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POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 8 October 1963, by
Professor Harold D. Lasswell

Since military strategy is part of the decision-making process among participants in world politics, we may begin our examination of the subject by considering the arena of world affairs. A few years ago the professional students of international law, international relations and strategy would give a glib reply when questioned about the identity of the participants in world politics. They would talk in terms of the "state" or the "nation state". And it is still the conventional answer. But it has become increasingly unsatisfactory for anyone who must look beyond legal forms to the facts of power in a rapidly changing world. The conception of a "state" is formalistic. According to traditional theory all "states" are "equal" once officially recognized by the existing members of the state system. Such a conception can scarcely be taken literally by anyone who looks at the power relations among governments. Side by side with the language of international law there has grown up a vocabulary designed to describe the distribution of effective power. It speaks of great powers, middle powers, small powers and dependents; and, more recently, in view of the tendency toward bipolarity, of "superpowers" or "giant" powers. It is clear that any serviceable categories will use two sets of terms, one for formal authority, and the other for effective control. If we say that sixty or seventy states are sovereign equals, we must also be able to say that the effective pattern of power in the world arena is bipolar, polypolar, multipolar, or whatever else the facts indicate. We can make very important distinctions between lawful power (authoritative and controlling), naked power (controlling but not authoritative), and nominal power (authoritative but not controlling).

The disadvantage of taking the state as the unit of participation in world politics is not only that the distinction between formal and effective power is blurred, but that other participants have become so important that it is misleading to relegate them to a subordinate position. International intergovernmental organizations have been set up by official action for general purposes (League of Nations, United Nations), and for a diversity of special purposes (health, science, and the like). It is true that these organizations operate under the formal authority of national states. But an examination of their influence will show that on some matters they are of decisive importance. The result of having an international hierarchy of officials, and assemblies and councils that meet frequently is to establish a new mechanism of much greater weight on many subjects than was possible when intergovernmental cooperation was sporadic and bilateral.

The list of participants needs also to be enlarged by adding transnational political parties. They are not always under the domination of any one government. The communist movement, for instance, was a power factor in world affairs long before the seizure of power in Moscow in 1917. International bands of revolutionists were active for decades seeking to organize bases for revolutionary seizures whenever crises of unemployment, of military defeat, or some other catastrophe created a revolutionary situation. Even when a revolutionary party organization is transformed into a humble appendage of an existing government, some of its remaining influence comes from the impression in various quarters that it represents something bigger than the government in question.

Besides transnational political parties there is much to be said for adding the supranational pressure groups to the list of effective participants in the decision making process of the globe. Pressure groups are set up for the purpose of influencing policy. They differ from political parties in that they do not formulate comprehensive political programs, or openly put up candidates in elections. A recent tabulation suggests that about a thousand supra-

national pressure organizations are actively promoting changes in the educational, medical, economic and other relations among peoples.

When we go behind supranational pressure groups and parties we typically come to private associations that operate across national boundaries. These organizations are not primarily specialized to the power value; rather, they use power incidentally to other purposes. In this connection think of the impact of business organizations that reach across many frontiers, and of trade unions, churches, scientific and professional associations. Private organizations have often been strong enough to upset governments, and to give decisive help to new regimes.

If we push our analysis far enough we come to individual human beings. Influential individuals (and families) often operate transnationally.

The position of the military strategist in the modern decision making process is highly diversified. In some places he is the advisor to a national government, as in the U. S. Elsewhere he may be the advisor of a government that purports to represent several nations. When the element of coercion plays a significant part, we speak of an empire (like the Soviet Empire) rather than a unified national state (like Sweden). In some cases the military strategist is advising a small political class that is relatively cut off from the rest of the society under its control. The members of this small ruling class may follow world affairs, and share the news and comment current among all who keep in touch with happenings throughout the globe. Below the political elite the society may be composed of kinship groups more concerned with tribal affairs than with the world at large. The underlying population may be nomadic or agricultural. It may remain self-absorbed in the treadmill of the seasons and the world views of a traditional culture. The underlying population may be more or less disorganized as a result of employment as a labor force in mines, plantations and other large-scale

operations. The political role of the strategic advisor is circumscribed by the integration of the top decision makers with the society as a whole.

