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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

**Issued Monthly
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.**

THE ROLE OF LABOR IN WAR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 28 April 1955 by
Mr. Victor G. Reuther

Thank you, Admiral. Gentlemen:

I am very grateful to the officers on the staff of your College here for their kind invitation to me to participate in your program. I want to make it very clear that I pose in no sense as any expert in a matter as weighty as that of conducting war — that is, in the traditional sense of that term.

Of course, the world has changed a great deal, for warfare is not limited to the firing of guns from planes and battleships or from equipment on the ground. The kind of foe that confronts the free world today has little respect for traditional methods of warfare, as it has little respect for traditional methods of diplomacy. The whole nature of war and diplomacy have undergone very great changes, as you gentlemen know far better than I. But, in the limited area in which I have spent most of my adult life, I have a very strong and a very deep conviction that in the final analysis the victory of the free world will depend in far greater measure on what is done at the social, the economic and the political level — at the level where we seek to win the hearts, the minds and the souls of men and where we can mobilize our resources to do justice to the democratic cause in that area — than in the area of traditional warfare alone.

I would not be so presumptuous as to argue the point that it is one approach as against another. It is a combination of all approaches that we have at the various levels that will determine whether or not the free world will survive. I have a very strong feeling that in a realistic sense we have not even begun to mobilize

democracy's resources in this important strategic, economic and political area nearly as effectively as we have already demonstrated our might, our strength and our influence in the traditional military field.

It is in the economic and political areas that the Communists have been making their greatest gains. Their victories have not been military victories in recent years; they have been victories of infiltration, of penetration, of capitalizing on internal economic and political chaos, and of capturing from within. Coming out of the labor movement, I have had some personal experience with the skills which the Communists have demonstrated in this area of infiltration and penetration of economic and political organizations, and of using them as weapons in their larger strategy. I have some personal knowledge of the sacrifices that are being made around the world today by democratic non-Communist groups who are at grips with the Communists, who are locked in battle with them, and who are winning that battle in crucial areas at the very moment when the nations of the free world in the military and diplomatic fields are either suffering reverses or have been forced into a stalemate.

I come to you today with the plea that we need to take a long, hard look again at what the Communist strategy is, what its goals and objectives are and the weapons which it has at its disposal. We also need to take a long, hard look at whether or not we are trying to defend democracy with our strongest arm tied behind our back.

I think that American labor, when it put its own house in order by defeating the Communist forces inside of our own labor movement, made a significant contribution to our own internal security and thereby enhanced our strength in the world-wide struggle. There are few groups in our country or around the world that are singled out for attacks by communism as is the labor

movement. The trade union movement is at the very heart of Communist strategy; it is the vehicle which it hopes to capture and then to ride to power in country after country.

The Communists have not really tried to capture the lawyers, or the businessmen, or the churches in a serious way. But the Communists, as part of their world-wide strategy, have sought to penetrate and capture the labor movement. So it is no great credit to the business community if the Communists have not captured it, although in many countries there has occurred something just as bad: the ultra-extremism of nationalism and of fascism has captured the mentality of some employer groups. But it is to the credit of the labor movement that it has been able to see this strategy of the Communists, recognize it for what it is, and lick them at their own game. It is to the credit of the American labor movement that in this day and age the Communists enjoy no significant strength whatsoever in any of the basic unions across the length and breadth of this country of ours.

I think that we can look back with considerable pride on the role which American labor played in helping to mobilize America's great resources and great strength in the last war. This mobilization reflected itself not only in the Armed Forces, to which industrial labor contributed a very large percentage of the personnel of the Armed Services. It was also reflected in the flexibility of the American labor movement in making whatever adjustments were required in its own practices and policies to facilitate the greatest degree of mobility. As a result of these adjustments the labor force could be shifted from one industry to another to keep pace with the shift from peacetime to wartime production. This is a tribute to American labor.

Long before the Selective Service Act incorporated provisions to protect the reemployment rights of individuals who were inducted into the Armed Service, the American labor movement, on its own initiative, wrote into its collective bargaining agreement

the following guarantees: that when men were inducted into Service their reemployment rights continued to build up and accumulate; that their service credits were equal to any credits in the factory itself; and that they were guaranteed reemployment with accrued seniority rights. But, most of all, the greatest contribution of the American labor movement to the preservation of our free institutions grows out of its determination to make our democratic way of life not just a slogan to be repeated on national occasions, not just the subject for oratory, but something which every factory worker, farmer, and housewife can live, can enjoy, can feel, and with which he can identify himself.

Why have the Communists won no significant influence in the American trade union? Because American democracy has been made to function in the labor movement. It has brought real and genuine benefits to ordinary people; it has not been built along class lines which helps the owners of industry alone to amass great profits, with a vast number of industrial workers living at pitifully low living standards — as is the case in many countries around the world. If we in America are so naive as to think that in those poverty-stricken areas, we can defend the *status quo* or hold onto the established institutions of wealth by mere military defense measures while the population in no sense identify themselves with democracy and feel that they have little or no stake in it, we are naive indeed.

The contribution of the American labor movement during the last war effort was not limited alone to industrial mobilization, for out of the labor movement came significant ideas on increasing industrial mobilization and production for war purposes at a time when it was desperately needed. But, unfortunately, many of those ideas were not welcomed. Some industrialists considered these proposals as though they were suggestions from a partisan segment of the community which had no right to put forward proposals on industrial mobilization.

There was a proposal that came out of the United Auto Workers Union — CIO to build 500 planes a day in the automobile industry. The initial reaction of the industry was: "This is nonsense and it is impossible; 85%-90% of the industrial equipment of the automobile industry is single-purpose equipment which cannot be converted to the manufacturing of parts for airplanes." That was the argument and, as a result, the conversion of the automobile industry was delayed for at least eighteen months because of that attitude. The industrialists finally did convert their plants for war production and, at the end of the war, the owners of the automobile industry pointed with pride to the fact that 80%-90% of their facilities were converted to such production.

I had an experience some years prior to World War II which made me feel especially sad when I saw the leaders of a tremendous industry, like the automobile industry with its great technical know-how and engineering genius, arguing against the simple suggestion that its machinery and its equipment could not be converted to war production. I spent two years working in the Ford factory in the Soviet Union in 1933-34. Technicians were recruited out of the Ford plant in Detroit and sent there to help equip that factory. The Soviet government had purchased the tools, the dies, the jigs and fixtures from the Rouge plant in order to manufacture the Model "A" Ford automobile. I went there as a technician and I worked with young peasant lads out of the Volga country who had never seen anything more complicated than a wheelbarrow or a pitchfork. They built a factory, uncrated equipment shipped from abroad, and began to manufacture cars.

I worked in the tool room. It took three months before one single die was built which would operate to stamp out a part. Each part in that die had to be made six and seven times because somewhere along the line it would be scrapped. Out of this peasant background, nevertheless, they learned how to do this work. Along side the company engineers were Red Army officers who supervised the tooling for tank production. The factory, back in 1933-34,

when it got into its first stage of production, was tooled not only for Model "A" production but for light tank manufacturing as well. No one argued about single-purpose equipment. The Russians knew what they wanted — and they tooled their plant for it.

It was tragic for me to return to my own country and have to argue with the heads of the industry that this equipment was not "single-purpose." America had a great car market that year and it was quite profitable to exploit that market. Car production got priority at a moment when tooling for defense production should have been given top-level consideration. I mention that not out of any sense of bitterness but as an illustration of the fact that out of the labor movement came a genuine, deep-seated desire to make its contribution to the total mobilization of our country for meeting the forces of aggression around the world. That sense of dedication to the national interest has grown ever stronger in the ranks of the labor movement.

I dare say that it will come somewhat of a surprise to you gentlemen to know that at this very moment around the world are stationed trade unionists from the shop, the mines, and the mills whose wages and living expenses are paid out of the voluntary contributions of American workers. These trade unionists are being sent to distant parts of the world to help advise and strengthen the democratic non-Communist trade union groups who are locked in battle against activities and forces of the Communist trade unions seeking to capture or to keep control of the labor movement.

Why is this matter crucial to the world-wide struggle which is going on at the present time? Let me say that where there is a country that has strong and democratic trade unions, there you have no internal Communist problem. Look at the map of the world, country by country.

There is no internal problem in Britain as far as the Communist threat is concerned. There is a strong free trade union

movement there which is active at the workshop level and down in the pits, doing battle with the Communists when they seek to get a foothold.

Is anyone concerned about an internal Communist threat in the Scandinavian countries? Of course not.

Even in Germany — physically divided, with a third of the country occupied by Red Army troops — is the Communist Party itself strong and does it constitute an internal threat in that area? It does not.

In little Austria, an island cut off from the rest of Free Europe, where there is also one-third of it occupied by Soviet forces (but with a unified government that has unified elections), the Communist Party gets no more than 30%-40% of the votes in their elections.

We have strong trade union movements in those countries which work hard at the grass-roots level to give the people not only the feeling, but the substance of the democratic way of life; to identify the people with the institutions of democracy and to give them a feeling that there is something worth defending there — not just slogans.

Step across into France and Italy, where the Communist Party captured the labor movement at the end of World War II and tried to forge the trade union movements into instruments of political aggression. They remain in power in France and Italy as the dominant forces in the trade union movement for only one reason — and one reason alone. It is not because of the skill and ingenuity of the Communist forces at the labor movement and worker levels, but because the social and political climate in those countries are ideal for planting the seeds of Communist ideology. There are miserably low living standards and great exploitation in France and in Italy. No amount of military alliances alone which we can make with those countries will give us any degree of security.

I lived for nearly three years in a little village on the outskirts of Paris. Working out of the little office, an old dilapidated building some 400 years old, I moved across Europe making contact with non-Communist trade unionists, counseling with them and advising them. I put through a lot of demonstrations in France, where the Communists mobilized their forces to try to block every single effort which the West tried to put into operation.

