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
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CONTENTS

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE GLOBE	1
<i>Commander Fred E. Bakutis, U. S. N.</i>	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	25
LOGISTICS	27
<i>Captain John M. Sweeney, U. S. N.</i>	
RECOMMENDED READING	43
PERIODICALS	49



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**INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICERS**

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FOREWORD

Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of professional interest to officers of the naval service.

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THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE GLOBE

A Staff Presentation delivered
at the Naval War College
on 17 August 1951 by
Commander Fred E. Bakutis, U. S. N.

Gentlemen:

Your intensive course of study here at the War College begins and ends on a global note. Today, we shall take a brief look at some of the more prominent patterns of our global environment. We shall also examine a few of their more obvious implications.

At the end of the year, in June, you will take part in a series of global strategy discussions to determine for yourselves what you consider to be a sound strategy for the United States.

Throughout the year, during your studies of strategy, logistics, tactics and foreign policy, you will see repeatedly how the facts of geography set the stage for all your problems, whether these be real or exercise problems.

As Shakespeare very aptly put it, "All the world's a stage, and all its men and women merely players". The same can be said for nations. The same can be said for armed forces in a particular theater of operations.

It is particularly interesting to study the principal geographic patterns of the globe to see how closely related they are to one another, to see how they point to certain implications concerning the affairs of nations. The patterns I speak of are those of the Physical World, the mountains, deserts, jungles, frozen regions, the usable land, and the oceans; the patterns of the Human World,

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1

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or the distribution of mankind; those patterns made by man's activities, his industry, agriculture, and mobility or transportation systems. These geographic patterns and facts form the basic bedrock foundation for the world situation today. You can go so far as to predict the future course of nations through a study of their geographic circumstances, just as Admiral Mahan, Sir Halford J. Mackinder, and many others have done.

In any event, a sound appreciation of the world geography should help us understand:

- (1) Why certain nations are particularly blessed with power;
- (2) Where we stand in this global family of nations; and
- (3) What course we should take to achieve lasting security for ourselves not only in a physical sense but also in a "way of life" sense.

Some of the patterns I have mentioned are fixed or constant. These are the physical features of the world. Mountains, deserts, jungles, and oceans change very little except in so far as man is able to alter some of these things slightly. The earth has remained basically the same for the past thousand years or more. It can be argued that the world is undergoing constant change, particularly with respect to climate. Yet, New England winters are still disagreeable. To us who think in terms of a couple of generations or a century, at the most, the Physical World is relatively fixed or constant.

We all know that the earth is round, yet we have been so accustomed to looking at flat maps of the world that sometimes our ideas get distorted. Here is the only type of an undistorted map of the earth that we can hope to observe. There is simply no way

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in which any large section of such a sphere can be flattened out without a great deal of distortion. The greater the section, the greater the distortion. Now that our primary interest has shifted northward, we should use a chart that provides us with a clearer picture of the arrangement of land masses across the northern part of the world. Better yet, we should refer to a globe to check ourselves and our ideas.

You who are in the middle of this auditorium are looking at the world at a scale distance of about 300,000 miles. You see a certain pattern of land and ocean areas. Water covers most of the surface of the globe, about three-quarters of it, in fact. Since all of the individually named oceans are inter-connected somewhere, world geographers call all of these wet areas of earth, the Global Ocean. This relegates the land masses to mere islands, islands on a grand scale.

Land covers the other one-quarter of the globe. Of all the land masses, the greatest is the European-Asiatic-Africa combination frequently referred to as the World Island. The other lesser continental islands, North and South America and Australia, are apart from this principal place of habitation for mankind.

Then there is a thin film of atmosphere around this globe. Man has learned how to make use of this film of air, just as he has made advances in land and water transportation. He needs all three to get along, but he keeps his feet on dry, solid ground. Furthermore, he makes all his preparations for his ventures across the water and into the air on land. To a great extent, the success of these expeditions is measured by his safe return to his home base on land.

Therefore, since man is so definitely a land animal, it is significant that most of the land exists in this one-half of the earth

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which is quite logically called the Land Hemisphere. The center of the land Hemisphere is the European peninsula.

Diametrically opposite is the wet side of the world, or the Water Hemisphere. However, most of our time will be spent on the Land Hemisphere since this is where most of the people of the world live.

This chart of the Land Hemisphere is an azimuthal equidistant projection centered on London. Every other point shown is at a true scale distance and a true azimuthal bearing from this central point. London is the center for most of these charts because it falls pretty close to being the center of the Land Hemisphere. In such a projection the accuracy is excellent close to the center. Around the edges you get an expanding distortion. However, as long as you stick to a chart of a hemisphere, this distortion does not become too great. It is a useful type of a projection to show the relationships of land masses, both in area and relative position.

Notice how compactly the land masses are arranged around one another; also how centrally located is that factory or dynamo of modern history, the European peninsula. The North Atlantic shares this centrality of location. Thus the Atlantic has become the most important connecting link between the New and Old Worlds.

About 90% of all the usable land areas of the globe are contained here. In this half of the world are found practically all of the land areas that are in the temperate climatic zones of the world. Practically all, or an overwhelming percentage, of the physical resources of the world exist in this half of the world.

Ninety-five percent of all mankind lives here. All of the great and potentially great powers of the world are found here.

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It is no small wonder, then, that it is called the Principal Hemisphere.

Now let's take another quick look at the diametrically opposite part of the globe, the Water Hemisphere. Here, land, the natural habitat of man, is quite scarce. Distances between places and people are great. Communications are difficult. There are few ties between the various places and peoples. There are no great powers in this half of the globe, nor do there appear to be even any potentially strong combinations of powers. So, with all apologies to Australia, New Zealand, and those who have worked so hard on the Antarctic, I would like to dismiss this half of the globe as relatively unimportant and concentrate on the Principal or Land Hemisphere.

THE PHYSICAL WORLD

Next, let's consider the Physical World. This chart diagrammatically shows the main physical patterns of the Principal Hemisphere.

The darkest areas are mountains; the dotted areas are the deserts. These are the equatorial jungles, and here up north is permanently frozen ground. The hatched area indicates the desirable real estate regions of the world.

These high mountains of the world have historically been the principal barriers to mankind's travel and his ease of communications across the land masses. Notice how these mountain regions form a horseshoe-shaped ridge around this central region, thus tending to concentrate most of the people of the world towards the North Atlantic. This important pattern resembles a stadium, or arena, where the big game always seems to be played.

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


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


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The Arctic, the frozen tundra and Polar icecap regions, have further accentuated the barrier-like characteristics of the mountains of the world.

