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U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS

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**INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICERS**

Issued Monthly
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

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FOREWORD

Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of professional interest to officers of the naval service.

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NAVAL STAFFS

A Lecture delivered by
Captain S. S. Miller, USN
at the Naval War College
5 November 1951

The subject of my lecture this morning is "Naval Staffs". In this lecture I will cover the subject of staffs in general terms, from the current functional and organizational viewpoints; U. S. Naval Staffs in particular; and I will touch lightly on the organization and functioning of the U. S. Army and Air Force Staffs. Since Captain Dingfelder's lecture, which follows mine, will deal in some detail with Naval Staff procedures and techniques, I will not discuss these matters but will confine my remarks to the broad discussion of the "what" and "why" of staffs. My aim is to present an appreciation for the necessity of a staff and some of the fundamentals which should be used as guides in creating and maintaining a good staff.

About two years ago, I was persuaded by my two sons, then 11 and 13 years of age respectively, to climb the highest mountain peak in the United Kingdom, Ben Nevis. I accepted the challenge but found that after four hours of huffing and puffing and resting, the two youngsters—the mountain goats—were laughing at my condition and were scampering circles around me. At last, fifteen long minutes later, when I finally managed to reach the foggy, cold top, I came to the reluctant conclusion that they could turn right around and climb it again and under two hours at that.

One year later, however, I hiked the Wapack trail in New Hampshire with the same two youngsters. But this time I equipped myself with a walking stick, a staff, before I set out to climb. My sons no longer scampered around me like mountain goats, but, instead, obediently fell in astern of me, squaw fashion, and accepted


Captain Miller is Head of the Command and Staff Department of the Naval War College.

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the fact that the old man could climb a mite better and longer than they could. This was entirely due, in my opinion, to the help of my "Staff".

As an example of another "old man" who found a staff of assistance, I would like to call a cartoon to your attention.

Fig. One—"FREDERICK THE GREAT"



This is FREDERICK THE GREAT with his staff in hand. He apparently intends to cross the bridge shortly and to proceed via the pathway marked "PLANNING" toward the village, "THE SOUND MILITARY DECISION". From thence, up the trail named "SKILLFUL EXECUTION", he undoubtedly will achieve his goal "VICTORY" at the top of the mountain peak. His way will be made easy by his staff.

Although well stated in the Naval Officer's Staff Manual, which is on your reading list, it is necessary at this time to briefly

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mention the "why" of the staff. Why is a staff necessary? Well, briefly, the myriad of details inherent in a large organization makes it virtually prohibitive for the Commander, himself, to be encumbered with these details and at the same time accomplish his primary function of command. Apart from the fact that the mental and physical powers of one man are unequal to such a task, the actual control of all the fighting forces under his command necessitates his undivided attention and if he had to attend to all these other myriad details, he would be seriously impaired in his function of command. Actually, of course, he does not have enough minds, enough brains, enough hands, enough time, enough sleep, to do it all. He needs help. The Commander therefore must have a reasonable number of assistants to whom these details may be entrusted. And these assistants are his staff. His staff provides the means by which the Commander multiplies and maintains his mental capacity, his energies, his skills and his capabilities. Thus he is able to exercise ceaseless command of his forces; he can continuously and vigilantly reappraise the situation confronting him, and by constant foresight and initiative formulate sound decisions; issue timely plans and directives; and maintain adequate force and drive to execute his will. In summary, then, it is the purpose of a staff to furnish the necessary aid to the commander to permit him effectively to carry out his functions of command.

What, in general, are the functions of the Commander? A generally accepted definition of these functions is: "To authoritatively and effectively control and direct the forces assigned him in the successful accomplishment of his assigned missions".

The functions of the Commander include the functions of his staff.

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DIAGRAM ONE—

**X = Functions of
Commander**

**Y = Functions of
Staff**

**Z = Incremental functions
Commander ALONE can
perform**

X = Y / Z

This diagram illustrates the relation of the Commander's and his Staff's functions. It is clear that the functions of the Commander (X in the formula), equals the functions of the staff (Y) plus the incremental functions (Z) which the Commander, himself, can alone perform.

If the Commander has no staff then he, himself, must perform all of the functions and we have X-Z. But where he does have a staff, and in higher command this is a "must", for reasons I have outlined, his functions equal the functions of his staff plus the incremental functions he alone can perform. These incremental functions include the making of the decision and the bearing of the full responsibility, for everything his forces do or fail to do. These latter functions he can never evade.

Let us now turn our attention to the "Y" functions of the Staff. I will not cover these in detail since Captain Dingfelder will do so later. But I would like to review them briefly.

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DIAGRAM TWO—

“FUNCTIONS OF A STAFF

Provide information

Anticipatory planning

Recommendations for Plans and Orders

Preparation of directives

Supervise and evaluate”

The first function is to “Provide Information”. This all important function provides the basis for the Sound Military Decision. This necessary information on own and enemy forces and other pertinent tangible and intangible matters must be constantly obtained from every fruitful source, evaluated, and analyzed to insure that it is sufficiently detailed and accurate to permit the Commander to make sound strategic, tactical and logistic plans. This information must be disseminated to all friendly commands who need to know, both vertically and horizontally in the over-all military organization as well as completely within the staff, itself, to insure coordinated staff action.

The second point is “Anticipatory Planning”. This function entails making a continuous study of the situation and preparing plans for possible future contingencies in the fields of strategy, tactics and logistics.

The third function is to make recommendations for plans and orders, based upon the mission of the Commander and also on directives received from higher authority.

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The fourth function is to translate the Commander's decisions into directives. This function includes the transmission of such directives accurately, surely, securely, and in timely fashion to the properly designated recipients.

The fifth function is supervising and evaluating. To the extent authorized by the Commander, certain designated members of the staff supervise the execution of plans and orders, and take such action as necessary, always in the name of the Commander, to insure the Commander's intentions are carried out. The evaluating function concerns itself with results of planned action in order to apply lessons learned to future planning.

The next matters I would like to discuss are "what makes a good staff organization" and "what makes a staff function properly— i. e., what makes it 'tick' "?

I must emphasize here that these fundamentals which I will discuss are not dogmas nor all inclusive. They are guides which the Commander and his staff should thoughtfully consider and use, as appropriate, in organizing and operating their staffs and their staff sub-divisions, respectively.

First let us consider the Static Fundamentals of Staff Organization, shown on the next diagram.

DIAGRAM THREE—

"STATIC FUNDAMENTALS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION

Unity of Command

Span of Control

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Homogeneous Assignment

Delegation of Authority"

These fundamentals I term "static" because they are fixed, "standing-still" and are the frame work or matrix in which the staff functions dynamically, as a living organism. They are the skeleton which does not become dynamic until galvanized into action by the muscles of the dynamic fundamentals which I will discuss shortly.

The first of these static fundamentals is "Unity of Command". This fundamental provides that the ultimate control of all action in any organization, and this includes a staff, must be vested in one individual at each organizational level. One "Commander" is located at each controlling level. In the staff organizational diagrams which I shall show you presently, it will be clear that this fundamental is observed in good U. S. Staff organizations. Each individual in the staff must know his job and must know "to whom he reports" and "who reports to him". In this way unity of staff action can be best assured.

Secondly, consider the fundamental of span of control. This fundamental defines the optimum number of individuals to be controlled from a central source and the considerations associated therewith. The Commander should not control too many individuals nor too few directly. The Commander also must consider the space and time magnitudes which separate him from those immediately subordinate individuals over whom he exercises direct control. Current theory has it that the number of subordinate individuals directly controlled by the Commander should not be less than 3 nor more than 7. This bracket permits the average Commander

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to operate at peak efficiency. Those who claim that it is cheaper to have your families by the dozen may take exception to this, but on the other hand they may relegate the control of the twelve children to their wife and thus themselves avoid violating the fundamental requirement of organizational theory that the span of control be limited to three to seven. Under normal circumstances, space-time considerations have less significance in this age of airplane and rapid communications. But, as it will happen when it *couldn't* happen, the airplanes *can't* fly, and the rapid communications *won't* work, and the carrier pigeons are fog-bound. Then the time-space factors must either be acceptable or the Commander's organization will suffer. The Commander must assure himself that the span of control considerations of space and time are properly recognized and planned for.

The third static fundamental is "homogeneous assignment". Homogeneous is derived from the Greek "homos"—meaning "same" and "genos", meaning "race or kind". Homogeneous assignment then means the same kind of assignment. As applied to organizations this fundamental requires that units or individuals within an organization should be assigned to tasks which are of the same kind or related nature, taking advantage of each individual's training and natural aptitude. As examples: We would prefer to assign an outstanding language student of the enemy's tongue to an intelligence translation section rather than to an engineering specialist staff billet; or an electronics engineer to communications rather than to the Admiral's personal staff as aide. By the same token, the USW section would best be assigned to Plans and Operations, rather than to Logistics or Communications; and Aerology to Operations or Intelligence rather than to Administration, Logistics or Communications.

