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FORCES PRODUCING THE PRESENT WORLD SITUATION

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 24 August 1954 by
Professor John W. Masland

Admiral McCormick, Captain Moore, Gentlemen of the Naval War College:

It has been suggested that I discuss certain of the forces or basic pressures that have contributed to the present international situation of tension, conflict and uncertainty. My central theme is this: Certainly the Soviet threat is the central factor that Americans must keep in mind at all times in planning their national and international affairs; yet apart from this threat, there are other basic factors that have been with us over a longer period, that will remain with us into the future, and that are even more fundamental in their impact upon the American position in world affairs. To put this another way: Even if the Soviet Union were to be removed from the face of the earth tomorrow, the United States would still be faced with problems of tremendous magnitude in adjusting itself to the changing world situation. The existence of the Soviet Union, of course, makes each one of these factors more complicated and difficult to deal with. Yet the Soviet Union did not bring them into being, and in our understandable preoccupation with the Soviet threat, we must not neglect attention to these other extremely significant conditions.

A dramatic way to describe the forces underlying the present world situation is to do so in terms of the striking differences between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this way, we can understand some of the reasons why the relatively peaceful nineteenth century has been replaced by the conflict and instability of our generation.

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of our present situation is the fact that we live in an era of fundamental, dramatic, far-reaching, revolutionary change. Change, of course, is not new. The significant feature for us is that the degree of change is greater and that the pace is faster.

John Condliffe, an economist at the University of California, has suggested that:

“It is not unreasonable to expect that the economic and political maps of the world will register shifts in the location of industry and political structure and in the balance of power that will make the latter half of this century as different from the nineteenth century as the latter half of the nineteenth century was from the eighteenth century.”

My device, then, will be to take up each one of these factors of change, to describe briefly the pattern that was developing in the nineteenth century, and then to carry this forward into the present. Of course nothing that I will say is original. I owe a great deal to the authors to whom I am turning constantly in my own reading and teaching. In preparation for these lectures, I have made particular use of the works of Hans Morgenthau and a new textbook by Norman Padelford and Colonel George Lincoln.

Technological Change

The first topic is technological change. I need not dwell on this at length to you gentlemen. But the points which I would like to emphasize are these: Technological development is a relatively recent phenomenon in human experience, it is happening very rapidly, and it is proceeding at an accelerating pace. Let me illustrate each one of these points.*

* In the paragraphs immediately following, I have made profitable use of a lecture by my colleague, Professor John Wolfenden, Professor of Chemistry at Dartmouth College.

First of all, technological development is relatively recent. The social history of man extends back about 1500 years, yet this period of technological development at most can be measured in terms of several centuries; in other words, only about one-tenth or two-tenths of one per cent of man's history.

What about its rapidity? The newness of technological development can be illustrated vividly if we imagine man's whole social history (1500 years) compressed into the life of an individual of, say, fifty years of age. On this time scale the steam engine was invented only several days ago; the aeroplane was invented only yesterday, or the day before; the radio got underway last night; the A-Bomb went off only a few hours ago.

Consider the speed of this development in terms of the magnitude of the forces unleashed. If we think in terms of the acceleration of the destructive capacity of modern weapons we can appreciate the crescendo effect of technological development. I am told that during World War I the largest explosive was a 2,000-pound shell. At the outset of World War II, it was the 10,000-pound shell. The A-Bombs that were dropped on Japan in 1945 were four thousand times as powerful — 20,000 tons of TNT. We are told by the press that the explosions of the H-Bomb last March in the Pacific were in the magnitude, in the first case, of 10-15 million tons of TNT and in the second case perhaps up to 40 megatons.

Winston Churchill commented on this accelerated pace in a statement in the House of Commons made after these explosions in the Pacific. He declared:

"We must realize that the gulf between the conventional high-explosive bombs in use at the end of the war in Germany, on the one hand, and the atomic bomb on the other (used against Japan), is smaller than the gulf developing between that bomb — that is, the A-Bomb against Japan — and the hydrogen bomb now being developed."

It is not only the application of these technological developments to military affairs that dramatic changes have been taking place. A statement which was made to me recently, which I have not checked but which I think must be pretty nearly accurate, was this: Approximately 75% of the income of the DuPont Corporation now comes from products which have been developed within the last fifteen years. Or take an old industry like the textile industry, one of our oldest. This has been revolutionized by the application of technology in the development of new fibres which are making necessary the development of new looms and all sorts of new techniques of design.

What about the implications and significance of technological change in national and international affairs? Note that it is proceeding at different rates in different parts of the world, and this situation produces all sorts of complications of a political, economic and social nature. Some of the countries are highly developed; others are undeveloped.

The countries in which technological development started in the nineteenth century are those in which it is proceeding now at a more accelerated pace, so that the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped countries is widening. This creates tensions between the developed and the underdeveloped areas as the latter attempt to catch up, as they attempt to skip certain stages of development and as they seek help from the outside but seek it on their own terms. We know that even within our own country these different rates of development cause trouble. Those of us who live in New England are aware of the problems created by the movement of textile mills to the South.