The military strategist often grades over to the role of a police officer or a subversionist. We all know the usual distinction between a military specialist and a policeman. According to our tradition the proper function of the armed forces is to repel foreign enemies, and we are inclined to look with a jaundiced eye upon attempts to involve these forces in the maintaining of internal order. The civilian tradition of English speaking countries has led us to put blocks in the road of executives who want to use the armed forces at home. (Our history recalls the abuse of authority in the hope of preserving unpopular dynasties).

In modern despotisms it is impossible to recognize a sharp line between military and police forces. Consider the interpenetration of the German officers corps by the Nazi party, and the complex allocations of responsibility for compulsory labor camps at home and abroad, and for extermination camps; and for the encouragement of foreign subversion.

To some extent the encouragement of foreign subversion has always been part of the military function. It has been taken for granted that an intelligence job would be done in advance on possible opponents (in addition to wartime operations). Inducements would be employed to encourage spies to betray the nation. Often these operations implicate large numbers of people. (We hear of the 70,000 agents used by the Germans in anticipation of 1870.) In more recent years the appearance of despotism, bipolarization and acute ideological conflict have enormously increased the strategic role of subversive activity.

Under modern conditions, therefore, military officers sometimes find themselves acting as advisors and liaison men to very strange groups indeed. They may work with supranational political parties to improve the strategy and tactics of espionage, sab-

otage and street fighting. From Nuremburg and other sources we know of the pre-war use of military advisors in connection with para-military formations and pressure organizations of many kinds. (There is, by the way, a big literature on the revolutionary technique evolved by the social revolutionists of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth, some of whom had professional training and experience).

When we consider the intimacy of association between strategists and top decision makers, the connection appears to be closest when the government has been taken over by military *coup*. But the top man may be satisfied with his own genius as a planner and a commander, so that anyone who is invited to advise finds that he is relegated to a modest role. Even under these circumstances, however, the advisor may be more than a "yes-man" who thinks only when spoken to. He may continue to make independent analyses of the factors that influence the security of the whole nation, and seek to clarify the minds of top decision makers concerning long-run matters. Cases of this kind have occurred among the advisors of warlords who seized power in some province in China. There have been nationally minded advisors who tried to shepherd their warlord along the path of unifying the whole Chinese people in order to maintain the integrity of China under modern perils.

It is noteworthy that trained officers are not as a rule at the top of modern mass party movements which have captured power. Actually there is latent and often overt tension between the leadership and trained officers. Men like Mussolini, Lenin and Hitler were gifted propagandists and organizers of mass movements who looked with mixed feelings at general staffs and top commands. The communist party was so fearful that the central policy of the organization would be under the domination of military specialists that they made a cult of the supremacy of the political man over the specialists. An entirely new set of officers were trained as rapidly as possible after the Civil War period in

the hope of wiping out ideological residues of the pre-Bolshevik era, and of indoctrinating officers of the Red Army with the fundamental importance of subordinating themselves to the central policy organs of the party (and government). Threatened by revolt and intervention, however, the communist rulers of the Soviet world have been recruited from individuals who almost invariably have political police training and experience. The Nazi movement took over control of the officers by the tactics of "divide and rule." Compliant members of the officers corps were advanced, while the more towering professional personalities were gradually disposed of by whatever methods (including false charges) were expedient.

In a nation possessing a strong tradition of popular rule, like the U. S. and Great Britain, the political factors in the formulation of strategy are in one sense simple. In Britain the responsibility for top decision rests with the Cabinet and the Parliament, and eventually the electorate. In the United States the integration rests with the President and the Congress, and ultimately the electorate. Formally speaking, political assumptions are communicated to the strategist by the competent political authorities, who receive advice for the over-all implementation of the national policy goals and objectives recommended. Top authorities clarify and commit national policy in the light of the advice tendered by the military strategists, and by those charged with diplomatic, economic and ideological implements of policy.

