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SPIRIT OF TITOISM

A Lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 22 October 1951 by
Dr. Bertram Wolfe

I. Ambiguities in the Marxist Attitude on the National Question

There is a certain ambiguity in the Marxian attitude towards the national question, which is the first matter which I propose to examine. If you read the *Communist Manifesto*, you will find on the one hand a declaration that the workers have no country to defend; next, that their aim is to establish themselves as the nation; next you will find an economic or market theory of Nationalism and Internationalism—that the idea of nationality grows up only when the nationwide market has developed so that you would automatically expect a feeling of nationality to coincide with the size of a given national or nationwide market.

On the other hand, you also have a declaration concerning the rights of complete restoration of Poland as an independent nationality in the *Communists Manifesto*. Poland was geared at that time part into the German market, part into the Russian market, part into the Austrian-Hungarian market. So it is quite obvious that Marx has abandoned his own economic interpretation

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of Nationalism in favor of recognition that there is a kind of demi-urge that has lived underground, something of the spirit of the Polish people which demands the restoration of Polish national independence. Thus even in the *Communist Manifesto* we find an ambiguity on the national question, which I take as the first background point in an approach to the question of Titoism.

Second, you will find in the relations between Lenin and Stalin a certain ambiguity on the national question. In 1920 Lenin was preparing a document (a series of propositions or theses) for the Communist International Congress *on the National and Colonial Question*. He sent a copy of it to Stalin for his opinion (as he did to a number of other people) and Stalin wrote back a criticism, expressing a disagreement with Lenin's thesis. Now that criticism (and I call your attention to the early date—June 12, 1920) — that criticism is extremely interesting.

Stalin writes,

“For nations which made up part of old Russia, our Soviet-type of federations may and must be accounted expedient as the road to unity. These nationalities either did not have a state of their own in the past or have long lost it, in view of which fact the Soviet centralized-type of federation will graft itself onto them without any serious friction. But the same cannot be said of those nationalities which did not make up a part of old Russia—which existed as independent formations, developed their own states and which, if they become Soviet, will be obliged by force or circumstances to enter into one or another governmental relationship with Soviet Russia.

“For example, a future Soviet Germany, Soviet Poland, Soviet Hungary, Soviet Finland—” (now this

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is 1920, and is a basic document which we might call Stalin's "Mein Kampf") "these peoples, having had their own state, their own army, their own finances, will hardly agree—even though they become Soviet—to enter at once into a federal bond with Soviet Russia of the type of the Bashkir or Ukranian. For a federation of the Soviet type would be looked upon by them as a form of diminution of their state independence, as an attack upon it. I have no doubt, therefore, that for these nationalities the most acceptable form of rapprochement will be a Confederation." (By which he means a kind of alliance or loose union of nominally independent states). "I say nothing of the backward nations; for example: Persia, Turkey—in relation to which or for which the Soviet type of federation and federation, in general, would be still more unacceptable."

This criticism of Lenin's thesis (which, by the way, Lenin rejected) indicates that as early as June 12, 1920 Stalin already had a concept of a future Soviet Germany, a Soviet Finland, a Soviet Hungary. He recognized that they could not directly enter into the Soviet Union "Federation" and he proposed a transition form which today he calls "The System of People's Democracies." Thus the first approach of Stalin to what today we call "Titoism" can be found in this document. Now where can you find this document today? It is not in Stalin's Collected Works. He has excluded it from the canon of his Collected Works because it is too revealing. Nevertheless, you can find it in Lenin's Collected Works—in the Russian Third Edition, volume XXV, page 624, as a footnote, in which Stalin's criticism written to Lenin is given in full. It is a document worthy of much more study than our leaders have so far given it.

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The third point in Stalin's special views on the national question to which I wish to call to your attention, is a contempt on Stalin's part for the right of borderlands and neighbors to genuine independence. On October 20, 1920, he wrote:

"Central Russia, this is the fireplace of world revolution, cannot hold out long without the help of the borderlands rich in raw materials, fuel, products of production. . . . The separation of the borders would undermine the revolutionary might of Central Russia In the circumstances of the war to the death that is flaring up between proletarian Russia and the Imperialist Entente for the borderlands, there are possible only two outcomes:

EITHER together with Russia.

OR together with the Entente.

There is no third possibility.

The so-called independence of the so-called independent Georgia, Armenia, Poland, Finland, etc., is only a deceptive appearance covering up the full dependence of these governments (if you will excuse me for calling them governments) from this or that group of Imperialists."

(PRAVDA, October 20, 1920; Stalin's Collected Works, Vol. IV, pp. 351-363).

