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CONTENTS

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U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

A Staff Presentation Delivered at the
Naval War College on September 10, 1952, by
Dr. William Montgomery McGovern

Admiral Conolly and Gentlemen:

This morning it is my duty and my privilege to discuss with you some of the major features of the United States Foreign Policy and to point out the historical development of some of these features.

By way of introduction, I think that it would be well to examine certain basic facts which have been determining factors in the development of all aspects of American Foreign Policy. The first of these facts is that the emergence of the United States as a major power has been a long, slow, and gradual process. The foreign policy of any nation must necessarily be conditioned by its relative strength and importance in the community of nations, and many of us are apt to forget that it is only in the last few years that America has been in a position to play an important role in world affairs.

By 1790 we had succeeded in firmly establishing our independence and our unity, but it was many decades before the United States had more than a minor role in the development of international relations. The founding fathers believed that America was destined to have little or no influence upon other nations; they hoped that other nations would have little or no influence upon us. For this reason they refused to establish a full time post of Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the President's cabinet. In its place they set up the post of Secretary of State and the conduct of foreign affairs was only one of the many responsibilities which originally devolved upon this official.

During the Napoleonic Wars the political and military importance of America was so slight that neither Napoleon nor his enemies made any serious attempt to secure American aid. While she was still struggling with the Napoleonic colossus, England felt perfectly free to engage in a war with the United States—which to her was relatively insignificant.

In 1823, it was generally thought that there were only five major powers in the world; namely, England, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia. No one was willing to concede that the United States ranked with any of these nations. In that year, to be sure, we enunciated the Monroe Doctrine—but let us not forget that at that period we had no armed forces capable of backing up this doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine was an expression of wishes and ideas rather than an embodiment of a policy which we were in a position to enforce.

By 1871 the United States had come up considerably in the world's estimate. The War Between the States had shown that Americans were capable of carrying out large scale military operations and that they were fully abreast of the latest developments in the science of naval warfare. The conclusion of this war showed, moreover, that America was destined to remain a single political unit, but no one ventured to suggest that the United States had become a world power. At this time the world powers were listed as England, France, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.

In a general way we may say that the rise of the United States to a position where it was recognized as a major power took place during the decade 1890-1900. A small but significant development took place in 1893, during Cleveland's second administration. Up to this time our highest diplomatic agents abroad had

only the rank of Minister. In that year America gave to some of these agents the rank of Ambassadors Extraordinary and Ministers Plentipotentiary. At that time this rank was accorded only to the diplomatic representatives of major powers and the very fact that some American agents were given this rank was a clear indication that the United States government was determined to play a significant role in world affairs.

The year 1895 marked another major development in American Foreign Policy. In that year Olney, the American Secretary of State, sent a sharp note to the British Government in connection with the boundary dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela. Up to that time our famed Monroe Doctrine had been implemented not by the American, but by the British navy, with the natural result that this doctrine had never been used to the serious disadvantage of British interests. In 1895, however, we told the British that they must arbitrate their claims against Venezuela, and that we ourselves would serve as arbitrators. For some weeks there was serious doubt as to whether the British would or would not accede to our demands. But just at this time England became seriously involved in South African affairs as a result of the Jameson Raid. The German Kaiser sent a famous telegram to the President of the Boer Republic, and this telegram seemed to indicate a serious potential threat to England's position both in Africa and in Europe.

As a result of this development, the British eventually came to the conclusion that this was no time to alienate American sentiment. Not only did they accede to the American demands, but they withdrew their fleet from the Caribbean, and let it be known that henceforth they were willing to accept American leadership in matters affecting the Western Hemisphere.

The next major development of American prestige took place as a result of the Spanish-American War of 1898-99. Although Spain had long since given up her claim of being a first class power, America's easy and overwhelming victory over Spain's military and naval forces attracted the attention of the world to the growth of her own political and military power. The fact that we secured not only Puerto Rico but also the Philippines was an indication that our interests and our influence was no longer confined to the Western Hemisphere, but extended to the Old World as well.

Another small but significant development took place in 1906, during the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. By this time we were dominant in the New World and were an important factor in Asia, but so far we had been careful not to become involved in Europe and in Africa. In 1906, however, the great European powers decided to convene a special conference at Algeciras in an attempt to solve several important problems, among them the status of Tangier and Morocco. Theodore Roosevelt thought that it was high time to have the United States present at such conferences, and somewhat grudgingly the other powers agreed to the admission of an American representative.

By 1914 every one was willing to admit that the United States was worthy of being counted among the major powers, but most foreigners continued to regard her as the weakest and the least important of the major powers. The events of 1917 and 1918 brought about a great change in this general estimate. It was clear to all that America had rendered valuable aid to England and France in the struggle to defeat Imperial Germany. But it still made the English furious for an American to declare that America had won the war. The English were perfectly willing to admit that the

United States was the equal of Great Britain, but they refused to admit that America was superior in either power or prestige.

World War II brought a great change with respect to America's position as a world power. The English were now frank to admit that they would have been hopelessly crushed had it not been for American aid. It was clear to all impartial observers that France recovered her independence and that Russia was saved from defeat only by the weight of American arms. By the end of World War II it was obvious that the old concept of the Concert of Powers had gone down the drain. Germany, Italy, and Japan had gone down in total defeat. England and France could claim to be only second or third class powers. Only two world powers remained—the United States of America and the U. S. S. R.

I have stressed the growth of America's political and military power merely because I want to bring out the point that America's foreign policy has necessarily been influenced by this growth. A foreign policy that was good for the weak America of 1820 would obviously be ill suited for the strong America of 1952.

Before leaving the subject of America's strength, I think it highly advisable to remind you that in many cases "pride goeth before a fall." It is quite true that the United States is now a major power; in fact, it is now one of the two great world powers. At the same time we must remember that there are many severe limitations on what we can hope to accomplish in international affairs. Our strength is great, but it is not nearly as great as we are sometimes apt to imagine. We are a first class power, and China is surely no more than a second class power, but events in Korea have shown even a second class power is capable of becoming a formidable obstacle to the carrying out of our objectives.

Another basic fact which influences all aspects of American Foreign Policy is the ambiguity which exists as to who does and should make this policy. In many cases there is a wide disparity between theory and practice on this point. If you read the Constitution you will find one thing; but if you take the trouble to analyze actual facts you will find a very different situation. The Constitution expressly declares that the right to declare war rests solely with Congress. Theoretically, the President has nothing to do with the matter—yet we all know that in actual fact the question of whether we do or do not go to war rests with the executive branch of the government.

It is generally agreed that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the right to dispose American troops where he pleases, and we are all aware that in certain cases the disposal of our troops will necessarily lead to the commencement of hostilities with or without the consent of Congress. Time and again, by Presidential order, American troops have been landed in Central America and in Caribbean countries and have proceeded to overrun the whole area without the formality of prior declaration of war by Congress. More striking still is the fact that for over two years we have been engaged in a desperate armed struggle in Korea—a struggle which has resulted in well over a hundred thousand American casualties, but which can not legally or technically be called a war because there has not been a formal declaration of hostilities.

We find a similar disparity between theory and practice when we come to analyze how treaties are made. The Constitution provides that treaties shall be made "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." From the very beginning one part of this clause has been inoperative. Once and once only did a President

attempt to secure the formal advice of the senators before trying to negotiate a treaty. This took place during Washington's first administration. The attempt was thoroughly unsatisfactory. The President became annoyed and the senators became disgruntled that their advice was not taken. Thereafter, all Presidents have deemed it unwise and inexpedient to ask the Senate for any formal advice before undertaking diplomatic negotiations.

It is still necessary for the President to secure the consent of the Senate before any treaty can be formally ratified. In fact, for the treaty to be valid it requires the consent of two-thirds of the members of the Senate present and voting. This in turn has led to endless complications. All the senators are fully aware of the enormous importance of treaties in our constitutional system. A treaty overrides and may well nullify all ordinary acts of Congress. The terms of a treaty rank with the Constitution itself as the fundamental law of the land. For that very reason the Senate has been rather cautious in consenting to proposed treaties. Because of the development of party politics and the development of divergent sectional interests, Presidents have frequently found it impossible to secure a two-thirds majority of the Senate in favor of treaties which they have negotiated.

To get round this difficulty in recent years our Presidents have made a practice of concluding "executive agreements" with foreign nations in lieu of formal treaties. In fact, some of our most important commitments abroad have been the result of such executive agreements rather than the result of treaties. Some of these executive agreements have subsequently been ratified by simple majorities in the Senate and in the House of Representatives. But in many cases very far-reaching executive agreements have never been brought before Congress at all and represent commit-

ments solely by the executive branch of the government acting on its own responsibility. To cite only a single example: the famous exchange of destroyers for bases inside British territory was the result of an executive agreement that never received the ratification of either the Senate or the House of Representatives.

It is clear that in recent decades the executive branch of the government has tended to play an ever greater role in the conduct of American Foreign Policy, a role far greater than that envisaged by the founding fathers who framed the Constitution. We can not, however, be content with so simple a statement. It is necessary to analyze what we mean by the term "the executive branch of the government." Normally, of course, this means the President of the United States acting as the chief of the executive branch of the government. It is certainly true that many Presidents have been strong personalities and have exerted a direct and personal control over American Foreign Policy. This was certainly true both of Theodore Roosevelt and of Franklin D. Roosevelt. In certain cases, in fact, we find that the President himself really assumes the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of State and the nominal Secretary of State is little more than an administrative assistant. This was undoubtedly true of the relationship between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Mr. Stettinius.

In other cases it is not the President but the Secretary of State who plays the dominant role in the carrying out of American Foreign Policy. During President Monroe's administration it was not the President but his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, who tended to formulate the foreign policy of the United States. In like manner, during President McKinley's administration it was not McKinley but his Secretary of State, John Hay, who laid down the basic pattern of our relations with foreign powers.

Even more interesting and important is the fact that in several instances our foreign policy has been dominated, or at least strongly influenced, by persons completely outside the State Department. Students of history will remember that in the early days of the American Republic Alexander Hamilton, though nominally only the Secretary of the Treasury, played a major role on the formulation of our foreign policy—in fact quite as important a role as Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of State. In modern times another Secretary of the Treasury, this time Mr. Morgenthau, was able to exercise a very strong influence upon certain phases of our foreign policy. I refer, of course, to the so-called Morgenthau Plan, which for a time was adopted as a basis for our relations with Germany in spite of the sharp opposition of most State Department officials to this plan.

Another marked peculiarity of American Foreign Policy is the fact that at various times this policy has been formulated by persons who were not in the Cabinet at all; in fact by persons who occupied no official position. Most of us can recall the enormous influence over our conduct of foreign affairs that was exercised by Colonel House during the administration of President Wilson. In more recent times it is certainly no secret that during World War II Mr. Harry Hopkins, merely as the personal confidant and agent of the President, was an all-important factor in the conduct of our foreign policy.

What I have said shows that there is considerable difference between the conduct of our foreign relations and that of some of the other major nations. In England, for example, the conduct of relations with foreign nations nearly always rests exclusively in the hands of the Foreign Minister, subject only to over-all control by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet as a whole. The Prime Minis-

ter not infrequently takes an active part in laying down certain basic policies, but the carrying out of those policies is left completely in the hands of the Foreign Minister. In the United States, on the other hand, both the formulation and the carrying out of our foreign policy may, or may not, rest primarily in the hands of the Secretary of State, depending upon the situation at the moment. In England, moreover, the Foreign Minister is able to maintain a rather tight discipline over all the subordinate officials of the Foreign Office and over the British diplomats who are sent to serve in foreign countries. In the United States, on the other hand, the control which the Secretary of State has over his nominal subordinates is frequently more lax. In many cases various persons within the Department of State and several of our Ambassadors and Ministers abroad are able to secure direct access to the President. In this way they are able to carry through policies to which the Secretary of State himself is opposed. In some cases he is not even aware of these policies until they are put into operation.

