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**THE PLACE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE  
MAKING OF NATIONAL STRATEGY**

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 18 March 1952  
by

*Mr. Joseph C. Harsch*

Admiral Conolly, Members of the Naval War College:

I approach this subject with some hesitation. I've done a great deal of thinking, myself, about what national strategy should be, but not until I received the invitation to address this group had I ever tried to think through the relationship to each other of the various elements involved in the making of national strategy. I hope, therefore, that what I say won't sound like the kindergarten course which you went through in the first week you were here.

I have prepared a sort of paper here — I'd much rather just stand up and talk to you, but I think that what I am trying to think into a subject as deep as this one I had better impose upon you the less easy formula of reading rather than talking extemporaneously. I don't think it will use up the whole time — and at the end of that I may, I hope, be a little more useful than I am in this first part of it. I was very interested by the fact that you invited me, a newspaper man, to express views on this subject. I am really not an expert in anything except the technique of gathering the news and presenting it to the public in the best perspective possible. I'm not an authority on national strategy or on the means best employed to achieve the purposes of national strategy. But you have asked me to talk to you on this subject — I am interested because I can not imagine Hannibal, Genghis Khan, Louis XIV,

**RESTRICTED**

25

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Napoleon, the Kaiser, Hitler, Stalin, or any of their generals, ever seeking the views of a newspaper man on the matter of this character. The fact that you do testifies to what is, I think, a healthy factor in the thinking of military leaders of my country. You do not obviously assume that the military point of view is, or should be, the sole determining factor in the formulation of national policy. You look around in the civilian body to see if you can find in that area some guidance in the forming of the bodies of doctrine which govern your thinking and planning. Whether you can obtain useful ideas from a newsman is something still to be determined. But the fact that you seek one out would in itself be documentation for the contention that American military thinking is not governed by what civilians sometimes describe loosely as "the military mind."

We have had recently in the news an example of what the civilian would be inclined to call "the working of the military mind on national strategy." A general of the United States Army kept a diary, in which he expressed some personal views. He had the misfortune to leave his diary unguarded in a German hotel room. It was stolen, as you know, photostated by Communists, and excerpts were then published in a book which purported to show that the United States is committed to a firm policy of making war upon Soviet Russia at the earliest convenient moment, and by sudden and unadvertised attack. He proposed that we strike a "Pearl Harbor blow" at Russia. He assumed that the war was inevitable — and the sooner, the better. The amount of damage done by that to American diplomatic and political position in the Alliance was equal or more than the damage done when an American magazine, published by civilians, purported to show how we would win the next war. I arrived in Europe shortly after the impact of that issue of COLLIER'S MAGAZINE on the European mind and it was shattering. I hasten to say, therefore, that it is not only a

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general of the U. S. Army who has compromised the posture which we attempt to maintain before our alliance — the civilian has something to learn as well.

Now I recognize that from a strictly military point of view the long-term military interests of the United States might be best served by an early, sudden, and stealthy American blow at Russia. If you can assume that the United States possesses today the physical ability to strike Russia a crippling military blow which would nullify the military potential of Russia for years to come and leave the military potential of the United States and its allies unscathed, I could see some possible sense in such a course of action. However, it would seem to me as a civilian that there are dangers in such a course, even if a swift military success could be guaranteed. I would be interested to know if any of you think it could be guaranteed — I'd be quite comforted.

For one thing, it would immediately lose to the United States any claim to a position of moral leadership in the world. Second, it might destroy for all time the present disposition of the world to assume that we Americans are more interested in peace and peaceful pursuits than we are in military power. And this assumption is, I think, an important element in the fact that by and large those parts of the world not now ruled by Russia prefer to belong to a coalition led by us than to the part of the world dominated from Moscow. And if that assumption of a superior peaceableness on our part were destroyed, it is possible that our present friends might become our future enemies. By destroying Russia's military potential, in the manner proposed by General Grow, we might find that we had conjured into existence a coalition against us of all the countries we presently consider to be our friends. And such a coalition might, over the years, reduce us to the position of an embattled island living in the middle of the great ocean — severed from the land mass of Eurasia and Africa.