The fourth constituent element in the Stalinist attitude towards Titoism I find in his definition of an "internationalist." On August 1, 1927, he said,

"A *revolutionary* is one who, without reservation, unconditionally, openly and honestly is ready to defend and protect the U.S.S.R., since the U.S.S.R. is

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the first proletarian revolutionary state in the world. An internationalist is he who unreservedly, without hesitation, without conditions, is ready to defend the U.S.S.R., because the U.S.S.R. is the base of the world revolutionary movement. And to defend, to advance this revolutionary movement is impossible without defending the U.S.S.R.”

The last point of ambiguity in this Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist attitude towards the national question I offer in the form of a conversation between Bukharin and Armstrong, who wrote a book on Tito. Bukharin said to Armstrong,

“National rivalry between Communist states is by definition ‘an impossibility.’”

“By definition it is impossible for the Soviet Union to be Imperialist; by definition it is impossible for the United States not to be Imperialist; by definition whatever the Soviet Union does is peaceful and by definition whatever the Soviet Union does is democratic. And so we are not surprised to find that national rivalry between Communist states is by definition ‘an impossibility.’ Just as Capitalism cannot live without war, so war cannot live with Communism.”

Bukharin did not live long enough to learn better.

II. *The Break Between Stalin and Tito*

We turn now to the open break between Tito and Stalin. This open break is as significant for our understanding of the Communist international, or the Coninform, as that famous unhealing fistula was for gastro-intestinal observation. You remember there was a doctor who once tried to operate and heal a

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fistula in the stomach of a living man. He failed; so he finally put in a window, took advantage of that open porthole, and continued to examine the functioning of the stomach and the intestines through it. Thus modern gastro-intestinal science developed. In the same sense the break between Tito and Stalin opened a window into the deeply secret processes that go on inside the Cominform. In the early days of the Comintern there were public debates, rival proposals, and thus we could get some notion of what went on. But, increasingly, the Comintern became monolithic, and with it came unanimity and overwhelming blanket secrecy. Were it not for this break we would have very little notion indeed of how the Cominform functions.

How shall we interpret the break between Tito and Stalin? We can interpret it first in emotional terms and say that Stalinism underrates the everlasting determination of peoples to be themselves. The 20th Century's chief lesson thus far, I should say, is that national independence is one of the few things for which men are willing to fight and to die.

Secondly, we can interpret it in historical terms—people with different experiences, different traditions, different cultures, inevitably have differing values. Even a World State would never be able to bleach out all the varied national colors from life.

Third, we can interpret it in terms of national interest and national traditions. The Yugoslavs have a tradition of resistance to outside tyrants—a tradition formed in the struggle against the Turks, strengthened in the struggle against Hitler, and now given fresh life and meaning in the struggle against Stalin.

Fourth, we can interpret it in terms of a special Balkan political tradition. Every Balkan Communist, every Balkan Socialist,

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every Balkan Democrat, every Balkan Liberal, has been brought up in the tradition of the need for a Federation of Balkan Republics. When we speak of "The Balkanization of Europe" we have in mind the same thing which has been the curse of life in the Balkans. The Balkan peninsula has been the playground of Great Powers—France, Austria Hungary, Germany, Russia—and Balkan patriots have long felt that the only way their lands could cease to be a playground of the Great Powers was if they were to federate and form a genuine Federated Power of their own. So it was almost automatic for Communists in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Rumania, as it would have been automatic for Socialists or for Republicans and Democrats, the moment they came to power in all those countries and felt a kinship with each other—it was automatic to propose a Balkan Federation. But, at that moment there was only one great power that was still to be kept out of the Balkans by a Balkan Federation: namely, the Soviet Union. And Stalin reacted angrily to the proposal of a powerful Balkan Federation which might have stood up against him.

Fifth, we can interpret the Tito break in terms of personal conflict, and this is the more instructive because Tito is a kind of "pocket" Stalin. Of all the disciples of Stalin, the one that learned most from him and was closest to him was Josef Broz, known as Tito. Now Stalinism is a jealous "ism." It is a kind of ersatz religion in which Stalin has become the infallible, the omniscient, the omnipotent leader and father of the peoples. The *vozhd* is a jealous *vozhd* and beside him there is no other *vozhd*. He may have disciples—twelve, or twelve times twelve, or any number—but he may not have partners, associates, or second-string leaders. The disciple who challenges this becomes by definition a "Judas Iscariot."