The principal deserts, indicated here, are hot and dry and, therefore, are relatively difficult places for man to live in and travel through.

The jungle areas, too, are relatively impassable, unusable, and not very comfortable for man's existence.

There is very little left in the way of desirable real estate, indicated here in tan. These preferred areas of land are the flat or rolling, rich, lowland regions of the world. Here we have abundant natural and mineral resources, adequate rainfall, usable vegetation, and perhaps most important of all—a rich soil and a kind climate.

We can see then how mankind would tend to grow in a compartmented fashion, with the undesirable and difficult regions of the Physical World acting as barriers between the principal concentrations of humanity. We can see how the principal races, the yellow and brown, the black and white, would develop separately behind their natural barriers, each adapting themselves independently to their local environment.

To visualize this a little better, let's take a look at where man lives.

THE HUMAN WORLD

This chart of the Human World gives you an idea of the patterns made by the distribution of the human animal. The concentrations and densities of people are graphically shown.

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


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These darkest areas indicate where humanity is really packed in tightly; the lighter shades show decreasing population densities. Such places as Belgium, Holland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, have average densities of about 700 persons per square mile. New York City is perhaps the most crowded area of them all, for within a radius of 15 miles from the City Hall about 10 million people live and work.

The total population of the entire world is now estimated at 2.3 billion. It took the world a billion years to grow its first billion inhabitants. The world population has doubled itself in the past century, and it is estimated that in the next 75 to 100 years the population of the world will double itself again. So, if population pressures mean anything, it looks as though future generations will have an even tougher problem learning how to get along with one another as nations.

There are four principal concentrations of humanity. In round numbers, East China contains about 500 million people. Another 500 million live in India and Southeast Asia. All of Europe has about 500 million, while we in all of North America can barely muster 200 million. The Old World outnumbers the New by a ratio of about 10 to 1.

However, numbers of people are not the complete story on manpower and its utilization. Numbers are still a powerful factor in military action. However, as far as economic productivity is concerned, numbers of people mean very little.

Furthermore, numbers of people, by themselves, in localized compartments, are not a threat to the stability of the whole world until these numbers achieve a high degree of industrial activity and the mobility required to break out of their natural boundaries.

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In other words, the ability of mankind to utilize natural resources and manpower efficiently; technical ability and know-how; these are a definite part of this business of "what makes a nation a world power".

In order to evaluate numbers of people in terms of their effectiveness, let us examine the world's economic activity.

THE ECONOMIC WORLD

This chart of the Economic World indicates the two basic elements of economic strength. The darkest areas show the intensely developed concentrations of industrial activity and agriculture. The light shading indicates the other food producing lands of the world, those that are not as intensely developed as these darker shades. When the two principal parts of world economy, agriculture and industry, are considered together, you get a good representative picture of how mankind has modified and improved his position.

We can see how favorably we sit in our space here in North America. Our system economically outstrips that of any other single system in the world.

This area in Europe is split politically and economically about here. If the economies of Western Europe and Eastern Europe were combined and integrated as a unified, efficiently administered system, this system could easily outstrip ours and surely dominate the whole world.

In the Far East, the economic strengths of Japan and North China have suffered as a result of World War II. We are doing all we can to bolster up Japan so she will become an asset to the free

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Economic World




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13

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world rather than a liability. China's economic potential, although somewhat second-rate, has become all the more significant by reason of its loss to the free world and its gain by the Communist world.

Human economic activity is also based on two other fundamentals, on manpower and resources. When I say "manpower" I mean the organized and effective ability to produce results. Similarly, I refer to resources in the broadest possible sense.

Man takes the resources provided by the earth, and by the efficient application of his combined abilities he conducts his economic activity. He builds up economic systems which reach out to all parts of the world for raw materials and markets. As an economy matures, it becomes more and more dependent upon world resources and world markets. It develops "roots" and "branches" that keep it going. Economic systems develop transportation systems which are the veins and arteries of the Economic World. As Montesquieu very aptly put it, "Commerce consists in making superfluous things useful and useful things necessary".

So, in order to visualize the economic activity of the world a little better, we should look at the transportation systems of the world.

HUMAN MOBILITY

This is the general pattern of Human Mobility, of mankind's global travel and transportation systems across the face of the earth. It roughly indicates the ship traffic, the railroads, the motor roads, pipelines, and inland canals.

While air transportation systems are not shown, man's more recently achieved mobility moves him and his gear between the

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


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same terminals and generally along the same routes that surface transportation does. It is surprising how little of the bulk weight is carried by air. On a tonnage basis it is but a fraction of 1%, while surface transportation takes care of the remaining 99% plus.

Ships are still the prime movers for carrying man's goods cheaply over the great distances between places on the face of the globe.

Land routes not only answer man's needs internally within the continents, but they also complete or finish out the job of making material available to people inland. In a way, land transportation does not compete directly with ocean transportation. The two form one continuous system, with land transportation supplementing sea transportation.

Water transportation routes are long in actual miles. However, in terms of cost, sea transportation tends to bring places closer together. In terms of cost per ton payload, a ship is a relatively cheap vehicle, and it takes very little money to run it from one place to another in terms of the value of its cargo.

As a specific example—a bale of rubber can be shipped from Singapore to New York, a distance of 10,000 miles by sea, for the same cost that it takes to haul it by rail from New York to Akron, a distance of only 500 miles. The cost of lifting the same bale of rubber by air from Singapore to New York would cost about 300 times more than it would by freighter.

But now we are getting pretty deeply into the implications of the geographical facts and patterns of the world. And it is properly so, for such is the true nature of the study of geography. Geography is important to us primarily because of its close re-

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relationship to the activities of man and nations. There have been many great people who have looked upon geography as a guide to practical politics and strategy. To mention a few, there was Kjellen of Sweden, Ratzel and Haushofer of Germany, Fargrieve and Mackinder of Great Britain and Mahan and Spykman of the United States.

At this time I would like to review the ideas of three of these gentlemen; three theses that cover practically the whole field of differing opinions regarding geographical interpretation. These are the ideas of Admiral Mahan and seapower, Sir Halford Mackinder and landpower, and Professor Spykman whose views fell somewhere in between these two extremes.

MAHAN

First let's take up Admiral Mahan's ideas. As you all know, he was a member of the staff and later the President of the Naval War College in the late 1800s. He published his significant book, "The Influence of Sea Power on History" in 1890, and followed this with numerous articles and books on related subjects. Most of us think of Mahan as a naval strategist and tactician. He was also a great geopolitician long before the term was invented.

