

1953

Introduction to Command Intelligence

George R. Phelan
U.S. Navy

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Recommended Citation

Phelan, George R. (1953) "Introduction to Command Intelligence," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 6 : No. 9 , Article 3.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol6/iss9/3>

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INTRODUCTION TO COMMAND INTELLIGENCE

A Lecture Delivered
at the Naval War College
on 31 August 1953, by
Captain George R. Phelan, U.S.N.

Gentlemen :

Today, I shall attempt to introduce the subject of *Intelligence* from an unconventional point of view — that of the commander rather than that of the intelligence officer — for intelligence is a function of command.

Furthermore, as this is the Naval War College where problems are usually conducted on a fleet or force level, I shall talk more or less from the point of view of such commanders. While this puts intelligence in a narrow naval package, it should serve as a satisfactory point of departure for the broader national and joint aspects which will be presented later in the course.

Before World War II, interest in intelligence was confined, for the most part, to the military services and writers of popular fiction. Today, there is widespread interest in its activities. Both the public and the Congress show an appreciation of its need in these atomic days.

Before the last war, only the Navy and War Departments had formal intelligence organizations. Now, there is a vast intelligence pyramid — composed not only of the service agencies, but also those of the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Treasury, and the Department of Justice; at the apex of this pyramid, is the Central Intelligence Agency whose level of

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operation is that of the National Security Council. Other departments also have smaller intelligence divisions and sections.

Today, intelligence is big business. Informed estimates place the number of people directly engaged in United States intelligence activities at between fifty and seventy thousand; in wartime, this is expected to increase at least tenfold — a half million to a million bodies — a *sizeable slice* of the manpower pie.

As intelligence organizations have expanded, much has been written for the guidance and instruction of intelligence officers; almost nothing for the guidance of commanders whom they serve. Consequently, a commander who wishes to become familiar with the intelligence element of his command finds his patch obscured by abstractions and complexities of publications whose point of view is that of his intelligence officer.

Therefore, in this introduction I shall attempt to delineate the commander's interest in intelligence and avoid as much as possible technical considerations of an intelligence officer. The limits of my field for this will be the positive side of intelligence — which I shall discuss under the following headings: (a) its nature; (b) its function in command; and (c) its processes.

Now, then, as regards its nature: —

I would like to fix a point of departure by delimiting the meaning of the word "intelligence" for, like all technical terms, it does not mean the same to everyone.

A hundred years ago the word "intelligence" was used to denote what we call "news." The editor of a paper would write

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that he had received intelligence of the arrival of a ship. This meaning has all but disappeared from common usage, but is still used in a specialized and restricted sense by the Armed Forces and other government agencies concerned with the formulation of foreign policy. In these agencies its use has been restricted to knowledge of foreign nations or hostile forces. The *Dictionary of U. S. Military terms for Joint Usage* defines "intelligence" as: *Knowledge achieved by logical analysis and integration of available data concerning one or more aspects of foreign nations or areas and immediately or potentially significant to planning."*

This definition emphasizes that intelligence is not an undigested and chaotic mass of rumors, reports, idle speculations, and facts. Such data, from the military point of view, are simply raw pieces of information — even though it is about an enemy. Intelligence, on the other hand, is the product of a critical and informed examination of all such data. What is true must be separated from what is false; what is more probable from what is less probable. Finally, intelligence must be pertinent to some immediate or future use; curiosities and irrelevancies — no matter how interesting — are not intelligence.

Needless to say, intelligence has been divided into many categories and given many fancy labels. Such classifications are for the most part made by the various intelligence agencies for their own purposes and according to the prevailing fashion. The distinctions which they draw are often ambiguous and of little real interest to the commander for whom the word "intelligence" suffices for all his needs. All intelligence available to a fleet or force commander or to you here at the War College comes under one of two classifications: *Strategic Intelligence* or *Operational Intelligence*.

