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U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS

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

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FOREWORD

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THE VALIDITY OF LIMITED OBJECTIVES

A Lecture delivered by

by Dr. H. M. Wriston

at the Naval War College
on 10 September 1951

Admiral Conolly, Gentlemen:

I am going to take as my topic, "The Validity of Limited Objectives." The century between Waterloo and Serajevo saw the most promising evidences of progress toward a peaceful world of any period in modern history. It was by no means a quiescent or stagnant era. Indeed it was one of the most energetic in human history. Nor was it free from war. On the contrary there were many wars, in many lands, for many objectives. There was hardly a year when there was not a manifestation of the use of force for international purposes somewhere in the world. There were at least 30 wars among established states and more than 50 cases of forceful intervention, besides wars of conquest in Asia and Africa. The peaceful character of the era, therefore, did not arise from the absence of strife; rather it came from the fact that wars were not general conflagrations but isolated instances of the employment of force for specific objectives.

The century of relative peace was not achieved at the cost of inaction, nor by clinging to the status quo. Indeed, changes were swifter and more sweeping than in any preceding age. Progress toward the goal of peace consisted in the multiplication of devices to keep wars small, to quarantine strife with a view to preventing its spread. So despite the presence of local, carefully quarantined wars, the ideal of rational peace was dominant.

Dr. Henry M. Wriston, President of Brown University, is prominent in the field of International Affairs.

The idea of limited war for limited objectives gained such headway that it came to seem the normal procedure. The first great war of the 20th century has been called World War I because men had forgotten that before the 19th century wars were common. They overlooked the fact that the Napoleonic Wars and earlier struggles had been as extensive as the political world. They did not realize that the failure of earlier global struggles to produce global peace was one of the reasons for the reversal of emphasis during the 19th century toward the limitation of war both in space and in objectives.

Along with those two limitations in dimension went a third —the limitation of legal action. The rights of non-combatants were expanded; humane practices regarding prisoners were developed; certain types of arms were banned. In short, the aim was to shrink strife to the least size and scope consistent with the attainment of limited objectives.

World War I, as we commonly call it, represented not only an abandonment of attempts at containment spatially; it was global in its objectives also. Woodrow Wilson, who became the expositor of the philosophy of the war, spoke of a "war to end war," a "world safe for democracy," and used other phrases indicative of the vast sweep of its objectives. At the Paris peace conference, statesmen sought not only to solve all the territorial, economic, and political issues, they wrote a constitution for a world government to perpetuate their work.

Coincident with their grandiloquent concept of global war for global settlements was the overthrow of many, perhaps most, of the old limitations and restraints. Non-combatants lost much of their privileged status; poison gas and other inhumane weapons were used. In the complete reversal of mood the rights which

neutrals had gained in the previous century were whittled to a sliver; nearly every restraint was denounced or evaded. In short, all three efforts at containment—in space, in objectives, in methods —were virtually abandoned.

Everything was done to bring more nations into the struggle, to expand objectives to the dimension of a new world order, and almost any means were held justified by the ends. Wilson elevated the use of force to a degree that prepared the way for "total war" when he spoke of "Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit."

Moreover a false assumption of absolute moral superiority was developed. The Treaty of Versailles was regarded not alone as an expression of the will of the victor; it assumed the guise of a moral judgment upon a criminal. As it would be absurd for a judge to negotiate with a culprit, so the treaty was, as the Germans called it, a "diktat." The defeated were not consulted as to its form or substance.

One might suppose that, when most of the assumptions upon which peace at the end of the First World War was based were proved wrong, it would have a marked effect in persuading men that those assumptions were incorrect. Yet despite the breakdown of the League of Nations, the collapse of the structure of reparations, and the failure of the prohibitions of Versailles to survive experience, the basic notions regarding war and peace were retained; they have dominated international life ever since. The idea that the 19th century could teach the Atomic Age anything has been rejected. Everything has been "globalized"—health, welfare, nutrition, culture, economics, finance, and politics. World-embracing institutions have been established as the instruments of this unification of all problems under one aegis. The dogma has

been advanced that not only does everything that happens anywhere affect everyone else in some measure, it can almost be said that the assumption is made that anything that happens anywhere affects everyone vitally.

A new set of terms has been tailored to fit the new structure of ideas. They match the sweeping inclusiveness of the concepts which the 20th century has substituted for 19th century experience. They lack the qualifying adjectives of earlier expressions and are usually stated as stark absolutes.

One such phrase is "total war." It is characteristic of most of the new patterns of speech; the slogan leaves no room for any different or competing idea. Yet even a few moments of serious reflection make it clear that the term is as imprecise as it is unqualified. History shows no instance, ancient or modern, of "total" war. The nearest approximations certainly would not be found in the 20th century—or at any time after the Red Cross, for instance, was established.

Not only is the phrase not justified by experience; to Americans it is incredible as an idea, for if ever there were such a thing as total war, it could never end. Peace would become an impossibility. If every thought, word, and deed were completely engrossed in war, there would be no room for even thoughts of peace; any move in that direction would be an impairment of the totality of war.

The origin of the expression shows this to be true. It was a German creation, and reflected both the ideal of the totalitarian state and the belief expressed by Ludendorf that "War is everything." "War is the highest expression of the racial will to life, and politics must be subservient to conduct of war." It assumes that

war is normal and that peace is abnormal. It goes so far as to say that war is not only a common occurrence, but is the most desirable experience.

There is a long history behind the development of this martial philosophy. For our purposes it is enough to point out that it is antithetical to the tradition, thought, and action of Americans. Even in Germany the dogma was expressed as an ideal rather than an achieved reality. In the United States the phrase never has corresponded to action nor does it have the slightest validity as an idea compatible with democracy.

The simplest analysis exposes the fallacy of the doctrine. How, then, could it gain such currency? To begin with it shares with all other absolutes the quality of being a half-truth, and half-truths are often easier to believe than the whole truth. It reflects part of reality—namely the undoubted reversal of emphasis from war limited in space, scope, and objectives to global strife for grandiloquent ends, using means beyond those permitted in recent times.

Furthermore, the expression "total war" has a deceptive simplicity and clarity. It can be quickly grasped. Like any slogan it is easy to remember. Constant iteration has a kind of hypnotic effect; it inhibits the reflection which would reveal the other half of the truth which the phrase suppresses.

In short, such absolute expressions blind public opinion to other significant realities; that makes them dangerous as guides to policy. Unreal thinking is no safe path toward any desirable goal. The problems before us are serious enough without having them complicated unnecessarily by confusing expressions and by dealing in absolutes where relativity is the reality.

"Unconditional surrender" was another verbal absolute which misled even those who gave it currency. It is the necessary and proper goal of the military to reduce the enemy to a condition where he will yield the point at issue with a minimum of bargaining. To do more than that is to waste life and treasure without achieving any enduring goal. Political leaders, however, should never employ as a political concept an idea appropriate only to the military; to do so is to lose touch with reality.

The reason for the difference in military and political expression is simple: when the armed forces have overcome the enemy, they have fulfilled their mission; the principal emphasis must then shift from the use of force to the employment of reason. If a great power is really rendered politically impotent, the politician faces an impossible task. The scientific truism that nature abhors a vacuum applies equally to politics. When a power vacuum or a political vacuum is created, new forces will rush in to fill it.

A third absolute which captured the public mind also arose from the abondonment of the 19th century proposals for the limitation of war in the interests of peace. With all the advertising fanfare that might herald a new discovery we were given the phrase "One World." As we look back across intervening events it seems hardly credible that so obvious a political fantasy could so long have dominated public opinion. That result was achieved by inflating one aspect of reality until it looked like the whole. An admitted physical reality is the globe—one world, indeed. Another aspect of reality is the interplay of forces around the world—undoubted and deeply significant. But the neglect of racial, religious, cultural, economic, and a thousand other differences, the suppression of all inconvenient aspects of reality made the "one-world" dogma only a mirage.

Now that the hypnotic effect of the slogan has evaporated, the mad irrationality of this absolute expression is starkly revealed even to the most obtuse, though a short while ago it was difficult of discernment even by the normally astute.

As a kind of reaction from one extreme we are likely to run to another. There is danger that the one-world concept will give way to a two-world dogma. Biaxiality is as false an absolute as its predecessor. Because the United States and Russia are the principal protagonists, there is a strong tendency in the United States to forget that neither power dominates large sections of the world, and that they influence other sections in varying degrees.

Biaxiality leads to the cognate belief that Stalin is behind whatever goes wrong—whether it is the Asianism of Nehru, the nationalism of Iran, the obstreperousness of Egypt, or any other uncomfortable attitude or episode anywhere about the globe. Discussion about the Far East, for example, often oversimplifies the problem by assuming that Mao is only a puppet, that all the strings of Chinese policy are manipulated in Moscow.

On the Communist side there is an equal and opposite fallacy which attributes the Korean crisis to "aggressive American capitalism." We are well aware of the absurdity of any such contention. Knowing its untrue character, we assume that those who use the phrase do not believe it, themselves, that they consciously lie about us. We should not reach that conclusion unless we, for our part, take adequately into account the other forces besides Russian imperialism which make trouble in the world today.

So long as we sincerely (but erroneously) see only one "real enemy," we must assume equal sincerity (however mistaken) on the part of our major antagonist. Without in any way discounting

the malevolence of Stalin's desires and schemes, it is folly to attribute everything to one source. The "two-world" fallacy is as dangerous as the "one-world" fantasy so far as rational, competent estimates of the international situation are concerned. It makes any understanding of Nehru impossible.