To Mahan, the key to national greatness and power was seapower.

Seapower consisted not only of the ability of a nation to use the sea for international trade, but also of a strong naval fleet that could insure the continuous use of the sea.

Mahan showed that the United States was admirably situated to take advantage of all the benefits of seapower.

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He saw the sea as a great highway, a broad, wide common over which man could travel and goods could be transported in all directions, easier, safer and cheaper than by land.

He did not think that any nation could ever achieve the status of a true world power or lasting greatness without seapower.

And lastly, he accurately predicted that the United States would eventually succeed Britain as the dominant maritime power of the world. As a consequence, it would become the greatest power in the world.

MACKINDER

Sir Halford Mackinder, a British geographer, took the opposite point of view. This eminent geographer convincingly argued that seapower was transitory; that eventually landpower might succeed in outflanking seapower. He delivered a significant lecture and paper before the British Geographical Society in 1904; this paper was called the "Geographical Pivot of History". Later, in 1919, he amplified his thesis in his book, "Democratic Ideals and Reality".

Like Mahan, Mackinder traced the rise and fall of nations, but from a landpower standpoint. He very convincingly indicated how landpower *might* have the last word over seapower. He traced through many historical examples, including those of Alexander, Xerxes, and Hannibal to show how landpower might have gained control of the troublesome seapowers by controlling all of the contiguous land areas, thus surrounding seapower. He applied this thesis to his time and showed how advances in land and air transportation might close the gap on the advantages of seapowers. You can almost see what Mackinder was talking about in his fears of

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landpower outflanking seapower in the present day, with Russia shifting her attention from one part of Eurasia to another.

Mackinder's concepts had mainly to do with the European-Asian-African landmass, which he called the "World Island". He contended that within this island there was a "heartland" that was inaccessible to the power and influence of the seapowers.

He foresaw that advances in land and air transportation could weld this entire landmass into a closely-knit, compact and powerful base. It could be a fortress offering defense in depth which no seapower would be able to penetrate completely, regardless of its amphibious character.

Thus Mackinder saw Russia as the pivot region of the world, with interior lines of communications and defense, with potentially a self-sufficient economy, and with a powerful military organization.

His fears of a combined Eurasia under one power gave birth to his famous triplet:

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island:
Who rules the World Island commands the World."

SPYKMAN

The late Professor Spykman of Yale University analyzed the opposing views of Mahan and Mackinder. After his death in 1943, his staff at Yale University published his accumulated articles and lectures in book form, "The Geography of the Peace". Spykman provides us with a good critique of the theses expanded by Mahan and Mackinder, particularly as to how these ideas have withstood the test of time.

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


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Spykman agreed that Mahan very clearly saw conditions as they existed for his day, but that he had not attempted to predict, or foresee, the influence of improvements in land and air transportation on seapower's dominant position. Also Mahan had visualized a balanced condition, or a state of equilibrium, between seapower and land power as applied to Eurasia.

With regard to Mackinder's views, Spykman believed that Mackinder's Heartland did not possess all the power potential that he had ascribed to it. Although Mackinder had remarkably assessed the topographical and space factors of Russia's power position, Spykman concluded that the Heartland did not necessarily mean domination of the World Island.

In fact, Spykman showed that the key areas of the Eurasian landmass were the "Rimlands". The Rimlands were the crossroads, the threshold between landpower and seapower as applied to Eurasia. The Rimlands possessed a vast proportion of the people, industry, and economic strength of the entire landmass. Spykman, therefore, changed Mackinder's famous statement to suit himself. Spykman said:

"Who controls the Rimlands rules Eurasia:

Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the World."

These three stimulating viewpoints make us wonder about our own country and the significance of our own geographic position in this highly competitive world.

AMERICA'S WORLD

The United States is an insular power of continental dimensions. We have direct access to both oceans and therefore to all of the ocean highways of the world and all of the maritime nations of the world.

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


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Physically, we are fairly secure. We have no unfriendly, threatening, land neighbors on our continent to absorb our energies and resources. Though human mobility has improved to the extent that our northern approaches and those of the East and West are no longer perfectly secure, these space and surface barriers offer some degree of protection.

Economically, we are not nearly as secure as we would like to be. We are dependent on other parts of the world for critical materials and for markets. We are not a self-sufficient nation. It is easy to see how a unified and efficiently administered Eurasian continent could outclass us, particularly in manpower and economic strength.

A military power sitting on the broad foundation of the entire Eurasian continent would enjoy the largest and potentially the strongest possible base for power.

It would be simply a matter of time before the "roots" and "branches" of our economic strength would be snipped off by such a rival power.

Therefore, our geographical circumstances seem to point to three basic conclusions:

First, we cannot hope to stand up against a Eurasia united against us. We need friends and allies, both to assist us and also to deny further strength to a rival power. Our natural friends and allies are the nations of the maritime world.

Second, we must do all that we can to insure, to build up, and to preserve the strength and well-being of our allies and friends abroad.

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Finally, we must always have the physical strength and capability, together with the moral intention, of striking back effectively whenever any part of our system, either at home or abroad, is threatened.

Thus we can see how the affairs of mankind find their foundation in the facts of geographical environment. It is only through an understanding of these basic geographic facts, their patterns, and their relationship to one another that we can intelligently determine where we are heading and what we need to do in terms of a global strategy.

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LOGISTICS

A Staff Presentation delivered
at the Naval War College
on 5 October 1951 by
Captain John M. Sweeney, U. S. N.

Before World War II Naval Logistics was more of a theoretical than a practical problem. Logistical support was considered a matter of routine by a majority of the officers of the Navy. In fact, the only logistic problems normally presented were those involved in fleet exercises and winter cruises. These were usually of such short duration that ships required only fuel, provisions, and emergency repairs, having stocked to capacity in all other items before leaving home bases. In addition, the ships were in excellent materiel condition, having received thorough upkeep prior to their departure from port. After Pearl Harbor, Logistics became more and more of a consideration until finally logistic planning and the fulfillment of requirements became one of the major problems of the war. Fleet Admiral King stated in his report to the Secretary of the Navy in 1944:

**“WHATEVER ELSE WAR IS, SO FAR AS THE
UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED, IT IS A
WAR OF LOGISTICS.”**

Initially, in this presentation, I should like to establish the relationship between strategy, tactics and logistics. As I see it, this can be done in two ways, namely:

- (1) By stating historical instances prior to World War II illustrating the importance of Logistic planning,
- OR**

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27

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(2) By refreshing your minds on the several instances of World War II and the more recent ones of the present Korean conflict.

