

1952

Introductory Remarks and Welcome by the President to the Participants of the Global Strategy Discussions

Richard L. Conolly
U.S. Navy

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Conolly, Richard L. (1952) "Introductory Remarks and Welcome by the President to the Participants of the Global Strategy Discussions," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 5 : No. 7 , Article 3.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol5/iss7/3>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

RESTRICTED

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND WELCOME

By The President,
VICE ADMIRAL RICHARD L. CONOLLY, U. S. N.

To Participants in
The Naval War College
Fourth Annual Session
of the
GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS
9 June 1952

Permit me to extend to you officially a warm welcome to the Naval War College and a cordial invitation to participate in the Fourth Annual Session of our Global Strategy Discussions.

I would like to give you some idea of the composition of the group which is assembled here for these discussions:

First, the staff of the Naval War College and the students of our several classes, which are as follows: The Strategy and Tactics Class, the Strategy and Logistics Class, the Command and Staff Class, and a small group of five officers who are pursuing an Advanced Course of Study here.

Secondly, a group of representatives from the various Service schools and colleges:

U. S. Merchant Marine Academy
National War College
U. S. Coast Guard Academy
Armed Forces Staff College
Marine Corps School
U. S. Naval Academy
U. S. Military Academy

RESTRICTED

7

RESTRICTED

**Air University and the Air War College
Command and General Staff College
Army War College
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Naval Intelligence School**

Thirdly, a group of Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve officers who have been selected for two weeks' active duty here at the War College from all of our Naval districts. These number 76 in all.

Fourthly, a group of about forty civilians who have been chosen from as many different phases of our national life as possible, each of whom is eminent in his own field and all of whom are highly respected, loyal and patriotic citizens of the United States. We are fortunate indeed to have these distinguished men come here to help us.

With regard to security of the discussions I request that you all respect our confidence, maintain inviolate the classification of papers and other information of a classified nature made available to you here and particularly that no statements of any participant be discussed outside nor attributed publicly to the author. Only by observing these restrictions can we hope to have free discussion in our meetings. All of the officers of our regular establishment are cleared for secret classification or above; all of the reserve officers and the civilian participants are cleared for secret information necessary for participation in the discussions. I mention this for the purpose of inspiring mutual trust and confidence between us.

The four groups that I have mentioned will be more or less evenly distributed and integrated into our twenty-three seminar groups. The fourth category, the civilians, may perhaps feel them-

RESTRICTED

selves confronted with an overwhelming representation of what has become to be known as "the military mind." I would like to alleviate apprehension on this score, at least to some degree, by assuring them most seriously that here at the Naval War College, and in fact at every one of our Service educational institutions, a very earnest attempt is being made to broaden the military mind by contact in an increasing degree with civilian influences. In regard to the Reserve officer group, although they served with us for a period of years during the late war, they have all had an opportunity since being released from active duty with the Services to undergo an emancipation and a purifying process, which some might call "demilitarization." Although they have been here already a week, I am confident that they have not been reinfected in that short time.

I am going to give you a little background for these discussions. Our students during the course of the year undertake to solve a series of operational problems of gradually increasing military complexity and expanding geographical scope. Operations Problem 9 reaches the ambitious and all-embracing size that requires for its solution a global strategic concept. This must confine itself to formulating a military strategy, although in that effort we must give proper consideration and due weight to the many other factors that affect a successful military strategy and, above all, we must shape the strategy so as to attain our national objectives. Our concept must produce an integrated allied war strategy. Inasmuch as there has not been a formal presentation as to what our national objectives actually are, we must begin by postulating a set which can be used as a basis for evolving the strategy calculated to achieve these objectives. Our military strategy will be considerably affected by many factors, such as: (a) the financial and economic capabilities of the United States and her allies to provide the resources for conducting such a war, (b) the political factors, (c) psychological and

RESTRICTED

9

RESTRICTED

ideological factors, and so on. While we must properly assess these and their effects, due to limitations of time we cannot enter too deeply into a detailed discussion of each or any of these subjects which, for our purposes, we must consider as collateral and supplementary to our main and central theme, a military strategy.

In undertaking a study of this kind, in order to arrive at a strategic concept that will outline realistic planned action in definite geographical spheres, we must progress from the general to the more specific and from the abstract to the concrete. We must progress from policy to objectives and thence to the strategic considerations and, finally, evolve a strategic concept. I believe that you would do well to subject your final decisions, in arriving at this strategic concept, to some such test of suitability, feasibility and acceptability, as you can find outlined in our War College publication "Sound Military Decision."

