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INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND MEANS OF RESOLUTION

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 26 August 1954
by

Professor Filmer S. C. Northrop

Admiral McCormick, Captain Miller, Gentlemen:

Although the topic, upon which I have been asked to speak, may seem especially academic, in view of the present state of the world, it none the less has important implications for you as military men. Roscoe Pound, former Dean of the Harvard Law School, has reminded us that there is no evidence from history that disputes between men, whether they be domestic or international, are ever settled by means other than force unless those disputes have been brought under the rule of law and of legal institutions. Thus, in judging the likelihood of war as a means of settling disputes between nations in the world at the present time, it is worth our while to indicate what the conditions are for settling disputes between nations by the establishment of legal institutions, such as the League of Nations, the United Nations, or a modified form of one of these, and the degree to which these conditions are met at the present moment.

In order to understand international relations, it is first necessary for us to become fairly clear about what a nation is. A nation is a group of people who pursue a group policy upon which they agree. Where there cannot be agreement on the fundamental norms for organizing the economic, political and military activities of a group of people there cannot be a nation. A nation is a group of people with at least some basic major norms and aims in common for relating themselves economically, politically, and even militarily.

It is worth our while to consider the source of the unity of people in a nation and the unity of people under law. To get at this, we need to consider what an individual is, because there are certain things which are true about individuals that make a nation possible. It is often said that the key factor in a nation is its economic strength or its physical and military power. This is true but it is one of those truths which, if taken as the whole truth, is somewhat misleading. The reason is that the effective power of a nation is a function of what it does with its power.

When a nation is divided internally by strife between its political parties and is weak from a political and an internal point of view — as, for example, France has been since World War II — it may not use or realize the potential power that it possesses. When a nation is divided in its foreign policy by: (1) an isolationist group who would restrict military policy and foreign policy to merely a defensive position in the contemporary world, after the manner of the late Senator Taft and, in part, of former President Hoover; (2) a group who would have an immediate showdown with the Soviet Union, as represented by General MacArthur and perhaps in part by Senator McCarthy; (3) a group who would pursue a go-it-together-with-allies foreign policy dedicated to a roll-back crusade to release the satellites in Eastern Europe and to shore up Asia; and (4) a group who would go-it-together-with -allies, but merely to contain communism — when a nation is divided in its own internal public opinion with respect to four such different foreign policies, then you can have the communists win two most dramatic diplomatic victories and have a country go down to two of the worst diplomatic defeats in its history. This, I take it, is what has just happened to our own country in the last few months. The communists have won diplomatically in Asia by succeeding in dividing us from our allies there, and the failure of E.D.C. means the breakdown of U. S. foreign policy for even containing, to say nothing about rolling back, communism in Europe.

This points up the fact that the power of a nation is not a function merely of its physical power, which is but a potential.

Whether the physical power is effective or not depends on the ideas with respect to how, when and where it is to be used, and even on the ideas guiding a people's diplomacy which, keeping the power in reserve, may achieve its aim without firing a shot. If a people are divided internally in the theory or the ideas upon which they are going to base their foreign policy, they can have the power and never get the benefit of it.

Why this importance of ideas and why the importance of theory as well as matter and force in international relations? This goes back, I believe, to the very nature of man himself and to the very nature and constitution of man's own nervous system. To make this clear in thoroughly physical and physiological terms, so that we keep away as far as possible from vague notions like "consciousness" and "mind," I would like to call attention to a recent theory of the nervous system that has been developed by a group of physiologists, neurologists and engineers with whom I have been connected — the cybernetics group made up of Wiener, Von Neumann, McCulloch, Pitts, Rosenblueth, Bigelow and Lorente de No'.

The old theory of the nervous system follows these lines. Picture in your minds a line of oval objects. These oval-like things are individual neurons. The neuron to the left is the sensory neuron. If there is an explosion that fires the sensory neuron from my ear, which fires another neuron in my cortex, which fires another neuron in the cortex, and yet another neuron in turn, then the firing of the last cortical neuron fires the motor neuron and I jump. If our nervous systems were based only on such a linear ordering of its neurons from the sensory neurons, through the cortical, to the motor, the aforementioned phenomena would be explained: There would be the stimulus which fires the auditory neuron that, in turn, fires the sequence of cortical neurons, which fire the motor neuron that contracts one's muscles.

But if this were all that man is, neurologically, he never could remember anything. The explosion would occur, but he could

never remember that it had occurred; neither could he have ideas; nor would he ever have science; he would not be able to reflect on the fact that he jumped or that he has muscular power to use and direct in a certain way. Such considerations led many people to think that the mental part of man — that is, the use of ideas and reflection — was purely phenomenal. The real thing supposedly was the physical stimulus connected linearly to the physical muscular response. They thought, to be sure, that we had a consciousness stuck on top of this but that the consciousness never had a thing to do with what happened; the stimulus hit you, they said; you had a motor response, and ideas did not matter. Ideas and theory were just rationalizations after the fact, and the fact (the motor response) was determined quite independently of any reflection upon it or memory of past motor responses.

A Spanish physiologist and neurologist, Lorente de No', who is now in the Rockefeller Foundation Laboratories in New York, came upon the discovery that neurons can be ordered in the cortex not merely in this linear way, but also in a circle. This opened new possibilities.

Let us suppose, again, that we have our initial explosion, the bang. It fires the auditory neuron which fires the adjacent cortical neuron in the circle of cortical neurons, which fires the cortical neuron to its right and so on until the motor neuron, adjacent to the circle or cortical neurons, is fired. If this were the end of the story, the final result would be the same as before, i.e., in the linearly ordered neural net; nothing would be left in the system to record the original stimulus.

Neurons operate on an "all or none" principle; they either are latent or they fire; there is no such thing as "half-firing." Also, a neuron will not fire unless it contains a stored amount of energy. If you stimulate a neuron instantly after it has fired, it will not fire again because it has used up the energy necessary for firing. The time it takes (and which is accurately measured) the metabolic activities of the body to build up the energy in that

neuron again so that it will fire is called the "refractory period." With this in mind, let us return to the last neuron to fire in the circular neural net.

Let us suppose that in addition to firing the motor neuron adjacent to it, it also fires the next cortical neuron in the circle of cortical neurons, which in turn fires its successor in the circle and so on. Thereby an impulse will have been passed around the circle. Suppose also, as is the case, that the time it takes to pass that impulse around the circle is no longer than the refractory phase of any neuron in the circle. Then the impulse will be passed on continuously throughout the life of the human being; i.e., as long as the metabolic processes of the body restore each neuron's energy within the refractory period following any firing. Then you have a "trapped impulse," representing *uniquely* the past stimulus. Such a circle of successively firing neurons with its trapped impulse passed continuously around it, Lorente de No' called a "reverberating circuit."

McCulloch and Pitts pointed out that this is the neurological correlate of memory. Something is left in the cortical system, after the stimulus has fired the sensory neuron and after there has been the motor response, that represents the past stimulus uniquely. When a fact represents something other than itself uniquely, the name for it is a "symbol." When anything stands for something other than itself, it is functioning as a symbol. A symbol is an idea. Thus, McCulloch and Pitts pointed out that any one of these trapped impulses, related uniquely to a specific type of stimulus, is the neurological-physico-chemical, energetic correlate or equivalent of an idea.

Recall also that a firing cortical neuron can fire an outgoing motor neuron which causes muscles to contract and the physical body to jump, strike out with force or move. This means that ideas really matter. It means also that muscular or other power is a function of ideas.

