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

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INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS

FOREWORD

This "Information Service" has been initiated and established by the Chief of Naval Personnel for the benefit of officers unable to attend the Naval War College.

In this and subsequent issues will be found selected articles of value to all officers. Many of these articles will be outstanding lectures delivered at the Naval War College and other service institutions.

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THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA

Major George Fielding Eliot

Admiral Smith, Gentlemen:

I have been asked to talk today on the situation in the Mediterranean and Middle East—and what I shall give you is pretty much of a reporter's story. I have recently been there and have seen a good many of our military, naval, and diplomatic people—and many local personalities as well. I'll give you as objective a survey of the existing situation as I can.

You all know of the strategic importance of the Middle East. Any European power seeking to expand into either Asia or Africa must pass through the Middle East. The Soviet Union is already in Asia, but access for large military forces or commerce from Soviet Asia to the rest of Asia (the inhabited portions of India, China and Southeast Asia) is not easy. The normal route is by air. There is an overland route through the Persian Gulf Area, and an important sea route from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal. All these lines of communication (including a network of cables linking Europe and Asia) are controlled by the Middle East.

Another fact to consider is that under the span of this great area lies the world's largest known reserves of petroleum—the life blood of modern war and modern industry. Oil pipe lines run from the oil fields of Iraq through Syria to Haifa and Tripoli. Other lines to carry Persian Gulf oil to the Mediterranean are projected and some partially constructed.

Major Eliot is the military and naval correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune and the military analyst for the Columbia Broadcasting System.

Because of its strategic location and its wealth in oil, the Middle East has become vitally important to us. It has always been vital to the British Empire. For more than a hundred years the British pursued a policy of propping up the Ottoman Empire which included what is now Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the area down to Arabia. This policy caused the British a great deal of trouble both at home and abroad, but the strategic necessity of the situation compelled them to undergo this criticism and continue their support of the Turks against the Russians. This policy caused the Crimean War and brought Britain to the brink of war in 1825 and again in 1877. In the latter instance it was the Congress of Berlin which was organized by British, German and other European statesmen that put a stop to Russian aggression without resort to war. Europe enjoyed peace for about thirty-five years thereafter.

Whether a similar solution can be found now remains for the future to disclose but it is clear that the problem is the same. The British, however, due to financial and economic difficulties resulting from the war, are no longer able to support this policy and we have stepped into the picture slowly, step by step, without a clear picture of what we were doing, but nevertheless with objectives very similar to those that have inspired the British policy for more than a century.

I should say that our objectives in the Middle East are first of all, to keep the USSR from expanding into this vital land-bridge; secondly, to preserve communications which are vitally important to us commercially and strategically; third, to preserve our very considerable oil interests, commercial and otherwise; fourth, to preserve a strategic position along the southern flank of the USSR from which a certain pressure can be exerted against a Soviet advance; and finally, as a minor and highly emotional issue, to secure a

satisfactory solution to the difficult problem of Palestine which at one time threatened an actual break between the British and ourselves.

I should think the objectives of the USSR in this area are; first, to get advance positions from which their ground forces could over-run areas which could be used as bases for hostile air power (e. g. - Turkey) ; second, to get possession of the Dardanelles and thereby insure control of the gateway to the Black Sea; third, to gain access to additional oil supplies; and finally, to further their political ideas. They haven't done as much among the Arabs as people seem to think, but in Greece they have tried very hard to undermine the government in an effort to make Greece part of their Balkan coalition.

Now our own policy in the Mediterranean has not been as consistent nor as much a part of a considered pattern as the Russian policy; it has grown bit by bit. We came into the Mediterranean originally to seize a position in North Africa from which we could eventually move on to Italy and thereby advance the bases of our air power to strike more effectively at Germany.

The extent of our operations and commitments in the Mediterranean I think perhaps were unforeseen in the beginning. Now we find ourselves deeply committed in the whole area. Even while we were negotiating treaties with Italy and the Russian satellites many people in the area felt that we would soon withdraw. The announcement by the Secretary of the Navy that we would maintain a considerable naval force in the Mediterranean as a permanent part of the naval establishment had great effect. I happened to be in Vienna at the time and Tito had just shot down a couple of our planes. The stabilizing effect of this announcement was of almost inconceivable magnitude. The idea that we were actually

going to stay in the Mediterranean with a strong naval force produced an electric effect.

Then in January 1947 came the British announcement of their intention to withdraw from Greece followed almost immediately by the announcement of what has been called the Truman Doctrine—United States assistance to Greece and Turkey. To show you how little the nature of the problem was understood, you may remember that when the bill was being considered by Congress there was a very strong feeling (especially in the House) that we should specifically exclude all military aid. And yet well over half the appropriation has been spent for military purposes. It is now clear to everyone connected with our Greek policy that order must be restored in Greece before the economy of the country can be revived.

Finally we come to the cold war—the acceleration of the cold war—the extension to Iran of our military assistance and advice—the tightening tension between the United States and the U. S. S. R. in Western Europe—and the creation of American air bases in the Azores and North Africa as a means of augmenting the carrier air power already in the Mediterranean. All of these segments of American policy are gradually crystallizing into a whole. They haven't crystallized as yet because they do not yet form a part of American policy for the Mediterranean-Middle East Area as a whole, much less a part of a combined Anglo-American policy which must come.

Now perhaps we can usefully examine for a moment some military aspects of this area. The key to our whole policy of resistance to the Russian advance is Turkey. That is because the Turkish soldier is the only military asset in this part of the world which will give us a return on our money; he is the only boy we

are sure will fight if we give him the wherewithal to fight. The Arab is worthless, and we are afraid the Iranians under present conditions are not much better. The Greeks are pretty well tied up with their local troubles which are certainly to be deplored. The Turk, however, is a soldier with whom something can be done.