At the end of the war, the Communists did not want any ships unloaded with any military equipment. It was not a meeting of military minds, gentlemen, that made it possible to land the arms in Marseille. There were trade unionists down there who broke the hold of the Communists over the dock workers in Marseille and permitted the ships to unload the military supplies.

But elsewhere in France and in Italy there is not the feeling on the part of ordinary people that there is something worth defending. The average French worker and the average Italian worker draws a weekly wage of one-quarter of what American workers earn. But when he buys the necessities of life for himself and his family he will pay as much, or more, than what we have to pay in the United States. Yet, the earnings of industrialists in Britain and in France, in terms of their capital investment, is greater than what American employers enjoy. There is this great gap between the "have's" and the "have not's." Democracy will remain but a slogan in France and Italy unless there is economic democracy, unless there is a feeling on the part of the people that they share in the benefits of what is produced in their economy. As long there is this great gap, or this great division, there is fertile soil for the Communists to plant their seeds of totalitarianism. It will grow and will be nourished in that kind of climate of insecurity and inequality, where there is a feeling of discrimination—a feeling that if this is democracy, there is little worth defending.

It is our feeling that people have to be given a stake in the democratic way of life if they will fight to defend it, and if they will make any significant contribution to a common defense. Of what real value is there to squeeze through a vote in the French Parliament of a 51% majority to commit French divisions to a European Defense Pact if there remain 5 million voting Communists in that country, and if those divisions that are recruited and armed are representative of those 5 million voters? A logical question to ask is: How many of the guns will point in what direction?

What we have to do is to begin working at the heart of the problem, of winning people to the cause of democracy, and not being content only with having a majority vote of a given government which may not be in power tomorrow. People remain; if people are given a stake, a share, and an investment in the democratic way of life then come what may, by way of cabinet shifts and changes at the parliamentary and legislative level, there is a strong foundation on which one can build. In this regard, I believe that at the workshop level the democratic free trade unionists around this world are making a contribution to the cause of democracy second to none.

On my first visit to Berlin, after the war, I remember something which General Clay said. I thought it was quite significant. We were talking about the efforts which the Communists were making to capture the trade union movement in Berlin by the use of a phony united front which they had put up; how the Berlin trade unionists had successfully resisted it—even in the Soviet sector of Berlin—and what a terrific boost this victory had given to the morale of the beleaguered city of Berlin, which was going through the siege of a blockade and was living only by the air lift. General Clay said that he doubted very much that the Allied forces could have stayed on in Berlin if the trade unionists had not won that victory. At that time, there was no real democratic political machinery established and the free labor

movement was therefore the most representative single group which spoke for the people in that beleaguered city. To give the Communists that kind of resounding defeat in their own back yard, to strike them a blow in such a vulnerable point, was a significant contribution.

In the crucial post-war years, the trade union movement around the world, with its own limited funds (and they were limited, indeed), have been pulling together the framework of a free trade union movement — a democratic, non-Communist movement called for the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) — which, today, represents 54 million people around the world in 57 different national trade union centers. This non-Communist trade union movement now enjoys personal contacts with democratic workers in practically every part of the world, including some that are under Communist control, where it maintains its connections through exiled groups who have liaison with groups behind the Iron Curtain.

Japanese trade unions, trade unions from Indonesia, from India, from Burma, from all of the underdeveloped countries of the Middle East, trade unions from dozens of countries in Central and Latin America, and, of course, all of the significant European trade union movements as well as those in the Northern Hemisphere, are members of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, which has operational headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. There is a staff of some seventy (70) experts and five(5) main regional offices around the world — in the Western Hemisphere, in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia, in the Far East, and in Europe — with a corps of trained labor experts who are practical trade unionists and who know how to organize a democratic trade union to give expression to the hopes and aspirations of people — experts, in other words, who know how to outmaneuver the Communists at their own game. In my opinion, these people are hard at work in various areas of the world making a very vital and significant contribution to the cause of the free world.

You cannot separate work at this level from what is done by the labor movement at the national and government level in terms of providing the kind of broad economic and political policies that tend to encourage the development and growth of democratic institutions of this nature. That is the reason why American labor has been so deeply concerned that the United States Government take the bold initiative in developing the economic policies and programs in the underdeveloped countries of the world that will remove the possibility of exploitation by Communists by creating the kind of wholesome economic climate that will encourage the growth and development of democratic trade unionism and democratic institutions.

We have met with success and we have met with disappointing failures as well. Some of the successes and some of the failures have been rather close at home here in our own Western Hemisphere. Last week, in Costa Rica, a large body of labor delegates from all over North, South and Central America gathered, meeting as a Western Hemispheric unit of our World Confederation of Free Trade Unions. They took stock of the situation in Latin America and one of the incidents which came up for discussion was the developments in Guatemala. I would like to spend just a few minutes in talking about that incident because it is close at home and because America has been so heavily identified with events there.

I need not go into the history of that incident. You know that what started out as a democratic revolution — probably as democratic as was our own Revolution in the early days — was distorted, was twisted and was captured by the Communists in Guatemala. But there were certain things which were set in motion during the early days of the democratic upheaval of Guatemala that were legitimate and should have enjoyed our support. One of these was that there should be a program of land reform.

How much loyalty do you think the American farmers would have for our democratic way of life if they were peons

working on vast tracts of land owned by tremendous landlords, or, worse yet, by firms from other countries who came in and made investments here and bought huge tracts of land? This is the background and this is the mentality of many, many people in Latin America who are quite suspicious of American firms that come in and buy out huge parts of their country to exploit their natural resources.

Here there was a system of land reform set in motion, for which the Communists later took credit and out of which they made political capital. There was a code of labor legislation which gave workers — whether they were plantation workers on the United Fruit plantations, whether they were railroad workers on the railroad lines owned by United Fruit, whether they worked in telephone and communications, or whatever — the right to unionize. It gave them the right to meet together and discuss their common problems and the right to petition for redress of grievances, a very fundamental right in a democracy.

The Communist regime is out and the so-called “democratic regime” is in with America’s official blessing. But one of the first acts of this new democratic regime was to wipe out the land reform program and to destroy the labor code. We have been meeting with workers down there who had the courage to fight underground the Communists while they were in power — and who say today: “We want the right to unionize.” You cannot fight the Communists who capture the labor movement or who capture the land reform program by substituting a vacuum in its place. The answer to Communist demagoguery is not inaction — it is positive democratic action. The great tragedy is that the military victory that was won in Guatemala may be lost and may go “down the drain” because of our failure to implement it at the social, the economic and the political levels; by our neglecting to provide the opportunity for indigenous organizations, democratic in character, to establish their own roots so that democracy has

a staying power, and so it can continue to challenge the threat of communism as it raises its ugly head.

Not far from Guatemala is the little country of Costa Rica. The man who was tapped on the shoulder to be Minister of Labor chose, instead, to become General Secretary of our Western Hemispheric unit of the ICFTU — an able young man by the name of Molcha. He has helped us to establish very significant trade union contacts south of the border in democratic countries and in countries of dictatorship (and the majority south of the border and in our backyard fall in the latter category). In Costa Rica, a model democracy has been established in this Hemisphere. You can search the length and breadth south of the border and you will find no government more genuinely dedicated to democratic practices and principles than Costa Rica.

Three months ago, I had the privilege of leading a delegation from CIO to visit the State Department. We informed the State Department officials that we had received information from our contacts in Costa Rica and Honduras, as well as in Mexico, that there was a military build-up on the private plantations across the border in Nicaragua and that this build-up was formed for the purposes of a military invasion. We cautioned the State Department that if this democratic government of Costa Rica were threatened or overthrown by military acts of aggression and if the Western Hemisphere organization, of which the United States was a part, did not quickly intervene, this refusal to act would serve notice on every friend of democracy south of the border that America was not on their side. It would also raise and revive the old fears of gringo intervention in Latin America.

We didn't think at the time that our advice to the State Department was taken too seriously. Perhaps the officials were being coy. But I was proud a few weeks later when the American government moved quickly; proud that it took the initiative — not alone in a unilateral action, which some could accuse as

being "Yankee intervention," but moved quickly as part of the Hemisphere team. It pledged military support to the country of Costa Rica that was threatened with open aggression and that incident did a great deal to clarify the issues south of the border — issues that were not too clear in the case of Guatemala.

These incidents have a very direct relationship to the kind of military alliances which we build around the world and to the kind of real and meaningful strength that is breathed into these pacts if these pacts are to be something more than paper documents, if they are to carry with them and behind them — as a powerful backstop — the will and determination of people to fight for freedom and free institutions. You do not build that kind of feeling and that kind of understanding by action at the diplomatic level alone. That kind of understanding by action at the diplomatic level alone. That kind of understanding can be built by people-to-people contacts, or the kind of relationships that can be established between farmers in this country meeting with farmers in other countries, between factory workers from here meeting with factory workers in other countries.

When the people around the world are generally concerned about defending free institutions, when they get to know us as we really are, when they get to understand what our own hopes and aspirations are, when they get the feeling that we are interested in them as people and are concerned with their problems — not just looking upon them as so many potential mercenary forces that might be thrown into some grand military strategy — then, and only then, will we build meaningful alliances. In order to do that, we have to put the kind of resources behind our economic and our political strategy that in the past have been part of our military strategy. I am not suggesting — and I want to make this very clear — any tearing-down of our military defenses; I am for keeping them strong and at whatever level is required to meet the threat of aggression. But that is but one arm — and the job cannot be done unless the other arm is put at work as well.

How much will this kind of economic program cost us? Well, the total cost of Marshall aid from the end of World War II up to now has been slightly more than 30 billion dollars. World War II cost us 30 billion dollars per month for forty-four (44) consecutive months. So the relative cost of building the kind of economic climate that will encourage democracy is "peanuts" compared to the resources that we put into military defense alone.

