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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 2 September 1953, by
Dr. Philip E. Moseley

Admiral Conolly, Admiral Robbins, Gentlemen:

I feel very humble at attempting to summarize a thousand years of Russian history in a few minutes. All I am going to try to do is pick out a few of the factors which have shaped Russian history; and then to indicate, very briefly, how they affect the Russian position today in the world and, therefore, our relationship of conflict and struggle for survival against Soviet power of today.

There is one concept which I think is basic to some of our confusion about Russian power and Russian intentions. That was expressed in an off-hand statement some few years ago by a very able statesman but, in that particular moment, not a very great historian, in my opinion — Dean Acheson. He said: "Soviet Imperialism is simply the old Russian expansionism in another form." This is a very basic question. If Russia has always been an expansionist power, if communism is just a device, a method, a technique for securing Russian aims, then, of course, we have to take one attitude toward Russia. We would be justified in pressing as hard as we could, not only to return Russia to her boundaries of 1941 or 1938 but perhaps to her boundaries of 1651, for example, in order to allow other peoples now contained within the Soviet Empire to exert their own national purposes and, we would hope, to join the side of freedom. If, on the other hand, there are basic differences between Russian expansionism and Soviet expansionism, then we need to analyze those and try to find the crack in the armor where we can drive wedges in peacetime or in 'cold war' time, as well as in time of 'hot war.'

One of the factors which is basic in both Russian and Soviet government is the multi-national character of the state. Pre-1913 Russia had about 51% of great Russians, the other 49% being composed of other peoples. The Soviet Empire of today, similarly, has about 50% Russians — a little over 100,000,000 out of an estimated 210,000,000 total inhabitants.

I want to say just a few words about this problem of the multi-national empire because this comes right back to the question: Is it Russian rule over the non-Russian peoples that make for this empire of 210 millions — instead of somewhat over 100 millions — and, if so, is the diversity of nationality a factor of weakness that we should try to exploit in peacetime and in 'cold war' as well as in war?

I am not going to bore you with the details of the numbers and locations of the various peoples in the Russian Empire. You are generally familiar with them. I will mention that, in addition to the Great Russians, who inhabit the main part of European Russia and spread across Siberia to the Pacific, there is also the Ukrainian nation within the Soviet Union, forming a Soviet Republic. It is estimated to contain 40 million people, making it not much smaller in population than Italy, France or Great Britain and, actually, considerably richer than Italy and probably richer than France in its natural and industrial resources. Then there is the Byelorussian nation of some 15 million, which lies in the Western part of the Soviet Union bordering more on Poland. Both of these peoples are Eastern Slavs and both of them have had (in their eastern parts, at least) a long association with Russia, to which I will return in a minute.

Then there are several peoples of, roughly 3.5 million each, the Armenians, the Georgians, the Azerbaidzhans, Turks, and there are some 15 million Moslems east of the Caspian, in Central Asia, conquered as recently as the 1860's, and 1870's. Those are the most important and significant of the non-Russian peoples from

the point of view of Russia's political stability, which is what we want to discuss today.

One of the features of the old Russian Empire, pre-1917, and of the Soviet Empire of today is that it ranks its nationalities according to their degree of loyalty and reliability. This in itself is an important factor in analyzing the differences which have appeared among these peoples. One of the peoples who were treated as extremely reliable in the Imperial method and are treated as relatively unreliable today are the Ukrainian people, the second largest people of the Soviet Union. One indication of this was the very severe application of collectivization, of suppression of national culture from the period 1929 down to the war. During and after the war, all of the Ukraine was under German occupation. The shifting out of the population and the removal of all those elements accused or suspected of collaboration with the occupying forces of Hitler was carried out with rigor in the Ukraine. Another interesting indication is that the proportion of Communist Party members among Ukrainians is only half that among Russians.

Turning to another group of people, the Georgians and Armenians in the Caucasus, on the other hand, cooperated actively in joining the Russian Empire and rejoining the Soviet Union in 1920-21. That does not mean that they were all enthusiastic about it or that there was no opposition. In fact, there were uprisings in the mountains of Georgia as late as 1930. At that time, I was supposed to cross on horseback over a trail and I had to be diverted to another route because there was an uprising along the Sukhum military highway. On the other hand, the proportion of Communist Party members among Armenians and Georgians is, roughly, twice that of the general population of the Soviet Union. Lying on the border line, as two Christian peoples, they have a long history of survival against Turkish and Iranian Moslem pressure. This is certainly a carry-over from the tradition of close attachment to Russia and relatively lenient treatment of their culture by Russia and by the Soviet Union.