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Sixth, we might interpret Titoism in ideological terms. We might bear in mind that orthodoxies tend to breed heresies; dogmas—challenge; commands—disobedience. Then the heresies, in turn, will claim to be orthodoxies, even as so many heresies in the Christian churches appeal to “primitive Christianity.” So Titoism has appealed to “primitive Leninism” against Stalin’s modifications or “betrayals” of what Tito claims to be orthodox Leninism. It is within this closed circle that Titoism has developed, and only now—reluctantly, hesitatingly, dubiously—some of Tito’s ideologues are beginning to question certain tenets of Leninism itself.

III. *The Multiple Appeal of Titoism*

Having made this multiple interpretation of the development of Titoism, I want to suggest something of the multiple appeal of Titoism. It appeals to national patriotism against treason to one’s country; yes, and even to the class that a Communist professes to represent. Wherever you have to put the interests of the Soviet government above the interests of your own country, your own people, and against your own working class—then you are faced with the problem of treason. Reluctance to commit these forms of treason is one of the appeals that Titoism makes to the Communist in other countries.

Second, it appeals to “primitive Leninism” as a return to purity of doctrine and true equalitarian internationalism.

Third, it appeals to fellow travelers “out on a limb” and anxious to climb down without any loss of revolutionary posture. I refer to an O. John Rogge in this country or a Ziliakus in England. The cold war having created an intolerable situation for people out on that limb, the problem was how they could climb

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down, yet still appear faithful to some kind of revolutionary doctrine. Tito gave the answer, which I think helps to explain why a Ziliakus or a Rogge becomes so ardent a Titoist.

Fourth, Titoism has an appeal to his neighbors still needing a Balkan Federation to defend themselves — to Italy and to Greece.

Fifth, it is of especial interest to the Atlantic Pact Nations, for it represents the crack in the armor, the breach in the walls. I have every sympathy for the plight of the Yugoslav people who are still under the heel of a totalitarian dictatorship and from their standpoint it would certainly be much better if Tito were a Democrat and not a totalitarian Communist dictator. But from the standpoint of our interest at the present phase of the cold war, I can't help thinking that Tito is more useful to us as a Communist than he would be as a Democrat.

IV. *Factors Which Made Titoism Possible*

Now I turn to the genesis of the Tito break. The first aspect that we must consider is the special circumstances under which Titoist Yugoslavia was born. Like Poland, Yugoslavia resisted German invasion from the outset. There is this difference, however, that Poland resisted both Hitler and Stalin while Titoist Yugoslavia resisted Hitler only when Stalin and Hitler broke.

Second, Yugoslavia is an ideal terrain for guerrilla warfare and although its main armies were easily smashed by the Wehrmacht, yet in the mountains of Yugoslavia guerrilla warfare was never abandoned.

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Third, the Tito forces participated in the final liberation of Yugoslavia and functioned as a kind of junior ally to the Soviet Army.

Fourth, their mountains were never fully occupied by Hitler as their country was never occupied by Stalin. It was the only East European state to escape Red Army occupation, therefore theoretically self-liberated.

Fifth, geographically, Yugoslavia is farthest from Russia of the so-called "People's Democracies." It has no contiguous border with the Soviet Union. It has direct contact with the non-Communist world — with Italy, with Greece and with the open sea along the shores of the Adriatic. These, then, are the special circumstances which made possible the rise of Titoism.

V. Differences Which Led to the Break

Now I should like to examine some of the differences — muted, but stubborn — that developed between Tito and Stalin long before either of them recognized that these differences were leading to a break. On March 5, 1942, Moscow sent a cable to Tito, criticizing him for being too pro-Soviet and too openly Communist in his conduct of the struggle inside Yugoslavia. I quote a few sentences from the Moscow cable:

WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION THE FOLLOWERS OF ENGLAND AND THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT IS ASSUMING A COMMUNIST CHARACTER AND THAT IT INTENDS TO SOVIETIZE YUGOSLAVIA. THE BASIC AND IMMEDIATE TASK CONSISTS NOW IN THE UNIFICATION OF ALL

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ANTI-HITLER ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO CRUSH THE OCCUPIER AND ACHIEVE NATIONAL LIBERATION. IS IT REALLY TRUE THAT BESIDES THE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR FOLLOWERS THERE ARE NO OTHER YUGOSLAV PATRIOTS TOGETHER WITH WHOM YOU COULD FIGHT AGAINST THE ENEMY ?”

Now this is an instruction—not to cease to plan for a Soviet Yugoslavia, but to slow up and dissimulate the tempo of progress in that direction. We thus find that Tito is more Communist and more openly pro-Soviet than Stalin wishes him to be at that moment. A similar instruction went to Mao and, as you know, Mao Tse-tung accepted the instruction and continued to collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek, but Tito stepped up his campaign against Mihailovich after receiving this cable. The Soviet Union continued to maintain a “hands off” appearance until very late.