**RESTRICTED**

27

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I can think of other objections to the Grow system of planning national strategy. It overlooks the interests of an alliance. It shatters the best laid plans of the psychological warfare specialist. It treats as non-existent the question whether even a certain quick victory over Russia might cost us more in the end, even physically at home, than a long power struggle of indefinite duration. It ignores the possible effect upon our national thinking of an action contrary to our established ethical standards. It skims over the considerations which the economist and the specialist in physical resources would advance. In other words, in my opinion, it is not a balanced approach to the problem—but the approach of a specialist in one form of national action alone. So I, for one, would be unhappy to see our strategic planning in the hands only of the military specialists. I am happy to be able to say, as a Washington reporter, that it is not exclusively in such hands or dominated largely by them. There was no greater horror anywhere in Washington than at the top levels of the Pentagon when the Grow story broke.

But it is equally apparent to any Washington reporter that we have not yet succeeded in Washington in working out the most effective machinery for coordinating the thinking of the experts in all fields of national strategy. Matters are not as bad today as they were in late 1949, when diplomats and soldiers were not even on authorized speaking terms—except at the top levels. I'm serious about that. If you don't know about it, just let me underline a little bit.

Towards the end of the period when Louis Johnson was Secretary of Defense communication between the Defense Department and the State Department had to channel by his edict through his office. Subordinate officials were not allowed to speak to officials of the State Department unless the whole thing had been arranged

**RESTRICTED**

through the office of the Secretary of Defense. There was an open, angry battle for dominant control over strategy planning between the two departments. I have worked in Washington for 23 years as a journalist — and I have never seen an interdepartmental battle like that one. Anything went, and the infighting in the clinches was brutal.

Those times have passed, but the millenium has still to be achieved. In spite of all the elaborate machinery of the National Security Council, The Security Resources Board, and the various coordinating committees with the Atomic Energy Commission, etc., we have not worked out a perfect system under which all the different experts, operating on the vast problem of national strategy, make their contributions in perfect balance at the right times. Paranthetically, I must say with amusement about that famous Johnson-Acheson battle that at one time I was employed as an intermediary in an attempt to reestablish diplomatic relations between the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of State. I was successful, after a period of several weeks, in arranging an authorized luncheon between a gentleman representing General Bradley and a gentleman representing Mr. Acheson — but it took a long time and extremely delicate negotiations.

Somehow the views of the economist do not get worked into military planning today at the stage where the military are spared having to discover at some later date that their plans must be revised to accord with economic fact. I'm talking now about what I believe to be the present conditions, to the best of my knowledge, of the Washington correspondent. The politicians' interests can interfere with strategy making at the present time at the most unexpected times and with the most disturbing results. The Bureau of the Budget is capable of making arbitrary decisions which ig-

**RESTRICTED**

29

## RESTRICTED

nore all the careful studies of the military experts. The Pentagon is not free of the charge of swinging wide with the argument, "we know best."

Recently, a distinguished member of congress—after sitting through another appropriations hearing — declared with passionate sincerity, "I hate all Generals and Admirals. I've been listening to them for 25 years and I'm forced to conclude that they can not distinguish between \$5,000 and \$5,000,000." Many a Congressman felt confirmed in his suspicion of his military thinking when an official of the Air Force testified to recent occasions when differences between services were settled by flipping coins. All of which only proves that there continues to be a basis for distrust on all sides, and that the perfect machinery has not yet been achieved.

✓ Now, I am sure that we can all agree that the national interests of the United States would not be advanced if any single point of view involved in the making of national strategy were to get out of balance. History is cluttered with the wreckage of societies which failed to achieve balance in strategy making. Some states have disappeared because they gave the military point of view too little attention. Others, for a contrary reason. Sparta was too military a society to survive — it neglected other values and considerations. Napoleonic France bled herself to death by giving too little attention to non-military considerations. Hitler's Germany probably would have done better had the military been able to maintain its independence of the "instincts" of the head of the state.

✓ Balance is the important thing, obviously; and, of course, who is to say precisely what degree of influence should be accorded to each element in the equation. I would be horrified myself if any one were to tell me to go ahead and to try to work out a formula

**RESTRICTED**

assigning to soldier, politician, diplomat, economist, intelligence expert, propagandist and psychological expert, each his proper weight in the determination of national strategy. One major problem I think we must recognize in even attempting such a weighting of the various factors is that we have become a nation of experts to a degree never before known in history. Each is so expert in his own field and so preoccupied in it that he tends to see only his own field of interest.

