often exists when there is a common ideology between state and proxy. Sanctioning is a relationship whereby the proxy is permitted to engage in malicious activities, so long as the ends align with the goals of the state. An example is Russian criminal organizations that are permitted to operate as long as they target only non-Russians with their criminal activities and occasionally turn their skills to patriotic purposes.

The next two sections are the strength of Maurer’s book. He closely examines all three proxy relationships, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of each type and using historical examples to illustrate his conclusions. Maurer clearly establishes historically the benefit of proxies to states and explains why states are likely to use cyber proxies as a tool for the foreseeable future. Maurer also does identify the standards for international legal responsibility that states bear for their proxies; however, after initially identifying these standards, he discusses them only minimally throughout his later case studies.

National security practitioners likely will gain the most insight from these case studies, in which Maurer applies his analytical framework to the use of proxies by the United States, Iran, Russia, and China. Drawing on the most recent events to highlight the use of cyber proxies by these states, he weaves together the economic, social, and political realities of each state and analyzes how these factors affect its use of proxies. Although it is tempting to view proxy relationships as being determined solely by the governmental actors, Maurer reveals how proxies often are a natural outgrowth of their societies. For example, he discusses how a combination of excellent technical training and poor job prospects has led to the increased use of sanctioning as a proxy relationship in countries of the former Soviet Union.

In conclusion, Cyber Mercenaries is both enjoyable to read and an important contribution to scholarship on the study of cyber conflicts. It dispels many of the myths and misunderstandings surrounding the use of proxies and provides an analytical framework that can be applied easily when following news reporting on international conflicts in cyberspace. It should be on the bookshelf of every scholar and practitioner in this vital field of national security studies.

JEFFREY BILLER


As the Second World War recedes ever further into the past, more and more works emerge that focus on historical back pastures or operations either overlooked or examined only lightly until now. Shadow over the Atlantic is an example of such works, but it is also a welcome contribution to understanding the vital Axis anticonvoy campaign and the role of the Luftwaffe in waging war at sea. Robert Forsyth is an experienced author, with a specialty in World War II German aircraft. He tells the story of the attempts by the German navy and air force to coordinate operations so as to maneuver Admiral Karl Dönitz’s U-boats into position to savage Allied convoys. In doing so, Forsyth focuses nearly exclusively on the operations of Long-Range Reconnaissance Group 5, Atlantic (designated FAGr-5).
Arguably, the most well-known German aircraft of the convoy war was the Focke-Wulf 200 Condor. FAGr-5 instead flew the newer, lesser-known, four-engine, twin-tailed Junkers (Ju) 290. Forsyth, with the passion of the true enthusiast, goes into great detail concerning the development and construction of the aircraft. No significant aspect of the plane is overlooked, from cockpit controls to armaments to the background color of the FAGr-5 emblem. Aircraft enthusiasts will find this detailed information of great interest, but lay readers may find just a bit too much emphasis on—at times literally—the nuts and bolts of the Ju-290.

By 1943, the tide in the U-boat war was turning against Admiral Dönitz, Germany’s supreme submarine admiral. His best commanders were dying, the ratio of U-boat losses to Allied tonnage sunk was rising, and the amount of ocean free from Allied air surveillance was decreasing rapidly. German air reconnaissance was deemed essential if there was to be any realistic hope of bringing wolf packs into action against the convoys, and thereby truly hurting the Allied war effort. Had the German navy possessed its own air arm, it might have been easier to provide this; instead, the Luftwaffe never was willing to give maritime reconnaissance anything like the support it needed.

Forsyth details how FAGr-5 went about its duties. He describes how search patterns were established and flown. The nascent use of airdropped buoys to try to track convoys and serve as navigational beacons is examined, as are efforts to use other emerging technologies.

For the pilots and aircrews of FAGr-5, Atlantic reconnaissance missions were long, demanding, and increasingly dangerous as Allied air coverage became more proficient and pervasive. Missions routinely exceeded twelve hours in duration. Weather conditions frequently were miserable, which also increased the risk of navigational error and mishap. Allied escort carriers and long-range, land-based fighter-bomber patrols increased in number, downing several of the group’s Ju-290s and damaging others.

Forsyth tracks the losses and replacement of the group’s aircraft with great care, to a level at which it is possible to track individual airframes over the period. His accounts of air-to-air combat are analytical and detailed. Allied reports are included to good effect. Over the period discussed, attempts to direct U-boats into positions to attack convoys became less and less effective.

Forsyth explains that this was owing in large part to the Allied ability to intercept and decode German radio traffic. This effort was so effective that the British often knew when Ju-290s were actually on patrol and when the next aircraft would be airborne.

After the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, things became increasingly difficult for FAGr-5. Resistance elements began affecting the squadrons’ operations. At times, the group formed ground-combat units and cleared local villages of resistance fighters, taking losses in the process. Getting supplies and needed parts from Germany took ever longer. Morale was low, but, as the records Forsyth accessed make clear, no one admitted such “defeatist” sentiments. During the same month as the Allied invasion, one of the group’s more unusual missions was the rescue of German meteorologists from Greenland.

Inevitably, FAGr-5 eventually flew its last missions over the Atlantic.
aircraft then departed for friendly fields in Germany—leaving the ground element to get out of France on its own. The account of the latter’s trek across France—in an eclectic convoy of vehicles with cobbled-together armaments and increasingly diverse groups of personnel who joined during the retreat—makes for fascinating reading. The trip was not without danger, and several firefights erupted between group personnel and French resistance units. Yet for all the excellent detail that *Shadow over the Atlantic* provides concerning FAGr-5, the human element is lacking. The planes and the operations are the center of attention; the men of the group are identified only rarely. There is the occasional mention of encouraging sports to boost morale or how the loss of a crew was unfortunate, but in the end the vast majority of the men of FAGr-5 are simply ciphers.

RICHARD J. NORTON


Writer, lecturer, retired general officer, and PhD, James Dubik has made a significant contribution to military scholarship and the practice of war fighting with this book. He has introduced a major revision in just war theory that undoubtedly will transform the viewpoint of supporters and critics on this philosophical tradition in applied ethics. Dubik understands that his proposed revision will not answer all objections and naturally will be subject to claims of deficiencies and other criticisms, but he rightly argues that his revised defense of the just war tradition advances a new perspective—one that undeniably will alter the way in which current and future generations interpret the justification of war. Demonstrating a mastery of detail and a clarity of understanding, Dubik persuasively employs the methodology of historiography to support and defend his war-waging principles, basing them on examples from the Civil War, World War II, the Vietnam War, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This methodological technique, reminiscent of Michael Walzer’s *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (Basic Books, 1977), is both convincing and engaging for those who study history and the art of war. By contrast with those who are academics and stress concepts primarily and praxis secondarily, as well as with those who are warfighters and stress praxis primarily and concepts secondarily, Dubik is a former Army general who experienced the challenges of warfare, yet is now a professor at Georgetown University. He balances both theory and practice in *Just War Reconsidered*, his magnum opus. Although Dubik respects and acknowledges the profound contribution to just war theory made by Walzer—as part of a long line of philosophers and theologians, including Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius, to name only a few—he criticizes the customary separation of *jus ad bellum* (justice in going to war) and *jus in bello* (justice in waging war). Walzer presents the usual understanding: that senior civil leaders debate the criteria that justify going to war, represented by *jus ad bellum*, and then, once a national decision...