This year, the Soviet Union is investing 2 billion dollars in economic aid, technical assistance, and technical personnel in Red China. That is ten times the economic aid which we are making available to India and twenty-five times the number of technicians. Now I ask you whether or not—in terms of the great struggle that faces the free world—India is as important to us as Red China is to Russia? Is the Soviet Union—with its limited industrial power compared to ours, with its far weaker economy, and with its far smaller supply of reserves and surpluses—in a better position to extend economic aid of this kind than we are? We have been most unrealistic; we have been penny-wise and pound-foolish in thinking that we can put all of our eggs into one basket and still fight a Communist strategy.

I think that the time has come when the free world has to mobilize all of its resources and match the real challenge of Communist aggression at every level with a superiority of reserves and resources. There are a billion and a half people in Southeast Asia, the Far East, and Africa who have not made up their minds yet which side of the fence they are on in this struggle. Whichever way these people throw their weight can be quite decisive. If we win them to the cause of freedom, we will have to work at an entirely different level than that at which we have been working.

In India, the average annual wage or income is less than fifty dollars a year and there are some 80 million people either completely out of work or only partially employed. The living

standards are pitifully low, with the vast majority of the people going to bed every night feeling hungry and having no great anticipation that the morning will bring them any greater degree of satisfaction. Of what significance does the signing of a military pact have to them? Or, perhaps they are suddenly dismissed as being "neutralists." They are not neutral in the choice between having food and not having food. When the free world goes to them with an offer of cooperation (I am not saying a "hand-out") to make young technicians available to help them develop their own economy, when the free world shows practical demonstrations of concern in their problems as human beings—we shall bridge the gap that divides us from them; we shall win them to the cause of the free world; we shall wrest the initiative from the Russians and their satellites by that kind of bold leadership in an area which up until now we have, to too large an extent, left to the Soviets alone to exploit. The pattern of the great successes of the Marshall Aid Program in Europe—and these successes have been tremendous and not been costly when weighed against other expenditures in our national economy—if applied with the new lessons we have learned as a result of that experience, we can win the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Far East to our cause.

I think there is a kind of practical know-how in the ranks of the labor movement about doing battle with the Communists which grows out of the experience we have had. It has not been learned out of textbooks—we have had to rub elbows with the Communists who tried to capture our movement. We recognize these Communists to be of the same breed and the same stripe as the Communists we ran into in France, Italy, Japan and Guatemala. It is as though they were all trained in the same "little *Red* schoolhouse"; they all rely upon the same technique of forging poverty, insecurity and misery into a weapon of aggression. They have no right to that weapon—that weapon should never be in their hands! If we would rob them of that potent weapon, then we must offer more than just a vacuum.

We must offer a counterproposal far more dramatic in its appeal and far more potent in terms of its effect. We have the resources. We are, in fact, so glutted with agricultural and farm surpluses that they cause national worry and concern.

In a recent meeting of the Foreign Operations Administration, Governor Stassen was talking about his own plans for using these surpluses as part of our total aid program in order to gear it in with our total strategy to win people. I made this comment: "Suppose the Soviets were worried with this kind of a problem. Suppose the Soviets had these tremendous surpluses of wheat, butter, and all of the rest. They would not sit around, hanging their heads. They would forge all of this into a weapon of aggression! We ought to forge our advantages into a weapon for real, world-wide understanding — a weapon in the defense of democratic rights, democratic concepts, and democratic institutions."

That is what labor is interested in doing. We do not pretend to be military strategists. Labor makes its contribution as enlistees and as drafted people in the Armed Forces. But in this area of winning the hearts and minds of men, in this struggle at the ideological level, labor has had some experience which to this date is not reflected in the policy levels of either our government or the other governments of the free world.

In conclusion, I wish to remind you that America has natural allies around the world — 54 million trade union members who have demonstrated their loyalty to the democratic way by booting the Communists out in their own movement; people who have made their dedication and their commitments to the free world; people who are daily making sacrifices to demonstrate their faith in free trade unions and free institutions. These are natural allies which the free world would do well to enlist in its cause.

I thank you for this very great opportunity to share the thoughts and thinking of trade unions in this very important matter. Thank you very much!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Mr. Victor G. Reuther

Mr. Victor G. Reuther, the youngest of three brothers who have become important figures in the American labor movement, was born in Wheeling, West Virginia, in 1912. He attended West Virginia University and Wayne University in Detroit.

In 1933, he and Walter Reuther visited abroad, traveling to several European countries, and then went on to Russia where they worked sixteen months as machinists in the Gorki auto plant. From Russia, they visited Siberia, India and Japan.

In 1935, Mr. Reuther went to work for the Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Company in Detroit. He was leader of the first sit-down strike in the Detroit area, in 1936, which resulted in winning union recognition and a wage increase at that company. His activities were then transferred to Flint, Michigan, where a crucial struggle broke out between the United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers Union (U. A. W.) and General Motors. He assisted in mapping the strategy for the Flint strikers, which resulted in General Motors signing a union agreement with U. A. W. During the next four years, he played important parts in a series of organizing drives which culminated with the unionization of the Ford Company.

During the war, he served as a labor member on the War Manpower Commission. He was also co-director of the War Policy Division of the U. A. W.

The factional disputes within the U. A. W., between the Communist wing and left wing supporters and the anti-Communist wing led by Walter Reuther, was climaxed at the U. A. W. Convention in 1946 — when Walter Reuther was elected President of the U. A. W., and Victor Reuther became Educational Director.

Mr. Reuther served as fraternal delegate of the C. I. O. at the London meetings in 1948 of the Trade Union Advisory Committee of the European Recovery Program and as the representative of American Labor and Co-Chairman of the Anglo-American Committee on Productivity of E. C. A. He was one of a committee of three sent by the C. I. O. to study the trade union and economic conditions in Europe in 1951, which finally led to the establishment of the C. I. O. European Office and to his appointment as representative. In this position, he worked closely with the anti-Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

In September, 1953, Mr. Reuther was assigned to National C. I. O. Headquarters as Administrative Assistant to Walter Reuther, and, more recently, as Assistant to George Meany, the present Director of C. I. O.

ASTIGMATISM AND GEOPOLITICS

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 29 August 1955 by
Professor Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr.

In the sixth century, the good monk Cosmos made a map. It is a wonderful map: the earth, the center, surrounded by water, the sky above, and over all that room for the blessed. Cosmos drew it all in his cell, and he knew that what he drew was accurate—he had the Holy Scriptures as source material.

Now you and I and Monk Cosmos would have a certain amount in common. We would agree that there is land, and that there is water. You and I might, however, experience some difficulty in persuading the good monk that there is air, but we might. Beyond that, there would be grievous differences of opinion. But this is a normal state of affairs. Because maps when looked at become ideas.

Aside from measurements in knots and miles and cubic footage, or quantities of this or that, there is a serious question whether there is much else on the face of the globe about which we today agree unreservedly among ourselves. At the very least it would seem undeniable that the way in which we look at a map of our little planet suggests whole ranges of thinking altogether different from one another.

Spin a school boy's globe of the world. Viewed from the equator the blue of the sea becomes all-important, the land masses fade. The faster the globe is spun the more obvious becomes the fact that the world's surface is largely salt water.

The fact is suggestive. It serves as a reminder that in this day and age the island empires are in league together against the

great Eurasian land mass. It brings to mind the interdependence of the world's islands, and that this interdependence, being industrial as well as cultural, depends upon the traffic of the seas. It may also suggest that in the air age the outside lines of communications may have advantages over the inside ones because of the effect of aerial war on enemy roadnets. And this in turn may suggest that military mobility now depends on seapower quite as directly as it did in the pre-railroad age. From such considerations, and there is no denying the truth in them, certain strategic preferences flow logically enough; geography has dictated them.

But suppose, with the globe still spinning, the eye is shifted to the north polar projection. From this view, the world seems strangely static. Two great continents almost touch in this cold silent vastness. Distance seems to pervade and direct all relationships. One loses a sense of the importance of allies, and air technology — both offensive and defensive — dominates in terrifying singleness all other considerations. Given the destructive capability of modern weapons, taken together with their carriers, the polar projection would appear to be the twentieth century map. "A glance at the globe dispels the distortion of the Mercator projection maps," writes General Bonner Fellers, in his *Wings for Victory*. And he writes it with all the enthusiasm of a man with a great discovery. "From the Arctic mainland of North America to Russia's arctic shore is only 2,000 miles!" This is likewise true.

But the truth is also that men live on the land, and that they continue to exist thereon under conditions which each succeeding generation is equally sure can not endure. Indeed, the great mistakes in military history have to do with mis-estimates of human durability, resourcefulness, and courage. And this in turn suggests that the realistic way to look at the globe is to stop it and to examine the relationships of one piece of land on which people live to another on which they live also.

The point is simply this: Depending upon the angle of sight the meaning of geography changes, and its lessons appear to be different. The situation is much the same as once it was with six blind men each of whom, examining a single part of an elephant, ended his days with a set of convictions as to the nature of the beast quite at variance with those of his fellows.

If one's view of the globe determines the patterns of one's thinking, does it not stand to reason that one's thinking changes one's views of the breadth of the seas, the height of mountains, the real distance between one area or another? And, despite the bad name German pseudo-scholars gave it between the World Wars, "geopolitics" is a convenient name to give to the process by which mind modifies statistical geography. "Geopolitics" is, that is to say, the study of the relative strategic value of various pieces of global real estate with a view to clearer understanding of the direction of national policy. The platform of geopolitics is human judgment. Hence, geopolitical thinking may be brilliant and illuminating, or it may be as mad and distorted as the human mind can make it. The speed at which a ship can sail, the distance a plane can fly, the availability of road-building machinery, governmental stability, all change one's conception of the geopolitical significance of jungle and swamp, tundra, ice flows, and economic complexes.

Now a judgment of the impact of the atomic, the supersonic, and the principle of the Pogo plane on world geography is out of the question here. But if positive thinking is outside the limits of the possible, negative thinking is not necessarily so. And some negative thinking about geopolitics may be helpful as a preliminary to its opposite.