Sometimes I fear that the tendency to overspecialization will be the cause of our ultimate downfall. We started out as a nation to specialize. We separated the executive from the legislative functions of government, thereby depriving ourselves of men like Winston Churchill, trained throughout their careers in both tasks. The British parliamentarian never forgets that at any moment he may become a cabinet officer. He must, and does, look at any given problem from both legislative and executive points of view. The British Parliamentary system also brings the country's best military brains into the legislative process through the device of elevation of top military leaders to the House of Lords. The military role in Britain is less defined than with us — but it is tied in more organically with the whole process of government. Sometimes I am tempted to think that we made a mistake when we adopted the Republican form of government, thus denying to ourselves a House of Lords to which we could elevate five star generals. Under our system General MacArthur must seek his revenge through political channels from outside the government. He is not automatically brought into the chambers of debate as he would have been in England. Think of how much it would have simplified that problem of the friction between the President, the Chief Executive, and his leading military commander if he could have resolved it not by dismissing him but by elevating him to the House of Lords under the title of Marquis of Bataan, Duke of

**RESTRICTED**

31



## **RESTRICTED**

Manila! It would have taken all the heat and the bitterness out of the issue and it also would have preserved the value of his thinking on the subject of the Far East in the making of national strategy. At the bottom level of legislative action, his thinking would have been brought into the process. As it is, our system does not permit that because it is so separating the Legislative from the Executive functions of government.

What are we going to do about all this? We have compartmented our legislators, our executives, our soldiers, our atomic energy experts, our economists. I have not a single criticism of the military which I wouldn't make with equal force with several other elements in our system of government that must be brought to bear upon any problem of this character. I have frequently found in my own experiences in Washington military men who are far more tolerant and broad-minded in their attitude toward the problem than were economists, politicians, scientists, experts of the Atomic Energy Commission, and things like that. But now we find the burden of world leadership on our shoulders. Without us there would not be a coalition strong enough to challenge the Russians. We must challenge them, and successfully, or we will ultimately find ourselves separated certainly from Eurasia and Africa and perhaps even from South America. Having compartmented our processes of government, we must find a way of fitting the compartments together at least well enough to permit us to outsmart the Russians sometime, somehow.

But, before we can even begin to accomplish this task, we must agree upon our national purposes. The founding fathers defined those purposes as, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Many individual Americans have tried in many ways to further define these purposes. It would almost seem today that social security had become a major purpose in the minds of

**RESTRICTED**

many Americans. With others, the first conscious goal would be lower taxes. Still others think that our primary national goal should be the abolition of the rest of the world. Some put peace first — General Grow would not agree. Personally, I would be satisfied with the old formula of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” In my opinion, those are the three things most of us want above all others — the three basic things. These other concepts that individuals have, called purposes, really represent the idea of the individual as to a way or means of achieving the basic objectives of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” It was a very good formula. I don’t think that the purposes of the human society have ever been more adequately defined. We want those things above all others. Everbody wants to live. Everybody wants as little interference in his normal life as possible and everybody also wants to have as good, as full, as rich a life with freedom to pursue money, a sports career, skill in weaving tapestry, if you like, or painting. The pursuit of happiness has many, many possible interpretations. To some people it means acquiring political power — to others it means getting a little acre patch where you can have a garden and some flowers. No two people would pursue happiness in the same way, but they all want to do it.

I would think that the best policies and strategies for us to pursue would be the ones which would most advance our chances of the enjoyment of those three things. Then you try to start to spell them out and what do they mean? That we prefer peace to war, but will fight if we must to protect our self-government and our opportunities to trade to advance our pursuit of happiness. We have a better chance for life if we have a minimum amount of war rather than a maximum, and a maximum amount of good police protection at home. We will have more individual liberty if we have a government of our own choosing than if we have one imposed upon us by foreigners. We will have a better chance

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## RESTRICTED

to pursue happiness if we can live in a condition of economic prosperity—we certainly want economic prosperity. Therefore, I think that we can further specify our national purposes as including political independence, minimum war, and maximum freedom to trade with ourselves and with others — for there can be no prosperity without trade.

