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The Higher Direction of the War

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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THE HIGHER DIRECTION OF THE WAR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 10 April 1952 by
Mr. Chester Wilmot

Admiral Conolly, Gentlemen:

In about an hour from now you may think that "warning" was the right term—but whether you feel that or not, I hope that you will feel quite free to take your revenge upon me by making your questions as frank and as forthright as you like. What I want to do this afternoon is to consider some aspects of, as the title says: "The Higher Direction of the War." Inimitably, that will involve me in some analysis of certain aspects of Anglo-American policy during the war and in what I hope is a fairly frank examination of the Anglo-American Alliance.

That alliance is the very foundation of our foreign policy. I believe that one of its great sources of strength is the fact that during the war and now the senior officers as well as the political leaders, working on common grounds and common projects, were able to speak frankly to each other; that there were "no holds barred." In the arguments of the Combined Chiefs of Staff very often the division was not upon national lines at all, but on service lines; the airmen and the naval men thinking one way and the soldiers thinking another—regardless of nationality. One aspect of the enemy side of the war that strikes one most forcibly, when one examines the German and Italian records, is that there was no such frankness, no such give and take, no such exchange of information, no common planning, no real concentration, no working together in the sense that we understood it. Maybe that is one of the primary reasons why we were able to

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defeat the so-called "Pact of Steel," yet the Axis Powers appeared to represent a solid and cohesive alliance to the world at the time.

As I say, I want to feel free to be fairly frank and I hope that you will feel equally free when it comes to question time.

On one occasion when I was speaking on much the same subject as this to the R. A. F. Staff College at Braeknell, there was an American Air Force colonel in the audience. When I had finished and came to questions, he got up and said: "Sir, if so many mistakes were made, how come we won the Goddamn thing?"

Now that, I think, tends to miss the point because while we are not worried at all that we won the Goddam thing militarily, we seem to have a Goddamn mess on our hands now. Whether or not that is due to the policy pursued in the war is, of course, open to argument. But I think we do need to reexamine the strategy and diplomacy of the war period to see whether there were not some decisions which contributed to the present situation.

It is on this basis that I want to review the higher planning and direction of the Second World War with particular reference to Europe—not for the purpose of placing praise here, or blame there, but merely from the point of view of examining the policies and judging them by their consequences. That is the only way you can judge a policy. What we have to do now, at this distance in history, is to take the decisions, to take the information available at the time—and then take the information which we have got now. We must examine both the straight concrete results (which we can all discern for ourselves) and the evidence that comes from enemy sources or from our own side about what the *real* situation was at the time and try, as I say, to measure our policies by their consequences. This is not a question

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of mere hindsight; it's a question of reexamining its circumstances in which its critical decisions were made, and of discovering that there were some people who were right *at the time*, some people who were wise *before the event*—and some people who were not. So, with that background, I would like to turn to the general development of the theme that I want to put to you.

It seems to me that in the higher direction of any war there are two very broad factors: On the one hand, there is the mobilization of the nation's human and material resources for military purposes and, on the other, there is the application of those military resources for the political purpose for which the war is fought—in other words, for the purpose of bringing about a more stable peace and a more satisfactory world in which we live.

If we take these problems—on the one hand mobilization of resources and, on the other, the application of those resources to secure our object in the war—I think that we come to this conclusion: In the mobilization of our resources the Western Powers were incomparably more efficient either than the Axis Powers or the Russians. On nearly all the major technical and scientific and production issues, we solved the problems—and we solved them in pretty good time. It is true that even at the end of the war we didn't have a tank that was as good as the German or the Russian tank, but there are very few other items of equipment in which we failed to produce what was needed for the job, and we managed to produce them in the necessary numbers.

We did solve this problem of "mobilization." In Britain we were able to call upon our people for a degree of effort in relation to the war that the Germans never even begun to demand. For instance, women were mobilized for war work in England in 1941. There was no such mobilization in Germany until the latter

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part of 1943 and then it wasn't severely applied. But, as I say, whether it was a matter of organizing our forces and mobilizing our manpower or of solving great scientific problems, whether in relation to radar, aircraft, or the atom bomb, on those grounds our records stand very high and stands the test of examination in the light of victory. By contrast with this, we find that the really great weakness, the great failure of the Germans was that Hitler did not in the early years of the war (when he was triumphant) expand his industrial capacity to sustain his strategic responsibilities.

In 1940-41-42, there was no marked expansion in German war production. In fact, one of the most extraordinary things that emerges from the enemy records is that production in Britain alone of the major categories of arms, munitions, and aircraft (regardless of production here) was greater than the production in Germany through 1940-41-42 and until July, 1943. That's why I say that one of the great Axis failures was their failure in the realm of mobilizing their resources. But when it came to applying these resources in the field, while we gained great victories, I think that the historian inevitably comes to the conclusion that we lost sight of the purposes for which we were fighting the war. We forgot, for instance, that when the war ended there would be the possibility that one power or another would replace Germany as the dominant force on the continent.

What I want to inquire into this afternoon is really this: How was it that in the process of liberating Western Europe and defeating Nazi Germany, we allowed Soviet Russia to get control of Eastern Europe and to prevent us creating in Europe the kind of peace for which we had fought? If we had to put the answer to that question in one sentence—or a little more—I think one would say this: Throughout the war Stalin kept his political ob-

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jectives always right in the very forefront of his thinking and we did not. When he was determining strategic issues, they were determined in their relationship to his post-war political objectives. When we were planning, we very seldom took account of post-war political objectives. I think that it is fair to say that on this side of the Atlantic your planners were reluctant to take account even of what you might call "tactical political factors" in relation to a particular strategic plan.

Only the other day I had a letter from a colonel who was on the staff of Field Marshal Sir John Dill, who was head of the British Staff Mission in Washington during the war. This letter happened to reach me here and it struck me as being particularly relevant to the point that I want to make. This colonel, a Colonel Davison, was a member of the Combined Planners working for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He says: "It was always a rather uncomfortable experience to discuss strategy with the United States' planners because one knew that they were shutting their minds to the political aspects of the problems. Indeed, it wasn't easy to get them to look at the political aspects of intelligence questions, as you will see if you look at the Combined Intelligence Committee papers."

What Colonel Davison wrote is a fair expression of the British view. The British Chiefs of Staff felt that in evaluating strategic situations your people had forgotten the dictum of your own Admiral Mahan, who said, you will remember: "The strategist is he who always keeps the objective of the war in sight and the objective of the war is never military and is always political."