Let us suppose that a second, later explosion occurs and the fired auditory neuron leads to the same reverberating circuit of neurons to which the first explosion was carried. Then the trapped impulse in the circuit is representing not merely one particular bang — the one, let us say, of five minutes past eleven, but also a second particular "bang" — the one, say, of ten minutes past eleven. Then, that trapped impulse is the symbol, not for one unique event, but for a whole group of similar events. Such a symbol logicians call a "universal." It is a class symbol; it is standing for a class of entities. In short, each and every man is a walking set of trapped universals which fire his motor neurons and hence determine the direction his walking takes.

Furthermore, the different reverberating circuits with their diverse incoming stimuli and trapped universals do not exist in isolation from one another. Incoming sensory neurons feed to a common area. Otherwise, you would not be hearing these sounds while you were seeing the color of this coat and experiencing certain inner bodily sensations. This is your specious present. This is the world of true immediate fact, directly inspected, which is a mixture of auditory, visual, tactual and other simultaneously experienced sensations. But this is not all. From the common area to which the different incoming sensory neurons run, the impulses representing visual data are pulled out and trapped in a visual area of the cortex; those representing sounds in an auditory area, and so on. This is the way the nervous system, starting with a complex of simultaneous inductive facts, pulls out abstract class concepts.

A moment later the simultaneous indicative facts are different. Novel events have occurred with different sensory neurons firing. In the cortical abstractive process there must be circuits, therefore, that trap temporal relations and that trap special relations. Finally, the many reverberating circuits with their trapped representatives of both entities and relations must be connected in ways that permit them to be put together in different combi-

nations. Thereby theory capable of being tested against the incoming stimuli is possible. One simple permutation of three reverberating circuits, A, B, and C, representing three different trapped universals, is a neural connection between them such that if A and B fire, then C fires. This is the neurological correlate of a definition. Then concept C is defined in terms of Concepts A and B. Definition orders concepts hierarchically. Thus, our abstract concepts, each one representing similar inductive facts of our experience, are built up into a hierarchy of elementary concepts and defined concepts, or, in other words, a hierarchy of basic and derived, or secondary, concepts. The effectiveness of the power — i.e., stored energy and muscular response — of any individual is a function, therefore, of his basic trapped universals and their adequacy to the facts of experience.

This neurological conception of any human being makes it possible to give an exact definition of a nation. A nation is a group of people who order their motor responses with a common set of trapped universals.

With this concept of the nation in mind, let us now return to our initial question of the likelihood of settling disputes between nations by recourse to law rather than by the traditional recourse to force. Clearly, one's conclusion will depend on whether it is possible to obtain an effective international law. Upon what does law depend for its effectiveness? Even in domestic communities certain laws are effective; others, such as the Prohibition Amendment in the United States, are not. Why?

It happens that legal scientists have investigated this question. One of the most distinguished was an Austro-Hungarian named Ehrlich. He spent a considerable portion of his life in Eastern Europe in the province of Bucovina. This community would find itself under one national government at one time, a different national government in another decade, and a still different nation with its particular federal law in another fifty years. Ehrlich noted

that the different positive laws which came down on this local community from the rival national capitals did not alter the behavior of the people. They went on marrying, inheriting their property, carrying on their social lives under the same rules as before. This observation caused Ehrlich to distinguish "the positive law" from "the living law," where by the former he meant the legal constitutions, statutes and institutions and by the latter he meant the inner order of the daily habits of the people quite apart from the positive law.

From this distinction Ehrlich derived the following criterion of effective law: Positive law for settling disputes is effective only when the norms of its constitution and statutes are the norms of the underlying living law of the people to whom it is applied. It may be possible to get new legal norms passed as positive law, as the Prohibition Amendment indicates, but if the living beliefs, habits and values of a large group of the people do not correspond to the positive legal norms, the positive law will automatically break down. The problem of an effective international law is that, therefore, of so designing its positive norms that they draw upon the living law of the peoples of the world for its effectiveness.

We now have two points that we shall take for granted in what follows: *First*, that you never have a nation except as a people have a common set of trapped universals which define their way of relating themselves to one another economically, politically, militarily, religiously, aesthetically, and in every way; and, *second*, that legal institutions can be devised to settle disputes without resource to force, as they have been in domestic communities, if positive law norms for handling these disputes are supported by similar common norms in the living beliefs and habits of the people.

If we take these two points for granted and then turn to our world, I think we begin to see why both the League of Nations and the United Nations turned out to be so weak in practice in handling their professed aims. At San Francisco the foreign mini-

sters of the major nations in the world (including the major Powers) signed solemnly, with the parliamentary backing of their respective governments, the Charter of the United Nations, dedicating themselves to bring about freedom, economic well-being, health and peace in the world and to achieve peace by legal rather than by warful methods between nations. But the ink was no more than dry on that document before the foreign ministers of the four major powers met in London to agree upon a peace treaty for Germany. This conference, as you well know, broke up (General Marshall represented the United States).

A British newspaper observer commented on the breakup to the following effect:

> The discouraging thing about the breakdown of the recent Foreign Ministers' Conference was not that they failed to solve the problem — a peace treaty for Germany which they came together to resolve — but that they could not find common norms or principles for carrying on soberly a further discussion of the problem.

Events since then have amply confirmed the correctness of that English newspaperman's observation and judgment.

Why this breakdown, but a few weeks after the United Nations' Charter was signed, when there was an atmosphere of collaboration throughout the world including even the United States and the Soviet Union who had just come out of a tremendous collaborative effort which had defeated both Hitler's Germany and Japan? I believe that the reason is that both the League of Nations' Charter and the United Nations' Charter were based on a false positive law premise: the false premise that the trapped universal, "freedom," the trapped universal "economic well-being," and the trapped universal, "settlement of international disputes by peaceful means" has the same meaning for all the signatories of those treaties.

We know that this premise is false. When Mr. Molotov signed the Charter of the United Nations, the word "freedom" meant "a society built on Communistic principles"; "a peaceful settlement of disputes" meant "a settlement in which any nation that was granted a peace treaty would build a society on communist principles — and only communist principles." When Secretary of State Stettinius signed that same document for the United States, he read into the words "economic uplift" the following: "the organization of the economic life and society on the basis of a free capitalistic economy." When Foreign Minister Bevin approved the United Nations' Charter, officially representing the British government (which was then a Labor Party government), by "economic uplift" he meant: "the type of social and national organization that involves nationalized industry."

When, however, the four foreign ministers came together to sign the peace treaty for Germany, they had to come down from undefined, abstract nouns to face the question: To what economic or political groups are we going to turn over the German economy? The Soviet delegate would not sign a peace treaty for Germany that did not turn the German people and the German potential industrial power over to a communist regime. A few of the British at that time would have liked to have seen a socialized economy — although they would not have fought over this. We would have liked to have seen a free enterprise economy. You can imagine if our Secretary of State had committed himself to a nationalized, socialist economy for Germany that members would have stood up in the Congress of the United States and said: "The State Department is using American taxpayers' money to bring about socialism in Europe."

We therefore, see that the words "economic need," "economic aid" and "economic well-being of men" cannot be separated from a specific set of norms for solving the economic problem. One political party or one national group has one set of norms and another political party and another national group has a different set.

