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Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory

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aircraft then departed for friendly fields in Germany—leaving the ground element to get out of France on its own. The account of the latter’s trek across France—in an eclectic convoy of vehicles with cobbled-together armaments and increasingly diverse groups of personnel who joined during the retreat—makes for fascinating reading. The trip was not without danger, and several firefights erupted between group personnel and French resistance units. Yet for all the excellent detail that Shadow over the Atlantic provides concerning FAGr-5, the human element is lacking. The planes and the operations are the center of attention; the men of the group are identified only rarely. There is the occasional mention of encouraging sports to boost morale or how the loss of a crew was unfortunate, but in the end the vast majority of the men of FAGr-5 are simply ciphers.

RICHARD J. NORTON


Writer, lecturer, retired general officer, and PhD, James Dubik has made a significant contribution to military scholarship and the practice of war fighting with this book. He has introduced a major revision in just war theory that undoubtedly will transform the viewpoint of supporters and critics on this philosophical tradition in applied ethics. Dubik understands that his proposed revision will not answer all objections and naturally will be subject to claims of deficiencies and other criticisms, but he rightly argues that his revised defense of the just war tradition advances a new perspective—one that undeniably will alter the way in which current and future generations interpret the justification of war. Demonstrating a mastery of detail and a clarity of understanding, Dubik persuasively employs the methodology of historiography to support and defend his war-waging principles, basing them on examples from the Civil War, World War II, the Vietnam War, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This methodological technique, reminiscent of Michael Walzer’s *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (Basic Books, 1977), is both convincing and engaging for those who study history and the art of war. By contrast with those who are academics and stress concepts primarily and praxis secondarily, as well as with those who are warfighters and stress praxis primarily and concepts secondarily, Dubik is a former Army general who experienced the challenges of warfare, yet is now a professor at Georgetown University. He balances both theory and practice in *Just War Reconsidered*, his magnum opus. Although Dubik respects and acknowledges the profound contribution to just war theory made by Walzer—as part of a long line of philosophers and theologians, including Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius, to name only a few—he criticizes the customary separation of *jus ad bellum* (justice in going to war) and *jus in bello* (justice in waging war). Walzer presents the usual understanding: that senior civil leaders debate the criteria that justify going to war, represented by *jus ad bellum*, and then, once a national decision...
has been reached, it is the primary responsibility of senior military leaders to fight the war in accordance with jus in bello norms. Convincingly, through historical references and extrapolations, Dubik demonstrates that successful wars have been won not only on the basis of tactical excellence but also on the strategic merit that both civil and military leaders have provided. Dubik insists that just war proponents have focused exclusively on the tactical dimension of jus in bello, thereby omitting the strategic facet of waging war, including the necessary public legitimation, determination of end-state goals, provision of logistical support, and preparation for reconstruction.

The five principles laid out—continuous dialogue, final decision authority, managerial competence, war legitimacy, and resignation—presuppose the classic benchmarks of proportionality and discrimination in jus in bello, but these additional five strategic components fill in the gap of what is tragically lacking in the standard just war formulation. When senior civil and military leaders fail to optimize strategic coordination of war via a dynamic partnership involving intense dialogue, the costs of war escalate in both economic and human-casualty terms, rendering those leaders who squandered the war efforts morally culpable. Unforgettably, General Dempsey in his foreword asserts that one of the most important and haunting lines from the entire book consists of these few words: “The difficulty of conditions that may mitigate responsibility does not erase it” (p. viii).

Dubik’s critique is not a replacement of Walzer’s ideas defending just war but rather an addendum that augments the value of strategic planning and cooperation between civil and military leaders. On reflection, a reader might question whether the strategic aspect of jus in bello might not exist already, to some extent, within jus ad bellum, considering military advisement as part of the moral calculation of proportionality and probability of success. Additionally, the reader might wonder whether the acceptable range across the military operations continuum would be determined best if the strategic dialogue and robust collaboration between civil and military leadership that Dubik champions went on not only as part of jus in bello but at every stage of war and peace. For instance, the war-waging principle of continuous dialogue also might apply to jus ante bellum (justice before war: strategic planning to shape fragile states so as to prevent war), jus ad bellum (justice in going to war: debating all nonkinetic and military options), and jus post bellum (justice after war: planning for reconstruction) to achieve jus pax (just peace).

Overall, Dubik’s strategic supplement to the category of jus in bello is a legacy that posterity will credit respectfully to the experience and wisdom of a distinguished scholar and warrior.

EDWARD ERWIN


June 4, 1942, stands out as one of the most pivotal moments in American naval history. The events of that day continue to be analyzed, scrutinized, and