To elaborate that a little more, before President Roosevelt went to the Casablanca Conference, he discussed the unconditional surrender formula with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he did not dis-

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cuss it with the State Department. When he went to Casablanca, he refused to take with him his own Secretary of State and insisted that Churchill should not bring Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary.

When Roosevelt went to Cairo, on his way to Teheran for discussions with Chiang Kai-shek, he refused to take with him a Far Eastern expert from the State Department. Maybe some of you think that it is a good idea to leave your State Department people behind in view of certain criticisms that have occurred. But the point is that the President tried to insist, in the higher direction of the war, that he was dealing with military problems that were no concern of his Secretary of State.

Before Pearl Harbor, Cordell Hull attended the meetings of the War Council in Washington. After Pearl Harbor, he was never invited to attend and no representative of the State Department was present at those meetings. Also, no representative of the State Department used to attend the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This separation between the military and the political is rather built into your system, but I do think it is a matter to which one has got to turn one's mind frankly and critically, because it appears (at any rate, to the observer from outside) that some of the points at which our wartime policy miscarried was due to the fact that there was no relationship between military strategy and the ultimate political purpose.

The supreme example of this is the case of the discussions between Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta regarding the entry of Russia into the Japanese War. Those discussions were conducted by Roosevelt and Stalin alone, without the benefit of any advisers except Molotov and Averell Harriman, your Ambassador in Moscow. When the conference began, Roosevelt sent his Secretary of State

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(Stettinius) out of the room on the grounds that the discussions were going to be purely military and not political. They were so purely military that what was agreed to on that occasion was that Russia should dominate Outer Mongolia, that Russia should dominate Manchuria, that Russia should have the Kuriles, and that Russia should have Southern Sakhalin—and there were no detailed military discussions at all.

Stalin, on the other hand, not only at the big conference but right through, whether he was dealing with Roosevelt or Churchill or Hitler, kept his eye on his political objective. In November, 1940, Molotov came to Berlin to discuss with Hitler what Hitler called "the partition of the bankrupt British Empire." This was five months after the German victory in France and five months after the Russians, in order to protect themselves by building up a *cordon sanitaire* in Eastern Europe, had taken over not only Eastern Poland (which, of course, they had got at the time of the Non-Aggression Pact), but had also taken over Northern Roumania and the little Baltic States.

The issue really, as put by Ribbentrop and Hitler to Molotov was this—they invited Russia to participate in the partition of the Colonial territories of the world, a partition between Germany, Italy, Russia and Japan. They suggested that in order to avoid conflicts between them, in the process of dividing the spoils, they should each direct their expansion efforts southward—as Ribbentrop said, "southward towards the sea."

Molotov paused, and said: "Which sea?"

Ribbentrop said: "The Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf."

Molotov replied in effect: "No! The Black Sea and the exit into the Mediterranean."

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It was on this issue that they broke. What Russia said in effect was—that they must have control over Bulgaria, balancing Germany's control over Roumania; that they must have the exits from the Black Sea through the Dardanelles. In other words, they must have a share in the management and control of the Balkans.

So far as Hitler was concerned, of course, Russia in control of Bulgaria and the Dardanelles would have stood between Germany and the oil of the Middle East which Hitler had to have if he was to carry out a sustained naval and air campaign against the British Isles. So, on this issue they broke.

The significant thing, however, is that Stalin did in fact agree to accept Hitler's plan for a four-power partition of the world, having made that condition about the Dardanelles and having made one other which is worth remembering now, because he said he would join its pact "provided that the areas south of the Caucasus in the direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." We know this now because we have got all the documents recording these discussions. Here you see Stalin's concentration all the time on safeguarding not Communist political objectives, but traditional Russian political objectives—the objectives of the Romanovs. The Czarist objectives are the direct forebears of the Kremlin objectives of today.

As we know, Hitler gained an early and striking success in Russia, as he had in the west. By December 4, 1941, the Germans were on the outskirts of Moscow. They were actually fighting in the suburbs. That night there was a dinner in the Kremlin. The guest of honor was Marshal Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister. From one of Sikorski's colleagues we know that at the height of the dinner when Sikorski thought he had found

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some mellowness in the man, Stalin turned to him and said: "And now we will discuss the post-war frontier between Poland and Russia." There, with the Germans in the streets of Moscow, this same concentration on the political objective.

A fortnight later, when Eden went to Moscow, he was confronted then and there with the demand that we in the West (Britain and the United States) should recognize Russia's claim to the territories she had acquired as a result of the Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler; namely, the little Balkan States, Eastern Poland and Northern Roumania.

At that stage, the President stood firm. Churchill was inclined to recognize these territorial gains because he feared that Russia would make a separate peace. But the President then took a stand which he endeavored to maintain until Yalta; namely, that he would make no territorial agreements affecting the post-war situation. In other words, he would make military arrangements with the Russians but he would make no political commitment since it would prevent him having a free hand after the war. That is one thing; it is quite another to disregard altogether your political considerations in determining your strategy.

The point I want to get at is this—in judging these events by their consequences one does see an enormous, relentless pattern unfolding, one thing seems to lead irrevocably to another. It is for this reason that I want to take you through what one might call an historical analysis of the development of Anglo-American policy from this point on, when we refused—and rightly refused—to recognize Russia's post-war political objectives as then stated.

Following this refusal on our part to recognize these territorial plans, Stalin changed his tactics. He made no further political

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demands until late in 1944. In fact, when Churchill tried to draw him out at Teheran at a dinner, Stalin said: "There is no need to speak now about Soviet desires, but when the time comes, we will speak." That time would not come until Russia was in actual or virtual possession of the territories which she wanted to acquire.

After this rebuff, Stalin pressed and pressed vehemently for the opening of a Second Front in 1942. Molotov came to Washington and in discussion with General Marshall and President Roosevelt secured an assurance that the Western Allies were planning to start a Second Front in France that year. Having got this assurance, Molotov proceeded to embody it in a public communique which General Marshall in particular was most reluctant to sign and to endorse. But the President felt that because of the danger of a separate peace and because of his refusal to recognize Russia's territorial demands, this Second Front promise had to be given publicly. Churchill went along with that promise, although in private he gave Molotov an *Aide-Memoire* in which he directly disassociated the British government from it.