Technological development, going at this highly accelerated pace, has far outrun man's ability to devise social and political institutions to keep up with it. We are living in a world in which the basic political institution, the sovereign state, has changed relatively little, in spite of striking changes in environment. Man has grappled with various ways to close the gap between political

and technological change, but as yet he has been unable to create political institutions to match the new physical conditions. This is not surprising since man changes his political, social and economic institutions slowly. Yet in the business world, to take one example, we have been remarkably successful in devising institutions to keep up with the technological pace, as is demonstrated by the modern corporation. Likewise, on the domestic political scene, we have been able to devise new administrative arrangements to adapt our constitutional structure, which is the oldest constitutional system in the world, to present needs. But unfortunately we have not been able to project these accomplishments to the international level. Consequently the international community is woefully deficient in institutional arrangements for peaceful change and the adjustment of tension and conflict.

Note also that technological developments have contributed to division and disunity in international affairs. It is frequently suggested that with the development of high-speed transportation and communications, with the development of economic interdependence upon the exchange of raw materials and goods and services between one country and another, the world has been drawn closer together. It is declared that it is now possible for an individual to buy a ticket on short notice and fly almost any place in the world, to conduct his business and return. It is possible for him to project his voice around the world instantaneously, to reach the ears of millions in seconds, or their eyes in hours. Yet if we reflect a moment, we realize that while modern technology has made these achievements possible, it has at the same time given governments the means to block the free movements of individuals, the exchange of goods and services, and the communication of information and ideas. This is an age of the economic blockade, the trade boycott, the censor, the propaganda broadcast, the controlled press. Thus, although modern technology has given man the means to create one world, he has chosen to use these means for the opposite result. Technological achievements are

employed to separate people and to hold them apart, rather than to bind them together.

Population Change

The second factor underlying the present world situation that I shall discuss is dramatic and explosive population change. The globe is getting to be an increasingly crowded place. In the last three hundred years world population has increased from about one-half billion people to almost two and one-half billions, a fivefold increase. About two-thirds of this phenomenal growth has come in the last one hundred and fifty years. The peoples of Europe alone have increased in number at an even faster pace, a sevenfold increase in the last three centuries. The United Nations Secretariat, in a recent study, estimates that the population of the earth is increasing by 23-25 million people a year, or at the rate of about 65,000 people a day.

The implications of this population growth are far-reaching; I shall merely suggest a few. First of all, there is the problem of sheer numbers and the pressure of these numbers on the earth's resources. Several years ago, immediately after the war, a number of Neo-Malthusians cried with alarm about this situation. They feared that man's ability to reproduce himself was outrunning his ability to produce enough food, clothing and shelter. This problem of numbers can be exaggerated, particularly when we consider our ability to bring new areas into production and to get more production out of existing resources. Yet even so, it is a very significant problem in certain parts of the world, where the population is increasing and where the people live at a subsistence level. Even if we do accept the proposition that man, through the introduction of new techniques, can produce more food, more services, more goods, we still must recognize that to make these available to the people in these areas, will involve far-reaching social and political changes. In the Orient, for example, the whole family system may have to be altered. These social, political and

economic readjustments in turn are apt to create instability as well as creating political problems of some magnitude.

The second comment along this line is that, as with technology, there are various rates of change in population growth throughout the world. The relative rates of growth of the world's population can be broken down into three broad categories. There are the areas, particularly in Western Europe, of so-called "incipient decline." These were the first areas to experience the industrial revolution and the very rapid development of population in the nineteenth century. In these areas the declining birth rate has caught up with the declining death rate (or it had before the war) and relative stability within a generation or less was to be anticipated. Before the war many of the political leaders in Europe were concerned about the problem of inducing people to have larger families and thus to stem the tide of population decline. Australia and New Zealand, likewise, fall into this category.

In some of these areas, then, relative stability has been reached, with a leveling-off to be anticipated in a fairly short time. In other areas the populations are still in a period of "transitional growth," but relative stability at some time in the near future (a generation, perhaps) is to be anticipated. Many demographers placed the United States in this category before the war, anticipating that our population would level off in about 1970 at around 160-175 million people. The demographers so far have been wrong. Instead of leveling off, our population has continued to increase far beyond our wildest expectations. I suppose many of us here have contributed to this situation! But most demographers still place the United States in the category of transitional growth. They argue that the leveling-off has been retarded. Other countries in this category include Japan and the nations of central Europe. Even the Soviet Union is placed in this category. Although it is experiencing very rapid growth now and will reach 250,000,000 by 1970, it will then commence to level off.

The third category includes the areas of "high potential growth." These are the areas that have not yet experienced the industrial revolution: China, Southeast Asia, India, the Middle East and Latin America. In most cases the populations are large and very dense in terms of cultivated land. Yet, even greater population growth is anticipated. Some authors argue that if these areas are favored by relative internal and external political and economic stability, and if the processes of industrialization are then introduced, we can expect population increases which will be almost fantastic in terms of what we have experienced in the past. It is said, for example, that if these conditions prevail in India the population will increase by 50 million more in a decade. The significance of this situation is that these areas of tremendous potential growth will move out in front, leaving even the Soviet Union behind and, certainly the countries of Western Europe and North America. It means that the peoples of Asia, if they have the relative stability that they need and if they are able to industrialize (and this is not impossible) will outnumber to an even greater extent the peoples of Western Europe and North America who have dominated international affairs in the past century.