In practice the relation of the military strategist to the top is far from attaining such diagrammatic clarity. First of all, the words in which national goals and objectives are stated tend to be ambiguous or ultraspecific. That is, if the President or the Congress is asked what they want to achieve in the domain of foreign policy in the next five years, the replies are likely to sound very ambiguous indeed. We know of course that the national security calls for the deterrence of aggression by foreign countries, abstinence from aggressive acts on our part, and successful counter-action if necessary. But the translation of these broad requirements into

more operational terms is not easy. By ultra-specificity is meant words that sound definite enough, but which must be taken with a grain of salt. Even the most emphatic and explicit statement may be a poor guide for the future. (In the U. S. the strategist is likely to remember Korea).

Uncertain as this may appear to be, of such are the facts of life in popular government. The military strategist must adapt himself to performing his obligation to the nation within this framework. On reflection, however, we conclude that the advisor-planner is by no means as devoid of guidance as the foregoing paragraph may suggest. By the proper use of the appropriate tools of investigation and analysis, much can be learned. By examining the trends of official policy in this country and abroad, the strategist is able to predict some of the situations involving national security that may arise, together with the policy objectives likely to be supported at home and abroad. The projection of past trends will often show that conflicts are in the making (typically when two opposing developments are practically certain to meet). The rearming of Germany, even in pre-Nazi days, pointed toward changes in the balance of power throughout Europe (and hence throughout the globe). Adequate interpretation of the future obviously calls for more than simple extrapolation of past lines of change, and the uncovering of facilities or incompatible trends. It is important to conduct a scientific examination of the balance of factors that have favored or retarded a given response, and to include in the assessment of the future, estimates of the probable presence or absence of these conditioning factors.

If we look at the history of strategic planning and recommendation, it is clear that the professionals have sometimes failed to make use of the tools of comparative historical, scientific, and projective analysis which are essential to the task. Our war histories are now calling attention to a number of alleged limitations that affected strategy between the two world wars. It appears that too much weight was given to the headlines of the twenties and

early thirties. The prevailing tone of the Presidents, the Congress, the political parties, the pressure groups, and the press was "isolationist." Since the U. S. had no diplomatic commitments to an ally, forward planning was often made on the assumption that the U. S. would go it alone in the war crisis of the future.

The tools of analysis to which I have referred in making an assessment of political factors affecting U. S. policy were actually used with success by the advisors of other governments. Important elements in Great Britain, for instance, correctly foresaw that if Britain were threatened by a resurgent Germany, the U. S. would interpret our national security to include the defense of Britain, and the prevention of the unification of Western Europe by conquest.

In developing strategies in execution of national objectives, once clarified (or postulated), a fundamental question is how much initial loss can be endured by the nation. How much loss can the U. S. afford to suffer at the outbreak of a war in which modern weapons are used by the opponent in his surprise attack? This is a more complicated question than tabulating and estimating data about weapons and industrial capacity. It is necessary to estimate the crucial political factors. Will losses of a certain magnitude (of people and production facilities) produce a disproportionately great increase in disunity? Will this significantly influence the strength of the immediate counterattack against the enemy? Will it importantly affect the restoration and use of production capacity in order to mount a decisive offensive within a relatively short time?

At first it appears that there are no exact parallels from the past. Crippling as the Japanese surprise attack was, for instance, it did not demolish a large fraction of our production facilities, nor decimate a significant fraction of our population. But it is possible to discern pertinent variables in past situations. Suppose that we try to envisage the direction, intensity and efficiency of the response of the American people should our industrial centers be made unusable by surprise, and the scale of civilian casualties

reach unprecedented heights. There have been cases of disaster in which panic has been held at a minimum. One factor was the very long anticipation shared by the public that the disaster might occur. Another point is that the members of the community must not feel that they deserve to suffer because they have been led into disaster by self-serving and short-sighted men. Furthermore, in the midst of a disastrous blow unity may be sustained if there is equality of treatment of all sufferers, irrespective of region, religion and color.

In calculating strengths and vulnerabilities in so far as they involve political factors, it is essential to consider all major deprivations to assess the probable response of the different components of the population, and to estimate the changes in attitude that are likely to be brought about between now (the time the estimate is made) and when the attack is postulated to occur.