The fourth static fundamental may be called "Delegation of Authority". Although the responsibility of the Commander cannot be delegated, the authority of the Commander can be delegated

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by himself if he so desires. In a staff, no staff officer, acting in that capacity alone, has any authority to command whatsoever. The Commander, on the other hand, can and does authorize certain members of his staff to act for him on pre-determined matters and within strict policy limits which he has established. All staff officers thus designated act in the name of the Commander and the responsibility of the Commander for their actions rests on the Commander's shoulders. However, the Commander can certainly take action within his own command against officers who let him down.

Let us pass on now from the static fundamentals of a staff organization, and consider what makes the staff tick. That is the "dynamic fundamentals of staff functioning". I would like to point these out now and discuss them briefly on the next diagram:

DIAGRAM FOUR—

"DYNAMIC FUNDAMENTALS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION

Selflessness — loyalty

Honesty

Knowledge

Judgment

Human Relations

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Timing


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Selflessness of staff officers is an essential part of the dynamic fundamentals of good staff functioning. Every staff officer must submerge his own desires; he must work for the good of the Commander, and once a decision is reached, support the Commander's decision as if it were his own. The staff officer is completely *honest* and *frank* with his Commander and his associates and he thus avoids *misunderstanding* which make for *poor* dynamic functioning. A staff officer realizes in order to contribute most to the success of his Commander he must have well founded knowledge and his judgment must be sound, and he does everything in his power to increase his knowledge and improve his judgment. In his human relations he is tactful, forbearing, he is friendly, he is willing to accept responsibility when given to him and strives to work in harmony with others. He looks upon his staff officers as brothers and his Commander as the "old man", his father. He further gains the respect of his associates by insuring that his motives in all matters are beyond question. The watch words of a dynamic functioning staff are cooperation, coordination and collaboration. It is the job of the Chief of Staff to see to it that the actions implied by these watch words are carried out. And it is also the job of the Chief of Staff, as well as his other staff officers, to make every effort to insure that timing in integrated staff work is accomplished.

The functions of the Staff, (F); the static fundamentals of staff organization, (S); and the dynamic fundamentals of staff functioning, (D), can be portrayed graphically by means of diagram five which will show their relationships from an interesting point of view.

DIAGRAM FIVE—



The see-saw shown here rests on (F), the functions. When the Static and Dynamic fundamentals are in balance, then we have the best combination. The organization is sound, it functions smoothly, and the Commander is free to most effectively do his job. He is relieved of routine and regular duties, in large part, and can devote his full attention to performing the tasks for which he is best fitted in special and creative fields .

On the other hand, if the static fundamentals have been ignored and the staff functions by virtue of over-emphasis on dynamic fundamentals a dangerous condition arises because once the source of the dynamic impulse—the personal element, the touch,—is gone, the organization ceases to function effectively. It would be better,

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if we have to emphasize one over the other set of fundamentals, to organize on sound static fundamental lines at the expense of lightening emphasis on the dynamic—for who can tell when the leader may fall, and in what dire circumstances this might occur. It is then that a well organized and well trained staff can help carry the heavy load falling on the leader's successor and enable him to carry out his task with minimum reliance on supplying the dynamic influence withdrawn by the former leader's untimely departure.

The term "leader", as used herein, does not refer to the Commander alone but to a "leader" within the staff, itself, as well.

It behooves us all to neglect none of these three important considerations in organizing and operating our staffs. Let us make sure our staffs perform their designated functions, that they are organized on sound static fundamental lines and that their smooth functioning is assured by proper application of the dynamic fundamentals of staff functioning.. Let us avoid overemphasizing either the dynamic or static fundamentals. In particular, care should be taken to avoid placing too great reliance on the personal touch, the one man show.

At this point, I would like to go back to my previous general definition of the functions of the Commander, which, you will recall, was "to authoritatively and effectively control and direct the force assigned him in the successful accomplishment of his assigned missions".

These general functions may be specifically sub-divided into two categories as shown on the next diagram.

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DIAGRAM SIX—

FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND

- A. Operational (Leading directly to accomplishment of Mission)**
- B. Supporting (Permitting success of A.)**

Category A is operational functions, leading directly to the accomplishment of the missions assigned, and category B is the supporting functions which permit the accomplishment of Category A functions.

These latter supporting functions include physically building up and maintaining the quantity of men and material of the command to a point of adequate quantitative combat readiness; preparation of forces (men and material) to a point of adequate qualitative combat readiness, and maintenance of that condition; service for the human and material requirements of the command, and maintenance of the good condition of the personnel and material of the command.

Nowadays, many Naval staffs are organized to assist the Commander in carrying out his functions along the following functional lines.

Let us now see how staffs so organized effectively assist the Commander in exercising the specific functions of command as set forth in categories A and B.

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DIAGRAM SEVEN—

**ONE METHOD OF EXECUTING
THE PROCESSES OF COMMAND**

1. ADMINISTRATION
2. INTELLIGENCE
3. OPERATIONS AND PLANS
4. LOGISTICS
5. COMMUNICATIONS (THE MEANS BY WHICH
A COMMANDER EXERCISES HIS COMMAND).

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For example, the operational functions leading directly to the accomplishment of the mission tie directly to Administration (personnel—quantity, records, control and morale); Intelligence (for information of enemy forces and other tangible and intangible elements bearing directly and indirectly on the achievement of the Commander's mission); Operations, for organization, plans, operations, training of personnel and intelligence on own forces; Communications, for providing rapid means for direction of his forces in accordance with the Commander's will and advising other interested commands of what they need to know in order to assist in the overall achievement of the friendly objective.

In the supporting functions all five functional divisions tie in directly in providing for adequate quantitative combat readiness of men and material, likewise the preparation of forces for adequate qualitative combat readiness ties in directly with these five divisions, particularly with Operations in respect to training of personnel; and


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logistics, and communications, in respect to material. The maintenance of the good condition of the personnel and materiel of the command, tie-in to a greater or lesser degree with all five divisions.

Now I will discuss some typical U. S. Naval Staffs.

First, let us consider a standard ship's organization.

FIGURE 2 — STANDARD SHIP'S ORGANIZATION



In a standard ship's organization given here we have taken it for a ship which has greater emphasis placed on its offensive power, either gunnery or aircraft, hence we have the Gunnery Officer as a head of department rather than the deck officer. You will notice that Administration, in the functional diagram on the left, is handled at the Executive Officer's level in large part. Intelligence can be said to fall under the Operations Officer as well as the Navigator who gives the Captain intelligence of the ship's position. The Operations and Plans functions are largely performed


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by the Operations Officer. From the point of view of logistics we have a tie-in, under the Executive Officer, of the Supply Officer, the Dental Officer, the Medical Officer, the Engineer Officer, the Gunnery Officer, even the Navigator and the Operations Officer. These Heads of Departments are all tied in under this general classification of logistics as agents of the Executive Officer who sees that their logistical requirements are coordinated. Communications, the means by which the Commander exercises his command, in this case, are tied in under the Operations Officer.

Figure 3 shows the organization of the Commander Amphibious Training Forces, Pacific Fleet.

**FIGURE 3—COMMANDER TRAINING COMMAND,
AMPHIBIOUS FORCES, PACIFIC FLEET**




A glance at this chart makes us feel that perhaps the static fundamental of span of control has been violated, but actually the traffic volume is low between the Chief of Staff and certain of these

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staff divisions. Thus the Commander, through his Chief of Staff, can afford to have more than 7 people reporting to him for direct control. In this case it is obvious that the operations would tie-in under operations, gunnery under operations, training under the operational function, research and development is of an administrative nature tying in across the board with operations for evaluation; maintenance, repair and fire protection would come under the category of logistics, and so on; personnel under administration, intelligence under the intelligence function, and across the line I think we can see that everything here is catered to by the functional layout.

FIGURE 4 — COMSERVPAC



I would like now to consider ComServPac organization which on first glance again appears to be somewhat out of line with the fundamental of span of control but notice the dotted lines for the left hand six brackets used to indicate that these staff officers have additional duty as agents of CinCPac. They are wearing two caps,


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and this affords an important liaison tie-in between ComServPac and CinPac. As in the case of the Figure 4 the volume of traffic and direct exercise of control over these 14 odd coordinating staff levels is low in some cases and hence the number of people directly and continuously controlled is lower than the chart indicates. Furthermore ComServPac personally being of a dynamic character can well afford to control this many individuals. This demonstrates that the static fundamentals are not dogmas and are violated in special circumstances.

The next figure is ComSixthFleet, a typical operational staff organization, where we find the direct tie-in across the board with no other explanation necessary, except that I would like to comment on the operational staff's design a little bit later.