Well, as you know, in that year we eventually came to the conclusion that there could be no cross-Channel attack. At the time, General Eisenhower thought that that was a grave mistake, but he subsequently conceded that it would have been fatal to have gone across the Channel that year. We went, instead, to Africa. But the President continued to be haunted, I believe, by this Second Front promise—it lay uneasily on his conscience and I believe that it was this which led primarily to the issuing of the demand for unconditional surrender. Incidentally, this illustrates the point I want to make about one act of policy leading to another. At the time one doesn't see the relationship between them, but in the light of history I think one sees the conjunction extraordinary clearly.

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The unconditional surrender demand was, I am sure (having talked to a good many of the people who were at Casablanca), designed as an assurance to the Russians that although we had not opened the Second Front in 1942 and could not open a Second Front in 1943—yet, we would not make a separate peace with Hitler, we would not come to terms.

At the time (as I mentioned earlier), the political implications of this decision had not been considered in relation to Germany, nor had the military implications been considered. There was no discussion by the experts in psychological warfare of the possible effect upon the German people or the German armed forces. It was regarded at the time as a rallying cry, a clarion call to the United Nations to rally for victory. And, above all, it was an assurance to Stalin that we would not make a separate peace.

The consequences of this were, in military and political terms, very much greater I think than anybody anticipated at the time. Yet, if we look at it logically I fear we must come to the conclusion that once we had demanded unconditional surrender, we were proclaiming our determination to carry the war against Germany and the other enemy countries beyond the point of military victory to the point of political disintegration—to the point where the enemy's state would collapse.

So far as the German people were concerned this, I believe, bound them body and soul to Hitler because what they dreaded above all else was the complete breakdown of government and the spread of anarchy throughout their country. Therefore, they felt they had no alternative but to go on fighting until the Nazi government was replaced by Allied military government.

The other aspect is this (and I think that this in retro-

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spect must be considered even more important): once we had said, "We're going to fight to the finish," we said in effect that the war in Europe would not end until the Western armies and the Russian armies met in the centre of Europe. It meant, too, that because unconditional surrender would have to be enforced, there would have to be armies of occupation and that the Russians, having advanced deep into Europe, would have every reason for staying there. Moreover, it meant their maintaining in the satellite countries garrison forces to protect supply lines. Thus the Russians obtained a legal justification for having troops in Eastern Europe to control what are now the satellite countries.

I don't say for a moment that all these possibilities should have been foreseen, or necessarily could have been foreseen. I do think that one is drawn to the conclusion that this is what unconditional surrender means, if you demand it. It may be a warning that it is unwise to demand it in the future and that it is unwise to carry on one's diplomacy under the basis of demanding the unconditional surrender of your adversary in negotiations.

After the Casablanca Conference, since the war would not end until the Allied armies met in the middle of Europe, the question so far as the post-war world was concerned was: "Where will the meeting place be? How far west will the Russian armies come before the Germans finally collapse?"

As far as we were concerned, the issue was—by which route would our forces come? To a certain extent this issue had already been decided at the start of 1942. Then, as you remember, the President, the Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff had proclaimed the doctrine of defeating Hitler first and waging a holding campaign in the Pacific. That was followed up in April of 1942 by an agreement in London (at the time of a visit by

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Harry Hopkins and General Marshall) that the final blow against Germany must be struck across the Channel, over the plains of Western Europe, and into the heart of Germany.

The cross-Channel invasion becomes the basic agreed policy, the ultimate move by which we are going to apply the major part of the forces in Europe. It was the British view (and I think it was the American view, too) that it would be fatal to attempt that invasion unless you were certain that it would succeed—that the only way we could lose the war in Europe was to invade and fail, or else to have the situation on the invasion beaches reduced to a stalemate.

The issue really between the British planners and the American planners was, I think, this: How is the success of that invasion to be insured? At the risk of over-simplification, I think that it is fair to say that your view was: if the enemy has such and such a force available to resist us on the beaches, we must meet that challenge by building up in Britain "such and such a force *plus*." The British view was: instead of trying, as it were, to out-produce the enemy and to defeat him by mass, to out-manuever him; that instead of, as I say, trying to build up such and such *plus* in England, we should endeavor to weaken the enemy in France by distracting him down into the Mediterranean and compelling him to disperse his forces, until he had in the West "such and such a force *minus*." Then we would have relative superiority without amassing such a vast force as would be needed under the proposals put forward by General Marshall. In other words, as I say, instead of trying to out-produce the enemy—you would endeavor to out-manuever him. You would draw his forces away from France, down into Southern Europe, expose the southern flank before assaulting the Western Front—instead of concentrating on building up an overwhelming power against the Western Front itself.

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To a certain extent, this difference of opinion goes to the very root of the difference between British and American thinking. You are a people with a surplus; certainly with a productive capacity to solve problems of this kind by sheer production, by delivering the goods. You have shown it again and again in relation to your own physical problems. I think that in relation to war you think along much the same lines—how much will it cost? How much do we have to produce to do the job? Give us a firm date by which it can be done. I don't think that that is an oversimplification because it comes out again and again in your strategic thinking. Of course, because of your own national self-confidence in your capacity to deliver the goods, I think you tend to become impatient—perhaps justifiably impatient—with the British desire to think in terms of making a little go a long way and winning not by mass, but by diverting the enemy's resources away from the point where you really want to attack.

The British, on the other hand, have no surplus and never will have any. They have always had to win their continental wars by means of exploiting the mobility of sea power (and now, air power) in order to threaten the enemy's forces widely, make him spread them thinly, and then strike at some point where comparatively small forces can achieve a strategic impact out of all proportion to their size.

I think that is the basis of the disagreement between our two policies with regard to the question of going into the Mediterranean. There is a very strong feeling in the British forces that your idea of concentration and our idea of concentration differ very radically. In the minds of your Army thinkers, the view of concentration seems to be that everybody attacks all the time, everybody pushes right along the line and that if you haven't got enough strength

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to break the enemy's line—well, then, you merely build up more strength.

The British concept is that, first of all, you gain your relative superiority by using your mobility to compel the enemy to disperse so that the process becomes your dispersion (a nominal dispersion of your forces through mobile sea and air power), followed by the enemy's dispersion, followed by your concentration at the point of main effort.

That, really, is the basic theory behind the Churchill-Brooke policy of striking first in the Mediterranean. I think that the wisdom of that policy is apparent in this one fact: In June of 1942 there were four times as many German divisions in Western Europe as there were in Southern Europe. By June, 1944, there were as many German divisions in Southern Europe as there were in Western Europe.