Furthermore, the London conference of foreign ministers made it clear that you cannot separate the military and the economic from the political. The movement toward European union and the European Defense Community have established this same point. I spent the last half of 1950 interviewing the major political party leaders of the six Continental nations in E.D.C. It came out very clearly then that the economic unification of Europe, known as the Schuman Plan, which is already in effect, will break down if E.D.C. does not go through. The reason is obvious: If E.D.C. does not go through, you are back in a power politics, bilaterally-arranged Europe. In such a Europe each nation must have absolute control of its steel and iron industries. This will break down the Schuman Plan because if each nation goes in for an autonomous national army it must have, if that army is to amount to anything, an autonomous coal and steel economy. This will mean that Italy will have to build steel mills, even though it is uneconomic to do so there. The whole Schuman Plan will go; in other words, the Schuman Plan will fail unless military collaboration is achieved. This shows, again, that you cannot handle the economic factor in society by itself. Many people say that the key to international relations is "economics." I think that the dependence of the European Coal and Steel Community on E.D.C. is disproof of such a contention.

Furthermore, it became clear in my interviews in Europe that there was not a chance of E.D.C. going through unless the political community went through. The reason, again, is obvious. I got it from Guy Mollet, the leader of the Socialist Party of France, which is the largest liberal party in the present French Parliament. (It is not the largest party in France — the largest one is the de Gaullist Right Party). He told me that the Socialists voted through the Schuman Plan one hundred per cent and that they would vote through E.D.C. — but only on condition that the political community went in simultaneously. The reason is obvious: The whole point of E.D.C., from the French standpoint, is to get German economic and military power under European control in-

stead of leaving it merely under unilateral, nationalistic German control. It is not going to do much good to have the Military High Command under European control if the politicians (who decide what is done with the military) are not under European control. This is why the Socialists — and I think most of the other French parties and leaders supporting E.D.C. — felt very strongly that they would not vote for military unification and collaboration between France and Germany unless there was political unification. It appears, therefore, that the economic and the military come down to the political.

Upon what does the political depend? The political turns around your over-all norms for ordering your social relations. Where peoples and nations do not have common, over-all norms, they will not trust one another politically. No people will vote away the control of their own domestic internal lives (the way in which they develop their economy — whether they do it with a free enterprise capitalism or with a nationalized semi-socialism, or with a complete, nationalized industry) to a supranational community unless they know that the community is going to be governed by the economic policies in which they believe.

This means, therefore, that if we are going to move toward a more effective international law we must give up the false premise that people mean the same thing by the word "freedom," the word "peace," or the words "economic well-being." We must realize we are living in a world in which the living law of different people is based on different sets of normative ideas. In other words, they are guiding their overt social behavior with different sets of trapped universals.

One of the major mistakes in thinking about the Soviet Union, and one of the things which has done as much as anything else to corrupt allied collaboration to stop it, is the theory that we are dealing with nothing more than an old-fashioned imperialistic power; in other words, one of the major causes is the neglect of the *ideological* factor. Admiral Stevens is one who has seen

this point and has emphasized that the international situation is far more serious than many people suppose, not merely because the United States and the Soviet Union are two major powers in it, but because of the specific ideology, the set of trapped universals, that define the communist concept of proper living law and proper positive law.

In the old Europe we have had in history many opposing powers — even powers with an imperialistic urge. The present situation, however, is different from this. In the old Europe those conflicting powers — France, Germany, Great Britain — had a common living law civilization. They all came out of a Christian civilization; they all accepted the rule of law; they all operated most of the time with a many-party political system instead of a one-party dictatorship, and they were all interconnected through their royal families in intermarriage. So there were certain rules of the game which, even if one got into war, one could trust because all the parties accepted those rules of the game. The military had respect for one another, even when they were fighting one another, because they knew they had a common code. Of course there are exceptions to this, but, on the whole, that was roughly the case.

Furthermore, even the most imperialistic of the traditional military powers never, due to its own ideology, regarded itself as having the moral commitment and the historical destiny to take over the whole world. Great Britain in her heyday never attempted to take over the whole world. She got a good piece of it and with that piece was able to be the dominant naval power and to control the situation. But never did she feel herself driven by her own internal ideology and morality to take over the world. Further, Great Britain in her own ideology taught herself, as she taught us in this country, that in the long run there is not really any good government that is not local self-government. Thus it was of the very essence of British imperialism that it would give up that imperialism in the end, as it did in India. You cannot fol-

low British political theory, as we have done and as Great Britain herself has done, and not stand for the position that when a native people acquire the power to run their own affairs in a modern way they have got the right to run them, themselves, and not have them run by a foreign power.

So power politics in the days of the old imperialism was one thing. The power politics in a world in which the Soviet Union and Mao's China are two of the major powers, with the two largest land armies on the surface of the earth, is a quite different thing because of the nature of the trapped universals that define the living and positive laws and the morals and ideas of any Communist society. This ideology has two points: *First*, ideas are secondary to matter; ideas are really the effect of body (this is their *materialism*). This means that morals are rooted in power. I do not think that is true of the British imperialism for the reason which I have just given: that morals are rooted in the freedom of the individual and the right of the individual to run his affairs himself when he has the competence, the wisdom and the learning to do so. This is what sobered the British Empire. It is what kept the British in their empire from running that Empire into the ground. It enabled them to really welcome U. S. independence in a way and to blame their own leaders for being so stupid as not to grant the U. S. the right to self-government and perhaps keep this country in a Commonwealth. But to the Soviet Union, matter is what determines ideas; ideas go where body goes and where power goes. That is the first point.

The *second* point is this: It is a part of Soviet reading of history that history is governed by a *determinism*; that what men think, what men do, has nothing to do with where their society is going and where the course of civilization is going. They believe this is all set up by an absolute determinism, as rigid as that lower sequence of cortical neurons; that this determinism is such that it is in the very nature and root of Western civiliza-

tion and world civilization that the societies represented by the liberal democracies will generate internal contradiction which can be resolved only by a revolutionary resort to force which will achieve a communist state for the entire world. This is what we are up against.

This means, as Admiral Stevens has pointed out, that you are not going to achieve peace in the present world by merely getting the power to balance their power, because their ideology is such that they are always going to attempt to overdrive the other powers. If you are in a power-politics world alone, it would be just a question of balancing your power against theirs, or with a little more power; there would be no danger of them making a foolhardy judgment to go to war because they thought they could win easily. But when you have a nation governed by moral imperialism, when a nation's own ideology, its morality and its norms — for morals are defined by norms, the norms for ordering social relations — when those norms are rooted in what is called "dialectical materialism" and "dialectical determinism" this means that you are dealing with a nation which, according to its own sense of morality, believes that matter is the deciding factor and that destiny is on the side of its use of power.

This is where the neutralists go wrong — where men like my friends Pandit Nehru and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan of India go wrong; that is in thinking that the creation of a reasonable atmosphere is sufficient to bring peace with the Soviet Union. A nation whose morals are rooted in the concept that ideas go where power goes and where matter goes is only going to be reasonable if it is confronted with power. But power alone is not enough! Combined with their ideas of the role of power is their theory of history, which is, paradoxically enough, an idea — the idea that they are destined to take over the world. They would be traitors to their own morality if they believed it were proper to create a power-politics, balanced equilibrium that would give peace over the long run. Indeed, they would be betraying their own idealism if they accepted such a policy.

This means that because of the very nature of the trapped universals that define the ideology of any communist power we must not only meet them with power, but we must also meet them with a positive ideology and program. To my mind, one of the things that makes the present mood of the world so pessimistic with respect to the prospects of peace is that the communists have apparently won their game, diplomatically, of dividing the free world. So, instead of the communist nations being met by a united free world with a positive ideal backed with police power, they are met by a divided free world, each nation tending to revert to a go-it-alone foreign policy.