The cultivation of the habit of thinking in political absolutes culminates in the incapacity to make wise political decisions. It is an established fact of political mathematics that no number of half-truths will ever add up to the whole truth.

Under the principle of political absolutism there is no way to deal with Russia except by total war. That is a simple, direct conclusion; yet analysis proves it to be self-defeating. It is a mere effort to avoid political action. Nevertheless after force to the ultimate has been employed, politics must supervene. From this there is no conceivable escape.

The absolutist would deny that assertion and say that there is one way out: occupy the country, remain in possession and continue to rule it for many years. That is an incredible program. No nation would be willing to pay the cost in life and treasure that any such project would involve. No nation which was at all alert to the consequences would be willing to pay the cost in moral decay, for the exercise of absolute power over another people for a long period of time eventuates in the moral collapse of the conqueror. But even if the price in life, treasure, and integrity were paid, the project would still prove futile; for at some time in the future, however far, the occupation would have to come to an end in substance if not in form also. In short, it would eventuate in political action. The effort to substitute force for reason can be successful only in a transient sense; ultimately reason must be the principal implement of political action.

I am not so naive as to believe we could now negotiate a settlement of our differences with Russia. After recent experience those who take that view seem to me totally unrealistic. One has only to recall the sterile futility of the deputy foreign ministers' conference which met at Paris in the Pink Palace for four months this spring and summer. It proved unable to agree even upon the heads of consideration for an agenda of a proposed meeting of the foreign ministers. When you cannot write the preamble to the preface, it does not make getting the book written look very hopeful.

But again we must beware of absolutes. Because we cannot settle all our problems with Russia, many people accept the conclusion that we can settle none of them. That notion is just as dangerous to sound policy making as its opposite. It has proved possible, even during the last five years, to relieve some tensions. The Russians withdrew their threat to Iran; they were stymied in Greece, they lost control of Yugoslavia; they modified their stand in the face of the Berlin air lift. None of those problems is permanently settled; there is no such thing in politics. But even a change in tension is a relief. We are well aware of that physically; that is why there is a brief pause before the discussion that follows such a talk as this. Change in political tension is just as helpful. The fact that the relief is transient is nothing to worry about any more than we should feel concern at having to resume a physical position.

We are confused in these matters by the assumption that there is one true absolute—peace. But peace is far from an absolute; it is always relative, for it does not consist in the absence of tension, but only in its adequate compensation. We are at peace with the British; more than that, we are joined with them as allies, committed to work together militarily, politically, economically, over a vast range of territory—the "North Atlantic" seems likely to pass

the Bosporus—and an even vaster range of problems. Nonetheless there are recent differences with Britain which have proved as intractable as our differences with Russia—the recognition of Mao, for instance, or the future of Formosa. If one set himself seriously to the task of listing all the areas of tension with our principal ally, and omitted to take adequate account of the asset side of the ledger, he could easily come to the conclusion that the alliance was bankrupt and that the tensions might lead to a break. Many people take that view, and seek to make it the dominant one.

The difference between our relations with Britain and those with Russia is that in one case the tensions, though severe in some instances, are at least partly compensated; in the other case compensations are wholly inadequate.

Merely to state the proposition that because we cannot do everything, we can do nothing, is to make clear its absurdity. Yet the current mood of public opinion comes dangerously close to that attitude. In fact, there is grave danger that the sentiment is so strong that any effort at negotiation will be damned as "appeasement" and so doomed to failure at home even if it should succeed abroad. The very word "peace" has become tainted. The phrase "peace offensive" is current. It tends to make anyone who seeks any accommodation at any point seem like the dupe (or agent) of Russia. Few want war, but fear of the accusation of being tricked by the "peace offensive" leads many people to seem more afraid of political negotiation than of all-out fighting.

The sound immediate program is to abandon the ideal of global settlement and substitute specific efforts to achieve limited goals. Even progress along that modest line requires action of two sorts. First, we must negotiate where negotiation is possible. Until a better program comes along the clear objective of policy

should be to nibble away at any problem, a solution for which seems at all promising. By that method we must do whatever is possible to compensate for tensions. It may not produce dramatic headway toward a general settlement, but the useful is often not dramatic. It may be only a short step with long intervals before another step can be taken; yet every advance is worth while.

Simultaneously another sort of action is essential. The free world should be strengthened to such an extent that the area of negotiation can be extended. There is ample historical evidence that negotiation from a position of strength is easier than from a condition of weakness.

Here we must be aware of a tension between the military and the political branches of the government. The military must be ready for any eventuality: that requires more preparedness than the political is usually willing to undertake. Partly this unwillingness arises from the necessity to sacrifice constructive programs of production and social welfare, calculated to raise the standard of living. It is hard to substitute a program that not only contributes little to the health of the economy, but is actually a drain upon it, and a drag upon the standard of living. Partly it arises from the necessity of financing such a program through taxes—and imperiling reelection thereby.

There is, however, a worthier and more significant reason for the tendency of the political branch to go more slowly with rearmament than the military, which has a heavy but particularized responsibility believed essential. It is the danger that instead of producing a situation of strength as a basis for more effective negotiation, too large a program may eventuate in an arms race, the effect of which is to postpone negotiation until after war has come and has been completed.

Thirty years ago nothing seemed clearer than that the race to arm was the short cut to war. From the point of view of the military there is always need for enough superiority to produce a margin of safety in any eventuality. By definition, both sides cannot have that margin. The most effective spy system in the world cannot discover all that the opponent is doing. By temperament, both assign the margin to the opponent; and tension mounts.

Today equally honest and well-informed people will say on the one hand that Russia is ridden by fear, and assert on the other that it is driven by dreams of world domination. Though there is a great difference between the motives which produce policy in those opposite states of mind, the two ideas may produce similar results in action. The Monroe Doctrine was defensive in purpose; nevertheless it led to the hegemony of the United States in this hemisphere, crudely but clearly expounded by the Secretary of State, William L. Marcy, when he said, "Its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." Clearly defensive measures can lead to expansionism, to imperialism.

The British hold Gibraltar, Malta, Singapore, Hong Kong, and other stations along the "life line" of empire. But in the 19th century this defensive chain involved the rule of the seven seas and produced war with the United States.

Woodrow Wilson's "world safe for democracy" was clearly a defensive phrase, spoken in response to the threat of German dominance. But Wilson directed the occupation of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, sent troops to Mexico, and did other things that seemed imperialistic to many.

The necessity of cleaning up a mess on our doorstep led us into the Spanish War. That speeded the annexation of Hawaii,

and eventuated in possession of Guam, Wake, and the Philippines and mastery of most of the Pacific. If an American president had proposed any such positive program of expansion, it would have been angrily rejected by an aroused public opinion. That episode in our history illustrates a profound truth: imperialism is not always intentional; indeed it is often the outcome of a defensive mood. When Nehru rejects the Japanese treaty because it does not deliver Formosa to Mao and Okinawa to Japan, we see his act as the expression of a hostile idea, perhaps Russian in origin. He may see our new arrangements with New Zealand and Australia, and with the Philippines, and our continuation of troops in Japan, our possession of Okinawa, and our denial of Formosa to Mao as unconscious American imperialism arising from a defensive mood.

Any nation with a unique political ideal and a distinctive economic system is always in danger. It is never understood by strangers who view it with suspicion and dislike. The situation may develop to such a condiiton of fear and tension that the "threatened" nation feels "surrounded" and turns to expansion as essential to survival.

The description applies both to the United States and to Russia. We have expanded enormously; but there are still Americans who feel that we are surrounded, and that there is no way out but war; they are the advocates of the so-called "preventive war." They have no official spokesman; but their number is very large and some incident might supply the leadership that would make the movement dangerously significant.

If the idea of preventive war is dangerous in the United States, with its diffused form of government which prevents the ready crystallization of such an idea, how much more dangerous could it be in Russia with its centrally dominated system. Russia has vivid memories of the "cordon sanitaire," a deliberate attempt

at encirclement; the aid to the "Whites" and the expeditionary forces in Russian territory. Once the idea were accepted that "peaceful coexistence" is impossible, the Politburo could launch a "preventive war" whenever the occasion seemed most propitious. Fear, a defensive condition, easily leads to aggression, an offensive action.

That explains why it is the inescapable function of political authority to determine how much preparedness is essential to make possible negotiation from situations of strength, and how much more preparedness would eventuate in so sharp an arms race as to precipitate war. There is no rule of thumb that has the least utility in deciding how much is too much. The one practical course is to combine rearmament with alert seizure of every opportunity for useful negotiation. If those negotiations are handled with deftness and skill, their success will be an indication that the situation of strength is being attained. If more and more irritations are ameliorated, the evidence of adequacy in armament becomes cumulative.

At the moment the utter sterility of recent negotiations offers clear enough proof that the situation of strength has not yet been attained—or else that negotiations are inhibited by fear of accusations of "appeasement," or have failed for want of adroit and shrewd management.

Meanwhile the Russian use of the veto, the abstention of the Soviet Union from many world agencies, its neglect to abide by the agreements it has made, its aggressive acts (or, as Aneurin Bevan would call them, its "adventures") have eventuated in the Korean imbroglio. That has all but dissipated the myth of genuine global collective action. It raises anew the validity of the concept of a limited war for limited objectives. For some months

we have observed the tussle between those who would deal with one issue at a time, and those who have fully accepted the theses of the world wars—force without stint or limit to the point of "total war," involvement of as many nations as possible rather than as few as possible, anticipation of a general settlement rather than a modestly specific agreement on a few subjects.

