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## Psychological Warfare

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## **PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE**

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 4 November 1952 by  
*Captain Charles H. Smith, U. S. N.*

### **I—INTRODUCTION**

Admiral Conolly - Gentlemen:

I am truly delighted to have this opportunity—and this honor—of talking with you about Psychological Warfare, because I have no doubt that some among you will, in your next duty assignments, learn that this subject is receiving considerably more attention than it was receiving when you left your last duty stations.

The most proximate reason for this new attention is the simple fact that Joint War Plans now carry psychological warfare Annexes which require planning action at practically all military levels. This is the first time in our history that we are consciously and systematically developing in peace a readiness to conduct sustained psychological warfare operations during war. Further, these joint plans have a firm basis in national directives which provide that civilian and military effort will be coordinated. No one could fail to be delighted to know this if he were familiar with the melancholy history of confusion and disorder which has characterized our national psychological warfare efforts for at least two world wars.

There are, however, important reasons behind the fact that joint war plans will require some of you to plan and mount operations of a type you may not have encountered heretofore.

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Certainly not the least of these is that modern warfare has become total; it involves not only the man who fires the gun but every man and woman who can help build the gun or who can help make the man want to fire the gun; also, it is total in that full mobilization of dwindling material resources is necessary to build the gun. Therefore, military strategy must not only deal with overcoming the physical ability of the enemy to resist, it must also deal with the minds—to destroy morale—of whole populations in order that military victory is made with the least cost to us in men, money and materials.

Further, there has been a growing capability in the form of techniques and methods available to *influence* minds on a planned basis.

Additionally, there seems to be an ever-growing realization that force alone is insufficient to change the minds of man. Thus, if you have overcome the will of the enemy to resist to the point that he considers further resistance to be *useless*, you have won a military victory but may have lost the national victory if you have not also made him believe that further resistance is *needless*—that is, he now supports, or at least will not resist, your national objectives and will not find it necessary again to resort to war.

Finally, as the catalyst to all of the other reasons, there is the national awareness that we are engaged in a first-class ideological war with Soviet communism—a type of war which manifests itself in such ways as the fall of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade, the “Hate America” campaign, and the stalemate in the Korean armistice negotiations over the POW issue—to name just a few.

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All of these reasons in combination have produced an important statement of policy which states, in essence, that psychological warfare techniques are accepted instruments of national policy. This policy contains, it seems to me, two significant principles.

*First*, it develops and refines Clausewitz' well known statement that "War is a continuation of politics by another means." The NSC has said, in effect: "...psychological warfare techniques provide an additional way in which to conduct politics, both in peace and war; the U. S. government will no longer deal only with other governments but will, when our national interests dictate, deal directly with the people over the heads of their government."

*Secondly*, the NSC has recognized the principle that psychological warfare, to be effective, must be a *continuous* process. During peace it is, for psychological reasons, called a "Foreign Information Program" and the over-riding objective is to promote the understanding of U. S. objectives in order to assist in the effort that these objectives are attained without war. During war the process is called "Psychological Warfare" for want of a better term. There have been several attempts to develop a more descriptive term but those who have tried it are often reminded of the story of the Australian Bushman who got a new boomerang and then drove himself crazy trying to throw away his old one. We are thus stuck with the term "Psychological Warfare." In the post-hostilities phase psychological warfare gradually cycles back into peacetime Foreign Information as, for example, in World War II the military assets became the *Allied* Information Service, the *U. S.* Information Service and through several other names until its present name: The International Information Administration of the Department of State.

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### II—DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

As citizens, we are of course interested in both the peacetime and wartime application of psychological warfare techniques. As military officers, we have a naturally predominant interest in the adaptation of psychological warfare to military Strategy and Tactics.

However, I believe it would be entirely unrealistic to launch immediately into a discussion of the capabilities and limitations of psychological warfare to support military operations without first endeavoring to:

*Develop a framework* of reference against which my remarks can be judged:

*Touch upon* some of the peacetime effort now being conducted, both for its illustrative value and as a basis for outlining organizational relationships in peace and what changes occur upon a transition to war.

