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11

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# NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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## CONTENTS

**GERMAN NAVAL STRATEGY DURING  
WORLD WAR II . . . . . 1**  
*Ex-Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, German Navy*

**ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AFFECTING  
THE NAVAL COMMANDER . . . . . 31**  
*Commander Geoffrey E. Carlisle, U. S. N.*

**RECOMMENDED READING . . . . . 55**

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
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## **GERMAN NAVAL STRATEGY DURING WORLD WAR II**

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 17 December 1952 by

*Ex-Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, German Navy*

### **Introduction.**

German naval strategy during World War II, particularly during its first half, was greatly influenced by the way naval war had been planned and conducted before and during 1914/18. When World War I broke out Germany had a powerful, well-trained navy, about two-thirds as strong as the Royal Navy. German ships fought well, the fleet suffered comparatively minor losses only, and yet it found a dismal end at Scapa Flow. When, in June 1919, we scuttled our ships there we understood the reasons for this failure but dimly. When things had calmed down to some extent after revolution and civil war, and when the rebuilding of the very small Reichsmarine had been taken in hand, every effort was made to analyze the operations and events of 1914/18 in order to learn what mistakes had brought about failure and defeat.

### **Drawing Lessons from World War I**

War diaries kept by the staffs and on board ship were a great help to establish the facts, personal recollections, many in the form of memoirs written by leading officers and statesmen gave an insight into the underlying ideas. Admiral Behncke, commanding 3rd Battle Squadron at Jutland. C.-in-C. Navy 1920/24, initiated the writing of the official history of the naval war; Admiral Zenker, at Jutland C. O. of BC VON DER TANN, C.-in-C. Navy 1924/28, encouraged historical research and very early started training younger officers in operational and strategical thinking; Admiral Raeder, at Jutland

**RESTRICTED**

1

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on Hipper's staff, C.-in-C. 1928/43, wrote a volume of the Naval History himself and re-established the Naval War College.

Apart from lectures, talks, the official Naval History, and classified studies on certain aspects of the naval war, its strategical lessons were strikingly expounded by Admiral (then Commander) Wegener in his treatise on "Naval Strategy in World War," which was made known to his friends in 1926, and published in 1929. Admiral Groos followed him with his book "*Seekriegslehren*" (Lessons from the Naval War).

The somewhat disturbing, but generally accepted conclusion of all these studies was that a faulty strategy based on a mistaken interpretation of the "Fleet in Being" concept lay at the root of the failure of the German Navy.

### **Development of German Naval Strategy.**

This was all the more surprising as up to about 1900, when the German Navy was small and France the most likely opponent, plans were bold, and provided for a cooperation with the Army by far-reaching operations like a large-scale landing in Normandy and a blockade of Brest. In the following years, the rapid expansion of the Navy, the task of keeping abreast of technical developments and incorporating them in fleet tactics seem to have absorbed the best brains of the Navy to such an extent that strategical thinking withered. Apart from the annual summer cruise to Norway, the Fleet trained exclusively in the Southeast corner of the North Sea and in the Baltic. A few cruisers were stationed at strategical points in foreign waters, in accordance with an old military-political tradition. In spring, 1914, for the first time in many years, two new battleships left home waters for a short cruise to the South Atlantic.

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### **Lack of a German Grand Strategy.**

In the years after 1900, no attempt seems to have been made at coordinating political, military and naval thinking and strategy. A strong "High Seas Fleet" was built, yet no bases were secured on the high seas. The Army expected a war on two fronts and knew that it would tax its forces to the utmost, yet no preparations were made to throw the weight of the powerful fleet into the balance. The Navy itself was of the opinion that the existence alone of strong naval forces in the German Bight of the North Sea would compel the British to blockade them closely. Therefore, it trained assiduously for a battle not far from Heligoland, by which its leaders hoped to bring about a "*Krafteausgleich*," (equalization of forces) enabling them to undertake more aggressive operations at some undefined later date.

### **German Failure to Exploit the First Phase of the War.**

In this planning the Navy Staff did not take into account the fact that no vital British sea communications ran anywhere near Heligoland Bight. On the other hand, it underestimated British susceptibility to any threat to the English east coast, let alone to the Channel. There is no doubt that in the first months of the war a feint in this direction could have brought the British Fleet to battle not much more than a hundred miles from Heligoland. The German Fleet, however, was kept tied to that island in the expectation of an attack which never materialized, whilst the German armies tried—and almost succeeded through the bold Schlieffen Plan—to crush the French armies in a few weeks in order then to oppose and best the slower-moving Russians.

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### **Naval Situation 1914/16.**

When the Schlieffen Plan failed in the weak hands of the younger Moltke, Germany's situation became most difficult. Neither commerce raiding by the few cruisers stationed outside home waters nor isolated hit-and-run operations against the English east coast could improve it in the least. After the initial phase of the war had not been exploited by the German Navy, the Grand Fleet, based on Scapa Flow, could rely on a distant blockade to strangle Germany slowly, but surely. It was in an ideal position to intercept any strong German attempt to reach the Atlantic and the British communications there.

Of course, geography assisted Great Britain in this strategy and made this kind of warfare easy. It should also be taken into account that an unbeaten German Fleet safeguarded command of the western and central Baltic, indispensable for a prolonged war owing to the ore traffic from northern Sweden. To some degree this explains the reluctance to commit the fleet. On the other hand, it was self-evident that Great Britain was a very dangerous opponent and could be hit hardest by destroying her shipping since a landing in England was out of question. It took a year and a half of cruising in the German Bight and an abortive attempt at unrestricted submarine warfare before the German leaders realized that the most direct, and at the same time only, method to open the road to British sea communications was by forcing the Grand Fleet to battle under circumstances favorable for the German superiority in submarines and air reconnaissance.

### **Admiral Scheer's Strategy.**

Admiral Scheer, the chief advocate of this more aggressive policy, took over as C.-in-C. Fleet in January, 1916. By a series



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of well-planned and inter-related operations he actually succeeded in bringing the Grand Fleet into the open in the Central North Sea. Although the ratio of strength in capital ships had greatly deteriorated (16 German to 18 British in the fall of 1914 as against 21 to 37 at Jutland), he was convinced that he had a good chance of success owing to the better training and material and by a clever use of submarines and airships. Within five months the fleets or large parts of them were in striking distance from each other four times, but chance prevented actual contact on three of these occasions. Only at Jutland, in May 1916, did the two fleets come to grips, but under far less favorable circumstances than those toward which Scheer had directed his hopes and operations. Bad weather upset his timetable; his submarines were already leaving their waiting positions; scouting by airships was ineffective due to bad visibility; the night attack for which the German destroyers had trained for many years, did not come off. Although the British lost far more ships and men than the Germans, the strategical gain was nil, since the overall situation remained unchanged.

### **Submarine War.**

Therefore, the German Supreme Command came to the decision to start unrestricted war by submarines as the only means to get at British shipping. Too much time had already been lost, Germany was suffering heavily under the blockade for which she had not been prepared. British losses were brought to a dangerous, but not to a mortal level, and the new kind of warfare brought the United States with all its resources into the war.

Owing to improved mining, the High Seas Fleet was now increasingly busy to keep channels open for the submarines leaving and entering. Therefore, although raids with light forces were

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continued, the battle fleet undertook only one more operation. In April, 1918, it proceeded farther north than ever before, to the latitude of Bergen, to intercept a convoy and its covering force, which might have been the U. S. VIth Battle Squadron. The timing was faulty, however; on a perfect day with unusual visibility, we sighted the snow-clad mountains of Norway, but not a single vessel. After a few months, there followed the bitter end with mutiny, revolution, internment, scuttling.

**Strategic Situation after 1920.**

At first, the historical studies previously mentioned and the conclusions drawn from them seemed to have theoretical value only. Under the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, the German Navy was a cripple at best. Germany was allowed to keep in service 6 obsolete battleships of the pre-dreadnought era, 6 very light cruisers built around 1900, 24 old torpedo boats, fully or partly coal-burning, a few minesweepers and tenders, but no submarines, no aircraft. Replacements were to have the following tonnage:

so-called BBs	10,000 tons
LCs	6,000 tons
12 DDs	800 tons
12 Torpedoboats	200 tons

Funds were so low in the first years after the war that hardly any new constructions could be undertaken, though all these vessels were ripe for replacement when the treaty was signed. By creating constant irritation in form of the Polish corridor the Treaty of Versailles had marked Poland as the logical adversary, who most probably would be supported by France. Because the German Army was of the opinion that only the Poles could be taken on, defence plans

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initially followed this line. A few years later, however, the problems of a war against both France and Poland were examined.

### Evolution of Strategic Thought.

Germany could not hope to defend herself alone against this combination. In order to make the idea of an alliance attractive to others, everything was done to bring the Armed Forces to a high pitch of efficiency. Good leadership and good planning were considered as paramount, and much was done to foster them. In the Navy, Admiral Zenker personally gave a number of lectures on strategy which, according to his listeners, were outstanding in clarity and penetration of the subject, a kind of naval Clausewitz. Unfortunately, they were never printed, although he caused a service manual "*Admiralstabsdienst*," i. e., "The Duties in the Navy Staff" to be written for the initial courses for staff officers.

These courses could be attended by a few officers only. To make all the others conversant with tactical and strategical problems, war games were held every winter by every unit, ship, flotilla, battalion, etc. Their value depended greatly upon the qualities of the officer in charge. The spring and fall maneuvers of the small fleet generally ended with a strategical problem. Every winter, lieutenant commanders and officers of higher rank were required to write a report on a strategical, tactical, or technical subject. Excellent libraries and lectures helped to further general education and military and naval thinking. In this way, much was done to keep the officers mentally alert in spite of the limitations of a very small Navy.

The treatise of Admiral Wegener on "Naval Strategy in the World War" was particularly suited to induce strategical thinking, and it was widely read and discussed. It gave an excellent picture of the mistakes and possibilities of that war. Among

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other things it pointed out the changes which the possession of Denmark and Norway would have made for German naval operations. From that time on the German Navy was Norway-conscious, if I may use this expression, and fully realized the implications of that area being in own hands or in enemy hands.