We have a mission in Turkey called the "American Mission for Aid to Turkey" and headed by Ambassador Wilson. It has three military groups—Ground Force, Air Force, and Navy—which work together under the senior officer who at the moment is General McBride. He acts as coordinator and reconciles differences of opinion which occur especially between the Ground and Air Force Groups and the various military and naval missions. Inter-service difficulties are bad enough in Washington, but they are very bad indeed when they are conducted more or less openly in a foreign capital.

In view of these questions it is perhaps the more remarkable that the missions are doing a first class job and are beginning to rehabilitate the Turkish armed services.

I don't suppose I could find words to do justice to the tact, energy, good nature, and patience exhibited by all grades and all branches of our Armed Forces in dealing with Turks, Iranians, and Greeks. It isn't an easy thing to go into a country like Turkey, for example, which has a fine military tradition of its own, and a very considerable amount of pride, whose army is headed by very senior generals of long service who tend to look backward on past glories rather than forward to new horizons and who are suspicious of foreign influence in any case—it isn't easy to tell these old boys that in many cases they are all wrong and they have got to do things this way. I'll give you one example. The anti-tank armament of the Turkish Army is based on the 37 mm. gun. Well, against modern

tanks you might just as well use a pea-shooter. But try to convince the Turkish General Staff; try to make them see that time and money spent on this weapon are just thrown away; that while we couldn't give them as many new guns, we would at least give them a gun (the 76 mm. self-propelled gun) that would stop any Russian tank that came along. It was awfully hard to make them see it. It meant getting down to battalions and telling Turkish Majors they couldn't have something they already had. I give you that as an example of the innumerable difficulties that are constantly being met and constantly being overcome in whole or in part by the officers assigned to these various missions.

Another example is the old Yavuz—an old German battle cruiser which the Turks now have in their navy. She is a museum piece; she has no radar, no anti-aircraft, and not even a proper fire-control system for the guns she does carry. She's an absolute waste and expense to the Turkish Navy—and yet they insist on keeping her because they say she's an emblem of national power; they like to look at her. They keep 1100 men on board her who could be used to man several destroyers or submarines. It is very hard to point out that this is not the way to build up a real ability to defend themselves at sea.

However, a great deal of progress is being made. This is only the beginning. Nobody can go in and take an army of 600,000 men and rearm and re-orient it overnight. It is not hoped to rearm all the Turkish divisions at once but to build up a striking force of highly mobile infantry divisions with a certain amount of armor attached. It is thought that in a year the Turks will be able to do a good deal in the way of a delaying action.

In regard to the Turkish Air Force, it is hoped to give the Turks a tactical air force which can give some cover to their

ground force operations. The Turks, like every other country, began by asking for strategic aviation—big bombers. Again, it was very difficult to explain that strategic bombing is a very expensive operation which can be conducted much better by a big power than by a small one; that their best contribution to strategic bombing is to provide air bases from which our heavy bombers could operate.

Next to Turkey is Iran which also has a frontier with Russia. Fortunately, the interior communications in Iran are not as good as those in Turkey. I say fortunately because if Iran becomes an avenue for Russian pressure, the Russians won't be able to go as fast nor as far through Iran as through Turkey. It is also fortunate because there is very little prospect of building up in Iran any military force comparable to that which we are building up in Turkey.

The Iranian Army could be disintegrated overnight. The individual soldier is supposed to be brave and of great endurance, but the officers are not good troop leaders, and the record of the army is not encouraging. For example, when the British and Russians invaded Iran in 1941, the Regent Shah decided to make at least a show of resistance with his crack first division—the Teheran Division. According to a British officer in Teheran, the day after this division was informed that it was going out to fight, the division commander and the faithful few who remained with him (one Greek intelligence officer, one regimental sergeant major, and three privates) were going around the bazaars with whips driving reluctant soldiers back to their units.

Now that may not be a wholly fair comment on the worth of the Iranian Army, because, after all, every soldier knew that some of the senior officers were intriguing with the British and some with the Russians. They all had political connections. Soldiers

don't have much confidence in officers of that sort and can't be expected to fight under such leadership.

We have a military mission in Iran—in fact we have two; one with the Army, and one with the Gendarmerie. They are doing the best they can. They are putting in a certain amount of equipment which I don't think is thrown away. It does encourage the government to stand up to Russian pressure and it does make the average man feel that he has a friend somewhere on whom he can rely. That feeling was accentuated in the Azerbaijan deal when we stood up for Iran against Russia in the United Nations.

Then the question of oil. There is in Iran very considerable oil properties. Abadan, at the head of the Persian Gulf, has the largest refinery in the Middle East—if not the largest in the world. There has been a great deal of talk about the Russians taking it by means of an airborne drop. They might try it and there is no defense except the Iranian troops. There are no British troops there and none could be taken in except by air. The whole area is pretty open and the Iranian General Staff and our American military mission think in terms of a withdrawal from the Russian frontier which flanks and controls the railroads and access to Iran. That is a possibility provided the Iranian Army had a staff and command set-up capable of planning and executing a withdrawal under enemy pressure. From what I saw of the Iranian Army I don't believe it could be done.

Perhaps the best hope for Iran is the able and courageous young Shah. He is surrounded and hampered by some rather bad advisors and is constantly clashing with various political chiefs. He has ideas of his own and lots of determination. Eventually he may be able to get his army on a paying basis but it seems a long way off.