The issue is not sharply defined and the dilemma has not been clearly stated. Those things seldom happen in politics. Indeed there is much evidence that most people are utterly confused. The key to the confusion is that Korea epitomizes the tension between competing concepts—the global theory on the one hand and the limited specific objective upon the other. Unhappily almost no one has been wholly consistent in supporting one view or the other. Minds have wavered between the two basic ideas as the tide of battle swayed.

Nonetheless there are definite evidences of the competition of the opposing concepts. The horror of the British when President Truman in an offhand moment said, "there has been active consideration" of the use of the atomic bomb, their resistance to advance beyond the narrow waist of North Korea to the Yalu, their refusal to sanction the "hot pursuit" of enemy planes into Manchuria—all are evidences of at least a foggy concept of a limited war for limited objectives. On the other hand the participation of several nations as active combatants or by token forces, the pleas for more men and materiel from more nations, the Kem Amendment, the Battle Bill, and other evidences of an effort to expand the economic as well as the military phase of the war tend toward the global idea.

Angry discussion of what may properly be regarded as a "satisfactory" settlement shows that many, whose general phil-

osophy of international relations normally comes close to isolationism, nonetheless feel no confidence whatever in the validity of limited operations or limited objectives once strife has begun. Indeed they denounce those who make any such approach as though they were not in error, but deliberately treasonous. Their view is that any departure from "all-out" tactics has nothing whatever to be said for it.

If Korea is one manifestation of the competition between two fundamental ideas as to proper procedure in the search for peace, we have other evidences of a tendency to revive some of the 19th century concepts. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, despite its vast sweep in territory from Alaska eastward, presumably beyond the Bosporus in its new incarnation, nonetheless is a limited organization. Formally it is related to the United Nations, but substantively it is an attempt to handle a limited range of problems in a specific area with which the United Nations could not cope effectively. In the same way the new mutual defense agreements with Australia and New Zealand, the proposed agreement with Japan, the Schuman Plan, and even the Marshall Plan make a limited approach to a defined objective.

All are evidences that there is a dawning realization that many of the world's problems are like food: they cannot be taken in too large amounts. While, like the items in a well-balanced diet, they all have an interrelationship, it is necessary to take one bite at a time. Perhaps a chess game offers an even better metaphor. Each move must be made with reference to the whole strategy, but the next move is dependent upon the counter move of the opponent, which, except in some highly formalized situations, cannot be predicted.

The plain fact is that there is so much diversity of interest that the attempt to deal with everything at once must break down. Even when we use the words "national interest," the phrase conceals the fact that the interest of a nation is itself a complex structure. The day of the economic determinists is over. If there had been any need for a *coup de grâce* Gandhi certainly delivered it. If it is asserted that India is a special case, it is necessary only to look at Iran today; surely it is defying its economic interest.

Many nations are pursuing interests which are not only non-economic, they are intangible. There are all kinds of variations upon emotional, spiritual, political, economic, and cultural themes, which dominate the idea of national interest from time to time, and place to place. The assumption, therefore, that nations follow their interest has validity only when interest itself is specifically defined for each nation, and often that has to be differently defined for the same nation at various times. Under these circumstances the experience of the world in more than a generation of attempts at global solutions illustrates the folly of excluding limited objectives by limited means merely because those concepts have not been fashionable.

Bismarck offers the classic example of a statesman who followed the doctrine of limited objectives. It is important to lay emphasis upon that fact, because it demonstrates a point of first-class significance: namely, that the theory of limitation upon action and objective was not the sole property of the peace-loving, or the neutrals, or the weak.

Bismarck was an aggressor. He deliberately made war; when a real *casus belli* was lacking he was not beyond manufacturing one. He was as callous to moral considerations as Machiavelli. His object was the erection of Prussia into a first-class power, and

he employed any available means to that end. He was not seeking to serve as midwife to a "brave new world," but to achieve a specific goal. He had no thought of "total" war. To Bismarck such an idea was the height of stupidity, because it would prevent reaping the fruits of victory. His advice to the King of Prussia epitomizes his whole thought on the subject. "War," he said, "should be conducted in such a way as to make peace possible." That may be regarded, perhaps, as a mere paraphrase of the classic dictum of Clausewitz: "War is nothing but a continuation of political activities with other means intermingled........Political activities are not stopped by the war........but are substantially continuous." The passage has been worn so smooth by repetition that it requires some effort to appreciate its fundamental character.

The reality which must be grasped is that in the long run every peace is a negotiated peace. This has never been expressed any better than by Lloyd George who wrote to President Wilson on March 25, 1917, "You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate power; all the same *in the end* if she feels she has been unjustly treated in the Peace of 1919, she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors."

No one has said it more plainly. Never has a prediction been more dramatically justified. Indeed it was not necessary to wait for Germany to fulfill the prophecy. The Treaty of Sevres, imposed upon a completely defeated Turkey by the Paris peace conference, seemed to the Turks so intolerable that they were roused to desperate, and successful, resistance. The Treaty of Lausanne was quite different from that of Sevres.

This reality that a treaty to end a war must be acceptable to the defeated nation is reenforced by the nature—and the cost

—of modern warfare. After victory is won the triumphant nation is virtually exhausted. After the first World War Churchill, whom no one could call a defeatist, wrote, "Victory was to be bought so dear as to be almost indistinguishable from defeat. It was not to give security even to the victors." Briand, the almost perpetual Foreign Minister of France, used words of the same import. In the light of our current situation Churchill could today safely repeat the words he uttered a generation earlier.

For many reasons, of which exhaustion is only one, the moment of victory is brief and the settlements made in that moment are brittle unless they are satisfactory, not superficially but fundamentally, to the defeated. For politics is continuous, while war is episodic. And nothing is writ larger upon the pages of history than the reversal of alliances. Italy, allied with Germany, then warred against it in the first World War as our ally; under Mussolini it returned to the German alliance, was our enemy, was defeated, disarmed, and now returns to the status of a quasi-ally. Ways and means are being sought to modify or nullify the prohibition on rearmament in order that the Mediterranean flank of free Europe may have more strength.

From Japan's surrender on the deck of the Missouri to the terms of the Treaty of San Francisco is a far cry. The alteration is not the consequence of a cooling-off period. It is the result of political developments in Russia, China, and Southeast Asia that make Japan more valuable as a solvent friend than as a helpless bankrupt. By deliberate action we are returning that nation to the status of a great power, with all the hazards it implies. Five years ago such a proposal would have received no serious consideration. The mutations of politics are such that Japan as a great power seems less dangerous to us than a power vacuum.

It is only a few years since Yugoslavia was counted as one of the satellites of Russia and hostile to the West. Yet, today, Tito has defied Russia and occupies a somewhat distinctive place in the world by reason of that action. No one could have predicted the course of Titoism nor do we know how permanent it will prove.

The Morgenthau plan for reducing Germany to an impotent agricultural economy is already but a dim memory to most of us. Germany is in the process of being wooed away from Russia to provide a buffer—or bastion—for the protection of Western Europe. Even our army of occupation is no longer concerned with holding Germany down but primarily with protecting it until its own strength can supplement ours. The High Commissioner has explicitly admitted that Germany must be treated as an equal.

These are modern illustrations of a point made by George Washington in his Farewell Address. In specific training and background he would not be regarded today as an "expert" on foreign relations. But he had personally studied all the diplomatic correspondence of the Confederation which preceded the Union under the Constitution. He decided that the French alliance of 1778 had become a danger to the interests of the United States; he set the neutrality policy in 1793, though Madison thought it a "mistake" and Jefferson called it "pusillanimous." He was clear-headed enough to read aright the signs of the times and realize that an alliance which was not only useful, but necessary, at one moment could be not only a burden but a danger in altered circumstances. He was not long out of office before the naval war with France vindicated his opinion and led to the ending of the alliance.

On the basis of study, reflection, and hard experience, Washington got hold of one of the fudamentals of sensible foreign policy. Aware of the sharp changes that circumstances produce in the

policies of states, he realized the impermanence of every political arrangement. As one of the means to flexibility, which mutations require if one is to pursue a realistic policy, he sought to drain political decisions of emotional elements in order that a commitment made in good faith at one moment could be modified when circumstances altered. To this end he urged the avoidance of "passionate attachments" and "inveterate antipathies."

The phrases embody two basic concepts. First, emotion is exceedingly hostile to wisdom. Affectionate sentamentality and bitter hatred both defeat reason, which is the only sure guide to sound policy. That is being illustrated today in Iran. Emotional drives are forcing that nation to decision and action which are inimical to its economic welfare, internal stability, and international security. The passionate quality of its behavior is manifestation enough of its unwisdom. It is not necessary to argue that the status quo was satisfactory, or that change was not only inevitable but was overdue. The folly of policy emotionally oriented finds only its most recent, not its most significant, illustration in the current crisis. Washington was profoundly right on that matter.

The second basic concept embodied in his brief phrases is equally significant: in politics nothing is permanent. Attachments and antipathies alike are, in the broad range of history, transient. It was not until the opening of this century that Americans came to regard Britain without "inveterate antipathy." Twisting the lion's tail was a popular trick of politicians seeking public applause; even so moderate a statesman as Cleveland used startlingly strong language in the Venezuela affair: "It will in my opinion be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power as a willful aggression upon its rights and interests the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have

determined of right belongs to Venezuela." It would have been difficult at that time to foresee the diplomatic revolution within a very few years by which the English speaking peoples would come to be partners in two world wars and the cold war that was to follow.

Current assumptions that there will *never* be another shift in this orientation cannot be proved. It is difficult to foresee circumstances which would produce such a startling change. There are many reasons to hope none will occur. But our attachment to our allies should be founded upon reason, not emotion.