I think that it is fairly clear now that had we not exposed the Mediterranean flank, had we not drawn those divisions down into the south, the Allied forces available to General Eisenhower on June 6, 1944, would not have been sufficient to get us across the channel. We would have had to wait longer and build up a greater mass of shipping and a greater mass of attacking forces. I don't suppose that we are likely to agree on the merits of the different solutions, but I think there is some purpose in trying to find out the concept behind the different ideas of strategy which were being put forward at that time.

There is another aspect in relation to this that I think is worth dwelling on. When the Casablanca discussions were in progress, the British put forward the view that we should go from North Africa into Sicily and at the same time we should hold in reserve

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a force capable of going into Italy, and of exploiting the political crisis which seemed likely to develop there at any time in view of Mussolini's uncertain position.

At Casablanca the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff would not go along with that idea. They said: "We'll clean out North Africa; we'll go into Sicily for the purpose of opening the Mediterranean—but no further."

In fact, it wasn't until after the North African campaign was over that informal approval was given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the planning of an invasion of Italy. No formal O. K. was given for the invasion itself until after Mussolini had fallen, with the result that it was six weeks before we could go into Italy.

We now know (from the German records) that when Mussolini fell Hitler was prepared to give up the whole of Southern Italy south of Florence and to give us then and there, without a fight, the territory which it eventually took us nearly eighteen months to secure. That is something you may say that we didn't know at the time. But the point I want to get at is this—when these plans were being discussed at Casablanca, the fact that there was a political opportunity of military significance was not taken into account by your people. They did not regard that as a valid factor in the calculations.

Sir Charles Portal, who was the Chief of the Air Staff in Britain, has told me that in those discussions the whole case for the invasion of Italy had to be placed on a strictly military basis even though in fact the weakness of Mussolini (a political factor) was a matter of great military consequence and held the promise of great military opportunity. But here, as I say, there was this very marked difference between us about this question of whether

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or not you take account of political factors in the calculation of your strategy.

If I may, I will jump from there to the Teheran Conference, which is the next logical issue. On the eve of Teheran the question of the strategy for 1944 was still undecided. The British were concerned that the German strength in Western Europe was still too great; that the forces which had been so far allocated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were insufficient to ensure success of the cross-channel invasion. Remember that at this stage, under the COSSAC plan, there was to be a three-divisional assault and the three-divisional assault at Salerno had very nearly failed.

The British feeling was: "Alright, if more forces cannot be provided in the United Kingdom then we must carry out further diversionary operations in the Mediterranean to draw the German strength away from the Western Front and to bring into battle such strategic reserves as the Germans have before we attempt to go across the channel."

It has often been represented that the Churchill policy was to make a grand offensive from Italy through Yugoslavia and into the Danube valley. I can find in the records of the time no evidence that such a policy was ever put forward. To him the campaign in the Mediterranean was the essential prelude to the cross-channel attack, but was not a substitute for the invasion. It was to him a question of using the Mediterranean for the purpose of exploiting political opportunities of military significance, such as Mussolini's weakness and the existence of Tito's partisans, exploiting the Mediterranean for that purpose while we had the forces to do it and at the same time distracting the enemy away from the west. But, as I say, this problem was still unsolved when we went to Teheran. Churchill was advocating very strongly that the in-

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vasion of France must be delayed until the late summer (1944) so that further operations could be carried out in the Aegean Sea in the spring with the object of bringing Turkey into the war.

If we are to appreciate what happened at Teheran, I think one has got to consider the strategic issue against what I can only call the "personal background" of the relationships between the "Big Three." For that purpose I want to point to one or two documents.

I think that the course of these major conferences between Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill can only be followed if we look at the personal factors involved, and if we remember that when three men, as powerful as they, were meeting round the table the inter-play of personality had a marked impact on the outcome of the negotiations.

I think there were three beliefs implicit in Roosevelt's attitude when he went to Teheran: The *first* was that he could handle Stalin, that he could get along with Stalin, and that provided he could meet Stalin across the table he would be able to work out a bargain that would really provide a stable basis for continued relations. His personal belief, as I say, that Stalin was "get-at-able" and that he was the man to handle him.

The *second* factor was Roosevelt's belief that the Russians at that time did not have any territorial ambitions, or any aggressive designs.

Thirdly, there was his suspicion that the British were more imperialistic than the Russians. That may sound incredible at this distance in history but at the time there is no doubt that again and again Roosevelt, in the presence of Stalin, was needling Churchill

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about British imperialism. At the same time, I believe, he was encouraging Stalin to be imperialistic himself—encouraging him, of course, unwittingly.

If you would like me eventually in Question Period to document my theory that Roosevelt was bitterly anti-Colonial and bitterly opposed to the continuation of the British Empire in its present form, I'll be happy to do so—but I won't waste time on that particular point now. But I think there were these three factors in Roosevelt's attitude: His belief that he could handle Stalin, the belief that Stalin had no aggressive ambitions, and the belief that the real Imperialists in the post-world war would be the British—not the Russians.

Added to that there was a belief that in the post-war world, provided you could establish a United Nations (a world peace organization), it would not matter if the balance of power were destroyed. It was on this particular issue that Roosevelt and Churchill differed most fundamentally. Roosevelt believed that you could take this great leap from national states to an international organization in one bound. Churchill believed (and said again and again) that if you destroy the balance of power, or if you ignore the balance of power as a factor in world politics, then you only encourage those who are inclined to be aggressive. He argued that your world organization will never come to fruition if, before it is established, one power is in command of vast areas of Europe and Asia; and that the only firm foundation on which to build your international organization is a balance of power *within* that organization.

As I said, I walked over to the lectern because I wanted to read extracts from various documents to you to prove those various

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points—but I am looking at the enemy clock on the wall up there and I think perhaps I had better not.

But I would like to say this—this belief that you could deal with the Russians and that the Russians would play ball was not something that existed merely in the mind of Roosevelt, the idealist. It was supported by Cordell Hull and it was supported by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In fact when Roosevelt went to the Quebec Conference in 1943 he took with him a memorandum which was prepared by the Joint Planners, but was regarded by his intimates as expressing his views. That memorandum, which was a military appreciation, said this:

“.....Since Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be given every assistance and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. Since without question Russia will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with Russia.”