There is another factor in the development of relations with foreign nations which is of some interest; namely, the growth of the power of public opinion in the formulation and implementation of our foreign policy. Immediate control over our foreign policy tends to rest more and more with the President or with one or more of the President's confidants, but to an ever increasing degree the President finds it necessary to keep in general accord with public opinion when it comes to departing from an old policy or to initiating a new one. In the early days of the Republic many Presidents were willing to disregard or even to go directly contrary to current public opinion in matters of foreign policy on the ground that the general public was too ignorant of international affairs to be capable of making sound judgments. A classical illustration of this situation was the course which Wash-

ington took in connection with the treaty which John Jay negotiated with England in 1794. This treaty was extremely unpopular with the majority of the American populace at the time and this fact was widely known. But this did not deter Washington from seeing to it that the treaty was duly ratified and put into effect.

In recent years the situation has greatly altered. Even the most vigorous of our Presidents and Secretaries of State now find it advisable to keep an ear to the ground in order to find out whether proposed policies will receive general acceptance with the public. You will remember that in 1937 Franklin D. Roosevelt made his famous "Quarantine Speech" in Chicago in which he indicated that he was preparing to use firm methods to curb the power of Germany, Italy, and Japan. This speech had a very unfavorable reception with the American public with the result that Roosevelt was careful not to implement the proposed new policy until public opinion had changed.

In this connection it would be well to bear in mind that our foreign policy is strongly affected not merely by public opinion in general but also by the action and attitudes of certain special pressure groups within the United States.

All students of political science are fully aware of the fact that no Secretary of State has a free hand to formulate any policy which is likely to affect the Near East. When he attempts to deal with any problem affecting our relations with Egypt, or Syria, or Saudi Arabia he must constantly bear in mind how his proposed policy will be received by the Jewish voters of certain states, more especially the state of New York. Neither the Republicans nor the Democrats will dare to make a stand on any issue which is likely to awaken the ire of this important bloc of voters.

I remember that a year or two ago I was discussing Near Eastern affairs with an Egyptian official. He complained that in any dispute between Egypt and Israel the American Department of State always took the side of the Israelis. My friend wanted to know what Egyptian diplomats could do to alter this situation. To this query I was forced to reply that in my opinion the only thing that the Egyptian Foreign Office could do was to arrange for about five million Arabs to be settled in one of our key political states, such as Pennsylvania or Illinois. Such a settlement would be bound to have a profound effect upon American Foreign Policy and would give it a pro-Arab slant.

In some instances the influence of pressure groups is less direct and less obvious, but it is present just the same. For many years our policy towards the countries of the Far East was strongly influenced not by the descendants of Orientals settled in this country but by American missionaries who had lived and worked in Asiatic countries, more especially in China. The average American knew very little about China, but through the activity of various church groups the opinions of returned missionaries received broad dissemination and thus ultimately had an important bearing upon our policy in Far Eastern matters.

In like manner, you will find that in several instances our foreign policy has been seriously affected by the likes and dislikes which are apt to be prevalent among American women's clubs. For many years past Gandhi and Nehru were the idols of most women's clubs with the result that a Secretary of State would be severely handicapped if he were to attempt to take a firm and realistic attitude towards the relations between India and Pakistan. It would take a very strong Secretary of State to dare to differ with a host of embattled females on such a problem.

We now come to the consideration of another vital problem; viz., what is and should be the over-all or ultimate goal of our foreign policy? Curiously enough, during the whole course of our national existence there has been a great variety of opinion on this point, even among our greatest statesmen. In this connection it is important that we contrast our position with that of the U. S. S. R., our rival for world leadership. Certainly since 1918 it is clear that all the major Soviet leaders have been united in believing that the U. S. S. R. should have not one but two ultimate goals in its conduct of foreign policy. The *first* of these goals may be called *territorial aggrandizement*, and is centered around the determination that the U. S. S. R. should constantly grow in size and in power until in the end it is the Supreme Power throughout the world. The *second* goal may be called *ideological aggrandizement*, and is centered around the determination of the Soviet leaders that the basic principles of Communism shall be made to spread until it embraces the whole world. The two goals coalesce in the ideal that all the countries of the entire globe, both in the Eastern and in the Western Hemispheres, shall be transformed into a group of countries dominated by Communist hierarchies—and all bound together as satellites of the U. S. S. R.

As I have already indicated there has never been unanimity among American leaders as to what the ultimate goal of American Foreign Policy should be, but at least all of these leaders are united on certain points, and one of these points is that American Foreign Policy does not and should not aim at unlimited territorial aggrandizement. As I shall have occasion to point out later on, the United States has passed through several periods during which Imperialistic doctrines were popular, and even at the present time there are some persons who believe that one of the principal aims of American Foreign Policy should be to see that the United States

becomes and remains the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere. But there is not and never has been any important or responsible group of American politicians who believed that it was the sacred duty of the United States to annex or even to dominate the whole world. For this very reason, it is hard for many Americans to understand unlimited territorial aggrandizement is a basic doctrine among the leaders of the Soviet.

But whereas all American politicians, whether Republican or Democratic, agree in rejecting unlimited territorial aggrandizement as a goal of our foreign policy, there is still great difference of opinion as to how far in our relations with foreign nations we should aim at the spread of basic American ideologies. Throughout the course of American history there have often been important groups who think that one of the basic goals of our foreign policy should be to promote the spread of democratic beliefs and institutions throughout all the nations of the world. In the case of a foreign nation which has a civil war between monarchic and republican factions most Americans have openly sympathized with the republican faction, and many persons have demanded that our whole foreign policy should be aimed so as to assist the republican faction in its struggle for victory. Many persons assert that it should be the goal of our foreign policy to induce all nations to accept and adopt universal suffrage and representative institutions as an integral part of their governmental organization.

This feeling was very strong in the period immediately following 1945. There was a strong faction in our government (and more especially in the State Department) which felt that it was the duty of the United States to impose a democratic form of government upon other nations, even if this necessitated the use of force. This faction was especially vociferous with reference to

those countries over which we had a good deal of direct control, such as Italy, Germany, and Japan. This group tried to insist that we should take advantage of our occupation forces in those countries to establish willy-nilly some sort of a replica of the American form of government.

Personally, I have always disagreed, and disagreed very strongly with the views of this faction. I have always insisted that to be successful, the governmental organization of any country must fit in with the cultural and traditional heritage of the nation in question. I have always argued that it is very stupid for us to try to impose our system of government or our type of economic organization upon a people who have a completely different background and who do not share any of our cultural heritage.

In this connection I remember very vividly the bitter battle that was waged in 1945 inside of governmental circles as to the proper treatment of the Japanese Emperor. There was a powerful group within our government which wanted to insist that the Japanese Emperor be deposed as part of the terms of surrender, or at least that the Americans aid in the setting up of a Japanese republic once we had fully occupied the country. I was one of many people who fought this suggestion tooth and nail. It goes without saying that I would be violently opposed to having an Emperor in the United States, but I was convinced that the long-term interests of the United States would be better served by permitting the Japanese to preserve the Imperial institution, and I think that at the present time most informed Americans would be in accord with this position.

What was true as regards Japan is also true as regards the other nations of the world. Abstractly, I am all in favor of repub-

lics as opposed to monarchies, but I do not believe that it should be part of American Foreign Policy to persuade the English to depose Queen Elizabeth. I am violently opposed both to Fascism and to Communism but I do not believe that American Foreign Policy should be centered around the objective of upsetting the Franco regime in Spain or the Tito regime in Yugoslavia. I am persuaded that even the State Department is gradually—very gradually—coming around to the acceptance of this point of view.

If, then, we reject territorial aggrandizement as being the proper goals of American Foreign Policy we are brought face to face with the problem: around what principle should the long term foreign policy of the United States be centered? To my way of thinking, the answer to this problem is straight and simple: the goal of our foreign policy should be essentially to protect the integrity and security of the American nation. We can say that the foreign policy of a President or of a Secretary of State has been successful or unsuccessful according to whether or not it had aided in safeguarding the independence, the safety, and the relative strength of the American nation.

After this survey of the general background, we are now in a position to examine certain detailed features characteristic of the development of American Foreign Policy. In the first place it should be noted that a great deal of our foreign policy has centered around the formulation and implementation of a few specific items which are sometimes called "doctrines," as in the case of the "Monroe Doctrine"; sometimes called "policies," as in the case of the "Open Door Policy."

Some of these doctrines and policies have had a profound effect upon our relations with the outside world. Considering this

fact, it is rather remarkable that most of these doctrines and policies were originally nothing more than the expression of an opinion or an objective by an individual President or an individual Secretary of State. In some cases the President made an official announcement of this policy to Congress, but in no instance did the President, at least at the time, make any attempt to have Congress formally accept or ratify them. Thus, the so-called Monroe Doctrine was merely a statement by President Monroe as to what he thought American Foreign Policy ought to be, and which would serve as a general guide as long as he was in office, but legally and technically it had no binding effect upon his successors. In like manner, the Open Door Policy was merely a statement of certain aims by John Hay, the Secretary of State under McKinley, and had no binding effect upon his successors in this office, nor upon the legislative branch of the government.

In some cases, at a later period, sometimes a much later period, these doctrines or policies were incorporated in, or formally recognized in treaty obligations and thus became part of the fundamental law of the land. But even in these instances the references to the doctrine of policy was made so vague that the President or the Secretary of State was left perfectly free to interpret and reinterpret them as they pleased. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine as interpreted by Monroe himself was something quite different from the Monroe Doctrine as interpreted by President Cleveland, and this in turn was something far different from the Monroe Doctrine as interpreted by President Theodore Roosevelt. The Open Door Policy of 1899-1900 was officially recognized in the Nine Power Treaty of 1923, but even after this period each President was free to decide for himself as to the true meaning and scope of this policy and as to what constituted a breach of this policy.

Not infrequently the doctrine or policy of one President or one group of Presidents is in flat contradiction to the doctrine and policy of another group of Presidents. Sometimes the American public is aware of this flat contradiction; at other times the general populace seems scarcely aware of this drastic change in our national policy. An interesting instance of the latter situation is the fact that some Presidents have openly pursued a policy of Imperialism, while other Presidents have been ardently anti-Imperialistic, and the general public has not always been fully aware of this sharp and sudden shift of policy.

During the early years of the American Republic, from 1789 to 1803, the Presidents and Secretaries of State almost uniformly adopted an anti-Imperialist or at least a non-Imperialist policy. It was generally taken for granted that the territory inherited from the old thirteen colonies would constitute the United States forever. A few disgruntled politicians spoke of the advisability of annexing Canada and Florida at some time in the future but such ideas found only a cold welcome among the responsible officials who were charged with conducting our foreign policy.

A great change took place in 1803 during the administration of Jefferson. Jefferson started out as a vigorous anti-Imperialist. In fact he was inclined to the opinion that any attempt to add territory to the United States was unconstitutional. In 1803, however, he came around to the belief that it was advisable to carry out the Louisiana Purchase. This not only brought the annexation of a vast expanse of land, but it also inaugurated a new policy; namely, that expansion should go on indefinitely, and this policy was adopted by most of the administrations between 1803 and 1861. *Imperialism* is an ugly word, and I do not recall during this

period anyone openly defending Imperialism as such, but we do witness the rise of such slogans as "Manifest Destiny," and "Fifty-four Forty or Fight."

As a result of this policy we annexed what is now Oregon and Washington; we welcomed the accession of Texas as one of the United States; we fought the Mexican War and secured as a war prize a huge area including the present states of New Mexico and Arizona. During this same period there was a strong and influential group which desired to seize Canada to the north; another group desired to annex Cuba and other Caribbean islands to the south. Such groups were listened to sympathetically by the leaders of several administrations. During the later 1850's, serious consideration was even given to the problem as to whether or not it was advisable to jump across the Pacific Ocean and claim the island of Formosa as American soil.

