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# NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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# **NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly  
U. S. Naval War College  
Newport, R. I.**

## **THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION**

A Lecture Delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 19 August 1953  
by  
*Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt*

Admiral Conolly, Gentlemen:

First of all, I want to thank you, Admiral, for that very generous introduction. I consider it an honor and a privilege to be invited to talk to this distinguished group. It is an honor to be asked once — a great honor — it is very reassuring to be asked again, and this is my second invitation to this institution.

Perhaps it is not a characteristic quality, but I am in a position where I must address you with unusual humility because sitting right before me here is Admiral Robbins — whose grasp of this problem is far superior to my own. In fact, I received a lengthy tutoring course from Admiral Robbins during the period when I was working on the report to The Honorable James Forrestal on “unification.” I have not only great affection for the man, but great respect for his attainments in that field with which I am acquainted — and I am sure that I would have in other fields if I were acquainted with his accomplishments there.

Another reason why I am particularly humble at this time is that not so very long ago when my youngest daughter graduated from Bryn Mawr College, in connection with the graduation she selected the topic: *Our National Security Organization*. It was one of those cases where the parent is called in as a kibitzer. We got up a document which I thought was very satisfactory and very adequate. But when the paper came back from the instructor, in big red letters were written the words: “Very superficial.” So I am

prepared for any sort of condemnation that you may heap on me. I might add that she survived my contribution and graduated.

My topic is: "The Historical Evolution of Our National Security Organization." The word "unification" became very well known in 1944-45. In 1944, a committee of the House known as the Woodring Committee held hearings on the subject — just before the end of the war. Most people date unification discussions from that period. But it will interest you to know that in the preceding twenty-five years there were about thirty suggestions and bills introduced in Congress looking to unification of the army and the navy. One of the most vigorous efforts was in President Harding's day. Later on, in Mr. Hoover's time, it came up again. At that time a most ardent opponent of unification was one who thereafter became one of its strongest supporters — General MacArthur. So you can see that views on the subject have not always been consistent — I am not reflecting on people for that at all. The point is that there has been, over many years, a trend toward unification of the two services.

Under the leadership of the army — from a variety of motives —the unification question became very active as the Second World War came to a close. The navy's attitude toward the problem was one of some reserve. I won't say opposition — I'll say reserve. The Air Force had had a considerable taste of unification with the army; they wanted the liberty of maturity; they sought an independent role in a unified establishment.

Secretary Forrestal asked me if I would study this subject and make some suggestions. I asked him if he would put the assignment down in writing. So he wrote me a little note — about three paragraphs, maybe ten lines — and handed it to me on my birthday. It was the most substantial birthday present that I ever received. Well, those little lines have occupied me (to a greater or less extent) going on nine years.

We made as thorough a study of the subject as we could and rendered a report after several months of rather intensive

work, and it was concluded that a mere unification of the military services was of limited significance. The important thing was to unify and bring into harmonious action all of those elements which related to, which supported, and which — in case of necessity — would defend our national security.

As a result, the report dealt not essentially nor solely with the army, the navy, and the air force — but with a program which would give us a national security organization adequate to the needs of the times. The report, as rendered, did not contemplate a Secretary of Defense and did not contemplate a single department. There were certain elements of the report with which the navy agreed; there were some elements with which the army agreed; and some elements with which the air force agreed — particularly that portion of the report which recommended a separate Department of Air. But there was not general agreement on the report, although I think it constituted the basis for discussions which lasted from 1945-1947 amongst these military departments, the other departments of government, and up on The Hill — with the result that what I should say was a pretty good compromise, well within the spirit of the report, was arrived at and passed in July, 1947, called the *National Security Act of 1947*.

I would like to read to you the Preamble of that Act because — though there have been amendments to the Act from time to time — in all the documents and reports relating to the amendments, approval is expressed of the purposes of the Act as originally enacted and all of the amendments have always been alleged to be within the spirit of that preamble. So it is very important to grasp and understand (and in my opinion, very important to adhere to) the spirit of that preamble. I will read it to you.

“In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and pro-

cedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security (I invited your attention to the fact that that includes much more than simply the military departments); to provide three military departments, for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces."

From my experience with this subject, I should say that I had read you the "golden text" of the National Security Organization and I bespeak your constant attention to that in judging amendments that have been made and those amendments that will from time to time be urged.

The great debate, as I said, terminated in the Act of 1947 and Secretary Forrestal became the first Secretary of Defense. That was not an easy job. The original Act (which was well within the spirit of the Preamble) did not contemplate a large Office of the Secretary. It contemplated the Secretary as a coordinator — someone who would aid, assist and, if necessary, direct the services to work together; someone who would tie the military elements of our Government closely to the State Department, to the intelligence groups, and otherwise see that we had a coordinated national security organization.

The Act gave the Secretary three special assistants (quite in contrast to the new proposals that I will come to). The Joint Staff had, I think, a hundred officers at that time. The various



components of the Act I will not undertake to review. You are all familiar, I am sure, with the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Resources Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those were the new elements established by the law. Amongst other things, it was the duty of the Secretary to see that the military part of that organization operated well within itself and in its relationships with the others.

Secretary Forrestal believed in evolution. He was a man who had great faith in the people with whom he worked — great faith in many people with whom he did not work. He assumed that everybody else was as deeply interested in the success of this enterprise as he was — and he acted accordingly. Naturally, fitting the old feet into the new shoes was not so easy and there were screeches of pain from here, from there, and from everywhere. These arose from service rivalries and conflicting service interests, from budgetary problems, etc. — the very things which you would expect and which should not have been particularly shocking to an experienced person. It was, however, a little bit disappointing and somewhat disillusioning, I think, to Secretary Forrestal not to find quite such an ardent desire for immediately successful operation on the part of all as existed in his own case. I think as time went on he felt that the original Act possibly did not give the Secretary sufficient assistance or sufficient authority.


The Act was passed in July and put into effect in September of 1947. (If I get stuck on any of these dates, I will call upon Admiral Robbins to help me out because I am sure he can tell me almost the hour when the Act went into effect).

The Hoover Commission, which had been appointed some time before, had not intended to examine the Defense Department nor the National Security Organization but finally decided to do so as the result of loud vocal dissents referred to above. Matters which might have been dealt with, let's say, less noise, received very resounding attention in the press. Both Mr. Hoover and Mr.

Forrestal accordingly felt that the situation was appropriate to have the new organization examined. It was certainly very early in its history. The organization had not been in operation for a full year. It became my fate to be Chairman of the Task Force Commission of the Hoover Commission in making that examination. One man said that it was the only case where the corpse acted as coroner at its own inquest.

We undertook the task and worked diligently, I can assure you, from June until December. We had a wonderful cooperation from the services, from the Central Intelligence Agency, from the National Security Council — from all concerned. We had a very fine committee. The committee met certainly two days — and very often three days — and nights from June until December. We had one member of the committee — Raymond B. Allen, then President of the University of Washington (now Chancellor of U.C.-L.A.) — who, to attend committee sessions, flew a distance considerably greater than around the world. I think the committee listened to over three hundred witnesses. Within our limitations, we did as thorough a job as we could. We came up with a report which constituted the basis for the Report of the Hoover Commission. This report is available to you and I will not attempt even to summarize it. The gist of our findings was that the Act and the organization were sound; but that the Act, as was to be expected within such a short time, was not yet working well; that a clarification and strengthening of the Secretary's authority might be in order. We made a recommendation accordingly, and certain other recommendations.

