *The Euratom Treaty.*
- Author:** Mollet, Guy.
- Publication:** VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, March 15, 1957, p. 349-352.
- Annotation:** The French Premier explains briefly the idea of Euratom and the Common Market and discusses the problem of Algeria and the Suez crisis.
- Title:** *A Comparison Old and New Japanese Defense Forces.*
- Author:** Horie, Yoshitaka.
- Publication:** MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, March, 1957, p. 48-52.
- Annotation:** A former Japanese officer analyzes the difference between the new and the old armed forces by comparison of the strong and weak points of each.
- Title:** *Marines Simulate Brush-Fire War.*
- Publication:** AVIATION WEEK, March 25, 1957, p. 33.
- Annotation:** A report on the Second Annual Fighter and Attack Weapons Meet held by the United States Marine Corps Third Air Wing.
- Title:** *From "Doctrine" to Policy in the Middle East.*
- Author:** Campbell, John C.
- Publication:** FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1957, p. 441-453.
- Annotation:** Considers the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the conditions in the Middle East that will affect its implementation.
- Title:** *Issues in International Oil Policy.*
- Author:** Levy, Walter J.
- Publication:** FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1957, p. 454-469.
- Annotation:** Points out the extent to which the West has become dependent on Middle East oil and considers the need to

define the broad goals of American oil policy and to find effective ways to implement it.

Title: *Oil in the Middle East.*

Author: Searight, R. G.

Publication: JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, February, 1957, p. 15-28.

Annotation: Mr. Searight is the Shell Company's Manager for their production in the Middle East. This lecture covers the significance of Middle East oil in the world supply situation, and, conversely, the importance of the Free World to Middle East oil-producing countries. It contains brief information concerning which countries produce how much and who the operators are. Transportation and other problems are discussed, and, finally, reasons are given for not attempting to develop additional reserves of oil in the Western Hemisphere or other regions apart from the Middle East.

Title: *"Vigilance — Yes; Fear — No."*

Author: White, Doctor C. Langdon.

Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, March, 1957, p. 3-16.

Annotation: A well-written and timely article which compares the war potential of the Soviet Union with that of the United States. In the light of this comparison, the author speculates on the imminence of war between the two nations.

Title: *Strategy and Organization.*

Author: Kissinger, Henry A.

Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1957, p. 379-394.

Annotation: Discusses the development of an adequate strategic doctrine as a basic requirement for American security in the nuclear age and proposes certain changes in the organization of the Armed Forces.

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The standard handbook for junior officers on personnel leadership of enlisted men, the *Division Officer's Guide*, has just been published in a new revised and enlarged edition by the United States Naval Institute.

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