Otherwise, we both may not know—to use a <sup>maneuvering</sup> mooring board analogy—where we are and where we want to go, and thus might find ourselves in the same fix as a friend of mine who was the architect for the replacement of school houses in the Tennessee Valley Authority where this project was causing a wholesale relocation of towns, graveyards, roads and schoolhouses. Finding himself lost one day, my friend stopped in his auto to ask his way of a local mountaineer. After some discussion of how to make his way around flooded areas, blown out bridges and abandoned roads, the mountaineer said: "I'm telling you, Mister; if I was trying to get to that place I just wouldn't start from here."

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So this is where we start from, a definition of psychological warfare—

Psychological Warfare is the *planned* use, by a nation, of propaganda and related informational measures designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of enemy, neutral or friendly foreign groups in such a way as to support the accomplishments of its national policy and aims.

This definition appears in the Dictionary of Military Terms for Joint Usage. The underscoring of the word "planned" is my own, since I believe it to be a key word. Although there is no precise definition of "Foreign Information," I believe everyone would agree that there is no perceptible difference between Foreign Information and Psychological Warfare except one term applies to peace and one to wartime conditions. In none of my remaining remarks will I make any other distinction between them, but as a purely military term there are several points in this definition to be noted.

First, the target is not the body but the mind. Further, the target is not opposing psychological warfare forces as in normal warfare, nor is it confined to the minds of enemies but may include neutrals and friendly foreign groups. Psychological warfare is also unique in that psychological warfare forces have only limited responsibility for defenses against enemy psychological warfare. By that I mean: they do not shoot down enemy planes carrying leaflets nor conduct training and education programs to offset the effects of enemy propaganda, nor even disseminate public information to domestic audiences to counteract enemy claims. The only defensive measure which is a psychological warfare responsibility is counter-propaganda, which is as a rule to be avoided

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as it is purely defensive and usually provides the enemy with more ammunition for his offensive.


Now you may well ask: Wh<sup>†</sup> can psychological warfare do? It is of course impossible to analyze the capabilities of psychological warfare in the same way we would analyze the capabilities of Air Warfare or Undersea Warfare. The capabilities of psychological warfare are measured in terms of its capacity to convince. Further, it can only be analyzed in terms of a specific situation which defines *who* is to be convinced, *what* that audience now believes as against what you wish it to believe, *when* you wish the audience to commence performing *passive or active* deeds in response to this new belief, and *why* you wish the audience to set or behave in the planned manner.

Nevertheless, it is possible to develop a general concept of the capacity of psychological warfare to convince. I have attempted to portray such a concept graphically in Figure No. I

Briefly stated, the concept is that the four components of national power (Political, Ideological, Economic and Military) create in combination a psychological power, which, under the definition of *planned* psychological warfare, is latent and unknown until a psychological warfare operation creates a desired psychological effect through the sensory perceptions of a *selected* foreign audience. To expand on this briefly:

*Political Power*—To the foreign audience means WHAT WE WANT, as they understand it from our political history in such forms as the Monroe Doctrine, Truman Doctrine, North Atlantic Treaty, our international agreements to prevent the flow of strategic materials to the Soviets, and so forth.

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**FIGURE I**

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*Ideological Power*—Is WHAT WE STAND FOR AND BELIEVE IN. When you see a man in clerical garb you unconsciously or subconsciously form a mental image of what he stands for; responsibility as against irresponsibility, truth against falsehood, right against wrong, and so forth. It is so with a foreign audience when they form a mental image of America. It is the job of psychological warfare to assist in ensuring that the foreign audience thinks of the United States in terms of free speech, the dignity of the individual, freedom of religious worship, the right of franchise, and all that we hold dear, instead of in terms of race riots, crooked elections, etc., which the enemy would have that audience believe.

*Economic Power*—means our capacity and willingness to assist them by economic aid in attaining what we mutually want without jeopardizing what we mutually stand for and believe in. Insofar as the Marshall Plan has accomplished this, it is a successful use of psychological power; where the economic aid has been provided without due regard for the psychological factors, it has failed to realize its full potential.

*Military Power*—how we stand ready to defend and protect by force if necessary what we believe in and stand for. The measure of our readiness is not only the existence of so many guns, planes and ships but is at once a measure of our Political Power to seek and attract Allies, our Ideological Power in showing how firmly and strongly we believe in our own standards of civilization, and our Economic Power to provide the munitions necessary for victory.

