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**CONCEPTS OF WAR AND THEIR CORRELATION
IN AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY**

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 23 March 1953, by
Colonel Tom R. Stoughton (Inf.), U. S. Army

In approaching the subject of concepts of war it is very evident at once that we are dealing with a subject which today effects the lives of most human beings on this earth. In this age of total war when national strategies are determined by factors other than military, it is still the military who must implement these strategies by pursuing a concept of war that will bring victory and not defeat. The victorious concept must include victory in the post war period and not leave us after World War III as we were after World War II. Thus we in the military must know what we are talking about when we refer to the concepts of war and have at least a general agreement among the armed services on the subject. Currently our Joint Staff in Washington is meeting frustrations due to interservice bickering over just which concept of war should be the basis for planning. A kibitzer on a JCS planning committee at work could very easily come away with the opinion that he had been listening to General Clausewitz propounding his land concept, Admiral Mahan his sea concept and General Douhet his air concept. This prevailing air of disunity stems from many reasons, but I suppose that the stress that has been laid on the terms *land power*, *sea power* and *air power* has had a great effect on the unsatisfactory situation. In this modern age we should not be thinking in a three-way concept but should get our thinking truly unified on a one-way concept to *military power*. Walter Millis, a well known modern military and editorial writer has written at length on the thesis that

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there is no such thing in reality as land power, sea power and air power—there is only military power. I do not wish to get into a lengthy discussion of this point but cite it only as a lead off to my claim that our Joint Staff must have a Unified Concept of War if they are to plan intelligently.

This faces us with the problem of how to evolve such a concept reasonably acceptable to all services. There appear to be three methods currently in evidence, all attempting to gain pre-eminence. The first of these and one probably most heard about due to its very nature, is the demagogic method. The dictionary defines a demagogue as “one skilled in arousing the passions and prejudices of the populace by rhetoric.” Common examples in this field are the propaganda slogans of “Victory Thru Air Power,” “From the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli,” “He Who Controls the Sea Controls Commerce and He Who Controls Commerce Controls the World,” “Who Rules the Heartland Commands the World Island, Who Rules the World Island Commands the World.” There are many more, but I will desist before I too sound like a demagogue. I maintain that no sound-thinking professional military man wants to be classed as a demagogue even though such tactics have been known to be successful in budget battles on “the Hill.” The pay-off is not in Washington, but on the battlefield where demagogic tactics do not win the victory. This, if nothing else, should throw this method out as a logical method of deriving a unified concept of war.

A second method is also unfortunately too much in evidence. This method is, briefly, to let each service have its own concept of war and give it the funds and support to implement it. Such a method would certainly keep most people in uniform happy, but I am afraid when budget time rolled around there would be some free swinging axe wielding by all review agencies. Our new economy-

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minded administration with its "big business brains" cannot be expected to be so gullible as to bow down by any such three-headed monster. Such free-wheeling by each service in its own field is also bound to run into the major obstacle that our next war will be governed by a strategy of scarcity. Thus I would eliminate this method as unworkable, uneconomical and certainly not in the best interests of our nation as a whole.

This brings me to a third method which as you might suspect is the one I am about to propose. It is the historical analysis method. Concepts of war arrived at by a study of history have later achieved victory in many campaigns. It has met the test of time and proven successful. Some of you might have the ultra-modernistic view existing in some circles that anything that has been done in the past is too antiquated, old-fashioned and virtually immoral. I'll admit this age of atomic power, jet aircraft, guided missiles and advanced electronics is a far cry from the age of Napoleonic warfare, but I maintain that many valid and useful lessons still can be learned from the past. And finally I believe that historical analysis will certainly produce something a lot more concrete and realistic to deal with than the use of demagogic catch phrases.

Thus, if you will bear with me during a short period of world history, I would like to turn back the clock to the 15th century and do some hopscotching through the centuries to the present. Of course, if time and your patience permitted it would be possible to go back to the dawn of history and trace the evolution and growth of concepts of war to the present time. That does not appear to be a reasonable approach so I have attempted to be selective through the years in preparing an historical analysis of the concepts of war based on the theories of some of the best known makers of modern strategy of the last five centuries.