### **Averting the Danger of Becoming a Coastal Navy.**

Nevertheless, there was some danger that owing to the smallness of the Fleet, the lack of submarines and aircraft, of battleships and carriers, the German Navy would relapse into purely coastal thinking. The critical time came when at last there was money to replace some of the old BBs by ships of 10,000 tons. At first, the only practical solution seemed to build a kind of large monitor, comparatively slow, with heavy armor and 11-inch guns, to be used defensively in the German Bight and perhaps offensively in Danzig Bight. Against strong resistance from several quarters, Admiral Zenker made the bold decision for a type which was well suited for the high seas and not for coastal warfare, a diesel-driven vessel of an entirely new type, with the comparatively high speed of 26 knots, light armor and six 11-inch guns. These vessels would be faster than almost any heavier ship, and more heavily armed than any faster ship, and their cruising range would greatly exceed that of any cruiser or capital ship. They were to be used in the Atlantic with the intention of compelling the French to employ the bulk of their fleet for escorting their merchant shipping. In this way, the German Navy Staff hoped to keep the road free for own vital supplies.

### **Aim: A Balanced Fleet.**

In addition, these vessels fitted in best with the idea of "*Bundnisfahigkeit*" appearing again and again in the reflections and memoranda of that time; i. e., of making the German Navy strong enough, in spite of all restrictions, so as to be a valuable contribu-

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tion to any alliance that Germany might enter. The political situation could change quickly, and therefore it was the aim of the leaders of the Navy to create a fleet as well balanced as possible under the circumstances, not a fleet for a special emergency which might never arise.

### **War Against Great Britain Unthinkable.**

One thing was clear to the Navy all the time between the wars up to 1938: A conflict with Great Britain was unthinkable. 1914-18 had opened our eyes and was considered as a tragic mistake which never should be repeated lest the consequences be far more terrible to both. Therefore, it was strictly forbidden to play with this kind of fire even in war games. As far as can be ascertained now, only one strategic game was carried through by the Naval War College, in the early thirties, in which England played any part. Its subject was not, however, trying out measures for a war against Great Britain, but demonstrating to the students the inter-relations between Mediterranean and North Sea in any war in which Great Britain might be involved.

### **London Naval Treaty.**

The Naval Treaty with Great Britain, concluded in 1935, showed the same trend of thought. In naval circles, it was taken seriously and welcomed as a step to a mutual understanding and for regularizing relations. We did not in the least suspect how little Hitler intended to respect treaties. The acceptance of 35% of British over-all strength seemed to us the best proof, particularly in the light of the geographic situation, that Germany did not harbor any aggressive intentions. True, the clauses concerning submarines allowed us to build 45% and later 100% of the British strength in that arm. It should be taken into account, however,

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that the British had few submarines, 53,000 tons at the time, and that the Germans did not speed up submarine construction, but pursued the policy of building a well-balanced fleet, composed of conventional types.

### **The Question of Diesel-Powered Ships.**

Many officers would have liked the construction of armored ships with diesel engines to have continued. In view of the development of fast battleships of other nations (especially the French *Dunkerques*, the 10,000 ton type was too slow and not heavily enough armed. Diesels for giving vessels of 20,000 tons a speed of 30 knots were in the experimental stage. Adapting them to the 26,000 ton SCHARNHORST would have retarded these ships by about a year. For the time being, the Navy therefore switched over to superheated steam of very high pressure in order to get BBs, cruisers and DDs with a good cruising range in a short time. The designers had been a bit too optimistic, however, and the new boilers and auxiliary engines caused considerable trouble at first. The range, especially of the heavy cruisers, fell far short of expectations. This is probably the main reason for their indifferent performance in Atlantic warfare.

The diesel idea was by no means abandoned. In the Z-plan 1938-39, armored ships of 20,000 tons with diesel engines appeared, and cruisers and DDs were also to be equipped with diesels. In winter 1944-45, we had a DD building with 6 diesels of 10,000 h. p. each, and another type for large ships was ready.

### **Hitler Sees War with Great Britain.**

At the end of May, 1938, in a discussion of the political situation with Admiral Raeder, Hitler for the first time mentioned that he expected Great Britain to join Germany's adver-

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saries. He asked the admiral to speed up the construction of the two BB's building at the time, and to make preparations for reaching submarine parity with Great Britain quickly. But a committee for making recommendations on an increased ship-building program for a possible war against Great Britain and France was not formed until September, 1938, and no immediate steps were taken for the strategical appraisal of the situation. In February, 1939, a war game was played at Oberhof, in Thuringia, with the subject of a war against both countries, but even then the prospective ratio of strength of 1944-45 was taken as a basis.

### Plans for an Ocean-Going Fleet.

In the following months plans were drawn up for increasing the Navy considerably after notice had been given concerning the London Naval Treaty (end of April, 1939). The so-called Z-plan visualized an ocean-going fleet of 10 BBs, twelve 20,000-ton armored ships, only 2 carriers, and a great number of cruisers and DDs. As mentioned before, many of these vessels were to be diesel-powered.

### Situation at Outbreak of War, 1939.

When war came in September, 1939, current construction had been speeded up slightly, but on the whole the German Navy had to face a situation which it considered as politically disastrous and for which it had made little preparation. It was much smaller than the French Navy, and roughly one-tenth of the Royal Navy—which alone counted in our eyes. In the various types the ratio of strength was:

BB	15	:	(2)
CV	6	:	0
CA and CL	64	:	10 (including armored ships)
DD	183	:	22
SS	57	:	46 (only 22 capable of oceanic warfare)

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11

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Moreover, the British had far more vessels of all classes under construction than the Germans. Geographically, the situation was much the same as in 1914-18, only the development of aircraft made it much easier for Great Britain to patrol and to control the routes leading on either side of Iceland to the Atlantic. On the other hand, Russia was a friendly neutral, and Japan was ready to give some support to German ships.

### **Strategy of Naval War Staff.**

Small wonder that with such an inferiority and in such an unfavorable position the attempt to make some lasting impression upon the British was considered as rather hopeless in some quarters, and a strictly defensive attitude was advocated. It was here that the study of the naval planning and operations of World War I exercised a great influence upon the decisions of Naval War Staff. However difficult the situation, whatever the odds might be, one idea was axiomatic with the C-in-C. Navy and his advisers: They had not the slightest intention of having their fleet, however diminutive it was, milling around Heligoland and playing at "Fleet in Being" in a remote and uninteresting corner of the North Sea.

They knew only too well how difficult it would be to employ the meagre forces at their disposal to secure command of the sea, be it for safeguarding the German sea routes or for intercepting enemy shipping.

The protection of German shipping had to be restricted to the Baltic and to the ore traffic from northern Norway. Little anxiety was felt for the Baltic. There was never the slightest doubt that the Poles would be eliminated in a very short time. The Baltic entrances were secured by mines and nets at their southern exits and considered as safe in view of the strength of the



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German air force and the obvious reluctance of the British fleet to venture into narrow and shallow waters near German bases. As to Norway, it would be best if she remained neutral. Then the ore traffic could use Norwegian territorial waters, like in peace time, down to the Skagerrak and, if necessary, to the Kattegat where it was as good as out of British reach—all the more so, as a large and strong mine barrage had been laid from the West Frisian Islands 150 miles to the north, which had pushed the exit from the German Bight almost up to the Skagerrak. Nothing could be done for the protection of the sea routes outside these extended home waters. Therefore, all merchant ships on the oceans were ordered to run for safety. Many made the attempt to return to Germany, and quite a number of valuable ships and cargoes evaded the British patrols. Nearly a hundred vessels, half a million GRT (gross registered tons), returned safely—among them the liner BREMEN, via Murmansk.

The total of the naval effort was to be concentrated upon the classical objective of denying the use of the sea routes to the enemy. Owing to the disparity of strength, it was out of the question to try to eliminate the enemy by a fleet action, as Admiral Scheer had tried. On appraising the situation coolly, Naval War Staff came to the conviction that the only road to success lay in attacking the enemy shipping routes and naval forces with energy and cunning, at as many places as possible, with every means available. The submarines were to operate at the focal points of the shipping routes near the British Islands; DDs and aircraft were to harass the enemy by laying mines close to the English coast; auxiliary cruisers and armored ships widely scattered in distant seas were to divert and contain enemy forces—even the two battle cruisers were to be committed in the Iceland passages.

**RESTRICTED**

13

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### **Criticism of Strategy of Naval War Staff.**

This was a very different picture from World War I. It goes without saying that Naval War Staff fully realized the daring and the risks of this concept and the danger of setbacks it entailed. Criticism was, and still is, not lacking; yet, on the whole, it would seem that the results justified the audacity of Naval War Staff. It should be kept in mind that at first the number of submarines was entirely insufficient for a large-scale attack. After war broke out, the efforts of the shipyards were concentrated upon this type of vessel; all other construction was suspended with the exception of small craft and of vessels nearing completion. Nevertheless, before the occupation of France, there was only material for about 200 submarines on hand, and it took 21 months to get the first boats ready. That meant two years until they could make their appearance in the Atlantic. It should also be remembered that the Russian campaign was not yet on the cards when these deliberations and decisions had to be made.

### **Practical Execution of Naval Strategy.**

Until greater numbers of submarines came into active service—i. e., until 1941—all the other means mentioned before had to be exploited to the utmost. This was done although there were difficulties and set-backs. *DEUTSCHLAND LUTZOW*, the oldest armored ship, had much engine trouble and made only one cruise, rather unproductive, in the North Atlantic. *GRAF SPEE* was lost after the Battle off the River Plate, owing to an unlucky decision of her commanding officer. In this way, an operation of two or three armored ships together became impossible. *ADMIRAL SCHEER* was more successful, appeared in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and caused much havoc to a Halifax convoy. The Heavy Cruiser *HIPPER* was fairly successful against another con-

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voy, but she and PRINZ EUGEN were greatly hampered by their insufficient cruising range. The BCs SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU attacked the northern blockade line in the late fall of 1939, sinking the merchant cruiser RAWAL PINDI; during the Norwegian campaign they surprised and sank the aircraft carrier GLORIOUS and some transports and smaller craft. Early in 1941, they made a successful cruise in the North Atlantic, destroying a considerable number of merchant ships. During their career they met with every kind of grief in the shape of torpedoes, mines, bombs, and engine trouble. This kept them in the dockyards for long periods. The BISMARCK operation, towards the end of the period when surface vessels could be employed, was daring and unlucky.

The ubiquitous auxiliary cruisers, ten in all, cruised in all the oceans of the world, sank 850,000 GRT of shipping, a light cruiser and a merchant cruiser, and sent a number of valuable prizes home—among them three whaling ships with enough oil for the entire German margarine ration for 4 months.

Taken all together, commerce warfare with surface vessels netted far over 1 million GRT, with the loss of 1 BB, 1 armored ship, and 6 auxiliary cruisers.