This period and this policy came to an end in 1861 with the outbreak of the War Between the States. For several years, of course, America was too concerned with domestic problems to pay any attention to further external expansion, but even when the fighting was over it was found that the American people had lost all interest in further expansion and succeeding administrations had to take this fact into consideration when they tried to formulate national policy. In fact, we may say that the period 1861-1898 was an era of marked anti-Imperialism. There were many reasons for this change of sentiment, with most of which we have no need to deal. One basic factor, however, requires brief mention. Prior to the Civil War most of our wealth came from commerce and especially from foreign commerce. The men who became millionaires during this period were mostly men who derived their wealth from trade "with the Indies" and with China. After the Civil

War, however, a great deal of our wealth came not from commerce but from industry. During this period we became so interested in building up the factories in Pittsburgh and Chicago that we lost interest in the markets of Canton and Shanghai.

During this period there was only one instance of territorial expansion, and that was occasioned by the purchase of Alaska. It is to be noted that, at the time, the acquisition of this territory was so unpopular that a great many Congressmen had to be bribed before they were willing to vote in favor of the proposal. Even so, in order to appease popular indignation, the leaders of the administration had to make a strenuous plea that they were not interested in expansion as such, but that during the troubled Civil War days the Russians had been very friendly to the United States, and out of gratitude we ought to be nice to Russia and take Alaska off her hands.

All other attempts at expansion led to failure. President Grant negotiated a treaty with San Domingo, under the terms of which that country was to be annexed to the United States. At that time the inhabitants of San Domingo were delighted to be annexed. Moreover, at the time he made the treaty Grant was still a powerful and popular figure. However, the anti-expansionist feeling was so strong that the proposed treaty had to be withdrawn. Warned by this example, later administrations adopted a determined anti-Imperialist policy. In 1893 this policy was put to a test. As you know, all during the nineteenth century a great many American missionaries went out to Hawaii in order "to do good"—and many of them ended up by doing extremely well—for themselves. In 1893 the American commercial community in Honolulu (many of them the sons and grandsons of missionaries) was powerful enough to overthrow the royal house of Hawaii. A republic

was proclaimed and the leaders of this republic asked that Hawaii be incorporated within the United States. But because of the existing policy this request was politely but firmly refused.

A remarkable change of policy took place in 1898. In that year William Randolph Hearst unofficially declared war on Spain and President McKinley officially followed suit shortly thereafter. The Spanish-American War witnessed a number of outstanding victories. Admiral Dewey crushed an important naval force out in distant Manila Bay. We had the famous naval battle of Santiago, in Cuba, which started out as a fight between the Spanish on one side and the Americans on the other and which ended up as a fight between two American admirals—but only after the Spanish fleet had been annihilated. Teddy Roosevelt and the Rough Riders charged up San Juan Hill and the American public was thrilled.

As a result of the tremendous and easily won victories achieved by the American forces during the war there was a tremendous change in American sentiment. Almost over night the vast majority of the populace of the United States became expansionistic once more. In response to this change in popular feeling the American government annexed Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. We told the American dominated republic in Hawaii: "We were wrong when we turned down your plea for annexation a few years ago," and before long Hawaii became an American territory. We did not annex Cuba, but by means of the so-called "Platt Amendment" Cuba became, and for several years remained, little more than a satellite power of the United States. The new expansionist policy was continued under the administration of Theodore Roosevelt. As a result of Roosevelt's forceful and rather high-handed action, Panama broke away from

Colombia and became in name an independent republic but in reality another country subject in large measure to American control.

During the administration of William Howard Taft there was a slight shift in policy. The doctrine of military and political expansion was no longer in vogue, but in its place there grew up the idea of "dollar diplomacy." During the last few decades the United States had grown immensely wealthy, and Americans were once more keenly interested in foreign trade—especially in the export of American industrial products. We were also, for the first time, in a position to invest a good deal of capital abroad. Taking advantage of this situation the Taft administration embarked upon a policy of using American economic power to strengthen diplomatic ties and to increase American influence, especially among the other countries of the Western Hemisphere.

With the election of Woodrow Wilson to the Presidency in 1912, the period of expansionism, both military and economic, came to an end. In fact, from 1912 down to 1952 both the American people and the American administrations have been markedly anti-expansionist and anti-Imperialist. During this period we have been victorious in two major wars, but in neither case did we take advantage of our victories to annex any important additional territory. The one and only exception to this rule was that after World War II we demanded, and I think rightfully demanded, control over the so-called "mandated islands" of the Pacific because of the important role they play in our plans for strategic defense. During this period not only did we abandon our previous expansionist policy; we also voluntarily gave up control over several areas already in our possession. We made the Philippines into an independent republic; we repealed the Platt Amendment,

thereby granting the Cubans complete control over their own affairs; we have indicated to the Puerto Ricans that they are free to secede from the United States if they so desire.

During this period we have also abandoned most of the basic principles of dollar diplomacy. During the past few years we have poured billions of dollars into foreign countries, but in all cases it was either to aid in their economic rehabilitation or else to help them with their military preparations against the common menace of Communism. In no case has American financial assistance aimed at or resulted in American political control. In this connection I remember with some interest the conversations I had with SCAP officials in Japan and with General Hodge in Korea during the period of American occupation. In both instances I found that the American officials were anxious to see that American military and political control did not result in having American business interests secure an intrenched position in the areas subject to their command.

As far as I can make out, both the Republicans and the Democrats, for all their differences on other points, are in general accord in embracing the principle of anti-expansionism so that a change of administration is not likely to cause a change of policy on this matter. At the present time any politician who openly proclaims that America should again go in for aggressive territorial expansion is apt to be soundly booed by his audience, with the result that politicians being politicians, they are careful to refrain from advocating such a policy. Certainly for the time being the dominant policy may be expressed as follows: America should refuse to give up a single square inch of any territory she now possesses, but neither should she seek to gain a single additional square inch. Personally, I am a little dubious about the validity of

the first part of this policy, as I, for one, would be willing to give Southern California back to the Indians—but I know that I am in a hopeless minority on the question and shall not press the matter.

The transition from a policy of anti-expansionism to expansionism and then back again has frequently been sharp and sudden, but for the most part this transition took place more or less unconsciously and without awakening a storm of opposition. In contrast with this situation is the storm which has frequently arisen when an administration attempts to pass from a policy of isolationism to one of collective security, or *vice versa*. The struggle over these two policies began at a very early period in American history. Shortly after the establishment of the republic some persons argued that we should ally ourselves with the British in an attempt to repress the French Revolution. Other persons argued that we should ally ourselves with the French Revolutionaries in their struggles against the British. The acceptance of either doctrine would have carried with it a tacit acceptance of the principle of collective security. But in the end we accepted neither doctrine and adopted instead a doctrine of isolationism, as embodied in Washington's Farewell Address of 1796 and Jefferson's Inaugural Address of 1801. This doctrine is generally summarized as being the idea that America should refrain from contracting any "entangling alliances." The idea behind this doctrine deeply permeated a large section of American public opinion and enormously affected our foreign policy during a large portion of the nineteenth century. Any suggestion that we contract an alliance with any foreign power—even a suggestion that we join in some world conference—was greeted with the howl that we were departing from the principles of Washington and Jefferson. Even as late as 1917 when we decided to give active military aid to England and France,

Woodrow Wilson thought it necessary to insist that the United States was not an "allied power" but merely an associated power.

In this connection it is interesting to note that many of the persons who made passionate appeals that we hold fast to the ideas embodied in the addresses of Washington and Jefferson quite obviously never took the trouble to read them, for a careful examination of these documents shows that both leaders were advocating something very different from rigid isolationism. More especially, a close study of Washington's Farewell Address shows that Washington was advocating not so much "isolationism" as "opportunism." He objected not so much to alliances as to *permanent* alliances. In fact, he expressly stated that in place of permanent alliances "we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." Incidentally, may I say that I think that there is still a good deal of vitality to Washington's remarks on the subject. I believe that it would still be unwise to establish a permanent policy based upon alliances with some nations and against other nations. At one period in our history it was doubtless useful to join in an alliance directed against Germany and Japan, but it may well be that on another occasion it may be equally useful to ally ourselves with Germany and Japan against some other enemy. At one period it was probably useful to join in an alliance with Russia, but a great many Americans were guilty of a serious mistake when they assumed this alliance would or could prove permanent in character.

In 1917, Woodrow Wilson bowed to the isolationist tradition by calling the United States merely an associated power. But a year later he made a sharp break with this tradition by demanding that America join the newly constituted League of Nations. This led to long and bitter discussion, both in Congress and among the American people. For the time being the isolationist tradition

triumphed and the United States refused to join the League, or even the World Court. The wisdom of this step is even now a matter of acrimonious discussion. It so happens that I was one of the persons who was in favor of America joining the League, but I still think that it is perfectly ridiculous when I hear people insinuate that if we had only joined the League of Nations we would have entered the Millenium. It is equally ridiculous to state categorically that if we had only joined the League, World War II would never have taken place. In my opinion the League of Nations was a step in the right direction, but it was far from perfect and never could have provided absolute guarantees for universal peace and security.

In the period 1918-1920, America rejected collective security and held fast to isolationism—but during the latter part of World War II there was a sharp reversal of public sentiment and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, by a series of very astute political moves, was able to convert a large number of Senators and Congressmen to the idea that it was necessary for the United States to join the United Nations. More important still, he was able to convert the bulk of the American people to this way of thinking. Almost over night isolationism became a term of opprobrium and both Democrats and Republicans embraced the new gospel of collective security. Many of the new converts were wildly optimistic in their appraisals as to what the United Nations could be expected to accomplish. Under the aegis of the United Nations, Imperialism and Power Politics were to be abolished forever; international understanding and perpetual peace were to be established, almost automatically. The widespread acceptance of this line of thought had a marked effect upon our defense program. Many persons sincerely believed that with the UN in operation there was little or no need to keep up a large army, navy, or air force.

The events of the last few years, from 1945 to 1952, have disillusioned many of these naive optimists. We have seen that the UN, for all its virtues, is not an infallible cure for all the evils of the world; we have seen that it does not automatically secure peace and guarantee our national security. As a result of this, there has been a marked change in public sentiment. I am sure that a majority (possibly 60% of the American people) are still in favor of some kind of collective security, but in many places we can witness a revival of the old isolationist or semi-isolationist point of view.

Speaking for myself, and only for myself, I should like to say that I believe that the extreme advocates of collective security and the extreme advocates of isolationism are both in error. I am of the opinion that we Americans should be neither isolationist nor internationalist but rather nationalist in our basic sentiments and in our approach to the solution of world problems. Isolationism must be rejected because it is absurd to say that American security will not be affected by the turn of events in Europe or in Asia. Even from the purely selfish point of view we must be vitally concerned with whether or not the free countries of the old world are able to maintain themselves against the Red Menace. At the same time naive internationalism must be rejected as this, too, threatens American security. I do not believe that the primary aim of American Foreign Policy should be to establish world government. At the present stage of civilization world government is impractical, and even if possible would be deeply injurious to the American standard of living and the American way of life. I am firmly of the opinion that we should work with and for the United Nations, but only to the extent that such a line of action helps to maintain American security and integrity. Moreover, we must be realistic about what the UN can and can not accomplish. We should work with and for the UN but we must also be sure that we

are in a position to maintain our security in case the UN collapses. If we had merely relied on the UN to repel aggression we would certainly have been in a bad fix in Korea, to say nothing of other parts of the world. We can not afford to be isolationist, but we should be internationalist only to the extent that our commitments with foreign nations, singly or collectively, promote the welfare of the United States of America. In a word, it would be well to go back to Washington's opportunism and support or reject alliances according to whether or not the proposed alliance will promote the security of the American nation.

Let us now turn to a brief analysis of the Monroe Doctrine. Unlike the doctrines we have been discussing, the Monroe Doctrine has never been the subject of bitter controversy—at least in its broad outline. Since its original promulgation practically all responsible statesmen have felt it necessary to pay at least lip service to this doctrine. At the same time there has frequently been sharp difference of opinion as to the real meaning of the doctrine and what it ultimately implies.