One further comment concerning population growth. In the nineteenth century, as the peoples of the earth expanded, they experienced relative freedom of mobility so that the pressures which were generated by rapid growth in Western Europe, for example, were in considerable part taken care of by the movement of people outward. We are familiar with the results of this situation in the history of our own country. To a very great extent the influx of millions of immigrants from Europe contributed to our technological and national development. South America, Africa and parts of Asia likewise experienced this transfer of people from Europe. This safety valve is no longer available; it has not been available for more than a generation. Man's freedom to change his abode from one country to another has been very greatly curtailed. We do have some migration but it is on a highly

selective basis. There have been some very considerable transfers of people, but they have been of a different sort. I am referring here to the practices of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union which forced thousands of people to move from one area to another where they were utilized as forced labor. This type of movement, rather than relieving pressures, has increased tensions and created new sources of trouble.

Changed Distribution of National Power

We move on now to the third general factor underlying the current world situation. This is the changing distribution of power relationships in the world. The nineteenth century world was dominated by Great Britain and the Powers of Europe; it was centered in Europe; it was a European World. The industrial revolution started there and expanded from there. Europe dominated the trade and commerce of the world; it exported its political, its social and economic institutions to the rest of the world. But now we live in a world in which Europe is no longer capable of occupying this central role. The European system has collapsed. In fact the deterioration of this system occurred before the situation was recognized by many here in the United States as well as in Europe. Like a house being undermined from within by termites, the European system still stood into World War II and many of us assumed that its characteristic features would continue after the war. We found, much to our dismay and contrary to much of our planning, that this was not to be the case.

In absolute terms it would be improper to say that the power of Great Britain and of the European nations has declined, although in relative terms Europe is less powerful. As the British and the Europeans have been projected into the present century they find themselves in a world in which they must share their responsibilities and their central position with the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States.

It is interesting to remind ourselves that this change has been generated in part by the Europeans themselves. As Barbara

Ward, editor of *The Economist* has said, "capitalism in one country was impossible for the British." They developed a capitalistic system and it was inevitable that they exported all of its features, but in so doing they laid the groundwork for the undoing of their own position. They exported their political institutions and political ideas, their economic institutions and economic ideas, and made possible the industrialization of other parts of the world which in turn could challenge them. It was a case of the 'children outclassing the parents' within a fairly short time, with the other European countries participating in this same process.

I would like to suggest certain of the factors which have contributed to the relative decline of Europe and the concomitant rise of the two superpowers. We can break these down into economic, political, and perhaps military factors. First, in the economic field, there is the situation that I have already suggested: namely, that the British, and subsequently the Germans and the French, developed their industrial leadership ahead of the rest of the world in the nineteenth century under conditions that were very much in their favor. John Keynes (later Lord Keynes), in his well-known book, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," published at the end of World War I, analyzed the very delicate nature of the European economy that permitted this advantageous situation to exist. Its success depended upon the fact that the working people were satisfied to work for relatively low wages and their employers, the capitalists, were satisfied to live on only a part of their earnings, leaving a good share for capital investment at home and abroad. Thus the earning capacity of Europe — its claim on the rest of the world — steadily increased during the nineteenth century.

This delicate balance has been upset since World War I. The propertied classes have not been able to reinvest their earnings but have had to live on them. The working classes, as they have participated more and more in the political process, have been unwilling to accept the position which they rather willingly

occupied in the nineteenth century. They have demanded more goods and more services.

There are other unbalancing factors. In the nineteenth century the situation was such that Great Britain and the nations of Europe could buy foodstuffs and raw materials overseas at low cost and at the same time sell manufactured goods at a relatively high rate. The balance of trade favored the industrial nations. Reinvestment of earnings contributed to a considerable degree to the continued success of the system. This situation was undermined just before and during World War I and has been aggravated since World War II. We see it dramatically illustrated in the dollar gap. Europe, now behind in the industrial race, has had to pay more for its raw materials and foodstuffs and is selling its manufactured goods, generally speaking, at lower rates. The balance is now running against Europe rather than in its favor.

Another contributing factor is the altered position with respect to other industrial nations. The British developed their industrial might in a period of relatively free trade. They abandoned their protective tariffs, purchased raw materials and foodstuffs abroad and sold abroad in a relatively free market, not only in their colonies but even more so in other countries. As early as the 1870's, France and Germany, and then the United States, having commenced industrialization, adopted protective trade policies, closing their markets to imported goods in an attempt to build up their own industries. As this continued it not only worked against the British but also worked against the European nations. They were challenged by the industrial might of the United States as well as by Japan on the other side of the globe.

Another reason for the relative decline of European power in world affairs is population change. The population of Europe has been falling behind while the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as parts of Asia, have rapidly moved ahead.

Still another factor is the breakup of imperial systems that the European powers had erected in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Later, I shall discuss at some length the colonial revolution that has been taking place. This revolution was European in its origin because these people were acting on ideas which they learned from the Europeans. The resulting dislocation of the imperial system has weakened further the relative position of Europe in the world power structure. Hans J. Morgenthau has pointed out that the existence of the colonies in the latter part of the nineteenth century eased the pressure on the political balance in Europe itself. The European Powers, which were rather closely balanced in Europe, were able to relieve the tensions among themselves by making adjustments along their colonial frontiers in distant parts of the world. They could do that with relative ease. They could make compromises which were not costly; moreover, they could make compromises which were not unpopular at home. With the breakup of this system they no longer have that margin of safety, so to speak, for they no longer have these relatively small stakes with which to play the game of politics. Thus, the pressures are brought back directly within Europe.