In addition to this positive ranking, in terms of Party membership, there is also a negative ranking which was applied both by the Russian Empire and by the Soviet Regime. For example, the Imperial Russian government, up to 1917, did not dare conscript Moslems from Central Asia; they were simply left out of military service in spite of the fact that the (then) roughly 12-14 million Moslems would have provided a substantial group for military service. The Soviet regime has conscripted them and has made a great boast that this demonstrates their strong attachment. But, as a matter of fact, the number of escapees and defectors from the Central Asiatic Moslems (where they have had an opportunity along the Iron Curtain to defect) is quite striking.

During and after World War II, the Soviet government actually destroyed six nationalities which, previously, had had Soviet or autonomous republics of their own. Among them was the Republic of the Volga Germans, which had been established by Stalin himself in 1918. Roughly, 600,000 inhabitants of this republic were seized in 1941 and scattered through construction jobs, lumber camps, prison camps, and in the far reaches of Siberia and the north; they have disappeared. I recently examined a map published in 1951 in Moscow, showing the administrative divisions of the Soviet Union in 1926, at which time the German Volga Republic occupied a substantial area along the lower Volga. That republic had disappeared from the map in 1951, which was supposed to show the administrative divisions of 1926. In other words, the Soviet regime is engaged in wiping out the memory that that republic ever existed in the Soviet system.

In 1944, the Crimean Tartars, a nation which had lived for 600 years in the Crimea and had some 450,000 people, was eliminated or liquidated. The people were simply gathered up, the women sent in one direction, the men in others, and the children to homes where they would be brought up speaking Russian and would disappear into the general population.

Several smaller peoples of the Caucasus, totaling about 600,000 — the Karachai, the Chechens, and the Ingush — similarly, were liquidated, their place-names wiped out, and they disappeared from the map and from the histories of the Soviet Union. The Kalmyks, a Buddhist people, settled since the late eighteenth century in the semi-desert area northwest of the Caspian, were also completely eliminated. It had a total of some 130,000 people before the war. You would be interested to know that the last known remnant of the Kalmyk people have now settled in Camden, New Jersey. There are about 450 of them. They have built a Buddhist temple. They have some difficulties with their neighbors because, according to tribal customs, they kidnap their brides. This is an occasion of great festivity, purely a ceremonial act, but their neighbors thought they had to call in the F.B.I., as kidnapping is a Federal offense. This has now been explained to the neighbors and the Kalmyks have also moderated some of their more extreme violence — or fictitious violence — in carrying out the kidnapping. Naturally, it is pre-arranged with the bride that she is going to be kidnapped.

Some people say that we should try by every means to play up the national differences within the Soviet Union — that this is the most reliable way of restricting the Great Russians to the territory in which they are settled, which is very extensive — and that we should attempt to regroup the peoples of the Soviet Union at some time in the future in a way which would set up a series of national states in all parts of the Soviet Union. There is a strong tendency in British thinking along this direction, with special attention to the Moslems of the Soviet Union, who are, actually, more numerous than the Moslems of all of Turkey.

There are a number of complicated factors here. For one thing, the relations between the Great Russians and the non-Russians have changed considerably during the history of the Soviet regime, as well as in the history of Imperial Russia. In the early days of the expansion of the Russian Empire, the idea was

that it should be a multi-national state with more or less equity, at least, of the ruling groups within each nation. Therefore, for example, the German barons of the Baltic region were able, from the time of Peter the Great until the 1880's (and in some respects down until 1918) to dominate the life of the three Baltic states. They were treated as partners by the Imperial Russian regime. Some of the Central Asiatic nations, through their ruling dynasties and groups, were treated in part as dependent allies rather than as a completely subject peoples.

However, from the 1860's and, particularly, from the 1880's on, the Russian Empire tended to stress adherence to Russian culture, language, and nationality as a superior factor to a mere political allegiance to the Russian Tsar as the ruler over many peoples. This proved to be a factor of weakness in the Russian Empire in its final decades because it intensified the demand of the non-Russian nationalities for, at least, autonomy and, eventually in many cases, for independence. Of course the most striking example of this unintended effect of "Russification" was shown in the case of Russian Poland. From 1815 to 1915, the Russian Empire held the largest segment of the Polish nation under its control. Particularly from the 1860's on, every effort was made to "Russify" the Poles. They were required to study in Russian from the beginning schools up. Underground schools in Polish had to be developed and maintained either by bribery or by trickery against the pressure of the Russian administration. Educated Poles could quite readily secure jobs in the Russian Empire, where they were likely to be absorbed into the Russians, but the officials in Poland had to be Russians. As a matter of fact, throughout those decades they were given special "hardship" allowances because it was felt they were serving in the midst of a hostile population.

