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THE RISE OF SOVIET POWER

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 30 September 1953, by
Dr. Merle Fainsod

Gentlemen:

I am going to talk today about *The Rise of Soviet Power.* In discussing that subject, I will confine myself primarily to its political aspects. I understand that *The Economic Potential of the Soviet Union* is scheduled for separate treatment in this course of lectures and, therefore, I shall try to avoid covering ground that is provided for elsewhere in your plans.

What I will try to do this morning is to discuss (and I fear discuss much too briefly) the origins of Bolshevism, the seizure of power in 1917, the way in which the Bolsheviks consolidated their power, the nature of this new Communist elite — its sources of support, the Communist formula of totalitarian rule — and the significance of some of the developments since Stalin's death.

I want to begin with an analysis of the rise of Bolshevism. To understand the appeal of Marx at the end of the 19th century in Russia it is necessary, I think, to see it against the background of the very rapid development in industry which was beginning to take place in Russia at the turn of the century. Russia up to that time was an overwhelmingly peasant and agrarian economy. In the last decades of the 19th century, Russia began to be industrialized. Railroad construction, mining, textiles, even steel industry began to expand. The number of industrial workers increased from a little more than half a million in 1865 to over two and a half million in 1900. That is of some significance because up to that point the Russian revolutionaries had looked to the peasantry as the great revolutionary class, but their hopes in the peasantry were

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disappointed — the peasantry was slow to awaken. To intellectuals who despaired of the peasants, this new industrial working class that was in the process of formation, the *proletariat*, so-called, seemed to give new hope; this seemed to be the voice of the future.

As confirmation of their hopes, in 1896 there occurred the first great Textile Workers' strike; some 30,000 workers were involved in the capital at St. Petersburg. That strengthened the conviction of some of these intellectual revolutionaries that it was the proletariat that would become the instrument of revolution.

They began to organize. The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, of which Bolshevism was an off-shoot, held its first congress in 1898; the second congress took place in Brussels and London in 1903. At the 1903 congress, divisions developed within the Party. It divided into a group of so-called *hards* and a group of *softs,* and the division was over the character of the party organization. The *hards,* who were led by Lenin, wanted to build a conspiratorial party of disciplined, professional revolutionaries who would lead the mass of the working class and act in its name. The *softs,* so-called, who were led by Martov, wanted an open party, a legal, mass Socialist Party, built on the Western European model of the German Social Democratic Party.

At this 1903 congress, the views of Martov on Party Organization triumphed, temporarily. But, in the election of officers at the end of the congress, Lenin's faction carried the majority. And because they received the majority of votes at the congress, they became known as Bolsheviks. This is from the Russian word *Bolshinstvo* which means "majority." They were the majority men. And Lenin's opponents became known as Mensheviks, from the Russian *menshinstvo*, which means "minority."

For a little while these two factions — Bolsheviks and Mensheviks — preserved a kind of paper unity in the same party. But under this facade of unity there was increasingly bitter factional

strife, and finally, in 1912, Lenin and his faction broke away and in effect organized a separate Bolshevik Party. It was a very small group to begin with. On the eve of the 1905 Revolution there were 300 members in all of Russia in the Bolshevik faction. Even at the height of the 1905 Revolution the party attained a total membership of only 8,000. They played a relatively inconspicuous role in the 1905 Revolution.

But that Revolution was a portent of things to come. In that Revolution, while challenge to the power of the Tsar was presented, the Tsar met the challenge by a combined policy of concession first and repression later, and the dynasty survived the 1905 Revolution because in the hour of decision it could still count on the allegiance of the army and navy officers, the police, the upper bureaucracy, the bulk of the landed gentry, and the leading figures of the business world.