All this has a bearing on such major estimates as the size and nature of the burden to be imposed upon the nation in advance of hostilities. Assume that we can make a dependable estimate of the level of armament that would exercise a stateable degree of deterrence of potential attackers. An element in the final choice of armament level is the probable internal effect of various levels upon U. S. unity. (Can we say, for instance, that when a specified level is exceeded, a comparatively sharp increase in disaffection follows?)

Up to this point we have looked at the position of the military strategist in the modern world, and paying particular attention to the political factors pertinent to the goals, objectives, strengths and vulnerabilities of the national policy served by the strategist. We shift now to another dimension of the problem, and examine some political elements that enter into the response of potential or actual opponents. We must see the world from the standpoint of the current and the prospective decision makers of foreign powers. Hence we encounter the same kind of uncertainty that enters

into the interpretation of our own decision makers. Even if we were able to ask those in charge of top policy abroad when they propose to attack (if at all), the replies (even though candid) might be ambiguous, or show the same ultraspecificity of which we remarked before. We can no more take the dictators at face value than we can take the democrats. In evaluating even direct testimony we must consider the imprint of another purge, or of a great success or defeat in an intermediate country.

The examination of the policy goals, objectives, strengths, and vulnerabilities of the potential opponent calls for the estimation of developments, assuming first that our policy remains much the same. Later we bring in the consideration of the impact of possible changes in our own policy. A key question in reference to the decision making process abroad is parallel to the question that we posed in reference to our own nation: What are the present authoritative prescriptions for the making of such basic decisions as war or peace? Do the agencies charged with nominal authority appear to have effective control? Who are the effective decision makers: What are their politically significant perspectives? How are these perspectives influenced by cultural characteristics? Class origins? Experience? Personality traits? By the security or insecurity of the position of leaders now or at various levels of crisis? In the future if changes occur in the group composition of the leadership, will it make any difference so far as the policies in which we are interested are concerned? For instance, if the leadership is widely recruited from diverse nationality groups, will it make for more or less internal unity, or for more or less aggressiveness in foreign relations? If the coming elite is largely recruited from the recently established families of the army, police, party bureaucracy, official bureaucracy, will it have any significant effect? (For instance: are those with military police experience so sensitive to internal division that they are timid about launching a war? Are they so much impressed by the progress of subversion at home that they believe a war to be necessary to preserve the regime? Are they so much impressed by reports of subversion abroad that war

appears unnecessary in order to win out in the world struggle? Are they impressed by the absence of successful subversion abroad so that security seems only possible as a result of successful war?) Are the personalities who come to the top in the regime willing to take great responsibility for important decisions; or, on the contrary, are they accustomed to evade risky decisions by temporizing? (Does this mean a drift into war because the top leaders do not stand out against a growing consensus among their numbers? Or does it mean that war is continually postponed?)

The foregoing questions have been directed to considering the composition of the decision makers, and assessing the perspectives in which they are likely to view political matters of importance to our security. A further step is necessary. Besides thinking of the results of a possible change in elite composition, we must estimate the probability that significant changes will in fact occur. This call for a systematic examination of the social processes which are likely to affect the political process of the opposing power. Without making an exhaustive inventory, we can at least direct attention to some dimensions of the total problem:

Wealth (economic institutions). What are the probable changes in the technology and the magnitude of production? Standards of living? Saving and investment? How will these developments affect the perspectives of the political elite?

Respect (social class institutions). How is the class structure likely to change? That is, will the upper, middle and lower respect groupings become more or less mobile? Will this increase or decrease the unity of the community as a whole? How will these changes influence the perspectives of the effective elite of power?

Well-being (safety, health, comfort). How are the numbers, and the physical and mental health, of the population likely to change? Will internal tensions be increased and the pressure for external expansion increased or reduced?