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I will begin with the first really modern military thinker and, incidentally, the first real expert stinker in the international field. He could be called with justification the first master of the department of dirty tricks. I refer to the notorious Italian statesman, Niccolo Machiavelli. He lived from 1469-1527 and served in government posts at home and throughout the principal countries of Europe. He was not a military leader but studied the problems of military and political power exhaustively and produced some most interesting concepts and doctrines. He preached that war was necessary and natural in order to establish the survival of the fittest in this world, and, consequently, that the complete destruction of the enemy must be the chief war aim of all nations. He stressed that war must always end in a definite decision. He is probably best known for his writings in the psychological warfare field, although he didn't know that is what it would be called some day. He stated that a general's interest should not be restricted to purely military actions but should be aimed at deceiving the enemy in every possible way, employing ruses, spreading false rumors and knifing him in the back when it hurt the most. His theories on financing wars were not exactly in keeping with the present powers of the Bureau of the Budget for he maintained that money is not the sinews of war. He did stress its importance however, in its relation to political power when he said that the basis of political power is military power and money constitutes political power only when transformed into military strength. Finally, Machiavelli is well known for his study of war as a social science. He concluded that discipline is the real foundation of a good army; that few men are brave by nature but good order and experience will make many so. He named the ability of the commander and the courage of his men as among the most decisive factors in the military game. I have dwelled quite at length on this old timer for I feel that many of his concepts are very applicable today and

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it is well for us to realize that the solutions for some of our current predicaments might have been mentioned years ago.

Next, I will turn to the 17th century and to perhaps the greatest military engineer of all times, Sebastian Vauban, Marshal of France. He lived from 1633 to 1707. His most significant contributions to the concepts of war were in the fields of siegecraft and fortifications and the corollaries thereto. As a main corollary he preached the need of defending fortifications from without and considering armies as living and flexible curtains for all forts. As a defense expert it is noteworthy that he maintained that any attack could beat any defense provided the attacker kept his force secure, invested the enemy completely, used well flanked parallels and approaches, and made a single final attack with artillery and infantry. I might point out right here and now that this last mentioned maxim of an artillery-infantry attack can well be translated into the modern maxim of concentration of our effort for a single final attack and not the frittering away of our means by haphazard air operations in one place, naval operations in another, and land battles in a third place. The final assault must be a unified effort. The most significant part of this concept is that the offense produces victory provided that certain conditions are met and maxims followed. The history of all warfare amply sustains this concept.

The next gentleman I come to here really never produced any concepts of war but introduced a philosophy of war that is the basis of most modern studies, so he certainly merits a few moments of our time. He is Carl von Clausewitz, the German General of the Naopleonic era. He was a soldier from the age of 12 and served with distinction in the German and Russian armies. He lived from 1780 to 1831 when he died of cholera. He is best

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known for his theory that war is nothing else than the continuation of state policy by different means. Political aims are the end and war is the means, or in other words, force is used in the pursuit of national policy rather than diplomacy. He stressed that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy must always be the aim of warfare; that the bloody solution of the crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's force, is the first-born son of war. Time does not permit sufficient treatment of the many sound Clausewitzian theories, but I do wish to state his idea on two other points prior to moving along. First, he believed that although the defense is in general the stronger form but with a negative object, that a swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive, described by him as "the flashing sword of vengeance," is the most brilliant point in the defensive. Second, he cautioned against minimizing the vital role of the moral and psychological factors in war.