In mentioning Roosevelt's belief that *he* was the man to handle Stalin, and his suspicions of Churchill's imperialism, I don't do so in any sense of political criticism. I mention them as matters of fact that are well established on the record. I may add this for myself, however, that I do believe that the effort to win Russia's friendship had to be made—I believe that it had to be made, above all, by the United States. And I do not believe that today the Western World would be as united as it is; I don't believe there would have been a Marshall Plan, that there would have been a North Atlantic Alliance, or that you would have the Mutual Defense Aid program today if a sincere and prolonged effort had not been made by the political and military leaders of the United States to win

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Russia's friendship and to win her cooperation. That effort had to be made.

You, I think, are a pragmatic people who are determined to find things out for yourselves and once you do find them out you learn from the experience extraordinarily quickly, as post-war history affirms. But I don't think that you, today, would be as united a nation in opposition to what Russia stands for if you had not a clear conscience in this matter and could not feel that in your wartime dealings with Russia everything was open and aboveboard and that the hand of friendship was freely and gladly extended.

In addition to that, I think one must also discuss this question of our wartime approach to Russia practically, and consider whether a less generous approach would not have produced a more cooperative reaction on Stalin's part. Because the lesson of all dealings with Russia—whether on the part of the Germans, or the British, or the Americans—is that if you make concessions to the Soviets without getting concessions in return, you merely encourage them to raise their price.

During the war you had in Moscow as head of your Military Mission a General Deane, who was an astute and unsympathetic observer of the Russian scene. In December of 1944 he sent a letter to General Marshall in which he summed up what, I think, is the real essence of this problem of dealing with the Russians. He puts his finger on the point when he implies that in our desire to earn Russia's cooperation we went so far that, instead, we encouraged her to be unfriendly toward us. In his letter General Deane said this:

“.....We never make a request or proposal to the Soviets that is not viewed with suspicion. They

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simply cannot understand "giving" without "taking." And, as a result, even our giving through lend-lease is viewed with suspicion. Gratitude cannot be banked in the Soviet Union. Each transaction is complete in itself without regard to past favors."

There, I think, he puts his finger on the whole problem of these wartime negotiations. It comes out again and again at Teheran and at Yalta that if you wanted to get a bargain with the Russians which would work you had to deal with them firmly, and you had to be very tough in demanding that for everything you yielded something was yielded by them.

Now let me turn to the Teheran Conference. It began with three personal episodes which I think were unfortunate. Before the Teheran Conference, Stalin had already discovered that there was a rift between Churchill and Roosevelt. In May, 1943, Roosevelt had asked Stalin to meet him at a rendezvous "either on your side or my side of the Bering Straits." He had suggested this as their meeting place because, as he said in his letter of invitation, if they were to meet in Africa or Iceland" it would make it difficult, quite frankly, not to invite Prime Minister Churchill at the same time."

So, before Teheran, Stalin was aware that Roosevelt was inclined to pursue an independent line, and this was confirmed most clearly at their first meeting (which was a private meeting between the two) where Roosevelt made it quite clear that he didn't agree with Churchill on many issues regarding the conduct of the war and the structure of the peace, and that he hoped to be able to work out with Stalin an agreement that would carry on through the war and into the peace.

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Stalin followed this up at once. That night he invited Roosevelt to move from the American Embassy to his own villa inside the Russian Embassy compound. He did this upon security grounds that may have been perfectly justified, but one can imagine the psychological effect in Stalin's mind if the President left his own embassy and went to stay in the Soviet Embassy. Then, at the first plenary session, Stalin suggested that Roosevelt should take the chair. This was a role that Roosevelt wished to play because in the chair he could avoid committing himself until he had heard the rival views expressed. He could maintain a certain measure of independence. He could avoid committing himself, for instance, on post-war issues. Since he was, I think, a man not untouched by vanity, he felt that in the chair he had the capacity to hold the issues in the balance and to determine them by his voice.

What was the result? As I mentioned earlier, Roosevelt and Churchill had gone to Teheran with no agreed Anglo-American policy. In fact, it was almost a matter of design on Roosevelt's part that there should be no agreement lest the Russians should think that they were dealing with an Anglo-American alliance. So in the Teheran discussions what was really an Anglo-American point of view was left to the British alone to sustain. Roosevelt, being in the center as Chairman, stood aloof from the discussion so that it tended to develop into a two-way argument between the British and the Russians. And because Roosevelt, as the Moderator, was to all intents and purposes opting out of the discussion, so America's military and political delegations opted out of the discussions, too, with a result, I believe, that the Russians were able to drive a wedge between Britain and America and to exploit that wedge for their own advantage.

The real issue upon which they exercised this capacity to split the Anglo-American alliance was the issue of the Second

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Front. Here, I think, is an example of the close liaison the Russians always maintained between the political and the military aspects of policy. The issue, as put to the Russians at Teheran by Roosevelt, was broadly this: "Do you want a cross-channel invasion in the spring and a stalemate in the Mediterranean until then—or do you want further diversionary operations in the Mediterranean and a cross-channel assault in the autumn?"

Stalin said: "I want the Second Front—and the sooner the better. I want not only a Second Front in Northern France, but I also want an invasion of Southern France."

Now, what that did was this: It settled the post-war map of Europe in so far as it could be settled militarily because when Stalin's view prevailed it meant that the reserve offensive power that the Allies had in Italy (when it came to the summer of 1944) could not be switched eastward into the Balkans—into the area of Soviet aspirations—but would be switched westward into Southern France, away from the areas which Russia hoped to dominate after the war. So, by coming down dogmatically in favor of the invasion of Southern France at Teheran, Stalin pretty well determined that there would be no major Allied operations (nor even any substantial diversionary operations) in the Balkans.

In the summer of 1944, six months after Teheran after the Normandy invasion had been successfully launched, there was a very strong school of opinion (British and American) which believed that the victory which we had gained in Italy by the capture of Rome should be exploited. We had the Germans on the run and there was a possibility of us going right on into Northern Italy, and crossing through Northern Yugoslavia into the Danube valley. This was the plan put forward by Alexander, by Mark Clark, and endorsed by Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's own Chief of Staff. It was

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backed by Churchill and the British Chiefs, but when the issue came to the point of decision, the President's reply was: "I cannot agree to the use of any of our resources in the Balkans without the consent of Marshal Stalin." That reply left the Russians an open road into the Balkans, and they made the most of it.