Every one calls the doctrine in question the Monroe Doctrine because of President Monroe's allusion to it in a message to Congress in 1823. In reality, however, there is good ground to call it the John Quincy Adams Doctrine because it was Adams, when serving as Secretary of State, who first thought out the policy and who persuaded Monroe to accept it as a smart diplomatic move. We could also, with justification, call it the George Canning Policy because the original proposal which led to the formulation of the so-called Monroe Doctrine came from Canning, the British Foreign Minister. Canning, a very able statesman, was aware that Spain, with the backing of the major Continental powers, was thinking seriously of making a major effort to reconquer her former colonies

in South America. He was also aware that if this effort succeeded it would be a serious blow to English commercial interests in that area. For this reasion he proposed to the United States the formation of an Anglo-American Alliance aimed at maintaining Latin American independence. This proposal was given serious consideration in Washington, and several persons spoke in favor of accepting the British proposition. It was John Quincy Adams who conceived the notion that America would secure even greater benefits by making a unilateral expression of policy, knowing that England would be forced by circumstances to back up this policy.

Following Adams' suggestion, President Monroe announced to the world that the United States would look with extreme displeasure upon the attempt of any European power to conquer or reconquer any part of the Western Hemisphere. All this was very fine, but let us not forget that at this time we had no army and no navy worthy of the name. If we relied only upon our own forces at the time, we could not possibly have enforced the new doctrine if the European powers had made a serious move in opposition to it. But Adams proved right in his prediction that the British would feel compelled to back us up—and at that time Britain still ruled the waves. For the next few decades the Monroe Doctrine was a success but only because we could induce the British, for their own selfish reasons, to pull our chestnuts out of the fire.

Originally, the Monroe Doctrine, in fact if not in theory, was merely a warning to the Spanish, the French and the Russians that they should keep out of the Western World. As I have already remarked, it was only in 1895, over fifty years after the Monroe Doctrine was publicly announced to the world, that America felt strong enough to apply this doctrine to the British as well. It was only at this time that the Monroe Doctrine came to mean what

it said. Even so, the Monroe Doctrine remained essentially, defensive in character and in intent. It implied merely that all European nations should refrain from aggressive actions in North and South America; it did not imply that the United States claimed any paramount power over the whole of the Western Hemisphere.

But as I have already pointed out, each President can and frequently does give his own interpretation to any "Doctrine" or "Policy." When Theodore Roosevelt succeeded to the Presidency a startling new interpretation was given to the Monroe Doctrine, an interpretation which is usually called the "Roosevelt corollary." Roosevelt insisted that if the United States assumed the responsibility of protecting the Latin American nations from European aggression, she was morally bound to see that the Latin American nations paid their just debts and carried out their other obligations to the European powers, even if this meant armed intervention by American troops. In effect, the Roosevelt corollary meant that the Monroe Doctrine carried with it the notion that the United States must play the dominant role in the whole of the Western Hemisphere and claimed the right to settle the affairs of any Latin American state that got into trouble.

It is not surprising that this new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine aroused a good deal of passionate ill-will south of the Rio Grande. Instead of looking upon the Monroe Doctrine as a guarantee of their independence, most Latin Americans regarded it as a mask for Yankee Imperialism. As a result, all over Latin America there was a marked rise of anti-American sentiment.

This situation was radically altered, and altered for the better, by the new interpretation given to the Monroe Doctrine in the period after World War I and more especially during the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. This new interpretation

of the Monroe Doctrine involved the linking of this doctrine with the principle of non-intervention, with the so-called Good Neighbor Policy, and with the development of the principle of Pan-Americanism. By Pan-Americanism is meant the idea that the various independent nations of the new world should voluntarily come together in the form of a loose "Union" for the purpose of discussing their common problems and preparing common or at least parallel plans in case any part of the Western Hemisphere was threatened by any non-American power.

The Pan-American movement has had a long and rather checkered history. The idea of a Pan-American Union was first suggested in 1824-25 but the attempts made at this time to establish such a union proved abortive. The idea was revived in 1889 when Blaine was Secretary of State and a nominal "Union" was established at this time, but for many decades thereafter the union was a name rather than a fact and had very little serious effect upon either the Monroe Doctrine or the conduct of inter-American affairs. During the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, however, and more especially during the period of World War II, the United States made a serious effort to strengthen the Pan-American idea and to give it a more concrete and forceful embodiment. This effort resulted in the Treaty of Chapultepec in 1945 and the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro in 1948. By the terms of these treaties the Monroe Doctrine received a new and very marked modification. The Monroe Doctrine was no longer a unilateral expression on the part of the United States of her intentions to defend the Western Hemisphere from external attack; it is now a multilateral expression by all the Latin American nations of their willingness to aid one another in the event of a threat to any one of them by an Old World power.

Personally, I am of the opinion that this reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine has had very useful and valuable results. It remains true, of course, that the United States is the strongest and most influential of all the American republics. It is true that in the event of a threat from outside the defense of the Western Hemisphere will depend in large measure upon the armed forces of the United States. For psychological purposes, however, it is far better to say that we are prepared to defend Brazil from attack because Brazil has promised to defend us from attack, or even that we will guarantee Costa Rica's independence because Costa Rica has promised to defend our independence. Our foreign policy should be realistic, but realism includes an appreciation of the sensitivity of our potential allies.

Let us now turn to an examination of the Open Door Policy and the part that this policy has played in determining our relations with other powers. In some ways we may say that the Open Door Policy is very old, dating back to our first contacts with the countries of the Far East. If you study what the United States did and did not do in China during the period of the First and Second Opium Wars you will find that we had already tacitly adopted what was later called the Open Door Policy. In like manner you will find that what Commodore Perry and Townsend Harris aimed at in Japan during the period 1853-1858 was also in general accord with this same policy.

But as we all know, the Open Door Policy in its final and explicit form dates back only to 1899-1900, when John Hay was Secretary of State. In 1899 we had just emerged victorious from the Spanish-American War, and as the result of that war we had secured control of the Philippines. For some decades previously we had not been greatly concerned with developments in the Far East

but now, because of our recently acquired foothold in the Philippines the American public and the Department of State became acutely interested in what was happening in China. We discovered to our amazement that the ancient Chinese Empire was threatened with imminent collapse.

The Sino-Japanese War, from which Japan emerged as an easy victor, showed that China far from being a "sleeping dragon," was weak and powerless. Many of the then great powers of the world decided to take advantage of this situation. They extracted from the Manchu rulers of China valuable concessions and also demanded recognition of special "spheres of influence." The Russians demanded and secured recognition of the principle that all of the Chinese Empire north of the Great Wall was part of the Russian sphere of influence. The Germans secured complete control of the port of Tsingtao and recognition that the whole of the Shantung peninsula was to form part of the German sphere of influence. The French secured complete control over the port of Kwangchowan and recognition of a large sphere of influence in southwest China. The Japanese secured recognition of their claim that the province of Fukien should be considered Japan's sphere of influence.

At first the British were opposed to the idea that China should be split up into numerous spheres of influence, for the very good reason that such a division interfered with the normal flow of British goods to all parts of the Chinese Empire, but when it appeared that the other powers were going to be successful in their demands for special spheres they, too, demanded a special sphere of influence which was to embrace the whole of the Yangtze valley. In a desire not to be outdone by the other powers even Italy demanded a special sphere of influence. But this was too much even for the

long-suffering Chinese. After making a rapid but correct estimate of Italy's real power, and her ability to enforce her demands, China politely but firmly denied the Italian claim for a special sphere of influence.

But Italy was the only major power that the Chinese dared to rebuff and to most students of international affairs it appeared that the Chinese Empire was headed for complete collapse, to be followed by the partition of this empire between Japan and the great powers of Europe. Just at this time a distinguished British naval officer, Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, who had served for some time in Far Eastern waters, wrote a book called *The Break-up of China.* More important still, he came to the United States and gave a number of public lectures on the same subject and these lectures made a great impression on the American public. Before long the Department of State became interested in the matter and Mr. Hay, the Secretary, devoted a great deal of time and energy to the study of the whole situation.

Mr. Hay established contact with Lord Charles Beresford. He also sought the advice of a Mr. Hippsley, another Britisher who had spent several years in the Far East as a member of the Chinese customs service. He then talked the matter over with some of his American friends. He listened eagerly to what his old class-mate, W. W. Rockhill, had to say about the problem. Rockhill was a rather astonishing person. He was both a diplomat and an Oriental scholar. Because of his friendship with Hay, he was appointed American Minister to China. To everyone's amazement he soon learned not only to speak but also to read and write Chinese, and in addition mastered Mongolian and Tibetan. Bureaucracy being bureaucracy, it is not surprising to find that as soon as Rockhill

gained fluency in the language of the Far East he was sent as Ambassador to Turkey, where he did not know a word of the language.

In any event, Hay, after consultation with Beresford, Hippsley, Rockhill, and others, proceeded to propound the Open Door Policy as being in the best interests of China, of the United States, and of the world in general. The Open Door Policy demanded that in China there should be equal opportunity for all, special privilege for none, and also that the territorial integrity of China should be respected. The plea for equal opportunity for all, special privilege for none meant, of course, that the Unitd States made no demand for special rights and privileges, but did demand that all the rights and privileges granted to other foreigners should be shared by American citizens. The plea for the territorial integrity of China meant, of course, that the political, military, and economic integrity of China should be respected by all the powers.

In 1899, and again in 1900, John Hay sent notes to all the major powers pleading for the general recognition and acceptance of the Open Door Policy. The Japanese, the Russians, the Germans, and the French were rather cool towards the proposal but none of them felt in the position openly to defy or to attack the idea. The British, on the other hand, after a little hesitation, accepted the proposal with enthusiasm and it was because of this fact that the Open Door Policy operated successfully for several years. Most Americans are proud, and justly proud, of the role which the United States played in the formulation of the Open Door Policy—but they are apt to forget that this policy worked well only as long as there was force available to back it up. It worked very well from 1900 to 1914 largely because in addition to our own Pacific squadron there was also a British fleet in Far Eastern waters which stood ready

to give support in case of need. The Open door Policy began to weaken toward the close of 1914 when the British had to withdraw their naval vessels to European waters to make use of them in the fight against Germany. During the period 1915-1918, Japan took advantage of this situation and sought to secure predominant power in China by means of the Twenty-One Demands and it looked for a while as if the Open Door Policy would be permanently wrecked.

The collapse of Germany in 1918 brought about the temporary revival of the Open Door Policy. The American and British navies were once more free to take action in case of trouble in the Far East. The more extreme of the Japanese demands on China were withdrawn and at the Washington Conference of 1922-23 provision was made for the complete restoration of the Open Door Policy. In fact in the treaties drawn up during this conference the principle of the Open Door Policy was for the first time specifically recognized and accepted by the major powers.

All of this was well and good and the American public settled back in a state of complacent optimism. Only a few years later, however, Japan kicked over the traces and again began a long series of aggressive actions. This began in 1931-32 with the Manchurian incident, was continued in 1935 with an overt action to control North China, and in 1937 developed into an attempt to secure control over the whole of the Chinese Republic. The United States from the beginning made a desperate effort to stem the tide, and appealed to England for support. This time, however, England refused to come to our assistance because she had already embarked upon a policy of appeasement to the aggressor powers and it looked as if the whole Open Door Policy was on the verge of shipwreck.

Notwithstanding this situation, the United States remained adamant in her determination not to abandon this time-honored policy, and this very fact was the cause of our war with Japan. It was because we insisted that Japan withdraw her troops from China and restore the Open Door Policy that the Japanese made their attack on Pearl Harbor, with the results that are well known to all of us. In our campaigns against Japan we spent many billions of dollars. More important still we lost hundreds of thousands of American boys as casualties. For a while it seemed that all this sacrifice was worth while. The Japanese surrendered in 1945, and it was taken for granted that the Open Door Policy (the cause of the whole conflict) would automatically be restored.