What possibility is there for recovering the morale of the free world? For, unless morale is recovered military power will not be effectively used. It seems to me that there are two positive ways. I shall have to state them dogmatically. (I have outlined them and given more detailed reasons for them in my book, *The Taming of the Nations*). The first way is to break from the basic premise that I believe is unconsciously underneath the League of Nations and the United Nations — the premise that all men have the same ideals and that all nations have the same ideals. We must honestly and unequivocally face the objective fact that the different nations of the world are building their social lives, their national unity, their economic institutions and their common law in terms of different sets of trapped universals. The communists use the Marxist ideology; the British Labor Party wants a semi-nationalized industry; the British Conservative Party stands for very much more action at the government level than either the Democratic or Republican Parties in the United States, yet at the same time insists on a free enterprise industry; France is divided into six political parties, no one of which has even a respectable minority, the largest political party being the de Gaullist Party with 118 seats of 627 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Hence, France can have a majority government only with a coalition (coalition governments are inevitably weak — they can only agree in their opposition to their enemies and they cannot put

through a positive policy because they do not agree in their norms for policy). This is the nature of the European world in which we are living.

Similarly, the whole Asian world has reacted against the West, throwing off Western imperialism. There is a movement throughout the whole Middle Eastern, Islamic and Eastern Asian world to root their institutions not only in the Western ways which they want, but also in terms of indigenous Islamic and Asian traditions and values.

It seems to me that the first positive step to get an ideology that can rebuild the morality of the free nations of the free world is to root this ideology in this plain fact of *living law pluralism* — in the fact that the Commonwealth nations of the British tradition want to root themselves in their British living law norms; that in India there is a Hindu religious tradition; that the Islamic world wants to build a modern state, drawing on their Islamic background, religion and law. This was the reason why British India had to be divided between India and Pakistan — the Muslim portions of India did not want their lives socially and culturally dominated by non-Islamic positive law in the national government.

I believe that for the world, as a whole, federalism is a mistake. An effective federalism is possible only between nations that have a common ideology and common norms. The world as a whole does not have common norms. The most we can hope for, therefore, so far as international law for the whole world is concerned, is a *confederation*. N.A.T.O. is an example of a workable alliance based on confederation. We have Islamic Turkey and Greek Orthodox Greece in it as well as Roman Catholic Continental Europe and Protestant Great Britain and the United States. This is workable provided the members going into the confederation will respect the right of each other party to build his institutions on ways other than one's own. If the members mutually guarantee that right, backing it with police power, such a positive international policy can build up the morale of the world.

I believe also that you can move toward a federalism of the nations with respect to certain specified powers in those nations where they have a common living law ideology. In *The Taming of the Nations*, I pointed out one case where I believed this to be possible. This is the Islamic nations. Two months after that book came out I had a letter from the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who was then the Chairman of the Pakistan Delegation to the United Nations, saying that he was in agreement with its conclusions. Two weeks later he announced the Pakistan-Turkey Treaty. I believe that is a workable alliance because both Turkey and Pakistan are Islamic nations trying to modernize and Westernize themselves. They have common problems, they have a common ideology, and they can trust one another and work together.

Thus it appears that legally, and from the standpoint of building the morale of the free nations of the world, there are but two practical things which can be done — and, again, both of them will take time. One is to build up an ideology for the world as a whole on the principle of living law pluralism — on the right of individual nations to build their institutions in the light of their own living law cultural traditions, and a guarantee of that right up to the point where they respect the right of their neighbors to do the same thing. This will permit the outlawing of aggression, while not requiring, for an effective international law, common economic, political, religious or cultural norms between the nations supporting it and protected by it.

In the case of nations like those English-speaking nations of the British Commonwealth, in the case of the Islamic nations, and perhaps in the case of the Buddhist nations of Southeast Asia, alliances — even a federation like the Continental European Union — would be possible. There, you can get stronger transfers of sovereignty from the member nation to the international community. The strength of a transfer of sovereignty from a nation to a supernation depends upon the strength of the common law of

the participating nations. Where nations agree in their political parties, their religion and their cultural traditions, it is possible to have a greater transfer of sovereignty from the national to the international group. Also military alliances of such nations will have greater strength. I believe, notwithstanding the present differences between the United States and Great Britain, that in the long run collaboration between these nations is going to work because our culture came out of their culture and our ideology, our political and economic theories came from the same sources as theirs. This gives us common norms and helps us, notwithstanding our momentary misunderstandings, to understand and trust one another.

To the extent that neither of these two conditions (world confederation on the principle of living law pluralism or alliances of peoples with common norms) is present, I think we must conclude that war is the likely outcome of the present world situation. If Dean Pound is correct in saying that there is no evidence for believing that disputes in any realm between men are settled by means other than force unless those disputes are brought under law — and if the two conditions for an effective international law have not been met— it follows, automatically, that we must keep our powder very, very dry.

BIOGRAPHY

Professor Filmer S. C. Northrop

Professor Northrop received his B.A. degree from Beloit College in 1915; his M.A. degree from Yale in 1919; and an M.A. degree (1922) and a Ph.D. degree (1924) from Harvard University. He studied abroad at the University of Freiburg, Germany; the Institute of Science and Technology, London; and Trinity College, Cambridge University, England.

In 1923, Professor Northrop joined the faculty of Yale University and was appointed Professor of Philosophy in 1932. From 1938-40, he served as chairman of the Department of Philosophy. For the next seven years he was Master of Yale's Silliman College. In 1947, he became Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law at the Yale Law School, while continuing as a Professor in the Department of Philosophy. Since 1947, he has been working in the field of anthropological philosophy under a grant from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.

Professor Northrop is the author of: "The Meeting of East and West," originally published in 1946 and in its eighth printing; "Science and First Principles," 1931; "The Logic of the Sciences and Humanities," 1947; "The Taming of the Nations," 1952 (for which he received the Wendell Wilkie Award, presented by the American Political Science Association).

THE CHALLENGE FACING THE UNITED STATES

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 25 August 1954 by
Professor W. W. Rostow

The challenge facing the United States is, in its essence, simple: can we prevent the enemy from fulfilling his intention? His intention is to drive the United States from power and influence in Eurasia; to isolate the United States on this Continent; and to deal with us in his own good time from the preponderant base he would then control.

Is the enemy making progress towards his goal? I believe he is making important progress.

What do we see as we look about the world?

The enemy has apparently developed a capability to threaten the United States with grievous damage; and he has put himself in a position to blackmail our virtually defenseless allies with atomic attack and national destruction.

One of our major allies — France — has accepted terms of limited defeat from Communist China, thus exposing for infiltration or worse a major strategic area embracing India, Burma, and Indonesia.

At just this moment the governments of those three vulnerable countries show signs of rejecting our world leadership and of seeking terms of accommodation with Communist China.

Japan, the Free World's major power base in Asia, is wracked by a chronic economic crisis, which rules out for the time being her assumption of appropriate responsibility — political and military — in Free Asia.

In the Middle East and in Africa conflicts long latent threaten to erupt, which the enemy has the intent and the capability to exploit.

In Europe, E.D.C., the mutual defense system we have long sought as an essential condition for European unity, seems on the verge of abandonment.

And finally, despite recent efforts, it is clear that the governments of Great Britain and the United States — inevitably the core of such Free World unity as there is — view this series of circumstances with different eyes and find the greatest difficulty in making common cause from day to day.