With respect to the military changes, let me suggest a few points. As you know, the European system in the nineteenth century rested very largely on the naval supremacy exercised by the British. It is interesting to go back to the writings of Admiral Mahan to see just how that was accomplished. Mahan points out that the British were able to maintain sea supremacy not by scattering vessels throughout the world — although, of course, they did have a cruiser here or a vessel there to show the flag — but actually through the maintenance of their principal units in the waters around northern Europe and the Mediterranean. By controlling the approaches to Europe the British were able to maintain their sea supremacy around the world, because only from Europe could any challenge to that supremacy originate. By maintaining control of these waters against any combination

that might be brought against them they could alter a situation far removed from Europe.

What happened? This system was successfully challenged. In the first place, the Germans began to build up naval supremacy in local waters, limiting the freedom of action which the British had. The Japanese created a navy, in part with the help of the British. Toward the turn of the century the United States developed a navy of some strength and that, likewise, limited the freedom of action of the British in distant waters. In effect, the British had to come to political terms with both the Japanese and the Americans and give up any possible naval action in the Pacific and Western Atlantic, and limit themselves to the greater threat of Germany.

Likewise, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, with the development of land transportation, the influence the British could exert from outside Europe by exercising her sea power around the peripheries was no longer as great. Thus political changes — the rise of Germany, Japan and the United States — and technological changes, which were more dramatically spelled out in the present century in the development of the submarine and aircraft, altered basically the whole framework by which the military supremacy of the British operated in the nineteenth century.

Now what do we have? The nineteenth century was one in which there were, in addition to the British, five or six great powers on the Continent. A relative balance was maintained very successfully for about one hundred years. This system of balances had quite a number of sizeable actors in the game who were able by various devices, one of which I suggested in connection with the use of their imperial areas, to maintain stability among themselves. That meant stability throughout the world because these were The Great Powers. But with the disappearance of these Great Powers on the Continent, and the rise of the two super-

powers, Europe no longer can play this central role in world affairs. We now have a situation in which two powers face each other, with Europe playing a relatively small role in the attempt to maintain a balance.

At the conclusion of the war many Europeans talked in terms of a "third force." They thought that by acting together on the Continent, or perhaps the British apart from the Continent but acting with their Commonwealth, they could play the part of a third force, or balancer. But by 1948, with the inauguration of the Marshall Plan following the coup in Czechoslovakia, most responsible Europeans gave up that notion. Recently there has been a revival of the idea. With the difficulties which we are experiencing in maintaining a coalition of our allies, some of them again are thinking in terms of the possibility of Europe playing a significant role apart from the two superpowers. I am very doubtful that this can be done, thinking in terms of the realities of the power situation. But this is a consideration that will continue to motivate many Europeans, particularly those who wish to demonstrate their independence of the United States.

I conclude by emphasizing again that the nineteenth century was one in which Europe was central and in which the circumstances were such that Europeans, particularly the British, could maintain relative stability throughout the world; whereas the twentieth century is dominated by two superpowers, and the conditions of stability which prevailed in the nineteenth century have disappeared.

PART II

Breakdown of the Colonial System

The next factor contributing to the present situation is the emancipation of the colonial areas. One of the striking characteristics of the latter part of the last century was the development of the imperial systems of the European countries. Great Britain, France, to a lesser degree Germany, and to a certain extent we

in the United States, participated in this general movement. Now these imperial systems are disintegrating and the units are achieving political independence or relative freedom from the mother countries. As I suggested, in the nineteenth century these colonial areas were on the margins of power politics. Now they are to a very considerable degree in the center of power politics. The recent conflicts between the Great Powers have been centered in these areas: Korea, Southeast Asia and to a degree the Middle East. These former colonial areas, rather than remaining on the fringe in international affairs, are now explosive centers in themselves.

What are some of the factors which are bringing about the breakdown of the imperial system and what are some of the implications of this change? In the nineteenth century the existence of these imperial systems enhanced the power of the European countries. It was popular some years ago to say that colonies did not pay, and this was demonstrated on some sort of balance sheet. But that picture notwithstanding, the raw materials which were available to these countries from their colonies as well as the markets which they had there and the manpower on which they drew increased the power and prestige of these European Powers. Moreover, as Europe has become relatively weak, the colonial and former colonial areas in turn have been in a better position to demand concessions, and the granting of these concessions has further weakened Europe. And so the cycle continues. The process was greatly accelerated by the two world wars. More than one observer has suggested that the freedom of India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Indo-China would not have come about had not World War II taken place. Although the Japanese failed to win their wars of conquest in Asia, the impact of their initial victories was to make the restoration of the old pre-war colonial system impossible.

I have already suggested that to a considerable degree the breakup of the colonial pattern is a European achievement; that

in establishing these colonies the Europeans also established the ideas, the techniques and the goals which have led the peoples of these areas to attempt to cast themselves loose from their European masters. I came across a letter the other day from an American traveler-student in Kenya who has been following the development of the Mau Maus. Let me quote several paragraphs that suggest how this process has taken place. In describing an interview with a native African, he writes:

“Joshua Thomas is a detribalized African. When I asked him his attitude toward the coming of the Europeans to his country, he said: ‘You have showed us civilization, sir, but you don’t give us a chance to practice it. You have taught us to eat good food, but we have no money to buy such food.’