There was no Soviet mission in Yugoslavia until February, 1944, although there was a Military Mission from Britain from May, 1942 on. In 1944 a Yugoslav brigade, trained in Russia, came equipped with uniforms with royal Yugoslav emblems and only after Tito protested were the emblems removed. In 1943, while Stalin was still uncertain whether Mihailovich or Tito would come out on top and still wished to avoid alarming the Western powers, he gave no direct help to Tito. Tito was puzzled, angered, and the only answer he knew was to step up his offensive and campaign of propaganda against Mihailovich. Only when the Americans and the British showed no unfavorable reaction and when all sorts of people in America and in Britain began to echo Tito's propaganda that Mihailovich was a Nazi collaborator—

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only then did Stalin conclude that his cautions and fears were exaggerated and only then did he begin to give open help to Tito.

Another curious document of 1942 is a lecture from Stalin to Tito on what "Internationalism" consists of during World War II. I quote:

"The defeat of the Facist bandits and the liberation from the occupier is now the basic task and is above all other tasks. Take into consideration that the Soviet Union has treaty obligations with the Yugoslav king and government and that any open actions against these would create new difficulties in the common war efforts in the relations between the Soviet Union and England and America. Do not consider your struggle only from your own national viewpoint, but from the international point of view of the English-Soviet-American coalition. Strengthen your positions in the people's liberation struggle," (you see Stalin is not averse to what Tito is trying to do), "and at the same time show more elasticity and ability to maneuver."

On this Tito commented to his close crony, Mosa Pijade,

"I did not give too many explanations to Grandpa. I merely asked for more weapons to carry out his instructions."

And Grandpa, in turn, sent word that there were "technical difficulties" which prevented the sending of more weapons.

Next, it is well to remember that the party which Tito now leads is truly a Titoist Party. A bit of biography will help.

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Tito was born Josef Broz in 1892 in Hapsburg, Croatia. He was a war prisoner of the Russians in World War I. There he was indoctrinated by the Bolsheviks, joined the Red Army, and got his first military training in the civil war that followed in Russia after World War I. Sent back to Yugoslavia, he became Secretary of the Metalworkers' Union of Zagreb. In 1928 he did a tour of duty of five years in jail, where he met Mosa Pijade, who was a fellow inmate, and their close friendship and collaboration began. When he got out of jail, he got a postgraduate course in the Lenin School in Moscow.

From the Lenin School he was sent to Paris to carry on some important Comintern duties in connection with the Spanish Civil War. In Paris he steeped his hands in the blood of "The Purges" when the Blood Purges were carried into Spain and served to demoralize the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War. By this participation in the Purge, Tito rose from an obscure second rank figure in the Yugoslav Communist Party to the chief of that party. For those earlier leaders who had stood in his way and were his superiors, largely disappeared in "The Purges."

In 1941 the Yugoslav Party numbered 12,000 members. Less than 3,000 of them survived at the end of the Second World war, but by 1948 those 3,000 had swelled to 470,000 — most of whom never knew any leader but Tito.

Now a glance at the Balkan Federation question. Dimitrov visited Tito at Bled in the summer of 1947. Their principal subject of conversation was the setting up of a Balkan Federation. Dimitrov for Bulgaria and Tito for Yugoslavia issued a joint communique about the immediate steps for the setting up of a Federation of Balkan People's Democratic Republics. Stalin re-

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acted instantly with anger. Dimitrov was forced to retract and disclaim their joint initiative in articles which were published in PRAVDA and IZVESTIA. But Tito did not publish a disclaimer. This, therefore, is a key point in the break.

Nevertheless in the autumn of 1947 (when the Cominform was established as a public body with the primary aim of fighting the Marshall Plan and a secondary aim of setting up a federation of satellites in the Balkans under Soviet domination which would be just the opposite of a Balkan Federation such as Dimitrov and Tito had envisaged) — at that point Tito was still the shining example and his country the most advanced of all the People's Democracies that had been created during World War II. The Cominform headquarters were in Belgrade. Tito was regarded as the outstanding of the Balkan leaders. Every one admired him for his power, for his having attained that power independently, and for his general manifestation of independence. Yugoslavia was being used throughout the world by Communists and fellow travelers as the model Communist state of those that had been newly born. Only after the open fight between Stalin and Tito were headquarters of the Cominform switched from Belgrade to Bucharest.