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Strategic Intelligence is a term common to the National Security Agency as well as the Armed Forces, and it means something a little different in each place. The word "strategic" may be somewhat misleading to naval officers for in reality what is meant is intelligence needed for planning purposes. *Naval Strategic Intelligence* is officially defined as: "*Intelligence on the capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions of possible or actual enemies within the field of naval warfare.*"

Operational Intelligence is a term more or less peculiar to the Navy, though it is coming into use in other services. It designates that type of intelligence used by the fleet commanders in the last war. It has been officially defined as: "*Intelligence needed by naval commanders in planning and executing operations including battle.*"

The difference between strategic and operational intelligence is one of *point of view* and *handling*. ONI sends CINCPAC strategic intelligence; CINCPAC uses it in the form of operational intelligence.

In any case, here at the War College you need not concern yourself with fine differences between terms because almost all of the intelligence available to you falls under the *strategic* category. You will meet operational intelligence only in a simulated form.

Although it is all intelligence from the commander's point of view, there are certain innate differences which affect his use and appreciation of it.

First, intelligence is either *static* or *dynamic*. Static intelligence does not change appreciably. It usually embraces natural

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features and more or less permanent structures. We are all familiar with many examples of it in the form of maps and charts or the population of a country. Dynamic intelligence, on the other hand, has no permanency — change is normal. Good examples are troop deployments and ship dispositions. The important difference between the two is that static intelligence, once its authenticity has been established, need not be reexamined. Dynamic intelligence gives no such assurance, and it must be interpreted in light of the trend it implies for its sense may have changed between the time of collection and consideration.

Second, intelligence is either *overt* or *covert*, according to whether its source is open or clandestine. Overt intelligence is the canvas upon which the picture is painted; it requires no discussion. The outstanding feature of covert intelligence is the necessity of protecting its source. It must be disseminated only on a “need to know” basis. In fact the more important it is to us, the smaller the group that should have access to it. This means that commanders on higher echelons will generally have sources of intelligence that are not available to those on the lower ones. As a result, general command doctrine must sometimes be violated, and a subordinate commander told specifically what to do with no apparent reason.

Again, some covert intelligence is so important to our overall mission — yet derived from such a delicate source — that its use must be denied our own forces rather than risk compromise of the source. For instance, a fleet commander may deny intelligence to all but a small group charged with the conduct of the battle although it often would have been helpful to other operating forces. Needless to say, this is a hard decision to make — and one that can be made only by the higher echelons of command.

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It is a cold fact of intelligence history that men have been sacrificed to preserve an important source.

Third, there is *old* and *new* intelligence. A commander must always consider the time element involved in forming conclusions from intelligence reports. Old intelligence cannot always be combined with new to make a picture — especially if it is dynamic in nature. As obvious as this is, you will find that delays in transmission and confusion of time of origin with the time of the event make this error more frequent than you would expect.

Finally, distinction must be made between intelligence derived from *primary* or *secondary* sources. *Primary Source Intelligence* derives from a direct process of observation or collection. Thus, an agent's report of having seen a number of ships in one place or the photograph of a gun emplacement would be primary source intelligence. *Secondary Intelligence*, on the other hand, derives from the processing of one or more primary source reports. It is usually met in the familiar form of intelligence publications, estimates, appreciations, etc. The intelligence which will be given you here — or is available to you in the library — is classed as *secondary*.

If this distinction is not recognized, secondary intelligence may easily be used to confirm the primary intelligence from which it was derived. The result is often misleading and sometimes ludicrous. For example, there was a report from an agent who stated that the Chinese Reds were going to launch an amphibious attack against our forces at Inchon from the Shantung peninsula. Later, the same report — as original information — was received from three different sources. After the lapse of several days, another agent stated that he had received confirmation of the report of the

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original agent from three other sources. From certain peculiarities of all these reports, we were able to identify their true source as the original agent's report. Among other things, it was apparent that the second agent had unknowingly used the first agent's report to confirm itself. Although the original report was evaluated unreliable and improbable, once having gotten in the intelligence system it blew around the world for months just like a dry leaf in a ventilator.