Far away from Iran at the head of the Adriatic Sea is Trieste—another spot where the cold war is being fought. The free territory of Trieste was created as a compromise between Italy and Yugoslavia. Its economic and political future are very dim. It is now divided into two parts: one part occupied by Yugoslavia which our boys call "Lower Slobovia" and which to all intents and purposes has been incorporated into Yugoslavia in violation of treaty stipulations; the other part occupied by British and American troops, 5000 of each. The American troops there are some of the finest I have ever seen. Just the sight of the 351st Infantry Regiment delights any soldier's heart. The appointment of a governor has been held up because the big four cannot agree. In other words, no candidate can be produced who is satisfactory to the United States, Britain and France on the one hand and to Russia on the other. Thus Trieste hangs in a sort of state of suspended animation.

Not too long ago I stood with the Chief of Staff of the American troops on an observation post overlooking Trieste. The Light Cruiser Dayton was lying down below. The Chief of Staff told me that our warships really worried the "Jugs". They come and go all the time and the poor "Jugs" never know when they are coming nor how long they will stay. It is an example of the long arm of the United States and it makes the natives feel uneasy. They think we have thousands of them.

Well those are the cold war areas; now we have two hot wars—one in Greece, and one in Palestine.

The war in Greece started as an attempt by Greek Communists to take over control of the government with the blessing of Moscow and the adjacent states of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. These states supplied the Greek resistance forces with

weapons—not their own weapons, but British and American weapons given to Yugoslavia in the last war, and captured German and Italian equipment.

As long as there was a good deal of support all over the country for the guerrilla movement (you don't say *guerrilla* in Athens—the proper word is bandit), it was difficult to make any progress. Now our people have worked out a formula that was developed in World War II. In effect this formula consists in surrounding an area on all four sides—then closing in to the center killing or capturing all bandits discovered. This was tried on a small scale last April. We used 30,000 troops but killed or captured 2500 guerrillas at a cost of only 150 Greek National Army casualties. The Albanian frontier is a larger replica of this same device using seven divisions and requiring a great deal more time because it is necessary every so often to pause, re-group, and bring up supplies. Remember that when you go off the road you are entirely dependent on what men can carry or what mules can carry. After you have pushed forward for two or three days from your road-head, you just have to stop and build more roads before you can go ahead again. It is hard fighting—but we are getting somewhere.

We come now to the other hot war which is in Palestine. As you know the trouble in Palestine is not closely connected to the cold war. It is a local trouble between the Jews, who wish to establish an independent state, and the Arabs who are trying to prevent such a move.

The General Assembly of the United Nations finally decided to divide Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. The Jewish state consisted of three parts: a piece of Galilee; a coastal strip along Tel Aviv which is the heart and strength of Jewish power in this part of the world; and an inland area connected with the sea

by a narrow corridor. The Arab state likewise has three sections—the central section, the coastal area, and the west of Galilee.

There are about 750,000 Jews in Palestine who are fairly well organized along military lines. In 1936 the British began the organization of police forces, both Arab and Jewish, on a large scale in the hope of ending Arab resistance to Jewish immigration. The British fought the Arabs from 1936 to 1939 without much result except that they did develop a considerable force of local Jewish police which became the nucleus of the Haganah, or Jewish National Army.

Then came the White Paper of 1939 in which Britain cut Jewish immigration to 1500 per month. This was resisted by the Jews and after World War II they began illegal immigration on a very large scale, the pressures resulting from which had a good deal to do with the British withdrawal. At the same time there developed two underground organizations—the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang. These were terrorist organizations in every sense of the word. They fought against the British by every means of assassination and otherwise.

The Arab protest to this continued Jewish immigration resulted in the formation of the Arab League composed of the states surrounding Palestine.

The only army in the Arab League that can be called an army in our sense of the word, is that of Trans-Jordan. Under King Abdullah, this army—the so-called Arab Legion—has been organized and trained by British officers right down to the company level. When the fighting broke out in Palestine this army and one weak brigade from Iraq were the only people who took an active part. The other armies in the Arab League were either occupied with police duties (Egypt) or too weak to be of any assistance (Lebanon, Syria).

The Jews on the other hand had an excellent force of highly organized and well disciplined troops. The results of the fighting could scarcely have been different. The Jews quickly captured the whole of western Galilee. The Arabs concentrated on Jerusalem. King Abdullah had only thirty days of supplies for his little army and he planned only to capture the Arab area of central Palestine which he wished to add to his own dominions. There was considerable fighting done in the Jerusalem sector, but the net result was to make clear that the Jewish State had been established and was able to maintain itself against any possible Arab power.

The Arabs had made comparatively few gains. However, King Abdullah had done some creditable fighting—but at the same time had shot his bolt. Since the other Arab states had contributed next to nothing, he was able to say to them, "Well, you started this war with Palestine against my advice. I went in and did my best with my whole force. I gained some military credit. Where were you boys when this was going on?"

It is clear that the British and American Governments have come to the conclusion that a combined Anglo-American policy must be agreed on. And the Arabs are being told that no matter how much they dislike these very unpleasant beans, they've got to eat them.

The necessity of viewing the Mediterranean situation as a whole has been sufficiently emphasized. The British have considerable forces in the area—and we are increasing our forces. Just as a combined Anglo-American policy is necessary in Palestine—so a combined plan is essential for the defense of the Middle East—an area that for the future as for the past will remain the crossroads of the world.

Note: This is a digest of the transcribed remarks of Major Eliot.