By 1917, these sources of support were melting away. The war, with its vast losses of men, territory and resources and its indication of incompetence — even degeneration — in the very highest court circles, the mounting war-weariness, the hunger and deprivation, all of these combined to stretch the traditional loyalty to Tsardom to the final breaking point. All that was needed was a precipitating incident to reveal how bare and hollow the appeal of the autocracy had become. The incident was provided on March 8, 1917, with bread riots and strikes on the streets of Petrograd. During the next few days the disorders expanded into a general strike and the decisive step toward revolution was taken when mutiny spread to the Petrograd garrison and the soldiers of the regiment refused to obey the commands of their officers to fire on the crowd. The power was in the streets — but it was still formless, anarchic, without clear direction. The fate of the Revolution turned on who would rush in to fill this vacuum of leadership which had been created.

Out of the chaos of those early days (March, 1917), two centers of initiative began to take shape. One was the hastily org-

anized "soviet" of workers' and soldiers' deputies, which at first was dominated by the moderate Socialists — the Socialist revolutionaries and the Mensheviks; and the other center of initiative was the more conservative group of leaders of the old legislature of the Duma, who undertook to organize a provisional government based on the acquiescence of the Soviets. And so there began in March, 1917, a system of dual power in which the *provisional* government exercised formal authority and the *soviets,* with their mass support, retained a kind of *de facto* right of veto and initiative.

In the first month of the 1917 Revolution, the Bolsheviks played a minor role. Their total party membership in March, 1917, was less than 25,000 in a nation of 150 million people. Yet, in the short space of eight months this tiny band of professional revolutionaries was able to build up enough leverage to seize power. How do we explain it — how did it come about? One major source of Bolshevik strength was its highly centralized leadership and organization, its activist, disciplined membership, and its clarity about its goal. Another source of strength was its tactical brilliance, if you want to call it that, its success in exploiting all of the accumulated dissatisfactions in Russian society. The Bolsheviks were willing in an utterly irresponsible way to promise what the masses wanted; they were willing to promise land to the peasants, peace to the war-weary army, bread to the hungry, and so on. Then a final source of strength was the fact that they concentrated their efforts on building power where it strategically counted; that is to say, among the sailors of the Baltic fleet, in the Petrograd garrison, and in the Armed Workers' Red Guard in the factories of Petrograd.

Lenin's feat as a revolutionary engineer was his ability to identify Bolshevism with the major moving forces of mass discontent in Russian society. He did not create the war-weariness which permeated the army and the nation, but he knew how to exploit it — and with one word endlessly repeated, *peace,* he fused

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it into the spark of Revolution. The land-hunger of the peasants was an ancient grievance. His political opponents, the Socialist Revolutionaries, had built their power in the villages on the promise to do something about it. But while the Socialist Revolutionaries — chastened by the responsibilities of power — temporized, Lenin acted and he stole their program from under their noses. With one word, *land*, he bought the neutrality of the villagers. Factory workers constituted one of the bases of Bolshevik strength. Lenin promised to take from the rich and give to the poor and with two slogans — "bread" and "workers' control" — he captured many of the factory workers away from the Mensheviks.

Now the Bolshevik Revolution of November, 1917, was not a majority movement. It was a carefully planned and remarkably well-managed *coup d'etat*, an insurrection. The last free election in Russia (the election to the constituent assembly which took place at the end of 1917) clearly demonstrated that the Bolsheviks' voting strength in the country at large was not more than 25%. But, as Lenin subsequently observed, "the Bolsheviks did have an overwhelming preponderance of force at the decisive points." In the areas which were strategically important for the success of the insurrection — Petrograd, Moscow, the Baltic fleet, the garrisons around Petrograd — Bolshevik influence was concentrated. The enemies of Bolshevism were far more numerous, but they were also weak, poorly organized, divided, and apathetic. And the strategy of Lenin was calculated to emphasize their division, to neutralize their opposition, and to capitalize on their apathy. Back in 1902, Lenin had written: "Give us an organization of Revolutionaries and we shall overturn the whole of Russia." On November 7, 1917, the wish was fulfilled and the deed accomplished.