We were soon to be bitterly disillusioned. Because of our foolishness in disregarding the Communist menace the situation in China is far worse than it was in December, 1941. In China today there is special privilege for one power only, and that an enemy power. There is privilege for no other power, neither for ourselves nor even for the English who again have been foolish enough to try and curry favor by appeasement. To talk about the political, military, or economic independence of China is a grim, tragic farce. The Open Door Policy has received a smashing and damaging blow, and I foresee a great deal of trouble for the United States until this policy is once more restored.

Before concluding my talk I should like to give expression to certain opinions regarding the strength and weakness of American Foreign Policy. I should again like to stress the fact that these opinions are merely personal opinions, for which I alone am responsible. In the conduct of our foreign policy we have had some astounding successes and some catastrophic failures. On the whole I think that our foreign policy has been sound but it has been handicapped by certain basic weaknesses. One basic weakness is

the fact many of the men who have been charged with the conduct of our foreign relations have shared with the general public a tendency to take a theoretical and legalistic approach rather than a realistic approach towards foreign policy. Most Americans have tended to look at treaties rather than at basic facts. We have thought that we could lay down certain moral axioms and write notes expressing indignation when certain foreign powers did things contrary to these axioms, feeling that these nations would see that we were right and that they were wrong, and as a result would quickly change their conduct. We have failed to realize that when any of our foreign policies has succeeded, it succeeded because it was backed up by force—either actual or potential.

The Monroe Doctrine succeeded, not because Monroe made a magnificent address before the American Congress, but because in the early days it was backed up by the British Navy and in later days we were powerful to enforce it ourselves. In like measure the Open Door Policy worked very well as long as the armed forces of the United States and England cooperated in enforcing it. It ceased to work when America and England were unable or unwilling to carry out this cooperation.

In this connection I should like to remind you of the developments which took place during 1931-32, when Mr. Stimson was Secretary of State. Mr. Stimson was a very fine man and a very brilliant man, but he, too, was inclined to take a moralistic and a legalistic approach rather than a realistic approach to the problems of international relations. When the Japanese began to march into Manchuria he addressed to the Japanese government a series of sharp notes, pointing out that the Japanese actions were contrary to our concepts of international ethics and international law. We now know that the Japanese made a serious effort to find out whether or not the American armed forces meant to take any

serious step about implementing the ideas laid down in these notes before making any further commitments. They soon found out that our armed forces had no plans for implementation—with the result that after each of Mr. Stimson's notes the Japanese instead of moving out moved further and further in.

Going back to an even earlier period, I remember that in 1928 there were many heated discussions in America about the merits of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact. On several occasions I was asked my opinions about the matter. I replied that, of course, I was all in favor of peace, and that I certainly saw no harm in signing the proposed pact but that it was ridiculous to assume that the signing of the pact would obviate the dangers of war. Several of my friends argued that a solemn treaty to outlaw war would be certain to make for perpetual peace, for surely no nation would be willing to break a treaty. I had to smile a little at this naivete, and certainly it is curious that only a few years after the signing of the Kellog-Briand Peace Pact, forever eliminating war as an instrument of national policy, we witnessed the outbreak of the greatest war that was ever known to mankind.

I believe that there is another weakness inherent in the formulation of a good deal of our foreign policy, and that is the frequent lack of coordination between the different branches of our government with respect to our long-range diplomatic, military, and economic plans. As I have already pointed out, the State Department has frequently erred by formulating diplomatic policies without consultation with the armed services, which the armed services felt that they could not implement. In like manner some of our military leaders have also erred by formulating war plans aiming at the immediate defeat of the enemy without reference to the long-range effect of these plans upon America's position in the world after the actual fighting is over. Some of these leaders were so

busy fighting Hitler and Tojo that they had no time to consider what was likely to happen to the United States after Hitler and Tojo were crushed.

During World War II, as you may remember, I served in a very subordinate position with the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. While carrying out my duties there I frequently had to read and comment on memoranda which the British Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent to the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. In many cases it was clear that in preparing these memoranda the British Joint Chiefs had consulted with the British Foreign Office and that the memoranda themselves were an expression of British national policy and not merely of the ideas of the British military leaders. I also became aware that in many cases the Armerican Joint Chiefs answered these memoranda without prior consultation with our Department of State. I also discovered that in many instances the Department of State sent to the British Foreign Office memoranda which seriously affected our national policy without prior consultation with the American Joint Chiefs.

This confusion and lack of coordination was obvious to many persons besides myself. As a result, an attempt was made to improve matters in 1945 by the formation of SWNCC, or the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. This organization fulfilled a very useful function, but it was soon found that its members worked on too low a level for it to have a decisive influence on national policy. In consequence of this fact SWNCC was abolished and in its place there was established, in 1946, the National Security Council, in which the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were directly represented and which reported immediately to the President. This was certainly a step, and a very important step in the right direction, but for various reasons which I cannot go into here the NSC has never performed quite

so efficiently as had been hoped. I sincerely trust that in the next few years the NSC will be permitted and required to function more effectively.

I am of the opinion that there has been another weakness in our foreign policy, especially in the last few years, and that is the lack of a global approach to our national problems. We have been in the habit of dealing with a European problem one day, a Near Eastern problem the next day, and a Far Eastern problem the day following without stopping to examine whether or not there is a connection between these problems. It is time that we bear in mind that at the moment we are dealing with an enemy that does have a global approach to these matters. I am convinced that anything which Russia does in Korea, in Indo-China, in Rumania, or in Eastern Germany is all part and parcel of a single underlying plan. The tactics may change from area to area and from time to time, but the basic strategy is the same, and we must be prepared to counteract this strategy. As an instance of our stupidity in this regard may I remind you that in 1946-47 we were telling the Italians and the French that they would not secure any American aid if they permitted any Communists inside their government. At this very same time we were telling the Chinese that they would not secure any American aid unless they did take Communists into their government.

By way of conclusion may I be permitted to express my opinion as to what our basic American Foreign Policy should be during the course of the next few years? It goes without saying that we should have a firm, a vigorous, and a positive foreign policy. We must learn to say what we mean, and to mean what we say. We should adopt no policy which we can not implement, and make no commitment which we can not carry out. So much for generalizations. Now for one or two concrete suggestions.

In the first place I am sure that you will agree with me that we must continue to guard the security and integrity of the whole of the Western Hemisphere against possible aggression from outside. This, of course, means that we must continue to maintain the spirit of the old Monroe Doctrine, though I am quite willing to accept the modifications of this doctrine as affected by the treaties of Chapultepec and Rio de Janeiro.

But what about our relations with the countries of the Old World? For some time I have been convinced that if at any time in the foreseeable future any power unfriendly to ourselves were to secure control over the whole of Western Europe we would be faced with a serious danger. War would become possible, even probable, but not inevitable. In like manner, if at any time in the foreseeable future an unfriendly power were to secure control over the whole of the Far East we would also be faced with a serious danger. Here, again, war would be possible, even probable, but not necessarily inevitable. On the other hand, if in the foreseeable future an unfriendly power were to secure control over both Western Europe and the Far East we would be in a desperate situation, and war would be not only probable but inevitable.

If this statement be true, I believe that it is essential that our foreign policy be directed towards the establishment and maintenance of what I call the Open Door Policy for both the whole of Western Europe and for the whole of the Far East. To the extent that we are able to establish and maintain both in Western Europe and in Eastern Asia equal opportunity for all, special privilege for none, and the territorial integrity of the countries in each area—to that extent we are establishing and maintaining a successful foreign policy.

BIOGRAHICAL SKETCH

Dr. William Montgomery McGovern

Dr. McGovern was born in New York City in 1897. He holds degrees from the Sorbonne, the University of Berlin and a PhD from Oxford.

Dr. McGovern 's colorful career has carried him into many fields, including those of author, lecturer, university professor and explorer. He has been a member of the faculty at some of the outstanding universities of the world. He was a lecturer in the School of Oriental Studies of the University of London and a lecturer in History and Comparative Religion at the University of Wales.

In 1929, Dr. McGovern joined the faculty of Northwestern University as an associate professor of Political Science. He has continued there until the present time, with many leaves of absence for travel, visiting lecture courses, service in the U. S. Navy, and in June, 1952, to fill the chair of Social Sciences at the Naval War College.

As a Master of twelve languages and a specialist in Oriental studies, Dr. McGovern was of great service to the Navy and top Government leaders during World War II, at which time he served with the U. S. Navy as a Commander, connected with various Intelligence duties. He was attached to the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and other J. C. S. organizations. In addition, among other accomplishments, he edited an encyclopedia set dealing with potential invasion areas, and carried out special missions to every military theatre of operations. He was awarded the Legion of Merit.

Dr. McGovern has traveled throughout many parts of the world. Two of his most famous exploits include a journey to the Forbidden City of Lhasa, disguised as a Thibetan coolie, and a

period of residence in Japan, disguised as a Buddist Monk. He has also led an expedition through the Amazon basin, subsequently excavating Inca and pre-Inca remains in Peru.

At the close of World War II, Dr. McGovern returned to Northwestern University to continue as Professor of Political Science and to introduce a new course called "Military Government of Occupied Areas."

Dr. McGovern is a member of the American Oriental Society, American Political Science Assn, and the following clubs: University (Evanston, Ill.); Adventurers, Tavern (Chicago), Army and Navy (Washington, D. C.).

Included in his works as an author are: Modern Japan, 1919; Colloquial Japanese, 1920; Introduction to Mahayana Buddhism, 1921; Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, 1923; To Lhasa in Disguise, 1924; Jungle Paths and Inca Ruins, 1927; the Growth of Institutions (in Man and His World), 1929; Early Empires of Central Asia, 1938; From Luther to Hitler, 1941; Japan, China, Korea, Political and Economic Factors, 1948.

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THEATER AIR FORCES

A Staff Presentation Delivered at the
Naval War College on 10 November, 1952 by
Colonel Franklin A. Nichols, U. S. A. F.

The subject of Theater Air Forces is relatively new. The growing importance of properly organizing Unified Commands in overseas areas is recognized and the role to be played by each service in a theater organization must be understood by all officers regardless of their branch of service. It is my intention this morning to acquaint you with the Air Force's role in a theater of operation.

In the field of theater air operations, it is becoming increasingly important, that all of us understand not only, that certain relationships and procedures exist, but also why they exist. Without going into details, I am sure you all are aware of the inter-service controversies over command and control of theater air forces and of the occasional inept, illogical statements by individuals on this subject. Therefore, in our instructions in this subject at the Naval War College, I want to explain the basis for our present concept. To do this properly, I think it best to approach this subject in three broad categories:

(1) THE EVOLUTION OF THEATER AIR FORCES.

(2) ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND OF THEATER AIR FORCES.

(3) TASKS OF THEATER AIR FORCES.

They say that you can't tell the players without a program and you certainly can't appreciate the role of theater air forces without some background understanding of its historical development. So let's go back a few years and examine the factors influencing the growth of theater air power.

Let me preface my remarks, by stating, that in my discussion of the evolution of theater air forces, it is not my intention to criticize or blame any service for the accepted concept of air power that was widely held at the commencement of World War II. Being a Monday morning quarterback is the easiest job I know of and it's very easy to look back now and let yourself say, "How wrong can we get." Remember the airplane was our newest weapon, and what it could accomplish in a major conflict, was not at this time thoroughly tested in war. Consequently, the doctrine developed in peacetime was soon proven wrong in wartime. Our extremists, on the one hand, advocated that close support was not necessary, but rather let's defeat the enemy deep in her own territory; while the Army commanders advocated that close support of ground forces was all that would be necessary. I believe what happened in the early phases of the war was a healthy situation because it high-lighted the two extreme points of view and therefore allowed the Airman and the Ground Commander to evolve suitable joint doctrine.

