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## Introductory Remarks and Welcome by the President to the Participants of the Global Strategy Discussions

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## **INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND WELCOME**

By The President

*VICE ADMIRAL RICHARD L. CONOLLY, U. S. N.*

To Participants in

The Naval War College

*Fifth Annual Session*

of the

*GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS*

4 May 1953

Permit me to extend to you officially a warm welcome to the Naval War College and a cordial invitation to participate in the Fifth Annual Session of our Global Strategy Discussions.

I would like to give you some idea of the composition of the group which is assembled here for these discussions:

*First*, the staff of the Naval War College and the students of our several classes, which are as follows: The Strategy and Tactics Class, the Strategy and Logistics Class, the Command and Staff Class, and a small group of five officers who are pursuing an Advanced Course of Study here.

*Secondly*, a group of representatives from the various Service schools and military colleges.

*Thirdly*, a group of Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve officers who have been selected for two weeks' active duty here at the War College from all of our Naval Districts.

*Fourthly*, a group of civilians who have been chosen from as many different phases of our national life as possible, each of whom is eminent in his own field and all of whom are highly respected, loyal and patriotic citizens of the United States. We are fortunate indeed to have these distinguished men come here to help us.

With regard to security of the discussions, I request that you all respect our confidence, maintain inviolate the classification of papers and other information of a classified nature made available to you here and particularly that no statements of any participant be discussed outside nor attributed publicly to the author. Only by observing these restrictions can we hope to have free discussion in our meetings.

The four groups that I have mentioned will be more or less evenly distributed and integrated into our twenty-six seminar groups. The fourth category, the civilians, may perhaps feel themselves confronted with an overwhelming representation of what has become to be known as "the military mind." I would like to alleviate apprehension on this score, at least to some degree, by assuring them most seriously that here at the Naval War College, and in fact at every one of our higher Service educational institutions, a very earnest attempt is being made to broaden the military mind by contact in an increasing degree with civilian influences. These Global Strategy Discussions I would consider to be a notable example. In regard to the Reserve officer group, although they served with us for a period of years during the last war, they have all had an opportunity since being released from active duty with the Services to undergo an emancipation and a reclamation process, which might be called "demilitarization." Although they have been here already a week, I am confident that they have not been reinfected in that short time.

In previous years' "Discussions" we have confined ourselves solely to shaping a military strategy for an all-out global war. This was the end-product of our efforts. However this year we are including the strategy and the military policies necessary to meet the requirements of a long continuing state of "Cold War." We are also to consider that the term "Cold War" may include possibility of limited hostilities as in Korea and Indo-China and similar involvement elsewhere; also, quasi-war or a state of suspend-

ed hostilities as in the case of the Nationalist Chinese forces in Formosa.

In undertaking a study of this kind, in order to arrive at a strategic concept that will outline realistic planned action and definite policies, we must progress from the general to the more specific and from the abstract to the concrete. We must progress from objectives to policies and, finally, evolve a strategic concept and a program for actual military readiness. I believe that you would do well to subject your final decisions, in arriving at this strategic concept and this program of readiness, to some such test of suitability, feasibility and acceptability, as you can find outlined in our War College publication "Sound Military Decision."

In the winning of the "Cold War," we must employ most effectively novel, unorthodox and, to most, unfamiliar methods and types of operations. Some part of such a program has been highlighted in the press as "Psychological Warfare." In this sort of a campaign, we will act against the enemy by operations of several categories: political, economic, military, psychological and educational, and para-military. In later address, General Donovan will handle this subject.

In the next three years, we may justifiably foresee many far-reaching and significant changes in the political, economic, and strategic strength factors of the Western Allies. Most vital to this augmentation of total allied strength will be the increase in the strength of the Armed Forces and the total warmaking potential of the United States itself, for this is the base of the whole structure. Inclusion of West Germany into a European Army would result in tremendous accretion of strength.

During this period, our program of economic and military aid to the NATO nations—particularly in Continental Europe—will, if it is successful as we expect, have achieved a tremendous build-up of the capability to resist invasion from the east. The

ground and air forces of NATO on the Continent will probably always require an increment of United States strength, together with a continued flow of material support to stiffen and nourish them. Nevertheless, as the combined strength of the Western European Armies grows, our commitment to them will be lessened. In determining our strategy for the future, this opens up whole new vistas. There are many areas of vital importance to our prospective enemy all around his periphery, which offer inviting and profitable points of attack. There are many areas in which fighting could be prosecuted with small forces in such manner as to greatly weaken him. There are routes over which he could be invaded in force in such manner as to sever main lines of land communication to his armies. There are other possibilities of invasion by massive forces which would outflank the main efforts in which he is engaged. I believe that we should look forward to employing on a global scale the advantage that sea power gives to us in exercising the strategic initiative wherever around his total periphery it is advantageous for us to attack—whether it be by bombardment, by raid, by expeditions of limited scope with limited objectives, or by movement of massive forces which can invade and occupy strategic positions vital to him in any further prosecution of the war by him.