Similarly our tension with enemies should be coldly rational, not founded upon "inveterate antipathy." We are dimly aware of this fact, though it seldom finds adequate expression. Recently the Congress passed a resolution, which the President transmitted to the Kremlin, in which it was declared that "the American people deeply regret the artificial barriers which separate them from the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which keep the Soviet peoples from learning of the desire of the American people to live in friendship with all other peoples and to work with them in advancing the ideal of human brotherhood." There was the implicit, though unspoken, suggestion that, when the Russian people altered their government, peaceful intercourse could be resumed.

Unhappily the resolution was conceived more as a tactical maneuver in the cold war than as a sincere expression of an underlying reality. Nonetheless it is not inconceivable that if war is avoided some accommodation can be found. We shall never have a viable policy vis-a-vis Russia until we read, learn, and inwardly digest Washington's parting admonition.

When it seems as though the ideals of the two nations were so antithetical that it would be impossible to live together, we must remember that for a long time Mohammedans and Christians carried on religious wars. Now they manage to live on comfortable terms with each other by restricting their religious enthusiasm adequately so that they do not exhibit it in efforts to use force for purposes of proselyting.

There was a time, also, when the principles of monarchism and legitimacy were so passionately espoused in Russia and most of Europe that it seemed it would never be possible to have true peace with the revolutionary upstart republic in America. Yet the time came when, during the Civil War, friendly gestures upon the part of Russia were helpful.

Today we tend to regard the Russian state as it now exists under the Bolsheviks as permanent; but it is scarcely more than thirty years old. In the course of that thirty years it has gone through different phases, during some of which it was actively co-operative. It would be as grave a mistake to regard the current phase as ultimate and decisive as it would be to say that it is transient and likely to fall in a brief period of time.

In the light of what has happened, it is almost amusing to go back and look at the *New York Times* headlines during the first two or three years of Bolshevik control. Almost constantly there appeared the prediction that the Bolsheviks would fail promptly and shortly be driven out. There was no expectation that Russia under their leadership could ever become a dominant force over half of mankind. That obviously was a wrong estimate. We are likely now to make an equally wrong estimate by assuming that what has happened is permanent and that there will be no change for the better. Perspective upon the problem should indicate to us

that there may well be a marked change. Passionate emotion, inveterate in its depth, can blind us to those mutations which Washington so long ago perceived so clearly.



For the sake of stimulating thought I have been suggesting the thesis that limited operations for limited objectives offer a valid method of achieving steps toward peace. Actually, it is a far more hopeful method than stubborn insistence upon making every incident a global affair. Determination always to use a tank, even when a fly-swatter is a more appropriate instrument, is not a good way to attain a peaceful objective.

QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD

I

Q. Would you apply your theory of "limited objectives" to the probable outcome of Korea?

A. I think I shall have to apply it in Korea. In other words, I do not think that the Korean action offers leverage enough to decide all the questions in the Far East. Nor do I think that within the limits of action to which we are now committed by reason of the alliance that we can hope to get a long-range settlement even in Korea. The most we can hope for, under the messy situation in which we have found ourselves, is some *modus vivendi* which will lay the foundation for future decisions. I say that regretfully, but I am fully convinced that the limitations which have been put upon us (and from which we cannot now escape) are such that we can't get a general solution. That is an unhappy remark, but it is my view.

2

Q. You spoke of Russian withdrawal from Iran as a victory, which it was. In what manner was that brought about?

A. I think that was one of the things to be credited to the United Nations. What happened there (and here I speak from memory and without immediate review) is that world public opinion became so clear as to what was going on that the Russians did not want to hazard direct action. It seems to be true, in the last five years, that the Russians are not ready to take the responsibility for ultimate action themselves. Whenever they start something, as they did there, if you can expose the fact that it is they who are acting and that they are acting directly and that they must take responsibility for it — they will withdraw. They would rather use puppets, like the North Koreans or the Bulgarians or the Romanians, or somebody else. But in that instance they were in a position where they would have had to take full responsibility for what transpired. Once the spotlight was on that fact, they just didn't want to take that responsibility. That's my own view of it.

3

Q. I took your statement about "the limited objective in the use of forces" to indicate you believe that the fewest possible number of nations should be represented in Korea. Is that consistent with the ideas of the United Nations?

A. I will give you my view of the United Nations in order to answer. I don't want you to think that I am the oldest living man, but I was an advocate of the League of Nations, particularly as it was originally promulgated by the American Bar Associa-

tion and the League to Enforce Peace, in the First World War. And I stayed with the League of Nations until after Russia came in and the League began to go to pieces. When the United Nations was organized, I was in favor of its organization. I did not join the committee led by Colonel Stimson for the United Nations because I felt they were advertising something that they couldn't deliver. I noticed an editorial in the *Providence Journal* (I think it was yesterday) that said that General MacArthur *derogates* the United Nations. I didn't have a dictionary at hand and I just have to guess at how you would "derogate" a thing. Whatever it means, I suppose that it means that he didn't think it was God Almighty. Now, there are two ways to kill the United Nations. One would be to sabotage it, and the other is to load more on it than it can carry. I'm afraid that we are in danger of destroying the United Nations by giving it too much load to carry. I feel, at this time, that the participation of the United Nations in Korea is more formal than real, and that in some respects we would be better off if we were there alone. At least we wouldn't have to submit our policy to people who do not have the same commitments that we have. This is a beautiful illustration of the fact that when you get too many people making decisions, the decision tends to be the decision of the stupidest.

4

Q. Would you comment on the statement of Justice Douglas that we should recognize Communist China?

A. I think that the business of judges is to decide cases in the Supreme Court, and that their statements should be judicial.

5

Q. In connection with Nehru's apparent attitude towards Kashmir, would you interpret that as paralleling the leaning of Hitler and Mussolini to see what the other nations did with Japan's aggression in Korea—that he is waiting to see what is done in Korea before deciding what he will do in Kashmir?

A. Speaking in the Kashmir matter as an amateur and not as an expert, there are some of these things which I have studied more intensively than others. My own view is that we have in India two factors which are of first importance. The first is that it is a nation of immense poverty. We have a strong tendency to say that if they do so and so they will lose their liberty. But most of them have never known liberty—they have none to lose the outcasts, the lower classes, the people ground in utter poverty. And, therefore, it is by definition a politically unstable nation. The second is that India is a new nation. Nehru has just won a victory on policy by being elected Chairman of the Congress Party, but even the experts were somewhat surprised at it. In other words, his own tenure of power is tenuous. In America we tend to think of him as without competition for power; yet within his own party and with the opposing party he is in intense competition for the maintenance of his own authority. My own feeling is that so far as Kashmir is concerned, he is a captive of that fact—that he doesn't *dare* make a wise and statesmanlike solution for fear it will upset his own power and then he can't make any contribution to India. I spoke about the danger of the appeasement label getting on any negotiations and so inhibiting *our* political action—I think that's what has happened with Nehru. I can't imagine a man with as much intellectual power and spiritual sensitiveness as he has in

some matters being so defiant of both common sense and morals as he is in the Kashmir matter, unless he is inhibited from rational action by his environment.

6

Q. Dr. Wriston, do you see any possible areas in which there is a prospect of successful negotiations with the Russians for small or limited objectives?

A. That's a tough one, and I'll answer "Yes" before I get scared. We may be in the midst of one now in Germany. It seems to me that in the last six weeks there has been a change in the Russian attitude towards Western Germany. There are some indications that they have become convinced that they cannot woo Western Germany away from us and that they may be ready to make some kind of an interim arrangement by which they will leave us more alone. That's not much. Also, as you know, the other day an interpreter called around at the State Department and asked why we didn't reopen negotiations on Lend-Lease. It was a crazy way of doing it, but if you can get the oriental point of view it's a good way to "save face," because you let the suggestion be made by somebody who can be repudiated. It looks as if they had some second thoughts which might make a solution possible. I have some hope, now that the Japanese Treaty is out of the way, that we may make some headway in Korea—either militarily or diplomatically, or both; the two have to go hand in hand. I think the defeat of Gromyko in San Francisco may have marked effects upon some sectors of Russian policy. In other words if you ask me do I think there is any significant point which can now be settled, I'll have to say "No." If you ask me whether we can pursue this policy of nibbling, my answer is "Yes." And there are

two or three places where something may be done. The point that I wanted to make is that we must be alert to seize those small opportunities and not scorn them because they are small, and not get ourselves in such a frame of mind that we don't seize them.

7

Q. Dr. Wriston, if you assume that your enemy has an unlimited political objective (I'm not saying that he has, but assuming that he has), would your theory of "limited objectives" put you at a disadvantage?

A. Well, the answer of course is "yes," as you ask it in those terms. But I do not think that they have an immediate unlimited objective, or could have under their situation. Perhaps I should make it clear that a "limited objective" does not mean that you don't have a long-range, broad-gauge policy—it means that the devices you take to achieve that won't have to be a global war or a global peace, or a global settlement. You should never have a limited objective which has no relationship to your total policy. Having said that, I think nothing is clearer than that the Russians are pursuing limited objectives. That is one of the things which has given them their strength; they break out in Iran, or they break out in the Balkans, or they break out in Korea, or they break out in Berlin—and then they withdraw, if they don't succeed. If they do succeed, they take Czechoslovakia, or they take Poland, or they take Rumania. But where they fail, they retreat and wait for the situation to mature again. For example, it may well happen that if the folly in Iran goes far enough the Russians will act in that field again. When I speak of a "limited objective," therefore, I don't mean that it isn't part of a larger scheme. I think that we have suf-

fered from laying down general categories, in the United Nations and elsewhere, and then finding they didn't fit local situations that often makes us look foolish. For example, the United Nations said that Korea was one. It set it up as a united nation, but couldn't carry out the decision. It sent a body of observers there who weren't allowed across the 38th parallel. Now the British and ourselves are in an argument as to what our "objectives" are. Are we after the unification of Korea, or after some *modus vivendi*? The record makes it perfectly clear that we wish for a unification of Korea, but that we didn't start out to achieve it by military action. We started out to repel aggression. After the Inchon Landing and the dash to the Yalu, we thought we had achieved a victory and of course we then said, "We're for the unification of Korea." After the retreat and the reestablishment of the line in the vicinity of the 38th parallel, we have to return to the original idea. It is very hard to swallow—our words about unification—but we're gulping, and sooner or later we'll swallow them unless there comes a change in the military situation—in which case, of course, we'll again be for the unification of Korea.