In the first winter of the war, well executed sorties of DDs and an auxiliary minelayer (speed 7 knots) carried a considerable number of mines, anchored and magnetic, into the waters off the English southeast coast. Their effect was increased by mines laid by aircraft and submarines at vital points around the British Islands. This mining campaign was probably started too early and with too few mines. It came as a surprise and had good success at first against warships as well as against merchant ships. The British developed an effective sweep much more quickly than had been anticipated, but losses from mines remained rather high until 1944.

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### **Results.**

In 1917, unrestricted submarine war had brought the United States into the war. For this reason, German submarines in 1939 had strict orders to conduct commerce war according to the regulations of international law. After the British Admiralty had announced that British ships would be armed, and given them orders to ram submarines at sight, the U-boats changed over to unrestricted warfare against cargo vessels. Passenger ships still were not to be attacked, even when proceeding in a convoy. In the area around Great Britain, the last restrictions were not abolished before August, 1940. In spite of these initial checks and the small number of boats, submarines sank about 5 million GRT in the first two years of the war, with a loss of 45 boats; 171 came into service in that period, more than half of this number in the last six months.

The grand total of warfare against enemy shipping in 1939 to 1941 was 8 to 9 million GRT—this would seem to prove Naval War Staff correct. In any case, none of the critics has so far brought forward any suggestions for a naval strategy which might have produced better results with so small a Navy. True, the improvement of the geographical situation during the first year of the war helped greatly. On the other hand, the events leading to this improvement, especially the Norwegian Campaign, detracted from the efficiency of the German Naval forces, quite apart from the fact that the German Air Force did not support the tonnage war.

### **Naval Strategy and the First Campaigns.**

The Polish campaign is of interest only insofar as Naval War Staff treated it as a sideshow and ordered every single modern vessel to the North Sea as soon as Great Britain had declared war. With Norway, it was a different tale. In British hands, it

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would have meant the end of any kind of German offensive naval strategy. With their Northern Barrage, the Americans had showed already in 1918 that it was possible to bottle up the North Sea. A repetition with improved mines and into Norwegian territorial waters would effectively block the road for surface vessels as well as for submarines. Moreover, the airfields of southern Norway in British possession were a direct threat to the German training areas in the Baltic, so far out of reach of the RAF. Finally, the suspension of the ore traffic from northern Sweden and Norway would cut down German steel production by one-half.

This is not the place to go into the details of the "Race for Norway," Suffice it to say that Naval War Staff would have preferred a neutral Norway, but once British intentions on Norwegian ports had been established beyond doubt, did everything in its power to make the operation a success. Every single vessel was committed, submarine warfare interrupted, an armored ship held back which had been preparing for an Atlantic cruise. The operation was a full success; the threat to the ore traffic, to the offensive strategy and to the training areas completely removed. Losses (3 cruisers, 10 destroyers, some auxiliaries) were smaller than expected, although heavy enough compared with the small size of the fleet. Oceanic warfare was affected by torpedo damage to the 2 BCs and one armored ship.

Rather unexpectedly, the French campaign brought about a great improvement for conducting naval war in accordance with the strategy of Naval War Staff. The leaders of the Army were not at all optimistic about the outcome of their attack; they expected stiff fighting and hoped, as General Halder told the Navy, to reach the Channel near Boulogne after six months. On being asked by the Army, the Navy had explained that possession of some ports on the eastern Channel would not help very much, and

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that nothing less than the occupation of the whole of France north of the Loire River, including Brest and Lorient, would change the strategic situation favorably.

### **Operation SEA LION.**

As a result of the quick success of the French campaign, the German Armed Forces were suddenly confronted with the problem of a landing in England. Naval War Staff never had any doubt that a large-scale landing in summer, 1940, would terminate the war speedily. It harbored grave doubts, however, about the feasibility of the operation. True, Raeder was the first to broach the subject to Hitler; yet, he did it mainly because he expected him to say any day, "Tomorrow, we will land in England," and he was fully alive to the great difficulties of the operation. No preparations were made before July, 1940, because the quick and decisive success of the campaign came as a complete surprise. From the beginning, Raeder emphasized the necessity of gaining unchallenged air supremacy. When the Air Force failed, the operation had to be abandoned.

The submarine war had been going on through all the months of preparation for SEA LION. Unfortunately, even after SEA LION had been shelved the German Air Force did not see any necessity for combined action against England's sea communications. Merchant ships were not considered as primary targets; for some time, Goering even prohibited attacks on them. A continuous campaign against British shipping, port installations and shipyards from the fall of 1940 on—better still, from June, 1940, on—was bound to meet with considerable success because the ships had hardly any AA guns, the ports neither, and the British fighter force was too small to give much protection. By attacking it where it was concentrated around London, the German Air Force played into its hands.

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In this way, a great opportunity of inflicting critical damage to the enemy was lost. To make matters worse, the submarines never had the long-distance air reconnaissance indispensable in view of their low numbers, which permitted enemy convoys to slip by unobserved. In the course of the war, Goering wrested the remnants of the small Naval Air Arm away from the Navy.

### **The Mediterranean.**

The entry of Italy into the war in June, 1940, had opened new strategic vistas. The Italians failed to utilize the situation in the Mediterranean, however, and there did not exist any plans for joint action in that theater. Hitler wanted to leave things entirely to his ally, Mussolini.

In September, 1940, when the fate of the operation SEA LION was still in balance, Raeder had a long conference with Hitler, under four eyes, because he was then more tractable than in a larger circle. Raeder put great emphasis upon holding the same course as before in the grand strategy of the war; i. e., concentration of effort against Great Britain as the main adversary. Emphatically, he tried to dissuade Hitler from the idea of attacking Russia. He proposed exploitation of the Mediterranean to the point of completely excluding Great Britain from that sea. A combined German-Italian effort could have taken Malta and reached Suez; wavering Spain could then be drawn into the Axis camp. This would settle the question of Gibraltar. With the Mediterranean secure in their hands the Axis powers could take over command of the Near East, which move, as Raeder hoped, would make war against Russia unnecessary. Besides, their position for Atlantic warfare would be much better.

Hitler declared himself deeply impressed by these ideas, yet he did not change his plans concerning Russia. Perhaps he might

## **RESTRICTED**

have acted differently if the Army had supported the views of the Navy. It never did, however, because from their continental point of view, the Army leaders were unable to grasp the great possibilities the Mediterranean offered. Colonel-General Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, considered all military action in that sea as an "attempt to gain time," and he said of the Navy, "These good people dream in whole continents."

In the following years, Naval War Staff repeatedly applied for "finally settling the Mediterranean question." In the fall of 1941, when the situation in North Africa was critical, Hitler himself gave orders for transferring 24 German submarines to that theater, with the result that the situation greatly improved. An Air Fleet was transferred to the Mediterranean, too, but what would have ensured full success in 1940 was only a half-measure in 1941-42, and the Russian campaign prevented taking really decisive measures.

### **The Russian Campaign.**

From the beginning, the Navy had grave doubts about the practicability of that operation because it deflected too strong forces from the main objective, Great Britain, which was to be reached in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The Army saw it as a purely continental problem and was sure to solve it in a few months. Hitler, whose own idea that campaign was, agreed because he wanted to see it that way. No effort was made to ensure maximum cooperation of a reluctant Navy. Naval War Staff assessed the probable Russian performance at sea quite correctly as inferior and planned far more boldly than the local naval commanders. Yet, in spite of daring raids of small craft and minelayers up to the front door of the Russians, the whole concept was defensive, using weak forces in order not to detract from the attack on Great Britain. In this way, it took months instead of



**RESTRICTED**

weeks to reach the outskirts of Leningrad, which was never taken, with the consequences that in the following years the Navy had to make considerable efforts to contain the Russian Navy, especially the submarines, in the innermost corner of the Gulf of Finland. Murmansk was attacked overland only, with the result that the advance bogged down in unpassable terrain.

Owing to the political set-back in Yugoslavia, which made military action necessary and retarded the Balkans and Russian campaigns, the land forces started their advance along the Black Sea far too late. Nothing was done to speed it up; thus, it happened that enemy naval forces remained operative in all the marginal and enclosed seas, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Baltic, and the Polar Sea.

A capable Supreme Command would have recognized the advantages of permanent undisputed command over these seas and would have secured it by a timely application of suitable forces. OKW never understood the slow, but immense pressure that great naval powers could bring to bear upon the small continent of Europe. The Navy saw it and acted accordingly, but failed perhaps to realize that once the decision for the attack on Russia had been made no effort should have been spared to bring about a speedy termination of this venture to have the back free again; all the more so as the BISMARCK affair had shown that the days of surface operations were drawing to an end, and there were unmistakable signs that things were becoming increasingly difficult for the submarines, too.

**Peak and Failure of Oceanic Campaign.**

After sinking the BISMARCK, the British Fleet had hunted and destroyed her supply ships throwing out of gear the whole

## **RESTRICTED**

German supply organization on the Atlantic, which so far had operated with little loss. In 1942 and 1943, the last auxiliary cruisers were either destroyed or had to turn back in the English channel. They had done excellent work, but their time had passed. Submarines came now into active service in large numbers and took over. They were essentially of the same type as in the first years of the war that with their wolf pack tactics had been so successful. Increasing activity of enemy aircraft drove them farther out to sea, and the lack of air reconnaissance made it difficult for them to find the convoys. The defense of the convoys was improving, too, and although submarine losses were still low, some of the most experienced commanders were lost. The average daily tonnage sunk per boat was going down evenly and inexorably; new construction in Great Britain and the United States was going up.

The entrance of the United States into the war gave the submarines a respite by offering lucrative targets in American waters. They made excellent use of the new opportunities, but this geographical extension could not solve the pressing problem of diminishing returns.

There was a short period of hope for widening the strategic field when the Japanese carrier force roamed the Indian Ocean. All dreams of a closer cooperation had to be buried after Midway, however, and Germany was on her own again, Italy becoming more and more a liability.

The impossibility of continuing warfare in the Atlantic with surface vessels had been acknowledged by taking the BCs SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU back to Germany by way of the Channel. This operation was tactically successful, yet it was a tacit admission that the usefulness of the initial strategy of Naval War Staff was running out. The only theater of war where

## **RESTRICTED**

surface vessels still could operate was the Polar Sea, where the Murmansk convoys offered profitable targets. Luck seemed to be running out, too, and operations were made difficult by Hitler himself, who after the loss of the BISMARCK demanded results without risks. In the first days of 1943, after an abortive attack on one of the convoys he gave the order to decommission and scrap the remaining BBs and cruisers as far as they were not needed for training purposes. Raeder could not convince him that this would be an intolerable blow to the Navy, and handed in his resignation. It was accepted, and Donitz was made his successor. Although a submarine man first and foremost, he soon perceived in his new position what this step would mean and succeeded in persuading Hitler to withdraw his order.