There are only two other matters that I will have time to touch on—I shall have to deal with these briefly. Let me go from this conference to the Yalta Conference, the outcome of which is explicable in very much the same terms as the outcome of Teheran. Again, you had no Anglo-American unity before the conference. You had a great Russian military victory—the occupation of the whole of Western Poland immediately following our reverse in the Ardennes with the result that Stalin went to Yalta, holding both the military and the political cards. Again, he exploited Anglo-American disunity. Again, he exploited the desire of the President to work out a solution between Stalin and himself—a "Big Two" solution.

This comes out very clearly in the discussions about the Far East about the entry of Russia into the Japanese War, because there not only did Roosevelt exclude his own Secretary of State, but he also excluded Churchill. There was no British representation either at the political level or, subsequently, in the Staff talks. It was entirely a Russo-American affair.

Here, I believe, Roosevelt destroyed his own position in relation to Stalin because in relation to the Far Eastern War he made certain concessions at the expense of China—without China's knowledge—concessions which seriously derogated from the sovereignty of China: such as that Russia should regain her rights in Dairen and Port Arthur and her control of the Manchurian railways. This, in effect, gave her Manchuria and gave her the legal

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right to the position from which, of course, the Communists eventually moved down into Korea.

Having made this bargain about the Far East (having abandoned his whole political position which had been up to that time: "I will make no post-war territorial settlements until the peace treaty and I will make no settlements involving any other country without that country's consent"), having abandoned his principles in Asia, the President could not expect to apply them in Europe; not against a man like Stalin, nor over an issue as touchy with the Russians as the issue of Poland.

I think if you study the Yalta Conference, you find that this bargain about the Far East is the turning point. Until that stage a fairly successful rearguard action had been fought against the Russian demands in Eastern Europe. After that, the flood gates were down. The consequences of this became apparent at the final conference at Potsdam, but I don't propose to go into that.

I merely intend to say one thing—and that concerns the decision about not going into Berlin and Prague. Here, again, we see our failure to take advantage of a political opportunity because of an American obsession with a purely military victory.

Within a month of the Yalta Conference, there was a serious breach developing in relations between Washington and Moscow. The President was accusing Stalin of breaking the Yalta agreement with regard to Poland, Rumania, and almost every other issue which had come to the test of action. The Russians were accusing the United States of "negotiating a separate peace."

So you find Roosevelt, early in April, cabling Stalin and saying this:

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“.....Frankly, I cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment towards your informants, whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations of my actions and those of my trusted subordinates.”

Now when relations had come to this pass, Churchill proposed that since Eisenhower's armies were across the Rhine, they should drive hard for Berlin and should there establish a bargaining position from which we would not retreat, unless the Russians carried out the agreements they had made at Yalta. When this was put to Washington, it was opposed (it had been opposed, initially, by General Eisenhower)—it was firmly opposed by General Marshall on the ground that it was more important to end the war quickly and to clean out the possible resistance in the so-called “National Redoubt” in Southern Germany than it was to secure Berlin.

In a cable to Churchill, General Marshall said this:

“.....The single objective should be quick and complete victory. Such psychological and political advantages as would result from the possible capture of Berlin ahead of the Russians should not override the imperative military consideration which, in our opinion, is the destruction of the German armed forces.”

So here, in the very last weeks of the war, there is still this concentration on the military outcome without regard to the political consequences. It is in that, I think, that for all our success in mobilization of our forces, for all our skill and bravery in the application of those forces in the field, we were denied the fruits of the victory to which we were entitled because in fashioning our policies we were not agreed as between Britain and America on the kind of post-war world that we wanted. We were not agreed on the

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policy which we should pursue in dealing with Russia and, therefore, we allowed the Russians (who always had their political objectives in mind) to gain their ends and to finish up in command of Berlin, Prague and Vienna.

Since then British military opinion and American military opinion has come a very long way, and one does see at every stage now a very close recognition of the importance of political factors in the determination of strategy. To take only one example: General Eisenhower's own report on the first year of NATO is as much a political and economic document as it is a military one.

I hope that you won't take amiss the time that I have spent in examining certain aspects of Anglo-American policy in the light of their results, because it is only in the light of those results that they can really be judged. In fact, your own General Bradley has said in his memoirs:

“.....At times we forgot that wars are fought for the resolution of political conflicts, and in the ground campaign in Europe we sometimes overlooked political considerations of vast importance.”

In that confession, I think, we have one of the major lessons of the war.

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Q. Mr. Wilmot, I don't disagree in any way with your analysis or conclusion, but I am wondering if you have taken your analysis far enough to conclude how in the world this could all go on generally in the presence of (and I say this seriously) the very astute and politically-minded Mr. Churchill.

A. That is a fair enough question. I think that over the last period of the war (at any rate the period after Teheran), he is on the record quite clearly as foreseeing the possibility that Russia would end up as the dominant power in Europe. He believed that every effort should be made in the last months of the war to forestall Russia and to get ourselves into positions from which we could either head Russia from vital areas or else could insist upon her standing to her bargains. But it is known now that Churchill shared an equal responsibility (or very nearly an equal responsibility) with Roosevelt for unconditional surrender. I think that Churchill himself would admit that until 1944 he was obsessed with the danger that Germany might be left in command of the continent—that Russia might either make a separate peace or might in fact be rendered militarily impotent, so that you would have a stalemate on the Eastern Front. Churchill, because of his recollections of the great crises of two World Wars, did find it extremely difficult to see beyond the question of defeating Hitler until the defeat was put beyond doubt by the invasion in June, 1944. I thought, until recently, that in the Mediterranean in 1943 the political factors which were preying on his mind were post-war political factors—the factor of forestalling Russia. But he now tells me that the political factors which he had in mind then were related to the war, not the post-war—the desirability of exploiting the political opportunities provided by Mussolini's weakness and by

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the activities of the guerrillas and partisans in Greece and Yugoslavia. I do think that before the start of 1944 he may have been no more alive than Roosevelt to the danger of Soviet expansion, but from then on Anglo-American post-war political objectives were very much in his mind. They were frequently brought forward by him at Teheran and at Yalta and in discussions by cable between London and Washington, both before and after Yalta. But he was in a weak position. He felt that he was fighting a rear guard action in defense of the British Commonwealth and of the British Empire. He was very riled at being excluded from the negotiations between Roosevelt and Stalin about the Far Eastern War, but felt that he had to go along with that agreement; otherwise, as he said to Anthony Eden: "We may be excluded from the Far East altogether." He was very aware of two things, I think, in the latter part of the war: *first*, that at all cost the Anglo-American alliance must be maintained even if it meant that he had to give way on most of the big issues; and *secondly*, that he must safeguard British Imperial interests against what he thought were the unjustifiable and rather irresponsible assaults by the President.