THE BERLIN SITUATION

Joseph C. Harsch

Mr. President, Gentlemen:

What I have to tell you I think perhaps will be of more value as illustrating the way the journalistic mind operates than from the point of view of substance.

I am on vacation. My sources of information in Jamestown, Rhode Island are not what they would normally be if I were operating in Washington. I have been sitting up here simply trying to think about what is going on. I cannot offer you authoritative information. My normal work is the process of attempting to evaluate the events of the day in world affairs. I will attempt to do that today and I warn you to look upon it, not as the thinking process of a man who is recognized as an official authority in his subject, but as the thinking process of the journalist who is trying to convey to the public in general a sense of perspective about events. You may find in what I have to say, perhaps, the reason why the public doesn't always respond accurately or intelligently to what is going on.

There has been recently a most curious turn of events in world affairs. I must be careful I know, not to assume *"post-hoc, ergo propter-hoc."* I know it is very easy to say *"A* happened, *B* happened, *B* happened because of *A."* I cannot prove the *sequitur* in this week's (5-11 Sept.) sequence of events. I assume that there *is* a cause and effect relationship, however, and I leave it to you to decide for yourself whether I am right or not.

Mr. Harsch is a well-known radio commentator and foreign news correspondent. At present he is news analyst for the Columbia Broadcasting System.

We have two things that have happened. You have the French crisis. With the best will in the world, neither our government nor the government of France has been able to give the French people a "cake" to divide which contains an equivalent sum total of food and goods in comparison with the "cake" they enjoyed in pre-war years. The government of the Center has been unable to divide that "cake" to the satisfaction of all the people of France and now the government of the Center is apparently in its death throes, with DeGaulle coming on the scene standing in the wings, waiting for his cue to come on the stage. The degree of uncertainty as to what will happen when DeGaulle takes power derives from these two things: the progressive weakness of the French government of the Center, and the impending arrival of General DeGaulle, which has developed only over the past ten days.

I would submit to you that there is, in this, a very considerable lesson for us to study and to heed. I think we are responsible, to a large degree, for what has happened in France. I think we could have done very much more than we have done to avoid it. And now we see, in a rather dramatic form, the consequences of the weakness in France on another stage of this world power contest.

For about three months the Western cause has enjoyed what Winston Churchill called a "favorable inclination"; the favorable inclination of our fortunes has been most marked. Then we got into this Berlin situation. From a military point of view, of course, the Western position there is completely untenable. It is untenable if you predicate a willingness of the Russians to resort to war in the last extreme as a means of settling the issue in their favor.

I have no means of knowing whether the Russians are ready to go to that degree or not. My own inclination is to assume that the Russians have no serious idea of allowing affairs to come to the point of war at this stage of history. Whether they are willing to do so ten or twenty-five years from now is any man's guess. I assume that they are not ready for war, that they have no intention whatever of going to war, that Winston Churchill put the story most accurately when he said in his Fulton speech that the Russians are interested, not in war, but in "the fruits of war". They are pressing for the fruits of war—short of war.

If that is correct—and I take it as my premise—then the military untenability of our position in Berlin probably ceases to be the significant fact. The significant fact is that over the past two or three months of this Berlin crisis, the West has been developing an increasingly strong position from the points of view of politics and propaganda, of economics and cultural influence.

We have been gaining strength, gaining in position, in two significant manners. One is in Germany itself, where the demonstration of the ability to put better than 4,000 tons of goods a day into Berlin by air, and thereby deny to the Russians a quick victory in Berlin, has had a profound effect on the whole German situation.

The Russians have been building, for over a year, a strong propaganda position in Germany. They have done enormous damage to that propaganda position of their own by exposing themselves to a test which they could not solve quickly. Had they solved the Berlin crisis in a matter of a week or ten days, obviously their propaganda position in Germany would have been improved by the old reason that nothing succeeds like success. But the thing has failed; they have put themselves in the position, before the German people, of

attempting to deny food and the other good things of life to a very large number of Germans.

There is no doubt that they have enormously reduced their potential popularity, their political acceptance, in the minds of the Germans of the city of Berlin. They have, also, in the process of failing to achieve a quick victory, done something that we ourselves were not able to do before—to bring the Western Germans towards the point of being ready to accept a Western German government. That cause of ours was never acceptable to the Germans of the West until the Russians by their behavior in Berlin, made it seem the lesser of two evils. You now have a considerable willingness on the part of Western Germans to proceed with the German government. In other words, the Russians have induced, by their actions, one of the two things that they hoped to avert by the siege of Berlin.

The Russian purpose, we assume, was two-fold; either to force us from Berlin (us of the West in general) or to force us to abandon our plans for a Western German government—neither of which they have been able to succeed in doing. On the contrary they have promoted, by their behavior, the two things they wanted to destroy. In that respect, Russian weakness has increased as the siege of Berlin continues.

In another, and equally important respect the duration of the siege of Berlin has contributed to Russian weakness in another theatre, that is, in their satellite area. When the war ended, Russia enjoyed very real popularity in the satellite zone. I was in several of those countries last summer—Poland, Czechoslavakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Austria. And I can assure you that as late as last summer, and in spite of the fact that the Russian Bear had already begun to scratch a little and to squeeze a little too hard, it was still

a much more desirable thing, in the eyes of the Eastern Europeans, than the memory of what they had been through during the war.

I think it is important to remember, in evaluating events in that part of the world, that the heel of the Gestapo pressed harder on the necks of those people than anything they had experienced in modern times—pressed, I think, even harder than the Bear is squeezing now.