Joshua has had some schooling, but not much by Western standards. He is tri-lingual; in addition to his tribal dialect he speaks one other dialect and English. His English is fairly good, but now and then he gets tangled up. Most of his education was in mission schools. The missionaries played a big part in making him what he now is. They even gave him his Biblical name, which he prefers to his old African name. But what the Europeans did not give him was a place in the world in exchange for his old one. Today, Joshua Thomas is rootless, culturally. He has rejected life on the Reserves and has come to live near Nairobi. He strives intensely toward the world of the Europeans, although he knows full well that the color bar is impassable. He is bitter sometimes — and lonely always. He has given up the gods of his forefathers and clings to Christianity, although he dislikes the missionaries who brought him his new religion.”

The life of this one African demonstrates the process that has been taking place. Here is an individual, like thousands and millions of others, who has picked up ideas of individual freedom, individual morality, conduct and justice, and who wants to apply these same things for himself. Likewise, many of his fellows are now acquiring the modern technological skills and knowledge. I would repeat, then, that this process of disintegration was inevitable in the system itself and that it is perhaps Western civilization's achievement that this has taken place in spite of the problems. Europe, the British, even ourselves, have exported our Western ideas of government, of morality and justice, and now other people are trying to apply them to their own situations, demanding the same freedoms that we already cherish.

Another element that is coupled with this desire for self-government is the demand for economic equality. These people have looked upon themselves as economically exploited. In the colonial and former colonial areas they have been called upon for the most part to produce basic raw materials, which have been exported to the more industrialized countries. They now wish (and they believe that political freedom is necessary for this) to develop more balanced economies of their own to secure release from the vulnerabilities of attachments to Europe and to build up thereby their own basic standards of living.

Likewise, they are demanding the ability to control their own security, to protect themselves. This reflects their fears in this bi-polar world which they see. In the past they have been associated with the imperial security systems of the European countries. Now they have the strength and the freedom of action to establish their own peculiar arrangements and to protect themselves. An illustration of this is the case of India who is trying to remain neutral. We happen to believe that they can not do this in the sort of world in which we all live. We say that neutrality is an ancient concept, no longer applicable. Yet in looking back at our own history we can see why these people, who have recently

achieved their own independence or are in the process of so doing, want to detach themselves from exposure to power politics and build up their own security system (which means their own industrial systems and their own military systems).

What are the consequences of this deterioration that has been taking place? I have already mentioned several. First of all, it will contribute to the continued relative decline in the role of the European Powers in the over-all global power pattern. Secondly, as this process accelerates in these colonial and former colonial areas, they will continue to be sources of conflict, both internally and externally; internally, because all sorts of adjustments — social, economic and political — are necessary as they assume the responsibilities of independent government; externally, because the Great Powers will not tolerate their neutrality and will attempt to line them up on one side or the other. Moreover, these new states engage in conflicts among themselves, as demonstrated by the difficulties between Pakistan and India.

One of the greatest consequences of the trends in the colonial world is the new significance of Asia in world politics. This area contains approximately half of mankind. As many writers remind us again and again, this area is very much on the move and new patterns of action and new forms of behavior are developing. Arnold Toynbee, for example, recently declared:

“The challenge of communism may come to seem a small affair when the probably far more potent civilizations of India and China respond in their turn to our Western challenge. In the long run, they seem likely to produce more deeper effects on our Western life than Russia can ever hope to produce.”

Toynbee may be exaggerating, but certainly as these areas achieve political freedom and independence of action, they will play an increasingly large role, particularly if they are able to apply within their own societies the technical advantages which we have developed in our own.

The new awakening that I have been discussing has brought to the peoples of these areas an awareness of what might be called "the good life," not only in terms of levels of living but also standards of human conduct, morality and individual freedom. They are interested not only in the material betterment of their lives but in the freedom of action that has been achieved by Westerners. The problem is that these people, with a different heritage from our own, have grown up with different sets of values and attitudes toward life and different modes of conduct. As they develop, they may do so within entirely different patterns of human behavior from that which we follow and find acceptable. These people of India and south Asia have behind them a rich heritage and certainly one of which they can be proud, but it is quite different from our own. They have not experienced the Renaissance and the Reformation, the liberal movements of nineteenth-century Europe out of which came our political institutions, our notions of the relationship of man to the state, the dignity of the individual, and so on. Therefore, we can expect different attitudes toward life, toward the relationship of man to the state, toward the accepted systems which we have developed and which we cherish.

In this country we have been prone to think of the struggle of the colonial peoples in terms of a struggle for independence from the mother country. This is part of the picture, certainly. But we ought to realize that in these colonial and semi-colonial areas a termination of foreign rule is only part of the picture and that it certainly does not mean the end of exploitation. The British like to remind us that it may mean the beginning of exploitation. The removal of foreign administrators and foreign soldiers does not necessarily remove the only means of exploitation available. In many of the colonial areas there has been a relatively small ruling group separated from the mass of the people. It may very well be (in fact it has been in some instances) that emancipation from a foreign ruler will merely lead to further exploitation by a native ruling class that does not accept Western values and that does not have the interest of the masses of people

at heart. This class will use independence to enhance its own privileged position. So this conflict for independence is at least two-dimensional; it is a struggle against foreign domination, but it is also a struggle against any kind of domination including internal domination. The end of foreign rule does not automatically mean the end of illiteracy, disease, poverty or substandard living. It may mean, unfortunately, the continuation of that unless new leadership can come forward.