As you proceed you will be dependent upon your own fund of information concerning allied strength, ready or potential, early and as the war progresses, and, similarly, upon knowledge of the enemy's strength, which may have become public knowledge or has become known to you either through special sources or as intelligence which can be made available to you here. Otherwise, where unknown factors must be used as a basis for decisions, *assumptions* must be made, but they should be noted as qualifications of your decisions.

Among the many concepts that will appear, I hope that consideration will be given to a global strategy that is not confined to any one geographical area ignoring and forsaking all others, but a strategy that is really global, not one for Eastern Asia *vs* Western Europe or vice versa, nor one that is merely Eastern Asia *and* West-

RESTRICTED

ern Europe, but one that takes into its consideration the military action that would be or might be required anywhere around the whole globe.

It seems apparent that any global war would be preceded by a prolonged period of the cold war. Perhaps there might be included in this period a long series of minor limited local wars. We hope not. This preliminary period would unquestionably have considerable influence upon the character of the ensuing all-embracing conflict and upon the setting and situation in which it is started. It is important that we estimate what the possible effects of this process will be and what will be the effects of a shifting ratio of relative ready fighting strength and even of relative total military potentials.

In the next three years we may justifiably foresee many far-reaching and significant changes in the political, economic, and strategic strength factors of the Western Allies. Most vital to this augmentation of total allied strength will be the increase in the strength of the Armed Forces and the total warmaking potential of the United States itself, for this is the base of the whole structure.

During this period our economic and military aid to the NATO nations, particularly in continental Europe, will, if they are as successful as we expect, have achieved a tremendous build-up of the capability to resist invasion. The ground and air forces of NATO on the continent will probably always require an increment of United States strength, together with a continued flow of material support to stiffen and nourish them. Nevertheless, as the combined strength of the Western European Armies grows, our commitment to them relative to our increased total force, can be lessened. In determining our strategy for the future, this opens up whole new vistas. I believe that we should look forward to employing on a

RESTRICTED

global scale the advantage that sea power gives to us in exercising the strategic initiative wherever it is advantageous for us to attack, whether it be by bombardment, by raid, by expeditions of limited scope with limited objectives, or by movement of massive forces which can invade and occupy strategic positions vital to an enemy in any further prosecution of the war.

Although I will not attempt to forecast the character and the nature of the strategy of the next war, I would venture several prognostications as to what it will not be. It will not be shaped for the purpose of employing any single weapon or any single weapons system. It will not be a single front war. On the contrary, I believe that it will be global in scope and that it will employ all the energy, skill and genius of the entire American people and the allies of the United States, that it will employ every resource of all three of our Services.

Now let us fall to and proceed with the work at hand! Let there be light without heat but let the chips fall where they may!



OFFICER STUDENTS OF THE U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE met in a Series of Discussions, the Global Strategy Discussions, at the Naval War College, Newport, R. I., 9-13 June 1952. Joining the Officers in a Scholarly Investigation of the Aims and Strategies of the United States and its Allies in the Event of Global War, were a Group of Prominent Civilians, Leading Flag and General Officers of the Armed Forces, other Senior Officers of the Services, and Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Officers. Shown in Committee Meeting are: L to R (Back to Camera). Capt R. L. MORRIS, USN; Cdr A. PRATT, USNR; Capt R. A. THEOBALD, Jr., USN; Lt Cdr N. C. WOODWARD, USN; LCol J. H. FRANKLIN, Jr., USMCR; Cdr C. W. FIELDER, USN; Cdr F. M. Lamkin (SC) USN; Bishop Granville G. BENNETT; Mr. Thomas H. KUCHEL; Cdr H. H. LARSEN, USN; Cdr C. E. KING, USN; and Vice Admiral J. J. BALLENTINE, USN.

RESTRICTED

AMERICAN OBJECTIVES

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

by

Dr. William L. Langer

Admiral Conolly, members and guests of the Naval War College; This institution has always been a center for the study of strategy and of the policies on which strategy must be based. One of its early Presidents, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, was recognized in his own day, as he is in ours, as among the most original, brilliant and stimulating thinkers of modern times. Mahan rested his doctrine on the teachings of history. He saw things in the large and therefore reviewed strategy in the broad setting of politics and economics. Furthermore, he was no cloistered student. For a quarter of a century he threw himself into the political fray as a publicist and teacher. It is altogether fitting, therefore, that in the present critical days the Naval War College should not only continue the broad studies of strategy and policy which he inaugurated, but should call in men from private life to join in its discussions and share in its problems. I am happy and I am honored to be asked to contribute, even in a limited way, to your deliberations. The subject of my address this morning is "American Objectives."

RESTRICTED

13