History is replete with instances of how lack of an appreciation of logistics has caused the loss of a campaign and in some instances the loss of a war. For instance, Napoleon met disaster in Russia because he failed to make adequate provision for his logistic support. The Confederacy lost the war between the States because the lines of communication to Europe were successfully severed by the Union forces and hence the South was deprived of logistic support from the old world. In World War II Marshal Rommel was defeated in Africa because of the failure of his logistic support across the Mediterranean.

Probably the most recent example of the importance of logistics in any campaign is found in operation Overlord during World War II. In that campaign there were two essential logistic bottlenecks, namely, the availability of landing ships and craft and the availability of transport aircraft. The Allies were forced to postpone the landing from 4 May to 6 June 1944 principally because of the shortage of amphibious craft necessary to carry both personnel and supplies to the beaches. We know that our logistics of the past war worked but they were not efficient. In World War III, which in my opinion will be a war of scarcity, we must do better logistics planning. Let's take a more recent example, the present limited war in Korea. In the first eleven months of the Korean War five hundred thousand personnel were transported from Japan and the United States to Korea; six million measurement tons of dry cargo were shipped to the same destination, carried in MSTs and vessels chartered to MSTs; five million tons of petroleum products were delivered at the Korean beachheads. These figures do not include the personnel transported during amphibious op-

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erations within the Korean theater or evacuated from the besieged beachheads. The amphibious lift from Hungnam and Inchon during the evacuation of these ports amounted to 410,000 measurement ton of cargo, 18,600 vehicles and 259,000 personnel. All this equipment came initially from the Navy, Army, and Air Force supply systems, which have respectively 2,000,000, 600,000 and 450,000 separate items in their respective systems. None of this equipment, POL, and supplies delivered in Korea was done automatically. All of it took planning, planning of the most laborious and minute nature.

It should be apparent from the last figures that I gave you that *Logistics is a science without which no military, naval or air operations can be planned or successfully carried out.* Therefore, I think we can truthfully say:

**STRATEGY AND TACTICS PROVIDE
THE SCHEME FOR THE CONDUCT OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS—
LOGISTICS PROVIDES THE MEANS
THEREFOR.**

Now let us proceed to an examination of the essential elements of any logistics problem, large or small. These three elements are:

**DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS
PROCUREMENT
DISTRIBUTION**

Regardless of the size of the logistic problem, these elements are always present. The precise way in which they intermingle and the degree in which each affects the issues, of

RESTRICTED**29**

RESTRICTED

course, will vary, blend and overlap according to the special circumstances.

The determination of requirements extends from the extremes of the determination of the over-all national and international requirements for the conduct of a global war all the way down to the determination of requirements for a small task unit engaged in a minor operation. In all cases the basic approach is the same and this basic approach is similar to the estimate of the situation as applied to other military problems.

Upon the proper determination of requirements and their relationship to the over-all economic potential of the country depends the decision as to the type of war we can fight. Whether or not we can assume the offensive will be determined by whether or not our logistics can support such an offensive.

This I believe brings us face to face with a fundamental principle which is:

THE DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS IS A RESPONSIBILITY AND PREROGATIVE OF MILITARY COMMAND.

The determination of military requirements is, of its very nature, a military function as it flows directly from the strategic decisions of the joint Chiefs of Staff in the implementation of their strategic plans in support of the national policy.

Today, we find that the requirements problem is one of the most troublesome that confronts the Department of Defense. The problem is accentuated by the fact that we are facing a probable continued, long drawn out partial mobilization, rather than the full mobilization as visualized prior to the Korean War. In World

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Wars I and II it could be correctly assumed that any sacrifice of the civil economy was justified to aid the military effort. However, our present-day effort calls for a powerful and prolonged military build-up without too much drain on our economic resources or civilian economy.

This new political and economic background for the war effort has important implications for requirements determination and for feasibility tests. In particular, we cannot today use the wonderful simplifying assumption that money costs in war-time military effort can be disregarded. Today the physical availability of critical materials has ceased to be a proper criterion for feasibility tests.

In addition, we find that the conflicting demands of the military, allied and neutral, and the civilian economy enter into the whole field of logistics, and to a large degree, logistics efficiency is affected by the proper balance and timing of forces and materials. Over-supply or the supply of materials or forces before they can be used effectively constitutes drains on the logistic support of all other effective forces, the national industrial potential and the civilian economy.

Therefore, it seems evident that no one, except the military commander, is in the position to determine requirements to meet the operational needs. There is nothing too difficult, though at times complex, in the process of estimating requirements. It is not an exact science. We strive for reasonability, even though we cannot expect to attain accuracy. In estimating, the Commander tries to stay within reasonable limits of error. Minor changes in strategic, tactical and logistical planning are often disregarded, if those changes do not appreciably change the end results. The uninitiated in the field of logistics expect a mathematically correct

RESTRICTED

31

RESTRICTED

answer, without appreciating the fact that all calculations are based on certain valid assumptions, the accuracy of which is within reasonable limits.

In order to assist the Commander and his Staff in the estimation of the military requirements there are certain planning tools or planning factors that work fairly well. Some of these came from experience in World War II. Some are the same as they were in World War I. Men haven't gotten any bigger. They don't eat any more. They do require, however, more ammunition than formerly.

For example, as a result of our landings in World War II there are two good planning factors that can be used for planning any such type operation. These are:

1. A minimum of five measurement tons of cargo is required per man to support an overseas movement of troops.
2. That after this man has been established overseas one ton of cargo per month is required to keep him there.

Now let's take a look at the second fundamental element in any logistic problem, i. e., procurement. After the requirements have been estimated, the next step is to determine the method of obtaining the finished products needed. Procurement, therefore, includes the translation of requirements into schedules of production, purchase programs, and the transfer of materials of all types into the hands of the military. As you learned in your study of economic mobilization, production, even for total war, is the province of the skilled producer in the industrial field, supervised

RESTRICTED

by the government mobilizer, for despite its subservience to military ends, it is by nature a civil function. Despite this civilian control, procurement must be responsive to the operational needs and sufficiently flexible to adapt itself to many and various wartime changes in those needs.

The third basic element in the logistic problem is distribution or "How do I deliver what I have to the combat forces?"

For our purposes today, distribution can be logically divided for discussion into two categories. First, that which relates to the procurement phase of logistics, and second, that which relates to the military phase.

The first category—distribution incident to procurement—includes the varied, intricate and numerous movements of materials to production centers and from there in the form of finished products to storage or staging areas. It includes, in the case of manpower, transportation from city, town or country to the production center, whether it be a factory, a mine, a farm or a merchandising post. In short, distribution incident to procurement includes the massive transportation network which binds together the manifold businesses and government agencies which produce and procure the sinews of war and are our economic strength in war.