There is a distinction between the tyranny of the Gestapo and the tyranny of the Russian secret police. It is the source, I think, of the greatest single element of strength in the Russian position; and that is the absence from the Russian propaganda armory of the doctrine of racialism which was so present with the Germans. The German came into those countries and he treated the people as inferiors. The Germans looked upon the Slavs as being a slave race. They treated them as cattle. They made it very clear that they regarded them as inferior peoples.

Now the Russian comes in; he beats a man over the head, or shoots him, or sends him to Siberia because he does not accept the true faith as preached by the Cominform, or because he thinks that perhaps Poland should have a little more independence from Moscow, but *not* because the man is a German, a Pole or a Hungarian. People are not persecuted in that area today because of their nationality or race. They are persecuted because of their political beliefs. That is a very different thing and it makes the process of developing resistance to the Russian tyranny a slower one.

It is less easy to dramatize the Russian menace in the minds of Eastern Europeans than it was the German menace for the simple

reason that the Russians are not inhibited by that racial doctrine which was the greatest weakness in the whole German position.

The people in Eastern Europe looked upon the Russians as their deliverers from German tyranny. There was a great deal that was specious about the assumption that the Russians liberated them. Russian propaganda, of course, has emphasized that point most heavily and sometimes has forced its acceptance more by pressure than by reason. However, there was, as I say, up until last summer at least, and I assume that there is a good deal of it now, a strong feeling that the Russian was their true defender against the Teuton who has been the exploiter of the peoples of Eastern Europe for about 1,000 years.

You must remember that Charlemagne's empire extended roughly to the present demarcation line between East and West, that is, up to about the Iron Curtain and the difference isn't very much. From the days of Charlemagne until now, a period of 1,000 years, the German has been pushing out eastward into the Slavic lands.

The Prussians, remember, were originally a Slavic tribe who were Germanized by the Germans, and Berlin was a Slavic city. There is still a little community south of Berlin where the native peasant speaks a Slavic tongue. That is, almost everything lying beyond the present Iron Curtain has been conquered over a period of a thousand years by the Germans who have pushed out, colonized, and exploited—leaving a tremendous residue of resentment against the German, a fear of the German, a desire not to allow the German to come back and reestablish the empire which, in effect, he held throughout all of Eastern and Southeastern Europe in the period leading up to this war.

There you are dealing with the element of greatest strength in the Russian position and it was at that very element of strength that they themselves struck by their German policy. They themselves have contributed to the undermining of their greatest source of strength by the very importance they have attached to winning German good will. The Russian has sought German good will with such obvious desperation that he has exposed to his satellites the fact that he apparently values the German above the Pole, the Czech, the Yugoslav, the Hungarian or the Bulgarian.

Again I must be careful not to assume that "because it happens after, it happens because of"—and I may be assuming a sequence there that is not altogether justified. But it seems to me that the Russian, by making such extensive efforts as he has over the past summer to win the good will of the Germans, has contributed mightily to the breeding of the troubles in his satellite zone which have come out in Tito's heterodoxy in Yugoslavia and in Gomulka's heresy in Poland. You have had troubles arising because the satellite Slav is beginning to doubt that the Russian is really his true champion against the German.

I want to say that, in a broader sense, I think what the Russians have done, we have done too. Both we and the Russians have natural allies. I think, probably, both we and the Russians have an inclination to doubt the strength and reliability of our allies. Since the war we have both done one thing in common. We both hesitated as to which way we would play our European game. The Russians officially base their European policy on the satellite system. They pose as the champion of the satellite against the German. The satellites are their blood brothers in the great new religion of Communism. Yet, as a matter of fact, they have vacillated between that policy and a policy of winning over the German at the

expense of the satellites. Of course every Pole knows what would happen to Poland if at any moment there should be a Russian-German alignment. It has happened many times in history and every time it has meant the partition of Poland. Russia has always been willing, in the past, to throw her Slavic "little brothers" to the German wolves for the sake of an alignment with Germany. There has been that vacillation which has, in itself, induced a greater weakness—resentment, opposition—and now the satellite system is not what it could have been if Russia had played its cards the other way, and had consistently and honestly been the champions of the Slavic peoples against the Germans.

The U. S. S. R. hasn't played its cards that way, and the result is the protraction of the siege of Berlin, which came very close to a climax over last week end (5 Sept. 1948). Then there was every reason to believe that the Russians, in an intolerably weak position, were on the verge of recognizing the necessity of capitulating to us on the issue of Berlin. I use the word capitulate advisedly because any bargain we might make over Berlin, any concession we might give them in return for the lifting of the siege, might lead merely to a repetition of the present condition.

The fact is that the Russian purpose in the battle of Berlin was one of two things; either to stop the formation of a Western German government or to drive us out of Berlin. A Russian failure to achieve one of those two purposes from a siege makes it a failure. If they haven't achieved either of their major purposes, then the operation has been a failure. And the Russian operation would be a failure if the siege were lifted tomorrow.

The failure would have to be qualified if we gave them any large or substantial concession for it. There is no evidence that at any stage we have been ready to give them any such concession. I am

sure in my own mind that they were on the verge last week-end (5 Sept. 1948) of accepting the necessity of lifting the siege without either up-setting the Western plans for Western Germany or causing our withdrawal or retirement from Berlin. The Russian position had become increasingly weak and that weakness was about to be reflected in a political decision which would be based on the realities of the power position.

But something went very decidedly wrong from our point of view. It didn't work out that way. The Russians, instead of lifting the siege on the basis of an agreement which had apparently been worked out almost to the last detail, suddenly became difficult and postponed the resolution of the Berlin crisis.