8

Q. Dr. Wriston, you indicated that Gromyko had suffered a defeat at San Francisco. I rather felt that he was defeated before he went there. Did you mean that his defeat became greater by going to San Francisco?

A. Yes, I think he dramatized her defeat. In general I think that the Japanese matter has been handled with great skill. The treaty that was signed was a very difficult thing to negotiate. Fifty-two nations were present, of which about forty had no real business to be there. Their interests were not deeply involved.

Despite parts of the treaty they disliked, they felt they had to vote with the United States. That makes them look like satellites and makes them uncomfortable—and it ought to make us uncomfortable. It would have been a lot better if many of those nations had unilaterally declared peace with Japan—declared peace and stayed away—and left it to the people who are really involved in the Japanese war to make the treaty. On that last night John Foster Dulles, in very candid statements, showed that the Russians were invited for a specific purpose and that they came for another purpose; they had no excuse for "misunderstanding." Therefore he said to them, "You could have stayed at home; when you chose to come you chose to be guided by the rules of this conference. They have been adopted, and therefore you're out of order." Gromyko was clumsy and so stupidly repetitious that he didn't carry any conviction even by way of propaganda. That dramatic moment when he wanted a cigarette, or some other form of relief, and went out for a minute, the whole place dissolved in an uproar; when he came back it looked like buffoonery. It made him appear ridiculous; expecting high drama, the conference got slapstick comedy. When he made the effort to keep the newsmen from being present at the signing by the device of having a press conference and stalling to keep reporters in attendance, he was defeated by the newspaper men who said, "We've heard all this." And they walked out. He expected to have more time for propaganda and hoped to be more successful in detaching Indonesia and two or three other Asian states, conceivably Pakistan. So I feel the Russians were lots worse off for having come there and having failed than if they had stayed home. Nehru stayed home, I think, so as not to have to vote with the Russians. Now he is going to make a treaty which concedes much that this treaty conceded.

9

Q. I had the impression that the strength of the United States in the peace conference at San Francisco was based principally on the support of general principles of international justice, rather than what might be called "limited objectives."

A. I don't want to be cynical, but think that after we've got a good settlement we often glamorize it by using large terms. What had actually happened in the eleven months that they referred to so often as the period during which this treaty was negotiated was some of the toughest bargaining that has ever been done. The Australians and New Zealanders really put the finger on us to sign a treaty we didn't much want to sign. This mutual assistance pact with Australia and New Zealand is not anything that anybody in Washington would ever have proposed. I cannot believe we are very happy about our new arrangements with the Philippines—I don't see how we can be, because we have accepted a responsibility which we are not in a position fully to discharge. We are going to have to let political leaders in the Philippines play "ducks and drakes" and at the same time we've got to go in and clean up after them, and that's a very bad situation when the politics are as bad as they are in Manila—and New York. Therefore, while I do think that there were great principles of justice and decency, I think also that there was a great deal more of hard-headed reasonableness, which was then (as I say) generalized in moral terms. I think so far as Asia is concerned Pakistan had a certain reason for signing; each nation had a particular reason which you can analyze for signing. When the nation has reached a decision, its representatives seldom say, "I think this is good business." They say, "This is an act of justice and right."

RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES

A Lecture delivered by
by Dr. D. B. Shimkin
at the Naval War College
on 4 September 1951

Since 1928, Soviet economic development has, in essence, represented the progressive realization of the patterns foreshadowed by the First Five-Year Plan. This has been particularly true in the emphasis laid on heavy industry, in the organizational forms of agricultural enterprises, in the geographical distribution of industrial centers, and in the lay-out and functioning of the nation's transportation system. In the last five years, however, fundamental new problems have become evermore pressing. The rigidity of agricultural organization has become a bottleneck, hindering rapid growth of the non-agricultural labor force. Droughts in 1946 and 1950 brought out once more the paucity and indifferent quality of developed agricultural resources. The unevenness of economic growth throughout the Soviet Union has permitted no relaxation in the heavy pressure upon the country's transportation network. The limits in productive capacity from developed mineral deposits and operating industrial plants have been closely approached. Satellite territories in Eastern Europe and the Far East now demand increasing economic integration and development to serve effectively as outer bastions of Soviet power. Above all, challenging the western world, so greatly superior in economic potential, would call for an utmost effort in direct military production.

An examination of Soviet alternatives in economic action and an evaluation of indicated plans, viewed from the standpoint of these growing problems, are the objectives of this review of Russia's economic potential. It comprises four parts: a delineation of the general accomplishments of the Fourth Five-Year Plan

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of 1946-1950; a summary of the major economic problems faced by USSR today; an evaluation of known aspects of Soviet and satellite economic plans; and an indication of the broad possibilities for further economic expansion by the Soviet sphere.

POSTWAR ECONOMIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS: In March, 1946, less than a year after the end of World War II, the Soviet Union promulgated a Fourth Five-Year Plan of economic reconstruction and expansion. The plan was fundamentally aimed at achieving in 1950 the goals laid down for 1942 by the Third Five-Year Plan, which had been interrupted by the war. The differences between the two plans were few, notably postwar reductions in petroleum and fertilizer production targets.

By the end of 1950, the goals of the Fourth Five-Year Plan in mineral production had been substantially achieved, except for a definite failure in natural gas output (See Figure 1). Electrical-power production and railroad ton-mileage slightly exceeded the anticipated levels. In contrast, the manufacturing of non-military commodities, from farm tractors and civilian trucks, to window-glass, cotton cloth and paper, failed by appreciable margins to reach the 1950 goals. Non-agricultural employment in 1950 totalled 35 million persons, or some 18% more than had been foreseen. This fact reflected corresponding failures to meet man-year productivity goals; it also meant far greater pressure upon the meager housing facilities of the Soviet Union than anticipated. In agriculture, only cotton production exceeded plan; however, grain and sugar-beet outputs were only slightly below target levels. On the other hand, the hay, flax and sunflower seed programs were marked failures. The increases in livestock numbers between 1945 and 1950 averaged less than two-thirds of those planned. Finally, while the reconstruction of manufacturing and transportation facilities in the war-devastated regions was successfully accomplished, extrem-

ly little progress was realized in the construction of new plants and rail lines. Such important projects as the Orsk and Rustavi steel mills, the Novosibirsk Automotive Plant[1], and the South Siberian Railroad remained unfinished.

By the end of 1950, Soviet mining manufacturing and railroad ton-mileage had reached levels 40 to 50% higher than the pre-war peaks. Especially important advances were realized in aluminum and electrical power output which reached over thrice and nearly double the pre-war peaks, respectively. The number of farm tractors produced in 1950 (81,000) was considerably more than achieved in 1937 to 1940, but far under the peak of 103,000 reached in 1935. Man-year productivity in non-agricultural pursuits exceeded that of 1940 by some 10%, a gain entirely ascribable to post-war increases in the work week, to 48 hours. In agriculture, the only important rise above pre-war production was in cotton[2]. This was desperately needed to suppy mills in the satellite areas and China; domestic output of cotton cloth in the USSR failed to regain the pre-war figure.

The most important effect of World War II on the Soviet economy was to force a tremendous eastward shift. During the Fourth Five-Year Plan period, the major effort changed from new development east of the Volga to reconstruction in the west. Nevertheless, the net result of the past decade has been to increase the significance of the Volga, Urals, Siberian and Turkestan economic regions to the following degrees:

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[1] In the South Urals, Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and Western Siberia, respectively.

[2] Nearly 40% in comparison with 1940, a poor year; only some 15% above the average for 1937-40. Data from L. Volin, U. S. Department of Agriculture.

In mineral production, from 25% to 50% of the nation's total.

In electrical power output, from 24% to 37%.

In rail-freight originated and terminated, from 28% to 41%.

It must be noted, however, that the share of these eastern regions in both total and urban population, and in developed agricultural land is no greater today than it was fifteen years ago. Another point is significant: within European Russia, the Central Regions and the Ukraine have maintained a fairly steady development, while economic stagnation has marked not only the war-damaged western frontiers but also the Caucasus.

How did Soviet economy, at the completion of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, compare in stature with the American? In mineral consumption, electrical power production, and, evidently in total industrial output, civil and military combined, the Soviet: American ratios in 1950 closely approximated 1:4. Even with the production of the Eastern European satellites added to the Soviet total, the ratio in comparison with the United States did not exceed 1:3; or, in comparison with the Atlantic Powers jointly, 1:5. The Soviet Union manifested relatively greater strength than a quarter of the American output in coal and lead, and in the production of cotton cloth, but exhibited much greater comparative weakness in petroleum and natural gas, and in a wide series of civilian manufactures, ranging from trucks to paper. In agriculture, forestry and fishing, the mean ratio was about 6:10; on a per capita basis, however, the supplies of these products available to the Soviet Union was less than half the American. The outstanding Soviet weaknesses lay in cotton and, surprisingly, timber production.

SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS: As was indicated earlier, many serious economic problems confront the Soviet Union today. These difficulties must, however, be viewed in proper perspective. They are unquestionably serious enough to hamper and delay the achievement of many Soviet economic and strategic objectives, and they might prove dangerous in an all-out war or comparable extraordinary emergency. But under present conditions they cannot stop a growth in the total power of the Soviet sphere, and certainly they presage no collapse.

In my opinion, the most important adverse factor in the Soviet economy since the end of World War II has been the great load of armaments, including the atomic energy program. This military burden seems clearly to have exceeded even Soviet anticipations. Lags in construction, and gaps between goals and performances in civilian manufacturing, simultaneously with excellent records in mineral production, electrical power output and transportation, give clear evidence on this point. Heavy militarization has cut deeply into supplies of labor, electrical energy, metals, chemicals and tools available to the civilian economy. Large-scale stockpiling has also been an indubitable factor in reducing civilian supplies.

			Ratio 1950 to		
Factor	Unit	Reached in 1950	Planned Goals	1939/1940 Peak	U.S. 1948 Output
Mineral production:					
Coal (bitum. equiv.)	Mill. m.t.	220	1.06	1.6	0.35
Petroleum	" "	35.0	0.99[5]	1.2	0.12
Natural gas	" m.[3]	2.51	0.28	1.2	0.02
Steel ingots[1]	" m. t.	2.48	0.97	1.4	0.31
Copper (electrolytic)	Thous. m. t.	(2.90)	1.12	1.8	(0.30)
Lead, primary	" "	(144)	0.92	(1.6)	0.39

RESTRICTED

Factor	Unit	Reached in 1950	Ratio 1950 to		
			Planned Goals	1939/1940 Peak	U.S. 1948 Output
Zinc, primary	" "	(128)	0.99	(1.6)	0.26
Aluminum, primary	" "	(180)	1.00	3.2	0.31
Cement	Mill. m. t.	10.6	1.01	1.8	0.30
Total[2]	Bill. U. S. 1937 doll.	1.57	(1.0)	1.5	(0.25)
Manufacturing:					
Farm tractors	Thous. Units	81[3]	(0.74)[3]	3.0	0.12
Trucks and cars[4]	" "	400	0.80	1.9	0.08
Superphosphate	Mill. m. t.	2.6	0.96[5]	1.7	(0.30)
Window glass	" m.[2]	66	0.82	1.1	—
Cotton cloth	" m.	3.98	0.83	1.0	0.44
Paper	" m. t.	1.23	0.92	1.5	0.14
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries:					
All grains	Mill. m. t.	(95.0)	(0.93)	1.0	0.60
Wheat	" "	30.2	—	—	0.85
Sugar beets	" "	23.4	0.90	1.1	1.3[6]
Unginned cotton	" "	3.7	1.2	1.1	(0.25)
Cattle	Mill. head	57.2	0.87	1.0	0.73
Fish catch	Mill. m. t.	1.72	0.78	1.1	0.82
Timber cut (roundwood)	Mill m.[3]	155	0.86	1.4	0.43
Elctrical Power Output	Bill. kw-h	90	1.0	1.9	0.27
Railroad Freight	Bill. m. t. kw-h	594	1.1	1.4	0.64
Civilian Non-Farm Employment	Millions	(34.5)	1.2	1.3	0.80

Factor	Unit	Reached in 1950	Planned Goals	Ratio 1950 to 1939/1940 Peak	Ratio 1950 to U.S. 1948 Output
Men, 15-59, *in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing*	Millions	(35.2)	—	1.1	4.4

Notes:

1. Probably includes a substantial proportion from scrap.
2. Excludes gold, silver, stone, sand and gravel.
3. Converted from "15-h.p." units; average calculated power per tractor - 33 h.p. Percentage of plan achieved, for the entire period 1946-1950.
4. Excludes an equivalent of 25% additional in spare parts.
5. Reduction from 1942 goal in Third Five-Year Plan.
6. Includes cane sugar.

Finally, the severe restrictions on trade which the western nations have imposed as counters to the Soviet threat have had a gradually cumulative adverse affect.

Next in significance appear to be the great Soviet shortages in productive capacity of all descriptions. Blast and open-hearth furnaces, electrical-power stations, housing and factory space, transportation, and farm equipment are all being used with great intensity. In general, the production reserves available to the USSR today are far smaller than in 1940, and negligible by comparison with the United States. Shortages in capacity are, of course, inherent in any rapid industrialization. However, they have been aggravated in the Soviet Union by substandard construction and manufactures, poor maintenance practices, and inadequate allowances for amort-

ization. Also significant since 1937 has been the great lag in new construction resulting from the diversions of materials and labor to direct military ends.

Closely allied to the problem of inadequate reserves of capacity are the continuation of obsolete and inadequately diversified production, as well as slow growth in labor productivity. Transportation and agricultural equipment have been especially characterized by the continued output of a limited range of old models. The attempt to achieve maximum production with minimum investment has led to frequent deficiences in belt lines and other internal transportation systems; in the diversification of machine tools; in the adequacy of control devices, which has in turn prevented the wide use of automatic production and, especially, quality control; and in space-allocation, lighting, ventilation and heating. These factors, combined with poor living conditions and a very high proportion of women and children in industry, have resulted in low productivity.

Low man-hour productivity both in urban occupations and on farms has resulted in a severe labor shortage, aggravated by the tremendous losses of men in World War II and by the maintenance of a huge standing army. To meet this problem, the Soviets have put great pressure on workers, prohibiting unauthorized changes of employment and making compulsory not only a 48-hour basic work week but also overtime within wide limits. Labor discipline has been extremely harsh, backed by criminal penalties for violations. The Soviets accelerated the entry of urban women into the labor market by the currency conversion of 1947, which virtually wiped out individual savings. In consequence, the present proportion of women in non-agricultural employment, nearly half, closely approximates the World War II peak. Further growth of urban employment, to a degree unanticipated in 1946, has been

maintained by the conscription of 14 to 17-year olds, largely farm children, for industry and the railroads. Up to now, the growth of city population by the mass transfer of adult farmers, as happened during the collectivization of agriculture in the 1930's, has been inhibited by the following factors.

First, the losses in power suffered from the slaughter of horses and the destruction of mechanical equipment during World War II have not yet been made good. Second, even by Soviet standards, urban housing and service conditions are too limited for much additional crowding. Third, the collective farmer, enjoying somewhat greater political and economic freedom, a greater security of subsistence, than his city cousin has been reluctant to leave the land. His rights to a place on the farm have been guaranteed by a charter in perpetuity. Nevertheless, the revocation of these rights which began in 1950 may be the beginning of a new era of forced urbanization.

Many raw materials have also been in short supply. In minerals, the non-metallics, particularly diamonds, fertilizers and sulphuric acid basics, have been especially deficient. Other weaknesses include petroleum, zinc, tin, molybdenum and cobalt. In agricultural commodities, the supplies of fibers, rubber, leather, and protein sources have been conspicuously weak. As mentioned previously, timber production is also low. All of these shortages have been intensified by the decline of trade with the west, the need for supplying the satellites, and the disproportionately great demands of armaments.

SOVIET AND SATELLITE ECONOMIC PLANS: At the present time, the position of the Soviet Union is anomalous—that of a planned economy without a highly publicized plan of national economic development. The Fifth Five-Year Plan, which was to

begin in 1951, has been either delayed or completely abrogated. Instead the main Soviet effort is ostensibly to be devoted, for the next five to six years, to the accomplishment of a series of grandiose water-development projects.

These plans may be divided into three groups: the Volga-Don Basin projects, the South Ukrainian projects and the Turkmen Canal scheme. The first of these is an old plan, started in the mid-1930's and originally scheduled for completion in 1947. Two parts of the Volga plan have already been completed, the Ivan'kovo-Uglich and the Rybinsk dam systems on the Upper Volga which have created a large reservoir above Rybinsk and have a capacity of 460,000 kw. if all the planned dynamos have been installed. Two other dams, near Gor'kii on the Volga, and Molotov on the Kama, started in 1933 and due to be completed in 1938-39, must yet be finished; they are to have installed capacities of 400,000 and 500,000 kw., respectively. All of these dams except the one at Molotov are wide but low structures, raising the natural water levels only by 36 to 49 feet; the Molotov dam is to be higher, with a head of 115 feet.

Lower on the Volga, two new dams are to be built at Kuibyshev and Stalingrad. They are to be largely of earthen construction, some two miles long, and 66 to 85 feet high, exclusive of parapets. Electrical power capacities of 2.0 and 1.7 million kilowatts, respectively, are to be installed; half the power generated to be transmitted to Moscow. The two reservoirs, each in excess of 16 million acre-feet capacity or equal jointly to that of Hoover Dam by itself, are to irrigate an overall total of some 10 million acres. To aid this purpose, two principal canals, one 60 miles south to the Sarpa lakes and the other 200 miles east to the Kamysh-Samar lakes, are to be dug as outlets for the Stalingrad reservoir.

West of Stalingrad, work on the Volga-Don canals is in progress. This canal, 62 miles long, must lift the waters of the Volga some 250 feet; those of the Don, 125 feet. To accomplish this, 13 locks will be needed. Below the canal, at Tsymlyansk, the Soviets are constructing a low but exceedingly long retaining structure consisting of a 500-yard wide dam and two earthen dikes totalling 13,000 yards. The structure is to raise the water level of the Don by 86 feet, creating a reservoir of some 10 million acre-feet capacity, which is to regulate the flow of water to Rostov, and to permit the irrigation of 1,850,000 acres, facilitated by canals aggregating 350 miles in length. The power to be installed at Tsymlyansk is to total 160,000 kw.