The second category, distribution incident to the military phase of logistics, includes the movement of weapons, equipment, supplies and personnel to the final user in response to strategic and tactical demands. Such movements are normally from storage to the final user but are also often from the vendor or producer to the final user when the urgency is great.

RESTRICTED

33

RESTRICTED

From this you can see that distribution is derived from procurement: that it is always involved with strategy, and that it ends up as a vital factor in tactical combat. In general, distribution is concerned with the following:

- (1) Accumulation and maintenance of levels of supply.
- (2) Special accumulation for special operations; storage and issue facilities.
- (3) All means of transportation. Here you will find that as the combat zone is approached and entered, this transportation operation and control becomes a most urgent prerogative and concern of the area, theater or perhaps tactical commander.
- (4) Operations of overseas port facilities. Here again is found the closest relationship between tactical commanders, base commanders, theatre and area commands. All are concerned with distribution and its intimate relation to storage, shore construction, harbor clearance, shipping and shore transport including the control thereof.

One of the most important requirements of the distribution system for a global war is the control of shipping. Shipping physically furnishes a bridge between available supply within the United States and the consumption within the theater of operations. Shipping capacity is a variable that must be determined. It is dependent upon the proper functioning of the other phases of the distribution system. As was the case in World War II it may be susceptible to waste. You may be sure that shipping will be as short in the future as it was in the past. It may be the critical link in the chain of distribution.

RESTRICTED

We have briefly examined the basic elements of any logistic problem, which are:

**DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS
PROCUREMENT
DISTRIBUTION**

I have attempted to point out that the determination of requirements and so much of distribution as relates to the delivery to the ultimate military user constitutes a relatively purely military phase of logistics.

I have also attempted to point out that procurement and so much of distribution as relates to delivery within the procurement phase constitutes the largely commercial sector of logistics and in that sense it is a phase in which civilian effort and know-how are predominant and civilian control is mandatory.

To illustrate the entirety of the logistic problem let me refresh your minds on economic mobilization. As you remember, economic mobilization is the orderly, coordinated mobilization of all the materiel and human resources of the nation for the most effective conduct of war. It deals, primarily, with the most rapid attainment of the maximum production of the country for the use of the Armed Forces, the civilian and related economies and the provision of the largest practicable number of effective personnel for duty in the Armed Forces.

It is a vast subject and deals principally with procurement. It involves all other elements of the logistic problem. Although under civilian control, it demands the greatest understanding by and cooperation of the Armed Forces as well as of industry, labor and the civilian population.

RESTRICTED

35

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Having examined the fundamental elements of any logistic problem, the next logical question you could ask is: "How is it solved?" Logistic problems, similar to any other military problems, are solved by:

ORGANIZATION

PLANNING

EXECUTION

SUPERVISION

The organization of a logistic staff or a logistic staff section is, or should be, based on the assigned task or mission of the force which it serves. There is no set organization for the accomplishment of any military mission, and the organization itself must be tailored to the needs of the force. Like all other staffs and staff sections it must be flexible to meet changing situations. I cannot give you a standard staff organization which will solve all organization problems for any staff or staff section, but I can give you one paramount characteristic, and one requirement of a logistic staff or staff section.

The one predominant characteristic is:

Normally because of the complexities of determining requirements, scheduling production or production goods, shipping control items, etc., the logistic organizations are generally more complex and actually are larger than the purely tactical organizations which they serve.

The one requirement of any logistic organization is that the logistic staff or section must have a thorough knowledge of inter-bureau or inter-departmental coordination, availability of materials, schedules of production of materials, and related problems of the industrial economy.

RESTRICTED

After the proper organization has been established, the next important step in the solution of the logistic problem is planning. The underlying principle in logistic planning which cannot be violated without courting disaster is that the strategic and logistical plans must be developed concurrently. The problem of the strategic planner at any level is a difficult one, but without close liaison between the strategic and logistical planners the task of meeting stock levels at the proper time and in the correct quantities is impossible. Concurrent development of the logistic and strategic plans also provides a check and balance on both the strategic and logistic planners. The strategical planner will avoid the pitfall that all things strategically desirable are logistically feasible, while the logistic planner, being cognizant of the strategic concept, can realistically plan for the proper scheduling, procurement and distribution of requisite equipment and supplies. Additionally, the strategic planner is assured that any plans developed are logistically feasible.

In this type of concurrent planning the logistic planner depends on two sources of information:

First: He requires advice as to the strategic plans and probable operations on which to determine the character, volume and timing of material support required, and

Second: He requires adequate knowledge as to the status of all materiel projects from which to furnish strategic planners a well informed judgment on logistic or materiel feasibility.

The logistic plan is therefore the link between the strategic plan and its accomplishment, since it provides, or should provide, the material support required for the consummation of the strategic plan.

RESTRICTED

37

RESTRICTED

Changes in the logistic plans are inevitably forced by changes in the strategic and tactical situation. Such changes may be due to acts of God, weather or enemy action as well as the necessity for fully exploiting success. One method to obtain the required flexibility necessary to cope successfully with these changes is to prepare logistic reserves similar to the tactical reserves required in any operation. However, let me assure you, that no matter how carefully such contingencies are provided for, others will arise to plague you. For example, the Fifth Fleet Commander, Admiral Spruance, at Okinawa included in his logistic plan the requisite ammunition requirements to provide for the reserve ammunition needed by the army forces ashore. The requirements for this reserve ammunition were 2 AEs. In his logistic planning Admiral Spruance planned for and brought forward 100% reserve and actually took into Kerama Rhetto 4 AEs loaded with the necessary reserve ammunition. During the first four days of the operation 3 of the 4 AEs were knocked out by kamikazes. This produced a critical situation. However, Admiral Spruance had provided for an additional reserve of 4 AEs suitably loaded at Saipan. He was thus able to call up this additional reserve and meet the necessary army demands for ammunition without any undue interruption to his plan. I believe this is one of the outstanding examples of World War II in which a tactical Commander was fully cognizant of the importance to his operation of not only adequate logistic support but also the necessity to provide the unforeseen contingencies.