I would submit to you that the obvious reason why they have done so is the development of the crisis in France. The French governmental crisis gave the Russians the opportunity that they had probably been praying for. Here was a sudden disclosure of a weakness on our side which counter-balanced the two great elements of weakness on the Russian side. They had been having troubles with *their* satellite system. I don't like at all to imply that we have a satellite system; but I suppose that we might as well frankly admit that, in effect, we have been building a satellite system. We like to think of it in terms of alliances, but ours was operating more effectively than the Russians' up until the French crisis.

Now I think the French crisis results from a mistake on our part, very much like the mistake the Russians made in their satellite system. We have never been able really to set upon one course of action. We have vacillated, too. We have had our system of alliances which we have built as best we can. It is difficult for us because we are not accustomed to that kind of thing. We have no background or experience in building a strong system of alliances.

It is a new field we are moving into, uneasily, and with a good many mistakes as we go along.

There has also been in this country a strong tendency to think perhaps it would be cheaper and easier to base our European policy on Germany rather than on Western Europe. That has manifested itself repeatedly in the urge that develops in Washington to stop the dismantling of German factories, to increase the level of industry and particularly to brush aside the arguments which the French have repeatedly made against doing these various things. That is, we have been torn between two courses of action; one a strong Western European policy and the other a strong German policy.

We, like the Russians, have assumed that we could perhaps solve our satellite problems, or subordinate our satellite problems to everything else if we could just win Germany to our side. Thus you have this great tug-of-war over Germany which, on the Russian side, has given Russia trouble in her satellite area; and on our side, has contributed quite significantly, I believe, to this present French crisis which could not have come at a more unwelcome moment.

The breaking of the French crisis at this particular moment of course means that it is almost impossible for the French Official, whoever he may be, in Berlin or in Russia to cooperate fully and adequately with the American and the British representatives in those places. How does he know that if DeGaulle comes in tomorrow, DeGaulle will want him to act that way? We don't know what line DeGaulle is going to take. I know of no reason to assume that DeGaulle's accession to power in France is going to be a disaster. It may end in greatly strengthening the French sector of the western front. On the other hand, I know of no reason to be sure that it *will* be that way. It could be the other way. We know that

the Communists in France have promoted this condition as best they can. The Communists must figure that it will benefit them to have DeGaulle come to power. Whether they are right or wrong only time will tell.

The moment DeGaulle appeared on the verge of coming to power, at that very moment the Russians apparently sat down with themselves and said, "All right, do we have to give up the battle of Berlin or don't we?" At that particular moment they were apparently ready to admit defeat on that one battlefield, but obviously, on no other. I'm sure, that if they had lost in Berlin, we would have felt the strangle hold on us at some other point almost instantly.

That French crisis saved them. It gave them an opportunity. It exposed a weakness which they could exploit, and which they *have* exploited.

Now for us, the lesson is that it is risky to try to play two policies, diametrically in conflict, such as a Western European policy, and a German policy. We can base our European course on Germany or on Western Europe; but we can't base it on both. We tried to have both, and we have succeeded in getting ourselves in trouble.

We have had a congenital tendency for a good many years to discount the French, to think that they were difficult and too brilliant to be sound. We have thought of them as complaining and as one thing or another. I don't need to outline the elements of our attitude towards the French, but the plain basic fact of the matter, which I think we have under-valued, is that France *is* Western Europe.

We could have a strategic system which began at the English channel You, not I, are the authorities on how strong or weak such a system could be. I would hate to think of our attempting a 20 year strategic power contest with the Russians if our bases were all on this side of the English channel. If we are going to have *any* position on the continent of Europe at all, there must be a strong France in that position. We can't have a strong France unless we are prepared to attempt to defend the Rhine and unless we are prepared to take into our calculations some realization of how the Frenchmen feel toward the Germans, which is the Western European counterpart of how the satellite countries feel toward the Germans on the other side.

We have tried to play it both ways. Our vacillation contributed to a French crisis which was Russia's golden opportunity in the battle of Berlin and here we are. I don't know how it is going to come out. I haven't any idea. It is going to be extremely interesting. I am sure that we have just missed the first major Western victory in the cold war.

I think it should have come this week (5-11 September 1948). The fact that it hasn't come seems to me like the battle of the Bulge. I think we have been caught by surprise. The Russians have exploited a weakness in our lines as swiftly and as quickly as Von Rundstedt exploited the weakness in the American front in the battle of the Bulge.

Now we must re-group; and in this re-grouping I, for one, think that we should give a little more careful thought to the position of France. It is a pity that we are going to have to do this with a France which is going through a transition in a very uncertain way. I don't know how we are going to react to DeGaulle. We

haven't had good relations with him ever. There has always been trouble between DeGaulle and Washington, and it is going to be extremely difficult for us to cooperate with Generel DeGaulle as the head of the French government. It could have been much easier for us to work out our relations with France under a Schumann or even a Marie. Those are people who understand our language quite well, better, I am sure, than does General DeGaulle. Now, we are going to have to do it the other way.

Note: This is a digest of the transcribed remarks of Mr. Harsh.

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THE NEEDS OF THE NATION IN INTELLIGENCE

Major General W. J. Donovan

Gentlemen, I appreciate the opportunity of being here because I know that my education will benefit far more than yours. Your President has asked me to speak on the subject, "The Needs of the Nation in Intelligence."

Every nation has certain vital interests that inevitably come in conflict with the interests of other nations, so national policy is, of necessity, the determination and redetermination of those vital interests that we must protect. Intelligence is the information upon which these determinations may be based.

I want to consider intelligence not merely in the operational sense, with which you gentlemen are so familiar; but in the long range strategic sense in which your service has a vital, but not an exclusive part. It is in this field that we have our conflicts and our difficulties in organization and interpretation.