I come now to the consolidation of Bolshevik power. What did that involve? In substance, it involved three operations: (1) the military defense of the new Red regime against the White armies and the small armies of the allies; (2) the suppression of

all opposition political parties inside the country, and (3) the consolidation of the dictatorship of the Party leaders.

Of the Civil War, I shall have very little to say. The first decision of the Bolsheviks after their ascent to power was to make peace with the Germans. That meant making peace on German terms. The terms were harsh, but Lenin argued that there was no alternative. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which was signed in March, 1918, the Bolsheviks temporarily signed away to the Germans a third of their country and more than half of their industry. That treaty was designed to win them a breathing space. But the breathing space did not immediately materialize. The ink was hardly dry on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk when the new Bolshevik regime was confronted with civil war and foreign intervention. That war lasted about three years. The Bolsheviks were attacked from all sides. But the Allies (the United States, France, Great Britain, Japan) were not prepared to press the attack home. They withdrew their troops and the Bolsheviks survived. And it was in this school that the new Red Army was created.

Coincidentally with the Civil War, all opposition parties were suppressed. For a very brief period (from late December, 1917 until March, 1918) there were three Left Socialist Revolutionaries (who stood very close to the Bolsheviks) in the cabinet, the so-called Council of People's Commissars. But they left the government as a protest against the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and after that the government went back to its original pure Bolshevik composition and it has remained such ever since.

Lenin made no bones at this point about the necessity for dictatorship. "There is no other way to Socialism," he insisted, "but the dictatorship of the proletariat."

"Every time I speak on this subject of proletarian government," he said, "some one shouts 'dictator.' You cannot expect that Socialism will be delivered on a silver platter. Not a single

question pertaining to the 'class struggle' has ever been settled except by violence. Violence, when it is committed by the toiling and exploited masses, is the kind of violence of which we approve."

Now the logic of Lenin's position led inexorably in the direction of the one-party state and the establishment of the Cheka and the Red Terror (the beginnings of the modern N.K.V.D.). By abolishing freedom for the opposition parties the Bolsheviks made the Soviets, the Trade Unions, and other forms of mass organization obedient instruments for carrying out the will of the monopoly party. When charges of suppression of opposition were made, the usual reply was the one made by Tomsky, who was for many years the leader of the Soviet Trade Union. "Certainly two, three, or four parties may exist under the conditions of working class dictatorship, but only provided that one party is in power and all of the rest are in prison." Tomsky, himself, was later arrested and only able to avoid prison by committing suicide.

From this one-party state it was only a short step to the establishment of dictatorship within the Party. This was uniquely Stalin's achievement. But Lenin had set the precedent. Away back in 1904, when they were fighting about the organization of the Party, Trotsky was criticizing Lenin's ultra-centralist ideas on Party Organization. At that time, Trotsky made a very prophetic observation.

He said: "In Lenin's scheme, the Party takes the place of the Working Class. The Party Organization displaces the Party; the Central Committee displaces the Party Organization; and, finally, the Dictator displaces the Central Committee."

Now that is exactly what took place, and the process by which it took place is an interesting one. In 1922, Stalin was appointed General Secretary of the Party. As General Secretary, he commanded the Party patronage; that is to say, his recommendations were largely decisive in appointments of local and regional Party

secretaries who then later returned to the Party Congresses as delegates — voting delegates.

When Lenin became ill in 1922-23, the most prominent contender for the leadership was Trotsky. But the man who had his fingers on the Party machine was Stalin. Stalin joined with two other leaders (Zinoviev, who ran the Leningrad Party machine, and Kamenev, who had a strong position in the Moscow Party organization), and together they united to rob Trotsky of a considerable degree of his authority. And they set up a *troika*, a triumverate: Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev.