The Commission followed, in general, the recommendations of the task forces and, speaking generally, Congress followed the recommendations of the Commission. The amendments were not of a very drastic sort; they were in a formal sense, possibly, but not in a substantial sense. The military establishment was converted into a single executive department — the executive departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air were converted into something new



Approved: *[Signature]*  
Secretary of Defense  
30 June 1953

called Military Departments; the Secretary was given an Under-Secretary and three Assistant Secretaries; and certain other changes of that type which did not change the spirit of the Act.

The tendency to centralize authority in the Office of the Secretary and to build up the Office of the Secretary — a continuation of the old Collins plan which looked to a single department with a single secretary and a military chief of staff — still continued and are still continuing.

One thing our committee did emphasize was the importance not simply of the authority in the Secretary (that is the vertical line on the chart), but the tremendous importance of the horizontal lines on the chart — the working together, the integration, the cooperation, the coordination.

I might just digress to tell you that in the first message that President Truman sent to Congress on the matter of unification, the words "cooperation," "coordination," (or their synonyms) occurred perhaps seventy times. In the amendment message that President Truman sent to Congress, I think they occurred about a dozen times. In the last message that General Eisenhower sent, with respect to Proposals No. 6, those words are absent. That gives you an indication of the trend and I will comment on that trend a little later.

This matter of proper coordination that our committee emphasized and the Hoover Commission emphasized had nothing to do with legislation or amendments. It had a great deal to do with the effective and successful operation of the National Security Organization; that is, the working together on equal levels, side by side, for a successful, harmonious task. I would like to emphasize more than anything else that I talk to you about that the success of our National Security Organization, the success of our military establishment, does not depend only upon the vertical line — but equally upon the cooperation, the coordination, the integration. Until we have achieved sound integration between the Military

Departments and the State Department, sound integration of all the intelligence facilities of the several departments and agencies, sound integration between the Atomic Energy Commission, the State Department and the Military Departments — the organization cannot function well. You cannot order it to work well any more than King Canute could order the tides to recede. It is only by great maturity, great experience, by establishing smooth working relationships on the part of the several facets that each contribute, by a realization that its success or failure will not come from focussing authority in any man — that it will work. Then the man who has to make the decision is in a position to make the decision and to see it carried out — and only then.

I am not going to enlarge on the accomplishments of Secretary Forrestal — in part, because I think my views would be prejudiced — but I think they were huge. The bringing together of those elements that were not well acquainted and had not worked together so closely in the past was a good deal like putting four or five roosters into one pen. It is very fortunate that we had a man of that temperament and that patience at that time.

The recommendations of the Hoover Committee, by and large, were passed by Congress. Louis Johnson became Secretary of Defense at about that time. I would like to comment upon one extremely interesting development under Louis Johnson's secretaryship. This question of the inadequacy of the powers of the Secretary had been batted back and forth for months preceding. I never thought that the Secretary's powers were inadequate. But when Louis Johnson cancelled the navy's super-carrier, you had the acid test of the authority of the Secretary of Defense. I am not passing on the question of "policy" — whether it was wise or unwise — I am simply passing on the question of whether the Secretary had ample authority or did not have ample authority. I dare say that when the Secretary was in the position to cancel a project as important as that and as dear to the heart of the Navy as that — and not be successfully challenged — that his power was adequate for anything that he should probably undertake to do.

There was one very constructive development that I would like to mention during Louis Johnson's tenure—and that was the enactment of Title Four of the National Security Act of 1947. To a business man, the accounting and fiscal practices of the departments are, let's say, somewhat unconventional. There is some justification for that difference because business men do not take their properties and blow them up every score of years. There are differences that justify differences—but I think, perhaps, the differences went a little too far. It was felt that there was waste that could and should be avoided, particularly now that our defense expenditures had reached such proportions. "Economy" is really not the word to use with respect to military matters. Military matters — particularly, war — are the negation of economy; there isn't any such thing as economy. "Waste" is what you want to avoid. It was felt that by better accounting systems, more similar accounting systems among the services, by a record of property and of supplies (what in business is called an "inventory"), it might be possible to avoid some waste. I wouldn't say that was a very unreasonable point of view. So, with the support of the military departments and of Congress, Title Four was enacted — which placed upon the Secretary of Defense (and upon the several civilian secretaries) the obligations expressed in Title Four of the Act with respect to keeping their accounts and keeping their books. In part, the Title has been lived up to, but there is still some distance to go. I would be ready to accept some excuses because since the Title went into effect, times have been rather squally. But I think there is still considerable progress to be made in the avoidance of waste.

General George C. Marshall followed Louis Johnson as Secretary of Defense. That was a rather tranquil period compared to what preceded and what followed. Mr. Robert A. Lovett was his Under-Secretary of Defense and, in due course, Mr. Lovett became Secretary and attention was diverted from matters of organization of the department to taking care of Korean affairs. Not much was heard about further changes in the departmental org-

anization until Dr. Vannevar Bush — a man of great ability, great distinction, and great accomplishments in the scientific field — became so concerned about the adequacy of our military plans that he made three speeches suggesting rather radical reorganization of the Defense Department. I think that in the interval between the speeches (which covered a few months), Dr. Bush changed his views somewhat as he became more familiar with the problem. I feel that Dr. Bush's cause for concern may have been justified; but his prescription would not have cured the ailments that he was trying to cure.

With a spirit of cooperation rather unusual in our history, the outgoing President (Truman) did everything that he could to facilitate the take-over by General Eisenhower. Amongst other things he asked Secretary Lovett to write a letter to him, setting forth what he thought the incoming Secretary should know and, particularly, any changes that he thought should take place in the Act. There were no very drastic suggestions contained in that letter. Again, I am not going into detail — I assume all that material is available to those of you who desire to familiarize yourselves with the details. But, those two stimuli — plus the fact that the President had a Reorganization Committee in the persons of Nelson Rockefeller, Dr. Robert V. Fleming and Dr. Milton Eisenhower set the stage for another look at the Defense Department. This committee, fortified by several other individuals of ability and distinction, held a few hearings on the subject — and came up with some recommendations which constituted the basis for President Eisenhower's recommendations to Congress known as "Reorganization Proposal Number 6." Well, some of you may already know that my attitude towards those proposals is something less than enthusiastic — and I am going to return the compliment involved in your asking me here by talking to you with complete frankness. Naturally, many of you will disagree with me and I can say that I took a first-class licking in Congress. I still think that it is our duty — your duty and my duty — to form our own opinions about these things and to express them.

I won't go into the details of the Rockefeller Report, but I will deal with some of the words from President Eisenhower's Message to Congress, embodying these proposals. One statement that I want to read goes back to something I said to you before. I am quoting now from the President's message:

"I am convinced that the fundamental structure of our Department of Defense and its various component agencies as provided by the National Security Act, as amended, is sound. None of the changes I am proposing affect that basic structure, and this first objective can and will be attained without any legislative change."

The President mentions three objectives — I will now deal with the first one:

"The first objective, toward which immediate actions already are being directed, is clarification of lines of authority within the Department of Defense so as to strengthen civilian responsibility."