This poses a very serious problem for the Western nations since we wish to participate in the constructive development of the so-called "underdeveloped areas." We want to give them aid in a proper way, to give them, as one author suggests, 'a dynamic, upward lift' so that their economies can carry a much higher standard of living, but at the same time insure that our help will bring benefits to all of the people and not just to a relatively few who happen to sit at the top. Moreover, this aid and this upward thrust should be given in a way which will direct these people toward acceptance of the values and standards that we hope to see spread throughout the world. The problem is a great deal more than one of increasing productivity. Unfortunately in connection with our discussions of Point Four, for example, we have perhaps concentrated too much on the importance of increasing the productivity of these areas. We ought to realize that it is possible to increase productivity and at the same time impose totalitarian methods on a state. Certainly Hitler, Mussolini, perhaps Franco in Spain, were all interested in a higher standard of living, more outward signs of more goods and services such as public housing developments, trains that run on time, and all of that sort of thing. As the Soviet Union has demonstrated, it is possible to raise the standards of living and increase productivity dramatically while at the same time enhancing the power of the state and thus creating more of a totalitarian system.

Therefore, in addition to problems of increased productivity we have problems of political and social organization. How are

these people going to govern themselves internally? Are they going to do so under an authoritarian type of regime or will they move in another direction, with greater participation by all of the people in the formulation of national policies and in the achievement of the good which might come from increased productivity? Tied in with this, of course, is the last question: Just how will these people affiliate themselves, internationally? We all know the problem of India in that respect and we wonder about some of the other areas which have recently achieved their independence, or will do so in the near future.

This is a very brief commentary on one of the most complicated problems of the present international situation. It is to these recently colonial countries that we must turn for the signs of future developments.

Nationalism

A fifth factor causing change in the present world situation is nationalism. Nineteenth century nationalism (and I shall be simplifying very much here) was a constructive force. It was a product of nineteenth century European liberalism. Nationalism meant two things, principally: first, freedom from foreign domination and second, increased popular participation in public affairs. Woodrow Wilson popularized freedom from foreign control in the term "self-determination," meaning that every nation should be politically independent. The nationalism of the nineteenth century was very largely that of national independence and self-determination, and it was constructive in that sense. Nationalism as associated with increased popular participation in national affairs was also a constructive force. Western European liberalism brought about the extension of the franchise, the development of parliamentary government, and the growth of concepts of individual freedom.

Turning to our own history we can see that nineteenth-century American nationalism was one of those forces which enabled us to expand across the continent, to grow materially, and

to develop our institutions. It enabled us to draw on the cultures of a great number of peoples who came to us from abroad, combining their best features with our own Anglo-American heritage. From the melting pot there came a new American nationalism and a constructive, powerful, spiritually-motivated force. By and large, differing in degree from country to country, this was the principal manifestation of nationalism in the nineteenth century.

What do we have in the twentieth century? We have gone quite some distance from this constructive type of creative nationalism toward a nationalism which is primarily exclusive in its manifestations. Man now glorifies the state as an individual in itself. Nationalism has come to be a device for achieving the adherence of all people to the goals of the state. Nationalism has created this idea of exclusiveness whereby anything which is not directly associated with that particular nation, or that particular state, is somehow no longer acceptable, is even evil. In its extreme, this form of nationalism was developed by the Germans under Hitler and the Italians under Mussolini, with the fantastic notions of racial superiority and national superiority.

You might say: "Well, this situation prevails in the totalitarian states but certainly nothing of this sort is practiced in the democratic states." Unfortunately the difference between the democratic states and the totalitarian states is not so much one of kind as of degree. We find the basic ingredient of this sort of exclusive nationalism manifested even in our own society.

To summarize: Nineteenth century nationalism was constructive. It was the principal ingredient which brought about the development of the state, giving it cohesive qualities which could then be applied to the further development of social and political institutions within it.

Increased Power of the State

Closely associated with the effects of nationalism is the different role of the state now as contrasted with the nineteenth

century. The nineteenth century was one of relative *laissez faire* in economic and social development. In the twentieth century the power of the state has increased markedly. This is particularly true in the totalitarian states but is also applicable to the democratic states. The state now has tremendous authority, great responsibility, and plays an ever-increasing part in the determination of human affairs.

There are many reasons why this has come about. Many of us decry it and think that it is a great tragedy. But whether it is or is not it is doubtful that it could be otherwise. The increased power of the state has come in part because of demands that the people make upon the state, particularly with respect to economic affairs. In the nineteenth century special groups or interests looked to the state for the utilization of its authority to enhance their own position. The simplest form of that is perhaps the demand for a protective tariff, a very natural sort of demand to make upon one's government. One feels foreign competition. One cannot stem it alone, but one can turn to the state and employ the authority of the state (in this particular case the erection of a customs barrier) to try to rectify this competitive situation to the advantage of the domestic producer. Over a period of years more demands of this sort have been made on the state. Each time that this is done it increases the relative role of the state in our society.