In that period, Stalin was cautiously, slowly building up his power. By 1925, he could afford to break with his allies, and Kamenev and Zinoviev moved over to join Trotsky, in opposition. But by that time Trotsky was a very weak figure. Stalin, in order to defeat them, mobilized his party machine, allied himself with the so-called "right wing" of the Politburo — Bukharin, Tomsky, Rykov — and, together, they got rid of Trotsky and his new allies. Then Stalin, having rid himself of Trotsky, in 1926-1927, turned around in 1929 to rid himself of the right wing — Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov. And the purge of deviationists, oppositionists and rivals for power continued and finally culminated in the purge to end all purges, the "Great Purge and Trials of 1936-38," when virtually every old Bolshevik in the Party of any standing was put to death or banished.

We can only speculate about the reasons behind the liquidations of the old Bolsheviks. The official reason given was that they were responsible for the assassination of Stalin's favorite, Kirov, who was the Leningrad Party boss, and that they conspired together to assassinate Stalin and his colleagues. Other reasons asserted in the trials were that they were traitors, that they had acted as agents of Nazi Germany — but that, I think, has to be taken with a considerable degree of salt. Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that this purge — this liquidation of the old Bol-

sheviks — destroyed the last vestige of independence within the Party and practically removed at one stroke from the stratum of leadership in the Party, the Government, and the Army, the generation that made the Revolution and prepared the way for the coming to power of a new generation — the post-Revolutionary generation.

Now I want to talk a little about this new elite who were catapulted to power over the dead bodies of the old Bolsheviks. Let me start with some interesting statistics revealed at the eighteenth Communist Party Congress in 1939, the first congress held after the Great Purge. There they examined the age and Party standing of various officials. The first group were the "top" Party leaders — the Regional and Republic Party Secretaries — a group of 333. In 1939, after the Great Purge, 303 of these (91%) were under forty years of age; over 80% of them had entered the Party after 1924, or the year of Lenin's death. If you go down a little bit, look at the "middle" management of the Party — 10,900 secretaries of district committees, city committees, and so on, — in 1939, after the Purge, 92% of this group were under 40; 93.5% entered the Party after 1924.

What these figures point to is this: the functionaries of the Party who replaced the old Bolsheviks represent a new, post-Revolutionary generation. The rise of this generation is a factor of importance in the development of the Soviet Union. In the first place, it is worth noting that this is a generation for whom the Revolution is already a page in the history books — something that happened so far back in childhood that it ceased to be a meaningful part of experience. For the earlier generation, the Revolution was the high point in their existence; they had made it, they were the agitators, the propagandists, the people who fought the Revolution. This new generation is a somewhat different breed. Their lives have revolved around the great tasks of the post-Revolutionary period — industrialization, collectivization, the Purges, more recently the war against the Nazis.

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This new generation has been educated in a political mold of Stalinite authoritarianism. It grew up in a period when the opposition to Stalin was being broken up and destroyed, when the totalitarian features of the Soviet State were being systematically developed and consolidated. It is a generation which, unlike the old Revolutionaries, has had very little contact with the outside world and which, indeed, has been deliberately insulated from such contacts. It is a generation, consequently, for which the whole experience of Western democratic society is known only in the distorted form of the shibboleths of Party propaganda.

In the third place, this new generation — this new leadership — comes to power with a different background of experience from the old. This new generation of leadership is drawn from the new aristocracy of plant managers, engineers, upper bureaucrats, privileged technicians and workers. They are organizers and administrators — not underground Revolutionaries. They do not belong to the party of the under-dog in the way that the old Bolsheviks did; they never had the experience of being under-dogs. This is a generation which occupies the privileged and responsible positions in public life. It may be under greater temptations than the last to enjoy its privileges and seek to perpetuate them, though perhaps that still remains to be seen.

As you can see from this analysis, the composition of the Party leadership has changed greatly as compared with the early years of the Revolution. It is a leadership which has been brought up in a ruthless school, a school which believes in strength and toughness, in authority, and in control.