So far, I have defined intelligence and classified it. I shall now talk about some of its limitations.

Complaints are often heard that intelligence conclusions are either too vague or too general to be of real value, and that intelligence officers are always copping their bets. Unfortunately, this is sometimes true, but it is also true that many complaints stem from a lack of appreciation of the limitations inherent in the intelligence process.

Interpretative intelligence, like calculus, is an art of limits. Its truths cannot be expressed in absolute terms. They lie between certain defined limits whose distance apart is dependent on the amount of information available — and its accuracy.

The intelligence picture is painted in shades of gray — not in black and white. Although this can be remedied to some extent in war, some “grayness” is always present. We were supposed to have had the data at the Battle of Midway, but I think that you would be surprised at the grayness of the picture from which Admiral Nimitz made his initial decisions two months before the battle. At that time, we did not have the Japanese plan as some people think but simply bits of information that seemed to form

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the dim outline of a plan such as hints of the area, of the forces involved, and a broad time bracket of when a major campaign would be launched. If Admiral Nimitz had misread this picture or waited for more information before starting action, it would have probably been too late to have assembled the forces to defend Midway.

While this is not a command lecture, I suggest to you that the ability to reach a proper decision from a dim intelligence picture is an attribute of a truly great commander.

The limits of intelligence are never more apparent than in attempting to fix the time of a future event. For instance, when will the enemy start a war? Although the public generally believes that intelligence can predict D-day or Y-year, the only way to *predict* such events is to *attack the enemy*. If you are forced to remain on the defensive, your intelligence can only inform you that the situation is so threatening that hostilities can commence any time. Unfortunately, a threatening situation has the habit of persisting for some time, and you become so conditioned to it that its translation into action is a true surprise.

From time to time, you will hear about indicators of war. The general idea is that it should be possible to have a checkoff list of significant events, actions, developments, etc., which, if carefully watched, should give a clear indication of a war situation and even imminence of attack.

Before World War II, there was worked out a normal distribution pattern of Japanese shipping with emphasis on tankers. Any change in this pattern would be an indication of war. The idea proved correct — but it just happened that the change occurred

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about one year before Pearl Harbor, a result of the European war and our economic policy towards Japan.

Since then, much work has been done on the problem and someone is always discovering a new solution. I do not ask you to share my pessimism on this subject, but I suggest that any system purporting to be a list of the indicators of war be regarded with skepticism.

Finally, I should like to say that the limits of intelligence cannot be presented with mathematical precision. They must be expressed in general terms; hence, the tent-like generalities of intelligence papers. This should be borne in mind when you read intelligence material in the library. No attempt should be made to read into it positive intelligence which it can support, but rather an effort should be made to picture the limits within which its truth lies.

So far, I have examined various aspects of the nature of military intelligence: what it is, its classification, its types, and its limitations. I now come to my second topic: intelligence as a function of command. For the purposes of clarity, I shall separate this into two parts: one, the basic philosophy of the intelligence-command relationship; and, the other, the more concrete and current intelligence functions of command.

To understand the philosophy of the relationship of intelligence to command, it is necessary to orient its military concept within the wider and more general field.

In its broader sense, intelligence is an element of power — and from earliest times princes and potentates, bishops, politicians, and businessmen have recognized that to carry on their affairs

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with success, knowledge of the world around them was as necessary as the capacity to act on such knowledge. Much advantage accrued to such organizations as the Roman Empire and the Medieval Church, who could afford to maintain the means to keep themselves informed and thereby establish a quasi-monopoly on news.

As communications improved and education became more widespread, monopoly of news became more and more difficult. Emphasis on intelligence then shifted to securing news of special and superior importance, and more quickly than that available to the general public. Hence, reports of secret agents and the like became highly important to governments and quasi-governmental organizations because they could provide this special information before the course of events made it public property.

Obviously, the kind of intelligence that was most significant related to the sources of power in foreign states and the intentions of those who manipulated that power. Hence, in the 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries, intrigues and cloak-and-dagger work were the hallmarks of high politics.