One important factor in all military planning and particularly in all logistic planning that must never be forgotten is lead time. Lead time may be defined as:

THE INTERVAL BETWEEN TIME OF DECISION TO PROVIDE AN ITEM TO THE COMBAT FORCES,

RESTRICTED

**AND THE TIME SUCH AN ITEM IS DELIVERED
TO THESE FORCES IN ADEQUATE QUANTITY &
IN RELIABLE OPERATING CONDITION FOR USE
AGAINST THE ENEMY.**

Lead time varies from a few hours in rare cases of simple items in ready reserve to five or more years in cases of complex new weapons, which require research, design, test, production and distribution.

In many instances the procurement, training, and distribution of competent operating and maintenance personnel are the determining factors in lead time. For these reasons it is necessary that the tactical commanders realize that logistics officers, while adept at reading the crystal ball, are not magicians who can materialize an item by waving a wand.

Good logistic planning is the culmination of much laborious and detailed work by subordinate officers under the guidance of farsighted commanders who insure close lower echelon liaison and understanding between logistics, strategy and tactics.

In addition, logistics planning requires a very large amount of statistical data to be furnished to the planner. This, in turn, requires careful thought in establishing and maintaining proper records. Admittedly this frequently puts a burden on the man in the field. Therefore, the directive governing the submission of statistical data should be periodically re-examined to insure minimum collection of useless material. The logistics planners must have ready access to the analysis of the results of their planning. Remember, in reality, the planner is the servant of the consumer and should listen to his criticisms.

RESTRICTED

39

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Just as strategic and tactical plans require momentum, so does the major logistical plan require momentum. Certain major changes are inevitable in the last days in the formulation of a plan. Each change proposed after the plan has become firm should be examined as to its desirability and feasibility. In many instances, the execution of a logistics plan must be actually started long before the date of issue or implementation of the formal strategic plan. In such cases it may be found that really desirable changes may not be logistically feasible of accomplishment.

Foresight is a paramount qualification for the logistics planner. Just as a good seaman instinctively watches the weather so the logistics planner should constantly be on the alert for strategical and tactical indications and situations which may vitally affect the logistics plan.

The next requirement for the solution of the logistic problem is the supervision of the logistics plan. Supervision of the planned logistic action is just as necessary as it is for strategic or tactical action. Supervision involves very close relation between planners and doers. It requires common sense and a high degree of experience. It cannot be too rigidly compartmented for then barriers will be set up between the strategic and logistic planners and mistakes will be perpetuated.

Unfortunately, the proper conduct of supervision requires many reports, which in turn requires the same careful analysis and dissemination as do tactical reports. Supervision is therefore one of the most important aspects of logistics.

CONCLUSION

I have given you a very condensed discussion of the fundamental elements of the logistics problem and pointed out, in gen-

RESTRICTED

eral, the method of solving said problem. I have also attempted to establish the inter-relationship of strategy, tactics and logistics, in order to provide each of you with interest, knowledge and appreciation of such inter-relationships. In closing I wish to leave these few thoughts:

First: Logistics mistakes are usually not evident until many months after they have been made and in many instances the momentum of industry and transportation make correction exceedingly slow.

Second: Mere knowledge of techniques, tables or organization, allowance lists, usage tables and the like, will not, in themselves, make a good logistics officer. This knowledge will make a good logistics leg man. Major logistics responsibilities require the highest type of intelligence, foresight and military character, the same qualities and abilities as are required in any competent commander.

RESTRICTED

41

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RECOMMENDED READING

Current Books

The evaluations of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service where a collection of books are available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948)

- Title:** *Red China's Fighting Hordes.* 346 p.
- Author:** Rigg, Lt. Col. Robert B. Harrisburg, The Military Service Pub. Co., 1951
- Evaluation:** A description and account of Red China's war machine, its people and personalities. The writer presents a very real picture of the Army's strengths, order of battle, tactics and future development. This book will afford the reader a greater appreciation of Red China and the troops now being encountered in Korea.
- Title:** *The Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls.* 353 p.
- Author:** Morison, S. E., Boston, Little, Brown. 1951
- Evaluation:** Constitutes Morison's fifth volume devoted to Naval action in the Pacific and the seventh in his "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II." In 332 well-annotated pages, supplemented by appendices showing forces involved, he has recorded in detail all phases of the Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls campaigns. His treatment of the subject reflects the objectivity and concern for accuracy of the true historian, flavored with the naval officer's ability to discern what is relevant or irrelevant to Naval history. Since in all phases of a campaign or op-

RESTRICTED

43

RESTRICTED

eration pertinent events are just as frequently concurrent as they are sequential, the narrative jumps from place to place, but the theme is never lost. It is a detailed chronicle of the Pacific war from the beginning of the Aleutians Campaign to the end of the Marshalls Campaign. It will be of interest to both civilian and military readers.

Title: *A Foreign Policy for Americans.* 127 p.
Author: Taft, Robert A. N. Y. Garden City, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1951

Evaluation: A statement of Senator Taft's views on events of today, and on the vital subject of the United States' role in international relations. Senator Taft says: "Fundamentally, I believe, the ultimate purpose of our foreign policy must be to protect the liberty of the people of the United States. War should never be undertaken, or seriously risked, except to protect American liberty." The implications of the above concept are far-reaching, and in the 127 pages of this book, the Senator lucidly develops his theme, as he discusses the role and development of United States foreign policy until its present (in his mind) confused state. While the reader may not agree with all of the Senator's views, his characteristic ability to think logically, and to state his thoughts clearly, make this book well worth serious study. This is all the more important since the tide of political events in the United States during the next year may well make these policies and concepts an important element in establishing the course and path of our nation.

Title: *The Philippines and the United States.* 315 p.
Author: Grunder, Garel A. and Livezey, William E. Norman, Okla., Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1951

Evaluation: A thorough study of the development of the policy of the United States towards the Philippines during the half century those islands were a dependency of this country. The study begins with the acquisition of the Philippines by the United States in 1898 as a by-product of the Spanish-American War. It shows how our government, inexperienced as a colonial power, handled the vital, social

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and economic problems of the islands and finally granted complete independence to the Republic of the Philippines in 1946. The story of the policy of the United States towards the Philippines is unique in modern colonial history and is significant in the light it throws on the present position of the United States in the Far East. These islands are important strategic assets of the United States, and this country is the principal guarantor of the continued security of the new republic. The book is authentically written with ample reference to source material.

Title: *Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations.* 367 p.

Author: Washington, D. C., Brookings Institution, 1951

Evaluation: This volume contains the report of a study on governmental administration prepared by the Brookings Institution under contract to The Bureau of the Budget. The first three chapters of the report are devoted respectively to a review of factors basic to the conduct of foreign relations in the world today, to recent developments in government organizations affecting the administration of foreign affairs, and to key elements of administrative doctrine for major units of the government. Six chapters then follow, each of which is devoted to the detailed examination of a complex problem involving a number of main issues and alternative courses of action.