Now let us examine the relations between Stalin and Tito during the critical period. Tito visited Moscow in April, 1945. He came back with a twenty-year treaty of friendship and mutual aid, with a military mission to run his army, an economic mission to integrate his industry into the Soviet economic plan. And he learned, to his dismay, that that plan envisaged Yugoslavia as a kind of second-class agricultural, raw material, metal-producing land, subordinate in rank to Czechoslovakia, to Poland and to Hungary, for Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary were slated for a greater degree of industrialization. I do not have

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to tell you that Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary possessed a greater degree of industrialization at the moment they were taken over by the Communists.

Tito was, moreover, at that interview urged into open battle with his own people. One way in which Stalin keeps puppets as puppets is to get them thus into open struggles with their own people. He was urged to go head-on into forced collectivization of Yugoslav agriculture. He recognized that his army was to be reduced to an auxiliary troop of the Soviet Army and that the whole scheme reduced Yugoslavia to a subordinate part in a detailed blueprint from Moscow to all her satellites. He recognized, too, that far from "withering away," this form of state domination was destined to grow stronger and the Soviet Empire would be ever more unified and the Balkan portions of it ever more subjected and coordinated into the Soviet Empire. He was put before the dilemma that Yugoslavia was to remain as before — poor, backward, weak, dependent, and subject to the will of greater powers, in this case the Soviet Union.

He paid a second visit to Stalin in May and June, 1946. Here they went into more detail on the same matters. He learned that the U.S.S.R. was going to reorganize the Yugoslav Army with modern tactics and modern equipment. There was to be no national manual of arms in this thoroughly national Guerrilla Army, but it was to take the Soviet manual of arms, just as, a little later, Hungary was ordered to teach its soldiers to take commands in Russian as well as in Hungarian. There was to be no national arms industry — generous equipment with weapons but if at anytime they wore out or at any time Tito needed new munitions for them, he would have to come "hat in hand" to the Soviet Union once more. There was a Soviet Mission to go to Yugoslavia and take virtual command of the Yugoslav Army,

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just as the Yugoslavs were permitted to send a Mission to Albania to take virtual command of the Albanian Army.

The Soviet Intelligence was to teach the Yugoslav Intelligence how to operate and was to have such plenary powers that it could easily by-pass the Yugoslav Intelligence and act as an espionage system on Tito and his fellow Communists. The Soviet technicians were to get notably higher salaries, and, as the Soviet Army officers, were to get plenary powers, and be in key spots.

VI. *Tito Draws First*

Tito left Moscow crestfallen and conferred with his Balkan confederates for closer cooperation to make counter-pressure so that the Communists of the Balkans would be treated with more wisdom (as he thought) and more dignity than had thus far been the case. For the moment all the leaders of the other Balkan countries looked to Tito for leadership, not realizing how far things would go. There followed a period of maneuver. The Comintern, or Cominform, was ordering a sudden drastic turn to the "left," in connection with the stepping up of its "cold war." In America, Browder was "ditched." In Czechoslovakia, Masaryk and Benes were driven to their doom. Tito, as a good Stalinist, recognized the symptoms and made a sudden ultra-left swing himself — went way to the "left" of the orders which he expected would come from Moscow any day, and announced that he was determined "to liquidate immediately all remnants of Capitalism in trade and in industry and agriculture." This drastic turn to the left is something for which Yugoslav economy and Yugoslav agriculture are still paying the penalty at the present moment, as each day's budget of news indicates.

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Stalin was as smart as Tito and when he saw Tito taking this left turn on his own so that he could not be criticized as an "opportunist," he recognized that this meant "fight." And so the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began secret consultations with selected members of other Central Committees concerning Tito's "errors" and Tito's "excessive independence." And the Cominform (which had been set up for the fight on the Marshall Plan) now sharpened its offensive instruments for a major war on Tito and Titoism.

In late 1947 the Cominform met in Belgrade — on September 27 — and Tito was still a leader among the Cominform leaders. He criticized heads of other Communist Parties for their timidity. He was shown sympathy by Dimitrov, by Gomulka, by Gheorghiu-Dej of Rumania. Even Thorez and Togliatti, who were present, were hesitant and showed some admiration for the courage and the independence that Tito was showing. Zhdanov, representing the Soviet Union, was also friendly to Tito, but he was in the beginning of his eclipse in the Soviet Union and died in 1948. His people were rapidly removed from places of power.

At the beginning of March, 1948, the Vice Premier of Yugoslavia, Kardelj, went to Moscow in a vain effort to persuade Moscow to send more machinery for the purpose of the industrialization of Yugoslavia. He came back empty-handed. On March 18, the Soviet government secretly withdrew all military advisors and instructors from Tito's Army, charging that they were "surrounded by hostility." On March 19 they withdrew all civilian missions, charging "a lack of hospitality and a lack of confidence." On March 20, Tito demanded an explanation.