The main result was to solidify the Polish nationality, to create a detailed knowledge of Russia, and a very strong and unanimous determination to reestablish an independent Polish state as soon as international changes in power gave them that opportunity.

On the other hand, the Moslem nationalities tended to remain pretty much within their old tribal village and religious culture without doing very much to adopt the knowledge and techniques of Western civilization. They remained in a more defensive, rather than counter-offensive, position in defense of their national independence. I mention this because in the Soviet period a different policy has been followed: that of trying to create a uniformity of ideas, ideology and culture, but using the different languages. The classic statement, of course, has been: "A culture, socialist in content and national in form." This means in effect that all the different nationalities in the Soviet Union are encouraged to read Stalin in their own language, rather than having to learn Russian in order to read it. That is not a very serious concession to the sense of national difference and national identity.

The Soviet attitude towards the relation between the Great Russians and the non-Russians has undergone three main stages, which I will simply list, without spelling them out in detail. During the first 12-14 years of the Soviet regime, down to 1929-1932, there was a definite preference given to the non-Russian nationalities. The history of Imperial Russian rule was treated purely as one of oppression and conquest, destruction of the national independence of other people. This put Russian language and Russian culture at a certain disadvantage in relation to the other nationalities. Between 1929-1934, the balance was shifted so that they could again speak of Russian culture, could stress much more than they had before the Russian language as the common language of the entire country for travel, work, and communication. There was a shift now in the interpretation of the Russian past. Instead of saying that Russian conquest from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries had been unmitigated evil and oppression, it was now stressed that Russian conquest had been the "lesser evil" compared with joining some other neighboring people; that it had, as a by-product of oppression, opened the area to the development of a more modern economy and to access of Western knowledge and science (much of which was, in fact, true).

During and after the Second World War, there has been a further shift toward extreme emphasis on the supremacy of Russian culture and nationality. This was expressed very sharply by Stalin at a big banquet to the leaders of the armed forces given in the Kremlin on May 16, 1945, when, at the climax of the banquet, he rose and gave a toast "to the Great Russian people which has borne the main burden of the struggle and which has never faltered in its support of the regime." He did not say that the Ukrainians had not faltered, or the Georgians, or other groups.

One reflection of this, especially since the war, has been the emphasis upon the continual superiority of Russian culture, the continual role of the Russians as the "elder brothers" to the non-Russians, and the emphasis that in every respect the earlier conquest by Imperial Russia was a progressive step. It was not a lesser evil; it was a great good. As one recent re-writing of the history of the Kazakh people in Central Asia has stated, in the official pronouncement condemning the history that had been approved and given the Stalin prize a few years before the line changed, the conquest of the Kazakhs not only brought them into the range of European civilization, but enabled them to learn the language of Lenin, the leader of the Revolution. All this occurred at a time before Lenin was even born; therefore, the Kazakhs might have been pardoned for not understanding several decades in advance that this was going to be a great privilege.

When we consider this problem, however, of whether Russia provides the expansion or whether it is Soviet ideology, we must consider several other factors and not merely look at the map in which many different nationalities are identified by names on the map. One factor is that the Russian language and culture (and, therefore, nationality since the Russians have never followed a racialist point of view but have always regarded as Russians those who learned the language well and adopted the point of view and the values of their culture) have undergone a widespread adoption, whether by attraction, by force, or by discrimination against the

non-national groups. In other words, if a Georgian wants to make a career outside of his small Republic of Georgia he has to, in effect, become a Russian in the ways that the Russians consider essential. The same is true even of a Moslem. And since the Soviet culture and Soviet ideology is anti-religious, it facilitates the adoption of a common non-religious, non-confessional culture in a way in which the emphasis upon the Orthodox Church, as the basis of Russian nationality, did not do under the Empire. But the Soviet Union has actually intensified a kind of supranational loyalty to the Communist Party, and the Soviet regime has channeled the ambitions of all active and energetic people from all the different nationalities towards supporting that end. Therefore, I think we should not assume that in all respects and in all segments of the population the non-Russian people are reacting in a hostile way against this emphasis upon, and propagation of, Russian culture since their own cultures also continue to operate within the narrow framework prescribed both for the Russian and the non-Russian cultures within the Soviet ideology.