While speaking of this era in history it is well to bring to your attention a famous Swiss soldier of the times who is credited with having understood and interpreted Napoleon most proficiently; in fact, Napoleon said of this officer that he betrayed the innermost secrets of his strategy. I speak here of Antoine Jomini, born in the French section of Switzerland in 1779, rising to the general officer rank in both the French and Russian armies. He was fortunate to have lived to the age of 90 and saw many of the principles he advocated proven. His highest position in the French Army was that of Chief of Staff for Marshal Ney. He was convinced by all his studies and experiences that there have existed in all times unchanging and fundamental principles on which depend good results in warfare, and these principles are independent of the kind of weapons, of historical time and of place. He cautioned against treating the elements of war mathematically

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but insisted there were a few basic principles which when followed make the chances of success great and when disregarded bring the danger of failure. Some of these basic principles are, the importance of gaining the strategical initiative, concentrating on enemy weakness, pursuit of a beaten foe, and the supreme value of surprise. Further, he showed a marked preference for the offense. He was an early vociferous opponent of the Maginot Line psychology of warfare, advising all commanders that even when forced to assume the defense by political or other considerations that every possible means should be used to avoid the mental and moral stagnation which eventually destroys any defense. He expressed it specifically as—

a. "to await attack in a strong defensive position with no other purpose than to maintain oneself is the worst of possible dispositions, a vicious disposition." Those Korean veterans present I am sure agree with Jomini on that one. And one last Jomini principle which hits quite close to home today was his caution that—

b. "the means of destruction in warfare are approaching perfection with frightful rapidity and the world's only hope is for the means of war to be limited by the laws of nations." He must have had a preview of this atomic age.

Moving to the American continent we find in this Napoleonic period a radical change in the tactics of warfare taking place. The formalism of European tactics with its strict marching and fighting formations and volley firing was being defeated by the untrained colonist and his accurate sharpshooting, combined with the systematic use of hills, fences, woods and at times entrenchments. The Europeans were greatly impressed when the Americans at New Orleans, a motley crew of frontier militiamen with a sprinkling of

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pirates, negroes and Creoles, decisively defeated an army of 7,000 veterans fresh from the Napoleonic Wars. The Americans utilized ditches and ramparts and accurate musket fire to inflict heavy losses on the British while themselves losing only eight killed and thirteen wounded. This might be termed an American concept of war which was well adapted to the conditions of the times.

While speaking of early American contributions to the concepts of war, I would be remiss if I didn't say something about the Civil War. General Grant emerged in this period as the first of the great modern generals. Williams in his book "Lincoln and His Generals" stated that Grant was quick to grasp the concept of the totality of war as it involved the economic resources of the nation and its civilian populace. On the other hand, Lee considered economic war as needlessly cruel to civilians and he did not visualize the strategic implications of economy and military power. It was this aspect that Mr. Williams stated convinced him that Grant was the greatest general of the Civil War. Grant was a master of what today is called global strategy.

I would like now to jump a bit across the pages of history to the World War I period for another concept of war which has not always received all the attention it merits. This concept was revived and applied by the British archeologist turned intelligence officer and Arab expert, T. E. Lawrence. He was born in Wales in 1888, graduated from Oxford and went to the Middle East as an explorer and scholar. By 1916 when the British under Allenby were fighting the Turks, Lawrence had become so influential with the Arabs that he became virtually the behind-the-scenes leader in this conflict. It was at this time that he became a leading exponent of a concept of war that a predecessor of mine at the Army War College called "a creeping paralysis produced by an intangible

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ubiquity which is substituted for fixed battle." In language that you and I will understand that ubiquity he was speaking of is the ability to be everywhere at once. The whole concept of course is better known to us today as guerrilla warfare. It was not new when Lawrence applied it in Arabia, but he brought it to focus there and in his well known book "Seven Pillars of Wisdom." He had predicted correctly that the untrained and poorly disciplined Arabs could not stand up against the veteran Turks in standard warfare and thus he concentrated on guerrilla tactics. This concept was successful and the operations of the Arabs made the Turks expend great efforts and produced a creeping paralysis that extended far back into the Turkish rear areas. Not only was this concept successful in the Middle East but Lawrence's book was translated into Chinese and we find in the early thirties the concept being applied actively and effectively against the Japanese invaders. Two of our well known enemies of today are experienced graduates of that period and expert exponents of Lawrence's concept. I speak of Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh. Mao used the concept in running the Nationalists out of China and Ho is doing pretty well in Indo-China. It was a loss to the Western Bloc when Lawrence was killed in a motorcycle accident in 1935. We could use his talents in the type of conflict facing us today and which is unquestionably in the future plans of the Kremlin.