Those of you who have been students of this subject for some time know, and those of you who will become students of this will learn, that the words "civilian control" are words to conjure with; they are magical words — magical in a number of senses: amongst others, in the sense that nobody knows what they mean. Of course, the military establishment should be under civilian control in the sense of the purse strings being in Congress's hands. Of course, it should be under civilian control in the sense of being subject to the President as Commander-in-Chief and, of course, each department within those limits that experience has indicated to be wise and necessary should be under the control of its secretary. There is such a thing as civilian control — and that is a sound thing; and there is such a thing as civilian meddling — and that is *not* a sound thing. It is very much like the dealings of the layman



with his surgeon. Whether there is to be an operation or whether there is not to be an operation is, after all, the decision of the patient. That is not a technical decision, that is not a professional decision — that is a policy of the patient, the civilian. And the relationship of the civilian authority to the military, in my opinion, is much like that. What action is to be taken, in a broad sense — what policy adopted, let us say, what funds are to be spent, what political factors enter into the situation — those are civilian decisions. When it comes to operations, you had better let the surgeon handle the knife.

I hope that amongst you students will be one — or more — who will give this matter of civilian control a thorough, historical and analytical study. It is founded in our Constitution. Why? Because the people that wrote the Constitution had soldiers all over them — under their feet, on their necks, in their kitchens, in their living rooms, in their stores, and everywhere else. They didn't want that. But, in my opinion, they did not conceive of civilian control as a situation where the operation of a theater command was to be through the civilian secretary. I think that the recommendation which did not go into the law, but which the Rockefeller Committee made — that the appointment of a commander for a theater of operations should not be made by the Joint Chiefs and that the control of a theater of operations should not be under the Joint Chiefs, but in the Secretary of the Department — was a mistake. I think it was not in accordance with the spirit of the Act and I undertake to prophesy (which is not my speciality) that it will not work — that it will not even be followed.

The second broad objective of the act:

“Our second major objective is effectiveness with economy.”

In the name of “economy,” certain boards are abolished and six new assistant secretaries are appointed and a general counsel.

I might say, gentlemen, that a man of cynical tendencies perhaps would feel that the appointment of six new assistant secretaries was not in and of itself a guarantee of economy. You know there is no such thing as a single assistant secretary. An assistant secretary, or a secretary, is a galaxy—a great group gathers around him. So, I think we will have to wait a little before we finally determine whether the abolition of certain boards and the creation of assistant secretaryships does or does not stimulate economy. I wouldn't be sure that it did—and I wouldn't be sure that it stimulated effectiveness because where you have three departments like the Air, the Navy, and the Army, they must work together. You must have representatives from all three and there must be somebody sitting at the head of the table to decide. Whether you call him an assistant secretary or whether you call him a chairman is "tweedledum and tweedledee." Let us see how it works out.

"Our third broad objective is to improve our machinery for strategic planning for national security."

There, it seems to me, the recommendations verge on the dangerous—particularly at this time. The Chairman is given the right to veto the selection of members of the Joint Staff and also the right to remove them. I don't know much about military matters but I know that in business the man who has the right to fire and the right to hire is the boss. Maybe it isn't that way in military matters—but I suspect it is. Furthermore, he has management of the Joint Staff. Well, when a man can control the person, or persons, on the Staff and can manage the work of the Staff—that comes pretty near to being his Staff and he comes pretty near to being its Chief. We are very fortunate in the selection of the new Joint Chiefs of Staff: Admiral Radford (than whom there is no abler officer), Admiral Carney, General Ridgeway and General Twining. We have there a wonderful group. It will be interesting to see, however, how the new Chairman employs these powers because

these powers put the new Chairman in a position where with little observation and possibly little challenge, he might convert that office into the Office of a Chief of Staff and he might convert the Joint Staff into sort of a General Staff. In my opinion, that development would be extremely dangerous. I do not say that is going to happen, but I think it is a situation that calls for eternal vigilance to see that it does not happen.

Congress does not want it to happen. The question, if put squarely to Congress, would receive only one answer: "Our people do not want it." My opposition to it is not based upon the fact that I would expect the Chief of Staff to take over the government and control of this country — that is not the way it operates, gentlemen. If you want to see how it operates, you can see how that man, Hitler, did it. He took over the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff's authority over the military being focussed, it was a very easy thing to do. It isn't the danger that that man will be a man on horseback and govern the Country — it is that you focus the power into a handle that a man of evil intentions can readily grasp. I don't see that in the horizon at this moment — but I wouldn't want to run the risk! The reason I have reservations on it also has to do with our military planning. I would have been very happy to see the Rockefeller Committee come up with a recommendation of the appointment of a group of distinguished scientists and civilians who on occasion would review the plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to see that those plans were realistic from the point of view of the political situation, our economic capabilities, and the developments in science and research. That, I think, is our great need — and not these other things. That recommendation, it seems to me, would have been very welcome — and there is still room for that recommendation.

The other proposals, as I have said to you, with the exception of that one — giving these unusual powers to the Chairman — are matters of no great importance. The way that matter is handled by Admiral Radford will be of great significance and of great importance. To that, I invite your attention.

That covers the ground in a little more time than I had intended to take. If you are interested in a bibliography, I will just mention certain documents where the story is told. I think my report to Congress is a pretty complete review of occurrences on the subject up to that time. The Hoover Commission Report and our Task Force Report to the Hoover Commission bring matters up-to-date. The Rockfeller Report is certainly grist in this mill, as are the President's Proposals Number 6 and the several Messages by President Truman. If you will go over those documents, you will either find yourselves exhausted or your appetites whetted. I cannot tell exactly in what frame of mind you may be in now but I hope your exhaustion has not been complete. Those whose appetites have been whetted can put forward such questions as they care to; any that I cannot answer, I feel perfectly secure about — I will just ask Admiral Robbins to help me on those.

Thank you very much for your attention.

## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH**

### **Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt**

Mr. Eberstadt was born in 1890 in New York City. He was educated at Princeton (A.B., 1913) and at Columbia Law School (LL.B., 1917). He entered the law firm of McAdoo, Cotton and Franklin as a clerk in 1919, and in 1923 became a partner in Cotton and Franklin. From 1925 to 1929, he was a partner in Dillon, Read and Company, and in 1931 established his own investment firm.

His public services have included: U.S. Army, in which he served from 1916-19; assistant to Owen D. Young, Reparations Conference, in 1929; Chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, 1942; Vice Chairman of the War Production Board, 1942-43; author of the EBERSTADT REPORT on unification of the War and Navy Departments and post-war organization for national security, 1945; assistant to B. M. Baruch, U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, 1946; author of report on the National Security Resources Board, 1948; chairman of the Committee on National Security Organization for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission), 1948.

Mr. Eberstadt serves on: Board of Advisers, Industrial College of the Armed Forces; U.S. Navy Civilian Advisory Committee; U.S. Army Advisory Committee. He is a member of the Army Ordnance Association; the Navy Industrial Association; the Navy League; U.S. Naval Institute; and Naval Historical Foundation.

## **GEOPOLITICAL THEORIES COMPARED**

A Lecture Delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 16 September 1953  
by  
*Dr. Harold Sprout*

Gentlemen of the War College:

I often feel a little bit like apologizing — intruding a mere professor upon a group of practitioners of the craft of naval power. It might amuse you to learn that when I published my first book, *The Rise of American Naval Power*, I began to get fan mail from naval officers on ships and on shore. Several of those letters said: "I can't quite place you. What class of Annapolis were you in?" I had to confess to them, in reply, that at the time I had never set foot upon a naval craft of the United States. Since then, that deficiency has been slightly rectified.

I come here this morning talking about a subject which I am convinced no one alive is really competent to discuss: that is a critical comparison and evaluation of the theories (hypotheses) which have been advanced which had a tendency to hook up the grouping of lands and seas, of resources and climate, and other earth factors, with the distribution of political power in the broad sense — military power in the specific sense — upon the earth's surface.