The thesis of this concept is that the fundamental capability of psychological warfare depends upon two factors:

the inherent vitality and appeal of the four components of national power, and, the skill with which

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the strength factors are brought to bear against weakness factors in the enemy's psychological power.

If, for example, your ideological power is weak, you cannot sell it,—as the Nazis and Fascists found out. If, on the other hand, your ideological power is inherently strong, as certainly must be the case of Western Civilization, its strength may never be known unless, in the words of Saint Mark, you go forth into all the world and spread the gospel to every living creature!

Some examples of the current effort to “spread the gospel” in the form of psychological warfare will be found on display in your library—examples of both Soviet and American efforts in the strategic field, and efforts of both United Nations and Chinese communists in the tactical field in Korea. Most of this material is “WHITE” or overt—that is, the source is clearly identified. There are a few examples of “GRAY” in that there is no attempt either to identify or conceal the source. There are examples, insofar as I can be sure, of “BLACK” propaganda—that is, a deliberate attempt to have the audience believe the source to be other than the true source.

As cold pieces of paper I'm afraid they do not convey a full impression of either the quantity or quality of effort being applied. For example, reading the Soviet posters alone would certainly not lead to a concept that, by the use of psychological warfare techniques, the Soviets have parlayed the four components of their national power in such a way as to compel the United States alone to employ nearly a million of its Armed Forces in direct or indirect support of combatant operations without one Russian soldier being engaged.

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Nor do these displays indicate adequately the nature and extent of the U. S. effort. I therefore would like to ask you when viewing these displays to remember that the International Information Administration works in four functional fields.

First, the International Broadcast Service, or voice of America, which operates around the clock in 46 languages to over 100 countries.

Next, the Press and Publications Service whose daily wireless bulletins reach more than 100 million readers and which maintains libraries in 150 strategic localities overseas.

A Motion Picture Service in 40 languages is distributed to an annual audience of some 400 millions.

Finally the Exchange of Persons Program. Last year about 8,000 students, teachers, and other leaders participated in this program to let America be seen as well as heard. The theory behind this program is that the best 'missionary' to, say, Burma is a Burmese.

The IIA invites criticism and comment concerning their effort and if any of you have ideas as to how to assist in the Cold War write to the IIA or if you wish I shall be glad to forward them.

### **III—ORGANIZATION**

So far we have seen what psychological warfare is and developed a general idea as to what it can do and is doing. Before going on into the specifics of a war time situation I believe it is wise to take a brief look at the organizational framework within

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which the peacetime effort is conducted and what changes occur in organizational responsibilities upon an outbreak of general hostilities. I promise you it will be brief because I do not wish to be in the position a minister was when a little girl told him after church one Sunday that she liked his music but thought his commercial was entirely too long.

Perhaps the shortest way to do this is to take a hypothetical problem and trace it from its inception through the planning stages into actual operations in peace followed by war. Figure No. 2 will assist in following the course of events.


The extent and nature of wartime psychological warfare operations will depend of course on many factors which cannot be clearly foreseen at this time. One of these factors will undoubtedly be effected by the degree to which the Department of Defense has participated in the cold war. The degree of this participation has been undergoing an ever-increasing tempo of evolution and there is a growing awareness that the thousands of Americans in uniform abroad create a very considerable psychological impact whether we wish it or not. There is a recognized need for additional effort to be sure that this psychological impact is one which reflects and promotes our psychological power.

This is, it seems to me, a three-pronged problem. The most important part is one of education, training, indoctrination and leadership in order that the mass as a whole is made up of individuals who truly understand that he is an important cog in the machine devoted to winning the cold war. On this firm foundation there would be ample room for extension of effort within present policy and budgets by insuring that normal military activities are conducted with due regard for the opportunities to create favorable psychological effects without affecting the primary objective for

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FIGURE 2

*NOTE—The discussion of organizational responsibilities extended to a higher classification and is therefore not included herein.*

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which the activity was planned. Further extension of effort—that is, *planned* use of measures designed to win friends and influence people abroad—is expected soon as a result of effort being applied to strengthen the Department of Defense participation.

But no matter whether in peace or war, under whatever organizational responsibility, the need for *coordinated* and *sustained* effort is essential.

#### **IV—CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS IN RELATION TO MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS**

We can now turn to psychological warfare by military forces in war.