The unfavorable turn of events abroad in recent months has set in motion here at home an understandable but dangerous sense of frustration and hurt feelings — a tendency to blame our allies, who are indeed not blameless, and to look to more national solutions to our security problem. We are, as a nation, a bit disheartened with the policy of Free World coalition. This is reflected in American words and deeds abroad which push our allies further from us. And so, with a sharpened sense of vulnerability and fresh doubts of American purposes, they look weakly and somewhat pathetically to Moscow and Peking for amiable gestures which, costing nothing, are not denied them.

It is not too much to say that the designation of the United States as leader of a Free World may become an empty figure of speech if recent trends persist. We are threatened with an isolation brought about not by our own conscious decision but through an interacting process, involving in part the rejection of American leadership by our allies, in part the turning of the United States away from a coalition policy. Our feet are on the road — not far, but on the road — to becoming an awkward island off the mainland of Eurasia, thus fulfilling the basic intention of Moscow and Peking.

The enemy's challenge is not only real and immediate; it strikes at the heart of our national interest and our national security. Our national interest is to preserve and to develop in this republic a society based on the fundamental principles of individual freedom within the range permitted by government by consent. Our job is not merely to protect the handsome real estate which is our physical base; it is to preserve the still developing way of life which is the heart and meaning of America. Military means are, of course, absolutely essential to protecting our society; but if we are driven back to island status in a hostile totalitarian world much, if not all, of our national interest would quickly be lost — even without military defeat. Our kind of open society demands an environment of open societies about us, notably in a world of modern communications and modern weapons.

These are, then, my fundamental propositions: we are challenged by an intent to drive us from Eurasia; the enemy is making important progress in this direction; and this is a mortal challenge for the United States.

The general challenge we face has three specific dimensions: military, political, and economic. I shall deal briefly with each in turn.

The military challenge comes to this: can we prevent the enemy from expanding his area of power in an age when he, as well as ourselves, has atomic weapon delivery capabilities sufficient to damage or to destroy whole societies?

It should have been clear from the beginning in 1945 that atomic weapons would constitute a transient and limited contribution to the security of the United States. It should have been clear that if we developed such weapons our potential enemies could and would also develop them. Atomic weapons carried with them a threat for the United States new in our history, new at least since the war of 1812; namely, that our enemies could inflict directly upon us grievous damage. It should have been clear that future

major wars, if they came, would not be fought wholly on the territory of other peoples. In any case, it is now abundantly clear that the United States must live in a world of physical danger and insecurity, at least until effective disarmament is installed on a world basis.

This does not mean, of course, that our atomic weapons are unimportant to security; nor that the degree of our danger is wholly outside our control. There is much to be done.

The maintenance of atomic weapon delivery capabilities of the kind we now apparently have can deny to any enemy not bent on suicide his ability to use them against us. The maintenance of this capability is not a static thing. The weapons, the means of their delivery, the means of defense are under constant development and change.

Until the very day — until the very day — when effective international controls are installed we must maintain our ability to deliver overwhelming national disaster on our enemies and we must minimize his ability to damage us and our allies. This is an endless job in the world in which we live — a job not merely of allocating money and producing gadgets, but a job for creative scientists. And we must take great care that their contribution is woven positively into the tasks of national defense; for it is the essence of atomic weapons and their delivery that our capabilities are not a simple function of our steel capacity or of our industrial potential in general. They are and will remain a function of the best creative and original scientific achievement we can bring to bear on highly specialized tasks. We can maintain our capability for the long pull only if we recognize this fact and avoid technical complacency.

But a successful counter to our enemy's atomic weapon delivery capabilities is the beginning not the end of the military security task. Our enemy has noted that we have come to regard atomic weapons as our main strength. Just as the Russians worked

around, blunted, and defeated Hitler's main strength — his ability to penetrate Russia with armored divisions — so they are seeking to work around our atomic weapon delivery capability: by diplomacy, blackmail, subversion, and limited military operations which afford neither satisfactory atomic weapon targets nor a political setting in which we can find it possible to launch a direct attack upon the centers of Communist strength.

Here, then, is our major unsolved security problem: within the framework of our atomic weapon delivery and defense capabilities, how can we develop the forces to frustrate and ultimately to dissipate the threat presented by the Soviet and Chinese Communist power?

As I shall try to indicate later, this problem has absolutely essential political and economic components: but it has a technical military side which deserves the most creative thought we can bring to it. Here, as I see it, is the military position:

> *First*, the enemy is extremely anxious to avoid the application to his structure of our weapon delivery capabilities. They carry to him a peculiar threat, not duplicated in the United States. These weapons threaten the continuity of his rule over his existing bases. With will and leadership our society could re-erect itself after atomic attack. The continuity of Communist rule in Russia and China is threatened by such attack. This is a potential source of strength to us in the test of will with which we live.
>
> *Second*, while the United States wishes to avoid atomic attack, it must and should be prepared to face it rather than surrender. But our major allies in Europe and Asia, less protected than ourselves, will go to the greatest lengths to avoid such attack. It is a blunt truth, which we had better face quickly, that "massive retaliation" is incompatible with coalition stra-

tegy and perhaps incompatible with the maintenance of American power and influence in Eurasia, if — I repeat if — it is the sole foundation of our military policy.

Third, we must, therefore, find ways of coping with the enemy's challenge by means short of our ultimate weapons, if our aim is to maintain our coalition and to stay in Eurasia. We must avoid situations where the enemy's limited aggression in Eurasia can only be met with our ultimate weapons, and the citizens and governments of the Free World in Eurasia are openly or covertly blackmailed into accepting limited defeat, rather than permitting us to use those weapons.

Fourth, as I said a moment ago, in the last analysis we must be prepared to confront the enemy with superior relative delivery capabilities, as a deterrent, and to fight and win a war with the ultimate weapons — if necessary on a bilateral basis — should his irrational action detonate a war.

Let me state this as plainly as I can. It would be a disaster to the American interest if we now took the view that we must simply prepare for the ultimate war; step by step this position leads to our isolation on this continent; that is it leads to the achievement of the enemy's objective. It would equally be a disaster if we did not maintain the capability to fight such a war to victory; for we could be bluffed to defeat or actually defeated. We must bend our energies to coping with the enemy's military threat by means short of ultimate war, holding our coalition together, holding the balance of power in Eurasia, while still maintaining a framework of superiority in delivery capabilities in the ultimate weapons.

What, specifically, do I mean by military means short of our ultimate weapons? *First*, in Europe, sufficient tactical strength — ground, naval, and air — to rule out a Soviet Blitzkrieg to the

Channel. I cannot pretend to full knowledge of the capabilities position in Western Europe; and I make the following observations with some reserve. But I do profoundly believe that Western Europe and the United States have the manpower and resources to construct and maintain an effective screen against Soviet ground strength; for that strength in Central Europe has grave limitations as an offensive instrument. It is far from its production bases; its supplies must pass through territories which would demand in war enormous troop allocations to assure lines of supply; Eastern Germany is, from Moscow's perspective, a forward base subject to dangerous flanking operations from the Mediterranean. This is no news to you. I would simply emphasize that the popular conception of a Soviet ground horde poised in Central Europe, beyond our capabilities to match or to contain, is not accurate. The problem of protecting Western Europe on the ground is a problem of will and purpose and, to some extent, a problem of economic resources. It is not primarily a problem of overwhelming enemy capabilities.

Second, and probably more urgent, the Free World must develop in Asia notably, but elsewhere as well, new methods for coping with guerilla and other limited operations, where the enemy's troops are apparently not engaged. Such operations usually reflect — as in Malaya and Indo-China — a weak Free World political base. But we live in a revolutionary world, where rapidly changing societies may well be weak and vulnerable to the enemy's methods of aggression. It should be one of our basic purposes to prevent situations from degenerating to the point where guerilla and other limited operations can take effective hold. Nevertheless, we must be prepared to deal with them effectively, where they arise.