The armed services would not need to come into the picture of national strategy making at all if there were no other armed services in the world working for political leaders with ideas which might cut across the American desire to enjoy “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” for Americans. Unfortunately, there are other armed forces in the world and some of them work for men (I don't know that I should say unfortunately, because if there were no others some of you people would have to look for other jobs which might be less congenial for you than the ones you have)—however, there are other armed forces and they work for men, some of whom conceive their purposes to be in conflict with those of the United States. Therefore, we civilians need and require the thinking of the armed forces in planning the maximum possible achievement of our national purposes. Not only reason, but also history, tells us all this.

✓ American military force was needed to gain us our independence, to conquer our continental territory, to preserve our unity, and to protect the boundaries within which we do business, operate our factories and do our trading. We would not have the world's biggest market for our goods inside our own borders if our armed services had not won and held our frontiers. So, as long as there are armed forces in the world and as long as some of them are employed by persons with real or imagined conflicts of interests with us — we need and require the advice of our armed forces in planning our national strategy.

**RESTRICTED**

✓ The question is how this influence should be exerted and what weight should be accorded to it? It would seem to me that the first assertion in order is that the military role should not be dominant any more than the political or economic should be dominant. If the politician were given total freedom to shape national policy in terms of his political problems, the end of our society might be swift and terrible.

I frequently remember an episode in my early career in Washington, in the House of Representatives, when a member of Congress, held in considerable esteem by his colleagues, stood up on the floor of the House one day to explain his vote on a bill then nearing passage (nearing the final vote) and he defined the creed of the demagogue. He said the creed of the demagogue is, "to vote for every appropriation, and against every tax bill." Now, it doesn't take much imagination to understand why that would be the creed of the political demagogue. A vote for an appropriation bill is always popular with some one — a vote for a tax bill is always unpopular with a number of people. So, if the legislator were to be guided only by his political interests and instincts, he would vote for every appropriation bill and against every tax bill, and the country would soon go bankrupt.

Then, if only the economist had power and he tried to decide our problems according to economic interests alone, we might come out with some strange forms of military power. It might be economically sound to increase our armed services, as sort of a make-work program, at a time when we had no foreign policy need for expansion of our armed forces. There could conceivably also be times when it would be economically good business to cut our armed forces at a moment when foreign policy dangers were at their peak. You couldn't possibly trust to economic thinking alone the making of national strategy any more than you could

**RESTRICTED**

35

## **RESTRICTED**

entrust it to the politician alone. But disaster could come equally from giving the military sole control over our national policy.

We have a recent danger here in the conflict between military and economic interests in the North Atlantic Council. The best judgment of the military leaders of the Standing Group of NATO for a defense program, which under examination was plainly beyond the economic capacity of several member states—particularly of the French. It became necessary at Lisbon to cut the targets for the defense of Europe below the levels estimated as essential by the military planners in order to be sure of having a Europe worth defending. The issue between the so-called Three Wise Men of Lisbon and the Military Standing Committee is, I suppose, one of the classic examples of conflict between military and economic interests. There can be no doubt that the military men who drew up the plans for NATO drew them up on the soundest and the best military basis possible. They applied what they knew of Russia's capabilities to the geography of Europe and came up with a decision as to the amount of military force that would be necessary to provide security for the West. They came up with an answer, however, which was at variance with the economic capacity of the West and there had to be a reconciliation, and what a frightful job of reconciling that controversy! Because, if you urge on the side of military strength you might destroy the economic base of your whole enterprise, and certainly an economically insolvent West neither can be defended nor would be worth defending. Conversely, if you weaken the military in the interests of the economic factor, you might lose the whole thing, too. You have an irreconcilable difference there and all you can do is split the difference, really — which is what they had to do. You don't know whether you came out right or wrong.

More recently the President has taken upon himself the responsibility, for political and economic reasons, for cutting the

**RESTRICTED**

Air Force expansion program below the figures recommended by the four members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously. At about the same time, the Congress was overruling the same Joint Chiefs of Staff on the matter of Universal Military Training. Our system of checks and balances operates in this open fashion, rather than in the British fashion of a merging of the various considerations involved in national strategy at earlier stages in the process.

We have compartmented our society; we have compartmented our government. We have drawn up such distinctions between the economist, the soldier, the politician, the diplomat, etc., that it is a terribly difficult, mechanical problem to see how you can ever fit them together and give them their respective proper weights. To my way of thinking, an important long-range program for treating the problem would involve less specialization, less compartmentation, and the breeding of men more broadly grounded in points of view.