SCHARNHORST and TIRPITZ were sent to northern Norway. SCHARNHORST was destroyed when she unsuccessfully attacked a convoy. TIRPITZ bombarded Allied bases on Spitsbergen and was later sunk by bombs. The carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN, which would have come in handy for these operations, was never commissioned because there was no naval air arm.

### **German Strategy Fails.**

In the year from the fall of 1942 to the summer of 1943, the jerry-built structure of German grand strategy toppled about the ears of its architects in the battles of Alamein, Stalingrad and Tunisia; in the landings in North Africa, Sicily and Salerno; in the failure of the Air Force, and in the complete breakdown of the submarine campaign. In May, 1943, 50% of the boats operating at sea were lost, without any corresponding return in enemy tonnage sunk.

## **RESTRICTED**

### **Attempts at Renewing the Submarine War.**

Nevertheless, in Germany's desperate situation, the submarine seemed to be the only arm that gave some promise of becoming offensive again. The main faults of the type in use at that time were vulnerability to radar-conducted attack when traveling on the surface, and very low under-water speed. The great advantages of a higher speed had been recognized before the war, and experimental boats had been built with Walther drive (i. e., producing hydrogen for underwater combustion from a chemical fluid rich in oxygen). Tests proceeded at a leisurely pace, however, and no steps were taken to explore other approaches to the problem. A means for evading radar, the Schnorkel, had been in German hands since 1940, when it had been found in Holland. Now, in the emergency of 1943, it was taken out of the ice box and soon proved valuable. The Bureau of Naval Construction quickly designed two types of submarines with electrical drive for high under-water speed. Shipbuilding was handed over to the civilian Speer ministry in order to get better priority and better deliveries.

The new boats, equipped with excellent underwater location gear, were to attack convoys from below with homing torpedoes and similar devices. Their high underwater speed enabled them to gain good attacking positions and to evade pursuit. It is very probable that these new tactics would have given new life to the strategy of attacking Allied sea communications. Though a few boats of the small type became operative, they were too late to change the course of events.

The war went on without any new naval strategy. The remnants of the fleet were employed in the Baltic with good success and small losses to support the desperately fighting army troops, and to cover the evacuation of more than a million people fleeing

**RESTRICTED**

from the Soviets. Western air attack took a heavy toll in the ports, and a few cruisers and destroyers were all the larger surface ships left at the end of the war.

It is rather difficult for me to say how far the German Naval Strategy in World War II met with success and how far it failed. Success and failure are relative concepts, and they may look very differently seen from different sides. Moreover, it is probably too early still to come to a final appreciation—all the more so as naval strategy is only part of the overall military strategy, and that again is part of what I may term grand national strategy.

My own personal view is that in the first half of the war German naval strategy was more successful than we expected, and that in the second half of the war it failed to a greater extent than would have been necessary. I think that the initial success was due to the correct evaluation and adaption of the experiences of World War I. Possible improvements have been suggested from several quarters, of course. They are mainly:

- (a) *A better preparation for enlarging the submarine fleet.* This was not done in time, owing to political reasons.
- (b) *Much better support by the Air Force.* This was more or less outside the hands of the Navy, though something could have been done about it perhaps by transferring a few first-class senior officers to the new Air Force or by creating better relations with the Air Force. But this would be the subject for another investigation.

## **RESTRICTED**

- (c) *Timely preparation of the assault on England.*  
Even with husbanding of Naval Combat Vessels and with more and better landing craft, a landing would have been possible only with excellent Air Force support and at least 3 to 4 airborne divisions.
  
- (d) *A concentration of the surface vessels for operations against focal points of British commerce.*  
Would have been best with the armored ships. Reasons given why not. The two BCs worked together as a rule. Of course, a strong task force in the Polar Sea against the Murmansk convoys would have been a good thing. This could not have been foreseen when this strategy was formulated.

The decline of the surface ships had been anticipated in the strategical calculations, and the submarines arrived in time to keep the ball rolling. They were defeated because German counter measures against the technical development of the Allies were taken later than circumstances warranted.

Of the problems on the higher levels of military and national strategy, I will limit myself to those of the cooperation of the three Services and of Hitler's influence on German naval affairs.

### **Cooperation of the Services.**

In spite of great initial success, German military strategy failed at least as spectacularly as naval strategy. The main reasons are, in my opinion, the purely continental outlook of most leading Army and Air Force officers. There were very clever men among them, but their utter lack of sea-consciousness was very startling, again and again. For them, the sea was something that was paint-

## **RESTRICTED**

ed blue on the maps and would serve as a moat in an emergency—but, to them, could not affect their decisive land operations. Between the wars, an attempt had been made at combined training by establishing a small Armed Forces War College in 1935.

There was only one course at a time, lasting one year, attended by 6 Army officers, 2 Air Force and 2 Navy officers. In 1938, the Army declared that these 6 officers could not be spared anymore, and the college folded up. It is significant that none of the Army students ever reached a high position in an operational staff; they were mostly used as military attaches, in the War Office, etc.

It goes without saying that this mental attitude made combined planning very difficult. As far as I can see, the Norwegian campaign was the only example of a perfect cooperation of the three services. Generally, they existed side by side and held divergent opinions on the strategy to be employed. There was never a theater C.-in-C. with full power over all the troops and units in his area. Before and during the Invasion in Normandy, Rommel could not give any orders to the naval and air units operating directly under his eyes.

### **German Supreme Command.**

Of course, an energetic and experienced Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces could have ironed out these discrepancies and compelled the Services to act together. He would also have evolved a common Italian-German strategy. There was no such commander, however. Field Marshal von Blomberg, the first and only Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, was dismissed in 1938. Hitler himself took his office over, with great energy and will power but lacking the qualifications of a great military leader. He had a good memory for facts and figures; he could

## **RESTRICTED**

see the advantages of a plan, but he lacked the gift of constructive thinking as well as that of picking out the right men and working them as a team. By some kind of personal magnetism, he had an uncanny influence on many people directly in touch with him. As a true revolutionary, he did not trust anybody and split up any force that might become dangerous to him.

### **Hitler's Influence on German Naval Affairs.**

It is difficult to say how far this magnetism influenced Raeder. I think their relations can best be termed a kind of armed neutrality. Hitler was greatly interested in naval matters, particularly in big ships, but actually he understood but little of the inner structure and workings of a navy. It seems that he respected Raeder as a first-class expert of matters foreign to him. Raeder, on the other hand, restricted his activities to his own naval sphere and never tried to interfere in anything bordering on what might be termed politics. It should be mentioned, however, that in religious and ethical matters he was adamant, whatever the attitude of Hitler and his NSDAP might be.

Hitler did not contribute a thing to the forming of the German naval strategy. When war broke out he at first greatly restricted operations against enemy merchant ships, for political reasons. In the case of Norway, he followed the reasoning of the Navy, after some hesitation, whereas he turned down the Navy's ideas about the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Navy talked him out of some of his more fantastic plans—like using some big liners for a feint against the English coast during SEA LION, or the occupation of Iceland, and the Azores and Canary Islands.

After the loss of the BISMARCK, he made a strong attempt to interfere in naval matters by abolishing the BBs and



**RESTRICTED**

cruisers, as mentioned before. On the whole his influence on naval operations was far smaller than on land warfare. What he never did was to create clear conditions for high level command and to bring together the leaders of the various branches of the war effort in order to coordinate their work. He wanted to make every decision himself and ended trying to do everything himself. Because he had no sense for ethical values, he conveniently forgot that he had been elected for social reform and against communism—not for starting a war for which there was no need and which never should have happened. I am convinced that in the ultimate his utter lack of ethics caused Germany's downfall.

Of course, there is much hindsight in these reflections. Criticism of the past should form the lessons for the future. I think the chapter of naval history which I had the honor of presenting to you today will remain valuable, on the one hand, for studying naval command and operations; on the other hand, because it shows the immense strength and great possibilities of sea power and the difficulties of the continental mind correctly to calculate the far-reaching influence of the sea.

**RESTRICTED**

**BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER**

**Former Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, G. N.**

Former Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge was born on 24 December 1894 in Leipzig and entered the German Navy in 1914. His record of promotions is as follows:

- 1 April 1933—Lieutenant Commander
- 1 January 1937—Commander
- 1 January 1939—Captain
- 1 April 1942—Rear Admiral
- 1 March 1943—Vice Admiral

During World War II, he was in command of German mine laying and patrol forces in nearly all theaters of war. In addition, he was Naval Liaison Officer Field Marshall Rommel's staff, and later was Chief of Liaison Staff in Italy. Ultimately he was Chief of the Designing Department in the German Supreme Naval Command.

Former Vice Admiral Ruge was qualified as a blockade officer in 1933. His decorations include the Knights' Cross to the Iron Cross which was awarded on 21 October 1940.

Since 1945 he has cooperated with the United States Naval authorities in preparing naval studies on German naval aspects of World War II. He is widely read and well-informed on world affairs. He speaks English, French and Italian fluently and possesses a working knowledge of Swedish and Russian.

**RESTRICTED**

**ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  
AFFECTING THE NAVAL COMMANDER**

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 2 February, 1953, by

*Commander Geoffrey E. Carlisle, U. S. N.*

Gentlemen:

The Judge Advocate General is again privileged to furnish to the Naval War College a lecturer on International Law. This year it is my pleasure and honor to act for him in this important matter. In addition to the importance of the subject I also consider it desirable for us to get acquainted and for you to know that we law specialists of the Navy, and such talents and abilities as we have, are available to assist you in the performance of the important military missions to which you will soon be assigned. It is the desire of Admiral Nunn that his officers furnish full and complete cooperation to the naval service in all matters relating to the law and I speak for myself and all the other law specialists when I say that we are dedicated to the proposition of supplying that cooperation and the best advice that legal research and analysis can supply.

The subject assigned for this lecture "The Aspects of International Law affecting the Naval Commander" is one particularly cogent to the members of this audience. Particularly important because each of you, during periods of foreign duty, may expect to encounter problems of International Law and encounter them, not in a detached academic sort of a way, but directly—face to face—as it were. Most of you have already faced such situations—all of you may expect to.

**RESTRICTED**

31

## RESTRICTED

Today the United States faces grave international problems of defense against an ideology which desires to enslave the free peoples of the world. To further that defense we have entered into international alliances and pacts which far surpass any similar peacetime alliances that the world has ever known. We have thrown our national resources into the fight. It is an extremely ambitious program and one in which the United States, as prime-mover, carries an overwhelming burden of responsibility. A responsibility which must be properly assumed if the program is to be successful and its aims attained. Success will depend upon the efforts of every United States national who may be thrown into contact with our friends abroad. As command and staff officers your exposure to such situations will be very great indeed.