Enlightenment (public information, civic education). Will information about the outside world available at all levels become more fantastic, so that the external world is viewed as vile and pusillanimous? Will the information available at the top share this image progressively, or will it on the contrary diverge from the popular picture, creating perpetual sources of tension in the control of international chauvinism? Despite the images purveyed in mass media of communication controlled by the government, will undercurrents of scepticism result in a general disinclination to credit officially propagated statements, and produce a feeble positive faith in the destiny of the whole community in its foreign relations?

Skill (professions and occupations). Will the growth of industrialization bring with it a network of scientific, engineering, and skilled labor talent so absorbed in improving their own conditions of life and opportunities that there will be little interest in external expansion? Or will the growth of some skill groups create strong vested interests in expansion, in order to gain greater scope than the home countries permit?

Affection (family, fraternal institutions). Will the pervading suspiciousness characteristic of all forms of public life lead to intense emotional bonds among members of the family and the early friendship group, with the result that the security of the intimate circle is more significant than more grandiose dreams of expansion in the name of larger social units? Or will the concern for the family have the effect of leaving politics in the hands of egocentric, calculating and unscrupulous persons who are concerned with the vast drama of world politics, and willing to take all the risks involved?

Rectitude (standards of right and wrong, of responsibility). Will the older religious faiths continue to survive and indeed gain in vitality? Will secular doctrines lose their capacity to involve fervent faith and self-sacrifice? How will these changing standards influence the outlook of persons who have an opportunity to take

a strong role in political affairs? (e.g., will they withdraw and leave the decision to the utterly unscrupulous; or will they develop a sense of responsibility for ameliorating the general condition of tension?).

It will be observed that the categories employed here refer to a way of describing the social process of any community, whether a local neighborhood, a nation, or even the world as a whole. We speak of the social process as *man pursuing values through institutions using resources*. The values (the categories of preferred events) are kept few for convenience of analysis (eight: power, wealth, respect, well-being, enlightenment, skill, affection, rectitude). The specialized patterns by which these values are shaped and shared are the institutions. Social processes may be compared with one another according to the degree in which values are widely made available to the members of the whole community, or the degree to which they are concentrated in relatively few hands. The first is a society that is relatively democratic; the second, relatively despotic (or a traditional oligarchy).

Having appraised the current and prospective decision making process of the opposing power, the strategist is in a position to evaluate the probable impact of the various instruments of action available to his own decision makers. Repeating a previous analysis it is convenient for many purposes to say that the goals and objectives of national policy may be sought by four major instruments of policy: military, economic, diplomatic, ideological. The distinctive means of military strategy are arms; of economic strategy, goods; of diplomacy, deals; and ideological strategy, words. In terms of distinctive effects military strategy aims at destruction (or production), economic strategy at scarcity (or abundance), diplomacy at the disunity of leaders (or unity), and ideological strategy at the disunity of masses (or unity). As a check list:

<i>Strategy</i>	<i>Distinctive Means</i>	<i>Distinctive Effects</i>
Military	Arms	Destruction (or protection)
Economic	Goods	Scarcity (or abundance)

Diplomatic	Deals	Disunity of Leaders (or unity)
Ideological	Words	Disunity of Masses (or unity)

The formulation and execution of military strategy calls for the proper articulation of all distinctive military means and effects with all the instruments by which national policy objectives are sought. The overriding principle is that of maximization, or the attainment of all the values sought by policy at the least cost (appraised in terms of those values). When we speak of political factors in the formulation of strategy we are referring to the assumptions that are to be made about the national goals and objectives to be accomplished; and further the weight to be assigned to factors of intention in achieving of these aims.

These instrumentalities of national policy may be employed in situations short of war, in war, and at the end of war. For the moment we are thinking of the political factors involved in the use of military strategy (in the context of policy goals, and in coordination with the other instruments of policy) in situations short of war, and intended to influence the opposing elite. We assume that the goals pursued are the deterrence of aggression by the opposing power, and the maintenance of a position which, if necessary, would enable us to use force effectively if aggression occurs.

In this connection we note first of all that military instruments possess certain special advantages in the prosecution of national policy in these short-of-war situations. I refer to the well-nigh compulsory control that can be exercised over the focus of attention of the opposing elite by moving our own "hardware." Ships, planes and guns are very tangible indeed, and exert peremptory control over the senses of those who are equipped to recognize the political significance of weapons. The top staffs and decision makers abroad must pay the same strict attention to our hardware that we do to theirs.