Today, this broad general field has come to be known as *national intelligence*, and it is more likely to be derived from statistics. However, its basic interest has remained centered in power and power manipulation in foreign nations. Because national interests and sources of national power in a modern state are very broad, national intelligence has retained the *inclusive character* it had in the days when it was primarily news.

Those interested in policy or power have always followed closely, but in a broad way, the armed forces of foreign countries because military capacity is part of the content of national power

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and military operations are channels for its use. However, military intelligence itself has developed in a separate and distinct fashion from that of the broader field. In fact, its early history is so much more definite and clear that it could be argued that the broader art is but an expansion of the military nucleus.

Never is the advantage of good, and the calamity of bad, intelligence more manifest than in war. Consequently, the values of intelligence have been well understood by the great Captains of the past as well as given full consideration by military theorists and doctrinaires. As a result, it has developed certain characteristic procedures — or even doctrines — which are generally understood if not always practiced by all military intelligence agencies.

Such doctrine is unique to the military services and is designed to be used within the basic frame of reference of their intelligence problem; that is, the enemy is *always known*, and the commander always has a mission in relation to that enemy. Intelligence interest focuses not on just *any* information of the enemy, but on that intelligence which has *effect on own mission*. Accordingly, the philosophy of this doctrine is an *exclusive one*.

The broad general field of intelligence, such as the national type, has had a more vague and irregular past, and has not developed any comparable doctrine. Yet so strong is the influence of established methods that there is a strong tendency to apply military procedures in the formulation of its conclusions; this often causes confusion to both its producers and its users. For, although it might be argued that national intelligence is but a broader and higher form of military intelligence, there are actually more basic differences than those of breadth and degree.

The sources of power and the intentions of those that manipulate it — and also the focus of interest — of the national type

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intelligence has many hidden ramifications. At the same time, it cannot always be recognized just where the national interests lie or what are the national policies for their support; in fact, the political leader is sometimes unable to positively identify his enemy or even to know what he wants to do about a probable one. While this may confirm a suspicion long held by his opposition, it nevertheless poses a formidable problem to his intelligence service which thus has no standards for the appraisal of relevancy in its collection activities, nor for formulation of conclusions in its interpretive processes. Consequently, the philosophy of national intelligence is *inclusive* as opposed to the *exclusive* nature of military intelligence, and its methods of derivation and presentation are variable rather than regular. The important point to keep in mind about the intelligence of the broad type is that its conclusions, which often concern peace and war, should not be read through military glasses.

I have discussed the general character and background of the wider intelligence fields at some length in order to emphasize the special and restricted character of command intelligence which I will take up next.

A commander's need for accurate and adequate information of the enemy is basic. The transformation of such information into intelligence — and its introduction into a commander's appreciation of his situation and into the formulation of his plans — epitomizes the intelligence function of command. It has been the subject much studied in the past by military logicians and theorists, and in modern times has developed definite procedure which it is necessary that you understand.

Whether with the aid of a large staff or by doing what comes naturally, a commander, in solving a military problem or

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in making a decision, must consider two elements which might be said to have opposite polarities in relation to his end in view. One of these elements is oriented towards the enemy and is usually designated the *intelligence element*; the other is usually designated the *operational element*. Such designations, of course, are in terms of the broad division of staff functions.

The logical basis of the decision-making process, and the soundness of the decision itself lie in weighing the effects of these two elements against each other, and in the final integration of the result. This process is greatly complicated by the fact that while the values of the operational element are known and finite those of the intelligence element are never so to the same degree. In fact, these latter values are usually available only in gray tones and in terms of limits, as I have previously pointed out. Obviously, because of this difference in clarity as well as in orientation, the same procedure cannot be used to handle both elements in the command process. Therefore, intelligence procedures and theories have been developed to derive and present the intelligence element in a manner that meets the requirements of the over-all decision making process.