Title: *The Secret Army.* 396 p.

Author: Komorowski, T. N. Y., Macmillan Co., 1951

Evaluation: An authoritative account of the Polish underground movement that operated so successfully against the German occupation between 1939 and 1945. Written by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish "Home Army" that rose from the underground and seized the city of Warsaw, it recounts the tragic sequence of events in that ill-fated insurrection of 1944. This book is of value in its treatment of the organization, operational control, and effectiveness of an underground army. It is believed to be of particular interest and is recommended reading for the study of unconventional types of warfare.

RESTRICTED

- Title:** *Policy Sciences.* 397 p.
Press, 1951
- Author:** Lerner, Daniel. Stanford, Stanford University
- Evaluation:** An attempt to evaluate the temporary developments in research within the social sciences, with emphasis upon methodology and techniques. This symposium brings together the views of a number of prominent social scientists, from different fields, upon the question of the systematic organization of knowledge with the entire body of the social sciences. Although the various contributors seem to have been rather poorly organized and the book does not achieve a tightly integrated argument, it does provide a very valuable summary of the subject. The contributions of Lazarsfeld, Arrow and Reichenbach have direct implications for modern strategy. The contributions of the anthropologists, although of a high quality, are much less useful to the military observer. Actual results of research are used only to illustrate techniques in all cases.
- Title:** *The United States, Turkey and Iran.* 284 p.
- Author:** Thomas, Lewis V. & Frye, Richard N. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1951
- Evaluation:** A discussion of Turkey and Iran, past and present, with an account of today's problems, and relationships. An excellent presentation of Turkish and Iranian society, culture, and economy against the background of history, remote and recent. Highly recommended reading for individuals particularly interested in this area and valuable for reference use in general.
- Title:** *The Russian-American Company.* 296 p.
- Author:** Okun, S. B. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951
- Evaluation:** One of the products of the Russian translation project of Harvard, this volume is an English version of an official record. It presents a fascinating account of a phase of world and American history of which the Western world has little knowledge: the opinions, the imperial machinations, and the ruthless lust for power of a state-spon-

RESTRICTED

sored private-adventurer group beside whom the East India Company were timid amateurs. The Russian-American Company was the vehicle through which the state of Ivan and Peter spread its influence across the vast expanses of Asia, the North Pacific, and down the coasts of America to San Francisco and the shores of Hawaii in the course of only a century and a half. It is a record of heroic adventure, of calculating use of power of white men's weapons and techniques to further the imperial ambitions of Tsarist Russia and to satisfy a lust for furs. Little-known facets of Russian ambitions, based on Russian records are revealed, one of which was the possible acquisition, in due course of time, of Haiti and some other Caribbean Islands. It is worthwhile reading to those who desire to broaden their understanding of both American history and Russian imperial designs; but it is both long and difficult reading, and deals with a relatively unimportant phase of imperial expansion.

Title: *Cross-Channel Attack.* 492 p.

Author: Harrison, Gordon A. Washington, D. C.,
Dept. of the Army, 1951

Evaluation: The first volume in the series narrating the events of World War II in the European Theater of Operations, deals with the development of strategy and planning for the attack on northwest Europe in 1944 and with the first month of operations establishing Allied armies in France. About two-thirds of the book is concerned with the preparations and discussions of strategy on both Allied and German sides from 1941 to 1944, while the remainder describes the combat operations in Normandy from 6 June to 1 July 1944.

Title: *Seven Fallen Pillars.* 320 p.

Author: Kimche, Jon. London, Secker & Warburg, 1950

Evaluation: The story of the decline of British influence in the Middle East, and of the mixture and conflict of Arab, Jewish, British, and U. S. interests in that area during 1945-1950. A chronology of important events from 1915 to 1950 precedes the main text. A greater portion of the book deals with the incubation and hatching of the new state of Israel and the unsuccessful and disconnected efforts to

RESTRICTED

create a strong Arab League. Although the author is a British journalist, he is highly critical of British official bungling in the Middle East, sympathetic with the creation of Israel and also sympathetic with the Arab peoples. He points to the growth of U. S. influence, while maintaining a critical attitude toward the "weather-cocking" U. S. policy in the Middle East. The book results from ten years' close experience with the area, interviews with countless persons, high and low, concerned with problems there, and the chronicling of events during this period. It is packed with detail and commentary, giving the impression of being compounded of boiled-down newspaper reports and the journalist's personal diary. It is replete with short punch-line sentences, maintaining a high level of emphasis, but leaving the reader somewhat at a loss for useful analytical conclusions. This book is recommended for those who are already conversant with the Middle East and who desire to fill in details or gain objectivity. The chronology is useful for reference.

- Title:** *Great Sailor.* 338 p.
- Author:** Vandercook, John W. N. Y., Dial Press, 1951
- Evaluation:** A biography of Capt. James Cook, R. N., the explorer and surveyor of much of the Pacific Ocean areas. It tells of his epochal voyages of discovery and exploration, how he carefully charted the areas he explored and how he defeated scurvy, that bane of maritime existence of his time. It is the story of a painstaking, efficient, sailor-scientist who added more territory to the British Empire than has been added by all British wars up to his day. The book is written in a somewhat florid but entertaining style.
- Title:** *Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany,*
- Author:** Nettl, J. P. London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1951
1945-1950. 314 p.
- Evaluation:** To the serious student of Soviet policy, this book will offer much concerning just what the Russian attitudes and methods of operation have been in the Eastern Zone of Germany. Political and administrative problems, as well as those concerned with economic development are

RESTRICTED

well discussed. Special emphasis is placed on Russian reparations demands.

- Title:** *Memoirs. 1874-1920. Years of Adventure.* 482 p.
Author: Hoover, Herbert C. N. Y., Macmillian Co. 1951
Evaluation: The first volume of Herbert Hoover's life-story covering the period from 1874 to 1920, deals with the author's early professional career, his work during the first World War and the making of the Treaty of Versailles. These memoirs, written in rough form between 1915 and 1924, are fresh with that detail and color of description which only can be obtained by the prompt recording of events. Mr. Hoover's early adventures as a mining engineer provide a lively introduction, generously interspersed with humor, which sets the stage for illuminating accounts of great historical events. This first volume well titled, "Years of Adventure," is highly recommended to those interested in the author and his work.