This point applies universally. But there are special factors that predispose the members of some ruling elites to emphasize

the significance of military weapons. Suppose that our opponent is indoctrinated with the idea that the "capitalist" enemy never does anything unless it is the outcome of a deep laid and hostile plan. This results in "over-interpretation" as well as over-sensitiveness to whatever weapon changes are attributed to us.

Assume further that the opposing elite is heavily indoctrinated about the importance of material factors in general. The emphasis upon such tangibles as the weapon and the factory underlines the significance attributed to developments on our side of these matters.

Suppose that the opposing elite is indoctrinated to think of themselves as "encircled" by a world conspiracy headed by the U. S. This predisposes them to give particular attention to moves anywhere in the world that appear in any way connected with us.

As instruments of national policy during periods of low-burning (as well as explosive) crisis it is clear that military weapons excel in manageability. They are amenable to central direction by professional planning and operating personnel: and they are run with an eye to security considerations.

The disposability of weapons, of course, is a factor that often results in the abuse of military instruments during short-of-war periods. Suppose that the problem is to induce the potential enemy to abstain from an aggressive action. If our weapons are unready, and if the intelligence services of the other side are in effective working order, it is folly to imagine that we are "detering aggression" by moving some of our ships, guns and planes closer to their boundaries. (The task is always to estimate the opponent's estimate of our intentions and capabilities).

The disposability of military weapons often leads to another abuse, which is failure to plan military activity as part of a properly prepared joint enterprise, involving the articulation of diplomacy, economics and ideological instruments. A case in point is failure

to provide in advance for the timing of peacetime weapon tests in such a manner as to extract the maximum benefit.

We have seen the impromptu use of weapons which brought about the *withdrawal* of an opposing power from a position judged by us to be contrary to our national policy. The use of the Berlin airlift is a famous case. A more dramatic example would be the use of our combined weapons to bring about a withdrawal from occupied countries. The top decision makers must obviously be willing to shoulder the risk of war in connection with such moves. Otherwise the deterrence effect will be frustrated (as above, when the aim was to induce the opponent to *abstain* rather than to withdraw).

By putting so much emphasis upon abstinence and withdrawal, we have diverted attention from other aims of national policy as they affect potential opponents. The dominant objective may be to induce *cooperation* for purposes compatible with our security. One of the declared goals of American policy is to bring about by negotiation, if possible, an end to the present armament race on terms compatible with our national security.

It is generally recognized that if this objective is to be achieved, a yet more fundamental purpose must be realized. I refer to the *reconstruction* of the policy orientation of the opposing power. It is not enough from the standpoint of national security to gain local and unlimited success in terms of abstinence, withdrawal or cooperation. By this time it has become quite clear that the outlook must change of those who are making the effective decisions elsewhere. In a sense our rearmament since 1945 has been a "short-of-war" activity designed to accomplish a permanent change, by peaceful means if possible, of the effective policies of the Soviet Union. By maintaining superiority in arms, while abstaining on our part from aggressive action, the hope has been to reduce the confidence of the Soviet Union elite in their doctrinaire outlook and their aggressive policies.

Finally, we turn to the use of military instruments in situations short of war for the purpose of influencing an *associated* or *uncommitted* power. One of the objectives can be *withdrawal*. We may want to put a stop to the continuation of measures that in our judgment endanger the peace, and promise no compensating gains for security. We may go so far as to use blockade to bring about this modification of policy on the part of a power with whom we are on generally friendly terms.

The object may be *abstention*. We may act to prevent extensions of measures which may appear contrary to our national security interests.

The object may be *cooperation*. Obviously an overriding aim of NATO is to organize cooperative activity against a common threat.

The objective may be *reconstruction*. U. S. policy has repeatedly declared in favor of bringing new institutions of unity into existence in Western Europe.