It is not possible for me or any other person to pick from the great mass of international law *all* of the things which may be of interest or of future assistance to you but there are certain aspects of international law, as it exists today, which may assist you. I desire to discuss with you—within the framework of the assigned subject, the time allotted and the restrictions of security regulations—those items and situations which are of current interest and which are potential sources of irritation between the United States and our allies, and which may be encountered in foreign countries.

Some of you may feel that international relations are of small concern to you. In order to disabuse you of this idea I want to take a couple of minutes to quote from Navy Regulations.

Section 0505 says:

“1. In the event of war between nations with which the United States is at peace, a commander shall observe, and require his command to observe, *the principles of international law*. He shall make every effort consistent with those principles to preserve and protect the lives and property of citizens of the United States wherever situated.

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2. When the United States is at war he shall observe and require his command to observe, the principles of international law and the rules of human warfare. He shall respect the rights of neutrals as prescribed by international law and by pertinent provisions of treaties, and shall exact a like observance from neutrals."

**0620**

"So far as lies within his power, acting in conformity with international law and treaty obligations, the senior officer present shall protect all commercial vessels and aircraft of the United States in their lawful occupations, and shall advance the commercial interests of his country."

**1214**

"All persons in the naval service, in their relations with foreign nations, and with the governments or agents thereof, shall conform to international law and to the precedents established by the United States in such relations."

**0613**

"On occasions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights, the senior officer present shall consult with the diplomatic or consular representatives of the United States, if possible, and shall take such action as the gravity of the situation demands. The responsibility for any action taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the senior officer present. He shall immediately report all the facts to the Secretary of the Navy."

The above regulations impose upon the commander far reaching responsibilities and duties in the field of international law, responsibilities he may not escape. To carry out those responsibilities, considerable *on hand* knowledge of the subject is required. It is

## **RESTRICTED**

not practical for most commanders to be experts in this field, nor is it possible for his staff legal officer to have on board or access to, an adequate library on the subject. There are, however, certain general principles and areas with which he can be familiar and which will furnish general temporary guidance until exact advice may be obtained. I will discuss some of these with you.

If this introduction has impressed you with the importance of your function in international law two questions have probably occurred to you. They are:

1. What, in outline, are the important danger points and aids with which I should be generally familiar?
2. Where can I most readily supplement my present knowledge and familiarize myself with the details of these matters?

I shall answer the latter question first. Here at the Naval War College two excellent methods are available. (1) In the regular academic program you are now following and (2) through the correspondence course service available to all officers. Both services are staffed by experts and the curriculum is carefully thought out and designed to meet your needs. They form the best method of securing the necessary basic knowledge. Additional knowledge may, of course, be secured through reading and experience.

In reply to the first question it seems to me that the following matters are of primary importance although not necessarily in the order named:

1. Criminal jurisdiction over our personnel in foreign countries.
2. Administration of foreign claims.

**RESTRICTED**

3. Contact with foreign flag vessels on the high seas, questions of blockade and violations of foreign territory.
4. Naval responsibilities in U. S. territorial waters and contiguous zones.
5. Effect of the immigration and naturalization act upon foreign marriages and issues therefrom.
6. General administration of bases located in foreign countries.

To understand the importance that I place on these matters it is necessary to understand the attitude of the foreign nations involved. The matter is not a simple one. It involves problems of national pride and economics as well as problems of defense. Many of our citizens are inclined to take the position that we are acting for the defense of the free world and that by our unselfish contributions of men and money we should be permitted to pretty much have our own way in foreign countries. That we should be free of restrictions and other petty limitations which seem subordinate to the compelling necessity for establishing an adequate defense system. The attitude is, "We're doing them a favor, why should they be less than fully cooperative?" Unfortunately the attitude of our allies does not permit such an approach. Almost without exception their attitude is, that by permitting the establishment of bases within their territories they are doing the United States a favor. This attitude of governments accurately reflects the attitude of their citizens and is understandable when the factors of local administration are considered.

Problems of displacement of local citizens from meager housing facilities, inflation, blackmarket activities, affronts to local citizens all seem to be an inescapable part of having our forces stationed in foreign countries. These things naturally cause friction

## RESTRICTED

and as naturally cause us to be considered as intruders rather than brothers-in-arms.

I do not wish to argue the merits of either position. The proper attitude is, of course, a realization by both parties of the difficulties involved and a firm resolution by cognizant persons to eliminate as much friction as possible.

Proceeding now to a general discussion of the above mentioned items.

## CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

The stationing of large numbers of troops within the boundaries of a friendly foreign nation *in peace time* is an idea entirely new to the world community. It immediately raises serious problems of criminal jurisdiction because of two equally well established principles of international law. The first is the theory of sovereignty which gives to a State exclusive jurisdiction over all persons within its boundaries. The second is the rule, that a State has exclusive jurisdiction over its armed forces. The North Atlantic Treaty nations recognized the clash between these two principles and recognized the necessity for abandoning the traditional military concept of exclusive jurisdiction if the sovereign dignity of the host State was to be maintained.

In frank recognition of this problem the signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty have agreed to share jurisdiction over military forces and civilian components of one nation stationed within the boundaries of other signatories to the treaty. The formula established is contained in Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. Without reading the Article to you its provisions are generally as follows :



**RESTRICTED**

1. Subject to certain enumerated provisions the sending state retains the authority to exercise jurisdiction over its people concurrently with the authorities of the receiving state. In other words—the principle of equal and concurrent jurisdiction is established.

2. Specific provisions governing the exercise of this jurisdiction are as follows:

a. The sending state has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable under its laws, including security offenses, but not under the laws of the receiving state. (Security offenses include, treason, espionage, sabotage and violation of law relating to official secrets.)

b. The receiving state has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable under its laws but not under the laws of the sending state.

3. In all other cases the jurisdiction is concurrent and subject to the following rules:

a. The sending state has primary jurisdiction over offenses against its property or security offenses, offenses solely against the property or person of another member of the force or civilian component and offenses arising out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty.

b. The receiving state has the primary authority to exercise jurisdiction in all other cases.

4. Provision is made for waiver of jurisdiction by either of the parties.

Thus you can see that stripped of its legalistic trimmings the NATO Status of Forces formula for exercise of jurisdiction lodges with the receiving state the primary right to exercise juris-

## **RESTRICTED**

diction over our people in the great majority of cases and in almost all cases which may cause serious friction between the two countries. Such cases, for example, as armed robbery, murder, rape, assault and other offenses of the type commonly committed by members of the military while mixing with civilian populations.

While the NATO Status of Forces Agreement has not yet been ratified by a sufficient number of signatory states to bring it into effect, it appears probable that it will come into effect during the present year. In any event, however, this formula has been adopted by our government in bilateral negotiations with several countries and you may expect that it will be the standard in most foreign countries you will visit. I say this even though there are and will be exceptions to it. In some countries we have found it convenient to secure exclusive jurisdiction over our people and have done so because from our standpoint, it is the most practical method of operation. In others we do not even have concurrent jurisdiction over offenses against the laws of the host state. This is rare and is a situation we will make every effort to alter. It exists under agreement previously negotiated between our country and the host country and which we hope will be altered by having the NATO Status of Forces Agreement come into effect if not altered earlier as the result of bilateral negotiations.

The jurisdiction problem also arises in other countries outside the North Atlantic Treaty area.

1. In Japan we are presently enjoying exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed in Japan by members of the United States forces, the civilian component or their dependents. But we have agreed that when the NATO Status of Forces Agreement comes into effect, we will conclude with the Japanese Government an agreement on criminal jurisdiction similar to the NATO formula. If the Status of Forces Agreement has not come into effect by 21

## **RESTRICTED**

April 1953 we have agreed to reconsider the situation pending its coming into effect.

2. In Germany we are enjoying exclusive criminal jurisdiction. It seems likely that future developments may lead to an abandonment of that situation.

3. With respect to United Kingdom Territories and our Leased Bases therein the jurisdiction is mostly concurrent over the troublesome type of offense and its exercise mainly depends upon local agreement between the Base Commander and local authorities. The first authorities to apprehend the offender usually exercise jurisdiction.

I do not wish to leave you with the impression that our people will always be subject to the primary criminal jurisdiction of the host state. We shall continue to seek exclusive jurisdiction in bilateral negotiations. However, the trend and precedent established by the NATO formula are such that we may expect a reduction in our rights to exercise it even in countries where it is now enjoyed. Nor do I wish to leave you with the idea that you may rely in the NATO formula for all North Atlantic Treaty countries. In many of them we are still operating under previous agreements of such a varied nature as to prohibit their being the subject of general discussion.

## **ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN CLAIMS**

One of the most serious sources of friction arises from the behavior of our people abroad or from accidental injuries which occur from non-combatant operations of our forces. Cases of drunken driving resulting in deaths of local citizens or the crash of an airplane in a populated area to mention two fairly common occurrences.

**RESTRICTED**

**39**

## **RESTRICTED**

To combat this friction the naval commander is possessed of a very potent weapon given him by the Foreign Claims Act. This Act, passed in 1942, was, and I quote, "for the purpose of promoting and maintaining friendly relations by the prompt settlement of meritorious claims in foreign countries.' Under it the field commander may consider and settle claims up to \$2500. The Secretary of the Navy may settle those between \$2500 and \$5000 and may certify claims in excess of \$5000 to Congress for consideration.

Under the Act you can scarcely conceive of an act of a member of the armed forces resulting in injury or damages to an inhabitant of a foreign country or to his property which is not compensable. When properly used this weapon alone will greatly increase the respect for our forces and will do much to still the clamor of local citizens who become outraged by such incidents. Most of them can understand the incidents having occurred in the first instance but few can understand failure or delay in compensating the injured parties. You should be ever conscious of the availability of this procedure and its flexibility.

Additional methods of settling claims arising incident to our presence in foreign countries are established by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and will eventually be available. They also are directed at easing friction between the two countries concerned.

### **CONTACT WITH FOREIGN FLAG VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS, QUESTIONS OF BLOCKADE AND VIOLATIONS OF FOREIGN TERRITORY.**

Naval commanders or their representatives are frequently in contact with foreign flag vessels on the high seas. The existence of a state of war gives rise to certain well recognized bel-

**RESTRICTED**

ligerent rights which are in contravention to the traditional concept of the "freedom of the seas". One of these is the privilege of visiting and searching foreign flag merchant vessels to determine if they are carrying contraband. In doing this the naval commander is exercising a right which contributes to eventual victory but he is also interfering with the commerce of nations which are neutral to the struggle. The right to search is given by international law; the methods to be followed are strictly established and must be followed if the searching vessels is to avoid offense to the foreign flag and the possibility of bringing her into the war on the side of the opposing power.