George Washington was a civilian, a soldier, a legislator, a merchant and an executive. He was typical of the leaders of his century. We do not go in for breeding that type of man any more. Henry L. Stimson is the last great American, I can think of off-hand, of that breed. Today, we do put our emphasis on specialists — and by so doing impose upon ourselves the necessity of working out complex formulae, under which the specialists will balance each other. Of course, it does not lie within your competence, or mine, to reverse this condition.

America, today, is a nation of specialists and what you really want to know today is the amount of influence which you, as military specialists, should properly have in the equation — and how much better you can exercise it. That I can not really tell you, except in the most general terms. I do know that if you reach for a degree of power which frightens the others, you will in the

**RESTRICTED**

37

## **RESTRICTED**

end reduce your own influence. I do know that every time you ask for more money than you can use (as sometimes you do), you weaken your case the next time you go to Congress. I do know that every time you over-advertise a new weapon, you reduce public confidence in your judgment. I do know that every time you overstress the danger of war, you reduce your ability to convince the public of the danger when it becomes real. I do know that every time you conceal your own uncertainty behind a bold front of "I know best," either in Congress or in inner government councils, you weaken your long-range influence in those places.

Personally, I would incline to think that too much emphasis is placed on machinery of coordination — and too little upon the caliber of men. Suppose that I had the capacity to work out the precise weight which should be accorded the armed services in the making of national strategy vis-a-vis the other elements involved. Suppose, also, that I could devise the perfect machinery for bringing your views into coordination with those of the diplomats, the politicians, the economists, the civilians, the merchants, the psychologists, the intelligence analysts and the industrialists. I still could not guarantee to you your right degree of influence if you send General Grows into those councils instead of General Marshalls or Admiral Shermans. But, on the other hand, if the armed forces came before the Congress and the people consisting of only Marshalls and Shermans, you would immediately enjoy an unfair advantage over the other agencies of government. No formula that you work out will work, because the effectiveness of any formula depends upon the caliber of the men involved in it. If you worked out the perfect formula given the precise men who are in these various positions of responsibility in Washington today and then you have a change, the weight that you have given — let's say the economist — is going to go up or down and get out of balance if the man you put in his place is stronger or weaker than his predecessor.

**RESTRICTED**

I don't think any one in his right mind can tell you precisely what is the role of the armed forces in the making of national strategy. We all know that you have a role — and an extremely important one. It has been recognized officially by act of Congress. Your voice is strong in every stage of the making of national policy. Conceivably at the moment it is a little too strong. Certainly it has gained so much strength in the past generation of American history that it has aroused resistance. There is, of course, a frightful problem inherent in the importance of military thinking in the making of national strategy. The world is so complex and the making of war is so complex, and it has such a bearing on every political and diplomatic decision, that in Washington today the military must be consulted about all kinds of things which don't seem to have direct bearing upon military planning. The result is that the military is in councils where the other elements of government were not accustomed to finding it. Military interests begin to have a bearing on such great political issues as the relationship between the Chief Executive and General MacArthur. The people on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and at the head of the three service departments in Washington have done their utmost, in my opinion, to preserve the old policy of "keeping out of politics." And yet, today, many leaders of our armed services are directly involved in domestic politics to a degree that we have not known in American history since the days of General McClellan and the Civil War.

How many of our military figures are involved currently? General Eisenhower is a candidate. General MacArthur is probably a candidate — he is not openly a candidate, but there doesn't seem to be much doubt he would be willing "if the lightning should strike," General Wedemeyer has been put up for political office. Admiral Denfeld came out for Taft the other day. The position a member of the military services takes in political matters has

**RESTRICTED****39**



## RESTRICTED

become new, has become important. It is a manifestation of the fact that it is not possible for any great issues of the day to be decided without consulting you. How you can play your role in the making of strategy without becoming involved in domestic politics is a very serious question. I don't know that it is possible.