The challenge I put to you then — as professional military men — is the building of new techniques of limited warfare — including the limited use of atomic weapons — capable of containing the enemy's superior ground forces, just as our atomic weapon delivery capabilities contain his delivery capabilities; and of developing new techinques for dealing with limited forms of war-

fare, where these break out, as a result of the enemy's method of political subversion and guerilla operations, in weak areas of the Free World.

This policy of military frustration throws fresh burdens on to our political and economic policy. If I am right these burdens are inevitable; that is, we cannot sit back comfortably and rely on "massive retaliation", for in the present state of the world that means the acceptance of defeat, the acceptance of U. S. isolation. Just as I have a right to challenge you with fresh thought on forms of limited warfare, you have the right and duty to challenge the civilian to produce policies which will bind up the Free World effectively, maintain its political and economic health, and to avoid if at all possible the degenerate situations where military instruments must be evoked.

Nowhere is this view of the link between our political and security problems more clearly justified than in Asia. France and the Free World have suffered major defeat in Indo-China not merely because Soviet and Chinese arms crossed the Indo-China frontier. We have suffered defeat because France so conducted its political affairs in Indo-China that the peoples of that region would not rally to defend themselves against a Communist-dominated movement acting in the name of national independence. The Free World defeat in Indo-China was primarily a political defeat; and there will be no wisdom in our Asian policy unless we accept this fact. Nor can we blame this recent defeat wholly on the French. We backed with our money their Indo-China effort, knowing its weak political foundations, hoping for the best against our instinct and the facts. We had every reason to know from ample post-war experience that colonialism is an impossible base from which to fight Communism. We must not conceal our part in the common failure. If we acknowledge it maturely I am sure we can go on to build a policy in Asia which will serve our own interests and those of the Free World.

I believe we can erect a united Free World policy in Asia because I am convinced that what the Asians want and what we want in that region largely overlap. By and large they want the time and framework of security to make good their freshly won independence in terms of economic development and domestic reform. Rightly or wrongly they interpret recent American policy as a negative obsession with the Communist menace; as a threat to the peace; and as a dangerous distraction from their own urgent tasks. To work with them we do not need to accept their sometimes myopic assessment of the Communist menace. We do need to align our energies and an increased margin of resources with the challenging tasks of economic and social transformation in which they are engaged.

Beneath the surface of recent events I detect an increasing awareness in Southeast Asia of the potential military menace of Chinese Communism. It is clearly reflected, for example, at the recent Ceylon Conference, and in Chou En-lai's reception at Rangoon. India and Burma have already exhibited a remarkable sensitivity to Communism within their countries, as well as an ability to deal with it. And I believe that, given time, they will make a sound assessment of the international menace represented by Peking. But this they must come to themselves. In the meanwhile we have a very great stake indeed in the success of their economic and social policies. India, Burma and certain other nations of the Far East are seeking to transform their societies into modern, growing nations by democratic political techniques — with the methods of consent — maintaining the concept of the integrity and inviolability of the individual human being.

Up in the North the Chinese Communists have launched an economic plan which seeks to reproduce on the Asian scene the transformation painfully wrought in the Soviet Union in Stalin's First Five Year Plan. It is being conducted in China with a human ruthlessness which matches its model.

The political and military future of Asia is likely to be determined at least as much by the relative outcome of the Indian and Chinese economic efforts as it is by the strictly military events of the next decade.

This does not mean that we should abandon the attempt to bring into being a collective military alliance in Asia, or that we should abandon our bilateral efforts to strengthen the effective military strength of Free Asia. On the contrary we need such an alliance and such bilateral undertakings, and the commitment to cope with a commonly understood danger which underlie them. It does mean that we should not confuse such military arrangements with a total Asian policy; and that we should be prepared to enlarge our co-operation with the developing areas of Asia, whether or not they are prepared now to join in a required military alliance, or in bilateral military arrangements with us.

Into such a sustained constructive effort the United States should be prepared to throw increased resources, increased technical and scientific skill, and perhaps most important, increased human understanding and moral support.

I might add that only substantial economic growth in Free Asia as a whole will create an environment within which Japan can solve its most serious balance of payments difficulties and attain the self-supporting status its great talents and energies deserve, and the development of its political and military potential demands.

The problems we confront in Asia differ only in degree and urgency from those we confront in the rest of the world. In the Middle East, in Africa, and on our own doorstep in Latin America the horizon of ambition of man and women has lifted. They want and expect for themselves and their children not merely increased material welfare but increased personal and national dignity. There is no doubt at all that historians of the second half of the twentieth century will mark as its central feature

this massive human awakening to the best — and sometimes the worst values of Western civilization.

Anyone who has had even a slight connection with our postwar affairs knows that this revolution in human expectation raises difficult day-to-day problems for American policy making. Revolutions refuse to behave like well-run corporations. There has been and there will be plenty of difficulty in the process of transformation now proceeding all around us.

But we Americans should welcome this transformation and align our national policy with it. For the combination of human dignity, national independence, and material advance which men and women now seek with increased vigor are precisely the things for which the United States has long stood and for which our society at its best still stands.

To align ourselves with the revolutionary transformations now proceeding will take more than an economic policy, more than money and technical assistance. We must take an active part in engineering the transformation towards independence in those areas where colonialism still exists. There are no easy and automatic formulas here, at least none I am prepared to back. Independence can not come everywhere tomorrow; and the job of making healthy free societies does not end with a formal achievement of independence. But the active weight of the American influence must be steadily directed towards hastening the process of responsible independence by peaceful transitional measures.

We must be energetic before grave crises are upon us in these revolutionary areas of the world. That is the true lesson of Indo-China. There are ample warnings in Africa and elsewhere which we should now be heeding.

Basically, we face in the Free World two economic problems; and the central task of U. S. economic foreign policy is to so marry these two problems as to make them mutually supporting assets.

One problem is that of the industrialized areas in the Free World, the problem of Britain, Germany, and Japan. They require expanding markets for their manufactured exports and expanding sources of foodstuffs and raw materials coming from places in which they can sell their own goods.

The second problem is that of the under-developed areas of the world which seek to develop and modernize their economies so that they can attain self-sustaining growth.

The answer, broadly speaking, is obvious enough. The underdeveloped areas must grow fast enough so that the Free World offers adequate markets for the industrialized countries; the underdeveloped countries must include within their development programs not merely new industries but enlarged output of goods which are needed in Germany, Britain and Japan; and the industrialized countries must provide the sustained flow of technical assistance and capital equipment to bring about this balanced growth.

In making such a partnership for balanced growth in the Free World the United States has a decisive role to play. It must generate and export increasing amounts of capital, both to accelerate economic growth in general and to increase the output in the Free World of the foodstuffs and raw materials the Free World's industrial areas require. It must continue unrelentingly the battle to lower tariffs and make the American market a more vital element in the Free World economy.

Specifically we must now launch and sustain a major new investment program in the Free World, and I mean an investment and not a give-away program. A large part of the growth problem does not depend on capital at all. It depends on the will of men to undertake new productive tasks; on their energy; on their technical ability; and on their managerial ability. We can contribute something substantial in these directions through technical assistance; but the job must take place basically in the de-

veloping areas. Beyond this, a sustained flow of U. S. investment capital could help mightily, both in itself and as stimulus to further efforts within the developing economies.