A word or two about the meaning of negative thinking as the term is used here. There are at least two ways of looking at war, as there are indeed at any subject. Those who lose wars study what went wrong. Those who win canonize the principles of their success and, parenthetically, it is rare that both aspects

receive comparable treatment within the hard covers of a single book — as they do, for example, in Professor-Admiral Samuel E. Morison's volumes on the Naval History of World War II. Because the United States has won its wars, perhaps an insufficient attention has been given to what goes wrong and why. The motive here is simply to point out some of the obstacles to clear thinking about the relationships between geographical areas in the light of their constantly changing value to national security.

Historically, the most frequent form of distortion occurs when geography is tailored to fit a political premise which has nothing to do with geography whatsoever. Take the case of Sir Halford Mackinder.


Sir Halford was in many respects a perceptive man. He had the imagination to understand that airpower had a role, and, in a world that had fallen quite madly in love with a misinterpretation of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, he must be given credit for correcting a current impression that somehow navies had a life of their own quite independent of the land.


But Sir Halford was a man who, in 1919, was properly anti-German and proudly British. On the morning of victory in 1919, he created a marvelous phrase and with it a delightful world.

The phrase you will remember. It was written in 1919 in his *Democratic Ideals and Reality*. "When our statesmen are in conversation with the defeated enemy," he wrote, "some airy cherub should whisper to them from time to time this saying:

'Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island:
Who rules the World Island commands the World.' "

It was a resounding phrase, and all those who wanted to be tough on the Germans for reasons more personal and vindictive, adopted the slogan as the scientific reason for being even





tougher. In the first world which Sir Halford created, the heartland was a great lump which, it must be confessed, was in actuality largely tundra. England was, so to speak, made the prime mover of power in the crescent around the heartland, and the United States was conveniently forgotten.

With the coming of World War II, Sir Halford redrew his world; or, to put it another way, during the two decades between the First and the Second World War he remade it. There were enormous differences between the first version and the second, the most notable of which was the U. S. A. had been brought in to help the British fulcrum readjust East Europe back into viable balance.

So much for Sir Halford. Despite his flashes of very real perceptiveness, he was a propagandist.

He was followed, of course, by the strange German General Karl Haushofer and a whole school of lesser men who laid down the scientific-geographic — “geopolitical,” they called it — justification for Nazi expansion. They offered a doctrine of landpower pure and simple. They put “Mackinder in a straightjacket,” as one commentator put it. At the same time a school of Japanese geopoliticians was, in as weird a gathering of pages as one could imagine, justifying Japanese imperialism on the grounds that Japan must control the Chinese heartland, for, as it was put in the perhaps spurious *Tanaka Memorial*, “. . . the full growth of national strength belongs to the country having extensive territory.” Yet, in retrospect, were these policies of landpower, the iron laws of survival as they were thought to be, so different from those adopted by the Japanese and German navy men of the same and previous generations? The precepts which Mahan laid down, when put into practice by the Germans, brought on a world war. Japanese naval programs suited their geopolitical situation, but poorly. How much better off Japan would have been had she been the Norway of the Far East rather than the Great Britain!

If loose, enormously loose, geopolitical thought were not currently so much in evidence, perhaps Mackinder and Haushofer would not be remembering. But geography is still used in the daily press, in speeches and in private conversation, as scientific data in support of one policy or another arrived at from points of view which have little or nothing to do with geography at all. This tendency is particularly disastrous to straight thinking, it might be said parenthetically, in this age in which geography is fast becoming a forgotten subject of study.

We are beset by slogans, which I must hastily add may have something to them but, in the absence of any accompanying data, serve certainly no useful purpose. For example, there is the oft-quoted phrase of Sir Winston Churchill — “the soft under-belly of Europe.” For what kind of troops is this rough and thorny hide on the under-belly of Europe really soft? Or was this phrase — so fanciful, so catching — simply used to illustrate the policy choice between the invasion of Europe or further “dabbling,” as American contemporaries called it, in the Mediterranean, a choice on which the Prime Minister had strong and certain convictions?

Geographical cant is in constant use. In Southeast Asia, we have heard much of the so-called “Domino Theory” or “Chain Theory” as applied to North Vietnam. It has been contended that the geography of the region is such that if this area falls, Laos will, then Cambodia, then Thailand, and eventually Burma. It is a catchy notion, but the point would be a difficult one to prove. The future of Southeast Asia depends, as it has, on who will fight where, when, and with what. There may have been political reasons why this area should not have been given over to the Vietminh, and I most emphatically believe that there were, but there do not seem to have been important geographical ones — either from the point of view of food production, communication network, or terrain features.

Geography has been used to further what may, or may not, be valid political views elsewhere. Formosa has been declared

so important a salient that if lost U. S. defenses would be hurled back to the rocky shores of Oregon or to the beaches of California, the exact location of the new defense line being a matter of the speaker's choice The Tachens have been called the cork without which the Formosan bottle would sink into the sea . . . Korea is spoken of as the knife against the belly of Japan.


There may be truth in all such pronouncements, but glibly and unthoughtfully spoken they give an urgency to a course of action which it would not otherwise have. Nothing can be more dangerous to a military planner, for a military planner — being a citizen — has strong opinions, too, on what should be done from a political standpoint. Often in military history these opinions have colored his views of geopolitical reality.

Far more difficult to deal with are conflicting views on the importance of one weapon against another, or of one weapons system against another, and the changes these make in geography. Take an extreme case.

In the French Army, most officers made their reputations in the colonies between major European wars. But their hearts were always on the Rhine frontier. " . . . from its beginnings France has found herself under the absolute necessity to fight for her existence on the land side . . .", wrote General Weygand in the 1930's. "There has been no such necessity to battle the threat to seaward," he continued. He had no concept at all that a colonial power might be dependent on seapower.

The French Navy was at the same time suggesting that the Empire was in fact becoming more important than metropolitan France herself. And naval personnel were suggesting that it followed that the British were in fact the enemy, that their control of the French seacoast on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, from Gibraltar and Malta, had in fact reduced the control of France over her own destinies. In other words, French Generals and French Admirals were drawing their maps of the world quite differently, both with the most absolute sincerity — and no






meeting of the minds at all. Perhaps such a problem is insoluble, although an awareness of its existence, which I have never discovered in French Army literature, might of itself have led to a more thoughtful approach to the problems of French security.

Indeed one's view of a single weapon may, of course, change one's view of geography quite as radically. For example, two distinguished writers, both with long military experience, describe the frontiers of France in terms so different that one reading the descriptions with terrain features given fictitious names would never gather that the descriptions were of the same area. For one, the Vosges Mountains in Northern France were a substantial obstacle, a "wide rampart" against the German invasion; for the other, the same area presented 500 kilometers "where no natural obstacles existed." The first mentions the low-lying plains of Belgium, where there "is neither wall nor ditch upon which to base resistance," as an area "in which valleys, rivers, roads and railways seem eager to guide the enemy." The second ignores the Belgian plains altogether. How can one account for the disparity? The answer lies in their differing appreciation of the strategic value of the tank as an offensive weapon. He who believed the Vosges high, and Belgium flat and inviting, advocated a small elite mobile attack army. This was General de Gaulle. The other was General Debeney of the French General Staff, a man who believed in the primacy of defensive doctrine and, specifically, in the Maginot Line.

But if General Debeney shifted his thinking and the terrain to suit his conceptions of a weapon's usefulness, his thinking was no more stereotyped than was Hitler's. If the General was a victim of the mistaken notion that the defense was stronger than the offense in Europe, Hitler was no less a captive of the notion that what was effective in France would be as effective in the vast plains of Russia. The concept of space as related to technology has been an enormous stumbling block to a realist view of geography. Space, after all, must be defined as area enhanced by obstacles minus a communications network. The mis-





take of the Japanese in China and of various of the French High Command in Indo-China was that neither appreciated the fact that mechanization and mobility are not interchangeable terms necessarily. Nor did they appreciate that strangulation and seizure of economic strong points, railroads and industrial facilities does not necessarily bring victory, that the old maxim about destroying force in being still holds.

Finally, as governments change course so the strategic usefulness of squares of sea and cubes of air change, too. Hence, there are no iron-bound laws in the would-be science of geopolitics. And the problem, therefore, is to have that degree of flexibility which allows judgment to change as the political scene changes. There is an analogy here between the international broker who invests and reinvests with revolutions, elections, agreements broken and made, and the military planner who must think in like terms about strategic investments.

Take the last few months, for example. We were able to deal with the situation in Korea, *as we did*, because of our base structure in Japan. What difference then has our withdrawal of forces from Japan made in the Far East? And is this situation not aggravated by the opposition to the Mutual Security Pact in the Philippines?


In the Near East the British have, for economy reasons, cut down their force commitment at the same time that the U. S. S. R. has decided to underwrite Egyptian armament. In the Mediterranean, too, the relations between Greece and Turkey have become strained in the matter of Cyprus, and there seems to have been a notable improvement in the relations between Jugoslavia and the U. S. S. R. The point is simple. From a military point of view, the geopolitics of the Mediterranean has so changed that it invites rethinking.


And, finally, in Europe there have been changes no less momentous and overall quite as alarming. Difficulties in North Africa have diverted French troops which had been available for


NATO. The Belgians have cut their time-in-service requirements. A recent British poll indicated the British were looking forward to further cuts in the defense budget. The withdrawal of U. S. troops from Austria, while these were never considered strategically vital, has nevertheless changed the communications network from Italy to Germany. In short, the relative value of European real estate from a strategic point of view has changed as greatly as has that in the Middle East or the Far East. What adjustments of forces in being, of plans and alternate plans do these changes call for?

Are these naval problems? Are the roles and missions of the Navy and Marine Corps such that problems of so global a nature come within their purview? I suggest that they most certainly do. For the Navy's mission is not just an attack mission; nor is it just a defense mission. Its mission is also one of supply so that any changes in the disposition of any kind of forces anywhere is a naval affair. As bases have been pushed further and further from the United States, the supply function of the Navy has increased. As bases are threatened by political change, naval transportation may be more important still. And in total war the sea may be the last mode of available transport for troops and supply, just as it was the first.