Q. Mr. Wilmot, I think I can appreciate and understand your speech a lot better if you tell me what you mean by political factors. What does that mean to you?

A. Let me take an example: the Mediterranean campaign in 1943. The British view was that if we went into Italy that year the military situation would be that much more favorable to us because Italy was politically weak. Mussolini was on the point of being overthrown. If we struck at the weaker political partner of the Axis, we would thereby gain a considerable military advantage. You did find throughout, I think, the British Chiefs of Staff trying to take a broad view of these strategic moves. In other

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words, they saw not only the opportunity of getting our forces ashore and conducting a profitable campaign in relation to the enemy's military strength, but also of striking at the enemy's point of political weakness. That's what I mean by "taking account of political factors in the determination of strategy." As far as political objectives are concerned, what I mean by that is this: I believe that it would have been of great political advantage in the post-war world if we (and by we, I mean the Anglo-American forces)—if we, instead of the Russians, had liberated Prague, Berlin and Vienna from the Nazis. The balance of power in Europe would have been that much more in our favor, even if we had had to give up Berlin afterwards because of the zonal agreement. The fact that we liberated Berlin, that we gained the decisive military victory in relation to Berlin, would have had great political advantages. If we had got in there first, it would have made all the difference in the world. Take just *one* consideration. In the last week of the war General Patton's troops were halted on the Czech border. The German forces in front of them were weak almost to the point of being negligible. The Russians were held by the strong German armies well to the east of Prague. Eisenhower proposed that we should go into Prague then and there. He communicated this intention to Moscow and Stalin immediately objected and insisted that we should go no nearer than Pilsen. Now, you may say: "What difference did it make?" It made this difference—that the Red Army got into Prague then and there by our default, because we held back. This was of direct benefit to the Czech Communists. There was a very prompt clean-out of the "Middle of the Road" elements—the Social Democratic-Liberal elements in Prague and in the trade unions. Moreover, when Benes and Masaryk went to sign a Soviet-Czech treaty of friendship in June, 1945, they negotiated in Moscow while there were Russian troops in the streets of Prague. That is the kind of

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political factor which I have in mind. I believe that in making military plans we should have considered what was going to happen in Europe *after* the war. It wasn't enough, as I said, to make a leap from national states to an international peace organization. Within that international peace organization you had to have regional groupings which would preserve the balance of power. Yet, this was a view that was not accepted in Washington. After his first visit to Moscow in November, 1943, Cordell Hull came back and told Congress: "When the United Nations organization is established there will no longer be any need for spheres of influence, for allegiance, for balance of power, or any of the other special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, nations strove to safeguard their security or promote their interests." That was the kind of philosophy which inspired the handling of problems. Since these political factors weren't going to be important, it didn't matter if you destroyed the balance of power altogether. This was a case, as I said, where I think that we ignored a political factor of prime importance.

Q. Mr. Wilmot, to go back to unconditional surrender. I believe that you mentioned the JCS in connection with President Roosevelt at the Casablanca Conference. Well, Mr. Roosevelt had a committee of civilians, post-war advisers—Advisory Committee on Post-War and Foreign Policy—or something like that. In November of 1942 a sub-committee on security discussed unconditional surrender, how it should be applied against Germany and Japan, with direct emphasis on Italy, and reported (not direct to Mr. Roosevelt, but to the committee chairman, Mr. Norman Davis—according to State Department records) the committee's entire thinking on the subject of "unconditional surrender." It would indicate that there was some civilian discussion on that subject.

A. I was under the impression that that discussion took place

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after Casablanca, not before it. If what you say is right, I am clearly wrong. I learned that it was discussed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I know that it was *not* discussed with the people in charge of either the American or the British psychological warfare sections, and I had understood that this civilian committee examining the ramifications of it met and discussed this issue *after* Casablanca, not before. Maybe you have additional information on that which I didn't have. If I am wrong about that, I am sorry.

Q. It is in the "Post-War Foreign Policy Declaration," printed by the Department of State.

A. Well, I shall look at it. Thank you very much. I'm sorry about that. There is no end to one's research in these matters.

Q. Mr. Wilmot, I am inclined to question the importance of the unconditional surrender. If we assume all the rest of the errors, what would be the alternative—and would it work?

A. The alternative to unconditional surrender?

Q. Yes. Would it have come out any differently?

A. I think it would have speeded the collapse of Germany. You see, at the time of Casablanca I'll admit that we did need to make an assurance to the Russians that if all our plans were delayed in their development, we would fight to the very end—that we would not come to terms with Hitler. But that was quite a different thing from saying that we would never deal on any terms with any Germans at any time—that is a *carte blanche* refusal. It meant, as I have suggested, that we were going to carry on the war beyond the point of military defeat to the point

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of the enemy's political collapse. As far as the Germans were concerned—civilian and military alike—I believe that it left them no alternative but to support Hitler until the very end. It is true that the plot of the 20th of July did reach the point of an attempt being made on Hitler's life, but the conspirators concerned in that plot found themselves balked at every turn when they sought support by influential people, for they were told: "We cannot go along with any proposal which requires us to accept unconditional surrender." As far as the German people were concerned, the more we bombed Germany (particularly the more we bombed their cities) the more we rendered them dependent upon the Nazi state as the only source of supply for food, clothing, medical care, and so on. They dared not turn against the Nazi state, particularly in the last months of the war when their plight was so desperate, because they knew there was no government which we would recognize that could take over. They were also very gravely worried by the fear that the foreign workers (of whom there were 10,000,000 in Germany) would take their revenge upon them if, in fact, there was an opportune situation in Germany at the time of the collapse. So, you found that our armies advanced across Germany, if the German field forces withdrew from a particular town (or were about to withdraw), the German civilians would come out through the woods and urge us to come in quickly so as to establish and maintain law and order before the DP's and foreign workers got loose in the town. This dread of anarchy, I believe, was a major factor in sustaining German morale. Now, whether it would have made any difference: I presume it would for this reason. The Russians knew they had us from that moment on. They knew that they could be as brutal as they liked in Eastern Europe. We were denying ourselves the opportunity of making any compromise, making any arrangements with even a decent German government—as we might have done

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in the latter part of the war. That opportunity was never open to us once we had declared for unconditional surrender. As I say, these are things on which inevitably one can make only an assessment. One can't be sure, but one can (I think) see certain events hanging together when one sees them in historical perspective; seeing them individually at the time, they appear not to be related.