Speaking of the Kremlin, an historical analysis of concepts of war cannot ignore our Soviet enemies. A brief look at some of the more modern leaders will indicate something of the Soviet attitude towards war theories. I have chosen Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin whose pictures I will not bore you with. Lenin, the hero of the Red Revolution in 1917 has written that Marxists have always considered the Clausewitz axiom that "war is politics continued by other means" as the theoretical foundation for the meaning of

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every war. He learned from Marx and Engels his ideas of power politics and deduced that warfare is not only military but also diplomatic, psychological, and economic in character. Trotsky, another power of this early revolutionary period was the father of the Red Army today although no militarist himself. He was the author of much of their current doctrine and expressed himself as basing his thinking on the concept that war is the continuation of politics with the army as the instrument. He made no claim to being a military expert and it is interesting in these days of civilian control of the military to observe his comment of thirty-five years ago when he said:

a. "In parliamentary countries war and navy ministries are often given over to lawyers and journalists who, like myself, see the army chiefly from the window of their editorial offices." Our late Public Enemy #1 of the day, J. Stalin, is primarily known for his concepts for the industrialization of the Soviet Union, training the whole populace for industry and modern war, and in building a general psychological preparedness of the nation. However, he too stressed his belief in the spirit of the offense and stated to H. G. Wells:

b. "Who wants a military leader incapable of understanding that the opponent is not going to surrender—that he must be crushed." Although the Soviets are noted for their defensive stands in World War II the brilliant Marshal Timoshenko has said that throughout the long ordeal of defensive war the Soviet goal has always been an eventual offensive which would bring victory through annihilation of the enemy's force in the field. This brief glimpse of these outstanding Soviet Communist leaders makes it quite evident that the concepts of Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Jomini and Lawrence have been well absorbed in the Soviet mind.

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As has been most evident up to this point I have been dealing primarily with land concepts or total concepts of warfare. However, since part of this presentation deals with an integrated strategy of all services I will touch briefly on several outstanding naval and air experts in order to permit me to arrive at my conclusions. It almost goes without saying that my naval selection is that famous alumnus of the faculty of this elite institution, Alfred Thayer Mahan. Any biographical data on him would be repetitious to this audience so I will skip that and proceed to merely refresh your minds on some of his outstanding theories. He is best known for expounding the principle of the command of the sea and the development of the elements of a nation's strength which contribute to sea power. He preached the necessity for controlling the sea by a great concentration of force able to drive enemy naval and merchant ships from the sea.

The ability to concentrate this power as required he held paramount. After the Russo-Japanese War especially he dwelled on the danger of dividing our fleet between the Pacific and the Atlantic. He expressed it simply as "concentration protects both coasts, division exposes both." Further, in the field of national power he repeatedly pointed out the close correlation between international affairs and naval requirements. His doctrine of sea power and principles of naval strategy have naturally been affected by the advent of fast carrier task forces and developments in land based air, but some of the basic concepts of Admiral Mahan are certainly still worthy of study. Much more could be said about this distinguished naval strategist, but I am sure it would be entirely unnecessary and superfluous before you naval experts.

While discussing naval contributions to concepts of war, I must not fail to mention the development of amphibious warfare.

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There is no single individual I found to accredit with the work in this field so I would like to take my hat off to the US Navy and the US Marine Corps for the present status of amphibious warfare concepts. Although the advancement of the art of amphibious operations has been pursued through the years by our navy, it was in the post-World War II years that much was done to keep this a live subject. The army has been accused by some of dropping the ball in this important field, and in this case it was fortunate for the army that the navy picked up the ball and ran with it. Thus I believe history will record references to the US Navy, the US Marine Corps and amphibious warfare in the same chapter.