The problem of straight thinking, then, on geopolitics is a difficult, devious business at best. First, one must not confuse political desirability with military realism. Second, there is the problem of correctly evaluating the relationship of advancing technology to geography. Historically, this has been the most difficult problem of all. But, today, there may be a problem more difficult still: namely, the relationship of political change to the value of global real estate. Since the political situation changes from week to week and more drastically from month to month, it is no more than a truism to say that what was very well for yesterday may not be for tomorrow and may not even be for today; which is to say that sound, positive thinking must be preceded by a battery of negative thoughts.







BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr.

Professor Katzenbach attended Princeton University, receiving his B. A. degree in 1940 and M. A. degree in 1948. He was an Instructor in History from 1946 to 1950.

From 1950 until September, 1955, he was Assistant Professor of History at the University of Tennessee and associated with the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. At the present time he is Associate Director of the Defense Studies Program, Harvard University.

Professor Katzenbach has written several books, including *Modern European History; French Army 1870 to Present; Far East from U. S. Military Point of View; Political Parties and the French Army Since the Liberation*, and *Economic Policies of the French Government of National Defense, 1870-1871*.

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF WESTERN EUROPE FOR WAR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
during Academic Year 1954-1955 by
Professor Max F. Millikan

Admiral McCormick and Gentlemen:

I face something of a dilemma this morning. My problem is how to limit the scope of my remarks to things that I know something about. I know a little about the European economies, but I am almost completely ignorant as to current European military strength, and I am also quite ignorant on questions of military strategy. Therefore, my problem is to try to identify a set of military problems to which the analysis of the economies of the countries which I want to talk about is relevant.

This is not as easy a job as it looks to be at first-hand because as an economist I share the conviction of the late great Lord Keynes, one of the world's greatest economists, that economics is not the most important of the factors that effect human behavior. Whereas I certainly would not want to contradict the Captain who introduced me and contend that economic potential is not an important piece of war potential, I think that economists generally — and, perhaps even more, non-economists — may have a tendency to exaggerate how much you can learn about military strength from a look at strictly economic factors.

Let me illustrate what I have in mind by describing a particular type of conflict in which I would assert that economic factors would play almost no role. Suppose that war starts tomorrow. Suppose that this is an inter-continental atomic war and that, unlike almost any previous war we can think of in history, this one comes to a conclusion in, say, three or four weeks. There

is an extraordinary degree of devastation everywhere and a general recognition that there is no point in going on with the destruction.

For the analysis of this kind of a war, starting tomorrow, I would say that economics is almost totally irrelevant. For the analysis of this kind of war what matters is military strength in being as of the present moment. As I have already indicated, this is something which I know little or nothing about and it certainly does not belong in a talk on the *Economic Potential of Western Europe For War*.

It seems to me that this kind of a war is not at all inconceivable. The significance of the over-all economic capability of a nation may have been increased in some ways by the development of atomic and nuclear weapons, but in other ways it may have been reduced very sharply. In so far as the conflict is confined to a relatively brief interchange of atomic blows, the outcome of the war will be determined in the first instance by the military strength in being at its beginning.

Suppose now that we change our assumption and assume that war starts after, say, five or ten years but that, again, it lasts only very briefly. If there were to be no change between now and the outbreak of war in military strength in being, the answer would still be the same: economics would not be relevant. Of course, economics could help us a great deal in trying to decide what the possibilities were for the development of very much greater military strength by the time that hostilities broke out. Economics could not tell us, however, whether such military strength would be developed. It could tell us only what certain of the limits might be to the development of military potential in the intervening period. I will say a little, but not a great deal, about the economic potential of Western Europe to get ready for war.

What I really want to concentrate upon is a third type of case in which war starts any time — tomorrow, or ten years hence

—but it lasts, let us say, two or more years. In this kind of a conflict the economic limits to military potential *may* be the crucial limits. Morale and political questions may be substantially more important or the effectiveness and efficiency of the military operations of both sides may be the critical factor. But this is the situation in which it is most likely that economic potential will become an important limit to the capacity to wage war.

I would like to distinguish between two different ways in which economic considerations may become important because I would like to concentrate very largely on one of them here. In the first place, it is important to consider the capacity of a country to continue to exist in the face of atomic attack these days. In other words, there is a very important set of problems which relates to the vulnerability of the civilian economy to military attack from the other side, and, particularly, to atomic attack. The weapons that have been developed in recent years have had as their key characteristic that they will almost certainly put in the hands of an attacker the capacity to inflict vastly greater damage on the civilian economy of the enemy nation than any weapons which we have had in the past.

The other aspect of economic war potential is the capacity of a country to maintain and supply modern forces in being in the face of attrition and through time. It is this problem to which I want to devote my attention chiefly this morning in my remarks on Western Europe — partly because we would have to get much more deeply into military matters if we were to discuss the vulnerability question than I feel competent to do.

Now that I have made my graceful bow to the truth that economics is not everything, I will feel free for the balance of my remarks to flaunt my professional bias quite unashamedly and talk exclusively about economic problems.

Of course, to begin with, we face the question of how we are going to go about setting up some kind of measure of the


economic capability of an area to support military activity. I am not going to engage in a long theoretical discussion of this point (I gather that some of you have been studying the problem of how to define economic capabilities for war with one or two of my M. I. T. colleagues), but I am going to plunge right into a discussion of certain alternative measures that we can use with respect to Western Europe.

I would like to offer one statistical caution before I begin. Any conclusion which I state during the course of these remarks which would be altered if any of the figures that I use were either 20% higher or 20% lower is a conclusion of which you ought to be deeply suspicious. In other words, in the kinds of measures we will be talking about margins of 15% or 20% of error are to be expected. All that we are trying to get at is general ranges of magnitude and relatively small differences are meaningless because the figures are not that good, either in concept or in the statistical data available for them.

I would like to start with the measure which first springs to mind when an economist tries to decide how well off a country is, broadly speaking, in economic terms. You are probably all familiar with this measure in a general way. It is called the *gross national product* and it is one version of a series of measures. Another one is *national income*, which comes to approximately the same thing in most cases. Gross national product is an economist's measure of the total value of the output of an economy in a given period of time, normally a year. I would like to show you a chart which compares estimates of the gross national product (shown as the upper of the paired bars on this chart) of the United States, Western Europe and the Soviet Bloc. Disregard the lower bars for the moment.

The gross national product of the United States in 1952 was approximately 350 billion dollars. The gross national product of Western Europe was in the neighborhood of 150 billion dollars. The gross national product of the Soviet Bloc, including

Chart 1



China, the U. S. S. R., and the European satellites, can be estimated anywhere between 100 billion (which is probably a lower limit for the Bloc as a whole) and perhaps 150 billion (which is probably an upper limit for the Bloc as a whole). Incidentally, for the purposes of this chart, I am excluding from Western Europe, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. I am including some countries that are not in the North Atlantic Alliance — Spain, Portugal, all of Scandinavia, West Germany and Austria — since it seems probable that the resources of that entire area would be available in one way or another in the event of major hostilities.

Initially, the interesting thing to notice about this set of figures is that already the Soviet Bloc has grown sufficiently in economic potential, as measured by gross national product, to be approximately equal to Western Europe. It actually shows in these figures as slightly greater than Western Europe. But, as I say, this is not a significant difference in the light of the statistical variation in the estimates.

If you exclude China, in particular, it is quite probable that the gross product of the Soviet Bloc, including only the Eastern European satellites and the U. S. S. R., was still in 1952 somewhat below that of Western Europe. It is very doubtful whether it continues to be below that of Western Europe in 1954, and, if growth rates continue at present trends, it certainly will be well above in another three or four years.

Now a brief look at the composition of this Western European gross national product by countries. Very roughly, a fifth of this total Western European economic output is produced by West Germany and Austria; approximately another fifth is produced by France; a little more than a fifth is produced by the United Kingdom — some 36 billion out of a total of 150 billion. In other words, well over three-fifths is supplied by France, the U. K., West Germany and Austria. Something like another fifth

is then supplied by the Low Countries — Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Scandanavia. Substantially less than a fifth, or about one-seventh, is supplied by the Southern European countries, Italy and the Iberian Peninsula.

Is this really a measure of economic war potential which is of any great service to us? I would contend that it is very useful to know that the total volume of output of Western Europe is of roughly the same order of magnitude as that of the Soviet Union; also, to know that the total output of the United States is better than twice that of either of the other two groups of countries.

I think it is also useful to note that should Western Europe become a part of the Soviet Bloc, and should the Soviet Bloc be able to exploit Western European resources as effectively as the Western Europeans exploit them, we would then be faced with a coalition which would very nearly equal ourselves in terms of this particular measure of the aggregate value of all output in the society.

Of course if we get into a war situation, this gross national product will change. That is one of the reasons why this is perhaps an inadequate measure. In the United States, for example, we were able to increase our gross national product at the peak of the war in real terms by somewhere between 10% and 15% above what it would have been had the normal trends of peacetime gross national product persisted. We did this by bringing women into the labor force, by working longer hours, and by reducing unemployment to very much lower levels than are normally to be found in a peacetime economy. Western Europe could do this, too. There is undoubtedly more slack in the Western European economy at the present time than there is in the Soviet economy and probably a greater percentage of slack than there was in the U. S. economy in 1940 or 1941. Nonetheless, it would be my guess that the bar beside Western Europe would not go up by more than 10% or 15% at the outside if her resources

(SEE CHART NO. 1)

were to be more fully used under the pressure of a wartime emergency. The over-all picture is not very much influenced, but it is influenced a little. Western Europe would look a little better relative to the Soviet Union if it were to make full use of its resources.

The first question that occurs to one in considering whether or not this is a sensible measure is that, in looking at the value of output, we have left out how many people have to be supported by this flow of goods and services. When we introduce people, we find that a double set of considerations comes into play. People, in general, are a mixed blessing from the standpoint of war capabilities. On the one hand, people can be soldiers and in this sense people are a good thing. You have more capabilities if you have more people. On the other hand, people have to be fed. If you have too many people, you may get into a situation where your economic resources are so fully absorbed in the attempt simply to feed them and keep them going that you have very little left over with which to arm the abundance of soldiers that you have.