War is not a discontinuity in time for psychological warfare; War is merely an interlude in the conduct of politics, during which *MILITARY POWER* takes on an added significance in the minds of the foreign audience, without any reduction in the significance of the other three forms of national power. The fact of war intensifies the basic human motivation and emotions of hope, hate and fear. It is the duty of the military commander to exploit all forms of national power to affect these emotions in such a way as to assist in winning his military victory.

Before examining the tools and techniques a few cautions seem in order.

The first of these would be the recognized fact that it is not an easy matter to bring a person to change his mind. Even seated by your fireside over coffee after a mellowing dinner I doubt you would succeed in changing the mind of a confirmed communist—assuming he would listen! Since your psychological warfare audience is separated from you by miles of space there

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arises a definite limitation as to your capability to create an impression on his sensory perceptions. The perfect psychological warfare technique is mass hypnosis at a distance but even under those unrealistically perfect conditions we know that hypnosis could not prevail upon an individual to behave in a way to violate his basic sense of right and wrong. Therefore the appeals must be realistic to the intended audience. Some talk you may hear as to inciting certain groups to revolution borders upon a lack of realism comparable to that if the Soviets attempted to appeal to Southern States again to secede from the Union! Appeals must be in fact *appealing* to make any difference to the audience or we should be like the old ladies at the zoo who asked the keeper whether the hippopotamus was a male or a female and got the reply:

“Lady, I don’t know and I don’t see how it makes any difference except to another hippopotamus.”

A second caution is that psychological warfare is but an instrument of policy. It does not make policy, it supports policy. It is, as General Eisenhower said, “a tool in the arsenal of war which has earned its right to place of dignity.” This is not to say that it should not have a voice in forming policy, and I believe, for example the “Unconditional Surrender” policy of the last war might have been avoided if psychological warfare people had been given an opportunity to analyze its probable effects.

Another limitation is that psychological warfare is not adaptable to *all* military situations. As a rule it is better to concentrate available resources on exploiting *existing* psychological situations than to try to *create* them for exploitation. Fear of gunfire, for example, is most exploitable when the shells are falling around. Military officers by their training and experience are likely to say to themselves, “My boss says my job is psychological

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warfare—therefore I've got to do something." It could well be that the best advice might be: "Boss, this is the time we should keep our psychological warfare mouths shut." I would not, however, leave you with the idea that the "man-of-few words" type is the best psychological warfare officer because I'm reminded of an item in a news magazine:

"In Seattle Mrs. Jones applied for divorce on the grounds that her husband had only spoken to her three times in their married life. The Judge granted the divorce and custody of the three children."

And, finally, before we see some examples of the use of the tools and techniques of psychological warfare, it is necessary to narrow the field to manageable proportions under either strategic, tactical or consolidation psychological warfare.

Consolidation psychological warfare is the type we have conducted in Japan since the war and that the Soviets are still conducting in and toward the satellites. It is probably the most important of the three types because of its potential to make the military victory a lasting victory, but because it is so closely associated with Military Government—which is not of primary concern to the Navy—I shall not give any examples of the tools and techniques and merely observe that with a captive audience all of the tools and techniques of education and training—movies, television, lectures, posters, precept and examples—are available in this effort to "win friends and influence people."

The following examples of the use of tools are mostly confined to actual uses, although some remarks as to their future



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adaptability are permissible even though we have already said that the capability of psychological warfare can only be judged in a specific situation.

*Radio.* The "Commander Norden" broadcasts to the German submarine arm in World War II is a good example of strategic psychological warfare. Post-war analysis shows that these broadcasts over a period of nine (9) months from March 1943 were effective in lowering the morale of the U-Boat arm by creating doubt as to the strategy, tactics and effectiveness of the U-Boat campaign. Tactically, radio was used by the U. S. S. TEXAS in the Western Task Force off French Morocco as a part of a planned effort to induce the French not to oppose our landings, by voice broadcasts on the local wave lengths. The fact that it did not succeed does not mean the effort was not soundly conceived.