Another factor to consider is that while the Imperial regime tolerated many different customs, many different ways of life, and different religions in different parts of the empire, the Soviet regime has actively been creating a uniform way of life. The spread of industrialization to the eastern parts of the country has greatly changed the way of life. In 1914, there were approximately 15 million people out of 150 million who lived in cities and, therefore, were undergoing urbanization and modernization in that sense. Today, there are around 85 million people out of 210 million living in cities, with a much more urban culture, much more emphasis upon urban institutions. Many of the cities of older Russia were really large villages which did not differ very much from the surrounding villages.

Urban life is extremely rugged in the Soviet Union and the hardships are great; but the emphasis upon educational, cultural and other institutions as a means of spreading the Soviet version

of "culture" is very striking. Certainly the process of churning up peasants into urban people has gone on at intensified rates.

In Imperial days, the Ukrainian peasants had their land customs, the Russian peasants had theirs, differing to some extent in different parts of the country; the villages of Central Asia followed more or less their immemorial customs. Today, for nearly twenty-five years, all of these peasants have lived under the collective farm system. It has a similar organization, a similar way of work, a similar degree of oppression and exaction upon the peasants throughout the country. There is, therefore, a greater degree of uniformity across the country than has ever prevailed before. That means that many of the basic problems of the people in their relation to the regime are not problems of nationality. They are problems of: Can the peasant get an adequate living? Can he both feed his family and acquire a few articles of clothing and household equipment as a result of working hard for an entire year? Can he get a somewhat lenient attitude from the government for his small livestock, which he is allowed to keep on his own small piece of land? These problems are more or less uniform throughout the country, in spite of its geographical diversity.

I want to emphasize then that the problem of national diversity is a very important one in the Soviet Union. It might mean — in case of a disruption of the regime by a sudden destruction, let's say, of its control and power centers — that people in outlying regions would reorganize their lives in accordance with their national identity. On the other hand, it is not clear that we would be able in time of 'cold war' to go very far in developing a sense of national oppression as a factor which appeals deeply to all the non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union. We might find, as I have often found in talking with non-Russians who had escaped from the Soviet Union in the past few years, that this problem is not in the forefront of their minds at all. Problems of making the regime livable, of persuading it to relax its extreme demands upon all the people, are much to the forefront of their minds as they escape.

In dealing with the Soviet Union, we too often attempt to treat them as if they were fellow-Americans. We assume too often they have the same set of values; that we can appeal to them in terms of what we consider important and valuable in life. This is often a weakness because it means that we shoot past the mark or actually have a negative effect. For example, people brought up under the Soviet regime do not understand a multi-party system; they do not understand a system of alternation of parties in power. They consider that a government which does not demand extreme sacrifices of its people is probably a weak and hesitant government. That does not mean that we should not tell them about our system of government and, particularly, about the liberties which we have. But we cannot expect that to be understood or real to most of them. They simply have not been given access to that kind of understanding of the West. In fact, especially since the end of the Second World War, there has been a positive campaign to prevent any fair or historical treatment of the history of the West, and, particularly, of the United States. Any Soviet writer or scholar who would try to treat a Western and free society as having its own basic traditions would be denounced as a "cosmopolitan." That is the basic meaning of the term, which often seems obscure to us.

One thing which we have to remember from Russian history is that, while Russia in its early centuries (roughly, from the ninth through the twelfth centuries) was very much a part of Central Europe and did not differ notably in its culture or in its outlook from the rest of Europe, from the thirteenth century on, it was increasingly separated from the West and did not begin to deal on any intimate terms with the West until the eighteenth century. That is a very basic factor. First, there was the Mongol conquest in the middle of the thirteenth century, which oriented Russia toward the East, towards an Asiatic despotism, an armed camp of nomads which by terror and periodic exaction of tribute kept the subjugated peoples weak and unable to organize resistance during more than two centuries. During the time that Russia was under Mongol conquest and absorbing Mongol attitudes of absolute

obedience to authority and when, in the subsequent period, they were overcoming the Mongols but, at the same time adopting many of their concepts of rule, Western Europe was undergoing three very important historical transformations.

One of these was the development of feudalism. Feudalism was, of course, a pretty bloody and anarchic way of life, but it did have certain ethical values which were crystalized in the concept of chivalry and the gentleman. It had definite legal advantages for the rest of Europe, from Poland, westward; relationships were considered to be based not upon absolute authority and absolute obedience but upon a contract between the ruler and the ruled, between the feudal superior and the feudal inferior. Both the superiors and the inferiors had their rights and duties. While they could not always enforce them of course, in feudal anarchy, that concept was extremely important. In other words, at the very time that England was developing, through the feudal struggle and through the solidarity of the aristocracy, the Magna Carta of 1215, Russia was about to be dragged under an Asiatic despotism. That is a very important turning-point.