As soon as you look at the bottom bars, which represent
(SEE CHART NO. 1)

population measured on the scale at the bottom of the chart, you at once see that people are in the opposite sort of ratio to gross national product in these two areas. The United States has much the fewest people of any of these three groupings and the Soviet Bloc has much the most people. However, I would suggest that for purposes of the comparison in which we are currently interested—for the purposes of a focus on Western European economic potential for war—you should disregard the bulk of this bottom bar, the one which represents the population of China. This consists of a little less than 600 million by their own official estimate, a population greater than those of Western Europe and all of the rest of the Soviet Bloc combined. If you add the population of the United States, the whole grouping is

still nearly exceeded by the population of China. That population has only the very small piece of economic output to support it represented by the small square at the end of the upper bar.

China, then, is an extreme case at one end of the spectrum where people are almost certainly very much more of a liability than an asset. China by herself is not an economic asset to the war-making capabilities of the Soviet Union, let us say, against the West. China's manpower is an asset but Chinese national product at the moment is so low that if China's manpower is to fight, the weapons with which they will fight must be supplied by other parts of the Bloc, as they were to a major extent during the whole Korean conflict.


I would therefore suggest that we forget about China when we are considering the comparison of Western Europe's economic potential with the economic potential of the Soviet Bloc because, if anything, China is a drag rather than an asset. This is reflected in the fact that if we divide gross national product by population, and get an indication of total output per man in our various societies, we come out with an almost invisible piece. The Chinese pro-

(SEE CHART NO. 2)

duct per man is somewhere around \$50 as against an American product per man (in 1953) of well over \$2,000 and an all-Western Europe product per man of about \$500, or a little better than that.

Within Western Europe, we again have to make some distinctions because not all of Western Europe would be an asset to a power that was trying to conduct a major war. Broadly speaking, it's again pretty clear that the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal) is an area that cannot do very much more than support its own civilian population in the event of conflict. It might be able to supply a few soldiers, but it certainly could not supply any of the economic sinews of modern war.

The same thing can be said of the southern half of Italy at the present time. Italy ought really to be cut into two pieces



for this purpose because the southern half of Italy is a relatively primitive, agricultural area with a per capita gross product which certainly does not exceed \$200 (it is probably somewhat less than that). Likewise, it would probably fall into the category of a net liability.

On the other hand, you have an area like the United Kingdom, with a per capita gross product of a little less than half of our own, where there is certainly a good deal of excess in the gross product over the basic minimum necessary to maintain survival and subsistence. This excess could be diverted to military purposes.

You will note, in the first place, that Western Europe as a whole has a per capita product about the same as the U. S. S. R. In other words, in a comparison of these two areas they march along side by side. The population of the Soviet Bloc (excluding China) and the gross product over-all is about the same as Western Europe. Therefore, since those items are the same, their divisor of course is also the same—the per capita gross product. Actually, if you throw the European satellites in with the U. S. S. R., you get a per capita gross product that is somewhat below that of all of Western Europe because the population is somewhat greater. However, there are much greater variations within the Western European grouping of countries than there are within the Soviet grouping. There are certain countries, like the Iberian Peninsula and southern Italy, which would make very little contribution, and certain other countries whose per capita income is so high that they could make a very substantial one.

It is tempting at this point to engage in a piece of reasoning which would suggest that Western Europe was in fact a good deal better off in terms of capabilities for war than the over-all gross product comparisons would show. It is tempting to divide gross national product into two parts: to say that one part of the total economic output of a society is required to maintain

minimum subsistence for the population of the society, and that above this bare minimum for subsistence the balance of resources might all be regarded as available for military uses.

As an index of the sort of bare minimum to which Western civilization could be forced, we could then take the minimum which rules in the Soviet Union. Something of the order of half of this per capita gross product in the Soviet Union goes into direct personal consumption in the U. S. S. R. In other words, you could roughly split that bar in half. This could be described as the portion of gross national product which goes to civilian

(SEE CHART NO. 1)

subsistence. The balance is available for other purposes, including defense purposes (we will go into what some of those purposes are later on).

It is tempting to say, therefore: "Why don't we take \$250 as an index of how far you can squeeze civilian consumption down and still maintain survival?" We would then find that if we squeezed the United Kingdom's civilian sector down to \$250 per person, or its equivalent, we would be able to supply three-quarters of the national product for military purposes instead of half, as the U. S. S. R. can do. Of course, the United States would provide a much more dramatic illustration. If we were able to go down to \$250 per person per year, we could supply seven-eighths of our total product to the military. This would lead us to the conclusion that the gross product comparison tends to understate the economic capabilities for military action of Western Europe because in certain of the Western European countries there appears to be more fat on the bones.

Unfortunately, in fact, it does not work this way. It is most unlikely that in any of the Western European countries you could reduce civilian consumption to anything like \$250 per head where it is not already that low. Of course in the United States, it would be quite inconceivable that we could get our domestic consumption

down anything like that far. This is not only because of political factors and it is not only because of the will of the people, but because of a series of other factors, which I will go into presently at somewhat greater length.

In order to analyze more fully the problem of how much one could squeeze out of the gross product of a country for military purposes, one has to analyze the composition of gross product; that is, the kinds of economic activity that are reflected in these over-all figures. I will state in advance my general conclusion, which, since it is entirely personal to me and might not be agreed with others, I will dignify by the name of "Millikan's Law." This conclusion is that there is an absolute ceiling on the military use of G. N. P. in any country or in any civilization at any time and that that ceiling is in the neighborhood of 50%; that it is probably impossible to reduce the proportion of peacetime gross product devoted to civilian purposes below about 50% of the peacetime gross product. This is a floor, and may very well be quite impossible to get down that low.

Obviously, in China, you cannot reduce the standard of living at all without mass starvation. In fact, there is a certain amount of mass starvation even now at a \$50-a-year standard of living. In my view it certainly would be impossible, at present prices in the United States, to get civilian consumption down below something well over \$1000 per head. In Western Europe and the United Kingdom, it would be impossible to get civilian consumption down to anything less than well over \$500 per head.

Let us consider for a minute what the components of gross national product actually are in a period of peace. The economists usually divides them into three groups, but I am going to divide them into four, splitting one group into two parts: (1) consumption, which is that part of total economic activity that is devoted to food, clothes, housing, recreation, education — all of the things that individuals consume in an economy;

(2) investment, which is not investment in the Wall Street financial sense but investment in the sense that the economy is using its resources to build productive equipment—to build plants, to build machines—to expand its capital resources; (3) governmental services, which can be conceived of as a kind of consumption if you like but which is such a different kind of animal that it probably ought to be described separately as the cost of governmental administration; and (4) while military activity, this normally is included as part of government services, but I want to separate military activity from other government activities.

How do these components break down at the present time in Western Europe? Very broadly speaking, something more than two-thirds of the total economic activity of the Western European countries is devoted to consumption in peacetime. It is somewhat lower in Germany and France, for example, than it is in the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, consumption probably takes over 70%; in Germany and France, it is probably closer to 65%-68%.

There is a very much wider range of variation in the other three activities. Currently, the United Kingdom has the highest proportion of its total economic activity devoted to defense activities, running somewhere in the neighborhood of 10%, depending upon how you compute it. Of course, Germany has probably the lowest proportion devoted to this category simply because she has not been allowed to devote any more so far. That will rise quite sharply as the new agreements reached at London and Paris go into effect. There are some defense activities in the form of police units and so on in Germany, so that something like 4% of Germany's total product goes into defense at the present time. France is not very much better, with somewhere around 6% of her product devoted to military output.

Investment takes another part of output, which, again, varies widely from country to country. The United Kingdom is

plowing 13%-15% of its resources back in the form of new capital equipment. Germany has a very high rate of investment, with a fifth of her resources currently going into capital for the expansion of her economy. France, similarly (and rather unexpectedly), has quite a high ratio of investment to total gross product.

But if we compare the Western European countries, which have a pattern very similar to that of the United States (currently our consumption rate is a little lower, or about 64% ; our defense rate is about 14% ; our investment is about 19% ; and our non-defense government rate is about 3%), with the Soviet Union, we see that our gross national product comparisons have considerably overstated the economic resources devoted to defense in the West. It is anybody's guess as to the level of consumption in Russia because the figures are so hard to interpret, but the share is down around 50% instead of 65% or 70%. Investment and defense, together, provide a total of in the neighborhood of 40% of the Soviet product. The dividing line between investment and defense expenditures in the Soviet Union is a very narrow one because a tank plant may be listed as a tractor plant; a plant that produces trucks exclusively for military use may be listed as an automobile plant, and so on. Because so much of the investment in the Soviet Union has a distinctly military bias — because so much of the plant and equipment that is produced there is produced with an eye at least to military results as well as to others — not only is her share of investment in defense currently very much larger than that of Western Europe, but that share is much more effectively focused on defense production than is the case in Western Europe.

Of course this does not answer the question of what Western Europe could do about this, but it does tell us what the situation is at the present time. To what degree could military production be expanded in the event of crisis, specifically in the event of war, in Western Europe? I have already given you my conviction that at best, because of the over-all application of Millikan's Law, it could not be expanded to more than 50% of gross

product. But could we get anywhere near that amount? Could we go up from the very low level currently ruling for most of these countries — 6%-10% — to anything substantially higher?

This problem breaks down into two pieces: (1) How much could non-defense activities be squeezed and still maintain the civilian economies in reasonably good shape? (2) Suppose the civilian economies could be squeezed this far, could the released resources be used effectively for military purposes?

Both of these questions require the answer to a prior question: How long a period of time are we talking about? The principal place where civilian production can be squeezed in most of the Western Europe countries is not in consumption, although this can be reduced somewhat, but in the 15%-20% that is going into investment. A large part of the production of new plant and equipment in Germany, in England, in France, and in Austria could be shifted over to much more directly military purposes without reducing current civilian consumption at all and without in the short period running into any serious problems of maintaining the current economy. If, however, this was done over a period of five to ten years, the effects would begin to be serious. Not only would there be failure to replace equipment as it wore out, but there would be failure to increase productivity and to advance economic capabilities.