Although our enemy has practically unlimited resources in manpower, his material resources for making war and the industrial capacity and transportation facilities required to replace his equipment and to replenish his stockpiles of war material and supplies are very strictly limited. These limitations and our attack on his limited resources, however, are meaningless unless by fighting we compel him to dissipate and deplete them. It is to our advantage that the localities in which this fighting occurs should be so chosen as to yield to us the most advantage, to him the least. Fortunately, his long frontier, varied terrain and extensive coast line offer many such opportunities.

I hope that we will all come to understand the nature of our adversary. By personal experience in official dealings, I early (1946) became convinced of his complete and utter unreliability. Study of his declarations of policy for world domination and a careful examination of his every act in the post-war period should leave no doubts of his evil intentions and his long-range plot to achieve our destruction. Professor James Burnham says, in an excellent lecture at the Naval War College, that Communism is not a philosophy, not a political party; it is an organization, an enterprise, a new kind of army, a secular religion, and a conspiracy. Our enemy is ruthless, relentless, and implacable.

There is one more point I should like to stress at this time. Our discussions here this week have as one premise a possible global war. This is essential to these discussions. That is the nature of our profession. This is a War College and we must study war.

But you should not conclude from this that we either expect or desire a global war. We all hope that it may be avoided (at least, for many years) and I can say with assurance that every one of us in uniform fervently prays that it can be avoided—with honor, of course. Planning for the conduct of war is a requirement of our profession.

In both World Wars and in the recent war in Korea, the outbreak of hostilities found us woefully unprepared for the type of conflict, the scope of the war and the character of the fighting. These repeated instances of a habitual state of unpreparedness can be attributed to several factors: lack of realization of the dangerous position in which the United States had been placed by world events; insufficient appreciation of the great extent of our interests; lack of the military policy that was strong enough to support our total contemporary foreign policy; and an inadequate or tardy implementation of the advance preparations that were necessary to meet the impending emergency. As a result, we have narrowly

averted disaster. The danger was potential, but inevitably approaching, in the case of World War I; glaring and imminent in the case of World War II; and, on a smaller scale, no less real in the war in Korea.

We cannot say that we have not been warned by many of our most eminent statesmen from Washington to Eisenhower and always by our most eminent soldiers from General Washington to General MacArthur—sailors from Paul Jones to Nimitz. Even one of our greatest war Presidents, Woodrow Wilson, with about two years' unmistakable warning, could not waken the nation to a realization of its danger nor quicken it to take the (by then) emergency measures necessary in preparation for the war that was sure to follow. However, to his everlasting credit, President Franklin D. Roosevelt began to remedy the situation of military weakness in which he found the nation upon assuming office and made great strides in the two years preceding the outbreak of hostilities.

Military policy needs to embrace other important factors in our present-day world, due to our position of leadership and power in it. Some of the other problems that must be solved in order that the policy can encompass the whole of the military situation and include all forms of warfare will be enumerated. For example:

How much of our annual national income will be expended for military purposes?

What proportion of our military budget will go to building and maintaining our own establishment and what for military aid to our allies?

What will we spend for development of new weapons; how fast should the perfected new weapons be produced; at what point will we shift production to a still newer weapon in each category; what will we spend on nuclear weapons, will they displace the conventional ones and how fast and how completely?

What is the proper proportion between our land forces, naval forces and air forces?

What mass of our force can we afford to deploy abroad and what should be maintained at home in a high state of readiness to act as a global strategic reserve?

What is the proportion between offensive aircraft, support aircraft and aircraft for the passive defensive?

The policy must be as complex as warfare itself has become.

It can readily be seen that it is closely affected by considerations of foreign policy and strategy.

One great apostle of preparedness, President Theodore Roosevelt, counselled: "Speak softly, but carry a big stick."

Since the end of World War II and our immediate demobilization to the point of military impotency, we have been in need of a rational, consistent, military policy that realistically supports our position in the post-war world. We know pretty well what our general objectives are. Fundamentally, we want to preserve our existence and our way of life. We want on a larger scale to preserve freedom in the world, because the loss of it anywhere threatens it here. The lines are clearly drawn. How are we to accomplish our aims? It will help if we have a fitting military policy and implement it—progressively and with constant determination.