As for the air strategists, I do not want to tread on the territory of the Air War College team but want to merely highlight the principle portions of the air concepts of two well known figures in this field. The first is the Italian General Douhet, an artillery officer turned airman, who first wrote on the importance of air power in 1909, later insulted the Italian General Staff with his opinions and was court-martialed in 1916, was exonerated in 1918 and made head of the Central Aeronautical Bureau. He was made a general in 1921 and concentrated seriously from that time in writing on his theories. He based his theories on two major assumptions: first, that aircraft are instruments of offense of incomparable potentialities, against which no effective defense can be foreseen, and second, that civilian morale will be shattered by bombardment of centers of population. Growing out of these assumptions were his two main concepts; first, that it is necessary and sufficient in order to assure an adequate national defense to be in a position in case of war to conquer the command of the air; and second, that the primary objectives of aerial attack should not be the strictly military targets, but industries and centers of population remote from

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the contact of the surface armies. There are additional portions of the now well known "Douhet Theory" which you will probably hear of later, so I will go on to that famous American airman who was also court-martialed, General William Mitchell. There are many parallels between the lives of Mitchell and Douhet even to the point that Mitchell too was a converted army officer who became supercritical of his superiors. Both men wrote a lot but the basic difference was that Douhet wrote mainly for professional military consumption while Mitchell pointed his writings at the general public in the hopes of convincing them of his air concept. Mitchell and Douhet were really contemporaries although most of Mitchell's theories were extensions or varied versions of the Douhet theories. General Mitchell was the first American to discuss the application of air power with a minimum of support by surface forces in global war. He differed here from Douhet who was willing to completely ignore the surface forces. Mitchell said with respect to defense against air attack that "the only effective defense against aerial attack is to whip the enemy's air forces in air battles." In the general field of air power concepts General Mitchell declared that "the advent of air power, which can go straight to the vital centers and either neutralize or destroy them, has put a completely new complexion on the old system of making war." With this brief coverage of the air concepts of Douhet and Mitchell I will leave the historical side of this subject for further treatment by the air experts.

In finalizing this historical analysis I would like to present some views of a famous Britisher with whom you are all familiar, Winston Churchill. In discussing the fate of the democracies in 1942, he said: "It is natural that the peaceful and improvident should suffer terribly and the wicked scheming aggressors should have their run of savage exultation. That does not end the story. If the great peaceful democracies could survive the first few years of the aggressors attack another chapter would have to be written."

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Now, gentlemen, whether or not that is a concept of war it seems to me that the role of shifting from the defensive to the offensive in that second chapter to which Mr. Churchill refers is the big job facing us all. A concept which will prevent disaster in the initial Soviet onslaught and bring ultimate victory for the Western Powers in the eventual offensive is the objective we all must gain.

In reviewing the concepts of war, I do not intend to develop controversies such as the planes vs battleships debate, B-36 vs super-carriers, or atomic bombs vs guided missiles. I am afraid all of us would be soon far off the subject of this presentation. I would like to point out that the facts of history sustain the findings of Clausewitz, Jomini, Lawrence and Mahan. In the air concept field history has not given us conclusive evidence as to what is the final answer. The fact remains that all agree in their respective fields to the need for offensive power to crush the enemy, be it on land, on the sea or in the air. All agree on the totality of modern war as it reaches into all walks of life. There are theories of land war, naval war, and air war, but unfortunately no accepted and agreed theory of war. For example this group of army officers I represent cannot conceive of the Douhet theory of winning the war without the army and navy, of bombing centers far from the battlefield and gaining victory smashing the armies in the field. The army needs the air for battlefield support as well as long range support. The army needs the navy to keep the sea lines of communication open, for carrier air and naval gun-fire support. The air force needs both the army and navy in many ways in gaining that ultimate victory we all seek. The fact that no single service can do the job itself is widely supported. General Vandenberg has stated on the subject, "The three services are in complete agreement that no one service can do the job alone." The decision over Germany, Italy and Japan was not

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gained in the air alone in World War II, and it is our opinion that it never will be by any power alone—but only by military power. The balance of forces making up that military power will vary with the situation and in the discussions to follow you will hear our ideas on that subject in certain specific cases. So in summing up this general discussion of concepts it is our fixed opinion that no victory will be obtained decisively without getting the army on the objective, still fit to fight. That we see as one of the main purposes for the existence of every sailor and airman.

