The Cold War: A World History

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Kiszely provides a convincing argument that the foundation for German success was theater-level strategy and management of the campaign. Even though the Allies had local successes, as demonstrated in the battle of Narvik, their tactical achievements were not embedded in a grand strategy or theater-level objective for winning the campaign.

In conclusion, Kiszely claims that the campaign in Norway was a decisive victory for the Germans, in that they achieved strategic surprise and dominating airpower. The main reason for the British campaign failure is found in the link between policy and plans. The ends were not supported by available means and ways, and policy became divorced from reality. Such determinations leave the reader to evaluate and decide where the responsibility for the failure of the campaign lies.

The book summarizes key military lessons learned and strategic guidance. I strongly encourage national security advisers and military leaders to read it.

LARS SAUNES


Odd Arne Westad has taken on a difficult task: providing a one-volume history of the Cold War. The U.S.-Soviet confrontation lasted over four decades and had many episodes. Cramming the entire story into one book—even one that is over seven hundred pages long—is no simple thing. Westad made his task even harder by taking an international focus and starting his coverage in the 1890s, with the politicization of the confrontation between labor and capital.

However, Westad is certainly up to the task. He is something of a transnational man. Although Norwegian, he holds a PhD from a U.S. school (the University of North Carolina) and has taught in both the United Kingdom and the United States. This book is the product of research in archives around the planet (Bulgaria, Egypt, India, Russia, South Africa, and the United States) and the reading of other source material published in German, French, Chinese, and Norwegian. An important advantage to this book is that it is an easy read, which is crucial, given its length. It is easy for historians to get trapped in the details of their research and skimp on their analysis and writing. That is not the case here. Westad covers events in a compelling but concise manner. At times, though, the reader might wish that he had provided more documentation of his arguments, since his footnotes often do not show from where his evidence came.

The chapter on the ideological elements of the confrontation before the 1940s is less than convincing, but fortunately short. Westad sustains these arguments better in the body of the text. In World War II, capitalism and communism worked together not because of the Nazi threat but only because of the Germans. “Some form of postwar conflict was next to inevitable” (p. 68). Joseph Stalin was a brutal dictator, but he also was indecisive and let European affairs drift, while the United States acted. As a result, Washington had more to do with turning the postwar confrontation into a sustained Cold War than did Moscow.

One of the central arguments of this book is that the Cold War was about more than the United States and the Soviet Union. On this point, Westad is certainly correct; the question is one of emphasis. He gives a good deal of
coverage to China and India; Latin America and Africa also get attention. However, the theme of these sections seems to be impact rather than influence, and while that focus makes sense for the argument he wants to make, it does seem to divert attention away from more-significant developments.

The individuals most responsible for moving the Cold War away from dangerous confrontation were Richard M. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev. Both wanted détente, but for different reasons. Westad argues that this period was basically a truce. In many ways, détente turned out to be much better for the United States. The competition did not go away, but it turned to soft power, in which global trends ended up favoring capitalism and the United States. Nixon also managed to turn China into an ally during this period. Westad argues that this development occurred more because of the incompetence of Mao Zedong as a statesman than Nixon’s skills as a strategist. Mao had weakened China, and his policies often brought about situations that were exactly the opposite of what he wanted. Rejecting the argument of most historians, Westad argues that the Americans rather than the Soviets killed détente, mostly because of American domestic politics. These arguments are well sustained, and although many might have trouble accepting these contentions, they are basically correct.

Why did the Cold War end with a U.S. victory? “Like its enemy, the United States had its portion of Cold War successes and failures. It is just that the balance sheet came out differently, and better, than that of the other side” (p. 620). The assets that worked to the advantage of the United States included long-term alliances, economic growth and transformations, technological change, and diplomatic skill.

This book is hardly the last word on the Cold War; given its significance, the period will be studied for decades to come. But Westad has given his readers an important, thought-provoking account, and that is no small thing.

NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES


In the summer of 1988, I stepped aboard USS Yorktown (CG 48) as a young midshipman during my orientation cruise and noticed a ship silhouette painted on the bridge wing. When members of my class inquired about its meaning, the crew regaled us with the story of the shouldeing incident with the Russian frigate Bezzaventnyy just a few months earlier in the Black Sea—the incident pictured on the cover of David F. Winkler’s recently updated Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation and Cooperation with Russia and China, 1945–2016. Winkler began studying the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (also known as the Incidents at Sea Agreement, or INCSEA) after experiencing such events firsthand as a junior officer in the Sea of Japan in the mid-1980s. Since then, he has established himself as an authority on the subject at the Naval Historical Foundation. With a foreword by the chief U.S. negotiator of INCSEA, former Secretary of the Navy John W. Warner, this edition of Winkler’s book builds on the original (published in 2000) by addressing the expanding influence of China and the resurgence of Russia as global competitors in the maritime domain.