He wrote to Molotov, "We are amazed. We cannot understand. We are deeply hurt. Openly inform us what the trouble is."

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On June 29, 1948, the unsuspecting world was startled by the publication of a Cominform blast against Tito entitled, "Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia"; and a Tito counter-blast, defensive in character but nevertheless obviously a counter-blast. The break was in the open. The period is an instructive one; it was the period when the Berlin crisis had come to a head. Berlin was being blockaded by the Russians. We were debating whether we should smash the blockade by running armored trains, properly defended, through the blockade lines.

At that time the Soviet military men were considering a military plan in case open war should begin. That military plan involved something which was of great importance to Tito and helps to explain Stalin's attitude towards Tito's Army. The plan was to smash westward, through Germany in a frontal attack towards France and the Atlantic; but, at the same time to out-flank France by sending an army through the relatively less mountainous areas, following the valleys of the Po and the Adige and the Plains of Lombardy; then striking up into France through the most accessible of the passes, thus hitting our troops from the rear at the same time they were being hit from the front by the major forces of the Soviet Army.

This makes clear why it was that Stalin conceived of Tito's Army not as a guerrilla force to defend the mountains against invasion (for the only conceivable invader was the Soviet Union), but as an auxiliary troop to serve the Soviet Army and to become a part of it in that outflanking movement in case war should actually break out. Stalin insisted upon equipping Tito's troops to be such an auxiliary force in a Soviet regular army while Tito dreamed of maintaining his troops as essentially mountaineer guerrillas to defend the sovereignty and independence of Yugoslavia in case of any attack.

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This same period was one in which U.N.R.R.A. supplies had been completely used up and the Yugoslav Trade Delegation in Moscow was begging in vain for aid in the industrialization of the country to get its Five Year Plan of Industrialization underway. It was directed instead to gear its minerals and ores into the more advanced industries of neighbor countries and of the Soviet Union.

VII. Soviet Imperialism

This brings us to the notion of Kremlin Imperialism, which Tito's break has made so clear. The subordination of the Yugoslav Army into an auxiliary troop; the subordination of the Yugoslav economy into the over-all plans and profits of Soviet industry; the attempt by the Soviet Union to get pro-consul's rights and extra-territorial status for its agents; its ambassador to be entitled to interfere in Yugoslav internal affairs; its agents to have the right to access to state secrets; its right to organize its own intelligence service to spy on the Yugoslav leaders, to be exempt from Yugoslav espionage and to recruit Yugoslav citizens as Soviet spies; its insistence that Soviet officers should get three or four times as much salary from Yugoslavia as the Yugoslavia generals and to have over-riding powers; its insistence of the rights of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to interfere in the affairs of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and of the Yugoslav state.

Now Soviet Imperialism combines all the imperialisms that have ever been invented in the long history of man. From the most ancient direct pillage and plunder and kidnapping of populations and extermination of elites to leave peoples leaderless, and the sowing of waste lands for strategic purposes, to the early 20th Century form of economic penetration and then has

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super-added its own forms of expansion of the total state through terror, concentration camps, deportations, police systems and the like.

Let us examine for a moment what we might call "classic economic Imperialism." The Soviet Union had set up (as Tito has now made clear by publishing the documents) mixed companies, *juspad* and *justa*—shipping and aviation. Theoretically, the stock is owned 50-50 by the Soviet government and the Yugoslav government, but the Soviet government paid in only 9.83% of its share during the period in which the Yugoslav government had paid in 76.25% of its share. The managing director in Yugoslavia was a Soviet appointee; his assistant was a Yugoslav who was ignored for all practical purposes. Soviet planes were allowed to fly into Yugoslavia, but Yugoslav planes were not allowed to fly into the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia paid 52% more for her freight shipments on the Danube than the Soviet Union did and 30% more (for reasons that are not clear to me) than any other satellite did. In other words, here was a system of direct economic exploitation thinly disguised under the guise of an equal partnership.

Similarly, the army equipment of Yugoslavia was left without replacement parts to keep it in subjection. Yugoslavia sent metals (principally iron) to Czechoslovakia and had asked in return for machinery in order to manufacture trucks. Czechoslovakia under Soviet orders sent not machinery to manufacture trucks, but sent trucks, meaning "you will never manufacture your own trucks." Yugoslavia found all its molybdenum monopolized by the Soviet government. Its cost of production was fantastically high — 500,000 dinars per ton according to the Yugoslav White Book; but the Soviet monopoly paid only the world price—instead of 500,000 dinars, 45,000 dinars—so that

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Yugoslavia lost 455,000 dinars on every ton that was delivered, and the more it delivered the more it lost.