*Leaflets.* The use of leaflets has become so extensive that "leaflet warfare" is becoming almost an accepted term. Few people know—or knew then—that a Japanese soldier bearing a safe-conduct leaflet surrendered as early as August 1942 on Guadalcanal. At Okinawa nine million leaflets were used in support of the 6th Marine and 7th Army Divisions and analysis shows a direct relationship between surrenders and leaflet use. A good example of strategic use of leaflets is that in which the Japanese people were told—for the first time—of the fact that Japan was considering surrender by quoting the text of the Emperor's reply to an official note concerning terms of surrender. In Korea, over three billion leaflets have been dropped. We are now almost uniformly warning towns of bombing a day or so ahead, an hour or so ahead, and then after the bombing apologizing that it was made necessary by their leaders. Intelligence has shown the advisability of continuing this program.

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The use of leaflets is very adaptable to Striking Force Operations and Amphibious Operations, when the element of surprise is no longer a consideration. If, for example, carrier-based strikes are to be conducted over a period of three days and the target program for the second and third days involves "X" number of targets, damage potential could be enhanced by dropping bomb-warning leaflets on "X + Y" targets. Appeals to evacuate the "X + Y" targets would of course be based on our desire for humanness and the fact we did not hit all of them — just the "X" number—would lend credence to the theme. More explicitly the leaflet could say:

This factory is for war; let soldiers—not  
civilians—do the work.

Further, appeals for evacuation could be supported by news of important allied victories withheld by the enemy or by "comfort kits" containing needles, soap, fishhooks, vegetable seeds or medicines as an aid to more permanent evacuation or tied to appeals to help downed aviators to evade capture. The use of "safe conduct" leaflets in an objective area which is not likely to be the scene of any invasion could not help but cause some concern to the enemy and possibly cause redeployments of his forces. System effects might be produced by leaflets directing *non existent* guerrillas to continue in hiding to await the signal for uprising.

*Rumor.* Considerable strides have been made in research to determine the capabilities and limitations of rumor. It will always, I think, remain an art but it is at least approaching a science. Very generally speaking, rumor will be circulated in proportion to the importance of the subject to the individual and the ambiguity of evidence supporting or contradicting the rumor. Researchers are now even claiming that an analysis of the pattern of dissemination and distortion of the various types of rumor pro-

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vide excellent diagnostic tools for intelligence as to morale and predicted future behavior under the stimulus of selected psychological warfare techniques. It would appear that in a closed society like a communist police state where factual news is tabu, the use of rumor might find very fertile soil.

*News Sheets.* In that connection, straight news could be the very best psychological warfare technique. The Soviet "Hate America" campaign which is apparently now being turned toward the theme that American armed forces are bestial and will commit atrocities against prisoners is certainly to be borne in mind, because too many Japanese have told us of their infinite surprise at receiving humane treatment after capture. Tactical news sheets resulting in capture without resistance of German positions in World War II have demonstrated their applicability. They have particular applicability to the areas behind the beach head which contain a valuable source of civilian labor which we would like to see friendly instead of hostile when we have overrun.

*Posters.* Linebarger tells of an effective use of a VD poster in China. Knowing that the Chinese were about to evacuate a town and that the Japanese would occupy it, the psychological warfare team left behind VD posters—ostensibly addressed to the former Chinese occupants, describing in some detail the symptoms of VD, one of which was a burning sensation of the urethra. Also left behind was a considerable quantity of a diuretic in the drinking water and it is claimed that two Japanese divisions were thus placed—shall we say—hors-de-combat—for two weeks. This technique would not have occurred to a person who was not intimately familiar with his psychological warfare audience to the extent he knew of the preoccupation of the Japanese race with their bodily functions.

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There are many other tools and techniques—but my time is running out and I shall just enumerate a few.

Literature explaining how the sailor or the civilian worker can effectively feign illness.

Forged ration cards

Counterfeit money

False road direction signs

Soluble salt mines dropped at dusk but unsweepable because they melted in one hour.

Counterfeit orders such as posting on a reservoir “CONTAMINATED—DO NOT DRINK”—Signed by the Medical Inspector General.

And for its amusement valve I shall say that we have a letter which claims that the author can cause radio waves from two separated transmitters to modulate into voice in the air over troops—and thus be a panicky voice from the clouds!

To wind up on a more serious note, a few words on planning for psychological warfare.

The purpose of both strategic and tactical psychological warfare is to ensure that the psychological factors in a military situation are properly assessed in the Estimate of The Situation and carried forward for exploitation in the development of plans and operations subsequent to the Decision.