Another great European development which Russia missed completely was the Renaissance — the opening of learning to criticism, the development of the historical sense, the development of the attitude which led to modern science — based upon experimentation, observation, and systematic study; not upon appeal to authority. Russia acquired Western science wholesale at a late period; it did not grow out of the general experience of the cultivated people of the entire area, as in Western Europe.

A third factor that Russia missed almost completely was the Reformation — the great spiritual, ethical reawakening in both major groups of Western Christianity which resulted in bringing ethical and moral teachings and concepts far closer into the people and into their daily lives than had been true in most respects in the Middle Ages. Both the Reformation and the Counter-Refor-

mation passed Russia by because of its isolation. Instead, what developed in Russia was a garrison state; especially, from the middle of the sixteenth century (from the time of Ivan the Terrible) down, roughly, to the middle of the nineteenth century, the Russian ideal was the garrison state. This meant that the basis of Russian society was the subordination of every class in society to the needs of the state, particularly, to its needs for defense. The landowners were given land to use, and, later, to own, but they held it only in terms of service to the state. If they were not excused from military and, in part, civilian service to the state at their own expense, they could be deprived of that land. In other words, they were not a class of independent landowners by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who chose to give service to the state; they were in a sense the superior group of slaves to the state.

In 1730, one of the main demands of the very influential guard's regiments, which controlled the security of the capitol of St. Petersburg, was that their service to the state be reduced from "life" to "thirty years." Similarly, a small merchant class was harnessed to the service of the state. They were forced to accept that government by despotic rulers who made them form corporations which were then jointly responsible for collecting many of the forms of taxes and paying it over. If the merchant's guild failed to pay the various customs sought and many of the other taxes to the state, collecting them at their own expense and delivering them to the treasury, they were punished, their property confiscated, they could have their ears cut off or their tongues torn out and be sent to Siberia.

The peasants were attached to the land of the state or of the landowners in order to provide the necessary support for the landowning military class. The priests were similarly fixed in their occupation and their children were obliged to become priests whether they wanted to or not. The Russian Orthodox Church, of course, until recently, required a member of the priesthood to marry before he could be ordained as a priest, and the children were required to

follow the profession of the parents. This system of a "caste" society is far more rigid than anything that developed in Western Europe and the system of serfdom (which lasted for three hundred years in Russia) was far more rigorous than had prevailed in Western or Central Europe. In fact, Russian serfdom, right down to 1861, can only be compared with negro slavery in this country; with the one important exception, of course, that there was no color difference — they were white slaves. But, right down to 1861 individual serfs could be sold apart from the land. The landowner generally punished recalcitrant serfs by sending them to the army for twenty-five years; or, if the quota for the army which the landlord was required to fill from among his serfs was already taken up, he could send them to Siberia. Of course in doing so he was losing a valuable property; therefore, he frequently resorted to other forms of punishment. Capital punishment by the landowners was forbidden, but they were allowed to give up to a thousand strokes of the cat-o'-nine-tails and, usually, twenty-five strokes were enough to finish off a recalcitrant serf. Thus, 80% of the Russian people lived under a very oppressive system with no rights that they could defend against the landowners. Even the right of petition to higher authority was forbidden and a serf who tried to appeal to the governor of the province against cruel or unjust treatment was likely to be sent to Siberia immediately. Thus, Russia, until 1861, was governed as a garrison state with each group of society performing definite functions for the purpose of maintaining and enlarging the power of the state; particularly, its international power.

The period from 1861-1917 was too short to carry out a transformation of Russia along completely Western lines. It is true that there was a growing educated class which was outside of this concept of the former garrison state and which provided a large number of people to staff the new professions which were necessary in modernizing the country; they formed a corps of doctors, farm experts, lawyers, teachers, and many other professions that had previously had no real part in a garrison state. On the other hand

they, in turn — by adopting Western Dress, by Westernizing in part their vocabulary to take account of new concepts — became remote to the people. This is part of the tragedy of Russia in 1917: that the intelligensia, which had the finest intentions but not always enough practical experience, since it was kept at a distance by the bureaucracy and the autocracy (which was suspicious of the intelligensia), also did not have the support of the peasants.

What Lenin really did in 1917 was to capture the inner element of control of a spontaneous movement of protest, not so much against conditions as they were in 1917 as against the conditions of the previous three hundred years of Russian history. The peasants by 1917 had taken over most of the land from the landowners. There were still some conspicuous large estates which aroused their resentment. The peasant did not feel that he was a citizen; he still felt that he was just, briefly, an emancipated serf. This psychology ran through the whole of Russian Revolution.