I am using the word "geopolitical" in a completely neutral sense — it is a word that became an epithet in the 1920's and 1930's; it became identified with the German program of "conquest, war, racism," and perhaps it is not yet completely decontaminated. It is a shorthand expression for "the relationship between geographical and other factors in the distribution of power in the world."

When one starts to inquire into geopolitical hypotheses about the distribution of power in the world, there are some things about which he immediately should be on guard. For example: Very few of these hypotheses reflect dispassionate objectivity. Most of them reflect a specific nationalistic viewpoint; most of them were formulated in the heat of some kind of a crisis, in a period of tension; most of them reflect advice to a particular government — a policy which, if followed, it was hoped would achieve some desired result.

One can take three outstanding figures to illustrate this. Captain Alfred T. Mahan, whom I regard as America's foremost geopolitical thinker to date, was first and last an ardent propagandist for United States territorial expansion overseas; for a powerful navy at a time when the United States had virtually no navy at all; and for large American participation in the affairs of Europe and Asia. If one recognizes this conceptual framework within which Mahan worked, one will not be misled into drawing unjustifiable conclusions from his works.

Another example: Sir Halford Mackinder, a British geographer, later a member of Parliament, director for a time at the London School of Economics, University of London — and Mahan's opposite number in Great Britain — spoke always as a conservative British Imperialist; a man who was generally satisfied with the things as they were around the world, who was alarmed by the growth of rival empires, and was anxious to contrive a formula that would enable Great Britain to survive as a world power.

Then take General Karl Haushofer who poured into his geopolitical writings the bitterness and frustration of German defeat in World War I; who borrowed and adapted theories from Mahan, Mackinder, and others with the manifestly nationalistic purpose of putting Germany back into the top rank of great powers.

Men have speculated on the relationship between geographical factors and the distribution of power in the world for many

centuries, but it is with the period since 1890 that we should be chiefly concerned. Since that date a bumper crop of geopolitical theories has flowed from the presses of Europe and America. A complete list of those who have ventured into this arena of analysis, speculation, and propaganda would be enormous and would include many quacks and charlatans as well as informed and competent analysts. Among the better known names on such a list one would find Friedrich Ratzel; his American protege, Ellen Churchill Semple; Captain Mahan; Sir Halford Mackinder; another British geographer, James Fairgrieve; a German general, turned geographer, Karl Haushofer; a Dutch-born professor at Yale, Nicholas Spykman; another Yale scholar, Ellsworth Huntington; the late Dr. Isaiah Bowman, and many others. In any list, I am convinced that Mahan and Mackinder would stand at, or close to, the top, if not for their originality at least for the breadth and sweep of their views and for the impact which both have had on subsequent thinking and statecraft.

I would like to begin, therefore, with a fresh look at Mahan and Mackinder; then to take up, more briefly, some of the variants and derivatives of their theories; and, also, certain other hypotheses presenting substantially different geopolitical explanations of political action and of the geographical distribution of political power upon the earth.

Before taking up any one of these men, specifically, I might note my own classification of these theories. There is one group of theories which ascribes greatest importance to the groupings of lands and seas and other phenomena of location, space, and geographical configuration. The names that head that list are Mahan and Mackinder.

It should be noted in passing in respect to this group that their thinking has often been colored by the kinds of maps which they looked at and studied. Surprisingly enough, it is only in fairly recent times that most political geographers have studied the globe as a sphere. If you know the particular map projections that were



in common use at a given time, it will often tell you quite a little about the thinking of the men who studied those map projections. As we go along, I think we can see how some of the theories reflect misconceptions that are probably attributable to certain map projections.

In the *first* group I would put Mahan, Mackinder, and others who ascribe greatest importance to the grouping of lands and seas. the *second* group of geopolitical theories includes the ones which ascribe greatest importance to the geographical distribution of material resources. In this group, you will find a number of leading geologists; among others, an anonymous study made some years ago, which I will refer to later. A *third* group of geopolitical theories are those which ascribe greatest importance to spatial and temporal variations of climate, variations of climate in different places at a given time and variations of climate through time at a given place. The names that stand out in America foremost in this field are Ellsworth Huntington and, more recently, Mr. Clarence Mills of the University of Cincinnati, a medical doctor who is working in the field of experimental medicine and whose challenging article about "Temperature Dominance Over Human Life" I suggested be circulated here for you to read.

Returning to Mahan, one has to say, first of all, that it is very hard to condense his propositions into a short statement. A very prolific and prolix writer, I find him a very difficult theorist to interpret. He modified and qualified his opinions a good deal from time to time and nowhere did he set down in concise form — in a single article or in a single book — the main outlines of his thoughts. He scattered them through a series of naval histories and scores of magazine articles on technical naval subjects and on current affairs. One has to put together bits and pieces and make the best one can of it. This operation entails the risk that the analyst — the synthesizer — may not do justice to the source. The analyst's own bias may easily distort the thought of his subject — in this case, Mahan.

As I read Mahan, his theory seems to run about as follows: that the key variable — governing the geographical distribution of political power upon the earth — has been in the past (and will continue to be in the future) the capacity of states to set the terms on which the oceans and connecting seas may be used as a medium of transportation. There is an elaborate rationale behind this, but it would take all the time remaining to develop it fully. Mahan's proposition grew out of his conviction that sea communications would always be so much more efficient and copious than land communications (he had no concept whatsoever of air communications), that the use of the seas was the *sine qua non* of material prosperity and of national power.

At the same moment, while he regarded sea power as the basis of national power, he never in his whole life systematically developed the concept of *total national power*; not to my knowledge, at least. His closest approach to a general theorem of power is to be found in the opening chapters of his first major work, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. He there attempted to classify the variables which affect the results attained (or, potentially attainable) by the competing states. These, Mahan divided into two main groups: one group called *geographical factors* and the other called *human or social factors*. With respect to the *geographical factors*, he emphasized three points: (1) the concept of *location*; (2) the concept of *defensive strength*, and (3) the concept of *resources*.

The most carefully developed of these three is the concept of *location*. This is Mahan at his best. He developed over and over again in his writings the concept of central position, and differentiated strategic central position from geographical central position. For example: The British Isles were on the periphery of Europe, and geographically exterior to the continent. British lines of communication to all points in the Mediterranean, in comparison with lines of communication overland from the center of Europe, were geographically exterior. But Mahan makes the point over and over

again that it was not the distance traversed that mattered; it was not the geographical position on the map that mattered; it was the time that it took to get from one place to another; the amount of energy (or cost, to put it in economic terms) of transporting a given amount of tonnage from one place to another, and the speed with which one could do it.

His argument was that in terms of cost, speed, and capacity, England could move more tonnage by sea to more places on the European coastline than any continental state could by land. Consequently, in a strategical sense, Britain's position was central, Britain's lines were interior — although in a purely geographical sense Britain's position was peripheral, and Britain's lines were exterior.

He linked this concept with the concept of *defensive strength*, by which he meant simply the ease or the difficulty — i.e., the economic cost — of making a position secure against attack. Here, the point which he made over and over again was the concept of *insularity*, against the concept of *continentality*. By insularity he meant that the state in question alone occupied a land area that was surrounded by water. Under that definition the British Isles, of course, was an insular state and Japan was another insular state. But he also said that to all practical purposes if a state occupied a *continental* position and had no continental neighbors who were power rivals, that state also was strategically insular — as was the case of the United States with no strong neighbors to the north or south and water on the east and west. Thus, in practice, the United States could be regarded as insular as Great Britain.