Now just in case some might accuse us of living in the past, I have selected the views of some of our modern military leaders to show that in this decade there is wide support for the concept of military power about which I have been speaking.

First, that great naval airman, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, made the following remarks shortly before his untimely death:

On military and national power:

“I think we have to talk about the military power of the United States and get away from being too compartmented. It seems to me that the time has come to talk in terms of national strategy involving all elements of our national strength, rather than in terms of power in only one or two elements.”

On isolation and international air war:

“If you try to survive with nothing but the resources of North America against the combined resources of the rest of the world, I believe that in the long term you would be doomed to defeat.”

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On national security:

“The security of the United States requires that we have a good army and that our forces be so proportioned that we can operate a balanced force wherever it is required. By a balanced force I mean a force of all arms.”

Next for the views of our senior military officer in uniform. I quote General Omar Bradley:

On balanced forces:

“Considering the enemies we may sometime face, our combined forces must be much more effective than they are today. Our greatest danger is that we will be caught up in the fancy of a futurism, and commit ourselves to unbalanced forces that will not match the forces which might oppose us. When I speak of balance, I don’t mean the dividing of funds equally among three services; I mean effective forces equal to the tasks that modern warfare may thrust upon us.”

On military power:

“American armed strength is only as strong as the combat capabilities of its weakest service. Overemphasis on one or the other will obscure our compelling need—not for air-power, sea-power, or land-power—but for American military power, commensurate to our tasks in the world.”

And now in spite of the fact that he has faded away, I do not think we should ignore that really great soldier, General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur. He stated in a speech at Miami in 1951, the following:

“It is our implacable purpose to retain undisputed control of the seas, to secure undisputed control of the air, to vigorously

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implement our atomic program with a full commitment to the use, as needed, of the atomic weapon, while maintaining a well balanced and highly developed ground force."

Having quoted from well known and experienced army and navy officers, I deemed it appropriate here to go to an experienced civilian and military airman for his opinions on the subject at hand. I have chosen former Secretary of the Air Force, Finletter. He has indicated several times that all our air strategists are not advocates of the Douhet-Seversky theories and that many are realizing more and more the need for concentration on the defeat of the enemy armed forces in the field.. In an address to the Air Force Association in 1951, Mr. Finletter said, "Air power should be made to bring atomic power to bear directly on the enemy's ground forces, retarding his advance and rendering him unable to concentrate his forces decisively. Here we are entering into new terrain and we shall use all the imagination we possess to see to it that effective use will be made of atomic weapons against profitable targets in the ground battle area."

While quoting modern military leaders, and considering the color of the uniform I wear, I should not miss the opportunity to climax this epidemic of quotes by publicizing a comment by "the boss," incidentally one of "our boys" who made good, former General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. He stated in his book "Crusade in Europe" that:

"War is waged in three elements, but there is no separate land, air or naval war. Unless all assets in all elements are efficiently combined and coordinated against a properly selected, common objective, their maximum potential power cannot be realized."

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Any discussion such as this on concepts of war becomes purely academic unless we can apply them towards a definite situation. We have no problem in that sphere now and do not have to assume who our enemy will be—the threat to our way of life comes from only one source—the Soviet Union, and its satellites. We need no proof of that, but I would like to repeat here one of Stalin's public statements which went right to the point when he said, "The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialists states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end one or the other will conquer. And until that end comes a series of the most terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable." An interpretation of this statement is necessary to the extent of examining what is meant by the series of collisions Stalin has predicted. I maintain they are not necessarily the collisions we used to call war, but fall more into the economic, political and psychological fields. We are facing such collisions today in this period of the cold war or limited war. It appears that the strategy the Politburo has adopted for the present series of collisions is that of conducting limited war while holding out the threat of an unlimited war with a great military force as the ace-in-the-hole. This strategy has been fairly successful so far and no doubt the Soviets like to envision attaining world domination by such a course. Thus they face us with a puzzling dilemma of advancing their cause by means which are completely repugnant to us now, while at the same time holding up their armed might as something even worse if we take decisive action.