The Evolution of Theater Air Forces

The first significant development began with the Tunisian Campaign. When the British First Army and the American II Corps pushed into Tunisia during the last half of Nov. 1942, they were supported by Royal Air Force planes of Eastern Air Command and the U. S. Army Twelfth Air Force. The tactical units

of these two organizations were directly responsible to the ground commanders. At that time the doctrines of air support in the U. S. were based on War Department Field Manual 31-35 of 9 April 1942, subject, AVIATION IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES. By the provisions of this manual the air support commander functioned under the Army commander and aviation units could be specifically allocated to the support of subordinate ground units. The manual conceded that attacks on the enemy's air force might be necessary and that local air superiority was to be desired. It thoroughly offset those concessions by stating that, "the most important target at a particular time will usually be that target which constitutes the most serious threat to the operations of the supported ground force," thus, giving to the commander of the supported unit the authority to make the final decision concerning target priorities and the ordering of a particular air support mission. The destruction or neutralization of enemy air was regarded as no better than a secondary role for the air arm. Even then the responsibility was conceived as a defensive one in which the air arm flew a protective umbrella over those sectors designated by the ground forces to receive support.

Inasmuch as command and the employment of air power are inseparable, it was quite certain in Nov. 1942 that under the provisions of FM 31-35, tactical air power would be used in North Africa when, where, and how the ground forces wanted it to be used, and that the air units stood to be parceled out among the ground units, to the detriment, if not the destruction, of the air arms two great capabilities, flexibility and concentration.

Events in Tunisia soon proved this to be true. To be sure, in the last half of November while the Allies were driving to within sight of Tunis, the matter of doctrine for tactical air operations

was of limited importance. It should be understood, however, that just about this time the importance of air power was beginning to be felt by our Army leaders. As a result of the mistakes being made in the early phases of the war, the Army Commanders were beginning to recognize the necessity of a new field doctrine. The following events soon left little doubt in everyone's mind that a change was needed.

In January, as the ground forces on both sides became more active, the Allied air arm had the strength, the fields, and the logistical support necessary to play a major role. But it consistently failed to throw the scales in favor of the Allied armies, for the simple reason that it was being misused. Why? Because on one occasion a ground commander insisted that fighters patrol his battle sector for two days to prevent an expected attack by Stukas. The Commander was reluctant to appreciate that the patrol, at best, would not have enough planes to interfere seriously with the anticipated attack and, what was more significant, that the patrol could be undertaken only at the expense of what might be more important activities; such as, a light bomber attack against the Stuka bases, reconnaissance of enemy troop movements, and use of the fighters against hostile land targets. There were other unfortunate results of the misuse of the Allied air arm. While the tactical air elements were occupied with local operations, the Germans were left almost entirely free to build up their ground and air forces in Tunisia. Throughout November and December, the enemy, disturbed only mildly by Allied offensive air operations, poured men, supplies, and planes into Tunisia. Even in January, when the Allied air arm had the strength and location to strike hard at the enemy's lines of supply and at air power, the persistent employment of the bulk of the air force in a defensive role allowed the enemy's build-up to continue with but little interference.

One trouble, of course, was that each ground commander naturally looked upon his own immediate front as the one area of real importance and felt that the air forces in his area ought to be used exclusively for his benefit. As far as the ground commander was concerned, the situation on his immediate front was habitually too serious to permit the diversion of the air units to participate in any other task except direct support for his individual unit. It was not that the ground commanders did not feel that air superiority was necessary. They wanted air superiority, but they also wanted the air war which could secure that superiority to be fought by someone else's air units.

Another trouble was that at this time the ground commanders neither understood nor appreciated the capabilities and limitations of air power. As Gen. Montgomery put it,

> *"A ground commander can no more effectively control Air Forces than an air force commander can control ground forces. If either of them try to control their opposite number, full advantage will not be taken of the outstanding characteristics of the other force."*

As a result of these unfortunate situations, the top army leaders decided something must be done. Of the action then taken, the most important development by far came from decisions made at the Casablanca Conference. The conference took cognizance of the growing fusion of operations by planes based in Northwest

Africa and those moving toward Tunisia with the Eighth Army. In order to improve coordination between these two air units, central direction by a single commander was imperative. It also recognized the desirability of grouping the American and British air units according to their functions, tactical requirements, and logistic possibilities, regardless of nationality.

As a result of this conference and in order to bring about a united effort in the use of air power, a re-organization of the air forces was in order. In the proposed rearrangement, Tedder was designated Air Commander in Chief for the theater. Spaatz was selected to head Northwest African Air Forces, and the tactical air arm to be under the command of Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham. Coningham in taking over this new command brought with him a set of tactical air doctrines which had been developed in the Western Desert Campaign. These doctrines, tested and retested during many months of combat and found to be sound, were at sharp variance with the principles of FM 31-35, which had governed tactical air operations in Tunisia. The great difference between the two doctrines was that, the air units were neither subordinate to, nor under the control of, the ground commanders. Coningham's coequal status with the Army Commander in the West had made it possible for him to use to their mutual advantage the peculiar capabilities of air power. His planes were not tied down to ground units to be used in penny packets, but were available for use whenever and wherever the need was pressing or the situation critical. They were not wasted on fleeting or unsuitable targets but were available for concentrated blows against vital points. His control over his units permitted him to keep them fully mobile. Flexibility, mobility, and concentration: those were the foundation stones upon which Coningham had built the Western

Desert Air Force into a powerful and successful striking force. So when Coningham took charge of the tactical air force during the reverses around Kasserine, he immediately put into effect this new deal concept of air power, which was gradually accepted by most of the ground commanders.

In the weeks which followed, the application in Tunisia of the battle-tested doctrine of the Western Desert quickly rectified the misuse of tactical air power which had been so evident in the early days of the Tunisian Campaign.

After the Tunisian campaign, this is what Gen. Eisenhower wrote: Quote — "The new administrative and operational organization successfully solved one of the basic problems of modern warfare—how to apply air power most effectively to the support of land operations. Direct support of ground troops is naturally the method preferred by the immediate military commander concerned, but this needs to be supplemented by assaults on the enemy's bases, on his lines of communication and on his factories, which are beyond the immediate range of the local commander's vision.

"The problem in a given operation is further complicated by the competing demands of individual commanders on a far-flung battlefront, each of whom would naturally like to have at his disposal some segment of the Air Forces for his own exclusive use. To a large extent in our experience, the creation of separate strategic and tactical forces resolved the conflict between the immediate needs of the commander for direct air support, and the equally compelling necessity of knocking out the enemy's war potential far behind his lines; but, perhaps, the greatest advantage of our new organization was its flexibility. Aircraft of the different combat

formations could be fused in a single mission as the need arose, and as a result, the local commander had for direct support the combined weight of the strategic and tactical forces when he most needed it."

In a few short months the Army Air Forces in Africa had switched from an unsound to a sound set of principles of tactical air operations, and at very little cost, had greatly improved the scheme of theater air-ground cooperation. Now that the validity of the principles had been demonstrated in combat, Gen. Arnold wasted no time in pushing the new doctrine through the War Dept. On 21 July 1943, there appeared a new Field Manual, 100-20, subject, COMMAND EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER. For the Army Air Forces, particularly for its tactical units and its tactical operations, the manual was an Emancipation Proclamation and a Bible rolled into one. In part, this is what the new manual concluded:

"Land power and air power are coequal and interdependent forces: neither is an auxiliary of the other . . . . The inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest asset . . . . Control of available air power must be centralized and command must be exercised through the Air Force Commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited. Therefore, the command of air and ground forces in a theater of operations will be vested in the superior commander charged with the actual conduct of operations in the theater, who will exercise command of air forces through the air force commander and command of ground forces through the ground force commander."

Field Manual 100-20 appeared in the midst of the Sicilian Campaign. But its appearance caused no particular flurry among either the air or the ground commanders who were sweeping the

Germans from the island, for the doctrines set forth in the manual had by then been generally accepted as sound. In the months that followed, the application of this doctrine continued to govern the operations of the air forces as they and the ground forces conquered the German armies in Italy.

These basic principles of tactical air operations developed in Tunisia, refined in Sicily and Southern Italy, were adopted and applied by the Ninth Air Force and other tactical elements participating in the European campaigns that commenced when the Allies invaded Normandy in June,, 1944, and ended in May, 1945, with the destruction of the powerful German military force. Thus by V-E day the principles set forth in Field Manual 100-20 had long since become the accepted doctrine of Theater air operations.

Now that we have the background knowledge of the WHY, let's pass on to the HOW; in other words, THE ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND OF THEATER AIR FORCES.

Now let us look at the Commander. Without a place to operate, people to command, and a mission to accomplish, he is a mere figurehead. When these three things have been provided him, he'll be ready to operate. First, let's give him some real estate.

Chapter 3 of Joint Action Armed Forces states that the responsibilities, missions, and tasks assigned to the commander will determine the type of command given to him. It illustrates this by citing the following two ways for assigning command. One is the functional method such as the Strategic Air Command. The other, and the one in which we are primarily interested, is the area and functional method. Whenever the Joint Chiefs of Staff decide

that the activity in a large geographic area is sufficiently concentrated and important to require full-time use of a major force or forces and moreover is largely independent of the activities of other specified forces, that area will be assigned to the command of one officer. This officer will be responsible, through one of the Chiefs of Staff acting as executive agent, for all assigned functions within the area. The effect of this type of command assignment is to limit the responsibility of the commander. In other words, he is responsible for *assigned* tasks within an *assigned* area. This JCS unified or specified commander coordinates the activities of all service components in the most effective and economical manner. Such an area command is what we shall refer to in this instruction as a theater of operation.

In accordance with the current doctrine, when a transient force or forces of a functional command such as Strategic Air Command are based in the JCS Commander's area, the area commander is to furnish them all the required air and logistical support. However, it is important to note he has neither command nor operational control over them, without the Joint Chiefs of Staff approval.

What kind of force will be assigned to the theater commander? The answer to this depends on the assigned tasks. If the tasks are primarily air tasks, as for example in the Northeast Command, the major force will be an air force with assigned small units of other services. If the tasks are a combination of significant air, ground and naval tasks, then the force will be composed of all three services. This latter type of force is called a unified command and is the most common type of force. It is this type that we shall consider in our instruction this morning.

I believe we have established now that the organizational form of a command, the nature of the forces assigned, and the authority of the commander are not arbitrarily assigned because we did it this way in the last war, but rather for current, pertinent and compelling reasons. I have shown that an area and functional command will be established for more or less large-scale, independent operations and a unified force will be assigned to its commander when significant elements of the services are needed. Stated another way, the force is tailored to the needs.

Now, let's consider the organization of a theater under a unified commander. Joint doctrine prescribes that in a unified command, the force commander does not exercise direct command of any of the service components or of a subordinate force. Further, each service component will be commanded directly by an officer of that component.

A commander of a unified command shall have a joint staff with appropriate members of each service component in key positions of responsibility. Normally, a member of the Joint Staff shall not also function as the commander of one of the service components or of a subordinate force.

The military organization of the Alaskan Command furnishes us with an excellent example of how this doctrine is executed in practice. There is a unified commander, a joint staff, and three service components, each commanded by an officer of that service.

Now let's look briefly at a theater organization which stresses primarily the Air Force organization.

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

Under the theater command is a naval commander, a ground commander, and an air commander. One echelon down in the air chain of command are the Air Defense Command, the Air Material Command, the Troop Carrier Command and the Tactical Air Command and any others which may be necessary in light of current conditions. A Strategic Air Command probably will operate from the zone of the interior and will only be supported logistically by the theater. The Tactical Air Command is primarily organized, equipped and trained to plan and conduct continued day and night air operations independently or in conjunction with an Army group. Under the Tactical Air Command is the Tactical Air Force. The Tactical Air Force is set up to control several fighter wings and a reconnaissance wing operating in joint operations with a single army. The Tactical Air Command also has a Tactical Bomber

Force which may be subdivided into bomber divisions for easier control and administration.