FIGURE 5 — COMMANDER SIXTH FLEET




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The next figure is an organization of CinCNelm staff, you will notice here that every one of the functional items is catered

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to. Administration and Communications tie-in directly. Under Plans and Operations we will find Intelligence, lower left. Logistics, across the board, is a separate division.

FIGURE 6 — CINCNELM



The Naval Staffs which we have discussed follow no fixed organizational pattern. Each is organized with the mission and the major tasks of the command in mind. In general, however, there emerges a rough pattern for Operational (seagoing) staffs and for Administrative (often times shorebased) staffs. The seagoing, Operational staffs, particularly in time of war, find it impracticable to perform many of their normal administrative functions in the personnel and logistic fields due to radio silence and other restrictions. Moreover, the limited space aboard a single ship for housing the staff makes it necessary to restrict the size of the staff. In Operations, the shift of emphasis from one area to another, perhaps thousands of miles apart, makes it mandatory that Naval Operational Staffs be organized to handle varied and

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
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complicated problems on the spot. Operational staffs must therefore contain many talents in few men. The Administrative details though handled in large part for short periods of time by the relatively self-contained units, the ships, which carry their own specialists and special gear, still must be supplied with personnel and logistic support. These Administrative requirements are met by rear echelons staffed to perform these essential supporting functions. ComServPac, ComPhibTraPac—are examples of these administrative types of staff whereas ComSixthFleet is an example of the seagoing, Operational staff.

Now let us take a look at the typical Army staff.

FIGURE 7—



I would like to point out here the characteristic of Army staffs which Navy staffs do not always have. Up at the level of the Commander we find his personal staff, his aides and others. Others frequently include Inspector Generals, Public Relations Of-

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ficers, and so forth. To be absolutely correct this chart should show the Chief of Staff immediately under the Commander where the arrow now points. The Chief of Staff directly commands the general staff. The term "general" staff as used here means the staff that concerns itself with a "general" *overall* picture with which the Commander is faced. In the Air Force the "general" staff is called the "coordinating" staff. The general or coordinating staff here is shown by G one, two, three, four, the colored rectangles—Administration, Intelligence, Operations and Material, respectively. Then down below the General Staff we find the Special Staff. The Special Staff is comprised of officers who are specialists in their own field, the medical officers, artillery officers, transportation officers, signal officers, and so forth. In the Army Staff organization, the special staff section heads report directly to the Commander and not to the Chief of Staff, and in some staff organizations, special staff officers also, by wearing another cap, directly command the technical troops which are assigned them. For example, the artillery special staff officer could also, and frequently does, directly command all artillery not assigned to other organic elements in the Commander's organization. The same is true oftentimes of the signal officer. I would like to note here that the difference between the Navy concept and the Army concept in respect to the communications or signals agencies is that in the Navy concept we have the communications up at this general staff level (as it is called in the Army), whereas in the Army it is in special staff level.

The Army Staffs are, in general, organized along the same pattern. This characteristic is due, I believe, to the relative fixity of requirements for staff assistance to the Commander in each organic element of the Army. The Battalion, the Regiment, the Division, the Corps, the Army are of such organic similitude that a standard staff for the Commander at their respective levels is

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natural. Besides, this method facilitates academic instruction in preparing officers for staff duties and permits staff officers to be shifted readily from one staff to another with no lost motion in breaking in.

FIGURE 8—




Figure 8 shows an organization of an Air Force staff. Here we find the personal staff, which we found before in the Army staff. At the level of the Army General Staff we find what is known in the Air Force as the coordinating staff whose groups consist of A-one through four and others as required. And then here below, we find the specialists staff group. Note here that communications falls in the specialists staff group. At times, the Air Force includes communications under operations. In fact, the Air Force staff organization is a little more flexible in its contour and pattern than the Army because it is more like the Navy in its requirements for molding its own task forces for particular situations.

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The Army's semi-fixed staff pattern, as I have previously pointed out, is due, in large part, to the relative fixity of requirements for staff assistance to the Commander due to the similitude of organization between Armies, Corps, Regiments, Battalions, Divisions, and so forth.

Now none of these staff structures are identical. And the reason for this is that the missions and special circumstances and organizational concepts of the Commander are not all the same. Naval staffs have this variable pattern as I have pointed out, due to space, time and operational considerations and variable forces and missions. The Air Force has more or less the same flexibility in their staff organizations, whereas the Army has a somewhat more rigid staff organizational pattern.

Naval Staff organizational tendencies appear to be to separate administration and operational functions, for reasons I have previously mentioned, and to follow the Army General Staff pattern, somewhat. You will notice the N-one, two, three, four and five coming out more and more in staff organizations of the Navy.

Some characteristics of the Navy staff include specialists being placed in what the Air Force calls the coordinating staff rather than down in the special staff. And communications in Navy staff organization usually is a separate division at the Assistant Chief of Staff level.

In conclusion, I believe that ample bibliography exists for any intelligent and thoughtful Naval officer to gain sufficient basic knowledge to become a good staff officer. But the basic knowledge is insufficient. Practice and diligent application of the fundamentals is mandatory in order for the staff officer to become well rounded and valuable. It is hoped that this lecture will serve to stimulate motivation in this direction for those who have not been staff of-

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fficers before and will stimulate constructive criticism from all of-
fficers in this auditorium who have borne with me through my talk.

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“NAVAL STAFF ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING”

A Presentation by
Captain F. A. Dingfelder, USN
at the Naval War College
5 November 1951

The purpose of my discussion this afternoon, is to present some ideas and information which, it is hoped, may be helpful in organizing a staff, or in serving as a member of a staff. This morning, Captain Miller discussed the principles and background of naval staff organizations. So my discussion will concern first, the 'how' of organizing a staff, and secondly, a discussion of some of the ideas and principles of staff functioning which, if clearly understood and practiced by all members of a staff, will generally result in maximum assistance to the Commander—and to the command.

The ideas and information which I will present are based on personal experiences and current practices, and have been taken from the texts of all the Armed Services. I realize that some of the information will have been heard many times by those of you who have served as members of a staff, but I hope you will bear with me.

My talk will be oriented to a naval operational staff at about the level of or below that of a task fleet or major task force commander. I won't have time to discuss administrative staffs, but they will, of course, vary somewhat from operational staffs due to the nature and magnitude of the functions which they perform. For example, type commands are more concerned with personnel administration, basic training, and the initial conditioning of ships and aircraft. On the other hand, operational commands are more concerned with the overall training for com-

Captain Dingfelder is a member of the staff of the Naval War College.

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bat, and in planning for and supervising the execution of combat operations. It goes without saying, however, that the basic ideas of staff functioning and organization are applicable to any staff.

No doubt some of us have already formed an idea as to how we would operate our staff, if we were to become commanders or chiefs of staff. On the other hand, few of us give much thought to the mechanics involved in organizing a new staff. We are prone to take the subject of organization pretty much for granted.

Actually, sound organization is a prerequisite to effective staff functioning. But the Navy, unlike the other services, does not have a definitive or dogmatic organization plan which we could adopt. Perhaps this is a good thing as it permits a commander to exploit his own ideas of organizational techniques, and to fit his staff more closely to the peculiar requirements of his command. In view of this organizational freedom, we might expect to find a wide variation in the structures of naval staffs, but such is not the case and we find that naval staffs, at the various echelons of command, do conform to a fairly standard pattern. This is due, I think, to three things: First, most naval commanders have a common appreciation of the practical application of the basic principles of organization. Secondly, the functions of command are comparable in similar organizations. And thirdly, the organizational pattern of naval staffs will tend to be influenced, somewhat, by the fact that their initial personnel allowance is generally predetermined by the Navy Department. A commander may have a choice as to the individuals who are to be ordered to his staff, but the number and technical qualifications of the staff members will, normally, be based upon the known requirements for staffs of similar commands, and on the availability of personnel.

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Thus, with most factors being equal, it is understandable that the staff structures of similar commands will tend toward standardization. It is also easy to understand why some commanders will find it expedient to adopt the organization plan and instructions of another similar command as the basis for their initial staff structure and staff instructions.

How you will organize your staff is quite another matter, but meantime, let us take a specific case and briefly discuss some of the mechanics of setting up a new staff. I won't go into all of the details, but rather, will try to give you an idea as to how the so-called typical naval staff organization got that way.

Let us assume that we have just reported for duty as Chief of Staff to the Commander of a new Fleet. It is to be an operational command similar to the present Sixth or Seventh Fleets. One of our first tasks will be to prepare, for the Commander's approval, a basic plan for organizing the staff and a set of instructions for its guidance.