If no information of the enemy is available, the commander in reaching a decision would have to assume that he was the enemy and deduce the enemy's mission in order to provide the necessary intelligence element. (This situation has by no means been unknown in the history of naval warfare; Nelson before the Nile is a good example).

However, deduction of an enemy's mission is not always possible, so that the commander may be forced to accept some substitute therefore — such as the enemy's broad objective, which

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can usually be determined from the nature of the war. Be this as it may, the prime requirement in such a situation is that whatever is used for the enemy's mission encloses reality. If this is unreal, so is the whole estimating process that follows.

Previous to the 20th Century, naval commanders — especially ours and the British — were acutely conscious of how often in the past adequate information of the enemy had been lacking. They were therefore cautious about allowing themselves to rely on the availability of such information in their decision-making or estimating procedures. Intelligence, when available, was to be used to indicate and confirm rather than as a prime basis of solution. This philosophy led, naturally, to the use of some form of derivation of the enemy's mission. Therefore, intelligence emphasis was placed on search for indicators of "What the enemy was doing" or "What he was going to do" in order to narrow the field of the commander's enemy considerations. This whole general process is sometimes called the *Theory of Intentions*.

While in great disrepute in some circles, this procedure is not a heinous crime. It is constantly being used under different names by those who condemn it. Actually, it is probably the only procedure that can be effectively used when information is meagre.

But for the following discussion let us assume that we have adequate information of the enemy. Then any system of interpretation which is based primarily on a derivation of the enemy's mission is undesirable for two reasons: *First*, the system is bound to present enemy considerations in too narrow a form for arriving at a sound decision. The commander's interest is not confined to what the enemy will *probably do* — probabilities may vary. His interest is not confined to what the enemy intends to do — *inten-*

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tions may change. The true parameter of the commander's interest lies in the inclusive question: "What can the enemy do that will affect my mission?"

Second, the system can easily lead to subjective conclusions about the enemy. Although it is not inherent to it, there is a strong tendency by those who use it to disregard intelligence that does not support preconceived ideas of enemy action or which is not favorable to their own pet courses of action.

I should like to digress at this point to observe that all of this does not mean that determination of the enemy's intentions is unsound and must not be used. It simply means that intentions are tricky and, if used, their innate weaknesses must be realized and guarded against. Thus, even if an enemy's plan is captured and his mission and intentions are clear, this should not preclude the consideration of other things that the enemy *might* do. The weight given such intelligence should be in proportion to confirmatory evidence that things are going according to plan — for deception has been practiced, and plans have been changed or not correctly executed.

The dangers of trying to "out-guess" the enemy have been marked by many unhappy incidents of history. It was not until the advent of modern staffs that an attempt was made to prevent this by introducing a system of logical appreciation of available intelligence and to determine *what the enemy could do rather than what he was going to do.* This system has been called the *Theory of Capabilities.*

In this country, the Army took the lead in this development — partly because they were the first to adopt a modern staff system and partly because, from the innate nature of his operations,

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an Army commander could expect the minimum intelligence requirements necessary for its implementation.

The Navy, on the other hand, has been very conservative in adopting it. In the past, studies have been made here at the War College and various naval writers have discussed it, but it was not until after World War II that naval staff manuals began to recommend it as a basic procedure.

To understand the current version of the *Capability Theory*, it will be necessary to throw your dictionary overboard and keep in mind two special definitions of the terms "enemy possible course of action" and enemy capability."

An "enemy possible course of action" is defined as *a course of action that the enemy may adopt if he finds it has merit, if he is physically able to undertake it, and if it suits his apparent mission.* Of course there are many possible courses of action which an enemy can undertake which will not be of interest to a commander.

An "enemy capability" is *an enemy course of action which he may adopt, and which, if carried out by him, will affect our mission favorably or unfavorably.* It is important to understand that within the terms of this definition you cannot have an enemy capability without a mission of your own — it is a "no tickee, no washee" situation. Thus, the difference between an enemy capability and an enemy possible course of action derives from your own mission — *not* that of the enemy.