With such a dilemma facing us we find ourselves for the present needing a concept of war applicable to limited global war. We need the full power of the army, the navy, and the air force as diplomatic instruments. Our army in Western Europe, our navy in Formosan waters, and our air force in North Africa are examples

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of our armed might in a cold war role. I could go on at length on this theme but it is the subject of another presentation which you will hear tomorrow. It is definitely a live and real problem which our concepts of war must be designed to fit.

The other situation we must consider is when the final collision comes what conditions will face us. First of all it is quite evident we face a large land power with strong tactical air support. We face a naval power impressive mainly in the field of its submarine and mining threats. We face a growing long range air threat with increasing atomic capabilities. Behind this military power are almost unlimited manpower resources and an expanding industrial might. Our foes have a dictatorial government in complete control of a nation which is accustomed to severe hardships and made up of individuals who don't write letters to their congressmen. In other words the state of psychological preparedness of the Soviet Union poses a definite threat which we must consider in our concept of how best to defeat our opponent. Further, the power of the Soviet is dispersed over a large land mass protected in many areas by terrain and weather barriers but with sea approaches to some of the most vulnerable areas. By this general and fragmentary coverage, I have hoped to bring out in very broad terms the highlights of Soviet potential. I have not developed Soviet vulnerabilities for I am sure it has been and will continue to be the subject of study by every one of you. I would like to put in a plug right at this time for a continued vigorous campaign by every military man to "Know Your Enemy." We cannot do too much in that field.

Now to adapt the concepts previously discussed to the Soviet menace. First in the field of sea power. Sufficient men, materiel and supplies to gain a decision can reach the Soviet Union by only

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one means—crossing the seas. That very definitely requires the elements of Admiral Mahan's concept of command of the sea to be fulfilled. Our surface forces must have freedom of movement in the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, the Black Sea and all other bodies of water leading to Soviet shores. In order to accomplish such a requirement our navy certainly will have to have every element of sea power, be it in the form of super-carriers, underwater demolition teams or seabees. Should an assault on the Soviet Union be considered through a route such as the Mediterranean, the navy would be called on for all its power. Carrier based air, naval gunfire support, freedom of movement on the sea, antisubmarine warfare, logistic support, would all play a vital role in the success of our operations. As a rank amateur among experts in the naval field, I will venture an observation with which I hope all of you will agree—that even with all the facets of Admiral Mahan's concept, as modified by modern strategy. fulfilled, the definite decision of complete victory over the Soviet cannot be attained by sea power alone.

Now to the use of air power in the role it will play in defeating the Soviet Bloc. I have discussed Generals Douhet and General Mitchell and could have added Major Seversky to the same category. Certainly the concepts of these gentlemen have application, but not in their entirety, to gaining the kind of victory we want over the Soviets. Air power is a vital part of the military power that must be applied in full strength when the final collision of which Stalin spoke is upon us. Beginning at home the air force must provide an air defense which will prevent any disastrous paralysis to our war effort. The air lines of communication between the US and the USSR, the skies over our communications zones in the theaters of operations, and the most important area over the actual combat zone must be in our control. Next into enemy terri-

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tory where the destruction of the combat logistic support will have an immediate effect on the front line situation. Finally we arrive in the heart of the enemy homeland where some air strategists would put all our air effort. I might say as an aside here that I do not intend to get into a discussion as to the exclusive use of SAC, that is a subject for discussion at the Air War College, but I do want to state that our concept of how to defeat the Soviet Bloc does not envisage the sole use of the Douhet concept. Military power must use air power in all its facets; it is just not good sense to ever put all your eggs in one basket. So my parting theme on the air picture is that the air force still has a major role to play as a member of the team that must have a winning concept when the chips are down.