The South Ukrainian projects comprise essentially the construction of the following: a dam on the lower Dnyepr at Kakhovka, with a reservoir of nearly 11.5 million acre-feet capacity; another dam, on the Molochnaya River to the southeast, and a diversionary canal from the old Dnyeprstroi reservoir to the Molochnaya River, carrying the flood-waters of the Dnyepr hitherto spilled and thus filling the Molochnaya basin to a capacity of 5 million acre-feet. From these basic structures a series of irrigation canals totalling 560 miles in length will be needed to distribute water throughout the Southern Ukraine and Crimea. New irrigated land is to aggregate 3.7 million acres; power capacity at Kakhovka, 250,000 kw.

The Turkmen project envisages the construction of a dam diverting much of the waters of the Amu Darya from the river's delta and the Aral Sea southwestward, via canals and old stream-beds, to the Caspian. The main purposes of this project are alleged to be the irrigation of 3.2 million acres, and the provision of industrial water supply to Krasnovodak and other mining centers.

The evaluation of all of these projects is extremely difficult, since very few technical or economic data regarding them are available. Nevertheless, I would like to summarize a number of my impressions:

1. Although these projects involve very large undertakings in moving earth and laying concrete, none of them are inherently impossible from the standpoint of present-day technology. However, the degree to which these projects appear to be serious plans rather than fanciful schemes differs greatly. Technically, the most dubious appear to be the Turkmen project, the Stalingrad-Kamysh-Samar lakes canal, the Tsymlyansk dam, and the Volga-Moscow transmission lines. It should be noted the Amu Darya is still a completely unregulated river, with tremendous variations in discharge, carrying an extremely heavy load of silt. The effectiveness of a dam just above the delta is thus very doubtful. In addition, the complete absence of industrial facilities in, or even transportation to, this region would make necesasry a very large scale of preliminary investment. In regard to the Stalingrad canal, I will simply state that not even the route has yet been determined. The Tsymlyansk dam, while technically not difficult to build, will face very difficult maintenance and seepage problems, since it is being constructed on deep, unconsolidated sands. Finally, the planned transmission lines from Kuibyshev and Stalingrad to Moscow would strain Soviet technology to the utmost.

2. At the same time, it is essential to note that all of these projects can be phased, and that alternative plans are fully possible for the later phases. In general, the first effects of dam construction would be to facilitate local water supplies and navigation; the power facilities can be built up very gradually, since the small drop characterizing all the sites involves numerous small generators rather than a few giants. Furthermore, the power developed can

be used locally, or transmitted for varying distances. In the Volga project, as laid out in 1937, barely 20% of the power from Kuibyshev was to be transmitted to Moscow. Instead, most to be used locally for power-intensive industry and irrigation, while the bulk of the remainder was to be transmitted to Kazan, Gor'kii and Ufa. The pre-war variant of the lower Volga project anticipated using nearly all the power for non-ferrous metals, fertilizer, synthetic rubber and other plants to be located near the dam site. The enormous power and water requirements for the manufacture of fissionable or fusionable atomic raw materials are well known; thus it is conceivable that the Volga projects might eventually augment Soviet atomic potential rather than furnishing power to Moscow.

3. The construction time for these projects, especially the irrigation schemes, is almost certain to be far greater than anticipated. Numerous bottlenecks for simultaneous progress on these various plans are evident, e. g., limited quantities of heavy earth-moving equipment, cement, and electrical-generating machinery. In consequence, the probable rate of investment is unlikely to exceed a moderate fraction of Russia's total investment capacity, leaving the bulk for a more general Fifth Five-Year Plan, intensified aid to the satellites, or a rapidly accelerating armaments program.

4. The economic effect of these programs, excluding the Turkman Canal as unlikely of accomplishment, may be the following. Extremely important gains in electrical power production, without corresponding pressures on coal mining or transportation, are probable. So too is the development of large water supplies on the Volga and in the Southern Ukraine for industrial and urban use. Substantial accessions to Soviet air and atomic power would be plausible by-products.

From the standpoint of navigation, both gains and losses may be foreseen. A deep-water channel from Tsymlyansk to Moscow and to Molotov in the Urals would be of great advantage to the Soviet Union, providing significant relief to the railroads which link the great central Russian, Ukrainian and Urals' industrial complexes. On the other hand, the loss of at least 16% of the Volga discharge because of water diversions and increased evaporation from reservoirs would accelerate the already-rapid drying up of the Caspian Sea. The northern shore would recede possibly 40 miles in a couple of decades; Kara Bugaz Gulf, already a separate lake, would disappear. Maintenance of transportation on the lower Volga and in the Caspian would be both difficult and costly. The effects on the important Caspian Sea fisheries would be disastrous. Much of the same can be said for the prospects of the Don below Tsymlyansk, which faces loss of some 40% of its discharge.

5. The projects envisage irrigating some 15.5 million acres of land. They do not emphasize, however, that nearly a million acres of cultivated land have already been flooded in the creation of the Rybinsk reservoir, and that the new reservoirs would flood an additional four million acres. Thus the net gain in cultivated land would ultimately total barely 3% of the acreage sown in 1950; the net gain in agricultural production, not more than 6 or 7%. Clearly, these plans provide no long-range solution to Russia's agricultural problem. The purported amelioration of climatic conditions through these projects is, of course, nonsense.

Let us now consider briefly the satellite plans for economic development. For Poland, Czechoslovakia and presumably, Eastern Germany, there is envisaged a 70% increase in mineral production within five years. Fuel output is to rise by about a third; cement, to nearly double. Pig iron, copper and zinc production

are supposed to be more than tripled. In manufacturing, the planned increases range from 40% for shoes, to 70 to 95% for locomotives, radios, textiles, motor vehicles and electrical-power output. Three new industrial centers are to arise, near Cracow, in the Warsaw area, and in the vicinity of Frankfort on the Oder. Generally speaking, the plans anticipate a rate of growth in industry comparable to that achieved by the Soviet Union during the First Five-Year Plan. However, conditions in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany today are far less favorable for rapid industrialization than were those in the USSR in 1928. Their populations are already 55% to 75% urban; their agricultural practices are relatively advanced. Furthermore, they must import a great part of their raw materials. All cotton, much timber, two-thirds of the iron ore, all steel-alloying metals, many non-ferrous metals, and such basics as sulphur minerals and phosphate rock must come either from the Soviet Union or the west. In addition, these countries carry armaments loads comparable to that of the USSR in 1939, rather than in 1928. Only substantial Soviet aid can avert the failure of these plans.

The plans for Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria are even more ambitious, calling for a 175% increase in mineral production within five years, and for the creation of many completely new industries, ranging from fertilizers to bicycles. Here again, Soviet aid would be indispensable for success.

POTENTIALITIES AND ALTERNATIVES: Let us summarize the data presented thus far. First, the Soviet Union, by the end of 1950, achieved an industrial output 40-50% above its pre-war peak, and a quarter as great as the American in 1948-50. In agriculture, it essentially regained the pre-war level, roughly 60% the current American output. Second, the Soviet economy today faces serious problems deriving from the impacts of an armaments

race with the West; of shortages in productive capacity; of obsolescence and inadequate diversification in many technological areas; of low man-power productivity; and of numerous raw-material shortages. Third, the absence of a Fifth Five-Year Plan currently leaves the bulk of Soviet investment capacity without known commitments. The water-development projects now under way are certain to be completed at a slower speed than planned. They are likely to be most valuable in augmenting Soviet electrical-power production and industrial water supplies, and in improving transportation within the Volga River basin north of the Caspian Sea. Sharp increases in Soviet air and atomic energy capabilities may be results. Finally, the Eastern European satellites have been committed to industrialiation programs substantially beyond their capabilities without substantial Soviet aid.

In conclusion, I would like to indicate the longer-term economic potentialities and alternatives of action which appear to be open to the Soviet sphere today. It is my belief that the USSR has the manpower and investment capacity at present to be able to double its industrial output within ten years. Such an increase, however, could be achieved only by continuing austerity, limiting armaments, and avoiding exports of capital. By such means, Russia could largely solve her food problems, through increased irrigation and, above all, systematic land improvement in the old Central Russian and Ukrainian agricultural areas. Considerable expansion in mineral output could be achieved, especially in Kazakhstan and Central Siberia. New industrial centers in these areas, and in the underdeveloped regions of Central Russia could, in conjunction with a moderate length of new railroads, greatly reduce the nation's weaknesses in transportation. The potential rate of economic growth by the satellite areas would, under such circumstances, be rather slower than the Soviet.

The second alternative would be accelerated economic growth in the satellite areas, including Manchuria, achieved by large capital flows from the USSR, and hence slower Soviet development. Such a program would gain more output with less investment and would create strong outposts, east and west, for defense or offense. Potential Titoism and the vulnerability of immensely long communication lines would, however, be paramount problems.

The final alternative would be a virtual cessation of economic expansion in favor of an all-out armaments effort soon followed by attempted seizure of Western Europe's industrial potential.

Which alternative or combination of alternatives the Soviet Union may have chosen is an unanswered question of decisive significance.

RECOMMENDED READING

CURRENT BOOKS

The evaluations of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Title: *The Soviet Union.* 216 p.

Author: Gurian, Waldemar, ed. Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1951.