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the President's decision and dismissed General MacArthur, they acted upon their own military judgment and for military reasons. They did not desire to embarrass the Republican Party or support the Democratic Party — that was the least of their interests. Nevertheless, when they took a position on military ground involving an issue between the President of the United States and the Supreme Commander in the Far East, they did inevitably inject themselves into a domestic political equation. And, one inevitable result was Senator Taft, a leading contender for the Republican nomination, saying that he had lost confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A corollary of that was his subsequent statement that if he became President, he would consult General MacArthur. It was said in such a context that it seems fairly clear that if Taft did become President, the existing members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would all have their resignations accepted at once and you would have a very substantial turnover in authority in the armed services. This is a terribly dangerous tendency because if it were not checked, if it progressed in the direction that it seems to be moving now, every one of you would have to take sides — you would have to be Democratic Admirals or Republican Admirals — and your chances for promotion would depend upon whether you picked the right party. And then your armed services would be torn not only between Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps — but between Republican Army, Navy, etc., *versus* Democratic Army, Navy, etc. You would have an eight-way split instead of a four-way split. That is very serious. It is terribly amusing and also deadly dangerous, too. Yet, I don't know how it is going to be avoided.

**RESTRICTED**

At the present moment the most influential, single man in Washington today, I believe, is General Omar Bradley. The President does not make a single decision with any remote national strategy implications without consulting General Bradley. It is terribly important that he consult him. And yet when you have that situation — when the President consults the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff more frequently on more issues of national policy than he consults probably any other one individual in government in Washington — the armed services are being drawn into politics. If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were given more power than he has today (which at one time was advocated), my mind is incapable of encompassing the implications. You have in General Bradley today a military man with more direct influence than any military man, I suppose, has ever exercised in the history of our country.

In Lincoln's day, in the Civil War, he had the equivalent of a Chief of Staff. He had Scott at first and then old Halleck. Then, finally, he put his reliance primarily in Grant. I don't believe that any one of those men had the equivalent influence on the President that Bradley has today. Part of it is, of course, the difference in caliber between Lincoln and Truman. There you come again to my point that you can't take a sheet of paper and draw out a formula for giving the military its role, because a General Bradley is going to have far more influence over a Truman than he would have over a Lincoln. It is the personal, the human equation that counts there. If he were not a man — General Bradley — of very great restraint, the situation would be far more explosive than it already is. It is already so explosive, as I have said, that you have Taft coming out and making that statement that he had lost confidence, which of course is partly for political purposes. The prime motive behind a statement like that, during an election campaign, is to attract support. It was an invitation to a very large number of

**RESTRICTED**

## **RESTRICTED**

people in this country who had rather see MacArthur as President than any other one living individual—and there are quite a lot of them. Taft was bidding for the MacArthur vote when he did that. But there you are — you're in this thing.

At least your voice at the moment is so strong and so obvious that criticism of it has developed. I think that at the moment you are a trifle too conspicuous for your own good. I wouldn't know how to tell you to become less conspicuous, though. Adjustment can not be made by any formula or any tinkering with the machinery. The machinery itself isn't too bad — but it will function according to the balance, wisdom and restraint of the men who operate it, and in it. It would be easier for the military if someone from the outside could draw up a perfect table of organization. That would relieve you of the problem of breeding better and wiser soldiers, sailors and airmen. The machinery will work better, I think, as you of the armed services recognize that you are specialists; that you are only specialists, although extremely important ones; that an alliance perfected by diplomats might be worth many divisions and that, therefore, the diplomat should be considered; that the tax expert and the economist may have considerations equal and perhaps outweighing some of yours; and, finally, that the wiser you are as individuals, the more persuasively you will be able to present your point of view.

I think that my conclusion, if I have any, is that this problem like all problems cannot be solved suddenly by any one magic formula. We love in America to find a sovereign panacea. We've been hunting for Carter's Little Liver Pills and Lydia Pinkham's Compound and Indian Medicine. The amount of that stuff we buy every year, if you take the trouble to find out, is an extremely interesting commentary on that basic, unshakeable faith of the American that around the next corner of the shelf in the drugstore he is

**RESTRICTED**

going to find the remedy that is going to solve all his ills. What we haven't as a nation, yet adjusted ourselves to is the fact that more frequently we outlive problems than solve problems. I don't think there is any possible solution, any perfect solution to your problem of what weight you have in this matter of making national strategy and all the various and detailed phases of it, because it is not just a question of relationship between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Congressional Appropriations Committee — that is the highest level of the issue. I don't suppose you face that problem very much when you are on the deck of your ship, on the bridge of your ship. But you certainly face it if you go into any of the many other activities which military officers go into now — military attaches and diplomatic missions attached to these mutual security administrations, missions overseas where you sit with people from the Treasury, from MSA, the State Department and all the rest and try to work out a sound strategy for American aid to Greece.