So, in a sense, Western Europe could secure a big increase in economic capabilities for war in the short run at the sacrifice of long-run growth and of higher economic capabilities in the more distant future. This is a dilemma faced in any analysis of the economic capabilities of a country for war. The economic capabilities for war tomorrow, or over the coming year or two years, are greater the more you cut into the economic capabilities for war in a period farther in the future.

In the United States, during World War II, we cut back our investment, which had been running from 15%-20% of gross

product in normal periods, to a level of around 5% or lower. During the war, we achieved a peak of approximately 40% of our national income or product devoted to strictly military purposes.

Russia, at the peak of the war in 1944, was listing in her official statistics something like 34% (less than ours) of her total product in military activity, but she was also listing an additional 14% in investment at the peak of the war. It is a pretty good guess that a substantial part of that investment was serving military purposes in one way or another. So, we probably ought to look at the Soviet Union as having allocated at the peak of the war roughly half of its national income to defense purposes.

Let us look now at the possible cuts in consumption. The question of how far consumption can be reduced is, of course, in part a political question. I am not a political scientist, so I am not going to talk about this. You will have to get your judgments as to the will and nerve of the Western European Continent and the countries composing it from some one more skilled than I. There are, however, certain strictly economic considerations that come into the problem of how far consumption can be cut. One of the reasons why you cannot follow the line of argument that I gave you earlier, simply assuming that you can cut back consumption everywhere to perhaps \$250 per capita because you can do it in the Soviet Union, is that patterns of consumption are very deeply engrained in our whole way of life and in the whole structure of our economy. For example, if people are used to travelling in automobiles, to take a case in point, you cannot simply eliminate automobile transportation because all of the fundamental economic activities of the country assume the availability of automobiles. Where people live, the distribution of their homes with respect to their places of work, and so on, have all been preconditioned by the existence of this particular element in our consumption pattern.

So one of the resistances to the reduction in consumption is the degree to which all economic activities are based on certain kinds of transportation, on the adjustment of heating and clothes to each other, on refrigeration of food, and the like. The fact that a civilization has been developed in England, for example, and in some of the countries on the Continent where clothing and living practices are adapted to the assumption that there is going to be a lot of fuel for heating and where food habits are adapted to certain assumptions about the kinds of food that are going to be available, limits the degree to which you can cut consumption and still maintain productivity of the economy.

There is another factor that works on the opposite side of the fence. In so far as a lot of the services which consumers receive and the services or durable pieces of equipment which they own, that is, are the services of consumers' capital, you can in the short run cut back very sharply the proportion of your production that goes into these durable consumer items. Of course, this was one of the big elements of fat in the U. S. economy during the war. We could cut the output of new automobiles altogether for a few years without cutting the volume of automobile transportation at all significantly.

The percentage of cuts that are possible in consumption in Europe are substantially smaller than in the United States. This is so principally because the share of durable goods in European consumption is very much lower than in American consumption. In other words, there are many fewer things that you could simply stop producing for two or three years for consumers without really affecting consumer welfare or efficiency in Europe. For example: in the United Kingdom, per capita food consumption is about 85% of what it is in the United States. On the other hand, per capita consumption purchases of transportation equipment are only 5% of what they are in the United States. There is not a huge automobile industry that can be turned over rapidly to making tanks and military equipment.

The consumption of household goods — refrigerators, kitchen equipment, and all of that sort of thing — is very much lower in the United Kingdom, being 34% of that of the U. S., as against 85% of the U. S. in food. This means that all of the services that are performed by household equipment in this country that have to be performed in the U. K. by the labor of housewives, domestic servants, or others (or which simply do not get performed) are elements in consumption which they cannot cut back as we could do.

Of course, they have advantages over us in some respects. One of the few types of consumption which is very much higher in a European country in absolute terms than it is in the United States is alcoholic beverages in France. The consumption of alcoholic beverages in France — at U. S. prices — is about three times what it is in the United States per capita. On the other hand, since this is only 2%-3% of the national income, and since in any case a French soldier probably has to have wine to fight properly, not much military advantage could be secured by cuts in this item.

There is one respect in which Europe is in quite a different position from the United States. Europe could, by cutting back on some of her non-durable consumption items — even though she does not consume large volumes of durables — release some resources which would be very valuable in military production. Broadly, this is because it is true of all European countries that a substantial part of their current consumption is paid for by exports of capital goods and equipment, of machinery and other types of durable items. The plants which make these could be converted to the production of war materials and the raw materials they consume, in turn, are also the raw materials that a war program needs. By cutting back on the consumption of food, for example, it would be possible for Europe to save in precisely

those items which would be important for military purposes, although the resources directly devoted to food production are normally not resources that can easily be devoted to military production — land and labor. Europe gets its food to a considerable degree (this is especially true of Great Britain, but it is also true of several of the Continental countries) not by producing it themselves but by producing manufactured goods which they exchange for food. Therefore, by cutting back on their food imports and some of their other soft goods imports they could free resources fairly rapidly for military purposes.

It is possible, in summary, that consumption could be cut back in Western Europe from 65%-75% of gross product to maybe 55%-60% of gross product, but it certainly could not be cut back to anything like the Soviet percentage. The big place where cuts would be possible — and where there is a real potential for expanding military activity — is in investment programs. These can be cut back as far as you like, depending on how long you think you can get by without replacing, modernizing, or expanding plants and equipment.


With all of these economic factors in mind, but extracting entirely from political factors, one might make a guess that the proportion of Europe's total economic resources devoted to military purposes could be raised from their present 6%-10% of gross national product to perhaps 30%-35%. If the program were properly handled, it would not be until something like perhaps 35% of total European product devoted to defense were reached that further cuts would begin to be self-defeating because they would interfere with the productivity of the civilian economy.

Now, I would like to show you one more set of charts

(SEE CHART NO. 3)

because we have talked so far entirely in terms of these broad sectors of production and have not looked at specific commodities at

Chart 3



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all. Certainly, in the short run, the question of economic potential for war has to be looked at in terms of the availability of particular commodities and particular production facilities since, in the short run, it is impossible to substitute widely within an economy.

If we look at the picture by commodities, relative to the Soviet Bloc, we see that in a number of key items Europe is better off than the over-all gross product figures would suggest.

For example, Europe is better off in steel, for she still has a very substantially higher steel capacity than the Soviet Bloc.

In coal, Europe is somewhat better off. This Soviet Union coal bar is a little shorter than the Western European coal bar.

In electric power, which of course, is essential to all kinds of military production, Western Europe is very substantially better off than the Soviet Union.

In aluminum, Western Europe is also substantially better off than the Soviet Union.

From the standpoint of economic potential for war, the glaring deficiency of the whole of Western Europe is in basic petroleum supplies, there being almost no crude oil production at all on the Continent of Europe. This would be a very serious weakness if Western Europe were fighting alone. On the other hand, if you throw in the petroleum supplies over which Western European countries currently have control, you come out with a figure very substantially greater than the Soviet Union figure. However, many of these sources of petroleum are militarily highly vulnerable—such as the whole Middle Eastern area—and therefore perhaps cannot be counted upon with very great confidence in the event of hostilities.

By and large, the picture which we get from a look at these specific commodities (and this would not differ much if we

looked at a lot more of them) is to reinforce a bit our judgment that the economic potential of Western Europe for war is probably equal to — perhaps greater than — that of the Soviet Union.

In summary, as of the present day the gross national products are about the same. The Soviet Union could devote a substantially larger fraction of its gross national product to military purposes than could Western Europe. But, on the other hand, Western Europe's resources, because she has engaged in manufacturing predominantly and traded manufactures for her imported raw materials and consumption goods, show some edge over the Soviet Union in the sorts of raw materials and manufacturing areas of the economy which are important to war potential.

I realize that I am over my time, but I want to spend just one minute on a final epilogue because I have talked so far entirely in terms of the present picture. This may give you an undue degree of smug satisfaction about the relative economic capabilities of the East and West and the importance of our allies in this struggle.

This whole picture is changing very rapidly. Over the past few years, the gross product of the Soviet Union has been expanding at somewhere between 5%-7% per year. This is an extraordinarily rapid rate of growth. It is roughly twice the rate of growth of the United States' gross product and it is also roughly twice the rate of growth of the Western European product taken as a whole. Certain Western European countries have shown surprising spurts recently: Germany has been expanding her national product at 5%-6% and France has been doing quite well in recent years, but many of the factors which are responsible for this are somewhat temporary factors. On the whole, if one were to make a guess, projecting present trends, I would say the probabilities would be a Western European rate of growth of maybe 3% a year, or roughly half of the Soviet rate.

It takes only twenty-five years at this rate of growth for the Soviets to achieve a position exactly twice the position of Western Europe in terms of most of the industries that I have been giving you. Therefore, if you are interested not in war tomorrow but in war fifteen or twenty years hence, you must become interested — and very vitally interested — in the growth possibilities of the European economies. The growth possibilities of the European economies, in turn, depend not so much on their resources — for they have the resources and the capabilities for growth — but on problems of administration, problems of morale, and problems of politics.

Having brought the key question around to a point where it is once again outside of my field, it is perhaps appropriate that I should stop.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Max F. Millikan

Professor Millikan attended Philips Andover Academy, California Institute of Technology and Yale University, where he received his B. S. degree in Physics. He then studied Economics at Cambridge University and received his Ph. D. degree in Economics from Yale University.

From 1938-1942, he was Instructor and Assistant Professor at Yale University. During the next year, he was employed as Senior Business Specialist in the Office of Price Administration. From then until 1949, he was Research Associate at Yale University. During 1942-46, however, he was granted leave to serve with the Government.