Lenin and a small group of Communists proved to be best able to interpret this spontaneous movement for the destruction of the old regime and at the same time most skillful in organizing a new garrison state on the ashes of the old. This concept of the role of the Communist Party dictatorship as a garrison which would not govern by the will of the people but would govern allegedly for its good was clearly stated by Lenin only ten days before the seizure of power in November of 1917. There were influential members of the Communist Party who said that they should not seize power, that this would be a dictatorship; that they should progress in an orderly way toward democracy of the Western type. Lenin turned this around and said: "For three centuries the czar has governed Russia with the aid of 100,000 landowners ruling millions of people. Why cannot 200,000 Communists govern the whole of Russia?"

Therefore, the Communist Party, which has governed Russia ever since that time, after a period of desperate struggle, at first

for survival and then for complete control, has been organized as a garrison, a minority which does not want to be joined by the majority; which insists upon rigid indoctrination and discipline and strict obedience to orders from above. We cannot understand the Communist Party unless we consider it, in part, as an occupying force which receives policies and orders only from above and which imposes those both by methods of persuasion and indoctrination and by unlimited use of force against real or suspected adversaries upon the entire people of the area, including the Russians as well as the non-Russians.

What the heritage of Russian history has meant in Soviet communism has been, then, the rule by a disciplined minority, a discipline of the Communist Party replacing the greatly weakened discipline of the Imperial bureaucracy in its civil, its judicial, and its military components. The Soviet Union has been and the Soviet leaders are proud to maintain a garrison state in which authority is from above; all decisions are made from above; the people are treated as an instrument. If they attempt to show a will of their own, as, for example, by inconveniently dying of hunger at a time when their labor is needed, this is also a form of opposition to the state and requires still further punishment.

At the same time the Soviet Union has — before, during, and since World War II — increasingly reverted to pride in the external power of the regime as a binding force to hold it together and to justify the tremendous sacrifices of well-being, liberty, and even of individual choice by all the people within the state. If there were time, I would list some of the restraints. We speak about forced labor in the Soviet Union; certainly that has been both a tremendous instrument of control of those not in slave labor camps as well as those in them and a means of carrying out large-scale construction projects at what the regime believes is a lesser cost to the state. But the free population is not “free.” All Communist Party members must go where they are assigned at any time; workers are not allowed to change from one factory to another without the per-

mission of the manager of the factory inscribed in their labor books. A member of a collective farm is not allowed to go more than ten miles from his collective farm without a written permit from the manager of the collective farm. Thus, the entire population, as in the days of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, is held within a rigid system of central control, losing all the great advantages of diversity, of autonomy, of initiative, from below. You must remember that there were no private associations tolerated in the Russian Empire until 1905, except for some cultural associations, and none at all, not even cultural associations, are tolerated under the Soviet regime. Until 1905, political parties were treated as conspiracies and punished accordingly. Trade unions were treated as conspiracies, even after 1905. The Soviet regime has turned it around by itself organizing the only political party, the only tolerated trade unions, and the only cultural, sport and other activities which are permitted in the country.

I am going to state, in a very dogmatic way, a number of differences between the foreign policy aims of old Russia (pre-1917) and the Soviet regime of the present day. I think that in itself will help to provide a lot of good meat for discussion. If I sound dogmatic, don't think that I really am completely so, even though dealing with Soviet affairs (which are handled in such a completely dogmatic way) does tend to make many people, in turn, dogmatic.

One important difference between old Russia in its relation to the outer world is that the old Russians of all classes considered themselves and their culture inferior to that of Europe and they regarded Europe as a whole. Learning from the West rapidly, they translated, they studied abroad, they traveled extensively, they invited many foreigners to Russia to learn their techniques — beginning, of course, even before Peter the Great with inviting Dutch seamen to Russia, artillery foundrymen, and so on from Western countries. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, claims that not only the Soviet culture of today but Russian culture at all times in the past has been superior to that of any other country or system

in the world. I do not think that most people in the Soviet Union take this too seriously, but it may flatter their national pride to have it told to them. This extends to absurd lengths in the field of invention, for example, and this reminds me of one story which came out of Soviet-controlled Bulgaria.

Two Bulgarians were discussing the latest Soviet discoveries. One Bulgarian remarked that so-and-so, a Russian, had discovered the radio long ahead of Marconi or any Western inventors. The other Bulgarian said: "Why, yes, but that is nothing to what they have discovered most recently. They have discovered a cow which grazes in Bulgaria and is milked in the Soviet Union."