I can give you several horrid examples of things that you can avoid. I was on a tour of the Mutual Aid countries just a couple of months ago. I remember one place (I will not out of charity specify — I could give you examples where the story was the other way) where a group of us came in; we were a group of traveling editors and newspapermen. We faced the lineup of the American Mission there. It is frightening to go overseas and find out how many departments our Missions have now. As I recall there were 20 Americans facing us. One was the Ambassador, but that was only the beginning. Then there was the head of Mutual Security, head of ECA, Treasury, Agriculture — goodness gracious, I can't remember. I'm frightened by the number of people we have to send to each one of these overseas posts. At that particular place, the head of the Military Mission spent the entire time at his dis-

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posal showing his chart of organization and justifying each man on his staff — as though we were Congressional Appropriations Committees. We didn't care, we didn't give a hoot how many people he had on his staff and what each one was doing in his office every day. We were interested in knowing the results he was achieving — how many divisions was he being able to mobilize in that particular country and how good were they? He just wasn't bright enough to know what he should be doing there — he had other jobs more important than distending his table of organization to some visiting editors. That is one horrible example not by any means typical, as you well know. I'm not drawing up an indictment of the military — I'm just pointing out one or two places of things you know as well as I do you could avoid.

I had an experience with a military attache in another place once, which was even worse than the previous one. He was a military attache sent to one of the countries of Southeastern Europe. When he arrived, presumably having been thoroughly briefed in both the Pentagon and the State Department, they gave him a little further briefing. They were talking at one point about the problems of Austria. In the briefing the word "Trizonia" was mentioned. "Trizonia, what is Trizonia? Is that just south of Albania?" he asked. He didn't know that Trizonia was just a way of defining the three zones of the Western Allied Occupation in Germany. He thought it was a country. There were three things that he didn't know and that was the first one. The other two were even worse, but I can't remember them—it was fabulous. The Ambassador had to ask him to be taken back to Washington right away. Those are things to avoid in — what are we talking about? We're talking about public relations. In so far as you improve your public relations by avoiding that kind of unfortunate thing, you will exercise your role in the making of strategy more effectively. You will

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do that when you have more men with the kind of background of experience that you are acquiring right here.

Really what I'm trying to tell you is that the Naval War College is a good thing, and there ought to be more of it I believe. Thank you!

**RESTRICTED**

**45**

## RESTRICTED

### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER

Mr. Joseph C. Harsch was born in Toledo, Ohio, May 25, 1905.

He was educated at Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts, where he received a B.A. degree in 1927. He also holds an honorary M.A. degree from Williams. He attended Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University, England, where he received a B.A. degree in 1929.

After graduating from Cambridge he began his newspaper career by joining *The Christian Science Monitor* in 1929. He has written consistently for *The Monitor* ever since.

As a foreign correspondent, he was in Berlin from 1939 until January, 1941, when he returned to the States. He had also served as a *Monitor* correspondent in London, Paris and Rome. His experiences in Germany were recorded in a book entitled, "Pattern of Conquest," published by Doubleday in the summer of 1941.

In addition to his *Monitor* writing, he served briefly at the beginning of the war as Assistant Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees. He covered the Louisiana maneuvers and was in Honolulu at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, after which he went to the South Pacific, New Zealand, Australia and Java.

Returning to the United States from the Pacific theatre, he began broadcasting as a news commentator for the Columbia Broadcasting System, in addition to *Monitor* writing, (1943 until the spring of 1949).

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In 1945 he returned to Europe as a war correspondent and was in Europe again in 1947 and 1949. His observations on Eastern Europe are incorporated in a book entitled, "The Curtain Isn't Iron," Doubleday, May, 1950.

He is an occasional broadcaster for the British Broadcasting Corporation.

From August 1949-August 1951, he was Chief of the Washington News Bureau of *The Christian Science Monitor*. Currently, he is special correspondent for *The Christian Science Monitor*.

Beginning April 1, 1951, three times weekly, Mr. Harsch presents news analysis "Meaning of the News" over Liberty Broadcasting System.

**RESTRICTED**

47