Finally, in this relation of metropolis to colony there was an ill-concealed basic contempt. One example will suffice: In one of the notes of the Soviet government to the Yugoslav government dated August 30, 1949, you will find this sentence, "The puppy is feeling so good that it barks at the elephant." Nevertheless, the puppy has so far checked the elephant, so we must now examine how the puppy managed to hold the elephant at bay.

First, Stalin had unexamined illusions as to the absoluteness of his own power. Up until that time no one had been able to stand against him. Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev — they all looked bigger to him than did little Tito, but at his breath they were blown over. He had only, he thought, to sound the trumpet and the walls of Tito's pocket Kremlin would collapse; he had only to hurl an anathema and Tito would vanish in a puff of smoke. Not only Bukharin, Trotsky and Zinoviev proved vulnerable to his anathema, but he had no difficulty with Poland, Hungary and Rumania. However, Tito had a power center of his own just out of reach. Moreover, he was the perfect disciple — a kind of pocket Stalin.

VIII. *The Crack in the Kremlin Wall*

In the chess game which now ensued they both played by the same book. He was able to anticipate each move. Every time Stalin touched a piece, he envisaged the entire alteration or configuration of the game — for he was playing the same game. He was invited to Moscow to parley — he politely declined the invitation. He was invited to Bucharest to parley at

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the Second Cominform session — he stayed away. Attempts were made to assassinate him — he protected himself well, though not as cautiously as Stalin does.

But there is an invisible wall which helps to protect him. There is danger in assassinating him before he has been discredited, before he has gone through the process of acknowledging his errors, discrediting himself, spitting in his own face, crawling, apologizing and doing all the other things that Cominform leaders have to learn to do at certain stages in their careers. Only then could he be safely exterminated, confessed “purged,” or assassinated. But to assassinate him before this has happened is to make a banner and a martyr of him. This, too, protects him. A coup d’etat was tried against him, but he comes from a land where people, as we say in Mexico, “learn to get up early”; that is, he drew first.

In April 1948, before the open break, he threw Hebrang and Zujovic in jail, recognizing that they were secretly organizing a Stalinist faction in his party. They are still in jail. When General Arso Jovanovic was trained in Moscow and returned to serve in his army, then packed his bags one night and made for the frontier, Tito seemed to get the jump again and Jovanovic was shot trying to escape.

A “revolution” in Yugoslavia has been called for, and called for, and called for — but the call falls on deaf ears. Tito, who had enormous opposition in his own country, undoubtedly has less opposition today than he had when Stalin attacked him, rather than more opposition. With his internal opposition, every knock from Stalin is a kind of boost. He has gradually moved over into the position of a national hero. Without ceasing to be a Communist he is also in the position of a national hero,

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defending Yugoslavia's independence against a great, bullying power. Therefore, Stalin's committees in exile have been branded as "puppets," "traitors," and Tito himself is a hero even with the people who resent his total state regime.

Charging Tito with ingratitude and lack of discipline has not proved effective, so Stalin has tried more complex ideological attacks. But an ideological attack permits an ideological defense. The Cominform has said that Yugoslavia has a police regime, terror, no party democracy, holds no party congresses. Tito answers, "You have a police regime; you have terror; you, also, have no party democracy; you hold no party congresses."

So every article of the indictment has become *a fortiori* an article of the indictment of the Stalin regime itself and this is the most distressing thing that has happened to Stalin since he came to power. Gradually Tito has stepped up his defensive until it has become an offensive, and he has done it with rare tactical skill. Today the Soviet regime is truly on the defensive against this tiny, ridiculous "puppy who is barking at the elephant"; on the defensive because from inside the Communist camp come the clear words of truth about Soviet Imperialism and Soviet terror and Soviet ruthlessness which, when they come from non-Communists, have less effectiveness. This is the true crack in the Kremlin wall of infallibility. Therefore Stalin cannot tolerate it and refuses to tolerate it but he tries expedient after expedient, move after move, and every time playing by the same book, having gone through the same hard school, having a somewhat better moral case, Tito out-guesses him and blocks each move on his part.

There are only two possible moves which might bring results. One of them is to run all his neighbor states into an

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attack — an open war upon him. This is too dangerous. Danger No. 1 — that the armies of the Balkan neighbor states are themselves infected with some admiration for this assertion of independence of a Balkan power; Danger No. 2 — Tito has (on a Balkan scale) a mighty good army and may not be overthrown without the intervention of the Soviet Union; Danger No. 3 (and largest of all) — during the period when Stalin wants neither total peace nor total war he cannot risk an open attack upon Tito, for out of a local war too easily can come a total war.