There is another joke which comes directly out of the Soviet Union about Kaganovich coming into Stalin's office very excited and saying: "We have suddenly discovered that an old Russian freak by the name of Petrov discovered the steam engine. This is wonderful. Now we can put the West in its place." Stalin turned to him and said: "Yes, but who invented Petrov?"

A more basic difference, I feel, is that old Russia operated in a system of states. Imperial Russia did not expect to rule the world. In fact, it had trouble ruling many of its own people and a number of czars found that led to assassination of themselves or of members of their families. Old Russia assumed that there would continue to be six major powers in Europe, in addition to the United States and Japan, or, in other words, that Russia was one of eight major powers in the world as of 1914. Even during World War I, Russian ambitions, which were extensive, did not extend to the destruction of the system of states because they assumed that Britain, France, Italy, United States, Japan would all remain great powers even if Austria-Hungary were broken up and Germany greatly weakened.

The Soviet philosophy calls for the destruction of the system of independent states and its replacement by a world-wide system

of Soviet republics. This has been basic from the beginning of the Soviet regime and it will be treated in a later lecture on "Soviet Ideology." The Soviet leaders maintain a very rigid, very unsound, philosophy which justifies this view in their eyes and they act upon it. It is true that every now and then they talk about "coexistence," coexistence of different systems. There is a great deal of talk now coming out of the Moscow and pro-Moscow propaganda channels about "coexistence." But this is typical of Soviet propaganda tricks because when they use the term "coexistence" abroad, they simply say "coexistence." We, being inclined to a world of "live-and-let-live," "give-and-take," assume that they mean the same things as we would mean by coexistence — that is, the permanent continuation of a number of major power centers, independent of each other. But when they use the term "coexistence" within their own ideology and in their own propaganda, they always attach a very important reservation. They say: "Coexistence at the given stage of history." In other words, at this stage it is convenient to Soviet propaganda to maintain that they do not intend at this time to overthrow all other systems. But history always goes on, whether you take a Soviet or a free interpretation of history, and, therefore, there will always be another stage of history. At that stage, there will no longer be any need for admitting the possibility or the desirability of different systems. This is a basic difference, then.

We must remember that the exercise of power within the Soviet system depends upon an increasing adoption of the ideology, the philosophy, the assumptions of the regime, as people rise nearer the top. For example, when people are chosen to be admirals, generals, secretaries of Communist parties of the larger republics, or ministers of state of the various republics and of the central government in Moscow, they are sent to a special school for a year in which they are given the ultimate in training in the management of the Soviet regime. At the lower stages, there are various schools through which they pass as people of energy and loyalty are moved upward. So the system tries to perpetuate an increasingly rigid ad-

herence to its basic philosophy as people come nearer to the exercise of responsibility under the basic policies of the state.

Another important factor is that while old Russia was until 1905, and in some respects until 1917, also an authoritarian state, it was of a more traditional, old-fashioned kind. As long as a political writer did not actually advocate the overthrow of the Imperial regime, he could publish almost anything. Lenin, while in prison, was able to write editorials for a very subversive newspaper which always had a nominal editor who could go to jail if the censor felt it had stepped over the line of subversion, leaving the real editors free to go on editing the paper, usually, under another name. As a matter of fact, just before 1914 this paper, which is the present-day PRAVDA of the Soviet Communist Party, had a special system of evading the censor. The paper was set and the proofs were taken to the censor. If they saw a *gendarme* officer coming out of the office of the censor, they knew he was coming to confiscate that issue or remove some part of it. The Bolsheviks had a fast horse waiting around the corner of the street. Their spy would rush and get into the carriage with the specially chosen horses and get to the publishing house before the *gendarme* officer could get there with the less fast horses supplied by the government. They would then hastily scatter the type, thus removing all evidence, and evade arrest.

The Soviet system is a totalitarian system. That means that it not only does not tolerate a wide range of autonomous activity, thinking, writing, and even agitation, but actually monopolizes all these activities, including a monopoly of the control over all forms of the printed word, and, as far as it can, of the spoken word. This is an entirely different system, much harder to break into; but, on the other hand, it does not necessarily in a time of crisis receive the complete loyalty of its people. It is clear that to a considerable extent the loyalty of Soviet people to their regime during World War II was recreated by Hitler and by the extremely brutal and cruel policies which he was determined to follow toward the peoples of the Soviet Union.