We must be ready, should war be forced upon us, to begin fighting an all-out war or, alternatively, to fight minor wars (like that in Korea), which might result from an attempt at piecemeal aggression or enemy attack upon critically sensitive areas. The peacetime standing military forces and the support ready to be given to them must provide the means for continuing any current war, such as Korea. They must be prepared to assume, as well, the



load of the initial phases of a general outbreak of war with a major enemy. At the same time, our standing forces must provide the base and the nucleus of the greatly enlarged establishments that would be required to win a general conflict, the mobilization and training bases for the future armies, fleets and air forces.

Another important element of a state of readiness is the achievement of an acceptable mobilization base for the nation itself, for its economy, for its industry, for its total ultimate power for waging successful war.

Meanwhile, we must build up our allies so that they may be able to defend themselves with better hope of success. We hope to do this with no greatly augmented help from us, either in very much larger peacetime U. S. military forces deployed abroad, or any greatly increased military aid, or any long-continued financial transfusions. During this long-term phase, which will in this instance be inclusive of the short and medium-term phases, we should provide for a continuous, progressive replacement of obsolete and obsolescent military equipment, lest we be stuck with an out-of-date, inadequate military machine. This replacement, modernizing and regenerative process, must take place at a tempo that will exceed that required in any past experience of ours. Required now is a series of advanced types of equipment flowing from the research stage through development and engineering, test and evaluation, adaptation for use in service, production in quantity and application to a projected, large-scale employment in training or in actual active operations.

We must include the re-building of a psychological readiness on the part of our people to accept sacrifices, rigors and hardships with constancy and determination. Such would imply service in our Armed Forces of a great deal of our young manhood for adequate periods of training, and it would require a tough and enduring spirit on their part. I would not doubt the devotion of our young men.

We cannot simplify our problems by setting our sights for a definitely determined date for mobilization day nor by deciding that we will be fully prepared on mobilization day. We must reach the mobilization basis as soon as may be, but not by prejudicing the achievement of the character of the result sought, not by such haste as to produce vast waste, not at the expense of our national economic and social well-being. We must prepare our mobilization base with the expectation that it will provide the means for expanding to the upper limit of our war-making capacity within a reasonable period after the outbreak of war and at the greatest rate of acceleration consistent with attaining the ultimate limit. We must not injure and hamper our efforts by over-emphasis or exclusive emphasis on any one of these factors at the expense of any or all of the others. We must have a broad consideration of the problem in all of its parts.

The *military position*—call it “preparedness,” “posture of defense”—of the United States has vastly improved in the past two and one-half years, not in all aspects but certainly as to the over-all relative, immediately available strength and as to that which could be quickly mobilized. Compared to their military situation in 1947, our allies have greatly increased both their ready strength and their potential. The military strength of these nations adds greatly to the combined allied strength, because the forces of our European and Asiatic allies are already overseas, sometimes actually deployed into a future theater of suppositious operations or actually fighting beside us, as in Korea. Indigenous troops are much more economically supported and maintained abroad in peacetime or in war than a similar number of our own troops.

It is now generally admitted that the real foundation of the Military Power of the Western World is dependent upon the total Military Potential of the United States itself. Such understanding is not enough, because it is not so clear to all that the United States must itself maintain ready Armed Forces to help bear the brunt of the early fighting if war should break out and

our allies be suddenly attacked. In the early stages of a war, we must help immediately or risk losing the war at the outset. Another time, we cannot rely entirely—for protection and the time in which to arm—upon the Navy and Air Force of Great Britain and upon the armies of the Continental nations to hold Fortress Europe unaided while we take several years to prepare behind such a shield.

It seems to me that one of our greatest needs is a continuing and steady military policy that would provide the level of military forces and the military resources which would support a strong and determined national policy. Such strength—both ready and potential—will support our diplomacy in peace and would provide the means of executing a winning strategy in case of war. To bring about such a condition the people of the United States must understand what are our national aims, what is the extent of the military strength which must be maintained in order to back them up, and what the cost will be. Let us not falter now.

President Eisenhower said that “the only way to avoid a world war is to win the cold war.” Results in this will depend to a large degree upon the soundness of our military policy and our success in implementing its programs. I am confident that the American Public will willingly bear the burden of indispensable armaments, instead of incurring the risks of losing a war or the penalties and price of winning a war. I am certain that we can preserve the peace only by being militarily strong and that to be weak invites aggression and attack. Let us be unafraid to be strong.