Now there is a certain logic to Tito's position which we in the democratic lands watch with the closest attention. He is engaged in a critique of Stalinism which has ended with a complete rejection of Stalinism. Nevertheless, the structure of his own state is still basically Stalinist in character: that is to say, he still has his political prisoners; he still has his forced collectivization; he still has his one-party state; he still has his secret police; he still has his terror—all the things he learned from Stalin. He has glossed them over a bit, undoubtedly softened them a bit as his relations with his own people become less tense; nevertheless, the structure is there. But the logic is one which compels him anxiously to reexamine that structure. I do not say to dismantle it—that is what we are watching with interest—but certainly he is constantly re-examining it.

The logic also of his position requires him to seek allies. He has been forced into calling off the war on Greece and in Greece. He has been forced into closer relations with Greece, Turkey, Italy and Austria (which is all that is left of the possibilities of a Balkan Federation against Soviet aggression). He has been forced to apply for help from the Free World, and we have given him help, and that too has its logic. We have not

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made conditions. We have had much debate as to whether we ought to make conditions and what conditions we ought to make, but the fact is that we have made no conditions. We are not endorsing his internal regime, but on the other hand neither are we making our critique of this internal regime a major criterion at present. The major criterion is that he represents a crack in the Cominform. He represents a Communist defiance, a Communist aggression in Imperialism that emanates from the Soviet Union, and he represents a struggle for independence of his country against the Soviet Empire. These things we are prepared to support to the extent that we are now supporting them because in the kind of world in which we live they are definitely assets, creating a better situation rather than a worse situation.

The full logic of his position is limited by his own dogmas and predispositions. I have recently spoken with Bebler and I found that Bebler, Kardelj and Pijade (who are the major theoreticians of Titoslovakia) are approaching very tenderly the question of re-examining Leninism. They are brave and bold in re-examining Stalinism. They are at the point now in their thinking where they are asking themselves, "Shall we also re-examine Leninism to see if in Lenin, too, there was some imperfection which gave rise to Stalinism?" And they are beginning to come to the conclusion that there was. How far that process will go, I do not venture to predict.

The final thought that I would like to leave with you is this: there is also a logic to Stalin's position. Leninism was defined by a Russian Marxist once as "Marxism a la tartar" (Marxism with tartar sauce). If that is true, we will have to find a much more drastic qualification for Stalinism. It is a kind of mountaineer blood-feud Marxism, geared to a total state and an aspiration to total rule of the world. But there within the

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Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist camp Stalinism has suffered its first check. And I do not believe that Stalin is so dumb as not to learn from what has happened.

Just as the British after 1776 never lost another colony, so Stalin has determined after June, 1948, never to permit another Tito and never to lose another Yugoslavia. But Britain's response was appropriate to the organic nature of the British regime. It was a slow, hesitant, blundering but incessant loosening of the bonds, until the British Empire changed (and is still changing under our eyes) into the British Commonwealth of nations.

We have watched India break the bonds and yet remain a part of the Commonwealth. I hope (and believe) that we will yet watch Egypt break the bonds and remain in organic relation to the Commonwealth. We have watched Ireland (where the situation was more tense certainly than in Egypt) break the bonds of colonialism and yet remain a part of the Commonwealth. So with Burma. In other words, the process continues and Britain has never lost another colony because according to its own inner nature it has gradually loosened the bonds.

Now according to the inner nature of the Stalin regime the direct opposite procedure is taken—to tighten the bonds. Being the ruthless total state that it is and Stalin being the kind of man he is, he can think of nothing but to squeeze tighter; to coordinate the countries more rapidly into his machine; to hasten the conflict between rulers and ruled; to remove those who have any roots in their own country and put in their places puppets who are completely dependent upon him; to let loose a hail of blood purges, executions of faithful and devoted Communists like Laszlo Rajk, Traicho Kostov, Clementis, Gomulka,

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and like loyal collaborators such as Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk of Czechoslovakia. There has been hail of accusations of Titoism, and one by one the men who have national roots in their own country, in their own Communist Parties and in their own laboring classes — these men have been executed in advance of the possibility that they may some day commit the crime of considering the interests of their country as different from the interests of the Soviet Empire.

However, there is also a danger in that method of solving the problem of Titoism. When you draw the bonds tighter and tighter you augment the potential discontent. Thus the Soviet Empire appears to grow tighter and stronger with its more ruthless coordination of all of its parts, but at the same time that introduces fresh elements of weakness into every one of the lands that Stalin dominates.