I now turn to the army. The army still believes many of the concepts of war taught by Clausewitz, Jomini, Lawrence and other great soldiers of the past can be readily adapted to twentieth century warfare. Colonel Welborn is going to tell you shortly in some detail as to how the army fights so I won't discuss the matter here. However, it is our concensus that the army very definitely needs the navy and the air force in their complementary roles and with the cooperation the army will go as far into Soviet Russia as is necessary to gain the final decision. Conversely, we are equally convinced that the navy and the air force in their complementary roles and with that Omar Bradley has stated, "Ultimately a war between nations is reduced to one man defending his land while another tries to invade it. Whatever the devastation in his cities and the disorder in his existence, man will not be conquered until you fight him for his life."

After the foregoing review of the successes and failures of different concepts of war, a resume of the Soviet methods of conflict, an application of the concepts of war to the Soviet threat, there

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remains but one other major item prior to coming up with a unified concept of war. I refer here to our national objectives, or just what is it we are shooting for when we evolve a unified concept.

You have all heard our national objectives expressed by our national leaders in different forms and have read the versions of many well known writers of the day. This Army War College Team is not aware of the national objectives currently accepted in the National Security Council but presents for your consideration an incomplete listing of some national objectives we believe should be agreed to and used by all national planning agencies. These are:

1. To protect our American way of life and preserve the general welfare of the people.
2. To restrain and reduce Soviet power and influence.
3. To seek peace by every means at our disposal but never by appeasement.
4. To destroy international militant communism if war comes.

With these objectives in mind and the foregoing part of this presentation as background, I am being presumptuous enough to propose a unified concept of war which I believe will give the United States the greatest possibility of successfully attaining our national objectives. It is:

A UNIFIED CONCEPT OF WAR

IN ORDER THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATION BE READY FOR EMPLOYMENT IN SUCH A BALANCE AS REQUIRED TO MEET ANY THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES, THAT NATIONAL EXECUTIVE

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AND LEGISLATIVE AGENCIES MAKE PROVISIONS FOR THE CREATION AND MAINTENANCE OF ARMY, NAVAL, AND AIR FORCES EQUIPPED WITH THOSE TYPES OF MODERN WEAPONS REQUIRED FOR SUPPORTING OUR NATIONAL POLICIES IN LIMITED WAR, AND PREPARED TO EXPAND, ATTACK AND DEFEAT THE ARMED FORCES OF THE ENEMY WHEREVER REQUIRED IN UNLIMITED WAR.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Tom R. Stoughton, Infantry, U. S. Army

Colonel Stoughton was born at Jeannette, Pennsylvania, on 3 August 1908. He was graduated from the United States Military Academy and commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Infantry on 12 June 1930.

He was first assigned to Fort Hamilton, New York, where he served with the 18th Infantry and the 1st Division until assigned to the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, where he completed the Company Officers' Course in 1934. After a tour with the 31st Infantry in Manila, P. I. from 1934-37 he was assigned to the 38th Infantry at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and participated with that unit in the several infantry division tests held at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, during the period 1937-40.

In 1940 he attended the National University of Mexico at Mexico City, Mexico, for one year prior to a tour of duty as an instructor in the Department of Modern Languages at the United States Military Academy. He left West Point in the spring of 1943 to attend the 13th General Staff Class at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and upon graduation was assigned to HQ ETO where he served in that headquarters during the preparations for the Normandy invasion and later in HQ Communications Zone as Deputy for Operations, G4. With the start of redeployment from the ETO he was assigned to the 5th Infantry Division and served in that unit as Regimental Commander and Chief of Staff until assigned to the 1st Course at the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia, in January 1947.

Upon graduation from that institution in July 1947, he attended the Department of the Army Strategic Intelligence School and upon graduation in December 1947 proceeded to Montevideo, Uruguay, where he served as Senior Military Attache from 1948 to 1951, when he returned to the US and was assigned as a student at the Army War College for the 1951-52 course. He completed this course in June 1952 and was assigned to the Staff and Faculty, Army War College, his present assignment.

His decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, Legion of Merit, and Croix de Guerre with Palm.