We do not like to say there is a stereotype organization for the Tactical Air Command. In order to maintain the highest degree of flexibility the Tactical Air Command organization must be tailored to fit the mission. The Command or Commander must take into account such factors as the objective, the friendly forces, enemy forces both ground and air, geographical area, and others. It was not uncommon in the last war to see units shifted from one air force to another, bomb wings from division to division. This flexibility of organization and operations permit quick shifting of strength from one air force area to another, from one type of operations to another, from a single task to two or three tasks concurrently, or from offense to defense.

Although the theater air commander establishes the policies for the conduct of air operations in conformance to the theater plans, he delegates a high degree of operational freedom to the Tactical Air Commander. The exact degree of operational freedom permitted the Tactical Air Commander varies somewhat with the specific situation.

There are three important things to remember in organizing and employing theater air forces. Organize, Train and Equip your force so as to follow the important characteristics of air power, such as:

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

Let us now discuss the mission of a theater air force. There are currently five areas, or theaters, in which American military units are stationed—Europe, Northeast, Alaska, Far East, and Caribbean. There are Air Force units in all of them. I will not discuss in detail the missions assigned to the various theater commanders, but by examining the air mission of several theaters, we can thereby deduce an air mission for our theater air force.

The mission of the Alaskan and Northeast Commands is to guard the air approaches to America and to support movement through their areas. The missions of the Alaskan Air Command and the Northeast Air Command are to furnish air defense of their assigned areas and to provide basing and navigation facilities to transient aircraft.

An analysis of the Caribbean Command's mission indicates that they include defense of the Panama Canal and training of our military forces. Thus the mission of the Caribbean Air Command is primarily to train air forces and to coordinate Air Force activities in its area.

Far East Command is responsible for the conduct of the Korean War, and for defense of its assigned area. The mission of Far East Air Force is to conduct tactical and troop carrier operations in Korea and to conduct troop carrier and medium bomber operations in the Far East.

Though the missions of the various air forces differ, all bear a striking similarity to the mission of the theater in which located. As you may have surmised, the mission of theater air forces is to exploit—to maximize and optimize—the characteristics of an air force in accomplishing the theater objective.

THE GENERAL MISSION OF THEATER AIR FORCES IS TO CONDUCT AIR OPERATIONS ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE THEATER MISSION AND TO PARTICIPATE WITH OTHER THEATER COMPONENT FORCES IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MISSIONS.

With my general mission in mind, what tasks will I, as an air commander, be required to perform in support of the theater. There are five basic principles to be understood in my relationship with the theater commander:

1. That the theater commander commands the air forces through the theater air commander.
2. That the theater commander determines the tasks that must be accomplished in order to realize his mission.
3. That it is the responsibility of the theater commander, not the ground, navy, or air commanders, to determine what these tasks are and which have priority.
4. That at various times during the course of events one or another of these tasks may become of overriding importance.
5. That some of these tasks will have to be performed by air forces, some by ground forces, some by naval forces and some by joint forces.

From past experience we can say that there are three broad tasks which the theater commander would normally assign to the air commander. All, one, or any combination of these tasks may constitute a mission of theater air power in a campaign. These tasks are:

1. **The gaining and maintaining of air superiority**
2. **Interdiction of the battle area**
3. **Close support of friendly forces**

We, in the Air Force, are now attempting, in our instruction of Air Force doctrine, to eliminate any misunderstanding as to a set priority in relation to those tasks. Thus, I want to emphasize that no particular importance or priority is attached to the order in which these tasks are listed. In the past, these tasks have been referred to as "phases of tactical air operations" and "priorities of tactical air operations." These were inadequate terms since they implied a set procedure of operations and have led to erroneous impressions concerning the proper employment of air power. Performance of any one of these tasks may be the predominant and paramount concern of theater air power in a particular campaign, or during some phase of that campaign. In situations such as those experienced in Europe during World War II, changes of emphasis on the tasks occurred almost daily.

So that you can visualize the capabilities and employment of air power in support of a theater operation, let's look at the first task in a little more detail, *the gaining and maintaining of air superiority.*

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The gaining and maintaining of air superiority in areas of operations is essential. An enemy possessing freedom of the air, subjects friendly air to constant attack, and forces friendly surface troops to constantly seek cover, disperse or suffer severe losses. Ensuring an acceptable degree of air superiority is, in the majority of operations, the principal task to accomplish. It is a major job which may require our entire air strength. Also, it is just as necessary in the execution of air operations as in the execution of land or sea operations. Gaining air superiority dictates that air power be directed and concentrated in mass against enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground. It requires, further, that enemy air bases, supply depots, and other facilities be destroyed or neutralized. Since this task of gaining an acceptable air superiority is, principally, an initial step in any type of theater action, the theater commander can usually be expected to begin his day to day plans with considerations for maintaining and even increasing this general air superiority within his theater of operations.



The immobilization of the enemy is another task of whole theater air power, not of any compartmented portion of it. So-called "isolation of the battle area" is only a part of the job of interdiction. The enemy's supply problems begin at the factory where his supplies are manufactured and do not end until his equipment is in the hands of his combat soldiers. Interdiction extends the paralysis of an enemy's transportation system from the battle area to the heart of the nation. Enemy forces that cannot move, raw materials that cannot reach the factory and supplies and equipment that cannot reach the user, military or civilian, are useless. A nation deprived of its means of moving is defeated. This is interdiction.

In terms of bombs, rockets, bullets and effort expended, interdiction of a selected battle area usually is a most profitable activity for tactical air power in furtherance of the over-all theater mission. This activity restricts the enemy from massing troops, equipment and supplies. It hinders any significant enemy movement into, out of, or within the area, and disrupts enemy communications to a point where general disorder may result.

Now let's consider the third task, *close support of friendly forces.*



Friendly surface forces in contact with the enemy require close combat air support to engage enemy targets which are not within the capabilities of ground weapons, or to supplement fire power of ground weapons.

In the theater of operation the first question is, what units are available for the direct support of ground troops? Again, once the theater decision has been made that this job is of overwhelming importance, all units allocated to the theater commander by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are available whether it be heavy bomber, troop carrier, jet fighter, land or carrier-based. *The priority of operations is determined by the relative importance of all the tasks confronting the theater commander. Let me repeat. The priority of operations is determined by the relative importance of all the tasks confronting the theater commander.* Too often, we overstress the importance of priorities of support missions based on a chronological sequence—air superiority, interdiction of the battlefield, close support. None of these missions is ever completely accomplished. Too often we create the erroneous impression that we can never isolate the battlefield until we have permanent and complete air superiority; that we never provide close support until we have achieved absolute isolation of the battlefield. This is certainly a misconception, and to operate on such a basis would fail to utilize most effectively the inherent capabilities of the weapon.

Once the theater decision has been made on the relative urgency of the job to be done, the decision as to the weapon to be used depends upon its characteristics, its availability, and its economy. The Army, for instance, does not use heavy artillery when Infantry weapons are available and can do the job; the Navy

does not use a battleship when a destroyer is available and can do the job; nor does the Air Force use heavy bombers when fighters are available and can do the job.

The characteristics of the aircraft and other equipment of a unit and the training of the combat crews are designed to meet certain requirements. It is uneconomical to use a weapon in a role for which it is not designed except when the requirements of that role are of overwhelming importance. The destructive and cumulative effects of heavy bomber attacks against the concentrated targets in the interior of a nation are far greater than against the small dispersed targets of the battlefield. Only when the immediate results desired are of critical importance is it appropriate to divert heavy bombers from their normal role. When this situation does arise, the theater commander concerned will not hesitate to concentrate his available air power as necessity demands.

To briefly summarize, theaters of operation should be designated and organized according to the situation and should be charged with conducting, concurrently or otherwise, those campaigns necessary to achieve the objectives assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The flexibility inherent in the airplane must be utilized to the maximum in order to provide overwhelming force at the place and at the time dictated by the situation.

We believe that only a theater organization of one Air Force under one control will permit the maximum use of this flexibility.

While the flexibility of the airplane and a correct organization permits massing overwhelming force where needed, the

equipment and training of a unit makes it more economical and effective on certain missions than others.

Compartmentation of tasks and missions subverts the unified effort required to accomplish an objective. The strength of air power lies primarily in its flexibility, so as to allow the greatest concentration in force, as required, and it is this asset which the theater commander should maximize above all others in his organization, policies and command structure.

Colonel Nichols is an Air Force Officer assigned to the Strategy and Tactics Department of the Naval War College Staff.

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RECOMMENDED READING

Current Books

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books are available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

Title: *Know Your Enemy.* 94 p.

Author: Mares, Delia S. Dallas, Banks Upshaw & Co., 1952.

Evaluation: **In a very concise manner the author reviews the historical development of communism. In so doing, she outlines the basic tenets of the Marxian theory. She then reviews the Leninist interpretation and application of the theory. Finally, she traces Stalin's rise to power and reveals the methods used to strengthen his hold on the communist world. The distinction between the ruthless dictatorial government of Stalin and the dream of the day of no government, as visualized by Marx, is clearly drawn. This is an excellent book. It should be required reading in every high school. Though also recommended for adults, people who have done considerable reading on the subject will find it somewhat elementary. It is recommended for reading by War College students early in the academic year.**

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Title: *The New Breed.* 395 p.

Author: Geer, Andrew Clare. N. Y., Harper, 1952.

Evaluation: A factual account of the activities of the First Marine Division, from the time of its landing in Korea at the Pusan Perimeter, through the epic "attack in another direction" from the Chosin Reservoir. An excellent account of the fighting in Korea from the "fire team and squad" point of view.

Title: *The Soviet Air Force.* 2d ed. 227 p.

Author: Lee, Asher. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1952.

Evaluation: The author, a senior Air Ministry intelligence officer during World War II, has very ably traced and evaluated the Soviet Air Force (including military and naval aviation) from its birth to its stature in 1952. The areas covered include birth and adolescence, organization, training, aircraft industry, airborne troops, operations 1941-43, airpower in pursuit of the Germans 1943-45, long-range bombers and the post-war decade. It can be concluded that the general information and statistics presented on the post-war Soviet Air Force are probably as accurate as any available to the layman. The book is recommended reading for all those interested in Russian war potentials.

Title: *Asia Aflame.* 294 p.

Author: Van der Vlugt, Ebed. N. Y., The Devin-Adair Co., 1953.

Evaluation: In the first thirty-four pages this volume portrays in easily readable form the background of communism, and the strategy and tactics pursued on a global scale by the communists directed from the Kremlin. It tells how the Soviet State is enabled to maintain power. Stalin's definition of strategy and tactics is also given. The later chapters deal in detail with the countries of the Far East, Middle East, Indenesia, etc., and show how communist infiltration is accomplished. The case of China is extreme-

ly interesting as is the author's remarks concernng personalities of the State Department in this case. The author believes that "native nationalism" is used by the fifth column wherever confusion exists with such confusion being in each case "communist inspired." This is an excellent picture of communsm in all Asian countries from Iran to Indonesia. The author has some good ideas (the last two chapters) on "How to Meet the Red Attack in Asia," and "How Can We Fight World Communism?"

Title: *Frontiers for Freedom.* 327 p.

Author: Hoxie, R. Gordon. Denver, Colo., University of Denver Press, 1952.

Evaluation: The author has recorded the salient features of the World Affairs Institute, a symposium of eminent statesmen, scholars, business and labor leaders, doctors, lawyers, and members of the clergy from Europe, Asia, and the United States who gathered at the University of Denver in July and August, 1951. The purpose of this symposium was to analyze the principal underlying causes of world tensions in an effort to determine appropriate measures for easing these tensions. Significant in generating these tensions is the revolt of the underdeveloped areas of the world against poverty and domination, as well as their drive for human rights. The capacity of the United Natiens and the democratic alliances for meeting the challenge of these problems is explored. The book presents a comprehensive picture of the primary causes for world tension and the measures considered necessary for their elimination. In view of the pertinence of this material to current strategic planning, the book is recommended to senior officers of all services.