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In the Estimate of The Situation phase two things are needed. First, basic knowledge of the inherent and static motivations of the enemy which determine psychological vulnerabilities. This might take the form, for example, of a factor which would indicate that D-Day should not fall within a certain period in French Morocco, because you might thereby inflame an otherwise passive population because D-Day was one of the sacrosanct holy days of Moslems. Secondly, you need intelligence concerning specialized and dynamic psychological situations which are developing in the target area, such as food shortages, friction between military and civilian leaders, inadequate logistic support, etc., and which will be subject to exploitation *prior to* or after D-Day.

Once the decision is made, the planner must analyze three factors as a basis for psychological warfare operations. First, he decides on the basis of the factors in the estimate whether his available resources can best be concentrated on creating:

*Mass effects*—that is, psychological effects on whole populations or large segments of whole populations.

*Leadership effects*—that is, on individuals such as the political or military leaders at the seat of government or the commanding officers of naval units or the squad leader at the scene of an amphibious landing, or

*System effects*, that is, on the intelligence system, the police system, or the commanding officer—political officer system aboard a Soviet submarine.

As an example of what can happen in a system effect, think of what would happen if we arranged to have a document fall into the hands of the secret police in, say, Vladivostok giving a ren-

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devious for an unidentified Soviet submarine with wording indicating the submarine was contemplating defection. As a maximum we might look for Naval orders prohibiting submarines out of sight of land, with consequent reduction in operational training. As a minimum we could hope for increased surveillance of all submarines and probably increased prestige of the zampolit (political commissar). We could then "needle" them piously over the overt Voice of America calling attention to the general lack of authority of commanding officers.

A second key factor is contained in the "IN ORDER TO" phrase of the commanders mission. Psychological warfare must of course direct its effort to support the purpose of the military operation. If, for example, the operation is mounted in order to gain a base for future operations the psychological warfare planner must obviously think in terms of trying to assist in gaining a friendly population both before, during and after the invasion, and in terms of what the future operations involve. The customary annex containing the commanders "CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION" is a valuable tool in this respect.

Lastly, national policy must not be compromised. That is to say, you can make no promise in your psychological warfare output which is not in accord with expressed policy.

Two more statements of fact and I will have finished.

First, you should remember that all the facilities of State Department and the Army and Air Force are available as well as Navy facilities. There is ample authority, for example, for CINCNELM to request SAC to drop leaflets with naval themes in the Baltic area and the State Department to mount a weekly or daily radio program addressed to the Persian Gulf area.

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And finally, perhaps the most important of all, is:

**PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IS A FUNCTION OF COMMAND.** The Classic tests of suitability, feasibility and acceptability are primary tools for the exercise of this command function.

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### **Biographical Sketch of Captain Charles H. Smith, USN**

Captain Smith, whose home town is Albany, Georgia, attended Marion Institute for one year before entering the U. S. Naval Academy, from which he was graduated in 1932. His first sea duty was in the USS ARIZONA, in which he spent two years in various departments. This was followed by three years aboard the IDAHO and two years in the JARVIS.

After seven years of sea duty, Captain Smith was ordered to the Postgraduate School at the U. S. Naval Academy. This duty was interrupted by orders to recommission the destroyer CROWNIN-SHIELD.

Captain Smith later went to duty at the U. S. Naval Academy. He went back to sea as Executive Officer of the destroyer CHAMPLIN which took part in the Sicilian Invasion. He received the Bronze Star as a result of action in sinking a German submarine.

Captain Smith had four years in command of destroyers, participating in the invasions of Saipan, Palau, Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa in the Pacific, followed by duty in the Atlantic in support of occupation forces in Europe. For this service he was awarded the Legion of Merit with Combat "V".

In 1947-48, Captain Smith was in the senior class at the Naval War College. This was followed by two years in Washington with the Central Intelligence Agency. In November 1950, he assumed command of Escort Destroyer Division 21 in Norfolk, and proceeded with this division to the Korean theatre. After a tour of duty there, circumnavigation of the globe was completed by return to Norfolk via the Suez Canal. For his combat tour in Korean waters Captain Smith received a Gold Star in lieu of a second Bronze Star Medal.

In January of 1952, Captain Smith reported for duty in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, where he became the Director, Psychological Warfare Programs Division.

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