Another situation in which naval commanders or their representatives are frequently in contact with foreign flags is in blockade situations where all commerce is denied entry to the ports or parts of the ports of an opposing belligerent. This requires the stopping and turning away of neutral vessels. Here too, definite rules are established by international law and must be strictly followed if offense is to be avoided. Other than the possibility of seriously offending a neutral is the possibility of subjecting the United States to damage claims by reason of the spoilage of cargo or delay in delivery.

In both of these situations the captain obviously must be familiar with the rules and regulations. He must know how to make a visit and search and what to do if contraband is discovered. Similarly he must know why a blockade must be effective and about such matters as pursuit and the effect of leaving station.

Rules for these problems are contained in a volume called "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare", which will be replaced with a revised and modernized volume sometime this year.

## **RESTRICTED**

An additional problem is raised by the violation of foreign territories by our ships or aircraft. Such incidents, aside from the friction caused, may be extremely expensive. For example, the Hungarian incident of a year ago which cost the United States \$123,000 in ransom for four aviators forced down in Hungary. Incidents of this type may only be avoided by proper indoctrination of personnel and assiduous care in approaching such areas and an understanding of the extent of foreign territory including territorial waters.

### **NAVAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN TERRITORIAL WATERS AND CONTIGUOUS ZONES**

This subject is one of great importance to the naval commander. Important because the performance of the Navy's primary mission of defense may in some degree conflict with the rights of citizens of the United States as well as those of foreign nations.

By definition territorial waters are the belt of sea surrounding the territory of the state, its territories and possessions. The width of that belt has been the subject of continuing debate among the states of the world and as recently as last August was the subject of a World Wide convention. The United States has traditionally adhered to the position that this belt of water is three miles wide. In this position it has been in concurrence with most of the states of the World but other states have advocated an increase of the width to one more in keeping with the concepts of modern defense. Historically the width was established as the range of shore defense batterys and on this basis alone is obviously archaic. To understand the importance of territorial waters it is necessary to realize that within these waters a state is considered to have essentially the same powers of jurisdiction and control and regulation that it exercises over land areas within its

**RESTRICTED**

boundaries. There are many reasons advanced as to why the United States should change its position and advocate an increase of the width of those waters. It seems almost self-evident that present weapons would support this position and that we should never permit a potential enemy to approach so close without serious challenge. There are, however, other considerations which override these basic self-evident ideas. Consider, for example, the difficulty and cost of patrolling a much more extensive area, or, and this is also important from a defense or war standpoint, the limiting effect upon our operations if we were to recognize a considerably broader belt as applied to other states. Assume, for example, a belt 12 miles wide, and then consider the difficulties of exercising the well recognized belligerent right of visit and search of neutral vessels in time of war outside their territorial waters. An additional consideration is the restrictions placed upon our citizens in the fishing industry if forced to fish farther from shore than three miles or come under the regulations of the foreign state. I do not advocate either view of the problem, but merely remark on them as a matter of introduction.

The Navy is normally charged in wartime with the responsibility for patrolling and enforcing regulations for the control of vessels in territorial waters. While primarily exercised by vessels it also involves the use of aircraft. In peace time the responsibility rests with the Coast Guard.

The degree of sovereignty which a state may exercise over these territorial waters has been the subject of an abundance of contradictory writing by authorities and has been further complicated by the conflicting practice of the various world states. It appears that the most acceptable and workable rule would restrict the exercise of sovereignty to that necessary to ensure security and defense and the protection of its interests in territorial waters

**RESTRICTED**

43

**RESTRICTED**

without excluding the peaceful navigation of the area by foreign vessels. Note that it is only within these waters that the *uncontested* exercise of sovereignty has been recognized. I think as naval commanders you should realize that the exercise of control within these waters is much less subject to criticism than in the additional zones I shall discuss.

Areas beyond the territorial waters are part of the high seas and are not normally subject to the control or sovereignty of any state. However, as a matter of self-defense, large areas of the high seas have frequently been designated as "Maritime Control Areas" and control exercised over them. There seems to be no substantial argument with the proposition that a State is entitled to preserve the integrity of its personality as a State. In the exercise of this right of self-defense it is entitled to take such measures as are necessary. These measures are subject only to the test of reasonableness, but no nation can long legally maintain such control if it is unreasonable under the circumstances. The right of self-defense does permit the establishment of such zones and control under certain regulations. Of importance to the naval commander is the fact that in his exercise of the powers conferred upon him in relation to such zones he must be ever conscious of the scrutiny of foreign states and must assiduously prevent his acts or those of his subordinates from violating this reasonableness test.

Another type of contiguous zone is the "Defensive Sea Area". As the name applies it is a zone established for defense around land areas of the state. It may be restricted to the territorial waters but may also extend beyond them. In mode of operation it is like a "Maritime Control Area" with regulations established for its administration. The naval commander is responsible for the enforcement of those regulations and must likewise be con-



**RESTRICTED**

scious of the possibility of his vessels violating defensive sea areas established by other nations.

**PROVISIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION ACT AS THEY AFFECT FOREIGN MARRIAGES**

The Immigration and Naturalization Act is of importance to the naval commander for two reasons. One, because it may directly affect the morale of the people under his command. Secondly, because it may indirectly affect his relations with the local populace.

We will assume for purposes of argument that a member of the military who marries a national of a foreign country, while stationed there, does so with the idea of bringing the spouse and any minor children to the United States. To do so he must comply with the requirements governing admission, some of which may be difficult to fill. For example, section 212 of the Act lists some 31 classes and many subclasses of disqualifying exclusions. Among them such things as insanity, disease, alcoholism, disabling defect, poor moral character and connection with subversive organizations. Under such conditions the naval commander must insure that the members of his command are fully and thoroughly indoctrinated in the provisions of the Act and that regulations prescribed for the control of the marriage of our personnel overseas are strictly complied with. To do otherwise is to risk the unfortunate situation of having our people married to foreigners who may not be admissible into the United States. To mention the problem to you is sufficient to point out the seriousness of it. Corollary to the above is the frequent necessity of explaining to irate local citizenry just why it is impractical to permit one of its daughters to marry a sailor. Particularly if nature would seem to dictate a desirability for the solemnization of the relation between them.

**RESTRICTED**

**45**

## **RESTRICTED**

### **GENERAL ADMINISTRATION**

Under this general head comes such things as cooperation and liaison with local foreign authorities. Internal administration of a ship is much the same abroad as it is in the United States. But administration of a naval base abroad under the provisions of the North Atlantic or other treaties may differ considerably from that of a base in this country. Language barriers and the necessity of conforming to local laws of industrial relations and labor, currency restrictions, use of military payment certificates, potential black-market activities, customs and imports, hiring of indigenous labor, passive and active hostility of local populations to the presence of U. S. personnel and many other items complicate the general administration of the foreign base.

Most of these things are provided for under bilateral technical agreements. Because of their seriousness all of them require a healthy respect if our mission is to be successful. All of them require knowledge on the part of the naval commander.

In administering these problems there is no substitute for excellent relations with local authorities. The naval commander who insures that all things possible to improve those relations are done will not hit serious snags in his international relations. Problems which could result in an exchange of diplomatic notes may often be avoided entirely if cordial relations are established between the Commander and the Mayor of the Town—the Legal Officer and the local judiciary—and the Provost Marshall and the local Chief of Police. There is no substitute for good Public Relations abroad as well as in the United States.

Having stressed a few of the spots in which you may anticipate trouble I shall now mention a few cases in illustration that have been in our office.

## **RESTRICTED**

1. Something over a year ago a sailor attached to the Naval Base at Port Lyautey, French Morocco, went on a drunken binge. During its course he drove his vehicle in such a manner that two people were struck and killed and one seriously injured. We had been exercising what was in effect concurrent jurisdiction and had been enjoying a local arrangement whereby the local authorities would surrender our persons to us for trial upon receipt of a simple request from the Base Commander. This particular case was so flagrantly offensive to local citizens that the local authorities refused to permit us to exercise jurisdiction over him and undertook his trial and punishment. The entire situation turned into a comedy of errors. On one side the Navy was insistent on his return, even though not legally entitled to him, on the other the French were adamant in their refusal. The final solution was even more farcical. The French court finally tried and convicted him, sentenced him to pay a \$520 fine and to be confined for four months then suspended the confinement.

Clearly a miscarriage of justice and one which could not happen if we were entitled to either primary or exclusive jurisdiction within that area.

2. An officer stationed in a foreign country as a part of the Military Mission accidentally struck a child with a small stone resulting in a slight abrasion to his scalp. In the particular country we have no jurisdictional rights over our people for violation of local law and are bound to permit our people to be tried by local courts in accordance with their rules of evidence. This offense started as a misdemeanor in the lowest court but as the result of political manipulations of the child's father for financial gain was successively removed to higher courts and the officer charged with "putting a life in danger" and subject to a minimum punishment of one year's confinement in a local penitentiary. You may be

## **RESTRICTED**

sure that many foreign jails do not approach the standards of our worst in cleanliness. You might also be interested to know that their local judicial system does not permit the defendant to introduce expert witnesses nor to cross-examine those produced by the state. This case illustrates two things, (1) difficulties caused by lack of jurisdiction and (2) a problem which might have been quickly and promptly resolved if handled under the Foreign Claims Act and the father placated.

3. A sentry aboard one of our ships in a foreign harbor discerned a native rowing rapidly away from another ship in the nest and heard shouts from persons aboard that ship. The sentry ordered the native to halt and repeated the order several times. When the native did not halt he fired a shot, intending it to pass over the head of the man in the boat. Instead it passed through his chest and resulted in immediate death. When the matter was brought to our attention in Washington it had been the subject of much comment in the local press and as the result of the protests of the victim's dependents, had been the subject of a diplomatic note to our government demanding immediate indemnification. From the information received it appeared that the Navy had been waiting for the results of a court of inquiry before taking any steps to contact the victim's dependents. At that point the demands were well under the \$2500 limit imposed on the local commander under the Foreign Claims Act. While the sentry was absolved from wrong doing the Judge Advocate General ruled that the force used was excessive and the matter cognizable under the Act. The same determination could have been made in the field. This is an example of an incident where prompt action under the Foreign Claims Act would have prevented considerable local comment and ill will.