The general philosophy of the Capability Theory is that enemy possible courses of action can be determined from intelligence available, and from the enemy's point of view. Once these

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have been derived, their individual effect on our mission can be ascertained and the resulting capabilities arranged in an order of probability. These enemy capabilities can then be used both as an anvil — against which our own courses of action can be hammered into shape — and a scale, on which they can be weighed.

The first step in the method of capabilities is, as we have seen, the determination of enemy possible courses of action. Although it is rarely emphasized, this step is just as important as the determination of capabilities because it serves to delineate the whole field of subsequent operations. The courses of action themselves should be derived from intelligence — not from the imagination. In deriving them, all intelligence available must be considered for its bearing on: the enemy general situation, his strength and disposition, his fighting efficiency, his intentions, his probable objectives, his knowledge of our forces, and his estimate of our capabilities and intentions. From study and analysis of these factors, certain courses of action should progressively emerge — each of which meets the requirement of being possible to the enemy.

It should be noted that in this initial process both enemy intentions, probabilities and our opposition capabilities are used. The rule of thumb here is that anything goes — provided it appears that it can be seen through the enemy eyes.

It is not generally realized that the basic intelligence error before Pearl Harbor was not so much that we did not give the Japanese credit for the capability of attacking Pearl Harbor — we did that. It was that we were so impressed with their many capabilities (what they could do to us) that we overlooked what they thought we could do to them. They had a big overestimate of the United States Fleet; they gave it a capability of interfering

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with their projected operations in Southeast Asia. Therefore, when Admiral Yamamoto made his estimate for operations against the Kra Peninsula, he considered that, as his first step, he had to neutralize the United States Fleet wherever it was — and he carried it out. Looking back, there are all sorts of evidences that pointed to such a Japanese over-estimate.

If we had realized this, we would have been driven logically to predict a Pearl Harbor, Lahaina or San Diego “disaster” — wherever the Fleet was.

As enemy possible courses of action begin to emerge from the synthesis and analysis of the first step, they should be tested against your own mission and either discarded, or further tested for determination of enemy capabilities. This process is not necessarily a formal written procedure. In practice, it is generally carried out mentally — proceeding in a shuttle-like fashion with the development of possible courses of action. The important difference between the two steps should always be kept in mind: the first step — possible course of action — is made entirely from the enemy point of view; the second — capabilities — includes the consideration of our own purpose and aims.

A list of the capabilities, no matter how complete, lacks the force and direction necessary for a commander’s guidance in making his decision. Therefore, available intelligence is next examined for evidence of the probability of each capability; and then an order of relative probabilities is determined. This, of course, can be done only if there is enough objective evidence to support such a determination.

Such, generally, is the current method of capabilities as used in an estimating procedure. It actually is a misnomer as both inten-

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tions and probabilities are considered directly in derivation of an enemy possible course of action and by implication, in listing capabilities, in the order of their probability. Actually, the whole method is a series of progressive integrations of intelligence aimed at insuring the commander an *inclusive* picture of the enemy from which to make a decision and an objective scale upon which to test his own resources.

Before leaving capabilities and intentions, I should like to warn you that these and related terms are often grossly misused; a fetish has been made of the word "capability," and "intention" has almost become an indelicate term. Some people, attempting to avoid bad taste, label everything "capabilities," and others use "capabilities" as synonomous with "imagination." Be sure your capability is not an intention.

Previous to the advent of modern staff systems, enemy information was the jealously guarded province of the commander although Julius Caesar is reported to have had officers called "speculators" who handled intelligence matters. This was unusual. The more usual procedure was for the commander and his chief scout or spymaster to keep their business strictly to themselves. All interpretation was done by the commander himself, or his principle aides, as part of the overall function of command. It was not until the development of the French staff system in 1796 that the distinct nature of the intelligence function of command was recognized. Since then it has developed along with other staff functions, but commanders have frequently been reluctant to delegate it. Even such a relatively modern commander as T. J. Jackson kept his intelligence (and also his plans) to himself. However, this is no longer possible. In these days of large staffs, the intelligence division must supply the enemy point of view to other staff sections

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as well as to the commander. At the same time, it must direct its activities in the light of their reaction so that an adequate and integrated picture is available to the commander at all times.