During our conference with the Admiral, he has given us a comprehensive briefing regarding our probable future operations, and of his ideas and intentions regarding the many problems that will face us in the months ahead. He has made it quite clear that he expects to devote his full time to personal command, to matters requiring a basic decision, to matters concerning policy and morale and to personal liaison with subordinate commanders and other commands. He does not wish to be disturbed with the details and routine matters incident to carrying out the many functions of command. These are matters, he stated, which he expects his staff to handle, and the responsibility for the minor decisions and staff action in connection therewith will rest entirely with the Chief of Staff. His ideas

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about the staff were summed up about as follows: "It is my desire that this staff be known as a good staff; that we have a sense of responsibility to the subordinate commanders and operating units; that we protect them from the useless hardships and harrassment which result from faulty staff functioning; and that by the issuance of clearly worded, forceful, and timely orders, both the subordinate and the other commands will be given assurance that this staff knows its business."

I think that gives us a pretty good idea of just what the Admiral expects of his staff, and particularly what he expects of his Chief of Staff. Now, let's get on with the plan. At this point, our task would be much easier, if we had had a previous tour of duty as a member of a staff. Otherwise, it is somewhat like being faced with our first OpProb here at the Naval War College. First, I think it is a good idea to examine the staff structure and instructions of another similar command. They will usually reveal some new ideas and, more importantly, they will serve as a check-off list for our predictions; they may very well serve as a guide for formulating our initial organization plan and for writing our staff instructions. I think, too, that we should review the basic principles of organization and give particular consideration to the principle of homogeneous assignment. Now then, what are the factors to be considered for our basic plan, what personnel will be required for our staff, and how shall we divide the work of the staff?

If the staff is to effectively assist the commander in carrying out the functions of command, it follows that the nature and magnitude of these functions will be a major factor in determining the personnel requirements for the staff. And, these functions should also be a major factor in organizing the work of the staff. Thus, we should now consider the probable operations

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
in which the fleet will be engaged. And, if we will make a thorough study of those operations, we will be able to anticipate and make a fairly accurate list of the many functions which the staff must carry out to effectively plan for and supervise the execution of those operations. And, of course, to handle the routine administrative work which is normal to every staff.

I won't take the time here to enumerate the many functions but they will be shown on various charts in just a moment. However, if we were to make a detailed analysis of the many functions of command, it would be apparent that all of them could be included under six major headings as follows:

DECISION	OPERATIONS AND PLANS
ADMINISTRATION	LOGISTICS
INTELLIGENCE	COMMUNICATIONS

Since all functions of command can be segregated into these six major categories, it seems logical to accept this segregation of functions as a basis for the divisional organization of a staff. If we do this, we can arrive at a basic organization plan for our staff as shown by the following figure 1:

FIGURE 1—



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The above figure shows the Commander and his two aides, the Chief of Staff, and under the Chief of Staff are five divisions—Administration, Intelligence, Operations and Plans, Logistics, and Communications. The primary and most important function of DECISION will, of course, be performed by the commander himself. This plan may be recognized as the basic structure upon which almost all naval staffs are organized.

You will notice that I have numbered the staff divisions N-1, N-2, N-3, N-4, and N-5. The first four divisions correspond to the Army "G" and the Air Force "A" divisions. It is recommended that the division numbering system, which I have shown, be used by all naval staffs, because in so doing it not only makes for easier liaison between the services, but also between naval staffs. Communications should be standardized as the N-5 division and if a separate plans division is set up it could be numbered the N-6 division. If our staff were a joint staff, the divisions would be numbered J-1, J-2 and so on; for a combined staff they would be C-1, etc. You will notice on the slides which follow, that I have shown the head of each division as an "Assistant Chief of Staff". I think this is a desirable title in the larger staffs, but in the smaller staffs the division heads would be more properly listed as the "Intelligence Officer, Communication Officer" etc.

Now then, with such a basic plan as this before us, it is an easy matter to assign homogeneously the various functions, which the staff must perform, to an appropriate staff division. After this has been done, we will have a more or less detailed functional chart as will be shown by the figures which follow.

Figure 2 shows the position of the commander and his two aides. Under the commander, we will assign the function of DECISION, such matters as concern basic policy, commendations,

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discipline and morale. The Flag Secretary, in this position, will act only in his capacity as an aide, but he will have other duties as head of the Administrative Division. In addition to his principal duty as personal aide to the commander, the Flag Lieutenant will be assigned the duties of Flag Signal Officer, and division officer for the enlisted personnel of the Flag allowance. He will also be responsible for the timely and proper rendition of honors and salutes, as well as the conduct of official ceremonies. He will have charge of the flag boats and automobiles.

FIGURE 2—





Figure 3 shows the position of the Chief of Staff. In addition to his duties as senior aide and advisor to the commander, he will be responsible for coordinating the work of the staff, and for ensuring that the policies and plans of the commander are carried out in accordance with his intentions and will. I am sure that we will all agree that the Chief of Staff is a most important cog in any smooth functioning staff.

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
FIGURE 3—



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Next is figure 4 which shows the N-1, Administrative division under which we will assign such activities as the Flag Office which includes official correspondence, files, custody of classified matter, except messages, etc. Also, such matters as personnel, legal, dental, chaplains, public information, etc.

FIGURE 4—




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The N-2, Intelligence Division, as shown by Figure 5, will collect, evaluate and disseminate intelligence information. The operational intelligence section might include special intelligence; information as to enemy strength, location and capabilities; photo interpretation; enemy shipping etc. The strategic intelligence section might include estimates and studies necessary for future planning; air and surface targets; ports, etc. This division will also be responsible for technical and counter intelligence, for censorship, and for maintaining an up-to-date situation or strategic plot.

FIGURE 5—



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
Figure 6 shows the Operations and Plans Division. The Operations section of this division will be responsible for assigning and coordinating the employment of units assigned to the command, and for directing the operation of those units. This will include such special operations as Air, Amphibious, ASW, USW, and Minelaying and Sweeping. They will also be responsible for Training and Aerology, as well as for super-

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
vising the activities in Flag Plot. The Plans Section will include both current and future planning, and the responsibility for maintaining liaison with other commands.

FIGURE 6—



Under the N-4, Logistics Division, Figure 7, will be assigned such functions as supply, fiscal matters, repair and maintenance of fleet units, statistics, etc.


FIGURE 7—



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The N-5, Communications Division, Figure 8, will provide such rapid communication facilities as will ensure positive command communications within the command and with other pertinent commands. This division will also be responsible for registered publications, for the operation of the message center, for communication security and communication intelligence, for ECM, and for postal matters.

FIGURE 8—



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That just about completes our detailed functional chart. It is by no means perfect, nor is it complete. I am sure that some of you think of additional functions, and of course some will have a different idea as to which division some of the functions should have been assigned. However, it will serve for the purpose of our discussion. This chart not only gives us a fairly good picture of the functions which the staff must perform, but by grouping similar functions within the various divisions, we can get a better idea of the overall skills that will be required to perform them.

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Our next step will be to determine the overall skills, or rather the ranks and qualifications of staff members, we will need to perform the functions which we have listed, and then to establish these needs as positions in our staff organization. For example, let us take a look at the Operations and Plans Division.

The head of the Operations and Plans Division should be an officer who is qualified to plan for and supervise the execution of large operations involving forces of all types. I think he should be the third senior officer on the staff and be qualified to relieve the Chief of Staff when necessary. Our staff organization should be susceptible to rapid wartime augmentation, and so we should establish a position for each of the functions listed under this division which will require special skills or technical qualifications. This would require about twelve assistants to the Operations and Plans Officer, but in analysing the magnitude of these functions, we will probably find that we cannot justify this number of officers at the present time. So, it will be necessary that some of the assistants occupy more than one of the positions and, in so doing, perform more than one function. For example, the Amphibious Assistant might very well double as an Assistant Plans Officer; the Assistant for Surface Operations might also fill the position of Training Officer; and the Assistant for Air might fill the position of Liaison Officer, and so on. Thus, our initial requirement might be 1 Captain, 1 Commander (line), 1 Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, 1 Commander (AVH), 1 Commander (SS), 1 Commander (aerologist), and 2 Lieutenant Commanders (line). We would then follow this same procedure in determining the personnel requirements for the other divisions. We will, of course, trust that BuPers, when ordering the officers to our staff, will see to it that, collectively, they possess the technical qualifications and professional background required to perform the

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functions we have listed. In the present situation, BuPers has done just that—our initial personnel allowance is on board and is acceptable. So, after a look at their qualification jackets and an interview with each officer, we can very easily assign them to an appropriate staff division. The head of each staff division will then be responsible for organizing his division and for carrying out the functions assigned to his division.

Combination position and functional charts should be maintained by every staff. They not only serve as a guide for assigning staff members to the divisions where maximum benefit can be derived from their technical qualifications and professional background, but also serve as a constant reminder of the many functions for which the staff is responsible and the division of that responsibility within the staff. They also show the position of every member of the staff and to whom he is responsible.