For example, in determining the aims, the capabilities, and the intentions of Russia, it is not sufficient merely to know the manpower situation in her armed forces. We have to take into account a much larger field which would include her basic raw material sources, her key industries, the health of her people, her state of morale, or any conflict in the Politburo. These suggestions are samples of the studies which would have to be made in order to determine what her intentions might be and to unmask her real purpose.

Major General Donovan was the wartime Director of OSS and in private life is a prominent New York lawyer. For conspicuous gallantry in the First World War, he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

One difficult thing today is that we have no thorough, comprehensive means of learning those basic facts about Russia from which we can infer her aims, capabilities, and intentions. Nor do we have any direct infiltration into the Russian satellites which present invaluable intelligence targets and which should be less difficult to penetrate than Russia. This points up a weakness in our system for the collection of intelligence.

We have another weakness in our system for collating and evaluating information. Today, it seems to those of us who are dealing with the problem that the real need in our country is for a place where information gathered by the different government agencies can be pooled. Consolidation of the agencies is not essential. We have had some experience already in consolidation and we know how difficult it is. If we had tried consolidation, there would have been a thirty years' war on our hands. If we can take the material that has been gathered and put it together, then research and analysis could make it available to all. That would be a great step forward.

We started on that basis during the last war in a very human way. Neither the Armed Services nor the State Department had ever even approached the idea of a central intelligence agency. Each service—State, War, Navy, and Air—began to protect its own position. Each one felt that it must cover every phase of intelligence that entered into the determination of policies—not only the strictly military, not only the strictly political—but everything. The result was the same kind of conflict among civilian and military agencies that you had originally between the Army and the Navy.

The C. I. A. was recommended as the result of O. S. S. experience. The concepts of C. I. A. were proposed in a letter that I sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the President in 1944. That

document fell into the hands of a reporter of the Chicago Tribune. It was published in the papers in 1944 while we were still in the midst of war, and it was published under the headlines, "PROPOSED GESTAPO TO BE SET UP." It was certainly a breach of security. Was it done for the deliberate purpose of discrediting the proposal and preventing its use? As a result the Joint Chiefs of Staff never acted upon that paper until many months after O. S. S. had gone out of business which it did on October 1, 1945, and after many other civilian agencies were on their way out.

The C. I. A. was based upon certain sound principles. Organization is one of the things that I want to talk about very frankly, because I know that many of you gentlemen may differ with me. What we sought to do for the permanent establishment was to create a central agency where intelligence material could be pooled and where representatives of all services could take part in its evaluation. We realized that evaluation is even more important than collection.

The N. K. V. D. and other Communist agencies may build up a bigger stockpile of information for Russia than is held by any other nation, but this quantity is offset by the fatal weakness of inadequate evaluation. It is the same weakness that existed in the German General Staff. Neither the one nor the other appreciated our spiritual and intellectual reactions.

We felt that the important thing was to have a civilian at the head of intelligence. Why? Simply, because any service man, whether State, War, Navy, or Air, becomes a prisoner of his own team and of his own service. His career is involved. It isn't a square thing to put him into any such position. He has to be free of those influences of comradeship, or school ties, or whatever they may be. That is the fight I made.

The personality of Admiral Hillenkoetter who now heads C. I. A. is not involved. On the contrary we tried to get him to head up our intelligence in the Pacific. The Navy wouldn't let him come to us, although he wanted to. Nor was the personality of any other individual involved. It was the thought that an individual from any particular branch of government would have a perspective or bias in accordance with that of his service. It was solely a matter of principle.

We can trace back the handling of intelligence. In the seventeenth century it was perfectly natural when strategy was largely the art of handling men in war, whether on sea or land, to have intelligence in the control of the military. But, today, in the twentieth century, when strategy is the art of integrating all the resources of the nation, you cannot hold yourself down to the same simple concept. The specialists, the linguists, all who can get at any source of information must get together and pool their resources both for gathering news and for evaluating intelligence. The military is no longer the single dominant factor, just as war is no longer dominated by any one service. My simple philosophy is that we will never have a real intelligence agency as long as we have a service man at its head because intelligence requires an unbiased effort on the largest scale.

There is an essential part of intelligence which we have not recognized—the counter-subversive elements, black propaganda, and psychological warfare. We need an organization to handle this. We must send organizers behind the lines to set up resistance groups. We must penetrate to rear areas by using men who are of the racial origin and speak the language of the countries we are seeking to liberate.

For a year I have been urging that we reorganize these groups because we have to go in and fight this subversive war.

We can do it in an open sense in Western Europe. We can use Western Europe as a base to do it in a clandestine sense elsewhere. It is essential in Europe and the opportunity is rich because everything that Russia has done has planted the seeds of her own disillusion, and with the proper information we may learn how to capitalize on this.

When this subject was under discussion at a recent meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff one of the officers said, "Well, you know, we fellows in the services—it's not quite in our line. It isn't something that we like to do." I replied, "I don't think it's any worse than dropping bombs on helpless women and children. If it is, then all I ask is that the Air Force and the Army and the Navy only do to the enemy what they are doing to one another now. Then we would have the perfect subversive operation."

That is absolutely true. War isn't a pretty thing. It is futile to hope that we can buy or maneuver our way out of it. I think the day for subtle diplomacy has passed. It is now the day for character and determination to prevail.