The solution of a military problem and the selection of courses of action are matters of vital importance in war. The problems are complex and the stakes high. To insure logical and sound decisions by a commander without dependence on individual genius, modern staff systems and procedures have been developed. Their philosophy might be stated succinctly as "the contribution of many minds to the decision of one."

There are two well-defined steps in the process by which a commander and his staff reach a solution of a military problem: the *Estimate of the Situation* and the *Development of the Plan*. In both steps the intelligence function of command is apparent. It is epitomized by two documents that are more or less formally prepared by the intelligence division for use in the over-all process. These are the *Intelligence Estimate* (which is a necessary foundation for an Estimate of the Situation) and the *Intelligence Annex* (which is a part of a plan, or order).

You will be required to deal with both of these later in your course. Full instruction will be given for their preparation and use so that I shall discuss only their highlights.

However, before getting into a discussion of the intelligence estimating and planning process, I should like to emphasize that at the best I am only presenting a slow-motion study. Actually, the intelligence function, like command, is continuous. It commences with establishment of command and continues in peace and war for the life of the command. It is therefore wrong to think of intelligence in planning and estimating as a box which you don't start

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to fill until the planning directive turns up. The commander should be kept constantly informed by his staff of all developments within and without his area of interest which may have impact on his command. Thus, long before the receipt of the directive, planning concepts should have been "roughed out" to meet possible contingencies. After a plan is completed, the process of re-examination and amendment continues as long as the plan is effective.

Now, the formal decision-making process starts upon receipt or derivation of the commander's mission. The first step the commander takes is to analyze his mission and determine his objectives and their priority. In this, he is aided by his whole staff. Intelligence plays an important role by supplying specific enemy vulnerabilities and a general picture of the enemy.

Once the mission has been analyzed and the commander's objectives determined, his staff intelligence division prepares the *Intelligence Estimate*.

Right here I would like to point out that the *Intelligence Estimate* is *not* an Estimate of the Situation. It is used in the preparation of one. It is *not* an Intelligence Annex because this is part of the Plan.

The Intelligence Estimate should provide the commander and his staff with a sound knowledge of the enemy situation as it affects their own. It computes the enemy capabilities — that is, once again, his capacity to interfere with the accomplishment of the commander's mission — and lists them in order of probability. Thus, by the use of the Intelligence Estimate the commander and members of his staff are made aware of those enemy capabilities that affect their own. From the interplay of the information thus

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presented and the operational contributions of the remainder of the staff, the commander makes his Estimate of the Situation — and makes his decision.

The intelligence Estimate — because of its usefulness to all of the staff — is usually written out formally, and then amended and corrected as the situation unrolls. It is arranged to meet the needs of its customers. Its various parts can be extracted for inclusion in the Estimate of the Situation.

Time is of the essence in preparation of an Intelligence Estimate. It has been my experience that you have from two hours to two days. Consequently, it should be confined to a bare statement of fact with a minimum of discussion. In fact, in some commands it is not written out but is made orally in the discussion between the commander and his staff in reaching a decision.

Like the Estimate of the Situation, the Intelligence Estimate cannot escape the personality of the commander. The important thing to remember is not the details of how it is done, but the philosophy behind it. It should always provide an objective picture of the enemy situation and the logical conclusions to be drawn therefrom. To accomplish this, the shuttle between intelligence and the rest of the staff must be continuous, irrespective of any prescribed steps.

Once a decision has been made and development of the plan gets underway, the intelligence division prepares the *Intelligence Annex*. Some Annexes weigh thirty to forty pounds for they should contain all those things that subordinates need to know to carry out the tasks assigned them as well as the intelligence the commander must have to carry out his mission.