I am sure that most of us will realize that any initial organization plan will be subject to minor changes from time to time as circumstances and experience indicate a need for a different arrangement. For example, later on the commander may decide to handle personally matters concerning public information. When future planning becomes a major function, we may decide to set up a separate plans division. We may find it desirable to shift medical matters to the Logistics division right away. The Chief of Staff may wish to personally supervise the activities in Flag Plot. Nevertheless, the plan which I have been discussing is an excellent basic plan and minor changes to it are matters of choice or circumstance. It embodies all of the principles of good organization which are a prerequisite to effective management, and which are so generally apparent in almost all industrial and naval staffs. In my opinion, this basic organization plan may be used as the point of departure in creating a basic structure for

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any staff. The nature and magnitude of the functions in each division will vary with the different echelons of command, and with the different types of command, but some of all the six major functions of command will be found in every command. Thus, they are a logical basis for the divisional organization of a staff. To me, a staff should never be created from the viewpoint of assigning functions to individuals, but rather from the viewpoint of assigning individuals to positions in the organization.

However, the best possible staff organization on paper will be only as good as the people who comprise it, and this brings me to the second part of my discussion—the operation of the staff.

I think it is very important, right at the beginning, to acquaint the staff members with the Admiral's and Chief of Staff's ideas and policies regarding the staff. To do this, I am going to assume the role of Chief of Staff and I invite you gentlemen to sit in while I acquaint the staff members with our ideas as to how we want to operate our staff. My remarks will be directed to the Division Heads, but they are of course for the information and guidance of all staff members. Some of the procedures will be peculiar to our staff, but they are generally applicable to any staff.

First, there is the subject of responsibilities. I am responsible for keeping the Admiral informed as to the status of our planning and the general readiness and effectiveness of the command; for relieving the Admiral of all details and such other work as will allow him the maximum time for personal command and for undisturbed reflection and thought; for making necessary decisions during his absence; for ensuring that the

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policies and plans of the Admiral are carried out in accordance with his intentions and will; and for coordinating the work of the staff and ensuring that conclusions which we reach are the result of sound mutual collaboration.

The policies and decisions of the Admiral will generally be basic in nature and general in scope. I will keep the Division Heads informed and will expect them to be thoroughly familiar with the Admiral's policies, and likewise, to keep their division subordinates so informed. Each Division Head should maintain a policy file as a constant reminder of this responsibility.

My door will always be open and I will expect you to feel free to enter my cabin at any time. Keep me informed of any bad news or difficulties which may hinder the accomplishment of your tasks—such as problems which you cannot solve yourselves. We can usually work out a solution before a problem becomes serious if we do it promptly and vigorously.

At this point, I want to bring up the subject of authority. Staff officers have no authority to command in their own right, except within the staff. However, in carrying out the decisions and intentions of the Admiral, there will be times when it is necessary for you to issue orders, not in your own name of course, but in the name of the commander. Thus, we must have a definite understanding of the Admiral's policy regarding his delegation of authority to the staff members. So, here is a staff order which I think covers the subject and it reads as follows:

“All policies, basic decisions and basic plans will be approved by the Commander before they are promulgated, and before they form the basis for supplementary decisions, or orders. Once the Commander has approved a specific problem, decision, or basic plan, or established

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a policy, the Chief of Staff and the Division Heads are authorized to issue, in the name of the Commander, such orders as may be necessary to carry out the will and intentions of the Commander, but not contrary thereto or in amendment thereof. In this connection they are hereby authorized to release messages and to sign official correspondence "By Direction".

Except in emergencies, Division Heads will refrain from releasing messages or signing correspondence which pertains to matters coming under the cognizance of another division. When it becomes necessary for you to issue an order in the name of the Commander, be sure you don't bypass subordinate Commanders or myself. In this respect, we must know the Admiral well enough that we can act and make minor decisions which will be in conformance with any patterns he may have established. Thus, we must have absolute loyalty and integrity to the expressed will of the Admiral.

Now for your responsibilities. You are advisers to the Admiral and must furnish him with such information and recommendations as will permit him to make sound decisions in matters of policy and planning. You are responsible for formulating and issuing, in the name of the Commander, the orders and instructions which will be necessary to carry out his plans and decisions, and for the supervision necessary to ensure that plans and instructions are carried through to a conclusion. Finally, you are responsible for assisting the Commander, and in so doing, assist the subordinate units of the command to increase their effectiveness.

In dealing with subordinate and other Commanders and their staffs, remember that you are representing the Admiral.

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When members of other units visit our staff, be sure they get to see the right person and get what they are looking for. When subordinate or other Commanders want a decision on a matter of policy or some request, treat them with the greatest of tact. If the decision is to be NO, request that they talk to the old man. On the other hand, if the decision is to be YES, tell them so, yourself. If the reply is to be written, I will sign it in the affirmative cases—negative replies will of course be written up for the Admiral's signature. Courtesy is contagious, and pays big dividends.

So much for responsibilities—now I would like to discuss some of the procedures and functions which require the fullest cooperation from all of us. How well we perform them, usually indicates to the other commands just how effectively we function as a team, and how well we know our business.

Routine paper work, official correspondence, reports, etc.,—all very necessary in conducting the business of command—but we could do with a lot less of it. A few good reports which are read and cover important matters are worth far more than a flood of reports which are seldom, if ever read. Let's keep an eye on reports—if they are serving a need, we should retain them. If not, we should get rid of them. Likewise, let's keep official correspondence to a minimum, prepare replies promptly, and keep the work baskets empty.

The processing of messages is one of the most important items in our staff work. Messages normally will contain important information or orders, and we must ensure that they receive prompt and coordinated action. The responsibility for ensuring that action is taken, must be assigned to a specific officer as a primary duty. That officer must be well informed on current and

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future plans and must have a complete understanding of the organization and allocation of responsibilities within the staff. Normally, this responsibility is a function of the Communication Officer, but in our staff, it will be a direct responsibility of the Staff Duty Officer. Not necessarily to take the action himself, except in emergencies, but rather to see to it that the officer who is responsible for taking the action, does so within a reasonable time and before it is too late. Many cases have occurred where a message has been routed to the wrong division for action and an answer sent out without first consulting the proper division. In other cases, the cognizant staff division failed to take action, or delayed so long that the answer was of no value. Safeguards against such errors are a necessity.

Next, there is the matter of providing information and here we are more concerned with what is done with the information than we are with the securing and processing of it. Routine distribution serves the normal needs, but we must always be on the alert to detect information which is hot and requires special or flash handling. We must see to it that such information gets to the Admiral, other members of the staff, and to other commands in time for it to be of value to them. We must constantly review the contents of reports from the viewpoint of the consumer and shape them to meet his needs. Most routine reports contain a mass of details. They are long, clog up communication systems, and finally the recipient has to spend valuable time trying to extract something of value to him. For example, I am sure that some of us can recall the time and effort that was spent trying to degarble some of the long summaries that contained a lot of detailed material which was of little actual value to many of the recipients, except from a curiosity standpoint. I remember one busy officer who stated that less than ten words of the entire report were of any value to him and, please, couldn't

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these few words be sent in a separate message. If not, he would rather not be bothered with the report at all. We can help in this respect by issuing special short summaries which are of interest only to certain commands, or we can identify certain parts of a long summary which may be of interest to a particular command. It is all right to furnish detailed reports to the larger commands who have the pick and shovel people to analyze it, but for our working units, we should eliminate the extraneous items. More work for us, perhaps, but it will be appreciated by those on the firing line.

We should be sure that the information which we pass on is authentic or else we should qualify it accordingly. Unfortunately we are not all infallible in interpreting what we see or hear, and so we must be discriminating in the information which we pass on and be sure that it will not be misinterpreted by those receiving it.

When to disseminate information and the amount to be disseminated can only be resolved by the use of good judgment and by the person on the spot. It must be sufficient to permit intelligent use of it and must be timely to be of value. Any doubt about disseminating information should always be resolved in the affirmative. I think Pearl Harbor emphasizes this necessity. After information has been disseminated, we should make sure that its significance has been understood. We must constantly keep in mind the necessity for modifying orders and information to fit the changing circumstances—they must be kept complete, and up-to-date.

It is extremely important that we take advantage of valuable information when we receive it. There is no greater error than not to recognize a need for action, or to recognize the need

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and then do nothing about it. This brings me to the subject of planning which is one of the most important functions of our staff.

Planning is important not only because of the size and complexity of modern combat operations, but also because of the time required to complete a set of plans and to make preparations for an operation. We must think at least one operation ahead of the one in progress. We must project ourselves into the future and initiate plans to meet possible future contingencies. Liaison with our opposite numbers in higher and lower echelons, as well as other commands, is helpful in this respect as it sometimes produces information which makes our anticipatory planning both valuable and appropriate to the overall situation.