Mahan's third point, *resources*, was the least well-developed and reflected Mahan's inability throughout his life ever to come to grips effectively with the problem of industrial war potential. His discussion of resources is limited very largely to discussions of such things as docks, machine shops, and other facilities needed to service ships. He never did really come down to a discussion of

coal, iron, soil fertility, and all the other resources essential to building the industrial capacity which supports a great national power.

Mahan was also weak in the discussion of *human* or *social* factors. His discussion of population is particularly disappointing. He seems to have regarded manpower as strategically significant mainly as it provided a reservoir of people to man a navy, a merchant marine, and the shore facilities that were necessary to service the ships and personnel afloat. He had no real concept (so far as I can discover) of the complex relationships of people in a modern industrial economy.

He discussed specifically what he called national character, by which he meant the customs and habits of a people and the relations of those habits and customs to national power. Here, again, he is disappointing. All his views seem to embrace is that certain habits and customs tend to dispose a people towards seafaring, commerce, and so on. Never did he seem to have much concept of morale, discipline, and other aspects of national character which we would regard as elementary and essential in any discussion of national power today.

His discussion of the character of government as one of the social factors in relation to national power is, likewise, it seems to me, defective and rudimentary by present-day standards. By the "character of government," Mahan meant to compare not merely the degree of popular control in a state but also the way in which the functioning of a given governmental system affects the state's ability to develop and sustain a strong maritime interest, an active foreign commerce, and a powerful navy. He made one point repeatedly: that democratic governments are notoriously improvident and generally unmilitaristic; that in a democracy it is very hard to sustain popular interest in the institutions of power necessary if the country is to maintain a strong military force on land or sea. His solution was to build up the pressure groups interested in main-

taining a navy. He said that if there is a strong merchant marine, a strong merchant marine interest behind it, a strong shipbuilding interest in the country, a strong organized interest of people who believe in the navy, and so on, then you would have pressures focussed upon the legislative body which would produce legislation that would tend in part to counteract what he regarded as the chronically improvident character of democracy.

I regret that time does not permit anything about the anachronistic character of Mahan's general thinking on economic policy patterns that support sea power. Almost all of his thinking on that subject comes right out of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His hero was Colbert, the mercantilistic French Minister of Marine of the middle seventeenth century. Mahan never achieved much sophistication in the economic field and in consequence his economic thinking was a century behind times.

Now, in the light of this general sketch let me summarize some of Mahan's ideas regarding distribution of power in the world in his time, and his expectations as to the future distribution of power.

Mahan early concluded that no Eurasian mainland state could ever combine regionally dominant land power and globally dominant sea power. His argument was that if a state has even one vulnerable land frontier to defend by an army and fortifications, it would take so much of its energy and its resources that it would not be able to compete with states that were wholly insular. He later modified this conclusion in the light of a simultaneous development of German land and naval power in the 1900's. By 1910, he had come to the conclusion that perhaps Germany was going to be able to do this thing which in the 1890's he said could not be done — combine dominant land power with dominant sea power. He reconciled this with his earlier position by saying that Germany represented an extremely efficient form of state organization (we would say today that Germany approached the concept of a total-

itarian state although the Germany of that day was far from that destination) and that Germany's neighbors and potential enemies were either inefficient despotisms (a clear reference to Russia) or improvident democracies (by which he meant England and France).

This later view is significant because it reflects a significant change in Mahan's evaluations of geographical and non-geographical factors. In his earlier thinking, he was thinking largely in geographical-strategical terms; in his later thinking, he was thinking more in terms of social and political factors: state organization, improvident democracies, and so on. You will find that this is symptomatic, that, as Mahan grew older and more widely read and studied, he tended to broaden his concept of national power; to think less exclusively in terms of geography and strategical position and more in terms of the total framework of social organization.

Mahan early concluded that Great Britain could probably sustain her role as a globally dominant sea power and a power-balancer in Europe (this is Mahan of the 1890's). By 1910, he had revised this conclusion by expressing doubt that any single state could in the future maintain a globally dominant sea power, or, single-handed, play the role of power-balancer in Europe. By this time, he was talking more about the desirability of an Anglo-American joint control of the sea, which is very much in the pattern of our NATO thinking of the late 1940's and today, and similar to the line of thought which Mackinder eventually came to in his later years.

Mahan regarded the United States as possessing the latent capabilities necessary for global command of the sea. He especially emphasized our globally central position in terms of sea power. Now, this is a very significant point. Depending upon how one looks at communications, the United States' position on the globe is either central or peripheral. If one thinks primarily in terms of land communications, quite obviously Eurasia is the central po-

sition. But if one regards sea communications as the dominant factor, then North America becomes the central position. If air communications should ever become dominant, the geopolitical values of the grouping of lands and seas would have to be recalculated yet again. If one thinks in terms of railroads and highways, supplemented by airlines, then the central position would still appear to be Eurasia. But if one thinks globally in terms of sea communications supplemented by air communications, then the central position remains the United States.

It is interesting that the later Mackinder (not the early Mackinder) and Mahan all through his career emphasized the point that in terms of sea communications the United States has a globally central strategical position combined with continental insularity; that is to say, the United States has all the advantages of great area and — although Mahan didn't develop the point — highly diversified resources, in addition to a globally central position in terms of sea communications. He more or less recognized, however, that the United States lacked the strategic shore positions from which to operate naval power around the periphery of Eurasia and Africa; and it was upon such positions that British naval dominance heavily depended: The British Isles, Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Cyprus, the Cape of Good Hope, Aden, Ceylon, Hong-Kong, Falkland Islands, Trinidad, Jamaica, etc. — wherever there was a bottleneck of commerce, the British had a naval base at or close to it.

Mahan recognized that the United States did not control these great trunk-line bottlenecks of commerce the way Great Britain did. That was why late in his life he kept saying that the qualities of the United States and Great Britain are complimentary; that if they could be joined together, they could resist any combination — much the line of thinking, as I said, that has gone into the formation of the Atlantic Alliance.

Mahan never deviated from the conclusion that Russia could be contained and harassed by sea power, but never could be mortally

hurt. This point is extensively developed in his book, *The Problem of Asia*, published in 1902, much of which sounds as though it were written yesterday. Sea power could get at Russia only in those regions where Russian land power approached the sea, such as the Turkish Straits, the Baltic, and the far eastern coast of Siberia. Mahan never deviated from the conclusion, moreover, that Russia could not itself become a serious contender for control of the sea except in the unlikely event (in his opinion) of successful Russian conquest of the marginal lands of Europe and Asia.

There was a point which he did not make that he could have made, and it is surprising that he did not make it. He wrote a great deal about the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and about the Russian attempt to move a squadron from the Baltic to the Far East and the failure in the end to do so. The point that he did not make anywhere in clear-cut fashion was that Russia's sea frontiers were disconnected — the Far East, the Black Sea, the Baltic, and in the ice-bound Arctic, and that between every one of Russia's sea frontiers there was interposed some strategical position commanded by the British Navy — Singapore, Aden, the Cape of Good Hope, Suez Canal, Gibraltar, the British Isles, and so on. It would have strengthened his proposition had he made the point, but he did not make it.

Mahan displayed remarkable ambivalence with respect to Germany. As late as 1900, he regarded Germany as a natural ally of the insular states in a concerted policy of containing Russia. By 1910, he had become so alarmed by Germany's own military and naval development and oversea territorial ambitions that he urged the alignment of the insular and West European maritime states with Russia to contain Germany.