On what support does the Soviet regime draw? It seems to me that there are three main pillars of support: first, the regime leans heavily on the support of this administrative and managerial elite — those who occupy the key managerial administrative positions, the higher level of bureaucrats, the plant directors and managers, high army and navy officers, the chairmen of the collective

farm administrations, and even the worker aristocracy of the stakhanovite workers, foremen, and brigadiers. The effort to consolidate the support of these groups, who play key roles in the administrative structure, takes two directions: first, the Party leadership treats them as a privileged category and pays them reasonably well; second, it seeks to draw them into the Party itself, and to identify them actively with the Party leadership and Party goals.

There is a second hard-core support for the regime and that is the support within the Party organization of what I call the hard, inner core — the apparatus (the *apparat,* the Russians call them) — the Party functionaries for whom the Party work is a full-time job and a career.

Then there is the third support, the repressive element — the Secret Police, the M.V.D., whose authority extends into every corner of Soviet society and for whom terror itself becomes a kind of system of power.

It is through these three main lines of authority — this administrative-technical line, this Party line and this police line — that the regime has worked out its basic pattern of control. Perhaps I can best illustrate how this control works by taking two examples: let us say, a collective farm and a factory. If you look at the collective farm, in the administrative line you find that it is run by a collective farm chairman who is usually a Party member and who is, indeed selected and approved for his job by the district committee of the Party. If you look to see where the kernel of support within that collective farm is, you will see that there is a little group around the collective farm chairman and his deputies and brigadiers who lead the work in the field who tend to be identified with the Party or with the *Komsomol,* the young Communists. It is this group that constitutes the core of administrative control. Within the collective farm there will also be, if there is a Party organization, a Party secretary who is responsible to the Party and who is there to watch the collective farm chairman. In

every rural district there will also be a district office of the M.V.D., the secret police, whose job it is to watch all of the collective farms, the machine tractor stations in the area. They have their network of informers who penetrate the countryside.

In the factory it is essentially the same scheme. In the administrative chain there is the factory director — now, invariably, a Party man and now technically trained for his job. Then you have the Party organization in the factory, presided over by a secretary. If the factory is of any size, this Party secretary is a full-time official, designated to his job by higher Party authority. He is there to watch from the Party point of view. Each factory of any size will also have its police outfit — the so-called "special section," a branch of the M.V.D., again, with its own independent channel of command. These people will control both Party and non-Party personnel in the factories through the network of informers of which I spoke earlier.

I could take this same pattern and trace it through for you in the army, the navy, or any other aspect of Soviet society. It is really a pattern that repeats itself over and over again.

The formula of totalitarian rule, as it took shape under Stalin, is a complex formula. In one of its aspects is represented a drive to safeguard his own security by obliterating all actual or potential competitors, or competing power centers. In a positive fashion, it tried to saturate and paralyze the minds of the Soviet people with a monolithic stream of agitation and propaganda which stressed the superiority of the Soviet system and the virtues of its leaders. Negatively, it sought to deny them access to any alternative by cutting them off from the outside world and by cutting them off from each other because of the spy system. Through the secret police, in other words, it attempted to create a milieu of pervasive insecurity founded on fear of the informer and the labor camps. The Party and the secret police guarded the loyalty of the armed forces and the administration and, in turn, they also watched each other.

In this system of institutionalized mutual suspicion, the competing hierarchies of Party, police, army, administration were kept in purposeful conflict, provided with no point of final resolution short of Stalin and his trusted henchmen in the Politburo or the Presidium. In other words, the concentration of power in Stalin's hands rested on the dispersal of power among his subordinates.

In another of its aspects, the Stalinist formula of totalitarian rule represented an effort to come to terms with the demands of industrialization. It enlisted the new Soviet technical intelligentsia, trained them, rewarded the elite among them with high material privileges and elevated social status. It created a labor aristocracy of honored stakhanovites to serve as a kind of bellwether for the working class. It repudiated equality and arranged its incentive system to reward the more productive workers, to penalize the backward and inefficient. It risked the alienation of the mass of unskilled and semi-skilled workers by paying them poorly, supplying them inadequately; but it also maintained its control over them by subjecting them to the most rigorous labor discipline.