The consideration of any of these moves involves an examination of factors affecting policy in the associated or uncommitted country, an examination no less exhaustive than we have referred to in case of an opposing power. Without reiterating the fundamental categories, the crucial point is whether our influence will strengthen or weaken national unity. Where the ruling elite of the associated power does not have the support of the underlying masses of the population, we are in the delicate position of needing to handle our policy instruments in such a manner as to bring about integration without further weakening of the power in question. Where the ruling elite has a great deal of popular support we have the problem, which has many conspicuous difficulties, of managing our relations in such a manner as to refrain from compromising our friends, and lowering their acceptability at home by seeming to transform them into puppets of our national needs.

There is no time to deal with the political questions that arise in employing military instruments of national policy in time of general war, or in immediate post-war periods. To some extent this omission is made because most of the modern discussion of our subject deals with problems of coalition war, and in seeking to work in harness with allies who may diverge in important ideological and organizational particulars from one's own nation; and in striving to accomplish subversive results in enemy jurisdiction.

So far as U. S. public policy has been concerned in the past, some of the most conspicuous failures have been in meeting the problems that arise at the end of active hostilities. It is essential to define national policy well in advance of the "onslaught of peace" if the political preparation is to be successfully carried through for the mastery of post-war situations in ways that contribute to national security goals.

On this note, we conclude. We have been viewing the political factors that concern national military strategy in a world arena whose participants are more diversified than the traditional conception of equal sovereign states. We are dealing with a bipolarizing world, a world of international intergovernmental organizations, of transnational political parties, of transnational pressure groups and individuals who may operate across traditional lines. The military strategist who is responsible to the top decision makers of modern powers under these conditions is confronted by a variety of problems and tasks that differ in many ways from the obligations of his predecessors. The political factors include the present and prospective assumptions to be entertained about the goals and objectives of national policy, and the articulation of military instruments with all the instruments at the disposal of national policy. The task varies greatly in situations short of war, in general war and in immediate post-war periods. The decisions affecting our national security now and in the future must be assessed by locating the effective as distinct from the formal elite, and by exploring the affiliations and experiences that influence their political demands,

expectations and loyalties. In predicting the future of policy the impact of change in all spheres of the social process must be taken into account. The potential impact of our own actions enters into the evaluation of the important decisions of the opposing leadership. Parallel questions must be raised for associated and non-committed powers, whether the objectives are primarily abstinence, withdrawal, cooperation or reconstruction. In general, political factors are factors of intention of perspective: of conceptions of goal; of expectations concerning the past, present and future as it affects these goals; and of loyalties. The strategy of military instruments in this context is to maximize the attainment of our national objectives by influencing the expectations that favor the actions that serve these security aims.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor H. D. Lasswell

Professor Lasswell was born in Donnellson, Illinois, on 13 February 1902. He received a Ph.B. from the University of Chicago in 1922, and a Ph.D. from the same institution in 1926. He has also done graduate work at the Universities of London, Geneva, Paris, and Berlin. In 1922 he joined the faculty of the University of Chicago in the Department of Political Science, advancing from an assistant instructor to associate professor. He joined the Washington School of Psychiatry, Washington, D.C. in 1938 as political scientist for one year. Since that time Professor Lasswell has been associated with the School of Law at Yale University. Until 1945 he was visiting Sterling Lecturer, and in 1946 he became Professor of Law, his present position.

Since 1939 he has also been Director of War Communications Research, Library of Congress. He has served as visiting Professor at Syracuse University, 1926; Western Reserve University, 1929; University of California, 1935; Yenching University, 1937. He has been a lecturer at the New School for Social Research, New York, since 1939. In 1928-29 he was a Social Science Research Council Fellow.

Dr. Lasswell is a member of a number of professional organizations, including the American Political Science Association and American Sociological Society, and is a contributor to many periodicals and is advisory editor of *Ethics*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *Human Relations*, and *World Politics*. He has published numerous books on world politics, some of the more recent being: "Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry," 1950; "National Security and Individual Freedom," 1950; "World Revolution of our Time: A Framework for Basic Policy Research." 1951; "Recent Developments in Scope and Method," 1951; "A Comparative Study of Elites," 1952; "A Comparative Study of Symbols," 1952.