I want to say a word on security. I came back from Europe recently and was greeted at the dock by a group of newspaper men. Among other things they said, "There is a man of yours (O. S. S.) who is accused by a self-confessed Soviet spy (Elizabeth Bentley) of having disclosed to her things that were of interest to Soviet Russia." I said, "I think I know that man. In tradition, in character, and in family, certainly he dates back to the earliest fathers. From what I know of him I cannot believe that he would ever do anything that would mean disloyalty to his country, but I am willing to assume that what you say is true." Now we must distinguish carefully between the intent and the deed. The intent is unknown, but while going through your excellent

library I noticed several copies of General Russell Deane's book, "The Strange Alliance", and I think that 50% of what that Bentley girl was supposed to have heard could be read in this book.

O. S. S. was an organization of 31,000 people; men and women in uniform, and civilians. These people were not trained spies. They were just ordinary people that constitute a cross-section of America. Certainly we were a vital target, particularly when Russia began to see that our interests and hers did not coincide. I believe that there was no vital information that ever leaked out from O. S. S. We had the opportunity of examining the documents of the Gestapo and the Japanese. We had worked against the Japanese in Siam and in China and in other countries of Asia. Our men had gone in to blow up tunnels, to work for resistance groups and to do a multiplicity of things. Many of the men in our fighting units had been murdered, but nowhere in these documents were we able to find that the Gestapo or the Japanese had ever uncovered our various elements of secret intelligence.

The method of organization and the type of our structure was the reason for this. I speak of it because it is important to get this thing home. You must expect penetration, or at least, efforts at penetration. It is not safe to build unless the structure is planned in expectation of penetration. Therefore, the segments of your organization must be set up so that penetration of one unit does not lead to penetration of another. This must be done both by blocking the flow of the blood-stream from unit to unit and by care in picking the individual members.

Now, besides having all O. S. S. applicants checked by the F. B. I., the Army, the Navy, and the Civil Service, we did something more. We set up an assessment school for the examination

of those who would go into particularly sensitive spots. The methods of this assessment school have been fully described in a book called "Assessment of Men."

This book is worth your consideration in dealing with problems as you do here, and even in the training of men in our Military and Naval Academies. It was an effort by scientists. It was made up by psychologists, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, and some ordinary common-sense fellows to inquire into what they call the total man. I got the idea from looking at a small but very interesting test made by the British. Then we took it on and applied it under Doctor Murray of Harvard. For all of you who have to deal with men, particularly in dangerous spots, it would be well worth while to look at the techniques that were used.

In addition to the work abroad we had our counter-espionage, especially in working with the British. The best job the British did in intelligence was their counter-effort against the penetration of their island by the Germans. In this war you didn't shoot spies. You took them and turned them around, particularly, if they had radios. You made use of them for the purpose of furnishing the intelligence to the Germans that you wanted them to believe, and you could run the risk of giving them 75% truth so long as the 25% that wasn't true would upset them. Of course all of us knew that we might have had that kind of thing put upon us. The long delay of the Germans at Calais was brought about by the material that was sent out by these British units during the period preceding the attack on Normandy.

The situation in the United States points out one thing to me. In America, neither O. N. I., G-2, nor C. I. A., has any right to set up operating counter-espionage units at home. This is purely a function of the F. B. I. although the F. B. I. cannot do it all alone.

You will notice that all the cases that are now appearing were not uncovered during the war. To me that is very illuminating. We only see it now. Certainly no one who had his own particular show was ever informed of it. As the Bentley girl said, she only went to the F. B. I. in October and by that time there were many organizations, including our own, that were out of business.

The lesson to learn from this is the necessity of having all these intelligence services tied in together, exchanging information, and being alive to those forces in our own country that may seek to penetrate into these organizations. Our men pursue a positive cause while police action comes along afterwards. That is the fundamental distinction between intelligence and the police. The police act after the event; they have to work backward. Intelligence must project itself forward.

Corollary to the union of all intelligence agencies is the separation of police and intelligence agencies. One of the most serious things that could happen in our country would be the union of our police with our intelligence agencies, because then you get back to the real operation of a police state.

All these things, gentlemen, lead me to the conclusion that, if we are going to be able to really unmask the enemy's intentions, if we are going to have that kind of information upon which our policy must depend, then we must put operational intelligence in one central place without disturbing the functions of any of the services. What the Navy has to do in its own technical field, its own determination of secret weapons and things of that sort, the Navy ought to do. But in these larger strategic questions, everyone has a contribution to make, and it should be centralized because it is only in this way that you will succeed.

Added to this you need secret intelligence. I think that we have so surrounded secret intelligence with lurid colors that we lose sight of its real function. I suppose that secret intelligence never produces more than 15% of the total. The great bulk of intelligence comes by ordinary overt means. But in time of war, that 15% may be so vital that you must be prepared to get it.

I will give one or two instances that may be helpful to consider. In 1939 the Russians were able to buy certain vital codes at the British Foreign Office. How much that had to do with the refusal of Russia to deal with England when discussions were going on in early 1939—who can tell? In 1940 it was discovered that a young American in the code office of Ambassador Kennedy had sold codes to the Germans. In Constantinople in 1942 the British Ambassador had a Turkish valet who was in the pay of the Germans.

Today, in all of the countries abroad the ordinary employees in all our embassies and legations are natives of those countries. How can we have any real security on that basis?

On the question of security we are torn between two things—the need of being secure and the need of getting the job done. Some units are so damned secure that they never do anything. To get something done risks must be taken. Something must be dared. Risks must be calculated, but once calculated a course can be set. And that means, gentlemen, that if you are afraid of the wolves you had better stay out of the forest.

Note: This is a digest of a lecture delivered by Major General Donovan at the Naval War College on 4 September 1948.