Planning, however, is not a function which is set aside for the plans officer alone; it is a responsibility of the entire staff to make recommendations and to prepare appropriate plans and orders. When a need for a plan or directive becomes apparent, the division heads, and other staff officers, should take the initiative and get the work started. When a staff officer undertakes or is assigned a task, he should make certain that he understands the task assigned. If not, that is the time to ask questions. Thereafter, he should develop his recommendation and formulate his plan.

When you bring a proposition to the Admiral or myself for a decision, be sure that it is based upon facts, valid assumptions, and logical conclusions; be sure that all supporting data is available; that noncurrences have been considered; that the recommendation is sound and timely; and, be sure that it is completed staff work and that you would stake your professional reputation on its being right.

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Certain strategic plans will of course be prepared by the plans section. But most of our planning will be in connection with directives received from higher authority. Thus, our implementing plans or orders must be completed promptly and effectively, and I want to emphasize the procedure we will follow in such cases. Normally, the Admiral will acquaint me with his ideas and wishes regarding the execution of missions that may be assigned to our command. I will then call a meeting of the Division Heads and pass on what information I have, discuss the mission in general, and make any necessary supplementary decisions. Further amplification may be required during the process of working out the detailed plan or order, and you should immediately inform me of any ambiguity in order that I can give you instant guidance, or that I may go back to the Admiral for further clarification of his wishes.

The Head of the Operations and Plans Division will be responsible for preparing the body of the directive. The other divisions will be responsible for preparing the annexes, etc., which are pertinent to their respective divisions. This means that all staff divisions must work on the same plan at the same time, and with the closest cooperation and coordination. There must be constant liaison between divisions—everyone must know what the other fellow is doing. When there is a difference of opinion, it must be resolved by careful analysis and discussion. This is concurrent planning within the staff; and the same procedure will also apply to all units within the command, a subject which will be discussed by Captain Wirtz later on.

After the directive and annexes are completed, they will be submitted to me and I will make certain that they are in consonance, and that they are in accordance with the Admiral's intentions and policies. I will then submit the completed plan to

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the Admiral for his approval. The Administrative Division will then be responsible for producing and distributing copies to all pertinent commands. Sometimes, of course, it will be necessary to distribute the plan by message, in which case the Operations and Plans Officer will be responsible for drafting the appropriate message.

After the plan has been distributed, we must constantly supervise the execution of the plan. Not from the viewpoint of establishing a Gestapo, but rather from the viewpoint of furthering the cooperation of subordinate units in accomplishing the mission of the command. The staff serves the subordinate units—not vice versa. The best method of staff supervision is for staff officers to get around and actually see what is going on in respect to implementing orders and instructions which have been issued. Telephone conversations and brief summaries or reports are very effective. They remind the individual who prepares them, or to whom you talk, that we are interested in what he is doing, and they in turn keep us informed. Statistical reports have value provided they are regularly submitted, tabulated, and reviewed. From them we can draw some conclusions as to the progress and efficiency of the command, denote trends, build up of supplies, aircraft status, etc. It is a mistake, however, to assume that all we need to do is issue orders and then let the statistics roll in to provide us with an automatic supervision and follow-up. Personal observation and study are always needed. Supervision and coordination go hand in hand, and I want to put some emphasis on coordination.

Coordination is not a function which is set aside for the Chief of Staff alone, rather it requires the fullest cooperation of all members of the staff, as well as the subordinate units of the command. We should aim to avoid conflicting and dup-

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licating effort, and to get maximum teamwork within the staff and throughout the command. Coordination means cooperation and there are several ways we can aid in promoting it.

Conferences and briefings are excellent, and in this respect we will have a staff conference every morning which will be attended by the Admiral, the Heads of Divisions and the Chief of Staff. The agenda for these meetings will be as follows: First, we will be brought up to date on the current situation and informed of events scheduled for the following period. Secondly, we will discuss items of unfinished business which require staff action. Thirdly, Division Heads will bring up matters of interest to the other divisions. In this manner we can all be kept fully informed as to what is going on, discuss future plans, and adjust differences of opinion as well as obtain supplementary decisions. We will keep these conferences as short as possible and try to eliminate the need for other formal conferences. They will not, however, eliminate the necessity for liaison and informal conversations between staff officers and with other commands.

Visits to subordinate and other commands are very helpful, but they must be planned with a specific purpose in mind, otherwise they are useless and become a nuisance to the commands visited. Thus, we will maintain a schedule which will permit all senior staff officers to visit subordinate and other commands at appropriate times. It goes without saying, that a staff officer should always report to the commanding officer of the unit visited, but more importantly, he should always inform the commanding officer of what he is there for, and before he leaves, what he has learned during his visit. This practice inevitably promotes cooperation and allays any suspicion as to the purpose of our visits.

Obtaining the concurrence of all staff divisions to a pro-

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posed plan or recommendation is a means of coordinating staff work. But, as General Collins said "They should be sought on the basis of good judgement". There will be times when important decisions must be made promptly and we cannot take the time to satisfy all differences of opinion. Concurrence procedure is an excellent way of ensuring that the Admiral and Chief of Staff are informed of dissenting views and of the difficulties that may arise in respect to a proposed plan. However, a nonconcurrence should not be taken too seriously, and it must not be inferred that every proposed plan or recommendation must have unanimous concurrence before it is submitted for approval.

Coordination between the various staff divisions, and within each division, is very important to the successful functioning of the staff as a whole. No staff division is an entity in itself; it is the mutual consideration of the over-all objective and the dove-tailing of effort that produces the most workable plan.

Spontaneous cooperation, mutual understanding of problems peculiar to other staff divisions, and an appreciation of the over-all mission of the command, are the basic tenets of coordination. The concepts of coordination within a staff can be applied to further cooperation up and down the chain of command. However, there can be only one channel for command. There is no such thing as a channel for operations orders or a channel for intelligence orders. Staff officers can only supervise and make recommendations.

The effective exercise of command requires the utmost in staff assistance to the Commander and to the command. In considering the demands of war in the future, it seems obvious that the need for effective staff action will be more important than ever before. This means that staff officers must be thoroughly

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informed and possess a fine sense of teamwork. They must understand and apply sound principles and ideas of staff functioning, some of which I have covered this afternoon and some of which must be learned by experience. Only then, can staff officers properly discharge their responsibilities to the commands which they serve.

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Security Information

RECOMMENDED READING

This section lists recent books and articles which may prove to be of interest to officers of all services.

Title: *What of the Night?* 265 p.
Author: Klein, Ernest L. N. Y., Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951
Evaluation: The author examines the nature of the Russian state and discusses the United Nations, Germany, Israel and other strategic factors in the world scene. He contends that the world has now reached the ultimate and conclusive opposition of the East and the West toward which history has been marching through all recorded centuries, i. e., one great power on each side. He further contends that the bitter hostility between the two surviving powers would be no less if Karl Marx had never written *DAS KAPITAL* or if Lenin had never been born. The book is both informative and thought-provoking.

Title: *Brain-Washing in Red China.* 311 p.
Author: Hunter, Edward. N. Y., The Vanguard Press, 1951
Evaluation: An expose-type book, reporting the findings from interviews and personal observations in the Far East and Southeast Asia during 1950 and 1951. The author offers impressive testimony to the successful psychological warfare waged by Communism in Red China, causing the populace to "lean to one side" ("big brother" Soviet Russia's side) and hate America. This is accomplished by brain-washing, pamphleteering, education, intimidation, and purging on an immense scale. Its early objective is the complete Communist indoctrination of very live Chinese in China and its rim lands including psychological preparation for war with the U. S. The Vanguard Press, publisher of this volume, was cited as a Communist enterprise by the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1944; nevertheless "Brain-Washing in Red China" is one of the strongest indictments of Communism yet encountered by this reviewer.

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Title: *Master Plan, U. S. A.* 253 p.
Author: Fischer, John. N. Y., Harper & Bros. 1951
Evaluation: This work attempts to answer in terms comprehensible to any reader, a maze of questions and doubts about U. S. foreign policy in the years since the end of World War II. It is written by a man who has been analyzing the international scene for two decades, and who has a flair for presenting complex problems in understandable terms. It is a remarkably unbiased piece of reporting and writing that serves its purpose well. The gist of Mr. Fischer's message is that, despite appearances to the contrary, the United States DOES have a "Master Plan" to guide its conduct in the slippery field of international politics; that on the whole it is a sound and well-thought-out plan; and that the men who have built it and who run it are capable and thoroughly devoted to the welfare of the country.