PERIODICALS

- Title:** *Russia's "Eisenhower" Is Preparing, Too.*
Author: Baldwin, Hanson
Publication: COLLIER'S January 12, 1952, p. 9-11, 39-42.
Annotation: Traces the career and military achievements of Marshal Zhukov, who has recently emerged from exile and who is reported to be in charge of strengthening and consolidating Soviet defenses in the West.
- Title:** *Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy.*
Publication: BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, November, 1951.
Annotation: Summary of events during November, 1951.
- Title:** *The "Counter-Revolution" in Russia.*
Author: Kelly, Sir David
Publication: THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, December 23, 1951, p. 13, 18-19.
Annotation: The former British Ambassador to the Soviet Union out-

RESTRICTED

lines the Soviet system as it exists under Stalin; states that its real weaknesses are long-term and recommends that Western nations build up their strength until a fair balance of power is established.

- Title: *Stalin's Troubles With the Underground.*
Author: Krajcovic, V. Stefan
Publication: SATURDAY EVENING POST, December 29, 1951, p. 19, 58-60.
- Annotation: Tells the story of the Slovak underground movement, organized into the Liberty Legion which is made up of fighting patriots and the White Legion which operates as a psychological warfare unit.
- Title: *Calling Stalin's Bluff.*
Author: Wheeler-Nicholson, Malcolm
Publication: THE FREEMAN, December 31, 1951, p. 201-204.
- Annotation: Advocates concentration upon psychological and internal warfare inside the iron curtain as the most effective means of meeting the Soviet menace.
- Title: *Guerilla Warfare.*
Author: Papagos, Field-Marshal Alexander.
Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January, 1952, p. 215-230.
- Annotation: Sketches the background of the struggle in Greece between irregular forces; tells how the activity was conducted and summarizes the lessons learned from this experience.
- Title: *Is Disarmament Possible?*
Author: Liddell, Hart, Capt. B. H.
Publication: NEW REPUBLIC, December 31, 1951, p. 11-14.
- Annotation: Points out the difficulties involved in enforcing disarmament plans and explains why the main hope of preserving the peace lies on the higher level of "grand strategy."

RESTRICTED

Title: *Can We Live in Peace?*
Author: Toynbee, Arnold.
Publication: NEW REPUBLIC, December 31, 1951, p. 14-15.
Annotation: Considers the question of peaceful co-existence with Russia and presents reasons why co-existence is not only possible but desirable from the Western point of view.

Title: *The Mind of Asia.*
Author: Northrup, F. S. C.
Publication: LIFE, December 31, 1951, p. 39-41.
Annotation: An essay concerned with what Asians think and why, in which the author gives the major reasons for the success of Marxist Communism in China.

Title: *This Is How the Chinese Fight.*
Publication: LIFE, December 31, 1951, p. 20-22.
Annotation: Describes the modern Russian-style Chinese army, its make-up, power and tactical concepts.

Title: *How the Kremlin Gets Our Strategic Goods.*
Author: Adams, Arthur E.
Publication: THE NEW LEADER, December 3, 1951, p. 2-4.
Annotation: An analysis of West-East trade shows that Russia acquires, on the open market, nearly a billion dollars worth of strategic materials from Western European nations.

Title: *Red Rockets.*
Author: Anderton, David A.
Publication: AVIATION WEEK, January 14, 1952, p. 37-41.
Annotation: Reports that the Russians are testing four missile types at Peenemunde, former center of German guided missile activities.

RESTRICTED

Title: *How Stalin Can Win.*
Author: Fellers, Bonner (Brig. Gen., U. S. A., Ret'd)
Publication: AMERICAN MERCURY, January, 1952, p. 40-48.
Annotation: Asserts that inflation and deficit financing may cause destruction of United States; that huge spending program is not purchasing security, and that the solution lies in a new over-all military strategy.

Title: *Mediterranean Rescue.*
Author: Gallery, Rear Admiral Daniel V.
Publication: COLLIER'S, January 19, 1952, p. 25, 67-69.
Annotation: The story of one of the biggest air-sea rescue operations in the Mediterranean's history to locate two pilots from the aircraft carrier CORAL SEA.

Title: *How Strong Is Red China?*
Author: Hanrahan, Gene Z.
Publication: COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, January, 1952, p. 34-38.
Annotation: Evaluates the economic, military and political factors which, combined with the strategic geography of China, play an important role in her strength.

Title: *Background for Russian Action.*
Author: Hittle, Lt. Col. J. D.
Publication: MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, January, 1952, p. 47-59.
Annotation: Traces East-West difficulties to prove that the basic objectives and methods of Communist Russia derive from origins deeply rooted in the history of the Russian nation.

Title: *The Defense of Europe.*
Author: Kruls, Gen. H. J.
Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January, 1952, p. 265-276.
Annotation: A study of the defense of Western Europe against Rus-

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sian aggression which reviews the political and strategic positions of East and West.

Title: *The Chance for Titoism in China.*
Author: Leng, Shai Chuan.
Publication: CURRENT HISTORY, December, 1951, p. 337-344.
Annotation: Examines the factors and circumstances surrounding Communism in China, concludes that the possibility of Titoism exists and suggests a specific course of action for the West to follow, which includes constant exploitation of the potentiality of Titoism in China.

Title: *The Atomic Illusion.*
Author: Potts, Ramsay D.
Publication: AIR FORCE, January, 1952, p. 20-23.
Annotation: Warns that the United States under-estimated the technological potential of Russia, especially in regard to atomic technology.

Title: *Strategic Intelligence and the Publication of Statistics.*
Author: Rice, Stuart A. and Kappel, Joseph A.
Publication: THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, December, 1951, p. 1058-1068.
Annotation: Studies the problem of restriction on the publication of statistical data which is of military value to enemy intelligence in the present situation, when we are not actually at war with the power we recognize as our enemy.

Title: *First Story of Naval Air Power.*
Author: Cassady, Vice Adm. John H.
Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 18, 1952, p. 28-33.
Annotation: An interview with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, in which he replies to questions on naval air power

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in Korea, the role of aircraft carriers and other questions on naval air operations.

Title: *America and the Russian Future.*
(Symposium on the Russian policy proposed by George F. Kennan)

Publication: THE NEW LEADER, January 14, 1952, p. 2-11.

Annotation: Presents a discussion by four analysts of an article by Mr. Kennan which appeared in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1951, entitled "America and the Russian Future."

Title: *The Sovereign Position.*

Author: Voight, F. A.

Publication: THE FREEMAN, January 14, 1952, p. 233-235.

Annotation: Develops the thesis that in the present conflict between Russia and the West, the decisive position is the Dardanelles and if held in sufficient strength, will enable the West to influence events in southern Asia and the Far East.