Moving now to Mackinder, it appears to me that the key variable in his theory was the alternating predominance of military force upon land and military force upon the oceans and connecting seas as a means of controlling the use of the seas. One of



the most common misconceptions about Mackinder is that his general proposition presented a dichotomy of land power versus sea power. But a careful reading of Mackinder's writings through a period from 1902 to 1943 reveals that he was interested in predominantly the same question as Mahan — the control of the seas. However, he approached it with a different set of propositions. His proposition was that in the past there had been an alternating control of the sea by the use of military force upon the land and military force upon the water. Once the whole shore line of the water area had come under the sovereignty of one state, then military force afloat became merely a police force. He cited for an example the case of the Indian Ocean which, by 1890, was virtually a British lake — all the way from Australia clear around to the Cape of Good Hope the shore line consisted of either British colonies or of territories which were dependent upon Britain or were allied with Britain. This was virtually a closed sea situation, such as prevailed in the Mediterranean after the defeat of Carthage by Rome. In that situation, military force upon the land controlled the sea (in Mackinder's thesis).

He went on to say that "the grouping of lands and seas, and of fertility and natural pathways" in conjunction with modern developments in overland communications pointed toward the eventual emergence of a single world-empire combining supreme global power both on land and on the water. His argument was that once the resources and land-power of Eurasia were consolidated under one political management and knit together by an effective grid of communication — such, for example, as was being developed in the 20th century through the railway systems of Europe and Asia — there would emerge such a powerful primary base — resources, manpower, and capital — that no combination of insular countries could stand against it.

Mackinder made much of the comparative productivity of the primary bases — that is, the home countries. He had an essentially modern, economically sophisticated concept of manpower

(which the economist would call "labor") plus resources (which the economist would call "land") plus equipment ("capital") plus organization ("management"). That is, in Mackinder's concept, manpower, resources, equipment, and organization (in the economic theory concept: labor, land, capital and management) produced productivity; and to compare the power of any two states, you needed to compare their productivity in terms of these factors.

The second condition of power, after comparative productivity of the primary base, was the security of the primary base. There, he made pretty much the same points as Mahan: the advantages of insularity, and so on.

Finally, his third condition of power was the strategical opportunities for bringing pressure or force to bear upon potential enemies from the territorial positions which one held. There his argument, again, was very much like Mahan's.

Mackinder's predictions of what was going to happen in world politics run about as follows: Eurasia-Africa, integrated by modern overland, rail, and other communications, were destined, in his view, to become the world's potentially most powerful and secure base of political power. In comparison to that, the insular states (including the United States) even in coalition could not compete. In 1919, he said: "If we take the long view, must we not still reckon with the possibility that a large part of the great Continent of Eurasia might some day be united under a single sway and that an invincible sea power might be based upon it?"

By 1943, Mackinder had retreated slightly from this dogmatic prediction and was admitting (at least, implicitly) that the insular powers in alliance with the Eurasian coast-land states might be able to balance this heartland Eurasian empire.

Karl Haushofer can be dismissed in a few words. He borrowed elements from Mahan, Mackinder, from a few other sources as well, added a few elements of his own, and set about showing Germany how to do the things which Mahan and Mackinder were

afraid Germany would do. Mackinder, in 1919, said to his government: "If you do not do certain things, Germany will become the dominant power of Eurasia." Haushofer in effect said: "It is a good idea; let's try it." Essentially, that is the contrast between Mackinder and Haushofer as I see it.

As time is running out, I will skip altogether the British geographer, Fairgrieve, who switched in mid-career from an essentially resources explanation of the distribution of national power (mainly in terms of energy resources) to a grouping-of-lands-and-seas hypothesis, patterned very much after Mackinder and Mahan.

I will also skip Nicholas Spykman who, if he had lived ten years more, might have made a very great contribution to geopolitical thinking in the United States. He died in 1943, when only 49 years old. I would say that Spykman's principal contribution was that he emphasized that the historical alignments of the last century and a half had not been the way Mackinder had pictured them. It had not been the sea powers or the maritime states against the Eurasian landlocked empire, but in each case had been some combination of the maritime states with the Eurasian landlocked empire against one of the other maritime states.

In the case of the Napoleonic Wars, it had been the insular state allied with the maritime states and Russia against France. In World Wars I and II, it had been the insular states of Great Britain and the United States with most of the maritime states of Europe plus the heartland state against Germany. His general proposition was that the crucial area was not the heartland, or the interior of Eurasia, but the coastland where the great population and the great industrial complexes were located, and that whoever controlled these coastlands (he called them "the rimlands") of Europe and Asia — particularly, Europe — would be in a position to exercise world power. This, again, you see is very close to the basic philosophy of the Atlantic Alliance.

I can make only a brief general statement of the theory that national power varies with the distribution of resources. The geologist, C. K. Leith, has developed an hypothesis on that basis. Brooks Emeny, formerly President of the Foreign Policy Association, published a book on the same theme. The British geographer, James Fairgrieve, announced such a theory. Perhaps the most interesting statement of this theory comes from an anonymous document that was prepared in Washington during the period of the war (in the middle 1940's). This was circulated to a limited group within the government and to a few outsiders in a mimeographed form ( a big document of several hundred pages).

In this document we read :

“Energy is the substance of a nation’s strength and the measure of its influence on its neighbors. In international relations, energy is fuel, is power. Thus, national power is determined largely by the amount of energy that can be turned into productive activity. If enough is available, the nation can provide for itself without recourse to war. And if war comes, a nation can defend itself. The nation lacking in energy resources, however, can neither provide for itself in peace nor defend itself in war. The capacity for peace and the capacity for war are thus measured to a large degree by the volume of energy resources within the country. International relations are patterned by differences in the quantities of energy available from country to country.”

That is energy-determinism, pure and simple.

The final group of theories is the one typified by the little article on “Temperature Dominance Over Human Life,” by Clar-

ence Mills, published in *Science Magazine*, September, 1949. Mills' argument runs about as follows: The human body is an internal combustion engine of rather low efficiency. For every calory of heat utilized, several must be dissipated into the air by radiation, conduction, evaporation, or other means. High temperatures, especially when coupled with high humidity, may make dissipation of waste heat more or less difficult. The human organism responds to high temperatures and high humidity by slowing its metabolism rate and this retarded metabolism is reflected in lower mental, as well as physical, activity.

The earth, he says, is currently in a warming-up phase of a long-term climatic cycle. Conditions in the tropics will become more unfavorable even than they are today and the stimulating climate of northeastern and north-central United States is deteriorating, while the climate of the U.S.S.R., far to the north (Baku, in southern Russia, is in the same latitude as Long Island) is growing more favorable, warming up, becoming much more stimulating.

I would simply say, by way of criticism, that the evidence of the long-term climatic trend is not yet definitely established. The meteorologists still disagree as to the long-term trend. The hypothesis regarding the relationship between human energy and climate has been challenged by very respectable students — biologists, geographers, and so on. The counter-argument is that the capacity of the human organism to adapt itself to different climatic conditions by adaptation of clothing, diet, and so on, is very much greater than Mills and Huntington were willing to admit. Mills has not established that climatic variations — even if his laboratory experience with experimental animals is sound — is so much more controlling than other factors as to outweigh all the others. He isolates this one variable and treats it as the determinant. He neglects the question of resources, he neglects the question of geographical position, he neglects a great many other factors, and says that this one factor is so much more important than all the rest that the rest do not matter.