Q. Mr. Wilmot, in this problem of bringing a war to a successful conclusion we come to the possibility of, shall I say, control from the air. I hope it is not wishful thinking that it might be (in a war against Russia) possible for us to gain control without occupying Russia. Do you believe that there is any lesson to be learned from the air battle over Germany that can guide us as to the ending of a war if we are forced into it with the U. S. S. R.?

A. If you are talking, Captain, about the application of strategic air power in the bringing about of the enemy's collapse, I think that German records do indicate two things very sharply. In the first place, very much greater damage is done to an enemy's war economy by the kind of attacks which the United States Air Force made than was done by the kind of attacks made by the R. A. F. A greater impact was made upon German production by the concentrated attack upon particular targets than was made by area bombing. The vital factor in bringing about the collapse of the German war economy was not the mass raids on the big cities (although these contributed to it because they inevitably complicated their problems), but the very decisive thing—the punch that got home—was the attack on oil and on transportation. There is no doubt at all, either, that this kind of an attack gives you much fewer post-war headaches than the mass obliteration of cities. I'm afraid that Bomber Harris was given far too free a hand in the last part of the war. He was really looking around for cities

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to obliterate, regardless of whether they had any military significance at all. On the other hand, the foundation of American strategic bombing policy was that you could bomb in daylight; that you could, if necessary, produce the fighters to escort the daylight bombers, that you could bomb accurately and pick out targets as small as aircraft factories and oil plants and could bomb transportation targets. By and large, the United States strategic bombing policy was overwhelmingly vindicated and that was, I think, one of the major spheres in which Britain thinking was quite clearly wrong in the light of the results as the German records now show it. This is one point, but there is also the question whether you can bring an enemy to his knees merely by strategic bombing unless you can find some such Achilles' heel, as the Germans had in the case of oil. Now, in the case of oil we were fortunate because the Germans were highly dependent upon synthetic oil plants—almost entirely dependent on them after the loss of Roumania; our intelligence was extraordinarily good; and we had the ability to hit with remarkable accuracy. But I don't think that we can generalize from that and say: "Therefore, we will be able to find Russia's Achilles' heel." If we could, it is obvious that this is the kind of target that we must concentrate on. It is wasteful and it is dangerous from the post-war world point of view to indulge in mass area bombing of cities at large.

The other point which I gathered from your question was whether you could police a state by the threat of application of aerial sanctions. I think that *is* something that can quite definitely be done. You see, at the end of the war we thought in terms, physically, of imposing military government in Germany by the presence of ground forces. Once you did that, of course, you had to bring the Russians into the Elbe and across the Elb. I don't know whether this was ever proposed (it may have been), but,

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quite clearly, once we had disarmed Germany we could have kept her disarmed by the threat of imposing aerial sanctions on her. That is one means of solving the problem if it comes to a showdown with the Russians and thus avoid having to occupy territories in order to enforce the peace treaty.

Q. Mr. Wilmot, taking our thesis into a possible war with Russia—it would seem that our military objective should be in line with a political one. Therefore, theoretically, the military objective would be limited to one that would create in the Russian zone a political power which would be friendly to this country. However, I cannot reason how one can be created in Russia under the German rule if we encourage their people to be antagonistic to their government. That is all very fine, and possibly in a state of anarchy if things get bad enough it can be created there. I can see how we can destroy the Kremlin—but how can we create anything to replace it? Total military occupation of troops would be the only answer I think.

A. I wouldn't be quite as pessimistic as that. I think in a way we are talking about two different things, aren't we? I see a very little possibility of us fostering resistance inside Russia today and thereby weakening the structure of the Communist state. Perhaps in ten, fifteen or twenty years' time there may be such a crisis which will bring about a downfall of the present Russian leaders or their immediate successors. But, because of the very control that the Communists have got (they have been in power now for thirty years), there is very little chance of our undermining the Kremlin from within. On the other hand, I would not despair of the possibility of finding an alternative government in the event of there being a military defeat imposed upon the present rulers of Russia. The Germans found, for instance, that they were welcomed as lib-

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erators in the Ukraine, in White Russia, and in Western Russia at large. That is not just German propoganda; there is plenty of quite authentic and dispassionate evidence to that effect. One of Hitler's gravest mistakes was that whereas he had this political sympathy on his side in the Dnieper Valley, and in Western Russia generally, he destroyed that sympathy entirely by turning loose his Nazi Party commissars with their racial doctrines and proceeding to wreck the country, to strip it, to take the industrial machinery out, killing many people off and transporting Russian labor to Germany. The goodwill that was there, when Hitler came in, was destroyed by him—another example of failing to take account of the political factors which are relevant to strategy. I do think that we would find a not inconsiderable support from within Russia, distorted as the Russian mind must be by propoganda, once we had imposed military defeat upon the present rulers.

Q. Mr. Wilmot, I am thinking of the Berlin airlift. I wondered who it was that was responsible for agreeing that the Russian control our access to Berlin, and who it was that remembered to provide for air corridors into Berlin without at the same time providing for ground ones.

A. Well, I think that is most relevant to this question of military and political factors being taken into consideration when making a bargain. When this question was being discussed in the European Advisory Commission in the first part of 1945, the British view was that we must have an absolutely firm agreement in writing with the Russians, defining the railways and the roads, as well as the air corridors, by which we could have access to Berlin. The American representatives insisted that this was purely a military matter that must be decided on the military level by the Russian, British and American commanders when in fact they met, and that there must be no prior political decision on

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this point. If you want an American view of the whole background for this, there was an article in **FOREIGN AFFAIRS** about three years ago by Mr. Philip Mosely, who was on the staff of the European Advisory Commission. He has given a very detailed and well-documented account of the background of these particular negotiations. I haven't read it for some time, but that is the burden of what he said. The other interesting thing was this: When Eisenhower, Montgomery and Zhukov met in Berlin in June, 1945, for the purpose of signing the treaty with regard to the joint occupation of Berlin, Vyshinsky was there at Zhukov's elbow the whole time and Zhukov signed nothing and said nothing without putting his head round to get Vyshinsky's word in his ear. That agreement, then signed, was a purely military one and contained no clauses whatever with regard to an Allied ground corridor into Berlin.

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