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4. Each foreign country has local labor laws which must either be complied with in the hiring of indigenous labor or must be avoided by governmental agreement. Sometimes it is difficult, if not illegal, for us to comply with those laws. For example, local laws in the United Kingdom requires the employer to make a regular contribution to the United Kingdom's Health Insurance Fund. It would thus follow that the United States, as an employer of United Kingdom nationals, would be required by their laws to make this contribution. The matter is complicated by United States law. Under currently effective statutes the Comptroller General has ruled that: In the absence of a statute or treaty to the contrary, pay roll deductions may not be made pursuant to foreign social security laws from the salaries of indigenous employees nor may employer contributions be made by the Navy Department for such employees under such laws. In the United Kingdom we have had an express agreement exempting the United States from such payments. As this authority is temporary in nature, we must secure legislation which would permit such payments or be sure that provisions for them are incorporated into future agreements between our governments.

The point of importance to you is an understanding that such payments should be carefully considered and evaluated under current agreements or laws in order to avoid paying unreimbursable amounts and also so that we can explain to foreign governments our inability to make such payments. New agreements will ordinarily contain a provision relative to this matter and will provide for their payment or avoidance.

5. Taxes encountered in foreign countries are frequently quite different than those imposed by our State and Federal Governments in this country. For example, one foreign government has a tax imposed on the tenant which depends upon the number

## **RESTRICTED**

of doors and windows in the dwelling, coupled with the size of the living area involved. To my knowledge we have no similar tax in the United States. Other taxes include personal property and road taxes. All of these matters are important because they reduce—at least indirectly—the pay of personnel. They also determine, in part, the attractiveness of foreign duty for personnel. They are all subject to governmental agreement and wherever possible will be eliminated. Their importance to you is primarily one of knowing that such taxes may have to be paid and that it is necessary to make a proper determination of this matter in order that personnel may be correctly advised.

6. Jurisdiction over civilian personnel, as exercised under the NATO and other agreements and as a result of supporting operations, raises the responsibility for trying civilians by courts-martial or other appropriate military tribunals. This responsibility may arise on any leased base area or within the Military Sea Transportation Service. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Articles 2(10, 11 and 12)), appropriate commanders may try civilian personnel employed by, serving with or accompanying the armed forces.

Trial of civilians is not unknown to the Navy and little trouble in establishing proper tribunals and effecting the trials is anticipated.

The problem as it may affect you is whether, in a particular case, a civilian is subject to your authority and trial.

A recent case in our office involved the problem of trial of civilian employees serving aboard MSTs vessels. As you probably know the Military Sea Transportation Service is made up of various types of vessels—some are owned by the Government—others are

## **RESTRICTED**

chartered on a space or bareboat basis. The Judge Advocate General was recently of the opinion with regard to MSTS vessels that those civilian personnel employed on Government owned vessels or vessels chartered on a bareboat basis and integrated in the MSTS fleet were subject to court-martial jurisdiction when the vessels were operating outside the continental United States. He was of the further opinion that personnel of vessels owned by commercial steamship companies under voyage or space charter were not sufficiently under military command to subject them to trial by court-martial unless they became integrated into a task force engaged in military operations.

You can understand from the above remarks that the solution of the problems of the military commander in this regard might well depend upon the geographical location of the vessel and the mission to which it is committed.

Exercise of jurisdiction depends also upon underlying agreements with the government within whose jurisdiction—outside the United States and off the high seas—the crime complained of occurs.

It would be possible for me to multiply these examples almost ad infinitum but no useful purpose would be served thereby. Enough has been said to indicate the concrete nature of the problems involved.

## **CONCLUSION**

In conclusion let us sum up the message that I have tried to bring to you today.

I have taken for major treatment in this talk the problems which face Staff and Command Officers in foreign countries and

## **RESTRICTED**

have tried to point out some of the more important areas of possible friction with which you will have to deal.

I have said to you that some of these problems revolve around:

1. Criminal jurisdiction in foreign countries.
2. Administration of foreign claims.
3. Contacts with foreign flag vessels on the high seas as the result of blockade and visit and search and the results of violation of foreign territory.

I have discussed briefly:

4. Naval responsibilities within contiguous zones.
  5. Immigration and naturalization of foreign wives.
  6. General administration of foreign bases
- and I have attempted to impress upon you the necessity for considerable *on hand* knowledge of the pertinent parts of international law and to point out some of the sources of information available.

If I have accomplished this I feel that I have done as much as time permits and that my visit with you has been successful.

Thank you very much.



**RESTRICTED**

**BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER**

**Commander Geoffrey E. Carlisle, USN**

Commander Carlisle was graduated from the University of Washburn, Topeka, Kansas, June 1939, with the degrees of Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Laws. He was admitted to practice before the Kansas State Bar in June of the same year and was variously employed until January of 1943 when he entered the Navy via the Naval Reserve Midshipman Program.

He took his training at the Naval Reserve Midshipman School, University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana and was commissioned an Ensign DVG, USNR, 27 May 1943. He was retained on board the midshipmen school as an instructor in Ordnance and Gunnery until October 1945. He was then assigned as an instructor at the United States Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps, University of New Mexico at Albuquerque, where he remained until separation from the service in January of 1946.

After a short period of private practice in Kansas, Commander Carlisle transferred to the regular Navy as a law specialist in November of 1946. Since that time he has served on the staffs of the Naval School of Naval Justice, Commandant Eleventh Naval District and Commander Destroyer Force Atlantic Fleet. He also served as station legal officer at the U. S. Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, California, and just prior to his present assignment, as Division Legal Officer for the First Marine Division in Korea. During this tour of duty he was awarded the Bronze Star with Combat V for meritorious service.

Commander Carlisle is presently assigned to the International Law Branch in the Office of the Judge Advocate General, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

**RESTRICTED  
SECURITY INFORMATION**

**RECOMMENDED READING**

**Current Books**

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books are available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

**Title:** *Turkish Crossroads.* 258 p.

**Author:** Newman, Bernard. London, Robert Hale, Ltd., 1951.

**Evaluation:** A very readable travelog of an extensive journey in a little-known country by a keen observer who gives an excellent picture of the land and its people. Starting with a brief sketch of the history of Turkey up to the Revolution, the author describes the reforms of Ataturk and prophesies the return to health of the "Sick Man of Europe" under the prevailing democratic system. The account of his travels and contacts with the Turkish people gives an excellent insight into the political and economic trends in the country and an appreciation of the value of such an ally in the present struggle against communism. Recommended reading for use in studies of that area and for anyone who may visit Turkey or wish to better understand its people and its problems.

**Title:** *The Campaign in Norway.* 289 p.

**Author:** Derry, T. K. London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952.

**RESTRICTED**

**55**

**RESTRICTED**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**Evaluation:** The Official British history of the Norwegian campaign in the spring of 1940 is an inter-service account, giving the highlights on German planning and execution and the British counteraction. The inter-service point of view is well chosen and carefully employed, providing objective treatment of land, sea, and air action. The difficulties and shortcomings which bedeviled British forces at the start of World War II are clearly portrayed. In spite of frequent instances of valor, the British action may well be summarized as "too little and too late." The need for unified or joint commands, careful preplanning and a minimum of cancellations, postponements and changes are stressed. This account contains much from which the earnest military student may profit. As a work of military history it should rank high. Facts are well documented and liberal illustrations are furnished. Interpretation is sound and important lessons are developed. This is the first volume in the military series of the United Kingdom History of World War II and if the remainder of the volumes should measure up to this one, the entire series should be well worth following.

**Title:** *International Shipping Cartels.* 323 p.

**Author:** Marx, Daniel. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1953.

**Evaluation:** The author deals with all aspects of the world-wide ocean shipping industry with special emphasis focused on international shipping cartels. He devotes considerable space to a general discussion of basic economic factors of the industry. Other important topics include regulation of overseas shipping, agreements in foreign trade, liner and tramp competition, and economics of shipping conferences. The naval officer will find this book presents a splendid description of the shipping industry. An understanding of the forces involved in the shipping world will give the reader an appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of the industry in relation to national defense.

**RESTRICTED  
SECURITY INFORMATION**

**Title:** *A Century of Conflict.* 439 p.

**Author:** Possony, Stefan T. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1953.

**Evaluation:** In *A Century of Conflict*, the author traces communist revolutionary techniques from the time of Marx and Engels through 1952. The book describes in detail the Soviets' theory of their "science of victory"; it proposes, and well supports the proposal, that the communists are working on a technique for world conquest that makes unnecessary a global conflict. Stefan T. Possony also forecasts a future course of events vis-a-vis communism—with and without an all-out shooting war. This volume can contribute much to an understanding of communism.

**Title:** *The Korea Story.* 180 p.

**Author:** Caldwell, John C. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1952.

**Evaluation:** *The Korea Story* is a brief account of the author's experiences with the U. S. civilian agencies in Korea prior to the North Korean attack. It is a frank discussion of the policies and procedures of our State Department and the United Nations during this confusing period. Though not particularly recommended for reference, this book is valuable to anyone trying to understand the situation in Korea and how it developed.

**Title:** *One of Our Submarines.* 316 p.

**Author:** Young, Edward. London, Rupert Hart-Davis, 1952.

**Evaluation:** Edward Young was the first officer of the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve to be ordered to command a British submarine in World War II. This is a story of his experiences. Book I traces his career from basic submarine training, through his early war patrols, to the time he was given his command. Book II is a history of his com-

**RESTRICTED**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

mand, H. M. S. STORM. The author is a writer and journalist by trade and his book reflects his skill. It is very readable and enjoyable. Particularly noteworthy is the author's ability to explain the technical details of submarine operations.

**Title:** *Big Business.* 204 p.

**Author:** Lilienthal, David E. N. Y., Harper & Bros., 1953.

**Evaluation:** In *Big Business* Mr. David Lilienthal, formerly Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and of the Atomic Energy Commission, presents arguments to show how outdated are the attitudes of modern Americans and their laws concerning big business. This book is of interest to a military officer as a citizen and as one who may expect to deal with industry in the course of his military career. On this basis, it is recommended for scanning or "skip" reading.

**Title:** *The Scope and Methods of Geography and the Geographical Pivot of History.* 44 p.

**Author:** Mackinder, Sir Halford J. London, The Royal Geographical Society, 1951.

**Evaluation:** Two lectures delivered by one of the most quoted (and often misquoted) geographers of the last century are contained in this pamphlet. There is also an excellent introduction by Mr. E. W. Gilbert. As one of the founders of geopolitical thinking in the twentieth century, although not the inventor of the word "geopolitics," Sir Halford Mackinder is worthy of the attention of all students of world affairs. These two lectures express most of his views on the interrelationship between physical environment and national political development. Although written about fifty years ago, they are timeless in their expressed conclusions. The first of the two papers, *The Scope and Methods of Geography*, is difficult reading but expresses a "new" approach to geography. *The Geographical Pivot of History* explains the true meaning of "balance of power," that is still largely valid. Both, as well as the interesting introduction, are recommended reading.