Another factor is that old Russia had no universal philosophy of rule and conquest. The Russians did not find it easy to rule other peoples; they certainly did not consider that their system was superior to that of all other peoples and that it should replace them. The Soviet system has a closely-knit, although highly fallacious, system of ideology through which it also is able to gain strong allies in other countries. This is perhaps the final basic difference: that old Russia did not have a Russian Fifth Column in France or Italy, such as the Soviet system today is able to mobilize through ideology (and other forms of pressure) even within free society, in smaller or larger units and in all countries. On the other hand, the Soviet ideology today insists upon centralized rule of all Communist parties and regimes from Moscow in all basic matters. This was the factor that led to the splitting off of Tito, since he felt that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, having achieved power in its own country, knew better than Moscow what was good for it. After making concessions (and being willing to make many more), he was not willing to make the ultimate concession of allowing his head to be chopped off. That, he felt, was asking too much.

It is both a strength and a weakness, then, of the Soviet techniques as well as of its philosophy of world revolution, that it insists upon the supremacy of the Soviet party, which is increasingly a Russian party — Russian in outlook and language, if not necessarily in composition, but perhaps also in composition — and that it cannot conceive of the expansion of the regime except in terms of obedience to Moscow and the maintenance of Moscow control. Old Russia had a long history of expansion. Much of it, however, was across unoccupied areas (or almost unoccupied areas) like our own expansion to the west. Other parts of it represented strategic expansion to the sea, as in the Baltic, the Black and the Caspian Seas; in the Far East, the attempt to move southward to take Korea, which they hoped to take in the 1890's, and, failing that, to take the more isolated point of Port Arthur. On the other hand, the Russian expansion (like the Soviet expansion) followed the lines of least resistance, which were usually preceded by strong efforts

to prepare the way and to build up a superiority of power and were not undertaken as a rash venture in most cases, although they suffered defeats, of course, when they miscalculated the forces.

The Soviet system, on the other hand, has in theory and in practice no limits except that of opposing powers or perhaps of fears imposed by its own limitations. I have tried to mention briefly some of the internal tensions and limitations which, over a period of time, may operate. If you ask me the key question — Will the Soviet regime slacken from within in this urge to expansion? I want to say that I do not believe that any of us can give an honest answer today and that the best we can do is to watch the internal processes of making the regime more livable for their own people; of watching the slowing down of the revolutionary fervor which was there in the beginning and which has become Russianized and dogmatized today. Then, on the other hand, we have to watch the very great ignorance and very great opportunity for misjudgement of the outside world which the Soviet leadership has shown, partly because of its extreme centralization, partly because of the ideological blinders which it wears whenever it looks at the outside world.

If there were time, I would go over some of the mistakes which Stalin made. Many of our publicists assume that the United States has made a lot of mistakes since the war. I would say that on the whole, we have made relatively few mistakes; that the Soviet leadership, on the other hand, has made many more miscalculations. That is perhaps the greatest immediate risk in that the Soviet leadership does not develop under its system and philosophy the tools of objective study and of free, uninhibited canvassing of all the different possibilities and all the possible lines of development which are open in a world in which, after all, we make our own history rather than its being made by a single, rigid, centralized philosophy, controlled by ten men sitting in a tightly-sealed room, cut off from the outside world.

Thank you!

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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Dr. Mosely has been Professor of International Relations at the Russian Institute of Columbia University since 1946. Since February 1951, he has been Director of the Russian Institute.

He was born in Westfield, Massachusetts in 1905, and was educated at Harvard University (A.B. 1926, Ph.D. 1933), and Cambridge University, with briefer periods of study at Perugia, Paris, and London. He carried on graduate study in France and England, 1926-28, research in Russian diplomatic archives, 1930-32, studies of Balkan village life, 1935-36 and part of 1938. In 1947 he visited Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and in 1950 he revisited some ten countries of western and central Europe, including Finland, Germany and Yugoslavia. He also revisited Yugoslavia in 1951 and 1952.

Before the war he taught European history at Princeton (1929-30), Union College (1933-35) and Cornell University (1936-42). During the war Dr. Moseley served as Chief of the Division of Territorial Studies in the Department of State, was a member of Secretary Hull's delegation to the Moscow Conference (October 1943); served as Political Adviser to Ambassador Winant in the work of the European Advisory Commission (1944-45); as Political Adviser on the United States Delegation to the Potsdam Conference (July 1945) and to meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers (1945-46); served as United States member of the Commission for the Investigation of the Yugoslav-Italian Boundary (1946) and the Commission for Drafting the Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste (1946). Since then he has served occasionally as a Consultant to the Department of State.

Dr. Mosely is the author of *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839* (Harvard Press, 1934); editor and translator of Chernov, *The Great Russian Revolution* (Yale University Press, 1936); editor of "The Soviet Union Since World War II," the May 1949 issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*; author of some sixty articles on Russian and Balkan history, social institutions, world affairs and United States foreign policy.