In order to justify a program of this kind we must bear in mind that economic foreign policy is not an instrument designed merely or even primarily to advance the American economic interest; although a foreign investment program of this kind is much to the nation's economic advantage. Its primary purpose is to help the nations of the Free World achieve that material progress which is essential for the highest purposes we share; human dignity, national self-respect, and the maintenance of societies worth defending.

Given the nature of the enemy's methods of infiltration and subversion, and the relation between economic progress and political viability in many areas, there is a direct and vital link between our military problem in its narrow sense and a program for economic growth in the Free World.

But what is the situation in the camps of our enemies? Is there any assurance that if the United States should now strike out along those lines that Communist military efforts could be frustrated and Communism itself defected in a political and economic contest? I believe there are ample grounds for such assurance.

In the Soviet Union, Stalin's successors are caught up in his heritage of over-concentrated power, a distorted economy, and a smoldering empire. There is powerful resistance among the generation of bureaucrats raised up by Stalin to accepting another all-powerful dictator. But they confront the dilemma of limiting the powers of the secret police over themselves without loosening the hold of the Kremlin over the restless Russian peoples.

Grave problems beset Soviet agriculture whose solution in fact requires that the stultifying framework of political and social controls over the Russian peasant be altered. Although Stalin's successors have publically exposed the problem of agriculture they

have not been prepared to take the profound steps required for its solution.

These men have on their hands the massive, wasteful system of forced labor, a monument to the momentum and vested interests of a police state at its worst. They know its costs; but to dismantle it would disrupt the system of rule they still operate, and challenge its basic power, precepts and methods.

They confront Stalin's heritage in the satellites as well. Moscow took each logical step towards total power in Eastern Europe; but now it faces the costs and dangers of its position as a universally hated occupying power, a technique of imperial rule notably insubstantial for the long pull.

Finally Stalin's successors confront the Russian peoples themselves, anxious for peace, anxious for material advance, anxious to have the burden of chronic fear lifted from them. These popular ambitions the Kremlin recognizes, but can not satisfy without changes in domestic rule and foreign policy it is still unprepared to make.

Stalin's successors have clearly been aware of the cost and the dilemmas Stalin's heritage has imposed upon them. And the symptoms of this awareness have impressed many European observers of the Soviet scene, notably Sir Winston Churchill, who spoke of them recently on his trip to Washington.

It is certainly heartening to observe that history has not stopped in Russia; and to be able to demonstrate with precision that monolithic totalitarianism creates grave long-run problems and dilemmas by the very techniques which impart a surface of implacable strength in the short run. And I believe our national policy should seek to exploit and to consolidate any substantive possibilities for easing tensions which may result from internal changes in the Soviet Union.

There would be grave danger, however, in assuming that these recent symptoms of change in the Soviet Union automatically will yield a solution to world-wide tensions. There are no signs whatsoever that the changes wrought by Stalin's successors are as yet more than superficial.

They have not in fact decreased the allocation of resources to military purposes and heavy industry.

They have not in fact altered the police techniques of control over the Russian peoples.

They maintain an imprisoned agriculture, embracing fifty per cent of the population.

The modifications in the forced labor system have thus far been minor.

The realities of Moscow's total control by armed force over the satellites remains beneath the surface of new policy gestures.

Moscow and Peking talk much of increased East-West trade; but there is not the slightest evidence that they are prepared to restructure their economies in order to expand such trade significantly and without such drastic reorganization they simply do not have the capacity to trade on a substantially increased scale with the rest of the world.

Communist China is a somewhat different case; although the same broad conclusions hold. The men who now rule the China mainland are confident, ruthless, ambitious for indefinite expansion of power and prestige in Asia. They are in a mood nearer to Stalin of the 1930's than to the uneasy middle-aged bureaucrats who now rule in Moscow.

The system of centralized power that Peking has clamped on the Chinese people guarantees intimate control in the short run. But the Chinese Communists confront two great problems. First, it is doubtful that the Soviet technique of indutrialization after 1929, based as it was on a rich surplus agriculture and an industrial heritage left from tsarist times, can produce the results the

Chinese Communists seek on the Asian scene. Communist techniques in Russia caused a 20% fall in agricultural output in the First Soviet Five Year Plan. This resulted in millions of deaths; but Russia's natural food surplus mitigated the crisis. Such an outcome in China would constitute a human disaster which would shake the control system erected by Peking and damage if not destroy the image of leadership the Chinese Communists seek to project out on Asia.

Whether or not a disaster of this magnitude comes about in China in the next decade it is clear that the regime has succeeded in alienating the 80% or so of the Chinese people who are peasants; and it has damaged the incentive to produce from the soil on which all else depends in China.

Second, the Chinese Communists are caught up inextricably in the fate of Asia. They are not isolated, like the Soviet Union after 1919. They must either make good their pretensions as the ideological model for Asia, and its major power, or they must fall.

Here is the Free World's challenge and opportunity in Asia. There is no reason why the united Free World can not produce more substantial material and human progress in Free Asia over the coming years than the Communists can in China. Such an outcome could be expected to have profound indirect consequences on the China mainland, on Sino-Soviet relations, and on the worldwide status of Communism as an ideology.

In short, I know of no responsible analysis of the situation within the Communist Bloc which does not lead to this conclusion: a vigorous and united Free World has the material and spiritual resources to frustrate Communism's menace and outstrip its pretensions as a system for solving the problems of organized society in this century.

My reflections, then, are basically optimistic. The areas for action are open to us on this side of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. We have the resources, the talents, and the heritage

of ideas and idealism necessary for the task. I profoundly believe that the challenge facing the United States can be met with success.

The lines of action I propose carry, of course, a price tag — a substantial price tag: some several billions of dollars more each year spent and invested in the Free World and at home than we now budget for. Extra material resources alone emphatically cannot do the job; but they are probably necessary. Can we afford such substantial additional outlays? Of course we can. Our economy normally increases its capacity to produce by about $14 billion each year. At the moment, we have an unused margin of capacity of about $30 billion. If this regular margin plus this back-log is not enough — and it is almost certainly sufficient to meet the foreseeable challenge — we have larger margins of surplus consumption to fall back on than any society in the world. If we fail to meet the challenge, it will not be because we lacked the resources both to do the job and to maintain our high standard of welfare.

Do we have the will to do this job? Here each man must speak from his own sense of the nation and from private faith. I should merely say that there is nothing in our history out of the long or recent past to suggest that, when the facts are laid before the American people and vigorous leadership offered, we will fail to respond. I profoundly believe, once the trend of events is made clear, that it is not in the American temperament to accept the slow, only momentarily comfortable defeat the enemy plans for us. Our country was born as a symbol to the world of national independence and freedom ordered by individual consent. We are not yet ready to retire from a field where independence and freedom are the issues of combat.

Victory will not come without sustained effort. It will not arise from complacency, peevishness, or brooding over past errors. It will not come cheaply. It will not be hastened by attempts at shortcuts or by partisan slogans. It requires a united America maintaining a solid creative effort — military, political, and economic — for decades if necessary.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor W. W. Rostow

Professor Rostow received his A. B. degree in 1936 and his Ph. D. degree in 1940, both from Yale University. He attended Oxford University from 1936-38, and received an honarary M. A. degree from that institution in 1946. He also received an honorary M. A. degree from Cambridge University in 1949.

In 1941, Professor Rostow joined the faculty of Columbia University for one year as an instructor. He was Harmsworth Professor of American History at Oxford University in 1946-47, and Pitt Professor at Cambridge University in 1949-50. Since 1950, he has been Associate Professor of Economic History at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Professor Rostow's principal fields of interest have been modern economic and general history, the American diplomatic revolution, and the British economy of the Nineteenth Century.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books and articles listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

The listings herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting reading matter.