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The content of the Annex falls into two broad categories: data concerning the enemy and the theater of operations of immediate concern to all units of his force, and plans and directives for the conduct of intelligence activities. Data of the first sort are in reality just an expansion of the Intelligence Estimate and will not be discussed. Of the remaining part of the Intelligence Annex, the Intelligence Directives and Plans, only that part known as the Intelligence Plan requires explanation.

The heart of the Intelligence Plan is known as the *Essential Elements of Information*, or *EEI*. There has always been some misunderstanding as to just what these are. Actually, they are very simple. By definition, *they are requirements for information essential to completion of the commander's mission and which are not available within his Intelligence Division*. They are posed in the form of positive questions, such as: "Will enemy Task Force X attempt to intercept our Expedition M?" They are accompanied by statements of indications which, if known, would contribute to the answer to the question asked, such as: "The presence of planes from X Force Carriers, position of X Force on our probable line of advance," etc.

The EEI serve two important purposes. They notify all collecting agencies, including those of superior and adjacent commands, what is wanted and they focus the attention of all hands on the critical unknowns upon which successful accomplishment of the mission hinges.

Once the EEI are defined and approved by the commander, intelligence tasks and their priority may be developed. This is by no means a list of passive measures but often requires active operations. Because of this, it is important that a commander follow

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the development of his EEI and his Intelligence Plan closely, and ensure the participation of his whole staff in their preparation. Its accomplishment may require the use of forces and facilities not under the cognizance of intelligence.

Here, at the War College, your command collection activities are necessarily artificial. If sufficient intelligence is not furnished you for your work, you supplement it by research in the Library and interrogation of visiting lecturers. Your EEI's should be simple, direct, and limited. However, this will not be true in case of war — especially, in the initial stages. Lists of EEI's will be much larger than your course here might lead you to expect. Furthermore, it is probable that if essential intelligence cannot be secured from outside sources, the commander will have to undertake operations to obtain it himself. This means reconnaissance operations of some kind. Because of this, it may be expected that many of the initial operations of war will be largely concerned with the procurement of information.

In the intermediate and lower echelons of command, such plans will have to be coordinated with higher and adjacent commands because in such operations the conflicting interests of disclosure of our plans and intentions must always be weighed against the need for intelligence for operations and planning.

From your experience with command and intelligence problems, it should be apparent that I have covered all of the commander's intelligence functions. Such matters as his collection responsibilities and procedures, his dissemination problem and the character of his intelligence organizations, I will leave for your further study.

This has been an introduction to command intelligence. It will have accomplished its purpose if it has made clear to you

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that while national intelligence is an element of power, military intelligence is a function of command. It is a function which is oriented towards the enemy point of view. In operation and doctrine it must be flexible. Defeat is too high a price to pay for uniformity. Consequently, what I have said here expresses current thinking and past experience rather than a rigid set of dogmas.

If, in your command thinking, you can introduce the enemy picture so that it will stand the test of logic from his point of view — not from yours — you will have gone a long way towards the mastery of the art of command intelligence.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER

Captain George R. Phelan, U.S.N. was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1925 with a B.S. degree.

As a junior officer he was assigned various division duties in battleships and destroyers and from 1929-30 was District Intelligence Officer, Third Naval District. He served as Assistant Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, from 1933-38 and was assigned to the Far Eastern Desk in the Office of Naval Intelligence from 1938-39. During the early part of World War II Captain Phelan was Commanding Officer of the USS TRACY, the USS AYLWIN, and the USS TERRY and Commander, Destroyer Division Eight. In 1944 he returned to the Office of Naval Intelligence where he remained until 1949, serving first as Head of Technical Intelligence and then Head of the Intelligence Staff. He served as Commander, Destroyer Squadron Five, and then was assigned to the Staff of CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT, where he served as Fleet Intelligence Officer and J-2 until 1951.

Following other intelligence duties Captain Phelan reported to the Naval War College in 1952 as a student in the Course of Advanced Study in Strategy and Sea Power, his present assignment.