More important than these somewhat specialized requests are the demands made upon the state for services of a broader nature. Many of these we now fully accept, but taken together they account for the transfer of a great deal of activity from private to public hands. At one time the highways, the postal services, the waterways and the schools were all privately maintained. We look to the state for the use of its vast economic powers to try to even the peaks and the troughs in the economic cycle, to ease the burdens of unemployment and of destitution in periods of depression, to provide for old age and other benefits. The responsibilities of the state in these areas are now accepted and political

controversy relates now to methods of operation rather than to fundamental issues. Although many of us don't like the term "welfare state," there is relatively little dispute over the services of such a state, when each service is considered independently.

The principal cause for increased responsibility by the state in recent times has been the demand for security, not security in old age but physical security in the light of modern developments in warfare. It used to be that we could mobilize our resources for defense after a war broke out, or soon before. I need not tell you that this is no longer possible. It is absolutely essential for every state to concern itself with these matters at all times. In an age of modern technology this means concern not only with the actual training of men in the use of new weapons but in the production of those weapons, the budgeting for them, the scientific developments that lead to them, and so on, and this leads the state into a vast array of activities.

The fact that the modern state plays an ever increasing role in human affairs has important implications for international politics. Earlier I pointed out that technological developments, rather than bringing people together, perhaps are separating them because they have made available to these separate states the devices and the means of cutting off contacts, of cutting off the exchange of ideas and the movement of people, of controlling trade and commerce. As the power of the state has increased, the instrumentalities which it can use in international relations in this way have likewise increased.

As the state's control over the means of information and the education system has increased, it is in a better position than it ever has been before to motivate the individuals and to prescribe patterns of behavior. Here I refer to the totalitarian states, although perhaps the difference between these and the democratic states is one of degree rather than kind. Although we now have available the means of mass education and exchange of information which enable more people to be better informed on a

wider range of subjects, the result seems to be rather that more people are thinking alike about more things than has ever happened before in our society. The consequences of this are felt internationally as well.

The International Economic Situation

The breakdown of the pattern of exchange of goods and services which was developed in the nineteenth century is another reason for the changes which have occurred in the twentieth century. The British, as they industrialized, developed a relatively free trading pattern, importing raw materials, food, and some services from overseas and, in exchange, exporting manufactured goods, shipping services, investment and other services. In the nineteenth century this system worked with considerable success and the over-all productive level was increased throughout the world.

As Barbara Ward has suggested, the people of the time looked upon this system as automatic and God-given, it worked so well. Based on the gold standard, the systems of exchange operated from London, the money market of the world, without much knowing attention. The controls automatically kept the system in balance. If a country was buying more than it was selling, it lost gold through the operation of the gold standard and automatically was forced to curtail its buying. The system was willingly accepted though some of the consequences were rather harsh. Sharp fluctuations in employment might be felt in an area, but they brought about adjustment and allowed the system to work.

As a result of all sorts of factors, this pattern was upset. The First World War had a great deal to do with it because it dislocated the normal productive pattern in Europe. Foreign markets were lost to the United States, Japan or to new local industries, and it was hard for the European suppliers to recover the markets after the war. Before the war they had been able to sell their manufactured goods at relatively favorable prices.

This was no longer so after the war. By that time protective tariffs were the usual pattern and the old relative freedom was destroyed. States moved to more, not fewer, controls, as they attempted to stabilize their economies.

The process of controls was greatly accelerated during the depression years, partly as a consequence of the demands for the welfare services, but to a greater degree because people would not accept the consequences of depression and demanded of the state that it take action. That action was national action. It is interesting to stop and realize that our own New Deal was a program of economic nationalism. Where there were conflicts between the relatively free trade ideas of Mr. Hull and the planned economy ideas of Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Hull had to take a back seat for the first several years. The depression thus accelerated this breakup of the old pattern of relatively free exchange of goods and services.

During and just after the Second World War we in the United States hoped that somehow we could get back to that relative freedom. Although, traditionally, we have been a protectionist country we recognized that to restore the pre-war trade pattern, we would have to break down our tariffs. We anticipated this approach when we wrote into the master Lend-Lease Agreements with the British, the French and others, provisions that looked forward to a post-war situation in which trade barriers could be reduced. We took the leadership in preparing a series of international agreements designed to carry this idea forward. For example, we helped set up the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and took the lead in the abortive attempt to establish the International Trade Organization.

But in the years since the war we have come to realize that the disruptive forces were much greater than anticipated, that the European countries are not willing to make the changes in their internal economies that would make it possible to go back to relative freedom. In fact, we are not prepared to make the

necessary sacrifices ourselves, particularly with respect to certain protective industries and agriculture. Right now, we are still pretty much on the fence. The President was forced to raise the tariffs on watch movements from Switzerland but at the same time was very careful to issue clarifying statements and to set up arrangements for another study of our trade position, looking toward relative freedom.

In addition to economic considerations there is the political fact that the world is divided by the Iron Curtain so that there is relatively little trade between East and West. We can never go back to the relatively simple, self-operative trading system of the nineteenth century no matter how desirable it may look to us. We are no longer willing to make the sacrifices, both with respect to security and welfare, that that sort of a system involved. Yet, we have seen the consequences of the economic nationalism of the twentieth century. A course between these two is needed.