**RESTRICTED  
SECURITY INFORMATION**

**Title:** *Fear God and Dread Nought.* 377 p.  
**Author:** Marder, Arthur J. London, Jonathan Cape, 1952.  
**Evaluation:** The career of Admiral Lord Fisher from Cadet to Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth (1854-1904), is set forth in his own letters—with explanatory notes by Marder. Fisher was a brilliant impatient, and aggressive naval revolutionary and reformer, considered by Marder to be the greatest British naval officer since Nelson. His letters reveal his unfettered use of power politics to achieve his reforms, as well as his professional skill, decisive character, and prevision. There are many lessons of current value scattered through this compilation. A valuable book for reflective reading. More valuable still if compared with the papers of a junior foe, Richmond, as compiled by the same author in *Portrait of an Admiral*.

**Title:** *The Silent World.* 266 p.  
**Author:** Cousteau, J. Y., Captain, French Navy. N. Y., Harper & Bros., 1953.  
**Evaluation:** As Head of the Undersea Research Group of the French Navy, Captain Cousteau presents the background and history of this group and many of the details of their work in the development of techniques and equipment for deep sea diving. The author writes in an easy and convincing manner. The entire book is an extremely interesting narrative that will provide the reader with a great deal of pleasure and relaxation.

**Title:** *The Arabs and The West.* 285 p.  
**Author:** Hollingworth, Clare. London, Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1952.  
**Evaluation:** This is a survey of the situation involving the Arab League States, with particular emphasis on Israel and Egypt. Part I treats each country individually, with sufficient historical background to give meaning to recent events in the Middle East; Part II is devoted entirely to the Palestine War, and Part III discusses general problems that have arisen in the aftermath of the Palestine War. These problems include the military situation, oil, communism, industrialization, and the Arab communities outside of the League. It is a comprehensive book, timely, very readable, and brought completely up-to-date by means of an epilogue.

**RESTRICTED**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**PERIODICALS**

- Title:** *Sea Power and the Western Revolution.*
- Author:** Williams, Ralph E., Commander (SC), U. S. N.
- Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, March, 1953, p. 239-249.
- Annotation:** The author of the Prize Essay, 1953, declares that it is the Western nations, rather than the communists, who made the revolution which we now look upon with such foreboding and analyzes its principal effects into which all of our military policies and actions must be fitted.
- Title:** *Know Your Allies.*
- Author:** DeVaney, Carl N., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A.
- Publication:** MILITARY REVIEW, March, 1953, p. 11-19.
- Annotation:** Emphasizes the necessity of officers learning the language and military doctrines of their allies so that, until terminology and technology are made uniform, they will have an understanding of allied nations.
- Title:** *Naval Air Looks to New Strength.*
- Publication:** AVIATION WEEK, March 2, 1953, p. 53-59.
- Annotation:** Discusses new fighter, bomber and sea plane types being developed for the Navy, and the new improvements in carriers to permit the launching of larger, heavier aircraft. (Charts, p. 55, 59, show planes on hand and on order).
- Title:** *New Formula for the Defense of Europe?*
- Author:** Schwarz, Urs.
- Publication:** SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS, March 1953, p. 4-6.

**RESTRICTED  
SECURITY INFORMATION**

**Annotation:** Suggests that the defense of Europe may ultimately have to be built along lines somewhat different from those laid down by the EDC treaties and proposes the replacing or supplementing of the traditional standing armies by militia armies.

**Title:** *Trade Not Aid: The British Prepare.*

**Author:** Hutton, Graham.

**Publication:** THE REPORTER, March 3, 1953, p. 8-12.

**Annotation:** Studies the steps taken by the Commonwealth economic conference to coordinate trade in the sterling area and to restore stability to the economy of the British Empire.

**Title:** *Nationalism and Raw Materials.*

**Author:** Mason, Edward S.

**Publication:** ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March, 1953, p. 61-65.

**Annotation:** Considers that raw materials requirements for economic growth and for national security can best be met by drawing on lowest-cost sources of supply and by utilizing scientific and technological advances in production and conservation of resources.

**Title:** *Russia's Achilles' Heel. Part II.*

**Author:** Hittle, James D., Colonel, U. S. M. C.

**Publication:** MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, March, 1953,  
p. 54-61.

**Annotation:** Part I, in the February issue, told of a Russia rich in raw materials and strong in population reserves. Part II analyzes the possible effect that geography, agriculture, transportation, industry and population would have in a war between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R.



**RESTRICTED  
SECURITY INFORMATION**

**Title:** *Soviet Army's Sokolovsky.*  
**Publication:** U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 6,  
1953, p. 62-65.  
**Annotation:** Biographical sketch of the new Russian chief of staff, who  
was responsible for the blockade of Berlin.

**Title:** *America and Asia.*  
**Author:** Luce, Henry R.  
**Publication:** LIFE, February 23, 1953, p. 121-134.  
**Annotation:** Reviews the historic relations between the United States  
and the Far Eastern nations, and states that our influence  
must be used to establish pacific relations among the sev-  
eral nations of Asia.

**Title:** *Russia and the West.*  
**Author:** Toynbee, Arnold J.  
**Publication:** HARPER'S, March, 1953, p. 54-58.  
**Annotation:** Contends that in the world's experience over four and a  
half centuries, ending in 1945, the West has been the  
aggressor—and discusses the experience of Russia in her  
relations with the West. (This is the first of two articles  
from the author's forthcoming book, *The World and the  
West*).

**Title:** *Asian Wars Need Asian Soldiers.*  
**Author:** Eliot, George Fielding, Major, U. S. A. (Ret.)  
**Publication:** AMERICAN MERCURY, February, 1953, p.  
20-22.  
**Annotation:** A western army does not have an inexhaustible supply of  
manpower; therefore, it must use native troops when fight-  
ing in the Orient.

**RESTRICTED**

**63**

**RESTRICTED**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

- Title:** *Three Years of Communist Rule in China.*
- Author:** Nai-jui, Ling.
- Publication:** THE REVIEW OF POLITICS, January, 1953, p. 3-33.
- Annotation:** A study of the Chinese Communist regime, which notes the factors contributing to its rapid rise to power; outlines the distinctive features of the Chinese Communist Party; and discusses the means by which the regime has consolidated its rule.
- Title:** *The Soft Underbelly of the U. S. A.*
- Author:** de Toledano, Ralph.
- Publication:** AMERICAN MERCURY, February, 1953, p. 114-128.
- Annotation:** Communist-dominated Guatemala is the headquarters for a well-organized, Soviet-inspired conspiracy against United States' influence in Latin America.
- Title:** *The Satellites Are Getting Out of Line.*
- Publication:** BUSINESS WEEK, February 14, 1953, p. 126-128.
- Annotation:** Reports that worker resistance to forced industrialization and collectivization is spreading throughout Russia's satellites and views this unorganized resistance as a new weapon for the U. S. to use in the cold war.
- Title:** *Geopolitics and Air Power.*
- Author:** Roucek, Dr. Joseph S.
- Publication:** AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW, Fall, 1952, p. 52-63.
- Annotation:** Reviews the influences of sea power and land power on geopolitics in the past and discusss air power as the basis of mid-century geopolitics.

**RESTRICTED  
SECURITY INFORMATION**

- Title:** *North Atlantic Community.*
- Publication:** CURRENT HISTORY, February, 1953.
- Annotation:** A special issue consisting of eight articles on this subject; one, examines the Russian economic threat; another reviews the institutional development of West European integration; and the remainder deal with the problems of the various member nations which influence their attitudes toward the international defensive and economic organizations.
- Title:** *Russo-Scandinavian Relations.*
- Author:** Coombs, G. M.
- Publication:** INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Winter, 1952-53, p. 41-45.
- Annotation:** Relations are tense and strained in the Baltic, where the Scandinavians fear Soviet expansion; and the Russians in turn do not want to force Sweden into any alliance with the West, thus creating a strong Scandinavian bloc on her borders.
- Title:** *Disruptive Soviet Maneuvers.*
- Author:** Kirk, Alan G.
- Publication:** VITAL SPEECHES, February 1, 1953, p. 229-230.
- Annotation:** The western nations must strive for unity and harmony so that they will not be weakened by Soviet propaganda, which is aimed at dividing us and bringing about the capitalistic war that they believe to be inevitable.
- Title:** *Critique of Containment.*
- Author:** Burnham, James.
- Publication:** THE FREEMAN, February 9, 1953, p. 331-336.

**RESTRICTED**

65

**RESTRICTED**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**Annotation:** A nation can be contained within its boundaries, but the diplomats who forged the policy of containment do not seem to realize they cannot contain a militant international force such as communism.

**Title:** *The Russian Armada,*

**Author:** Woodward, David.

**Publication:** HISTORY TODAY, February, 1953, p. 107-114.

**Annotation:** Describes the voyage of the Russian fleet from the Baltic to the Far East, which involved traveling 11,000 miles without bases and ended in defeat by the Japanese Navy.

## **ERRATA**

**Vol. V No. 7. March 1953**

### **Petroleum—Captain John H. Morse, Jr., U. S. N.**

Please correct as follows:

- (1) Page 4, line 11. Change sentence to read "That is true because we rarely find petroleum in large quantities in the same areas where it is consumed in large quantities;
- (2) Page 12, line 2. Change to read "have about 100 million barrels of oil that lie under the ground—
- (3) Page 20, line 6. Add after second sentence "Therefore, when we are drawing oil from some 4,000 pools, as we are in this country today, many of those pools are bound to be in their declining phase of production. Consequently we must continuously find, and tap, new pools of oil if we are to just maintain our present rate of production, much less increase it. In other words, we have to walk to stand still, and run to get ahead.

So far we have been able to find the new pools we need to continue increasing our production, but it is getting harder and harder to do, and more expensive. Figure 16 indicates that the size of our newly discovered fields has been getting smaller and smaller.

- (4) Page 38, line 8. Change sentence to read "Notice that Russia has only 7%
- (5) Page 41, line 10. Change sentence to read "are educated guesses, at best;
- (6) Page 53, figure 39. "Tapline" is shown dotted as a proposed pipeline. It should be shown in solid line as an existing pipeline.