Title: *The Saar: Battleground and Pawn.* 197 p.
Author: Russell, Frank M. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1951
Evaluation: The Saar Basin has been continually the prize in the game of power politics that began in 1870. The author became involved in the solution of controversies over the Saar following World War I which very nearly brought the Peace Conference to the breaking point. Thus, the Saar offers an unparalleled case study of "an ambitious experiment in international cooperation" which is very capably presented by the author. He analyzes the political cleavages revealed at the Paris Peace Conference, evaluates the international regime that governed the Saar from 1920 to 1935, and discusses the plebiscite that placed control of the Saar under Nazi Germany in 1935. Finally he views the Saar of today—a political entity under French supervision—evaluating the present policy of efficiency, firmness, and benevolence. The political future of the inhabitants of the Saar will not be determined by themselves or any one nation. In the game of international politics the Saar will remain a place of strategic importance on the political map. An excellent study in international relations and the effects of multiple interests in an area of strategic (economic) importance. The reso-

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lution of the problems surrounding the Ruhr and the Saar will have their impact on the final peace treaty with Germany when negotiations are undertaken for the formulation of that treaty.

Title: *George Washington—A Biography, Vols. III, IV*

Author: Freeman, Douglas Southall. N. Y., Charles Scribner & Son, 1951

Evaluation: With the publication of these two volumes Dr. Freeman's monumental biography of Washington reaches the half-way mark. The period covered is the twenty years between 1758 and 1778. The story begins with Washington's return to civilian life in late 1758 and his marriage to Martha Custis. Most of the remainder of Volume III is devoted to an account of the life of the young couple at Mount Vernon and of the events leading up to the outbreak of the American Revolution. Washington is depicted in the role of a great planter, a member of the House of Burgesses and as a delegate to the First Continental Congress. The remaining chapters of Volume III and Volume IV recount the story of the Revolutionary War years, ending with the early spring following the winter encampment at Valley Forge. The reader sees the character of Washington, the Commander-in-Chief of the new Continental Army, grow through victory and defeat as he stubbornly tussles with difficult and annoying problems of command. The new army always untrained, loosely organized, and poorly equipped periodically faded away with resignations and expiring enlistments. The battles and campaigns are brilliantly described. Throughout, Washington is a vivid, living character, and the author is scrupulously accurate in depicting him and the settings in which you see him. These volumes are truly great and should be read by every military man.

Title: *The Sea Around Us*. 220 p.

Author: Carson, Rachel. N. Y., Oxford University Press, 1951

Evaluation: This is a book every seaman should read, for it tells the story of our chosen element in language that is poetic, rich, and fascinating. At the same time it contains a wealth of information and facts relating to the sea and its role in

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the life of our planet. Recommended for all to whom the sea holds any appeal or attraction.

Title: *Defense Economics.* 32 p.

Author: National Industrial Conference Board. N. Y.,
N. I. C. B., 1951

Evaluation: A concise and readable chart-survey with interspersed editorial comment covering defense spending, the nation's resource position, and the problem areas of inflation. This brochure is an excellent study of the country's progress in the first year of defense and the problems which lie ahead. It begins by making in pictorial form, a survey of the impact of defense spending on the nation's economy. Next the effect on the nation's material resources, the percent of industrial production devoted to defense activity, the position of the national stockpile and manpower supply are well illustrated. Finally the history of inflation, the credit-generating role of the Federal Reserve System, the effect of corporate profits, wages, productivity, taxes and deficits on the inflationary spiral are all clearly depicted. A visual explanation of the inflationary "gap" is especially noteworthy. The chart work is of a high order of technical excellence.

Title: *Out of Bondage.* 311 p.

Author: Bentley, Elizabeth. N. Y., The Devin-Adair
Company, 1951

Evaluation: An autobiography of Elizabeth Bentley commencing in 1935 through 1946 concerning her activities in the American Communist Party. Detailed facts are given as to: the methods used by the Communists in recruiting new members, the activities and meetings of Communist groups, how 'contacts' are made, activities of N. K. V. D. (Russian Secret Police) in the United States, and the use of Russian propaganda on the American Communists. Of particular interest is the account of her dealings with Earl Browder, Lud Ullman, Greg Silvermaster, and many others.

Title: *Communism Versus the Negro.* 253 p.

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- Author:** Nolan, William A. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1951
- Evaluation:** A penetrating and well-documented exposition of the propaganda techniques and methods Communists have been directing against the Negro minority in the U. S. from 1919 to 1951. It incorporates extensive information about the socio-economic problems of the Negroes, their hopes and aspirations as American citizens. It is of particular value to those interested in psychological warfare.
- Title:** *Life's Picture History of Western Man.* 306 p.
- Author:** The Editors of LIFE. N. Y., Time, Inc., 1951
- Evaluation:** Here is a magnificent record of Western man's heritage and spiritual development—from the setting of deep tap-roots in Grecian beauty and Roman law to the flowering of the age of "The Common Man" in the 19th century. It is a record gleaned from the fruits of Western man's spirit through the ages of his development, from his works of art as expressions of his faith and beliefs, in stone and paint and cloth. The pictures are accompanied by a simple and well-written commentary that briefs the history of the ages which the pictures illuminate.
- Title:** *The European World.* 618 p.
- Author:** Farmer, Paul. N. Y., Alfred A. Knopf, 1951
- Evaluation:** Treats of ancient and medieval history, the history of modern Europe, and the history of civilization in all parts of the world. Its principal theme is the evolution of Europe, and its expansion around the globe in the modern period. The book provides a broad view of the course of world history, in one volume and enables the student to understand the historical forces that shape the world in which he lives.
- Title:** *The Reds Take a City.* 206 p.
- Author:** Riley, John W. and Schramm, Wilbur. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1951
- Evaluation:** Confusion, despair, hope, grief, elation, hunger, and fear—these are the ingredients of THE REDS TAKE A CITY,

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The three months of Communist control in Seoul in 1950 are covered in a graphic way by the authors, who were members of a team of experts assembled by the U. S. Air Force to assess Communist techniques imposed upon the Korean people. Detailed interviews with Korean officials who remained in the South Korean capitol during the Communist occupation, refugees, and representatives of all branches of community life, serve as the basis for the story which gives Westerners a peek behind the Iron Curtain. Written in a clear and concise manner, this volume gives a picture of the well-conceived and pre-planned pattern used by the Reds in gaining control. One is struck by the similarity between the method used in Korea and that used in the satellite countries of Europe.

Title: *Understanding History.* 290 p.
Author: Gottschalk, Louis. N. Y., Alfred A. Knopf, 1951
Evaluation: A description of how an historian works. It covers source and evaluation of material and discusses criteria, various theories of history and the objectives of historians. The book is carefully written and since the author explains technical terms, it is easily understood by the average reader. It sets a very high standard of scholarship.

Title: *Clear the Decks.* 242 p.
Author: Gallery, Daniel. N. Y., William Morrow & Company, 1951
Evaluation: Brief summary of the author's wartime experiences. Hidden between the lines of this collection of "sea stories" are expressions of the basic fundamentals of sea-power and the factors that make the American Navy the fighting organization that it is. The book is a tale of the sea and seamen, told in a refreshing manner, that in no way detracts from the lessons in "command at sea" that it teaches. It should be required reading for all those who go to sea in ships and some day will succeed to command.

Title: *Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority.* 138 p.
Author: Mead, Margaret. N. Y., McGraw-Hill Co., 1951

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Evaluation: This is an attempt to analyze the role of leadership and authority in Soviet Russia by what is known as the "inter-disciplinary" approach. Anthropologists, linguists, psychiatrists, historians and literary analysts have participated in the study. It would appear that the peculiar condition of Soviet leadership is built on a structure of anxiety, subtle terror, indoctrination and artificial enthusiasm. The masses, however, seem to accept this leadership without any substantial opposition. Quite obviously, then, the insecure leadership becomes a more proper target for disaffection and revolt than the masses. The implications for psychological warfare, to say nothing of the conduct of more orthodox military operations, is quite obvious.

Title: *The Art of Clear Thinking.* 204 p.

Author: Flesch, Rudolf. N. Y., Harper & Bros. 1951

Evaluation: Presents in plain, readable, idiomatic English, current concepts of what thinking is and how the art of thinking can be cultivated. An informative book skillfully and thoughtfully written, including intelligent observations on the little-known riddle of the physiology of thought. The author deflates the importance, attached by some, to formal logic; offers simple methods for spotting fallacies in arguments and propaganda, and defines the hallmarks of the good executive. In addition, the readability of the book is enhanced by excellent examples used to illustrate his major theses. It is of value to Naval officers in that it provides a practical guide for self-help in improving the art of thinking and in increasing the flow of ideas.

Title: *The Lonely Crowd.* 373 p.