The Deterioration of Diplomacy

One of the more troubling developments of recent years has come in the area of the conduct of diplomatic relations. The procedures and standards of behavior employed have become more, rather than less, crude. In the nineteenth century professional diplomats were recruited within the separate countries from the same general social classes. Through similar educational systems they had impressed upon them similar standards and forms of behavior. They constantly improved these standards of conduct and of international behavior and brought into play qualities of decency and humaneness. This trend found its way not only into the prescribed rules of diplomacy, but also in the development of rules of warfare.

What do we have in the twentieth century? These commonly accepted standards of diplomatic behavior and of national behavior have badly deteriorated. Although we in the democratic countries are doing our best to stick to them, we feel, nevertheless, that

we must violate them in certain cases in order to survive. Diplomatic procedures are prostituted for purposes for which they were never intended.

It is paradoxical that as these diplomatic standards of behavior have been violated, we have at the same time been building up other formal instruments for the conduct of international relations, both at the general and at the regional level. Particularly important is the development of the League of Nations after the First World War and of the United Nations and all of its associated instrumentalities since 1945. We now have available to us formalized international organizations that were not available before. This is not the place for an estimation of the value of the United Nations but I would like to suggest that the United Nations represents the culmination of many generations of activity toward the development of formalized institutions of international organization and does make available a forum through which international affairs can be handled effectively. The rules of the game seem to be breaking down but yet the instrumentalities are somewhat improved.

Associated with that is one additional complicating development. This, too, is of a paradoxical nature. In the nineteenth century political affairs were carried on by relatively few people, whereas in the twentieth century, even in the totalitarian states, there is popular participation. In a democratic state this means that the people participate in the formulation of policy and in the projection of those policies into actual programs. In a totalitarian state this broad participation is certainly not in the formulation of policy, but even in these states the ruling classes feel that they must create the illusion of broad participation and have developed devices for apparent participation.

What has been the consequence of this situation, associated as it is with mass education and with the modern means of transportation and communication? It has made the conduct of international affairs much more complicated. It is more difficult to achieve

balance and stability and perhaps at this stage in the game it has made the international scene even more volatile. In our own country we like to believe that a democratic country is necessarily a peaceful country, but I am not certain that we have demonstration of that in history. Many writers have pointed out that with broad participation in policy formulation, and in the discussion of national and international affairs, things are much more unstable than they were previously when a relatively few professionals, all subscribing to more or less the same standards of conduct, could negotiate, compromise and reach adjustment among themselves. In the day of the headline, TV, and radio, when these devices can be used to manipulate opinion and arouse emotional outbursts, tensions between nations and pressures for change may be greater than they were before. One of the contradictions of our time is that as more people participate in national affairs problems of adjustment and compromise become more, not less difficult.

The Nature of the Soviet Threat

I would like to conclude by repeating and amplifying what I said earlier. Although the Soviet Union is certainly *the* central problem to us today, nevertheless these other problems are more basic and more fundamental and will stick with us if the Soviet threat is eliminated. For the United States these factors that I have outlined, in the light of the Soviet threat, present some pretty tough problems. All of these conditions contribute to revolutionary change, breaking up old institutions, bringing about new patterns of behavior and new relationships of peoples to each other. The United States, as a developed and stable country, would be satisfied to keep things pretty much as they are. Unlike an earlier period in our history, we favor the *status quo*. Yet, we realize that we cannot survive by standing still and that these changes are going to continue all about us, creating problems that we simply cannot avoid. Although we would like to be relatively isolated and let things stay pretty much as they are, we cannot do this in a dynamic world. The Soviet Union, on the other hand,

has a tremendous amount to gain by further disintegration and dislocation throughout the world. The Soviet Union lives and breathes on conflict and chaos.

The United States, therefore, has the more difficult task of trying to maintain stability in a rapidly changing situation. This is particularly true of the changes in the colonial areas. We realize that these changes are inevitable, yet the accelerated changes are bringing instability for the time being, at least, and this situation works to the immediate advantage of the Soviet Union. Our problem, then, is to work with these changes in such a way as to preserve sufficient stability and yet enable the colonial people to bring about the social, economic and other changes that are required.

The real challenge to America is to remember that not so very long ago this country was a revolutionary country, the one which was feared by the advocates of the *status quo*, the crowned heads of Europe. At that time there was an American "subversion," the subversion of individual liberty and individual freedom as stated in our Declaration of Independence. We were feared then by those who tried to stem the tide of change, just as the Communists are feared abroad today.

The way to balance and to meet the Soviet threat is to think of what the American subversion can contribute to the peaceful development of each one of these factors underlying the present situation, recognizing that changes are inevitable, and that we have to lead them in constructive, rather than destructive, directions. So I would say, let's not forget the American subversion. We are revolutionists, too. We have the greatest revolution in the world.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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Professor John W. Masland graduated from Haverford College with a B.S. degree and received A.M. and Ph.D. degrees from Princeton University.

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During 1942-43, Professor Masland was employed as Divisional Assistant in the Department of State. In 1945 he was a member of the Board of Editors, "International Organization," Secretariat, United Nations Conference. This was followed by a position as research expert in the Government Section of the Supreme Command, Tokyo. During 1950, Professor Masland was a member of the resident faculty of the National War College. He has been Professor of Government at Dartmouth College since 1946.