Evaluation: A collection of opinions on the Soviet Union written by eight of the country's foremost authorities on the subject. Each contributor has written on a specific aspect of the subject in which he is particularly qualified. The topics covered by this symposium are: The Development of the Soviet Regime from Lenin to Stalin; Historical Background of Soviet Thought Control; Results of Soviet Five-Year Plans; Soviet Exploitation of National Conflicts in Eastern Europe; Aims and Methods of Soviet Terrorism; Religion in Russia, 1941-1950; Church and State in Central Europe. This book is ably written and deserves high praise, although being the work of eight authors, it suffers a little from lack of integration.

Title: *Victory Without War.* 73 p.

Author: Warburg, James P. Lancaster, Pa., Franklin & Marshall College and The Current Affairs Press, N. Y., 1951.

Evaluation: This short book by one of the advanced thinkers of our time is a noteworthy analysis of United States foreign policy—particularly of what the author conceives to be its weaknesses in concept and execution; and a further outline of how these weaknesses might be corrected to give the United States a positive dynamic role in the international scene. Whether or not the reader agrees with all premises assumed by Mr. Warburg, this booklet warrants careful study by all interested in the role of our country in the uneasy world of today.

Title: *Roads to Agreement.* 240 p.

Author: Chase, Stuart. N. Y., Harper & Bros., 1951,

Evaluation: Discusses various efforts to promote agreement among men. Failure therein causes many of the world's troubles. Thus it follows, that if men could learn the techniques of obtaining harmony, the world's problems would be more easily solved. There results a challenging and easily read book.

Title: *Total Empire.* 293 p.

Author: Walsh, Edmund A. Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Co., 1951.

Evaluation: Father Walsh, well known to senior officers as the founder and regent of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, presents in "Total Empire" a unique interpretation of world Communism by going back to the roots of the Russian Revolution to answer the often asked questions: "How is it possible?" "What is the secret of Soviet success?" "Why does the Russian Revolution now control 800-000,000 people?" With a penetrating insight and understanding of the behavior of man, Father Walsh has, after twenty-five years of study and personal contact with the Reds, produced a complete analysis of the guiding philosophy of this world movement and has provided a simple explanation of dialectical materialism showing how it is the norm of Soviet foreign policy.

Title: *Russia By Daylight.* 240 p.

Author: Crankshaw, Edward. London, Michael Joseph, 1951. (Published in the U. S. under the title: Cracks in the Kremlin Wall, N. Y., Viking Press, 1951.)

Evaluation: "The first thing to do in any conflict is to define the enemy. Only then can we decide what the conflict is about; and until we know what we are fighting, and why, we shall not get very far." These opening words set the tone for, and express the concept of, this most timely book. In "Russia by Daylight," the author has accomplished the difficult task of defining the enemy and isolating the professional Bolshevik from the background in which he works and manipulates his adherents to achieve his basic

goal of power. He analyzes the motives of the "Communists" of the Kremlin's Russia, and following an examination of the backgrounds and forces that have shaped them, estimates their resources, their strengths and weaknesses. Against this backdrop, he proceeds into a sober examination of what the free world might—and could—do to counteract this international conspiracy to terrorism. Every American, and particularly all those whose duties must bring them into contact with any representative of the Stalin regime, should read this book.

Title: *The Operational Code of the Politboro.* 100 p.

Author: Leites, N. N. Y., McGraw-Hill, 1951.

Evaluation: This is probably the clearest, most concise, and most pertinent expose of the Soviet-Communist thought pattern that has yet been published. It presents the doctrinal basis of communist action in so blunt and forthright a manner that the reader, unless he is prepared for it, might tend to reject portions of it as beyond credibility. For this reason, it is suggested that "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" be read as a preliminary appreciation of this point of view so foreign to our Western culture. (Note: "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" by Mr. George Kennan was published in **Foreign Affairs**, July, 1947.

Title: *The Art of Administration.* 208 p.

Author: Tead, Ordway. N. Y., McGraw-Hill, 1951.

Evaluation: A "democratic", human relations approach to the problem of administration. It reviews only broad, general concepts in an attempt to inculcate an attitude rather than to show how to administer. The author has included the recent findings of the social scientists and psychologists. Though administration is not included in the War College curriculum, this book is of value in understanding current trends such as the Doolittle Board Report.

Title: *Balkan Caesar.* 229 p.

Author: White, Leigh. N. Y., Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951.

Evaluation: The author traces the strange and devious career of Tito of Yugoslavia (the only disciple of Stalinism to defy the master and remain alive) through changing identities

until Marshal Tito emerges. He throws new light on the wartime conflict between Tito and Mikhailovitch which has been thoroughly misunderstood The reasons behind the dramatic break with Stalin are presented clearly and in detail. By dealing with Tito, in interest of our national security, we should be able to turn Tito's heresy to the ultimate goal of the Western civilization. Provides a good background for an understanding of the Balkan States.

Title: *In Defense of the National Interest.* 283 p.

Author: Morgenthau, Hans J. N. Y., Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

Evaluation: Brief history of American foreign policy which points out basic "errors" and explains them, highlights our failures of judgment in Asia and Europe, and decries our present weakness of leadership A highly stimulating book which those of ideological turn of mind will find most challenging. The author develops his basic thesis that the national interest is the only basis for correet and effective foreign policy, points out how Americans have tended to ignore that fact ever since Washington's time, and then leads into our present difficulties to explain our confused and vacillating policies since World War II. Very valuable as background reading on foreign policy and current political problems for all naval officers.

Title: *American Diplomacy.* 146 p.

Author: Kennan, George. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951.

Evaluation: This is a masterly diagnosis of the ills that plague United States policies and foreign relations by one of the best political minds in our land. Mr. Kennan makes a vivid, plain-spoken appraisal of our foreign relations over the past vital half-century; and arrives at some conclusions that are revealing—though apt to be somewhat shocking to our self-esteem. He shows, in brief, how our national preoccupation with the moral and legal principles of international relations, and our concurrent neglect of realistic factors of international power politics have been largely instrumental in bringing us to the present precarious position in an uneasy world. He then indicates, with evidence to support his thesis, that our policies

should be based on a careful appraisal of POWER FACTORS in the world of today—on the creation and maintenance of a state of maximum stability the world over. Included in the volume, as appendices, and as well placed accents on the central theme, are reprints of his two most renowned former articles—THE SOURCES OF SOVIET CONDUCT, and AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE. Recommended reading for all officers attached to the Naval War College and for all who are interested in the foreign policies of our country.

CURRENT PERIODICALS

This section lists material published in current periodicals which may be of interest to all officers.

Baldwin, Hanson W.

China As a Military Power.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October, 1951, p. 51-62. An evaluation of the "new" Chinese soldier and of the military potential of China which concludes that the Chinese Army is now a major political factor in the Orient.

Cramer, Frederick

The Dictator: A Modern Version.
CURRENT HISTORY, September, 1951, p. 151-158. Explains how the theories of Hobbes, Hegel, Marx and others have contributed to the ideas used by modern dictators and emphasizes that they must be fought in the spiritual as well as the military and economic realms.

Fechteler, Adm. William M.

We Can't Be Invaded.
U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, October 5, 1951, p. 24-29. An interview with the Chief of Naval Operations, in which he replies to questions concerning the Navy's role in U. S. defense.

Hessler, William H.

Turkey - Hairbreadth Democracy.
THE REPORTER, October 16, 1951, p. 17-19. An analysis of the political situation in Turkey, one of the newest democracies in the world.

Horan, H. E., Rear Adm., R. N. — *Combined Operations, Past and Present.* THE NAVY, October, 1951, p. 243-245. Briefly reviews the use of combined operations in the past, gives an account of the planning that was necessary for the successful invasion of France and suggests that proper study of the subjects of combined operations before the war might have shortened it considerably.

Long, George W. — *Journey Into Troubled Iran.* THE NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE, October 1951, p. 425-464. Descriptive article on present-day Iran whose soil holds nearly one-eighth of the world's proved petroleum reserves.

Mowrer, Edgar Ansel — *What Asia Wants.* HARPER'S, October, 1951, p. 67-72. Considers the revolt of Asia to be against interference by Western Colonial powers and inequality of status among Western Nations.

Quigley, Harold S. — *Our Dilemma in the Far East.* THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW for Autumn, 1951, p. 498-514. An interpretation of our Far Eastern policy based on the fact that conflict for power in Asiatic states left the U. S. in each case, with a choice between two equally unsatisfactory systems of Government.

Reinhardt, G. C., Col., U. S. A. and Kintner, W. R., Lt. Col., U. S. A. — *Sea Power: Base of American Policy.* MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, October, 1951, p. 40-45. Argues that the U. S. Navy is the basic tool of foreign policy and must possess the strength to pursue all the tasks incumbent upon naval supremacy. (Discussion of the theories of Mahan and MacKinder, p. 44-45).

Spaight, J. M. — *Pax Atlantica.* THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, August, 1951, p. 434-439. Warns against disarmament if

danger of war with Russia lessens and proposes that with British and U. S. air and sea power in the lead a new era of Pax Atlantica similar to the 19th century Pax Britannica, is possible.

Tannenbaum, Frank

The American Tradition in Foreign Relations.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October, 1951, p. 31-50. Develops the thesis that U. S. foreign policy has been based upon the ideal of juridical equality and moral integrity of nations and in conclusion, states that our quarrel with Russia concerns her contempt for the independent sovereignty of other nations.

Vandenberg, Hoyt S., General

Air Power's Decisive Role in Europe.
LOOK, October 9, 1951, p. 29-34. Recounts the lessons learned in Korea to show why air power is the dominant factor in planning Europe's defense and compares military problems in Europe today to those of 1944.