**Mills also assumes a relatively static technology with respect to air conditioning, clothing development, clothing customs, nutrition, and other fields. Every one of these impinges upon and affects the impact of climate upon human behavior.**

**Rather than take up valuable time with a summary of conclusions, perhaps it would be better to take our intermission and then come back and seek the flaws in my arguments.**

## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH**

### **Dr. Harold Sprout**

Professor Sprout was born in Benzonia, Michigan, on 14 March 1901. He was graduated from Oberlin College in 1924 with A.B. and A.M. degrees. In 1924-25 he studied at the University of Wisconsin Law School and at the Western Reserve University Law School in 1925-26. He was a Carnegie Fellow in International Law in 1928-29 and was granted a Ph.D. degree from the University of Wisconsin in 1929.

Dr. Sprout was Assistant Professor of Government at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, in 1926-27, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University in 1929-31. Since 1931 he has been in the Department of Politics at Princeton University, advancing from the rank of instructor to full professorship in 1945. He has been Chairman of the department since 1949.

Professor Sprout has been in demand as a visiting professor or lecturer and has served in these capacities at Columbia University, University of Denver, University of Pennsylvania, the Army War College, the U.S. Naval Academy, the U.S. Military Academy, and the National War College. During World War II, he served successively as a consultant for the Office of War Information, the War Department, Department of State, and the Navy Department.

He is co-author with Margaret Sprout, his wife, of: "The Rise of American Naval Power," (revised edition), 1943; "Toward a New Order of Sea Power," (revised edition), 1943; "Foundations of National Power," 1945, revised 1951. He is a member of numerous professional and educational organizations and has been a prolific contributor of articles on American foreign policy and defense policy to various journals.

## RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluations of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books is available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

**Title:** *Fire in the Ashes.* 405 p.  
**Author:** White, Theodore H. N. Y., William Sloane Associates, 1953.  
**Evaluation:** An excellent evaluation of the situation in Europe today, Russia's influence upon that situation and America's position with relation to the whole. He is extremely optimistic in his point of view but makes an excellent overall evaluation of the European situation in 1953. He recognizes and discusses the factors involved in the international interplay for power within the European area and places Russia and the U. S. in perspective with that area. A well-written book which is recommended reading for students of world politics and strategy.

**Title:** *Beyond Containment.* 406 p.  
**Author:** Chamberlain, William H. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1953.  
**Evaluation:** This book is an attempt to sketch the history and interpret the causes of the cold war. At a time when new maneuvers and zigzags in Soviet foreign policy are taking place, it puts timely emphasis on the permanent factors in Soviet communist theory and practice which have produced the cold war. It is an excellent treatise on the relations of the free world with Russia. The author's conclusions are based on his experiences and impressions during twelve years in the Soviet Union as a journalist. His book is authoritative, well documented and highly readable. He



presents no information, conclusions or recommendations not readily found elsewhere. However, he has presented a clear, concise exposition of the Soviet version of communism, what it is, its methods, aims, and prospects of future success as well as the steps which the U. S. and the rest of the free world have taken, are now taking, and should take in the future to keep the non-communist nations from being engulfed by the Soviet Juggernaut.

- Title:** *What Europe Thinks of America.* 222 p.  
**Author:** Burnham, James, ed. N. Y., John Day Co., 1953.  
**Evaluation:** The editor has invited nine European writers to express their views of European opinion on selected topics designed to encompass major points of misunderstanding and disagreement between Europe and the United States. The writers are all non-communist and reasonably pro-American; they have not previously written for American audiences. The resulting collection of essays which Mr. Burnham has compiled is truly excellent, and provides a rare and valuable opportunity to see a number of world problems from another point of view. The contributors are thoughtful and articulate, although not necessarily wholly objective. Translations are extremely well done, and the small volume is very easy reading.

- Title:** *NATO Handbook.* 57 p.  
**Author:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Paris, 1953.  
**Evaluation:** A booklet, published in Paris in July of last year, was prepared to give an authoritative thumbnail sketch of NATO. It is written in three chapters. Chapter I presents briefly the events leading up to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Chapter II discusses the content of the treaty. Chapter III covers the development of the organizations established for the purpose of carrying out the political and military functions and responsibilities under the treaty. The text is supported by appendices giving pertinent extracts from related documents and by charts showing current organizational structures. This booklet is considered to be excellent, and Chapter III is especially recommended.

- Author:** *The American Way.* 246 p.  
**Title:** Clough, Shepard B. N. Y., Thomas Y. Crowell, 1953.  
**Evaluation:** *The American Way* is a discussion of what the author considers to be the most important factors contributing

to the economic basis of our civilization. Although the economic progress of the United States is not especially easy to understand, inasmuch as no one cause can explain it, Shepard B. Clough has clearly developed the many factors of growth and explains how they have been brought together in fortuitous combination and how necessary each one was for the achievement of economic progress. American economic history is clearly recounted in simple language, unburdened with statistics. This work is recommended as basic reading for the student of American economic development.

**Title:** *A History of Military Affairs in Western Society Since the Eighteenth Century.* 776 p.

**Author:** Turner, Gordon B. N. Y., Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1953.

**Evaluation:** A selection of readings originally designed for the Reserve Officers Training Program and for college students in general, and used as a basis of instruction in a course offered in Princeton University. Organized chronologically, it endeavors to emphasize developments in each period that have made the greatest impact upon military affairs. It is not concerned primarily with matters of a purely military nature, or with the separate arms of the military establishment. Its aim rather is to uncover the "relationships, trends and principles" that have guided soldiers and statesmen since the eighteenth century. In the words of the editor:

"The major criterion of selection used has been the author's concern with some aspect of the relationship between war and society; that is, the relationship between scientific and technological developments on the one hand and strategic and tactical concepts on the other, the balance between civil and military authorities, the association between members of armed coalitions and within the military establishment, and the impact of war on society and society on war."

The selections are drawn from a very wide range of distinguished writers, military and civilian.

- Title:** *Report on the Atom.* 321 p.
- Author:** Dean, Gordon. N. Y., Alfred A. Knopf, 1953.
- Evaluation:** In clear, non-technical language the everyday problems of the Atomic Energy Commission are described. There is a short, general history of the American entry into the atomic energy fields. Fissionable material is followed from the discovery of the uranium ore until finally destined for atomic bombs or nuclear power plants. After a discussion of the relations of the Atomic Energy Commission with the military, and other government agencies, an explanation is made of present commission policies. The book closes with four chapters devoted to security and international relations in the atomic energy field, and suggestions as to the time and conditions for a change in American policy for nuclear power. It contains background information that should be known by every American citizen. The military and power implications are especially interesting to all military officers. To date, this is the best exposition of how America came to adopt the present policies concerning Atomic Energy.
- Title:** *Moscow and Chinese Communists.* 306 p.
- Author:** North, Robert C. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1953.
- Evaluation:** The author attempts to encompass in one volume the beginnings of the Chinese Communist movement, the course of relations with Moscow, the rise of Mao Tse-Tung, and the implications of the People's Republic. A large order, indeed, but he has presented in capsule form an excellent study of these vast subjects. Both a novelist and political writer, Mr. North borrows freely from the former technique to enliven and simplify his writings on such an abstruse subject. The book is extremely easy to read. Unlike a great many writers on similar subjects, the author not only presents a concisely written history, but also concludes with a recommended program for action in Asia to regain our lost prestige and to combat communism.
- Title:** *A Policy for Scientific and Professional Manpower.* 263 p.
- Author:** National Manpower Council. N. Y., Columbia University Press, 1953.
- Evaluation:** An over-all picture of what is happening to scientific and professional personnel and a comprehensive evaluation of scientific and professional manpower problems are contained in this volume. The book is divided into two parts.