Many of the publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books is available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch of the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

Title:	*Realities of American Foreign Policy.* 120 p.
Author:	Kennan, George F. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954.
Evaluation:	Mr. Kennan has covered more material in this short book than is generally found in three volumes. He has presented the substance of a series of lectures delivered at Princeton University which includes a very articulate and forceful reassessment of American foreign policy. He scans briefly the historical foundations of United States policy and then plunges into the problems of today. The author spells out carefully the functions of government in foreign affairs, divides the world into two distinct segments and argues that the American fallacy has been to seek Utopia and to move blindly toward the accomplishment of one world. He states that there can be no peace with Russia so long as the Soviets pursue their drive for complete dominance. He further argues that containment and liberation are complementary, not alternatives, but that liberation alone runs the greatest risk of igniting global conflagration.

Title: *The Revolution in American Foreign Policy* 94 p.

Author: Carleton, William G. N. Y., Doubleday, 1954.

Evaluation: A thumbnail sketch of the international position of this country prior to World War II is followed by an excellent, concise unfolding of the revolution in foreign relations occurring after 1945. Portrays not only the changes in foreign policy during the past ten years but also the causes, significance and consequences of these changes. Professor Carleton has performed the amazing feat of concentrating the essential facts and forces that have shaped the international relations of the United States during the past ten years into less than 100 pages. It is very readable, a ready reference for orientation, and concisely shows how we got where we are in world politics — and many of the reasons why. Highly recommended as basic reading for the purpose of review, orientation, and a renewal of perspective for the revolutionary ten years after 1945.

Title: *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, vol. 1. 336 p.

Author: Mao, Tse-Tung. London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1954.

Evaluation: This is the first of a proposed five-volume set, based on a four-volume Chinese edition. It covers the most important writings of Mao Tse-Tung from 1926 to 1936. The scope of the writings and speeches is too broad to be briefed. But the plans, aims, strategies and beliefs of the Chinese Communist Party leadership are made exceedingly clear. Actions from the "First Revolutionary Civil War" through the "Second Revolutionary Civil War" are justified by almost the same thinking (and frequently in almost the same words) used by Lenin and Stalin in the U.S.S.R. Mao shows the same willingness to compromise strict ideology in the light of existing conditions which was typical of Lenin, and a similar ability to rationalize all actions to fit into the Marxist pattern. He appears, through his writings, to be a realist, recognizing the vast differences between China and other nations (including Russia), and advocating lines of action suited to the people, the place and the time — yet, with the ultimate end always in view. Anyone who holds any doubts concerning the character of the Chinese Communist movement should browse through this volume. "Agragarian Reform" disappears quickly — this is pure Marx-Lenin-Stalin skillfully adapted to China. Of particular interest to the military is an insight into Mao's thinking on "How to Study War" (pp. 175-187), and "On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism" (pp. 153-174).

Title: *Accessibility of Strategic and Critical Materials to the United States in Time of War and for our Expanding Economy.* 415 p.

Author: United States Senate. Minerals, Materials and Fuels Economic Subcommittee. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954.

Evaluation: A Congressional report on the materials that now — and will — control the United States economy in peace and war. A well-documented report of vital interest to economists and strategists, including naval officers.

Title: *France: Keystone of Western Defense.* 77 p.

Author: Furniss, Edgar S., Jr. N. Y., Doubleday, 1954.

Evaluation: Analyzes various factors which account for French attitudes and actions in international politics. First, are discussed French anxieties and the internal factors which tend to keep such anxieties in the fore; then, quite logically, the economic, military and political conditions, and the loyalties of the French populace and their leaders. The book gives an answer to most of the questions which arise when trying to figure out what motivates and implements current French policies. In brief, it is an excellent source of information to acquaint one with French political motivations, both national and international.

PERIODICALS

Title: *For the Defense of Europe: A New Approach.*

Author: Kennan, George F.

Publication: THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, September 12, 1954, p. 7, 68-69, 71, 74.

Annotation: Analyzes the failure of E.D.C. and proposes a way to secure Germany's contribution to Western defense without alienating France.

Title: *What Atomic Disarmament Means to NATO.*

Author: Gruenther, Alfred M., General, U. S. A.

Publication: VITAL SPEECHES, September 1, 1954, p. 676-679.

Annotation: An address on NATO that includes an outline of the philosophy of war being studied at SHAPE and the place of atomic weapons in it.

Title: *Thinking Ahead.*

Author: Berman, Harold J.

Publication: HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, September-October, 1954. p. 147-158.

Annotation: Considers some of the obstacles that arise in the conduct and trade between communist and non-communist nations and suggests a policy of bilateral agreements which could give the West benefits of East-West trade without increasing the relative strength of the Soviet.

Title: *The Defense of Latin America.*

Author: Eliot, George Fielding.

Publication: AMERICAN MERCURY, October, 1954, p. 101-106.

Annotation: Deals with the lack of adequate defense for Latin America and tells what the U. S. is doing to help improve the military services of the region.

Title: *America Through Foreign Eyes.*

Publication: THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, September, 1954.

Annotation: The articles in this volume are concerned with general national images of the U. S. in foreign countries ("The Soviet Image of the U. S.," by Frederick C. Barghoorn, p. 42-51) and with the images of foreign students who have studied at American universities.

Title: *Let's Quit Talking Nonsense About the Cold War.*

Author: Baldwin Hanson W.

Publication: THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, September 11, 1954, p. 25, 155-156.

Annotation: Examines some of the phases currently in use and warns that acceptance of these generalities and half truths has a damaging effect upon our efforts in the cold war.

Title: *Can We Stop Communism in Africa?*

Author: Gunther, John

Publication: LOOK, October 5, 1954, p. 49-54.

Annotation: Briefly notes influences that favor the growth of com-

munism and those that militate against it and gives a concise statement of the situation in some of the key countries of Africa. (Map, p. 53).

Title: *The Strength to Win.*
Author: Finletter, Thomas K.
Publication: THE ATLANTIC, October, 1954, p. 48-53.
Annotation: Discusses revision of military planning procedures of the Department of Defense to provide a system of priorities for determining the size and composition of our Armed Forces.

Title: *The Adequacy of Our Present Defense Program.*
Author: Radford, Arthur, Admiral, U. S. N.
Publication: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, Release No. 899-54.
Annotation: An address before the Economic Club of Detroit, 27 September, dealing with our current defense program.

Title: *Russia Forging Trans-Polar Striking Force.*
Publication: AVIATION AGE, September, 1954, p. 16-23.
Annotation: Provides information on Russia's long-range bomber striking force, including the airbase structure, an estimate of strength and equipment in service. (Maps, p. 17 and 18).

Title: *Air Power and World Strategy.*
Author: Slessor, Sir John, Air Marshal.
Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October, 1954, p. 43-53.
Annotation: A noted airman takes an unusual stand with regard to the position of air power within the military establishments of the West. He maintains that a single weapons system strategy is foolhardy and that any military posture must be geared for any eventuality.

Title: *The World Since the War: The Third Phase.*
Author: Makins, Sir Roger.
Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October, 1954, p. 1-16.
Annotation: The British Ambassador to the United States makes his assessment of American and British policies in what he terms the Third Phase, characterized by the softening of Soviet Strategy. Sir Roger has taken a very objective approach to the subject of Anglo-American relations and their possible courses of action.