A third characteristic of the evolving Stalinist formula of totalitarian rule was its effort to identify itself with traditional sources of authority in Russian history and Russian society. This search for legitimacy was a strange and devious journey. It led to a drastic reorganization of the educational system; it manifested itself in the restoration of the authority of the family, in restrictions on abortions and encouragement of childbearing, in tightening marriage bonds, on the assumption that these measures would contribute to stability in social relationships and contribute, more particularly, to enhance the power of the regime. It produced an uneasy *de facto* concordat with the orthodox church, in which the political loyalty of the clergy and their communicants was exchanged for a precarious toleration of religious practices. But it expressed itself most forcefully in a striking rehabiliation of patriotism as the cohesive force of Soviet society, resurrecting Russian history and old military exploits and heroes; by parading dangers,

fanciful rather than real; by sealing off the Soviet people from all contact with the outside world; by appealing to the most primal instincts of nationalism; by saturating (or trying to saturate) the consciousness of the people with a sense of the superiority of the Soviet order. The regime sought to consolidate devotion to Party and state interests. Through Soviet patriotism, the Party leadership proposed to create the Soviet man of the postwar world politically conscious, proud of his society, aware of the dangers of the so-called "capitalist encirclement," and prepared to make his contribution to the consolidation and expansion of the Soviet power.

Now, the question of the death of Stalin. Will the death of Stalin set forces in motion which will lead to important modifications of the Soviet regime? As you know, in the first month after Stalin's death the new regime initiated a series of measures which appeared to portend an easing of living standards for Soviet citizens, which promised "a liberalization of the dictatorship," which promised an alleviation of tension between East and West. Price cuts on food and consumer goods were put into effect; an amnesty was declared for minor offenders in prisons and forced labor camps; the release of the arrested Kremlin doctors was accompanied by a declaration that high secret police had fabricated evidence and abused their authority; that they had sought to stir up national animosity, and that the new leadership was prepared to guarantee "the constitutional rights of its subjects against any form of arbitrary action."

In the area of foreign policy, a marked change of line was evident. The American propaganda, which had been very intense up to that point, was muted somewhat. For the first time in a number of years the Soviet press referred to the aid rendered by the Allies during the Second World War. In his statement to the Supreme Soviet on March 15, 1953, Malenkov declared:

> "At the present time there is no dispute or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully

by mutual agreement of the interested countries. This applies to our relations with all states, including the United States of America."

That announcement was soon followed by the East-West accord at the United Nations on the designation of a new Secretary-General; the conclusion of the agreement to exchange sick and wounded in Korea; a Communist retreat on the issue of forceable repatriation of prisoners, and the signing of the armistice agreement in Korea.

Now, the ultimate significance of these moves can only be appraised in the light of future developments. They can only be determined as Soviet intentions are tested in detail. In my view, sanguine hope that Soviet domestic and international policies will undergo fundamental revision do not appear to be warranted. In the perspective of Soviet historical development, as I have briefly sketched it, the current peace campaign and the domestic concessions which accompany it must be viewed as a tactical maneuver designed to win the new regime a breathing space to consolidate its authority. During this period, the Kremlin can be expected to make every effort to quiet fears of Soviet aggression; to try to confuse and divide Western sentiment about long-term Soviet intentions; to woo the support of its own subjects and peoples.

Whether the present phase of defensive consolidation will be long-lasting will depend, in my view, in considerable measure on the success which the new leadership enjoys in stabilizing its authority. If a successor emerges who gathers all the reins of power in his own hands (Malenkov has made considerable progress in this direction) and if he is able to manipulate them with Stalin's dexterity, then I think no significant changes in the character and goals of the Soviet regime can be anticipated. If a successor (whether he be Malenkov or someone else) turns out to be a weak figure, or if the dictatorship is lodged in a divided committee, then power will become blurred and diffused among the rival elite formations, and

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the opportunity to exercise strong initiative in foreign policy will operate under some restraint.