The first, a statement by the National Manpower Council, presents recommendations to the nation for developing more reliable knowledge about our human resources; for strengthening institutions that educate and train scientists and professionals; for maintaining a continuous flow of students into institutions of higher education; for expanding the opportunities for capable young people to secure advanced training; and for utilizing more effectively the available supply of scientific and professional manpower. The recommendations include suggestions to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the universities, business, the professional societies, and the public. The second part of the book was prepared by the Research Staff, National Manpower Council. It is a comprehensive review of the facts and issues upon which the recommendations are based. These facts were compiled and evaluated with the help of top experts — the staffs of professional societies and other noted specialists in engineering, teaching, medicine, and physics. Part II begins with a history of the personnel in the sciences and the professions, depicting different rates of increase resulting from changing economic and social conditions. It explains and evaluates, both from the long-run and short-run points of view, the shortages that now exist. There is a chapter on how the armed forces have used and misused this highly trained group of individuals; a discussion of the deflecting of scientists into applied research work; a critical evaluation of the fact that the engineering schools are turning out the sought-after business managers for our complex economy; and an analysis of the country's reserves for scientific and professional training.

- Title:** *Russian Assignment.* 568 p.
- Author:** Stevens, Leslie C. Boston, Little Brown, 1953.
- Evaluation:** Admiral Stevens has written an intimate portrayal of his shrewd observations of the Russian scene observed during his duty as naval attache' in Russia for three years, 1947-49. He writes lucidly of many personal experiences, including extended visits to different parts of Russia, fishing and sightseeing trips, observations while watching parades or women street-sweepers at work, buying a drink at a saloon, and descriptions of the Russian theatre. He intentionally has omitted any political or military analysis of events and matters of an official nature. This book is well worth reading for anyone who desires to gain a deeper insight of Soviet traits, mode of living, and logic of thinking. It explains Russia in human, nonpolitical terms, and for that reason can be of value in better understanding Soviet policies and actions.

## PERIODICALS

**Title:** *Report on Tomorrow's Airpower (A symposium).*

**Publication:** AIR FORCE, October, 1953, p. 32-89.

**Annotation:** A report by top people in industry, government, labor, and the military, on the question: "Where does our air power go from here?" Individual reports include **Planning for the Long Run, Labor, Engines, Components, Air Force, Airframes, Weapons Systems Development, Navy, Electronics and Army.**

**Title:** *What Situation?*

**Author:** Romlein, John W., Colonel, U.S.A.

**Publication:** MILITARY REVIEW, November, 1953, p. 3-6.

**Annotation:** The soundness of the decision which the commander makes depends upon **WHAT** situation he sees. The author shows that it is erroneous to speak of the estimate of **THE** situation and urges us to consider five situations: the true situation, the one seen by us, the one seen by the enemy, the one we think the enemy sees, and the one he thinks that we see. He proves his point with historical examples.

**Title:** *Britain's Strategic Relationship to Europe.*

**Author:** Wilmot, Chester.

**Publication:** INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, October, 1953, p. 409-417.

**Annotation:** Discusses the current relationship of Britain to Europe brought about by political and scientific developments and considers questions arising from the strategic issues involved in the settlement of the German problem, which is a key factor in attaining a balance of power in Europe.

**Title:** *Naval Control of the Yellow Sea.*

**Author:** Barry, Donald.

**Publication:** THE NAVY (Great Britain), October, 1953, p. 284-285.

**Annotation:** Deals with the Royal Navy's contribution to the United Nations' effort in Korea.

**Title:** *The Soviet Army.*  
**Author:** De Pue, B. E. M., Major, Belgian Army.  
**Publication:** MILITARY REVIEW, November, 1953, p. 73-87.  
**Annotation:** Lists ten factors (besides manpower) which must be considered in assessing the real strength of a great power and discusses each in relation to Russia.

**Title:** *Defense and Strategy.*  
**Publication:** FORTUNE, November, 1953, p. 87-94.  
**Annotation:** Brief accounts under this heading deal with the fiscal 1955 defense budget; organization of the Defense Department; the crisis at Hughes Aircraft; and the germ warfare confessions of U. S. officers as a factor in the loss of the psychological war in Korea.

**Title:** *India: Russia's Dupe or Ally?*  
**Publication:** U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, October 16, 1953, p. 35-37.  
**Annotation:** Outlines the activities of Krishna Menon, India's delegate to the U. N., and tells of his influence on Nehru, which is responsible for the direction of Indian foreign policy against the U. S. and in favor of Russia.

**Title:** *East-West Trade Possibilities.*  
**Author:** Hoeffding, Oleg.  
**Publication:** THE AMERICAN SLAVIC AND EAST EUROPEAN REVIEW, October, 1953, p. 350-359.  
**Annotation:** An appraisal of the Moscow economic conference indicates that the trade expansion implied in the Moscow program would accrue mainly to the Soviet Union, rather than to Eastern Europe and China.

**Title:** *Will the New Joint Chiefs Gamble on Peace?*  
**Author:** Bigart, Homer.  
**Publication:** LOOK, October 20, 1953, p. 33-35.  
**Annotation:** Deals with questions of importance to military planning which face the new Joint Chiefs of Staff and reports on the views of Admiral Radford on some of these issues.

- Title:** *Soviet Military Strength.*  
**Publication:** INTERNATIONAL SERVICES OF INFORMATION, October 9, 1953, p. 49-51.  
**Annotation:** Reports that Russia is building up a long-range naval air force aimed at destroying British and American naval forces at the beginning of a future war.
- Title:** *Scandinavian Insularity.*  
**Publication:** THE ECONOMIST, October 10, 1953, p. 82-84.  
**Annotation:** Calls attention to the strategic and political conditions in Scandinavia that are causing concern to NATO military planners and considers the impact of the new tactics of the Soviet government on the area.
- Title:** *United States Diplomacy.*  
**Publication:** CURRENT HISTORY, October, 1953.  
**Annotation:** The articles in this issue outline the historic background of American diplomacy and deal with contemporary U. S. policy in Europe, Latin America, the Middle and Far East.
- Title:** *Asian Allies for America.*  
**Author:** Ballentine, Joseph W.  
**Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, October, 1953, p. 1047-1063.  
**Annotation:** Reviews our relations with the nations of Asia in an attempt to determine why we failed to find, as Russia did, a way to inspire the peoples of Asia to espouse our cause and to serve its purpose.

## **REORGANIZATION OF SENIOR COURSES AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**

The senior courses in strategy and tactics, and strategy and logistics, offered at the Naval War College, have been re-organized into a single two-year "Naval Warfare Course". The change, consolidating all of the advantages of the two former courses, have been implemented already, and the present students will be graduated in June, 1954 as the first class in the Naval Warfare Course.

Beginning in August 1954 the new two-year course may be taken in whole or in part; that is, a certain percentage of students will take two years, and others will take only the first or second year parts of it.

The combination of the two courses into one was made in order to extend the benefits of both to the maximum number of officers who will exercise high command, and in recognition of the inclusive responsibility of the commander for all facets of planning and operations, including logistics.

The extension of the course to two years is brought about by the increasing complexity of modern warfare, and the increasing participation of Naval officers in joint and combined command, and in the formulation of strategy at National and Allied level. The higher education required to enable senior naval officers to meet the demands of present-day command exceeds the capability of a single year's course.

It is expected that the new two year Naval Warfare Course will provide the Navy with senior officers educated at the highest practicable level in the art of naval warfare, make the benefits available to more officers than now take either course, and arrive at these goals more rapidly than former curricula or courses would allow.