Author: Riesman, David. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950

Evaluation: An attempt to indicate a new sociological and psychological approach to the understanding of American society. This book has created a considerable stir in American academic circles. The author has used contemporary developments from all of the social sciences and combined them into a novel and intriguing interpretation of American society. Although some confusion is caused by the use of new and unique terms, the author

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fastens his terms down with the skillful use of analogy and example. Essentially a study in sociology, it is written with such high literary skill and from so provocative a viewpoint that it is well worth reading.

Title: *The Yenan Way.* 307 p.

Author: Ravines, Eudocio. N. Y., Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951

Evaluation: The vivid personal narrative of a man who joined the Communist party because he believed that here lay the road to reform for Latin America. His disillusionment and final break with Communism are carefully documented. The reader will learn of the insidious "Yenan Way" as developed by Stalin and Mao Tse-tung in China and projected by the author and other agents of the Comintern into Latin America as the successful "Popular Front," and will meet such men as Clement Gottwald, George Dimitrov, Haya de la Torre and Wilhelm Pieck. He will see Republican Spain of the Civil War and visit and revisit the Moscow of the 1930's. This is a provocative and informative book.

Title: *Germany and American Neutrality.* 236 p.

Author: Trefousse, H. L. N. Y., Bookman Associates, 1951

Evaluation: A keen analysis of the major puzzles of Germany's wartime diplomacy toward the United States. The author traces behind-the-scenes development of Germany's policy toward the United States during the period 1939-41, using testimony given at war crimes trials, secret conference records, memoirs, diaries, and President Roosevelt's Hyde Park papers. Hitler's basic policy of "first things first" called for keeping the United States neutral while conquest of Europe was being completed. To this end Hitler prescribed an attitude of circumspection toward U. S. forces in the Atlantic, and attempted to create pressure in the East to divert U. S. attention away from Europe. This policy of neutralization, while not successful in isolating Britain from U. S. aid, did succeed in keeping the U. S. in a "non-belligerent" status. However, the "diversionary force" in the Far East caused the dramatic collapse of this policy when Japan, after

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getting assurance of German assistance in the event of war with the U. S., launched the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor—an attack which apparently surprised the European end of the Axis as much as the U. S.

- Title: *U. S. Navy at Gate to Russia*
Author: Gardner, Mathias B., Vice Adm., U. S. N.
Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, December 21, 1951, p. 40-43.
Evaluation: Vice Admiral Gardner of the Sixth Fleet, U. S. N., Mediterranean explains the duties of the fleet, its combat strength and how it cooperates with our allies.

- Title: *Satellites in Arms*
Author: Stowe, Leland
Publication: LIFE, December 17, 1951, p. 98-108
Evaluation: Taken from the author's forthcoming book on Eastern Europe CONQUEST BY TERROR, this article reveals that Soviet Russia has organized the armed forces of its satellite countries into the largest, most thoroughly internationalized army ever created. (Harrison map indicating railroads and inland waterways, p. 98; charts showing fighting potential of satellites, p. 103, 104, 106).

- Title: *Limited War*
Author: Stanford, Peter Marsh
Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, December 1951, p. 1311-1317.
Evaluation: Reviews the important role the Navy has played in maintaining the security of the nation in the past and proposes the formation of a small, flexible naval force capable of dealing with the problem of limited attacks which threaten security at present.

- Title: *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*
Author: Wright, Jerauld, Vice Adm., U. S. N.
Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, December, 1951, p. 1253-1265.

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Evaluation: Outlines NATO's objectives, the organization of its controlling and coordinating agencies and the military command structures under which its European forces plan and operate. (Charts on p. 1262-1263 give organization and commanders on NATO Allied Command in Europe and staff organization and key personnel of SHAPE).

Title: *Our Magic Word: Disarmament*

Author: Schreiber, Jean-Jacques Servan

Publication: THE REPORTER, December 25, 1951, p. 15-16.

Evaluation: Emphasizes the importance of the American disarmament plan by which the West wrested from Russia the initiative in propaganda warfare.

Title: *Red Blueprint for Terror*

Author: Riley, John W., Jr., and Schram, Wilbur

Evaluation: LOOK, January 1, 1952, p. 10-14

Publication: An article condensed from the book THE REDS TAKE A CITY tells briefly the Communist plan of occupation as it was carried out in Seoul.

Title: *Challenge of the MIG—and the Answer*

Author: Baldwin, Hanson W.

Evaluation: NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, December 9, 1951, p. 9, 54-56

Publication: Compares the MIG-15 with the U. S. sabrejet, considers its effect upon the concept of American airpower and asserts that the only possible answer is technical development upon which new strategy and tactics depend.

Title: *Why Europe Won't Fight*

Author: Dallin, David

Publication: AMERICAN MERCURY, December 1951, p. 31-39

Evaluation: Discusses factors which lead to the author's conclusion that the free nations of the continent will fight badly, if at all.

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Title: *We're Really Fighting Russia Now*
Author: Vandenberg, Hoyt S., Gen., U. S. A. F.
Publication: U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, December 14, 1951, p. 19-21
Evaluation: An analysis of the war in Korea in its various phases with emphasis on the present challenge to U. N. air supremacy.

Title: *Thought Control in the Soviet Union*
Author: U. S. Department of State
Publication: SCIENCE AND SCHOLARSHIP, November 26, 1951, p. 844-851
Evaluation: Describes the ideological demands on Soviet scholars by the Communist Party and the limitations imposed upon them by the Government.

Title: *Report on Korean Air Losses*
Author: Winchester, James H.
Publication: AVIATION AGE, November, 1951, p. 38-39
Evaluation: Quotes figures from the official statistical records of the Far East Air Force in Tokyo giving cargo plane statistics, figures on sorties flown, tons of bombs dropped and enemy losses as of October 6.

Title: *The American Stake in Europe*
Author: Earle, Edward Mead
Publication: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, October, 1951, p. 423-433
Evaluation: Traces developments leading to a reversal in U. S. policy of isolationism and explains motivating forces behind our present policy toward Europe.

Title: *The Changing Pattern of War*
Author: Aquila
Publication: ROYAL AIR FORCE QUARTERLY, October, 1951, p. 319-322

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Evaluation: Reviews the changes in the pattern of war brought about by two world wars, argues that air ascendancy is now necessary for the successful prosecution of war and must be secured by NATO countries.

Title: *The Mediterranean Basin and Soviet Air Power*

Author: Vickery, William M., Capt., U. S. A. F.

Publication: AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW,
Summer, 1951, p. 66-73

Evaluation: An analysis of the Russian threat in the Mediterranean and our ability to defend the area in view of Russian air superiority.

Title: *What We Have Learned from V-2 Firings*

Author: Porter, Richard W., Dr.

Publication: AVIATION WEEK, November 26, 1951,
p. 23-30, 35.

Evaluation: A summary of the positive and negative results of test firings of the German V-2 rocket, as reported by Dr. Porter at a recent meeting of the New York section of the American Rocket Society.

Title: *How Close Is War With Russia?*

Author: Bess, Demaree

Publication: SATURDAY EVENING POST, November 24,
1951, p. 25, 107-110

Evaluation: Draws a comparison between events of 1951 and 1941 when U. S. provided military aid to countries fighting Germany and Japan without imposing conditions which may have provided a more lasting peace and discusses three facts which emerge upon consideration of the Russian-American conflict.

Title: *Portrait of Soviet Russia by Russians*

Author: Inkeles, Alex and Bauer, Raymond A.

Publication: NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Novem-
ber 25, 1951, p. 9, 26-33

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Evaluation: Presents a picture of Soviet life obtained by an extensive series of interviews with Russian refugees and states that these interviews do not bear out the current theory that the collapse of the Soviet regime is imminent.

Title: *The National Interest of the United States*

Author: Kennan, George F.

Publication: FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, November, 1951, p. 16-17, 42-44

Evaluation: Explains the meaning of "national interest" by discussing the subject in terms of what it is not, advocates more modern concepts of national interest and forbearance and restraint in our dealings with other nations.

Title: *The Moral Challenge of Communism*

Author: Ward, Barbara

Publication: THE ATLANTIC, December, 1951, p. 37-41

Evaluation: Pleads that the long-range problem of moral revival be given the same recognition as the immediate necessity of military security in view of the fact that now, in the period of Western rearmament, the Soviets are making the moral issue the center of their campaign.

Title: *How They Work Together Under Eisenhower*

Author: Reynolds, Quentin

Publication: READER'S DIGEST, December, 1951, p. 9-17

Evaluation: A report on SHAPE, including brief information on the background and purpose of NATO Defense College.

Title: *Can We Defend the Middle East?*

Author: Liddell-Hart, Captain B. H.

Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, December, 1951, p. 30-36

Evaluation: Surveys conditions in the Middle East and our ability to defend it in case of Russian attack, finds that chances of direct defense are scanty and that at present, the best defense lies in the potential retort of strategic bombing of the U. S. S. R.'s most vital areas.

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