Title: *U-Boat* 977. 207 p.

Author: Schaeffer, Heinz. London, William Kimber, 1952.

Evaluation: Schaeffer has written a most interesting description of his career in the German Submarine Service during World War II. The book is primarily an account of the author's naval career starting with his preliminary training as a

naval cadet, covering the highlights of several submarine war patrols, and culminating in the long trip made with his first command, the U-977, from the North Atlantic to Argentina after Germany's surrender. The many amplifying discussions and descriptions in this book give the reader an excellent picture of submarine wartime operations from the point of view both of the individual submariner and of the high command. The various changes in tactics and deployment made by the German High Command in its effort to thwart the ever-increasing effectiveness of Allied anti-submarine measures are ably and interestingly discussed.

Title: *Brassey's Annual—The Armed Forces Year-Book.* 430 p.

Author: Thursfield, H. G., Rear Admiral, ed. N. Y., Macmillan, 1952.

Evaluation: The sixty-third edition of "Brassey's Annual" is primarily an examination of the British Armed Forces, their organization and their experiences, with the forces of all other nations covered in lesser detail. The contents also include pertinent and provocative articles on such subjects as: "War by Proxy," "Political Warfare," "The Future of the Aircraft Carrier," "The Future of Air Power," and "The Tank in Future Warfare." One of the best chapters is devoted to "British Destroyers" and is an interesting and thoroughly covered account of the history of destroyers in the British Navy. The account of the loss of H. M. Submarine "Affray" is a particularly well written analysis of this event. "Brassey's Annual" should be very valuable as a reference in studies on tho current world situation and Western defense, and as a guide in any evaluation of the British Armed Forces.

Title: *The Antarctic Problem.* 316 p.

Author: Christie, E. W. Hunter. London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1951.

Evaluation: This is a presentation of the claims of sovereignty by Great Britain, Argentina, and Chile for the portion of

the Antarctic between 20 degrees W and 80 degrees W, including the islands from the Falklands south. It includes a strategic portion of the Antarctic, for in it is the only part of the continent extending north of the Antarctic Circle, as well as the islands which guard the entrances to the Strait of Magellan and the Drake Passage. The author made a comprehensive study of the historical and documentary background, and presents it in a most interesting manner. Details are given of the discoveries by explorers, merchantmen, and scientists, as well as descriptions of occupation and acts of administration. Since the author is British, his presentation is biased in favor of his country's claims. Chile, Argentina, and Great Britain all have permanently occupied bases in the area. This book is considered to contain background material of value to a Naval officer, and the fourteen pages of the conclusion are of value in studying the international law concerning claims of sovereignty.

Title: *George Washington, Vol. 5—Victory with the Aid of France.* 569 p.

Author: Freeman, Douglas. N. Y., Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952.

Evaluation: The fifth volume of Douglas Southall Freeman's planned eight-volume biography of George Washington equals the first four in merit. It covers the period from Washington's receipt of the news of the French alliance on 30 April 1778, until Christmas Eve 1783, when he again became a private citizen. The author is true to his purpose and keeps Washington the center of interest throughout. The story is told against the backdrop of those discouraging war years when our revolutionary army knew only defeat and privation. The cheering note of the French alliance brought only disappointment as it was months before it could be turned into material aid. When this aid did arrive, Washington showed great skill in planning and conducting the seige of Yorktown, employing the combined land and sea forces of the allies. If Washington had served only the years covered by this volume he would deserve the appellation, "Father of Our Country."

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Title: *Russia and Her Colonies.* 319 p.

Author: Kolarz, Walter. London, George Philip and Son.

Evaluation: In this book the author discusses the relations between the Communist Government and the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. The magnitude of the "colonization" problem for the Soviets is indicated by the fact that the Russians make up less than half the population of the USSR, and that there are "180 peoples of the Soviet Union." In the territories of these peoples the Soviet Government has built schools and universities, developed natural resources and created modern industry, but whatever benefits the minorities have derived from this must be weighed against the negation by the Communist Party of human rights and regional aspirations. Of special interest is the final chapter, in which the Soviet "melting-pot" is compared to that of the U. S., and the colonization policies are compared to those of the British. The latter brings out how the British have attempted to promote the democratic process while the Soviets have tried to curb it. The author sounds a note of hope for the non-Russian peoples inside the Soviet Union and throughout the world when he contends that the best chance for a strong, unified Soviet Union lies in providing in the future for a democratic Russian federation in which the colonies are granted greater freedom of religious autonomy and allowed to have their own language and culture. Such a change of policy would, of course, promote amiable relations with the Western nations. This book appears to be an authoritative treatise on a subject that is unusual in that the extsnt of colonization within the USSR is not generally known. While the pros and cons of the Soviet Government's relations with each of the non-Russian peoples are of no special interest, the existence of the problems generated and the conclusions drawn from them are of significance to students of our foreign policy and to military planners.

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PERIODICALS

Title: *Control of the Sea.*

Author: Fechteler, W. M., Admiral, U. S. N.

Publication: ORDNANCE, January-February, 1953, p. 599-601.

Annotation: A reasoned and well-organized statement of the vital importance to us of control of the seas and an exposition of how that control should be used to project naval air and amphibious power as well as the power of air and land forces overseas.

Title: *Outlook for* 1953.

Publication: INTERAVIA, Volume 8, No. 1, 1953.

Annotation: Articles written by air experts on such subjects as: The Future of Civil Air Transport; The Economic and Physiological Limits to Air Power; U. S. Aeronautics in 1953; What's in a Shape? and Straight, Swept and Delta. These articles portray aircraft trends for 1953.

Title: *Could We Stop a Red U-Boat Attack?*

Author: Gallery, D. V., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

Publication: THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, January 31, 1953, p. 28-29, 86 and 88.

Annotation: An experienced antisubmarine-task force commander discusses the present-day submarine threat and the Hunter-Killer Force, Atlantic, established by Admiral McCormick to counter the menace of the growing Soviet submarine fleet.

Title: *LST Base Keeps Chennault Line Flying.*

Author: Christian, George L.

Publication: AVIATION WEEK, February 2, 1953, p. 64-72.

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Annotation: Tells how Major General Chennault's Civil Air Transport line is kept in operation by a maintenance base built on a World War II LST tied up at a port on Formosa.

Title: *The Truth About Biological Warfare.*

Author: Creasy, William M., Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Publication: ORDNANCE, January-February, 1953, p. 619-621

Annotation: Concise, factual information presented in an attempt to correct false impressions that may have been created by sensational articles published on this subject.

Title: *Battlefield Intelligence.*

Author: Baldwin, Hanson W.

Publication: COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, February, 1953, p. 30-40.

Annotation: The author seeks to discover how Hitler was able to effect complete tactical surprise when he launched the Battle of the Bulge. Very interesting article.

Title: *Korea: Are We Teaching More Than We Learn?*

Author: Colwell, James

Publication: THE REPORTER, February 3, 1953, p. 24-26.

Annotation: Asserts that our struggle with Communist China will very shortly require a reappraisal of her position as a world power and discusses China's future as a military power.

Title: *With Kurita in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.*

Author: Koyanagi, Tomiji, Rear Admiral, Former Imperial Japanese Navy.

Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, February, 1953, p. 119-133.

Annotation: The former Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet of the Japanese Navy, reviews the course of events and describes the battle as he saw it.

Title: *A Report on Russia.*

Publication: FORTUNE, February, 1953, p. 111-125.

Annotation: Four articles appraising Soviet strength (1952-1955) cover: (1) The Kremlin's Plan V; (2) The Red Air Forces; (3) How Business Gets Done in Russia; (4) Soviet Society: From the Dacha Set Down. (Map, p. 116-117, indicating mineral and industrial production areas; Charts, p. 119).

Title: *Western Aid for Red Build-up.*

Author: Duncan, David Douglas.

Publication: LIFE, January 26, 1953, p. 23-32.

Annotation: Strategic materials are being shipped behind the Iron Curtain in ever-increasing amounts by dealers who center their activities in Vienna.

Title: *Shall We Blow Them Up?*

Author: Miller, George H., Captain, U. S. N.

Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, February, 1953, p. 151-155.

Annotation: Time, geographic position, and the ability to create a military establishment for our national security are our advantages in the cold war; if we use these advantages wisely and exercise patience in our dealings with the communists, a war between the United States and Russia may be avoided.

Title: *If I Were Russia's Chief of Staff.*

Author: Liddell Hart, Basil H., Captain, British Army.

Publication: UNITED NATIONS WORLD, February, 1953, p. 10-14, 63.

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Annotation: The author gives his concept of how Russia would win World War III. Includes a chart of Russia's proposed airborne blitz. Especially recommended reading for all hands.

Title: *Can We Avoid War With Russia?*

Author: Kennan, George F.

Publication: NEW REPUBLIC, February 2, 1953, p. 13-17.

Annotation: In an address before the Pennsylvania Bar Association, January 16, the former Ambassador to Russia recommends certain general principles to observe in dealing with the problems of international communism.

Title: *Red China Should Be Blockaded.*

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 16, 1953, p. 16-18.

Annotation: Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King gives his views on measures that should be taken to end the stalemate in Korea.

Title: *What Is England Thinking Of?*

Author: Hauser, Ernest O.

Publication: THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, January 24, 1953, p. 22-23, 65-67.

Annotation: Attempts to explain the British attitude toward communist infiltration of the press, civil service and Church of England. Discusses the willingness of the British to trade with Russia and Red China.

Title: *More Imports Needed.*

Author: Slichter, Sumner H.

Publication: THE ATLANTIC, January, 1953, p. 37-40.

Annotation: Tho author, a noted economist and Lamont professor at Harvard, develops the thesis that the U. S. can enormous-

ly strengthen the economies of the non-communist countries and help them to achieve a considerable degree of convertibility for their currencies within several years—and presents ways and means by which this can be done.

Title: *Indo-China War—A French Dilemma.*

Author: Driscoll, John J., Colonel, U. S. A. F.

Publication: AIR FORCE, January, 1953, p. 24-29.

Annotation: Asserts that, to Russia, Korea and Indo-China are but two fronts of the same war and must be considered such. Outlines the difficulties faced by the French in the long struggle against the Viet Minh.

Title: *Soviet Military Strength.*

Author: Del Vayo, J. Alvarez.

Publication: THE NATION, January 24, 1953, p. 66-69.

Annotation: Compares the military strength of Russia with that of the NATO nations and concludes that there is no basis for the theory that by 1955 the balance of military power will be so altered in NATO's favor that the policy of "peace through strength" will be effective.

Title: *Has France a Case in Tunisia?*

Author: Monroe, Elizabeth.

Publication: THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW, Winter, 1952-53, p. 1-17.

Annotation: An analysis of the French problem regarding North Africa, gives the historical background of the problem and notes the importance of the area to the West.

Title: *Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the United States.*

Author: Morgenthau, Hans J.

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Publication: THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, December, 1952, p. 961-988.

Annotation: A discussion on the present debate between advocates of a utopian foreign policy for the U. S. and a realistic one, in which the author reemphasizes the stand he has taken and refutes his critics.

Title: *Choice in the West.*

Author: Bernard, S.

Publication: WORLD POLITICS, January, 1953, p. 133-167.

Annotation: A European student of politics, reviews the political situation which has developed in post-war Europe and considers the choices now open to the West in its relations with the Soviet Union.

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ERRATA

Vol. V No. 5 January 1953

1. Ocean Shipping—Captain B. M. Dodson, USN.

Please correct as follows:

Page 3 line 2—Change 4 million cubic feet to read 1 million cubic feet.

Page 3 line 15—Change 4,000 cubic feet to read 40,000 cubic feet.

2. Naval and Marine Officer Training.

Page 71 line 15—Change sentence to read:

Thirty USNR Lieutenant Commanders selected by the District Commandants, and ten USMCR Majors selected by the Commandant of the Marine Corps are expected to attend this course.....

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