Professor Millikan served as principal Economist with the War Shipping Administration during 1942-44; as Assistant Director of the Division of Shipping Requirements, War Shipping Administration, from 1944-46; and as Chief of the Economic Intelligence Branch, Division of Research for Europe, Department of State during 1946. The following year, he held two positions in the Government: Consultant to the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid and Assistant Executive Secretary to the President's Committee on Foreign Aid. He became Consultant to Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President, Executive Office of the President, in 1950, also acting as Consultant to the Department of the Air Force during 1949-1950 and Consultant to the Economic Cooperation Administration during 1948-1950.

During 1949-1952, he was Associate Professor of Economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, being granted leave from 1951-52 to serve as Assistant Director to the Central Intelligence Agency. Since 1952, he has been Director of the Center for International Studies and Professor of Economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Professor Millikan has lectured at the National War College, Naval War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

He is editor and co-author of *Income Stabilization in a Developing Democracy* (1953) and author of articles in *Econometrica* and *American Economic Review*.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

The listings herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Books on the list which are not available from these sources may be obtained from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Services Collections. These collections of books available for loan to individual officers are maintained in the Bureau of Naval Personnel; Headquarters ELEVENTH, FOURTEENTH, FIFTEENTH Naval Districts; and Commander Naval Forces, Marianas, Guam. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest Auxiliary Library Service Collection (see Article C9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

- Title: *The Net that Covers the World.* 315 p.
- Author: Cookridge, E. H. N. Y., Henry Holt, 1955.
- Evaluation: A well-written and interesting account of the Soviet secret police system. Beginning with a historical narrative of the traditional Czarist background of the present Soviet secret police organization, the reader is lead into a detailed outline of the subdivisions of the present-day system, the functioning of the Soviet secret police organization, and the extent and activities of the police-controlled Comintern nets throughout the world. Many interesting details of world-famous incidents, such as the murders of Jan Masaryk of Czechoslovakia and Leon Trotsky in Mexico, are revealed. The author concludes that the "really disastrous failures (of the system) have been concerned not with obtaining information, but in interpreting it." The final chapter contains a warning to the readers to consider all Soviet diplomats, representatives and citizens as potential secret police agents.

- Title:** *Inside Africa.* 952 p.
- Author:** Gunther, John.
- Evaluation:** A well-written account of personages and areas encountered or visited by Mr. Gunther in his 40,000-mile quest for research material. It contains short biographical sketches of political and social leaders of the various countries of Africa. In addition, it covers in concise form the underlying reasons for the social, economic and political unrest that is encountered in Africa today, with particular emphasis on the "nationalism" of the various "Black" and "Arabic" political parties, and the "color bar" placed on the "Black Africans" by the sometimes ruthless Europeans. It also explains the different theories of government as set forth by the British, French and Belgians looking toward future self-rule. This book, like the others of the "Inside" series by Mr. Gunther, is very readable and provides a somewhat modern approach toward understanding the reasons for the nationalistic "uprisings" that are occurring almost daily in North Africa.

PERIODICALS

- Title:** *After the Geneva Conference.*
- Author:** *Interavia* Study Group
- Publication:** INTERAVIA, September, 1955, p. 665-683.
- Annotation:** Presents three articles under this heading: (1) discusses President Eisenhower's proposals for arms control by air reconnaissance and the launching of a space satellite; (2) describes U. S. air defense; (3) deals with Russian air power.
- Title:** *How Russians "Stormed Sonic Barrier."*
- Publication:** AVIATION WEEK, September 12, 1955, p. 21-31.
- Annotation:** A translation of an article in a Russian periodical, in which the Soviets claim all honors in the application of sweepback as a means of reducing speed drag at high speed.
- Title:** *Is Amphibious Warfare Dead?*
- Author:** Canzona, Nicholas A., Captain, U. S. M. C.
- Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, September, 1955, p. 987-991.

- Annotation:** Evaluates the types of modern warfare and, in pointing out the devastation possible from a thermonuclear attack, concludes that amphibious warfare still stands as a potent implement of strategy.
- Title:** *On the "Originality" of Mao Tse-tung.*
- Author:** Schwartz, Benjamin
- Publication:** FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October, 1955, p. 67-76.
- Annotation:** Considers some of the problems of Chinese Communist history upon which some light is shed by careful study of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works.
- Title:** *America's Reds Dig In.*
- Author:** Thompson, Craig.
- Publication:** THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, September 17, 1955, p. 40 and 105-106.
- Annotation:** Reports that the Communist Party in the U. S. is being forced underground and reviews recent events in labor unions to show the Communist strategy employed.
- Title:** *Now Another Island is Causing Trouble.*
- Publication:** U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, September 16, 1955, p. 28-29.
- Annotation:** A brief account of the present dispute in which Britain, Greece and Turkey are involved over the island of Cyprus.
- Title:** *Royal Commission Tells How Soviet Spy System Works.*
- Publication:** U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, September 23, 1955, p. 98-106.
- Annotation:** Extracts from a Royal Commission study made in Australia tells how a Russian spy network operates.
- Title:** *Annual Review of Naval Aviation.*
- Publication:** THE NAVY, September, 1955.
- Annotation:** This issue on British naval aviation includes articles entitled "Fleet Air Arm" and "The Carrier as a Strategic Weapon."

- Title:** *After Geneva: A Greater Task for NATO.*
Author: Pearson, Lester B.
Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October, 1955, p. 14-23.
Annotation: The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada outlines the course to follow in the new and warmer international climate which the conference at the summit generated.
- Title:** *Britain's Changing Military Policy.*
Author: De Weerd, H. A.
Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October, 1955, p. 102-116.
Annotation: Surveys the British attitude toward defense and the use of nuclear weapons since World War II; points out her value as an ally, emphasizing her influence even now in Asian affairs.
- Title:** *Russian Navy Dangerous — Carney.*
Author: Foss, William O.
Publication: NAVY TIMES, September 10, 1955, p. 1 and 12.
Annotation: Deals with the contents of the report by former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert B. Carney, on naval activities during fiscal year 1955.
- Title:** *Expansion of International Trade.*
Author: Waugh, Samuel C.
Publication: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, August 22, 1955, p. 303-305.
Annotation: A brief discussion of U. S. policy in regard to international trade. (Chart, showing percent of strategic materials U. S. obtains from abroad).
- Title:** *What's Behind Soviet Disarmament?*
Author: Garthoff, R. L.
Publication: THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, October, 1955, p. 22-27.
Annotation: The author claims that the recently announced reduction of 640,000 in the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces

was merely a reallocation of "surplus" military manpower to the understrength economic sector (particularly industrial and agricultural) of Soviet national power. It was not "disarming" to "ease world tensions," but actually was made to increase over-all Soviet strength vis-a-vis the Free World. "The only real Soviet attempt at 'disarming' is the attempt to disarm us both politically and militarily."

Title: *Global Mobility.*
Author: Eliot, Major George Fielding.
Publication: ORDNANCE, September-October, 1955, p. 216-218.

Annotation: A short article comparing the geographic situation of North America with that of Russia, and pointing out the great advantage of the American situation. Notes that Russia's power is largely land-based, while America's power is far less dependent upon fixed bases, and therefore has greater strategic mobility. Emphasizes that while Russia may enjoy an advantage in weapons or men at any given time, the limits which apply to any land-based power will apply to them as well and tend to offset their advantage to a considerable extent. This article is of interest to students of Mahan and Spykman, for it develops to a small degree their ideas within a modern framework.

Title: *Middle East: Ingredients of War.*
Publication: NEWSWEEK, October 10, 1955, p. 50, 53-54 and 56.

Annotation: A concise analysis of the present diplomatic crisis concerning Egypt, Algeria and Cyprus, which pose a threat to Middle East defenses.

Title: *The Battle of Midway.*
Author: Eller, E. M., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
Publication: ORDNANCE, September-October, 1955, p. 237-240.

Annotation: A brief description of the battle early in World War II, which more than any other affected the outcome of the Pacific War. The author generalizes from the lessons learned in that battle to the need for a strong Navy, today, now that Russia has exceeded Britain in sea power

and is still growing. He makes a further point that not a single one of the many amphibious operations undertaken by the U. S. in World War II failed, and that the advent of nuclear weapons has added to the striking and amphibious capabilities of the U. S. Navy.

- Title:** *New Warfare — New Tactics.*
- Author:** Liddell-Hart, Captain B. H.
- Publication:** MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, October, 1955, p. 10-13.
- Annotation:** Discusses the tactics of future wars and points out that a policy of reliance on massive nuclear retaliation is something more than fallacious. Suggests that the power of defense over the attack has been lost sight of — a theme on which the author wrote considerably in pre-World War II days. Examines this concept of the strength of the defense in terms of World War II experiences and draws certain conclusions for new tactics in future wars.
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- Title:** *Political Cooperation in the North Atlantic Community.*
- Author:** Padelford, Norman J.
- Publication:** INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, August, 1955, 353-365
- Annotation:** A study of political cooperation among the NATO nations which made possible the achievements of the past six years and which the author suggests could be developed in other fields as well as the military.
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- Title:** *What Happened in the POW Camps.*
- Publication:** THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, October. 1955, p. 32-35.
- Annotation:** A summary of the official report of the advisory committee on prisoners of war which gives some details of the treatment of U. S. prisoners by the North Koreans and Chinese. Although specific recommendations for remedial action by the military services are made, the most outstanding item is the conclusion that the individual must be indoctrinated in American ideals by school, family, church and community before he enters the military service.

- Title:** *Quemoy: The Immediate Threat to Peace.*
- Author:** Cooke, Charles M., Admiral, U. S. N. (Ret.)
- Publication:** COLLIER'S, October 14, 1955, p. 71-76.
- Annotation:** The former commander of the U. S. Seventh Fleet warns that Red China has not abandoned plans to take the Nationalists' islands and the success or failure of the Chinese Communists depends on what the U. S. does to stop them.
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- Title:** *An Atomic Navy — When.*
- Publication:** U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, September 30, 1955, p. 40 and 42.
- Annotation:** Presents a series of questions and answers dealing with changes in sight for U. S. sea power.