Some have seen in this combination the possibility for an eventual transformation of Soviet totalitarianism into some type of constitutional order — this uneasy equilibrium among the administration, Party, bureaucracy, armed forces and police. Mr. George Kennan has referred to it as the "erosion of despotism." In my view, the immediate prospects of such a development are not hopeful. It is undoubtedly true that the Soviet regime could greatly improve its popularity by slowing the tempo of industrialization and militarization, by devoting a larger part of its resources to the production of consumer goods, by imposing legal restraints on the police, by stabilizing the position of its bureaucratic elites. There are certainly forces in Soviet society which would warmly support the kind of evolution of which I have spoken: this yearning for peace, for security, for a rise in living standards is very widespread among Soviet citizens — judged by the interviews that we have had with those who have escaped.

But there are also important countervailing considerations. Stalin's successors, his best pupils, have risen to power by practicing the arts which he taught them. Their careers have been devoted to forging the weapons of totalitarianism. The system with which they have identified themselves carries its own dynamic momentum. The secret police, and the Party apparatus on whom the leadership depends to sustain its authority, have a vested interest in the perpetuation of their privileges and perquisites. The institutional pressures which they generate, operate to preserve and consolidate the dictatorship. As long as the Kremlin leaders continue to see their future in terms of forced industrialization, in terms of industrial and military might — they will probably persist in relying on totalitarian instruments to force the pace of industrialization.

Those who possess absolute power do not part with it willingly. As I see it, the governing formula of Soviet totalitarianism

rests on a moving equilibrium of alternating phases of relaxation and repression; but its essential contours do not change substantially. A totalitarian regime does not shed its police state characteristics; it dies when power is wrenched from its hands.

Let me conclude by summarizing my estimate of Kremlin intentions. The long-term goal remains not socialism in one country, but communism in one Kremlin-dominated world. The Communist leadership is prepared to move toward that goal as swiftly as we permit. It probably will not consciously precipitate a world war in the near future; certainly not unless it feels reasonably certain that it can win a cheap and easy victory. Meanwhile, I think it will continue to test our defenses — political as well as military; it will probe where it can hope to achieve gains with minimum risks and it will seek to accumulate strength against the day when it feels better prepared to throw down the gauntlet.

It was Lenin who proclaimed, many years ago, to be sure:

> "The resistance of the Soviet Republic, side by side with imperialist states for a long time, is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end and before that end comes, a series of frightful clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable."

In the present juncture of world affairs, no one can be certain that Lenin will not prove a true prophet. What can be said, I think, is this: that if the Kremlin decides to move, it will move because of weaknesses and not because of our strength. So, the only alternative to total war and the only basis for effective negotiation remains an unremitting effort to keep the defenses of the West strong, to maintain the dynamics of economic expansion, to sustain so far as possible standards of mass welfare, and to demonstrate the unity and vigor of the Community of Free Nations.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Dr. Merle Fainsod

Dr. Fainsod, Professor in the Department of Government at Harvard University, was born at McKees Rock, Pennsylvania, on 2 May 1907. He received his B.A. degree from Washington University in 1928 and his M.A. degree from the same University in 1930. At Harvard he received an M.A. degree in 1931, and a Ph.D. in 1932.

Dr. Fainsod has been associated with the Department of Government at Harvard University since 1933, advancing from an instructor to the rank of professor, attained in 1946. He was Chairman of the Department from 1946-49. He also served as a visiting lecturer at Yale (1940); Staff Member of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, 1936; Consultant Temporary National Economics Commission, 1940; Price Executive, Consumers Durable Goods, Office of Price Administration, 1941-42; Director Retail Trade and Services Division, 1942-43; Commissioned Captain, Specialists Reserve, Army of the United States, May 1943. He was Deputy Director, Civil Affairs Training School, Harvard University, 1944-45.

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